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Airmobile Operations

COLONEL ROBERT E. MCMAHON
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Reprinted from the June, 1959, issue of the Military Review, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA

This article is in consonance with current instruction at the United States Army Command and General Staff College — Editor, Military Review.

SINCE the dawn of history, the mobility of combat forces has always been a decisive element in warfare; and in this age of space vehicles and nuclear weapons, military mobility assumes even greater significance. What is military mobility?

The quintessence of military mobility is the capability to shift combat power rapidly — it includes the rapid shifting of forces across the face of the globe (strategic mobility) as well as across the battlefield (tactical mobility). In either case, military mobility enables the commander at any level to augment the effective strength of his forces at any point or area, with no increase in the means available to him. It permits the commander greater freedom of choice as to the geographical location of battle and enables him to gain local superiority over an enemy whose total strength may be greater than his own. It permits the achievement of tactical and strategic surprise, assists in deceiving the enemy and, under certain circumstances, permits eluding the enemy, or disengagement of forces which then can be withdrawn or relifted to engage the enemy on another front.

Mobility, therefore, is an essential element of victory in combat and it is doubtful if forces lacking a high order of mobility can survive for long on the nuclear battlefield. The requirement for mobility in the combat forces of both today and tomorrow is ever increasing. In this regard, General Maxwell D. Taylor stated —

We must constantly develop two fundamental capabilities: firepower and mobility ... The firepower will come from the improved weapons ... The mobility will come from the improvement in all forms of transportation, but particularly in the field of air transport.

Military Mobility in History

A perusal of military history discloses that for over 2000 years military mobility was expressed in terms of human feet, animal transport, and sailing ships. It is enlightening to note that the tactical mobility of the infantry-cavalry elements of Hannibal’s Carthaginians compared very favourably with the tactical mobility of similar United States forces in the Spanish-American War. The first great improvement in tactical mobility occurred as a result of the development of the internal combustion engine, and within the brief span of 50-odd years, more progress was made in military mobility than had been made in the entire 2000 years which preceded it.
Battlefield Applications

World War I saw a major step forward in increasing the tactical mobility of combat forces. This was a product of the development of the tank. Note the contrast between Teddy Roosevelt’s Rough Riders at San Juan Hill and the employment of tanks on the battlefield at Cambrai and Amiens during World War I; note also the contrast between the means used to convey the message to Garcia and the use of observation—liaison airplanes in World War I. This major improvement in tactical mobility and the corollary increase in combat power on the battlefield occurred in a space of less than 20 years as a result of technological developments. But despite the fact that the United States was the most highly motorized country in the world, between World Wars I and II tactical, vehicular mobility in the Army was slow in materializing, and it was not until 1939 that the motor vehicle became an integral part of our divisional equipment. However, with World War II, rapid strides in motorization and the use of aircraft permitted greater improvements in tactical mobility and the application of combat power.

Significance

The student of military history generally is aware of the changing pattern of warfare in the past two World Wars, but more often than not, the significance of these changes is lost. He fails to comprehend that in the past 50 years, no major war has been fought with the same tactics, equipment and techniques as the war which preceded it and oftentimes mistakenly looks to the past for solutions to the future. It is a poor military scholar indeed who fails to keep pace with the future and does not realize that the rising tide of technological developments in mobility, as well as in other fields, will make most of the means and techniques of World War II as much a part of history as the Rough Riders at San Juan Hill. Future wars will be won in the minds of creative men adapting the products of new technologies to the conditions of the nuclear battlefield.

The Future

As the military scholar peers into the future and attempts to visualize the kaleidoscopic nature of the future battlefield, he is beset with a seemingly never-ending array of technological advancements and changing conditions. Of one thing he can be sure: battlefield mobility will be on a scale and degree that far exceeds that achieved in World War II—for this is a lesson of recent history. The crude tanks of World War I evolved into the polished fighting instruments of World War II. The slow, unmaneuverable airplanes of World War I evolved into the sleek fighters and huge bombers of World War II.

What of the broad future? Are not the fighter and bomber of World War II rapidly becoming as much a part of history as the horse cavalry? Time and technology are replacing attack aircraft with missiles, such as the Honest John and Redstone, and newer missiles, such as the Sergeant, soon to come. The inquisitive, soldierly mind is forced to ask: What impact will time and technological advancements have on tanks and other earthbound combat vehicles? World War II accelerated, with great strides, the development of combat aircraft, and by the time of the Korean conflict the helicopter, an aerial vehicle designed to operate in a ground environment, had appeared and subsequently won an uncontested place on the battlefield. What will be the next development—aerial reconnaissance and security jeeps, light armoured aerial vehicles firing heat seeking, homing, guided missiles, or surveillance and personnel vehicles skimming across the battlefield at high rates of speed? How would earthbound vehicles fight such an enemy?

New Developments

Aerial vehicles in many respects are less limited in operation than other mechanical vehicles which are employed
AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

on the battlefield today. There are no bad roads, blown bridges, or impenetrable swamps in the environment in which they operate. The requirement for airfields and other limitations, such as weather, are well-enough recognized to need no reiteration here. Happily, great progress has been made in the fields of vertical takeoff and landing aircraft (VTOL), short takeoff and landing aircraft (STOL), and turborotor aerial vehicles which operate in a ground environment.

The future promises even greater progress in these fields. Military publications and other periodicals are continually bringing to our attention newly developed aerial vehicles of the ducted fan, tilt rotor, and tilt-wing types. Other more advanced types are under development. The commanders and the planners must recognize the capabilities and potentialities of the new aerial vehicles which are being produced. Above all else, concepts of mobility, airmohility, must not lag behind the production of the hardware; the concepts must lead and must generate the requirement for production of aerial vehicles to keep pace with concepts of future war.

Tactical Mobility

The Army's tactical mobility is being steadily improved in both the battlefield movement of troops and in the flexibility of its firepower. The Army must of necessity develop suitable Army aerial vehicles to live on the battlefield. The Army's requirement for aerial firepower was succinctly stated by Robert R. Rodwell, writing in Aeronautics, as follows:—

There is a need for a peculiarly Army armoured strike aircraft, which ideally should have VTOL capabilities, conferred either by jet lift or ducted fans. Fighter development is inexorably moving away from the requirements of close support for ground forces, as the speed and altitude of potential attacking aircraft endlessly increase.

Of equal importance, and complementing aerial fire support vehicles, are suitable aerial transport vehicles for movement of troops and supplies about the battlefield. Such vehicles, with a three-dimensional capability, have less vulnerability to terrain obstacles and snow, mud, and heavy forests which plague ground vehicles.

Forces moving by air provide, to a significant degree, the great increase in mobility and maneuverability required to complement increased firepower on the modern battlefield. As new aerial vehicles are being developed, new concepts in the application of airmohility to the battlefield must precede them. Coupled with the development of new concepts, new aerial vehicles, and utilization of airpower on the modern battlefield, there must be a change in concept and attitude toward aircraft in general. They must cease being regarded as a specialized vehicle only to be used on rare occasions. They must be regarded essentially as a tactical vehicle which has a vast range of capabilities which must be fully exploited to win the battles of tomorrow.

The Army's Role

Within the tri-service team, the Army — by virtue of experience and training — is best capable of recognizing the proper relationships for integration of air-delivered combat power in land warfare. The Air Force understandably is chiefly concerned now with the strategic aspects of an all-out nuclear exchange in general war and the capabilities of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) as a deterrent force to nuclear aggression. That this is a very important function of the Air Force cannot be denied, but its importance must not obscure the requirements of the Army for airmohility in fulfilling its land warfare commitments. The Army's airmohility requirement can be divided into two categories—that of strategic airmohility and of tactical airmohility. The development of strategic air transport is a basic function of the Air
On the other hand, the development and utilization of air mobility as part of land warfare is of basic interest and concern to the Army.

The Army's Requirements

To most readers of the daily press, both civilian and military, the Army's search for increased air mobility is expressed as a requirement for additional troop carrier aircraft. This is only a part of the Army's over-all problem in achieving air mobility. The requirement for increased strategic air mobility does exist, and its fulfillment is essential if we are to realize to the fullest the combat potential of our Strategic Army Corps and the Strategic Army Forces concept. However, another and equally vital area is the requirement for intra-Army air mobility, derived wholly from Army aviation.

In one of his appearances before the Congress, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, emphasized the mobility problem of tomorrow's war and the requirement for Army aviation by stating—

*We are, however, faced with what I would call a lag in mobility because the battlefield upon which units can exist, if both sides have these atomic missiles, will be a very large, porous area.*

And then after a brief discussion on improved ground mobility General Taylor said—

*We look also to organic aviation belonging to the Army for this battlefield mobility. That is to move men, equipment, and supplies between the various sections of this broad and deep battlefield.*

Does this mean then that the Army desires to own and operate a separate combat and logistics aviation system paralleling the Air Force system now in being? This is the question most often raised by the public, the press and the Congress.

The answer, of course, is a resounding No!

In providing an increase in air mobility, Army aviation does not seek to supplant or duplicate existing aviation capabilities of the Air Force. Its sole objective is the provision of aviation support to Army forces which cannot be provided by our sister services. In short, Army aviation support complements the air mobility provided from other sources. In the same presentation cited above, the Army Chief of Staff expressed this point very clearly as follows:—

*Now this mission or role does not conflict, in my judgement, with what the Air Force is called upon to do. We are not seeking high performance aircraft which would be associated with the Air Force. We are interested in the short field capability, which we must retain in order to have that air unit alongside the ground unit.*

To the student of aviation employment, it is readily apparent that the Air Force in pursuit, and properly so, of its assigned mission has developed material, techniques, and tactics incompatible with the Army aviation objectives noted by General Taylor. Aircraft with the speed, range, and altitude capabilities needed for the USAF missions and possessing, at the same time, the VTOL/STOL and unprepared field capabilities needed by the Army are not now and will not be available within the foreseeable future. Even the relatively narrow range of Army transport aviation requirements cannot be met with a single type of aircraft.

Basic Philosophy

By definition, Army aviation is aviation organic to the Army and assigned the mission of augmenting the capability of the Army to conduct prompt and sustained land combat. To accomplish that mission, six broad functional areas of application have been designated. They are—

1. Airlift for troop movement in the combat zone.
AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

2. Airmobility for land reconnaissance.
3. Rapid movement of supplies in the combat zone.
4. Command, liaison, and communications.
5. Combat zone aero-medical evacuation.
6. Observation.

An analysis of these functional areas indicates that all of the functions listed contribute to the over-all tactical mobility of Army combat forces. However, it is in the application of airlift for troop movement in the combat zone and airmobility for land reconnaissance that the greatest potential for improved Army mobility lies. Further analysis of the first three functions reveals that we are really speaking of intra-Army airmobile operations as contrasted to joint airborne operations. However, as the comparison following indicates, these two kinds of operations are so different as to warrant a more precise designation. For that reason the term “airmobile operations” has been selected to describe those airlifted combat operations conducted by and within the Army.

Operations

Airmobile operations are defined as those operations in which combat forces and their equipment move by aircraft and air vehicles about the battlefield to engage in ground combat as a normal part of land combat operations.

In any comparison of joint airborne operations and Army airmobile operations three fundamental differences are apparent. First, airmobile operations normally are tactical and much smaller in size, scope, and duration than joint airborne operations due to the limited number, range, speed, and lift capabilities of the Army aircraft currently authorized. In contrast, joint airborne operations normally utilize USAF aircraft and are more expensive in time, effort, and facilities required for their conduct. Their advantage, of course, lies in their size, strategic range, and scope when compared to the relatively small and shallow airmobile operations.

Second, and derived in part from the first, Army airmobile operations usually are conducted with aviation elements and ground elements physically disposed within the same general combat area. Those elements working together on an intimate day-to-day support-to-supported basis develop a relationship, the practical benefits of which cannot be duplicated by even the closest inter-service cooperation.

The key to the third and last difference lies in the nature of the command structure. In Army airmobile operations, all major increments of the force involved are Army units under direct command control of the Army force commander. As a result, most of the complex and time-consuming procedures required to effect the co-ordinated action of two or more services in a joint operation can be reduced or eliminated.

Responsiveness

An appraisal of those differences reveals an important and often ignored advantage. The significant improvement in responsiveness gained principally by the unity of command and control in Army airmobile operations is a major step toward achievement of that mobility so vital to our success in any future conflict. Time is the key. Whether or not that conflict is marked by use of nuclear weapons, the threat of their use is ever present. It is essential that we maintain an immediately available mobility differential over our potential enemies to the extent that we can mass, disperse, and shift forces before the enemy can react. Airmobile operations, properly employed, are a major step toward that goal.

Limitations

The limitations of airmobile operations also deserve consideration. First among these is the limited number of aircraft
authorized by current fiscal and manpower programmes. No statement on the specific quantity and types of lift required by a given size Army force can possibly satisfy all students of the problem. However, the consensus appears to be that, if we consider a normal type field army containing three corps as a yardstick, the requirement approximates twice the amount of airlift now authorized.

The limitation on scope and size, noted as emanating from the size and types of aircraft authorized, has two facets. One is technical and arises from the engineering problems encountered in attempts to provide vertical lift capability, reasonably high speed, and great cargo capacity in a single aircraft. The other is arbitrary and arises from current Department of Defence restrictions on the size and type aircraft to be used by the Army. However, this DOD directive permits exceptions when it can be shown that an aircraft exceeding those limits can be employed profitably by the Army without duplicating an existing capability of the Air Force.

The operational limitations of aerial vehicles also deserve mention, as well as some of the measures taken to overcome these limitations. Weather often is mentioned as a limitation in connection with airmobile operations. It should be remembered, however, that peacetime safety factors will not be the criteria under which combat operations are conducted. Adverse weather, such as reduced visibility occasioned by rain or lowered ceilings, can be used to advantage by the attacker as it screens his movements from the enemy. Because of the low altitude at which aerial vehicles are used in airmobile operations, they are able to operate and navigate by land marks on the ground or electronic aids.

Another point frequently raised is the impact of air defence missiles on airmobile operations. These operations are conducted at low levels, in the nap of the earth, where ground clutter on radar sets is the rule rather than the exception. Pre-assault nuclear fires, as well as conventional suppressive fires, and flight route planning to avoid known concentrations of enemy air defence weapons, all assist in keeping losses to an acceptable ratio. The perfect defence has yet to be organized and with the increased size of the field army area more avenues of approach are open to penetration.

Maintenance is a problem that faces any commander and aerial vehicles require considerable maintenance. However, by standing down all aerial vehicles for 48 hours prior to an operation, near 100 per cent availability usually can be obtained. Additionally, aerial vehicles are being refined and improved, and on new vehicles maintenance requirements have been reduced markedly.

Concepts

Since the first atomic bomb was exploded, firepower has advanced at an ever-increasing pace while mobility has shown little significant improvement over World War II. The capability of ground forces to conduct airmobile operations as a routine part of ground combat, assists in closing the gap between firepower and mobility.

Airmobile forces are remarkably flexible and versatile. They can be employed to seize critical, lightly held, or unoccupied objectives; to exploit the effects of nuclear weapons rapidly; to outflank enemy positions; to conduct reconnaissance, security, and screening missions; and to conduct raids. During offensive operations, combat troops and their firepower can be shifted rapidly to gain a decisive tactical advantage, to counter an enemy attack, and to extend the depth and area of combat operations. In order to reduce the vulnerability of airmobile forces to nuclear weapons, aircraft and air vehicles may be used to concentrate forces from dispersed locations just prior to employment, to disperse forces rapidly after the engagement, and to shift other forces and to move reserves. During defensive operations, forces for forward area defence may be reduced by
organizing strong airmobile reserves in dispersed areas for timely delivery to critical areas.

All tactical and tactical support units of the field army should be capable of participating in airmobile operations. Units must be prepared to function with only that equipment which can be air transported. Substitution and modification of equipment may be necessary. Airmobile forces, although normally considered as close combat elements, may be specifically organized to include fire support or other close combat support elements. Infantry close combat elements are the most adaptable to airmobile operations because they are readily moved by all types of aircraft. Airmobile forces, transported by Army air vehicles, can depart from and land on some terrain considered unsuitable for airborne operations, that is, rocky or heavily broken terrain hazardous to parachutists.

When employed in airmobile combat operations, Army aircraft and aerial vehicles fly at those altitudes best calculated to avoid detection and escape enemy fires. Flight routes are planned to take advantage of any protection afforded by valleys, forests, and other terrain features. Known enemy locations are avoided when possible. Enemy occupied areas that cannot be avoided are neutralized by supporting fires delivered from aerial vehicles or by other means.

Control

Aircraft for Army airmobile operations conducted by divisions normally are provided by attaching or placing in support, corps or Army aviation means. Aviation control personnel and equipment are provided concurrently. Operational control of aviation units to include control of air movement normally is assigned to the lowest echelon capable of effecting control and co-ordination. Aviation attached to the division for airmobile operations may be attached to or placed in support of battle groups. Airmobile operations may be conducted under corps control.

The transport helicopters of the field army are special purpose aircraft designed primarily to assist the commander in accomplishing airmobile operations for combat and equipment lift missions. While the helicopter can be used as a purely logistical vehicle, its utilization in that role can be justified only on the grounds of urgent tactical necessity when no other means are available.

Planning

The procedures for planning and conducting large airmobile operations are similar to those employed in airborne operations. Small-scale operations involving units of less than battle group size are characterized by simplicity and frequency of repetitive engagements throughout the battle area. However, airmobile operations require less time and detail in planning than airborne operations because of their size, scope, and their simplified command structure. Plans for airmobile operations normally are developed at lower echelons than for airborne operations. Over-all planning is habitually accomplished at division or corps level. The various plans and planning sequence follow those prescribed for airborne operations.

Future Airmobile Units

As the techniques of providing airmobility for Army units improves, it is not beyond possibility that combat units, equipped with their own organic aircraft, may be organized. The employment of such units on combat surveillance operations as well as aerial reconnaissance and security missions would greatly assist the modern army. Aircraft for such units would be considerably less expensive in dollars than Air Force aircraft.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the case for airmobility for ground forces has been recognized by eminent military authorities. Airmobile operations are as much a part of modern land combat as the trucks and
tanks of past wars. Indeed, it appears that without a high order of mobility — air and land — ground forces cannot survive on the nuclear battlefield for any great period of time.

That the Army must more and more depend on its own resources for battlefield airmobility is evident. New ideas must precede the development of new vehicles, and new concepts should force the designers to their drawing boards in a quest for the machines to support the concepts. There can be no standing still in the quest for mobility or any ideas of “let’s do it as we did last time”. No concept or ideas should be rejected solely because they appear novel or unconventional. As stated by General Douglas MacArthur: “New conditions require ... new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past”. The search for better mobility, better firepower, and better units must be pressed forward relentlessly. Future wars will be won with new tactics and new techniques using the sky as a highway and exploiting airmobility.

In mathematics the application of the same method to the same figures unfailingly produces the same result. In strategy, on the other hand, twice times three seldom makes six; the answer may be ten now and five next time. Let us be on our guard, therefore, against the one-track mind which, confronted by the complex problems of the art of war, tries to find a ready technical solution by means of instruments which are much too inflexible to cope with varied and constantly changing situations. The competition to bring the army to the final pitch of technical perfection, frequently without any consideration of practical usefulness, produces a mechanical and lifeless formula which becomes gradually more questionable when applied to the actual conduct of war and, especially, when it is a matter of supporting a foreign policy.

— Colonel F. O. Miksche.
A MOST important battle in the struggle against Communism is taking place in the Indian State of Kerala. The battle is important not only because of the immediate issues involved but because of the light it throws on Communist aims and on the methods employed in their pursuit.

Kerala has the only freely elected Communist Government in the world. Superficially it is surprising that a population which is 40 per cent Christian and has the highest literacy rate—60 per cent—of any Asian country except Japan, should have elected a Communist Government by democratic processes. The answer to the riddle lies in the subtle electioneering tactics of the Communists and the short-sighted actions of some of their opponents.

Concurrently with the election campaign the Communists inaugurated a great "Campaign for Peace". Many opponents of Communism fell into the trap of joining in this campaign, a good many of their prominent leaders appeared with Communists on "Peace" platforms. Through this association the Communists acquired much prestige. In the electioneering field they concentrated on "Peace" which, naturally, everyone favoured. Through the association of ideas the Communists made it appear that much of their political programme, which in any case was bound to be attractive to the economically distressed people, also had the approval of their opponents, who were depicted as mere shadow sparrers over details. Enough electors fell into the trap to give the Communists a majority at the polls.

The present disturbances in Kerala arise from the Communist Government's education policy. Of the 11,000 schools in the State, some 7000 are privately operated, about two thirds by Christian denominations and one third by Hindu organizations. In an effort to subject the youth of Kerala to the full force of Communist indoctrination, the Government passed a law which clearly aims at the ultimate liquidation of all private schools. One provision of the Bill deprives the schools of the right to select their own teachers. As the law stands teachers may only be chosen from a list drawn up by the Government, which in effect means a list provided by the Communist Party. Other regulations, if rigorously applied, would make it impossible for the schools to continue as independent organizations. Within a few years a generation of Communist indoctrinated youth will have been produced.

From the very beginning both the Christian and Hindu religious authorities protested vigorously against the Bill, and gave notice that they would close their schools rather than accept Communist nominated teachers.

The schools were due to reopen on 1 June after a long vacation. In the hopes of effecting a compromise the Government postponed the opening date until 15 June, but the school authorities remained absolutely firm in their resolve. At the same time they declared that they would employ only non-violent methods of resistance.
In an endeavour to whip up popular resentment against the school authorities, members of the Government have indulged in a blatant rabble-rousing campaign, and have accused their opponents of all sorts of illegal intentions, including armed revolt. Religious leaders have been subjected to personal indignities, riots have been instigated and a state of general tension has been induced. Mr. Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, has visited Kerala to make a personal investigation but, at the moment of writing, there is no sign of any settlement of the dispute.

The fact that in Kerala the Communists rode to power on the “Peace” bandwagon ought to remind us that there are more ways of waging war than by the use of lethal weapons. Other means have always been employed but it has become possible for the Communists to develop them into a fine art and, wherever it is
CRISIS IN KERALA

We need to remind ourselves that there are various forms of peace just as there are various forms of war. There is, for instance, the peace of the prison cell, or the intellectual slave who tamely lets other people do his thinking for him. And there is the kind of peace recently imposed on Hungary by Soviet jackboots. But in the final analysis the only sort of peace worth having is the peace which ensures the liberty and dignity of the individual man. Anything which tends to endanger that liberty is not an act of peace, it is an act of war.

Douglas Hyde, one time leading Communist, succinctly exposes the real nature of these peace crusades: "The Communist peace campaigns are among the most successful means of undermining the West. Here they believe they are on a good thing for every normal person is acutely conscious of how appalling a third world war would be. And the more thoughtful realize that something more positive than the present uneasy peace is desirable. But the peace which the Communists want is one which disarms the West while leaving Russia and her satellites free to prepare for war. It has nothing to do with peace, and everything to do with Russia's aims for expansion."

Douglas Hyde puts his finger on one of the chief difficulties which besets the individual when trying to decide his attitude towards these spurious peace crusades — the fear of being accused of "warmongering". A good many people, some of them in positions of leadership, genuinely seem to think that unless they support every voice raised for peace they automatically support war. The Communists know well how to play upon these sentiments. Faced with this false, but seemingly real, dilemma most people take a neutral line.

In this war of words offensive action is as desirable as it is in a war of lethal weapons. We need to attack these "peacemongers" and their dupes at every opportunity, to challenge their genuineness, to expose the source of their inspiration. In this struggle for the minds of men there can be no neutrality; those who are not for us are against us. Neutralism, or the failure to actively oppose these spurious crusaders, can only lead to defeat.

— E. G. K.
Individual Study

It used to be supposed, indeed it may still be supposed in ill-informed circles, that the army officer requires to know very little beyond the mechanics of his profession. This was probably not true at any time; it is certainly not true in the revolutionary epoch in which we live. Today no soldier can effectively discharge the duties of a senior command or staff appointment without a wide knowledge of what is going on in the world, in particular without a sure grasp of those aspects of political, economic and scientific affairs that impinge on national security and defence.

The professional education of an officer cannot be confined to the instruction he receives at Army Schools. Individual study is essential to the acquisition of that breadth of knowledge and understanding required of today's army officers. And, even when it has been acquired, individual effort is still necessary to keep it up to date.

To assist officers in planning their individual studies, the AHQ Advisory Group on Military Literature has been formed. This group has the duty of selecting from the mass of material constantly becoming available, those books which are most likely to further the professional knowledge of officers of the Australian Army. The Group's first List of Recommended Reading is to be regarded as a basic list, a foundation on which further lists directed towards progressive study can be compiled. The initial list should provide many hours of enjoyable and profitable reading.

[Signature]

Lieutenant-General
Chief of the General Staff
ONE of the difficulties facing the officer seeking to improve his professional knowledge through the study of past events and current trends and development, is to select, from the formidable mass of material available, the books best suited to his purpose. To assist officers in making this selection the AHQ Advisory Group on Military Literature has compiled the undermentioned list of books.

This list is by no means exclusive; it does not pretend to include every book that every officer may wish to read. It is intended as a guide to planned reading which aims at the acquisition of knowledge of—

(a) Contemporary military thinking.

(b) Political, economic and scientific developments which have a bearing on Australian defence.

(c) Military history, particularly that of World War II.

Similar and progressive lists will be published at six monthly intervals.

It is to be clearly understood that the fact that a book is recommended does not imply official approval of the author's views and interpretations. It signifies simply that the recommended book contains a thoughtful presentation of facts and analyses viewpoints which merit the attention of military officers.

Official histories have not been included because it is considered that officers will already be aware of their value and availability.

RECOMMENDED READING LIST No 1, JULY 1959

OUR NUCLEAR FUTURE by Edward Teller and Albert L. Latter (Criterion Books, New York, USA).

What will be the consequences of the use of nuclear energy in peace and war? What are the dangers for the individual, the nation and the human race? To answer these questions two nuclear scientists have written this concise and authoritative account of what is known about the basic nuclear processes. The effects of radio-activity and fallout from nuclear weapons are explained clearly and simply.

THE FAILURE OF ATOMIC STRATEGY by Colonel F. O. Miksche (Faber and Faber Ltd, 24 Russell Square, London).

From a closely reasoned but lively study the author concludes that overemphasis on atomic weapons has placed the West in a very bad bargaining position. He has much to say about the strategy and tactics of atomic and conventional warfare, the relative strengths of 'teeth and tail', and the reorganization of armies to make them more effective instruments of national policy in both cold and hot war.
LIMITED WAR by R. E. Osgood. (Cambridge University Press, UK).

The author examines the theories of graduated deterrence and limited atomic warfare.

AUSTRALIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS by Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper. (F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne and Canberra, for the Australian Institute of International Affairs).

A survey of Australia's search for a new policy and a new security system in the period 1950-5, including a chapter on the Suez crisis.

NEW GUINEA AND AUSTRALIA. Edited by J. Wilkes for the Australian Institute of Political Science. (Angus and Robertson, Sydney and Melbourne).

After discussing the land and its people, the administration and the Indonesian claims to West New Guinea, the author's finally consider the island in the light of Australia's defence and foreign policy.


A comprehensive, easy-to-read account of development and trends from Peking to Constantinople. Part I deals with events between World Wars I and II; Part II deals with current trends. A good broad foundation for the more detailed study of Asian affairs.

NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM IN EAST ASIA by W. Macmahon Ball. (Melbourne University Press).

In this book Professor Macmahon Ball, Professor of Political Science, University of Melbourne, explains in direct, lucid terms the nature of the revolution that is now sweeping the countries of East Asia. He examines the way in which the Western World has been trying to meet the promise or menace of this revolution, and offers a critical analysis of the assumptions underlying Western attitudes.

BACKGROUND TO CURRENT AFFAIRS by Desmond Crowley. (Macmillan and Co, Ltd, London).

Lucidly and concisely the author creates the background against which the student may make an intelligent interpretation of day to day events. Of particular interest are the chapters on the rise of nationalism in Asia and the Middle East, Communist China, the divided sub-continent of the Indian peninsula and the countries of South-East Asia.

LONGMAN'S AUSTRALIAN GEOGRAPHIES—No 5, INDONESIA and No 7, NEW GUINEA. (Longman and Green, 605-611 Lonsdale St, Melbourne).

These little books of about 40 pages give a brief but comprehensive review of the people, climate, terrain and resources of the countries concerned.

FLOOD TIDE IN CHINA by C. P. Fitzgerald. (Cresset Press, London).

The author, who is Professor in Far Eastern History in the Australian National University, Canberra, attempts an objective appraisal of Communist rule in China, linking the revolution with China's historical past and pointing out the differences between Russian and Chinese Communism. The subjects covered include the question of Formosa and the attitude of the Chinese communities in South-East Asia. The views expressed in this book should be compared with those expressed in THE BLUE ANTS (see below).


This book is at once a brilliant travelogue and an acute analysis of Chinese Marxism and of what the Chinese Communist revolution means to the world now and in the future.
RECOMMENDED READING

THE MARKET OF SELEUKIA by James Mason. (Faber and Faber, London).

An easy-to-read description of the ideologies, power politics, nationalist and religious movements at work in the Middle East. The author's comments provide food for thought and controversy. Well mapped.


In his usually lively style the Field Marshal tells the story of his victories from El Alamein to the Baltic. He goes on to describe his work as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the development of British military policy during this period, concluding with an account of the formation and building of NATO.


An authoritative account of the reconquest of Burma in 1944-45 by the distinguished commander of the Fourteenth Army.

THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE by Chester Wilmot. (Collins, London).

A brilliant critical examination of allied strategy in the European theatre of war in 1942-45 and its ultimate results.

RETREAT FROM KOKODA by Raymond Paul. (William Heinmann, Ltd, Melbourne).

A fine intimate account, from the fighting man's point of view, of the bitter retreat of the Australian troops across the Owen Stanleys in the early days of the New Guinea campaign.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the June issue to "The Population Problems of China" by Staff-sergeant P. G. Gittins, Royal Australian Engineers.
IN peacetime training, particularly on tactical exercises without troops, much time is wasted in trying to decide on the best plan for a given operation. What is really required is not necessarily the best plan, but a good plan quickly arrived at. Most well-training officers are quite able to produce a good plan for any operation that they may reasonably be expected to conduct, but unfortunately not all of them have confidence in their ability to do so. Much of this lack of confidence has been created by the evil cult of the directing-staff solution. In fact, most tactical problems admit of several sound solutions and, if one of these is selected as the DS solution, those who produce other sound solutions may feel that they have somehow failed, with resulting damage to their self-confidence.

Planning is, of course, only one step in the carrying out of an operation. The ability to produce a sound tactical plan is clearly essential to a successful field commander, but the making of a plan is one thing and its execution quite another. In reality, the course of a battle very seldom closely resembles the original plan for obviously — although this is somehow seldom reflected in training — the enemy always tries, often successfully, to disrupt or completely to frustrate our plans. The fact is that the conduct of the battle is often a more serious test of a commander's ability than is the planning.

The elementary lessons of command can be well taught in tactical exercises without troops, but it is only in telephone battles, signal exercises, and particularly in tactical exercises with troops that the problems of the conduct of the battle can be presented with any realism. The two-sided exercise is very difficult to control and umpire and, although it provides an entertaining spectacle, it is often of no great instructional value, except perhaps for commanders and staffs at a very high level. Up to the divisional level the one-sided exercise with a controlled skeleton enemy is probably the best means short of battle itself of training commanders and staffs in the conduct of the battle. This type of exercise permits those controlling it to represent the action of the enemy in a realistic manner of great instructional value and, in particular, to create a realistic intelligence picture. Unfortunately, even when intelligence is realistically represented in an exercise, it is often not well handled. Too often officers assume that exercise intelligence is necessarily entirely accurate and entirely complete, whereas intelligence in war seldom pretends to be either; exercise controllers must be careful not to be sportsmanlike when the fortunes of real war would not be.

The need for sound training in planning for, and in the conduct of, the battle is recognized and in general well provided for. There are, however, a number of preliminaries to battle other
than the making of the plan, which may seriously affect its outcome. These preliminaries are certainly carried out in tactical exercises with troops, but seldom do they receive as much attention as they deserve. This may be partially owing to a reluctance on the part of exercise directors to criticize these preliminaries because such criticisms are apparently aimed directly at commanders and headquarters. In any case there is always room for improvement in this sphere if the battle is to begin in the most favourable circumstances possible. Much can be done by preliminary arrangements and study. The composition of reconnaissance groups, orders groups and the rest can be dealt with in standing orders, but the actions necessary between the recognition of a situation requiring a new plan and the execution of the orders to put that new plan into effect provide abundant food for thought. For this period of preliminaries to the battle an orderly procedure is required, but not a standing procedure, for the factors affecting it are too numerous and varied to permit any sort of standardization. Let us examine this period.

During this period the following must be done: the reconnaissance, the making of the plan, the issue of orders, and the deployment of the forces for battle. These actions must be carried out at all levels from the highest commander concerned to the lowest and, if time is short as it usually is, they must as far as possible be carried out simultaneously. This is fairly obvious and is generally well understood. What should be equally obvious, but which, for some reason, seems to be less clearly recognized is the importance, if time is short, of setting in motion first of all those processes that are going to take longest; these are generally the deployment of the forces for battle and the preparation and distribution of the fire-plan. Only too often a commander goes on with his reconnaissance, planning and issue of orders without beginning his deployment, with the result that unnecessary confusion and fatigue are produced among those who must actually fight the battle; or he does not at the earliest possible moment give to those responsible for working out the details of his fire-plan the information necessary to do this task, with the result that the detailed fire-plan cannot be distributed in sufficient time for it to reach, and be digested by, all those who are dependent on it.

The fact is that the ability properly to appreciate time and space is one of the most important qualities that a successful commander at any level must possess. The importance of this quality will very frequently appear during the conduct of the actual battle, but we are concerned here with its effect on the preliminaries.

Two or three ways have been mentioned in which a commander may help to make the best use of the time available between the recognition of a new situation and the carrying out of the necessary action to meet it. But even if these steps are taken, there will frequently be insufficient time to do all the things at all levels that seem to require to be done. It is here that the character and ability of a commander are really put to the test. He must decide what share of the limited time available he is entitled to take for his own use.

If, when time is short, senior commanders do all the things that they consider it desirable that they should do, it may well be that their subordinate commanders have not time to complete the essential things that they must do. A senior commander may, for example, consider it most desirable that he carry out a reconnaissance on the ground for an operation he is about to order. If, however, his ground reconnaissance would take so much time that there would be insufficient left for subordinate commanders to carry out ground reconnaissance which for them is essential, the senior command must be satisfied with a map reconnaissance. An able commander will not only estimate accurately his share of the time available but also ensure that he does not exceed
it; his skill will enable him to make the best use of the time available and his experience will tell him things that less experienced commanders would have to seek out.

One of the things that each commander must do in the time available to him is issue his orders. This is not only a very important action, but also one that may easily result in his exceeding his share of the time. The commander must select carefully the place where he intends to issue his orders, bearing in mind the time that he and his subordinates must take to travel to and from that place and not forgetting that movement in the forward area takes much longer than movement further to the rear. Usually, but not always, it is better to go forward to issue orders.

The place where orders are to be given must be selected early so that the warning order may be issued without delay. The warning order may contain little more than the time and place at which orders will be issued; it may, however, indicate the nature of the operation, its general area and direction, probable grouping including the composition of the reserve, the time before which there will be no move other than reconnaissance parties, the general position of assembly areas, and the composition of, and rendezvous for, reconnaissance parties both operational and administrative. The more information that is in the warning order, the more subordinate commanders can do early so that time will be saved later. The rule is that, if time is short, a long warning order is worth-while; if time is abundant, there is no necessity to issue much information before the orders group assembles and a short warning order, perhaps limited to the time and place of orders and the time before which there will be no move, is appropriate.

To return to the operation order itself. If time is short, confirmatory orders in writing often do not reach the addressees in time to be of value; in fact, if, as often happens, the written orders contain some amendments to the verbal orders, confusion may result. Below a very high level, well-trained formations and units can, and in general should, except in deliberate and complicated operations such as opposed landings and major river crossings, dispense with written operation orders. This can only be done, however, if the commander is able to issue orders clearly and concisely. It is fatal if, knowing that confirmatory orders are not going to be issued, he rambles on, repeating himself in his efforts to ensure that no detail is omitted.

Particularly if the giver and receivers of orders are tired, misunderstandings can readily happen, and they are best avoided by following fairly closely the laid-down sequence of orders; but this certainly does not mean that the issue of orders should be a monotonous recitation. The commander must address his orders group personally and convey to them his determination that his plan will be accomplished. Nevertheless, he must not, in an endeavour to avoid sounding stilted, allow his orders to become merely a directive or operation instruction. An operation instruction is highly appropriate when a commander wishes to give latitude to deal with unforeseen circumstances to a particular subordinate commander—for example, to the commander of a covering force or of a mobile force carrying out an independent mission—but, when several subordinates who are expected to work in close co-operation are all given latitude, confusion is very likely to ensue.

Sometimes a commander may consider it advantageous to issue preliminary orders some time before he gives his operation order proper. This is appropriate, for example, when he considers that it is important to carry out a reconnaissance on the ground but that, if he does reconnoitre, there may be insufficient time left for his subordinate commanders to do so too. In this case he may issue preliminary orders from the map in sufficient detail to permit his subordinate commanders to
carry out their reconnaissances at the same time that he is carrying out his. The operation orders are then issued after the reconnaissances have been completed.

This method used in the appropriate circumstances has obvious advantages; but it has disadvantages that are perhaps less obvious, and these should be carefully weighed against the advantages. The first of these is that the orders group must assemble twice instead of once, and this may seriously encroach on the limited time of the subordinate commanders. Secondly, if the superior commander's reconnaissance is really worth-while, it may result in changes of plan, and this means, of course, that the subordinate commanders, having made their reconnaissances before they knew about these changes, may have to carry out further reconnaissance later. Finally, the superior commander having completed his reconnaissance, may, in order to save time, be tempted merely to amend his preliminary orders rather than to give a complete operation order, if he does this, there will be grave danger of omissions, misunderstandings and resulting confusion. Important as reconnaissance is, if there is not really time for a commander to carry out a reconnaissance, it is better for him to accept the fact and to issue orders after a careful study of the map; the additional time made available to subordinates by doing so will probably more than compensate for the disadvantage of their superior not having seen the ground himself.

If time permits between his issue of orders and their execution, a commander usually visits his subordinate commanders to discuss their plans, and at these meetings some changes to the original plan are sometimes agreed to. If changes are made, they must, of course, be notified to all concerned, and this can often be done most effectively by holding a co-ordinating conference. A Commander should remember, however, that the co-ordinating conference, although a convenient device from his point of view, can be most inconvenient to his subordinate commanders, who are probably summoned to it at a time when they have many other important and urgent things to do. It is often better to disseminate changes in the operation order by message or liaison officer rather than by holding a co-ordinating conference, except in circumstances when there is ample time, as, for example, in the deliberate occupation of a defensive position well in rear of the existing front. In very deliberate operations, of course, there may be no objection to holding two or even more co-ordinating conferences after the operation order has been issued, and when the operation is a very complicated one it may be essential to do so; but even in these circumstances a commander should only hold a co-ordinating conference when one is really required.

Occasionally a commander will issue preliminary orders some time before giving his formal orders and also hold a co-ordinating conference later. When this is done, it is safe to say that either the issue of preliminary orders or the holding of a co-ordinating conference is redundant, for the circumstances in which these two events are appropriate are different. The issue of preliminary orders is a device to save time when it is short; whereas the co-ordinating conference is appropriate only when there is no great urgency.

Sometimes, regretably, a commander has been known to issue preliminary orders and later to hold a co-ordinating conference, without any formal issue of orders at all. This is a most unsatisfactory and untidy arrangement, because the very name preliminary orders implies that formal orders follow whereas a co-ordinating conference implies that formal orders have already been issued and may require co-ordination. Such a practice invites omissions and misunderstandings and is, therefore, dangerous and should be considered quite unacceptable in war.

A good commander does not readily complain or make excuses; but, if searchingly questioned after an operation or exercise, subordinate commanders wil
very frequently admit that they were not given sufficient time in which to carry out their orders. Unfortunately, this is only too frequently true. What is probably as frequently true but much less frequently admitted or even recognized is that these commanders probably did not make the best use of what little time they were given. It is a very lucky commander in war who receives all the time he needs to plan and execute an operation, but many a commander who believes that his part in an operation failed because he was given insufficient time would be very surprised to know that, with the same allotment of time, a more skilful commander would have achieved success.

There are many ingredients that make for success in battle; the first is men, and, even on the nuclear battlefield, nothing can be achieved without them. But the best men—and somehow Canadians who are not in the Services seem to find this difficult to grasp—can achieve little without discipline and training, and the better their discipline and training, the more a given number of men can achieve. With good discipline and training even men of less than the highest quality can achieve much. Then there is equipment, always important and now more so than ever, but still not, as some seem to think, the only ingredient that counts. Leadership is certainly of the first importance, but, like the other ingredients of success in battle only significant in conjunction with the rest. It is a quality that cannot be acquired by training, but which, if possessed, can by training be greatly increased in value. Another ingredient is the plan. A good leader and good men can, it is true, succeed in spite of a mediocre, or even a bad, plan, but seldom can they do so as such a disadvantage without paying a heavy price. The making of the plan is the most important preliminary to battle, but the other preliminaries that we have been discussing are necessary to translate the plan into action and they form still another important ingredient making for success in battle.

In the conduct of the battle the commander and his staff each have a distinct role to play. The staff must constantly keep themselves informed of the progress of the battle and pass this information to all concerned; above all they must present to the commander a clear picture of the battle, a picture neither distorted by unreliable reports nor clouded by unimportant detail. The commander for his part must decide when and how to influence the battle, and this does not mean merely approving action suggested by the staff. The major decisions of the battle are the commander’s and his alone; he must decide what to do and how to do it. In the same way, in the beginning the commander must himself make the plan and this, too, does not mean approving a design prepared by the staff, although the staff may be required to examine the feasibility of various courses of action in the light of weather conditions, the availability of transport or ammunition, from the administrative standpoint and so on.

In the preliminaries to battle other than the making of the plan, again the commander and the staff each has a distinct role to play. The commander himself must decide the general way in which his plan will be turned into action, and this is just as much his own task as is the making of the plan itself; but within the framework of this design are innumerable details which must be provided for and controlled, and this is the task of the staff.

This period of battle preliminaries lies, as we have said, between the making of a plan for battle and the control of the battle itself. These preliminaries must not be dismissed merely as a drill or standardized procedure; they are a series of interrelated processes demanding from the commander and his staff qualities no less than those demanded by battle itself: intelligence, natural aptitude, experience, imagination, self-confidence and, perhaps most important of all, training.
A large proportion of our people must think—and be entitled to believe—that an Army makes history only when it goes to war. In all the memorable years since a formed body of troops first stood on this continent, in January, 1788, the Army has done much to bring the Australian people to where they stand today. Yet the official military histories prepared in Australia to date have been concerned only with the Army at war.

Surely the activities of the Army in the years between wars are worthy of official histories, or must this task be left to individual enthusiasts? It is more likely, if nothing official is done, that the history of the Army’s peace-time activities in this country since 1788 will remain officially un-recorded, or else be presented only as background material in non-military histories. This has already occurred in certain historical books of great value; examples are the works of Dr H. V. Evatt and M. H. Ellis.

The Australian people enjoy certain advantages, so far as the potential for preparing authentic historical records is concerned, over most of the separate nationalities on this earth. Firstly, we are the only single people on earth which inhabits a continent to itself; thus there is no deep division in the matter of apportioning the contributions towards our present developed state. Secondly, the record of events existing in contemporary documents is available as from the very beginning of our existence.

So far as the Army is concerned two major considerations need to be examined at this stage, namely,

(a) What has been done to exploit these priceless advantages, before it is too late and the chance passes for ever? and
(b) Has the Army on this continent done anything between wars to warrant official action to prepare histories. Or, alternatively, will the historical perspective available to posterity be lacking in essentials if the Army’s peace-time record is not complete and readily available?

Peace-time Histories
So far as this writer is aware there are no authentic official military histories available which record—

(a) The organizations, roles, dispositions, fortifications, barracks and military developments applicable to the Army in Australia during the years between wars from the 26th January, 1788 up to the present day.
(b) The associated political and military events which created the need for changes in the Army's structure and roles in the years of peace since 1788.

It might be suggested that military events from 1788 until the last British troops left in 1870 are the concern only of the British Army. It would be equally illogical to say that our political history prior to the commencement of self-government in the various Colonies is not our concern either.

The Available Histories

A number of privately prepared histories covering Australian military events in peace have been prepared. Within their limited scope these are historical assets of great worth. However, they each have the shortcomings which inevitably arise when a writer is obliged to compile a history in his own time and with, at best, restricted official support. These difficulties will remain with us until the Army accepts the compilation of comprehensive peace-time histories as being an essential contribution to the historical records of the Nation generally—and the Army in particular.

One of the finest examples of an "unofficial" military history covering the years since 1788 was completed in 1953. It is the "Short History of the Military Forces in NSW", which was written by Lieutenant-Colonel K. R. G. Coleman, MC, and Lieutenant-Colonel J. T. Knight, both serving officers of the ARA. That work had the support of the GOC of a Command and was printed to meet only a limited distribution. It has already become a collector's piece and deserves to be reprinted at Departmental expense, and given a wide enough circulation to cover all major Army libraries and capital city public libraries.

Some years ago a procedure was instituted by AHQ, whereby outline details concerning units in peace-time will be reported once in each three years. That is some compensation for the neglect in earlier years, but the restricted aim of that procedure can never be a substitute for comprehensive histories. It also does not compensate for the century and a half which awaits an official pen.

Events Worth Recording

The Australian Colonies were garrisoned by British troops from January 1788 until September 1870, a period of nearly 83 years during which time a miserable settlement comprising less than 1100 souls had expanded to a continental people of more than 1,600,000. This expansion must be included among the greatest human achievements in history. It was an era lacking nothing in human drama, and during which the most significant of political and social evolutions occurred.

The Army in Early Years

During the early and critical years of our history the Army was more than a garrison force. It represented trial and punishment for all, civilian and soldier alike; it provided protection against foreign and domestic intruders (the dispossessed stone age warriors who became unwanted strangers in their own land); it stood guard over the exiled convict wretches who formed the principal source of labour for clearing, planting and construction; it variously intimidated and supported the Vice Regal Representative; it provided surveyors, explorers, engineers and Lieutenant-Governors; for long periods between the Naval Governors it substituted Military rule for civil government.

These things the Army did—and much more. Struggling outpost subsidiary settlements could never have survived without the Army's protection; quite frequently a detached junior officer found himself burdened with responsibilities out of all proportion to his rank.

Soldiers have left their mark on our geography, our culture and our architecture. Among the finest of our
historical buildings are the military barracks at Paramatta, Hobart and Paddington. The Victoria Barracks at Paddington are probably the largest group of convict built buildings still remaining in this continent.

Between the “routine” events of garrison life in a growing community, the Army went off to fight; in New Zealand, in India and other far places. Regiment replaced regiment, and generation followed generation. Civil law replaced military law, and freedom replaced oppression under the lash.

One must not at this stage commit the error of making a collective appreciation of these men, and reaching the conclusion that they were legions of civic-minded visionaries, striving to push back the frontiers, and to bring the light into a dark age. They were nothing of the kind.

It is a long gap which spans the years between the Marine companies of Phillip’s day and the 18th Royal Irish who marched out of our history in 1870. Yet each Marine company, the NSW Corps and every succeeding Regiment, was probably very typical of its day. For the great majority of them it is likely that service in the Australian Colonies meant no more or less than service anywhere else.

To many of the free settlers and emancipated convicts the British soldier was alternately regarded as a friend or oppressor. The convicts in road parties and iron gangs undoubtedly had their particular viewpoint, stimulated by the lash.

To Governor Bligh the Army must have seemed the lowest form of mutinous rabble, and his successors in office could hardly be expected to forget what had happened to Bligh.

Fortunately there were a few quite outstanding soldiers with those regiments, men with vision and courage and great professional ability. Their explorations,
their engineering works, their common decency and their routine dedication to regimental duties, made up for the chicaneries and the brutalities of their day.

Colonial Troops

As the first native born "Cornstalks" grew into middle age, government became increasingly local and, in time, culminated in self-government for the various colonies. With local government came responsibility for defence and the birth of our great volunteer armies. Units like the 1st Battalion (City of Sydney's Own) Regiment (Commando), can trace their history for more than a century.

Coincident with the grant of self-government, the first colonial regular troops were raised. Some had a brief and inglorious history, others survived the expansion and contractions of the public purse until Federation in 1901.

The Years Since Federation

The processes and details in the merging of our colonial forces into a national army alone deserves an official history. This reorganization, with all its historical significance is little understood today. Particular corps are blessed, from time to time, with the services of an enthusiast who delves into the archives and endeavours to produce a coherent picture of what took place. These valuable records are only windows in the fog. Obviously a comprehensive official history is needed.

Then there are the obscure years of 1901 to 1914, the first experiment with national service, the first Australian regimental organizations, the establishment of a Military College at Duntroon, the Kitchener investigation and report, and the condition of our Army in 1914 when the Australian Army first met the test of war.

The fluctuating fortunes of the Australian Army between 1919 and 1939 are probably known only to those whose
knowledge is drawn from personal experience. The details of the introduction of a divisional organization, and the design of an Order of Battle on a Commonwealth wide basis for the first time, are shrouded in mystery. National Service and a Senior Cadets system can be deduced from the Defence Act and Australian Military Regulations and Orders, but the military history of those years goes unrecorded.

The great expansion preceding the outbreak of war in 1939, the evolving — or stationary — military doctrines and organizations of those years are also still to be told in a consolidated form.

Finally, the military events affecting the Australian Army since 1945 are already becoming matters for mental recollection only. The raising of our first Regular Field Force, the revitalized CMF, National Service the changing Order of Battle — all these matters for historical record might well fade, and be virtually unknown to future generations of Australians.

Surely the peace-time story of an Army is worth a comprehensive history. In most respects the Army's history on this continent is symbolic of the history of the Australian people. For many years the very peace, government and development of our people, was wholly dependent upon the discipline and organization of an army.

Our volunteer contingents, divisions and corps did not arise from nothing. Their beginnings will be found in years of peace, and in the dedicated efforts of small Regular and Citizen Force cadres.

Not everything done by soldiers during our history was good. Some of the military associations with our growth into a nation are not pleasant; but they are now history, and they are an inseparable part of our story since the day that the First Fleet anchored in Port Jackson.

Conclusion

If official histories covering the periods discussed are worth preparing, it becomes a problem of deciding what government department should sponsor their compilation. In this connection it is worth noting that there was no Air Force in existence during the last century, and that there was no naval participation in the early Australian garrisons, unless the Marine companies can be regarded as naval. Therefore, the Army would appear to be logical inheritors of the responsibility, at least for proposing that appropriate official histories be prepared for the period up to 1870, when the British garrison troops left Australia.

Interwoven with the era of the British Army here, there is of course, the story of our first Colonial Troops, dating from 1854, excluding some earlier Loyals who were raised for local purposes.

Wider service implications arose as the various Colonies assumed the reins of Government, and these would suggest that the Defence Department should sponsor histories continuing the coverage up to the time of Federation.

From 1901 onwards the peace-time activities of the Army are distinctive enough for separate volumes, dealing only with the Army, to be prepared.

It is considered that official histories of the type proposed should be prepared as a matter of priority. The cost should not exceed the salaries and travelling expenses of, say, two full-time historians for approximately ten years. A period in the United Kingdom would be required, as many essential early records are not available in this country.

The results would more than justify the cost involved. In any case, how can such a small contribution be compared against the priceless value of a continuous military history, dating from that day in January, 1788, when the tramp of marching feet and the tap of drum beats came to this timeless land — to stay.
Title
The competition is titled the “AMF Gold Medal and AACS Prize Essay”.

Eligibility to Compete
All ranks on the Active and Reserve Lists of the Australian Military Forces.

Subject
A separate subject shall be set annually for each section by the Chief of the General Staff, and promulgated in AAOs.

Sections
There shall be two sections—
(a) Junior — Members up to and including substantive captains.
(b) Senior — Substantive majors and above.

Prizes
(a) For the best essay in each section — £25. In the case of two or more essays of equal merit this prize money may be shared.
(b) For the better of the two section winning essays — provided it is of a sufficiently high standard — the AMF Gold Medal and a further £50, making in all the AMF Gold Medal and £75.

Submission of Essays
(a) Essays will be typewritten and submitted in quadruplicate. Units will co-operate with competitors and arrange for essays to be typed, if this assistance is requested.
(b) Essays may be of any length. It is not desired to define the length limits, but as an indication they should be between 3000-5000 words.
(c) Authorship will be strictly anonymous. Each competitor will adopt a motto and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope, with the motto and section identification typewritten on the outside, and his name and address inside.
(d) The title and page number of any published or unpublished work to which reference is made in the essay, or from which extracts are made, must be quoted.

(e) The essays will be addressed to the Secretary, Military Board, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne, S.C.1, the envelope being marked "AMF Gold Medal and AACS Prize Essay".

Judging

(a) Essays will be judged by at least three referees appointed by the Chief of the General Staff.

(b) The decision of the referees will be final. They are empowered not to award the AMF Gold Medal and the AACS prize of £50 if, in their opinion, no essay submitted comes up to a sufficiently high standard of excellence.

Promulgation of Results

The results of the competition will be promulgated in AAOs. Additionally, the AMF Gold Medal and AACS Prize Essay will be published and distributed.

SUBJECTS FOR 1959

The subjects set for 1959 are as follows:—

Senior Section

During World War II the characteristic feature of Allied strategy in the Pacific was the concentration of massive amphibious forces with effective sea and air cover for seaborne assaults upon a succession of island bases.

Discuss the probable changes which would be necessary in this strategy at the present time.

Junior Section

The development of an adequate surveillance organization will be essential to ensure the effective use of nuclear weapons.

Discuss the elements of this problem and the organization best adapted to meeting the need.

CLOSING DATE

Essays must reach the Secretary, Military Board, by 31 December 1959.
The ARMY Inspection Service

J. Shilkin, Ed., B Com, AMIE Aust
Deputy Director of Army Inspection

The practice of inspecting military supplies purchased from contractors is long established and now plays such an important role in the procurement of supplies and equipment that Inspection must be considered as one of the major elements that enter into the Army procurement programme. Government inspection rather than sole dependence upon contractor's inspection has been found necessary to prevent acceptance of defective or incorrect material. The consequences of defective or incorrect material, or of improper preservation, packing or marking, or incomplete identification of otherwise satisfactory equipment, could be so serious that independent inspection is necessary.

The responsibility for ensuring that only stores which conform to approved designs and standards of performance are accepted for issue to the Australian Army rests with the Master General of the Ordnance who discharges this responsibility through the Army Inspection Service under the control of the Director of Army Inspection. A nation wide organization with headquarters in Melbourne operates throughout Australia, inspecting and testing the products of Australian suppliers to the Armed Services and ensuring that only products of the required standard are accepted.

Even before the establishment of formal inspection facilities for military supplies, the custom of carrying out inspection played a prominent part in British national life. In the old guilds of the 13th and 14th centuries special measures were taken to inspect the work of apprentices and journeymen and guard against any bad or makeshift work. Before a journeyman could set up on his own he had to submit a sample of his work to the wardens of his Guild who subjected it to severe inspection. If his work was accepted it was known as his "masterpiece" and he was then recognized as a master in that particular craft.

In the field of munitions production, inspection was established as early as the 15th century when John Judde was appointed Master of Ordnance on December 12st, 1456, and was charged especially with inspection as well as the provision of war material of all descriptions. As early as 1631 a Commission by Charles I on the subject of Arms and Armour referred to the need for uniformity in stores, and pointed out that when new stores were to be manufactured they should be to a pattern held in the office of the Surveyor of the Ordnance—an officer created in 1543 with responsibility for the inspection of Government Stores. In the reign of Charles II in the year 1683, a warrant was issued detailing the permanent establishment and rates of pay due to every officer from Master General of Ordnance (a position established in 1664) at a salary of £1500 per annum down to the lowest officer at a salary of £26 per annum. One of the five
principal officers forming the Board of Ordnance was known as the Surveyor-General. His duties were "to survey and make proof of all ordnance, powder, small arms and all other emptions and provisions of War and not to suffer any stores to be received which are not good, serviceable and also duly proved and marked with our mark if it ought to be". This might be taken as the first authentic reference to proof and the placing of the acceptance mark on accepted work.

Today the Army Inspection Service ensures that supply is according to the sealed drawings and patterns of stores held on behalf of the Services and issued for the guidance of manufacturers. No departure from such standards for supply can be made by a manufacturer without the approval of the Director of Army Inspection.

In the USA the contract for the first naval vessels built for the Government after the Revolutionary War contained specific provisions for inspection of the vessels during construction and for inspection of their armaments.

In Australia, formal inspection of military stores commenced in 1838 when the Colonial Ammunition Company manufactured .450 ball ammunition for the Australia Forces. Organized inspection of general stores and clothing for the military forces commenced in 1911, and in 1912 an organization was set up to inspect ammunition and weapons. In 1919 the Commonwealth Government placed the Army Inspection Branch under the control of the Munitions Supply Board, and in 1929 the Branch was transferred to the Department of Defence. Subsequently by an amendment to AMR and Os (AMR No 30) the Master-General of the Ordnance was made responsible:

"in general for the provision, inspection and maintenance of war material and ordnance stores; and in particular for research, design, experiment, provision, proof and inspection of armaments, ammunition, vehicles, technical stores and instruments, clothing, general stores (except those for which the QMG is responsible) scientific developments of war material, patents and inventions and administration of the Ordnance Services and Inspection Branch."

Except for a period — 17/12/1940 to 25/1/1943 — during which it operated under the Chief Military Adviser, Inspection remained within the MGO Branch until 1 February 1950. It then transferred to the Department of Supply and Development as part of the newly created Army Branch of that Department — later to be known as the Design and Inspection Branch, Department of Supply. On 12 March 1959 the functions of design and inspection were transferred from Department of Supply back to Department of the Army. The Directorate of Army Inspection became part of the Branch of the Master-General of the Ordnance and the State units of the Army Inspection Service became AHQ units operating under local administration of the respective Commands.

In addition to those responsibilities related to the Service departments, the Army Inspection Service has achieved growing recognition through various inter-departmental arrangements as the inspection authority for many other Commonwealth Government departments and instrumentals. A significant part of the activities of the Inspection Service is now, therefore, concerned with non-military supplies. For instance, items supplied under Colombo Plan contracts such as railway wagons, deep well pumps, transmitting and receiving stations and other highly technical and costly apparatus are inspected and passed by the Army Inspection Service before despatch overseas. Similarly stores are inspected for the Antarctic Expedition, for the Department of Immigration (clothing), for the Atomic Energy Commission, for the PMG (clothing), as well as for certain United Nations organizations (e.g., foodstuffs, insecticides, soaps, etc).
The Director of Army Inspection is the head of the Army Inspection Service and is responsible to the MGO for:

(a) Technical direction of Army Inspection Service activities throughout Australia.

(b) Inspection and/or proof of all equipment, armament, ammunition, clothing and general stores being procured for the Army.

(c) Inspection and/or proof of items for the RAN, RAAF, other Departments, etc., as may be agreed from time to time.

(d) Special inspection and/or re-proof of existing Army stocks as required.

(e) Conduct of development and ballistic firing trials and the production of Range Table data.

(f) Control of Proof Ranges.

(g) Checking that production data in contracts is adequate to govern inspection and acceptance.

(h) Liaison with Department of Supply and with production planning authorities on standards of acceptance and on quality assurance.

(i) Preparation of technical schedules for ammunition and weapons to control production to meet Service orders and the requirements for testing and proof.

(j) Issue and interpretation to contractors of drawings, specifications and other standards for supply.

(k) Processing of requests from contractors for departures from design.

(l) Development of general stores and clothing.

In order to discharge these responsibilities, the Director of Army Inspection has an organization consisting of professionally qualified engineers, chemists and other technologists, as well as qualified tradesmen and semi-skilled personnel operating over the extraordinary wide range of the industries and products dealt with.

The appointment of Director is held by a Regular Army officer with rank of Brigadier, and the Assistant Director positions in charge of inspection activities in Victoria and NSW are Army officer appointments with rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, whilst that in South Australia has the rank of Major. In addition, there are a very small number of Army appointments for specialist operations such as at Proof Ranges. Postings to the Army positions are made from time to time so that continuity must be supplied by the civilian staff at the head of which is the Deputy Director of Army Inspection.

Inspection consists of the physical examination, test and, where necessary, proof of stores (by actual firing or ballistic tests) to ensure that they comply with the terms of the contract and that they are in every way serviceable and appropriately packed to withstand transport and storage. In the broader industrial sense, inspection, if it were necessary to define it in a very few words, might be called "the function of comparing or determining the conformance of product to specification". It is as well to note that Inspection does not establish the design; it essentially sees to it that what is asked for by the customer or the ordering authority is supplied. The error is sometimes made of blaming Inspection for what is alleged to be inferior design or usefulness or appearance, etc., of Service stores. The contract or order and the terms for supply specified therein is the Inspection "bible" and Inspection has little or no licence to permit departure from such standards for supply.

Historically, Government inspection was originally concerned almost entirely with the rejection of completed stores which did not conform to specification. It has now become necessary because of the increasing volume and complexity of military supplies, and because of the rapid technological development of industry, to place special emphasis on inspection control at all stages of manufacture from the materials to the
ARMY INSPECTION SERVICE

finished store. It has become the function of Government inspection to contribute towards a smooth production flow resulting in a satisfactory end product, rather than merely to "screen" the end product and reject those that are faulty. In this connection it must be realised that no amount of inspection can make bad work good, but that intelligent planning of inspection and production will improve product quality to the stage where adequate quality assurance is inbuilt into a production programme.

A further step in the forward policy of Government inspection in Australia is now being taken in that the complete onus for the quality of his product is being placed on the manufacturer's shoulders by his being made responsible for the processes of examination and quality control as well as the processes of manufacture. The Government inspection organization can then fulfil its due role of examination for acceptance as distinct from examination for quality which latter is the responsibility of the manufacturer. The development and growth of this policy, in the USA particularly, has had a profound effect on the standard of production in American industry, and it is believed that the insistence on and application of modern quality control philosophies on the part of Australian contractors for supplies to the Armed Services will have far reaching results in improving the standard of Australian manufactured goods in general.

During a recent visit to Australia of Professor J. M. Juran—a world authority on Quality Control—he estimated that defective work was costing Australian industry £200 million pounds annually. Whilst it would not be economical to reduce this figure to zero because of the cost of perfection would be even higher, it is clear that inadequate control of production and inadequate inspection or quality control methods are resulting in enormous national losses in Australia. The part played by Government inspection, therefore, must be a particularly important one not merely in assuring that the Services obtain correct stores, but in influencing the standards of manufacture and supply from Australian industry generally.

The problem of the Army Inspection Service is largely a question of where to inspect, when to inspect and how much to inspect. The factors influencing these activities are not often the same as those which might obtain in private industry alone. Government inspection cannot be governed by economic consideration alone. A small low cost item furnished to the troops may be as vital to successful operations as a large highly expensive piece of equipment. The Army Inspection Service must, therefore, accomplish sufficient inspection of all important equipment regardless of its price. In any case the relationship between the Government and the supplier is not the same as that between commercial buyer and seller. Although civilian and military articles may look alike the conditions of use are entirely different, and the Inspection Service must be sure that the store supplied will meet the rigid military specifications laid down.

The methods of inspection employed by the Inspection Service are many and varied in character and demand a wide range of technical equipment used for precision gauging, mechanical and performance testing, ballistic, radiological, ultrasonic, magnetic, electrical and chemical inspection. These, in turn require test houses, ranges, special purpose buildings and other special facilities, in addition to staff with appropriate professional or trades qualifications who are specially trained to carry out the inspection activity concerned. The Army Inspection Service operates its own Meteorology laboratory which is registered as an approved Laboratory by the National Association of Testing Authorities, and also conducts its own Textile, Metallurgical, Fire Control Instruments and Electronics test houses. It operates extensive proof ranges at Fort Gellibrand (Victoria), Port Wakefield (South Australia) and Compton
Vale (Victoria) as well as specialized ballistic ranges at various Commonwealth Government munitions establishments. In addition to its own facilities, the Army Inspection Service makes good use of other Government and private test houses and laboratories covering many technical fields.

There is a constant need for the Army Inspection Service to keep abreast of modern developments in technology with particular reference to techniques of quality control and inspection generally. Its qualified professional staff direct inspection operations and procedures with close regard to the use of such modern inspection equipment as optical projection, air gauging, electronic comparator, etc, as well as modern radiological and acoustic apparatus. Close attention is paid also to the application of up to date statistical methods including statistical quality control and acceptance sampling techniques which, whilst now used extensively in the more advanced industrial countries, have yet to be widely accepted and employed by Australian industry. The Army Inspection Service of the Department of the Army has already done much to focus attention on the great advantages which will accrue to Australian manufacturers through adoption of modern quality control methods, and will play an increasingly important part in directing the methods of quality control, and hence production of high standard goods, along the most advantageous paths.

In the fields of general stores and clothing for Service use, the Army Inspection Service is not only responsible for inspection and acceptance but also for design and development. This is a most important function having regard to the peculiar and special purpose nature of the Service requirements which are subject to so many diverse geographical, climatic, strategic and operational factors. The Army Inspection Service operates its own Clothing Development Centre at Brunswick (Victoria) where development of special purpose textiles and clothing is undertaken to meet standard and exceptional Service requirements.

It should be noted that the Army Inspection Service does not confine its activities to new production; it also acts when equipment already in use in the Service is modified or re-worked to modernize it.

The Army Inspection Service, it can be seen, has had a long history of service in the interests of the nation. During World War II a vast array of manufactured products had to be inspected and re-inspected throughout its various stages of production. Thousands of workers of both sexes were employed on inspection duties. Few knew anything about inspection methods and techniques, few had factory experience of any sort, and a heavy burden was borne by those responsible for inculcating inspection appreciation and knowledge amongst the inexperienced workers employed. Today the production for the Armed Services has dropped to levels which no longer demand hordes of Government inspectors, but industry grows apace in Australia and new people are daily being inducted into new and expanded industrial organizations to learn modern methods of production and quality control. The Army Inspection Service is now playing its part not only in safeguarding the immediate interests of our nation’s defence but in adding to the power and efficiency of Australian industry at large. Should there be any future national emergency and mobilization become necessary, the Army Inspection Service will be found ready to carry out its essential work and to play its part in the nation’s security and progress.
THE CONVULSIONS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

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In 1911, the Manchu dynasty, which had ruled China for over two hundred years, was overthrown by a national upsurge. The advent of a Republic marked the end of an era and reversed China's age-old policy of protecting her frontiers by extending her influence over the adjacent countries. The new Republic of Sun Yat-sen functioned within the frontiers of China, thus creating a power vacuum throughout the bordering areas. This was filled by the growing national urge for independence and the dominating influence of the colonial powers—France and the Netherlands—and the Western democracies—USA and England. As a result, the entire region of South-East Asia was seized with a violent convulsion.

Nationalist China having succumbed to the Communists, in 1949, the tiny Republic of Shensi re-emerged dramatically as the People's Republic of China; and with it, nearly one quarter of the world population went over to the Communist bloc. The emergence of Communist China thus gave a new swing to the global strategy and upset the balance of power in South-East Asia. Not only did it lay the foundations of a new Chinese empire but assured the establishment of Communism in the area as a 'captivating' and gripping ideology. Another convulsion had started in the entire region of South-East Asia.

The Advent of Communist China

The Third Civil War between the Communists and the Nationalists of China had started in 1946. Initially, the Nationalists met with successes but the tide turned in the second year, when under Mao Tse-tung, the Communist Army grew into a relatively powerful military force and made great headway. By the end of 1949, Communists had put out of action a total of about eight million of Chiang Kai-shek's troops, and driven them out of China. Communist China had come into existence, turning a new page in the history of South-East Asia.

By now the Red Regime in China has acquired all Chinese territory except Taiwan (Formosa) and has completed land reforms throughout the country. It has successfully practised Communist indoctrination in the country, and after unifying economic and financial policy, has been able to establish state-owned economic leadership. It has destroyed the Nationalist element completely, has created a solid political organization and has imposed an unshakable authority over the entire country. Although the Communists have committed errors and face grave economic problems in their drive towards industrialization yet the indications are that they have substantially progressed and gained strength as
a big power. In short, Communist China has built a strong army, restored national unity, installed a powerful government and is all set for the recovery of a big-power status.

The Soviet-Chinese Relationship

The Russians agreed on 11 October 1954 to evacuate the ice-free Manchurian naval base at Port Arthur and to sell back their share of four joint Soviet-Chinese companies to China. Two of these companies had clamped a Soviet hold on the exploitation of Sinkiang's oil and mineral resources, to help Red China set up 15 new heavy industrial projects and build two railroads linking Central China with Russia. "This testified that Red dynasty in Peking in only 5 years of power had achieved the strength and status of partnership with Russia", and also that Russia and Red China were moving closely together. It was a great new boost for Red China's prestige where Communism in its new aggressive role was being evolved.

The Soviet policy, however, aims at establishment of a world-wide Communist regime by any means—political manoeuvring, subversion, economic pressure or force. This aim has never been concealed, in fact, it has always been proclaimed as the 'inevitable historical development of mankind'. Red China was, therefore, chosen to be built up to lead a world revolution in South-East Asia, where the people with their national urge for independence were already faced with a convulsion.

China's South-East Asian Policy

The Sino-Soviet alliance has turned Manchuria virtually into a Communist outpost in the North. Japan is broadly exposed to the power of a co-ordinated political complex, comprising China, the Mongolian People's Republic, and Soviet Asia. China, practically, maintains Manchuria 'like a dagger at Japan's heart'. This comparative security in the North and the Communist doctrine of forming a protective ring of satellite states, has led to the revival of China's traditional policy. Red China is now set to extend her influence and domination across her frontiers into the adjacent countries. The goal of the Communists, therefore, is the control and subjugation of the peoples of South-East Asia.

This is further supported by the need to find food and shelter for the swelling population of China. Her 600 million people are estimated to multiply into 1,000 million by 1982. China, therefore, needs some outlets beyond her existing frontiers.

In order to implement their concept of subjugation of South-East Asia, the Chinese can resort to armed aggression against the countries now struggling to maintain their independence. They can adopt political tactics of intimidation also, by effective infiltration, supporting neutralist tendencies and by preventing formation of regional defence pacts. While retaining and extending their capacity to commit armed aggression, the Communists, however, for the present, are relying on a wide range of more subtle tactics, both political and economic, to achieve their ends. As a result, the danger of an overt aggression is less apparent but their ultimate objective continues to be the establishment of 'disciplined Communist regimes'.

Use of Force

There is such a continuity in the Chinese Communist front that any open aggression would expose it, and culminate into a general war in Asia. Before any aggressive move, on the other hand, Red China would have to take into account, in addition to SEATO and its forces, the mutual defence treaties of the United States with South Korea and Formosa and the forces maintained under these treaties. The general war would confront the Chinese Communists with operations which would not be mutually supporting and would hamper the rapid concentration of their forces, due to long frontiers and inadequate
means of transportation. It is, however, revealed from the SEATO's Second Annual Report that the Communist armies employed in Viet Nam and Korea are still in existence and are being controlled by Chinese Communist hierarchy. While it retains its capacity to commit aggression it is effectively held in check by the defensive strength of the SEATO countries.

Political and Economic Measures

The Reds, thus prevented from resorting to armed aggression are pursuing Lenin's dictum "to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy". Meanwhile, they have focussed their attention in the political and economic fields. An observation of Communist activities in South-East Asia reveals that they are trying to secure the legal recognition of the local Communist parties where these are not yet legalized, and encouraging them to infiltrate into their governments and industries. They have intensified their economic activities also, by entering in the field of economic aid with Russia's support. As a result, when a Communist party shows signs of growth, they promote the formation of coalitions or inter-party alliances of 'Popular Front' elements, with a view to making them strong enough to take over the control of the countries concerned.

In these fields, they are assisted by a unique feature of this region: the presence of a substantial number of Chinese, emotionally attached to their motherland, in almost all the countries of South-East Asia. These Chinese, although settled in different countries, yet due to their traditional loyalty, look towards China as their homeland. Many of them have accumulated great riches and exercise powerful influence in the affairs of their country of adoption. They are the human bridge between China and the countries of South-East Asia and a great asset for the leaders of the Red Regime.

The interactions of national urge to maintain independence, and the threat of domination by international Communism, in the South-East Asian countries, is a complex but an absorbing study. These countries have either just gained their independence or are in the process of consolidating their earlier gains, and yet are faced with a number of convulsions.

Burma

The Anti Fascist People's Freedom League which was organized by Aung San and had won the independence, was again returned to power in 1956. The ideology of the League is supplied largely by its socialist programme. Its government, therefore, follows the policy of striving for a welfare state at home and neutrality abroad.

On assassination of Aung San and his entire cabinet in 1947, U Nu, the only surviving leader of the League, took over the reins of the government. Immediately after, a formless and bewildering insurrection started. It became incomprehensible and at one stage, threatened to envelop the country. U Nu launched an all-out attack and, by March 1955, was able to defeat Karen National Defence Organization—the last organized faction of the insurgents. The insurrection then virtually collapsed. The amnesty of October 1955 resulted in complete decentralization of insurgents, who broke into small armed bands, partially led and organized by the Burma Communist Party. He, however, could not stop the resultant Communist infiltration in the government and the industry. On 26 June 1958, U Nu again promised the insurgents an amnesty for past offences and legislation of the outlawed Burma Communist Party, provided they gave up arms and worked as legal parties in accordance with the Constitution. He hoped that this measure would help in complete extinction of the insurgents, who mainly consist of those members of the original resistance force which had refused to return to the civilian life and organized themselves into political militant group
of extreme left, with no programme but pillage and revolt against the established government.

He then visualized that Communist ascendency in Burma could only be checked by establishing Sino-Burmese friendship. He, therefore, declared his intention of keeping clear of any alignment with a power bloc and sought as close a relationship with China as he had with the Western Powers. When Chinese troops, however, entered the undemarcated border territories of Burma, U Nu found himself facing the Communists on his own soil. This forced him to negotiate considerable readjustment of his relations with China. His visit to China was followed by Chou-en-Lai's visit to Burma in 1956. It was on this occasion that the five principles of peaceful co-existence were enunciated and an era of Sino-Burmese friendship, based on non-interference in each other's internal affairs, ensued.

While U Nu has yet to achieve complete evacuation of Chinese troops from Burmese soil, he is now feeling the growing impact of "propaganda and economic force of Russia and Communist China focussed on his countrymen". The Western influence in Burma, therefore, is ranged against creeping Communism helped by the socialist programme of the State, the outcome of which hangs in the balance.

Laos

Laos won its independence as a result of Indo-China cease-fire agreement, signed at Geneva in July 1954. This agreement left the territory occupied by Pathet Lao — a Communist militant organization of Laos led by Prince Souphannouvong — as undefined. The citizens of the two provinces occupied by Pathet Lao were, however, accorded the right to participate in the general elections, to be held before the end of 1955.

The government of Prince Souvanna Phouma succeeded in signing an agreement with Pathet Lao only at the end of 1956. It ended the civil war, placed the Pathet Lao territory under the Imperial Government and recognized the Pathet Lao movement as a legal political organization. Also, it provided for the integration of Pathet Lao forces in the Royal Army and Civil Service, formation of a new government of national unity and a foreign policy based on neutrality, co-existence and friendly relations with all countries. As a result a coalition government of national unity under Prince Phouma, with Souphannouvong as Minister of Economic Planning and Reconstruction, was formed in the middle of last year, after a prolonged crisis.

The violent struggle for supremacy between the adherents of Communism and the Royalists thus entered a new phase. The Laotians are now subjected to an unmitigated Russian and Chinese propaganda under the aegis of Pathet Lao and a peaceful struggle for supremacy between the Chinese-led Communism and Western-inspired Royalists continues unabated.

Thailand

The people of Thailand are mainly farmers. They are conscious of few principles beyond loyalty and devotion to monarchy and Buddhism. The government is a constitutional monarchy and resembles an oligarchy, with powers in the hands of military men. Since 1932, internal politics has chiefly centred round the struggle between two men, Pibul and Pridi, dependent upon the support of Army or Navy and lately of Police.

In 1932, People’s party led by two young army officers, in a bloodless coup, forced a constitutional government upon the king. Thus came modern Thailand into being and with it a most curious form of government. For, in 26 successive years there have been 12 major revolutions, 5 different constitutions and 22 changes of administration. A revolution, however, was normally confined to a brief bloodless battle
between the army and the navy, mostly around Bangkok, leading to the formation of a government either under Pridi or Pibul. In 1941, Pibul decided to back Japan, declared war against France and won four disputed provinces, through Japanese intervention, from Vichy-controlled Saigon. Pridi who was exiled, meanwhile returned and organized a Free Thai Movement. At the end of the war Pridi, who was acclaimed as a saviour, became Regent, and started building up the Navy as a foil to the Army. He, however, became suspected of being involved in the assassination of King Ananda. In 1947 tanks rumbled again in Bangkok. Pridi fled into exile and Pibul emerged as the head of the government.

It was in 1952 that Pibul faced with a world divided into two blocks and a tendency amongst Asian powers to follow India in an attempt to form a neutral bloc, took a plunge and aligned himself with the Western democracies by signing the SEATO pact. In September 1957, however, Pibul was ousted and exiled by Marshal Sarit in a bloodless coup. Sarit has been elevated by Pibul as a counter-balance to the growing influence of police chief Phao who was also ousted and exiled. With the exit of Pibul ended the most pro-American regime in South-East Asia. The ruling junta, however, held an election and the government which assumed power is pledged to stick to pro-Western policies, in conformity with national interests.

The Thais have been pursuing a policy of playing the French in Indo-China against the British in Burma and Malaya. This enabled them to retain their independence — political, economic, and cultural. But today they are surrounded completely on all sides by the Communists. In the north, the colossus of Communist China is trying to roll over through Communist-infested Laos. An autonomous Thai Republic has been set up within the frontiers of China with Pridi as its head and with more people of Thai extraction than living in Thailand itself. In the east, North Viet Nam is ready to infiltrate, on the bidding of Communist China, and in the south jungle Communists who once infested Malaya have now infiltrated into Thailand. Within the country there are 3 million Chinese out of a population of 20 million, of which, Bangkok has the largest number. This human bridge, although apparently loyal to the regime, must be considered a potential convert to Communism. Thailand is, therefore, in ferment.

North Viet Nam

When the Japanese occupied Indo-China, Ho Chi Minh, with the acquiescence of Vichy French, organized a united front of Communists and Nationalists to fight the Japanese, underground. His guerrillas (about 10,000 men) gained the reputation as being the only effective underground force against Japanese and received their surrender in the fall of 1945. He then founded the Republic of Viet Nam which he left after a long crisis, to go again underground. He then started his seven years war against the French. The French, meanwhile, brought back Emperor Bao Dai, an ex-puppet of the Japanese, to re-inspire the Viet Namese nationalism, but achieved nothing. In 1954, Ho struck with Chinese field guns and Russian rocket launchers, and forced the surrender of French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. This brought to an end the French colonial rule in Indo-China. A peace treaty was signed on 21 July 1954. "The balance of power lurched and tilted in favour of Communists and Viet Nam north of 17th parallel went behind the iron curtain". The Viet Minh — the Communist part of Viet Nam — have followed the same pattern as that of Red China. They have completed land reforms, and have successfully practised Communist indoctrination. They have destroyed the nationalist element completely, have created a strong political organization even extending into South Viet Nam, have imposed an unshakable authority...
north of 17th parallel and have built up the most effective jungle army in South-East Asia.

South Viet Nam

South Viet Nam remaining under French Union, was ruled by Ngo Dinh Diem in the name of the nominal Head of the State, Bao Dai. There were three private armies—the Hoa Hao, the Cao Dai and the Binh Xuyen—created while the country was at war, by feudal and religious war lords. A serious conflict assuming the proportions of a civil war, however, developed between Premier Diem and the three politico-religious sects. Saigon was blockaded and a number of battles were fought on its outskirts. The three armies were, however, finally eliminated by Diem who, thereupon, held a referendum to choose between himself and Bao Dai as the Head of the State. He was elected by overwhelming majority on which he proclaimed Viet Nam as a Republic, installed himself as the President and disapproved the clause of the 1954 cease-fire agreement requiring negotiations between North and South Viet Nam, for holding general elections to create a single government for the entire country. Diem continues his effort to shake off the throes of convulsions from Viet Minh-infested South Viet Nam with American economic aid and his unflinching support of the Western ideology.

Malaya

Malaya became independent on 31 August 1957 and brought together the nine States of the Malay Peninsula and the two British Settlements of Penang and Malacca. This also brought to an end the Communist terrorist activities which had already been reduced by the anti-terrorist operations. The present government of Tengku Abdul Rahman is a coalition government, consisting of Malays and Chinese, with a population of 30 and 23 lakh respectively, but there is always a possibility of breaking up of the coalition and ascendancy of a Communist-inspired government.

Indonesia

Predominantly Muslim and with a background of Hindu culture, Indonesia bitterly hates European domination, and places no curbs on the flourishing Chinese tradesmen or even on ever-growing Communism. The first elected government assumed office in March 1956, with Sastraomidjojo as Prime Minister. It was a coalition of the Nationalists, the Masjumi, the Nahdatul Ulema, and five splinter groups. The Communists—the third largest political party—were kept out. The government's foreign policy, however, aimed at complete emancipation of Indonesia consistent with active neutralism.

The course of events happening in 1956 necessarily indicated some sort of change. Corruption within the government and political parties had brought about an economic crisis. Parliament had become an arena of petty feuds and the army had started moving more decisively in the political field. Many islands had begun to chafe under Java's domination. Things came to a head when Dr Hatta resigned the Vice-Presidency to enter into active politics. This smashed the dual leadership which had first launched the independence movement in 1945 and touched off a series of insurrections through the country. These were primarily brought about by the outlying military commands who demanded more political and economic autonomy, exclusion of Communists from association with the government and safeguards against Java's domination, and rejected outright any system of government based on the principle of guided democracy, which President Sukarno advocated as a measure for the stability of the country.

In the midst of the furore that the new concept of guided democracy created, the Sastraomidjojo Government disintegrated and collapsed. The following day President Sukarno proclaimed a state of war and siege throughout the Republic. He then formed a government of independents
under Djuanda and on 3 May 1957 inaugurated his concept of guided democracy. The new system consisted mainly of a National Advisory Council composed of leaders from all walks of life including Communists, headed by the President himself, who alone held the powers of selection and dismissal.

This touched off fresh revolts in outlying islands by various territorial commands who refused to obey the orders. The Banten Council of Central Sumatra, headed by Lt-Col Ahmed Hussain, first demanded setting up of a national government, headed by Dr Hatta, then proclaimed a new government of the Republic on 15 February, 1958, with Padang as their Capital. The Jakarta government then undertook to quell the revolt by force, which came to an end after about nine weeks, in May 1958. In some parts of the land, the authority of the Central Government still remains un-acknowledged.

Indonesia is not only faced with the problems of equitable distribution of national resources and political and administrative adjustments between Java and the rest of the islands but also with the ever growing Communist ascendency, backed by subtle forces of propaganda and economic aid. The insurrections in Indonesia have indirectly brought the country nearer to Russia and Red China and have removed it further away from the Western democracies.

Conclusion

The advent of Communist China, not only laid the foundations of a new Chinese empire in South-East Asia, but also led to the introduction of the powerful ideology of Communism in its most vicious form. This came at a time when the struggle of the peoples of South-East Asia for liberation from hunger, misery and foreign rule had reached a crucial stage. The people of South-East Asia, who bitterly hated European domination, could not, therefore, refuse the extended hand of Communism. This interaction, therefore, created a ferment through South-East Asia.

The ferment caused a set-back for the Western influence which started waning in the wake of growing nationalism. Whereas the Western democracies could not shake off the prejudices and racial discrimination and would not allow their own standards, the Communists identified themselves with the rising force of nationalism and the struggle for liberation from hunger, want, and European domination. The vacuum, thus created by the withdrawal of Western influence, is being filled by limitless Communism.

In the social and economic fields, Communism has gained great popularity and has become a powerful force to reckon with. As a result, South-East Asia's economy is gradually being interwoven in the Communist sphere of influence. In the political field the Communist advocacy of partnership and coexistence creates a popular appeal against a background of hated Colonialism. The Western Powers, therefore, have an uphill task in rebuilding South-East Asia, both economically and politically, and promoting their own kind of social and economic well-being.

The American Far Eastern Aid Programme and the Colombo Plan along with UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the WHO and FAO, have done a lot to reduce hunger and misery and to foster the foundations of economic independence in South-East Asia. The Western Powers—particularly USA—have established political relations also, based on mutual respect and partnership, and have built up powerful military forces with a view to checking the aggression on the part of Chinese Communists. They are also trying to raise strong political structures from within the countries as deterrents to Communist dominance.
South-East Asia today is, therefore, on the cross roads. Powerful forces are influencing its course. The interplay of these forces has caused a serious convulsion, the outcome of which hangs in the balance. It can, however, be said that the deciding influence will be the one which would raise faster the standard of living of the peoples of South-East Asia, and thereby build up a strong political edifice based on popular support from within the countries.

I am convinced that we must overhaul our mobilization plans. Mobilization as known to us during the last two wars looks archaic against the background of nuclear war. The word brings to mind an entirely erroneous picture, one portraying an effort spread over days, weeks, and even months before completion. Perhaps we need a new word for mobilization in a nuclear age. We need a system which is effective in a matter of hours, following national radio warnings. It must not be dependent on vulnerable communications systems. It must be founded on a body of men and women, all of whom know in peacetime exactly where they go in war and what they do. The system must include civil-defence workers. The whole question requires a new look. We are not paying sufficient attention to this vitally important part of national and allied defence.

—Field Marshal Montgomery.
BOOK REVIEWS

THE FAILURE OF ATOMIC STRATEGY by Colonel F. O. Miksche. (Faber and Faber Ltd, 24 Russell Square, London).

Colonel F. O. Miksche is a former officer of the Czechoslovakian Army who left his country when it was occupied by the Germans. During World War II he was a member of General De Gaulle's personal staff. After the war he returned to the Czechoslovakian Army and represented his government at Supreme Allied Headquarters, and later as Military Attaché at the Czech Embassy in Paris. When the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia he again left his country's service and subsequently became Professor of General Tactics at the Staff College of the Portuguese Army. Since 1956 he has devoted his time to the study of strategic and tactical problems.

Colonel Miksche established his reputation as a analyst and writer with the publication of his first book Blitzkrieg in 1941. Since then he has consistently added to his reputation, particularly with his notable contribution to modern military thought in his Atomic Weapons and Armies and Secret Forces. In some of his earlier works he forecast the march of events in Europe and Asia with remarkable accuracy.

In his latest book, Colonel Miksche sets out to show that, despite much loose and wishful thinking, military forces are still an integral part of the cosmos of international relations, and that it is only through a correct appreciation of the part played by the 'balance of forces' that we can understand the real nature of the political moves that are constantly taking place.

Colonel Miksche sees the present struggle for power as a contest between two civilizations, with America and Russia as the two principal protagonists on either side. In organizing their military forces to back their political activities, particularly their opposition to the spread of Communist imperialism, the Western Powers have, in his view, over-emphasized the role of atomic weapons. Now that both sides have these weapons the massive deterrent is much too massive to be played in any situation short of a 'suicide pact', since it is fantastic to suppose that a distinction can be drawn between the strategic and tactical employment of nuclear explosives. And when he sets up a situation on the map of Europe his contention is convincing, from the European's point of view at any rate.

The Russians have not staked every move on the employment of atomic weapons. While providing themselves with atomic weapons to match those of the West, they have at the same time developed a preponderance of versatile, hard-hitting conventional forces. As a result they are able to back their every move in the field of international relations with military forces nicely adjusted to the value of the prize. At the diplomatic conference table they are able to play a variety of tunes on a variety of instruments, whereas the West can play only one tune on one instrument. And, since practically all subjects of diplomatic debate fall far short of the
absolute issue, Western representatives always find themselves in the position of a man who goes to an auction of cheap goods with nothing less than a £1,000,000 note in his pocket. He has no money small enough to bid with.

Colonel Miksche pleads earnestly for the restoration of the warrior in the scheme of Western military organization. We have, he thinks, too many mere technicians and too few soldiers in our fighting formations, there is too much emphasis on the machine and too little on soldierly qualities. He produces some very interesting arithmetic to show that the West has developed a military instrument ill-suited to the situation in which it finds itself, not through a shortage of manpower, but through the manner of its employment. He backs his plea for a more effective balance between teeth and tail with striking figures.

Miksche considers that the West, through the inappropriate organization of its available resources, is faced with three possible courses—

(a) We can continue to yield step by step to Communist encroachments, which for Europe amounts to total surrender by instalments.

(b) We can commit suicide by employing the atomic weapon.

(c) We can regain freedom of movement by a reorganization aimed at giving us conventional forces more nearly equal to those of the Russians.

In advocating course (c) he pleads for a much closer political, economic, and military integration of the European nations.

Miksche by no means confines his thoughts to the political and strategic sphere. He discusses tactical and organizational problems with insight and force, and his ideas make very interesting and provocative reading.

The Failure of Atomic Strategy is an important contribution to current military thinking and must be rated as essential reading for everyone interested in this subject.

— E. G. K.

BEDS IN THE EAST by Anthony Burgess. (William Heinemann Ltd, 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

In sharp contrast to the rather heavy literature appertaining to the end of colonial rule in Asia, this light-hearted novel strikes a refreshingly humorous note. Set in the atmosphere of the twilight between the passing of one era and the dawn of another, it takes a cynical yet sympathetic view of the forces at work in the new Asia.

Most of the people in this book are caricatures, that is to say their personalities have been somewhat distorted to produce an amusing effect. Nevertheless, while keeping us laughing, Mr. Burgess shows us in a very striking, human way, some of the problems, racial, political, economic and social, that beset the new Malaya. If there is a note of nostalgia for the passing of British rule, there are also some shrewd observations on the characteristics of the new order, and on the effects of the impact of some of the products of Western civilization on Asian youth. For instance, it is startling, or comforting, to find that the problems of juvenile delinquency are much the same there as they are here.

Mr. Burgess presents the problems of the new society with the light touch of the accomplished satirist. Doubtless he could have given us a somewhat similar picture of our own society, and it might be good for our souls if he did so.

Beds in the East is a good book to take on a journey, or if you want to escape for a while from the problems of nuclear warfare or the compilation of the annual estimates. Its perusal will give you much amusement and return you not a little profit.

— E. G. K.
THE DARK DANCER by Balichandra Rajan. (William Heinmann Ltd, 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

The Dark Dancer of the title is the god Shiva, the wielder of the forces of life and death, of birth and decay, of terror and sensuality, a fit symbol for the turbulent period of Indian liberation which is covered in the novel. The leading character, Krishnan, is a vegetarian, pacifist, South Indian Brahmin, Cambridge educated, and lately returned to his own home to accept a family arranged marriage and future in an environment where a nice sense of the main chance determined one's future, and where the pressure of conformity in the minutest relationships is overwhelming on the personal plane.

The atmosphere on the eve of liberation is one of foreboding, and the leading characters embody the tensions of society. The bride chosen, Kamala, is a gentle Hindu girl whose serene acceptance, backed by her own unshakeable convictions, challenges her more complex husband. His meeting with an English girl he had known in his student days leads him into an affair, as a result of which he deserts Kamala. The fact that this girl, a non-conformist, came from a tradition which had non-conformity among its attributes met the demands of one side of his nature. “You ought to write,” she told him, “It’s the solution for those who don’t belong.” But he desperately wanted to belong.

This search for identity is the theme of the book, while the dance of Shiva symbolises the stormy background of fratricidal murder and arson in which Hindu, Moslem and Sikh were caught up and in which terror itself was also an acceptance. “Was there a place for contentment in the Temple’s heart, in the kindling core of the mind when Shiva danced, in the circle of flames, in the dead earth’s shuddering body?” This relentless search to renew an ancient tie leads Krishnan back to Kamala who, an Indian like himself, finds identity working in a hospital in the heart of the Moslem/Hindu slaughter. The debate is carried on an extremely high plane, and Kamala’s Hindu charity could lead her to say to the embattled Indian M.O. “Your task is to heal. Whoever the sick are, whatever their religion. You’ve always been equal to your duty. It makes no difference if it suddenly becomes bigger.”

Nevertheless, the fact of acceptance forces the reader to feel the moral nihilism of the extreme attitude carried to its logical conclusion. For instance, in the hospital where there was a chance of saving one or two by concentration “justice demanded that they dissipate their efforts, surrendering all to a democracy of despair.” In the West, the end of mankind is an action, which is the realization of thought; in the East, all too often with the educated, who are in control, it ends with the word, for all action is tainted at the source. In the event, when the mob took over, unchecked, the failure of authority to act ended in as great a tide of suffering and slaughter as history records. This brings us to the heart of the common problem: the West, too, has been forced to recognize the limits of action, for power which asserts itself in violence, when pushed to the ultimate, is also self-defeating.

Kamala’s self immolation, illustrating in the Indian idiom that acceptance is the surest form of protest, confronts Krishnan with himself, and while the shadow of the dancer still leaps, peace of a kind settles over the tormented earth.

The navel may be read and appreciated at several levels. The violence and the terror are conveyed by the symbol of the dancer, while the personal problems of the central figures force the fine wrought language to carry a tremendous burden of meaning. In the end, Krishnan is forced back prosaically on to his Government job, a public servant on the way up, and in the words of his scheming parents, he should not settle for less than a Joint Secretary’s daughter, a Joint Secretary who has a house.
The author was educated at Presidency College, Madras, and graduated from Cambridge with First Class Honours in Economics and later took First Class Honours in English. In 1946 he received his PhD in English from Cambridge University and was Director of Studies in English from 1946 to 1948 when he joined the Indian Foreign Service and served as Advisor to the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations.

Highly articulate, he has succeeded in conveying to a sympathetic reader something of the complexity of the great sub-continent, of the stresses laid on the more ambitious of its inhabitants by the fact of subordination to a foreign power, of the social, geographical environmental factors which, while forcing conformity and resignation, are also the seed bed of violence. “Dust and desire and the chain of the soils crippling poverty where the green blades burst gallantly through and the rain never came that the villagers prayed for”. Such writers as Rajan provide us with a bridge which we can use to better understand India. Handling the language with a rare precision and evocative power, by helping us to understand India, where certain incompatible factors of religion and of custom demand a solution, he confronting us too with the necessity for rightness in decision.

— WO C. M. D. Flinn