MILITARY BOARD

Army Headquarters
Canberra
1/11/1961

Issued by Command of the Military Board

Distribution:
The Journal is issued through Base Ordnance Depots on the scale of One per Officer, Officer of Cadets, and Cadet Under Officer.
Soon after the outbreak of World War I in 1914 a Turkish army crossed the Sinai desert from bases in Palestine and attacked the Suez Canal. The attack failed and throughout 1915 British troops held positions in the desert covering the canal.

Early in 1916 the British began to push the Turks back across Sinai and the Imperial Camel Corps, to which Australia contributed a substantial contingent, was organised in order to provide a force with great mobility and a wide radius of action on the waterless desert.

Each mounted infantryman of the Camel Corps could carry on his beast sufficient water, food and ammunition to last him three or four days. Since motor transport had not then been very highly developed, and air supply had not been thought of, the ability to move and fight for four days without re-supply conferred important advantages. Throughout the campaign in Sinai and Palestine the Camel Corps performed extremely useful work, particularly in deep reconnaissance and operations on the flanks.

The picture shows an Australian soldier of the Camel Corps moving out on patrol.
**CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training in the CMF</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major H. L. Bell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Window on the Mediterranean — Strategic Review</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander John G. Dillon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Real Meaning of Nuclear Stalemate</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander John G. Dillon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia — World Focal Point</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant P. G. Gittins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Forgotten Army</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major R. J. Stanley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book Reviews</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The information given in this document is not to be communicated either directly or indirectly to the Press or to any person not authorised to receive it.
The AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL is printed and published for the Directorate of Military Training by Renown Press Pty. Ltd. The contents are derived from various acknowledged official and unofficial sources and do not necessarily represent General Staff Policy.

Contributions, which should be addressed to The Editor, Australian Army Journal, Army Headquarters, Albert Park Barracks, Melbourne, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers. £5 will be paid to the author of the best article published in each issue. In addition, annual prizes of £30 and £10 respectively to the authors gaining first and second places for the year.
TRAINING
IN THE C.M.F.

Major H. L. Bell,
Royal Australian Infantry

In this provocative article the author shows how one CMF unit successfully met the challenge of one of the Australian Army's most important problems. In view of the great importance of the subject, it is hoped that this article will encourage other authors to put forward constructive ideas on CMF training.

—Editor.

Over the last twelve months we have been treated to a spate of articles on the Citizen Force, and even controversy on the subject. Such controversy is excellent, in fact it is, I hope, one of the reasons for the existence of the Australian Army Journal, but which we see so rarely. I have, however, been not a little irritated by the tone of some of these articles. Everyone seems to hold forth on what should be done to make an efficient CMF, quoting well-meaning theories which often have a suspicious ring of not having been personally applied by the authors. So far we have heard little of what anyone has done, and what happened as a result of it.

The aim of this article is to outline some of the main defects in CMF unit training, the causes and results of these defects, and how one infantry battalion set out to overcome these problems. The article is largely based on infantry training but where applicable is meant to cover CMF training as a whole.

Background

The unit quoted in this paper was a metropolitan infantry battalion located in one depot with a detached company a short distance away. Re-raised in 1948 it took over 400 men to its first annual camp and increased this total each year up to the inception of National Service. Due to various factors, all attributable to certain aspects of the National Service scheme, the unit was in a fairly run-down condition at the time (1958) of the institution of the programme to be described. It still, however, retained a good esprit-de-corps and a solid core of pre-National Service volunteers. At this time all officers except the Commanding Officer and Quartermaster were of post-war vintage.

Lest critics accuse me of drawing on examples that are extreme cases in order to back my statements, I wish to emphasise that
each example quoted is typical of what I encountered and can be substantiated by names, locations or dates. Had I wished to use sensational cases there are many juicy ones still in my repertoire! Should anyone think that I was hardly in a position to observe other units, I hasten to add that we were in the largest CMF formation in the Army and within eight miles of four other infantry battalions.

Finally, in order to make clear my own position on the subject; I started in this battalion as a CMF other rank and returned to it as its ARA Adjutant.

PART 1 — THE DEFECTS

The major faults of CMF unit training are, I consider:

(a) The haphazard approach to training.
(b) Lack of adequate basic training.
(c) Rapid turnover of personnel.
(d) Acceptance of lowered officer standards.
(e) Insufficient training time.
(f) Poor discipline, with its resultant effects on training efficiency.

You will note that I have not mentioned lack of equipment. Recruits may join because they pine to wear an American steel helmet, but that doesn't keep their interest. I personally found that a well delivered lesson on the EY rifle (vintage 1917) will hold more attention than a second-rate oration on the Mechanical Mule. Within reason, any arms unit can hold interest no matter what equipment it possesses.

The Haphazard Approach to Unit Training

The endeavour put into unit training by both CMF officers and their regular staffs is prodigious, sometimes unrewarding and to the really devoted often heartbreaking. Much of this effort is not justified by the results, and a perusal of the annual training reports will reveal the same deficiencies arising year after year. I would be the first to oppose an inflexible training programme imposed by higher authority on all units alike. Nevertheless, I cannot cease to wonder at the non-interference and sometimes complete lack of interest shown by some higher formations in what training the unit does and how it does it. This is in sharp contrast to the "A" and "Q" side where petty interference, check and counter-check are the order of the day. Not for nothing did my C.O., on the eve of my departure for a CMF adjutant's posting, advise, "Train if you like but nobody will be really interested; but make damned sure that you get those returns in on time!"

Provided sufficient homage is paid to the "current phase of war for study" aspect, units are usually allowed to go their own way — most satisfactory for those units capable of doing so, but not so satisfactory for the majority that are not. The re-
result is that the unit syllabus is often geared to the training background and experience of the officers in it. I have witnessed on many occasions units and sub-units pay undue emphasis to one aspect of training solely because this aspect is the "hobby-horse" or only qualification of the officer responsible for the training.

Some (but I am sure by no means all) defects arising out of this haphazard approach are quoted below. Units of different types and different localities to my own could doubtless produce others.

(a) Unit training often lacks progression and the cumulative effects of progressive steps over, say, a one year's cycle, is lost. Many units do not work out their outline programme a year ahead (and that is the barest minimum) with a view to its culmination in the annual camp. Of course, this is often an outcome of higher formations being somewhat tardy in promulgating their policy.

(b) There is a common tendency to think "too high" in training. Lectures on battalion tactics are given to private soldiers whose main tactical need may be field signals and section formations. Most unit TEWTs are run at battalion level when the majority of subalterns are probably in desperate need of training in platoon tactics and patrolling. In the limited time of home training the "must knows" should come first but the "must knows" for the junior leader are often neglected in favour of higher-level training. I would say that the probationary lieutenants of my unit, at the time of my arrival as Adjutant, possessed a greater knowledge of supporting arms than my graduating class of the Officer Cadet School. Yet these same probationary lieutenants were almost useless as instructors and knew absolutely nothing about patrolling — the platoon commanders "bread and butter". In fact I can recall a First Appointment examination where the emphasis was on patrolling, being denounced by at least half of the examiners as "unfair and too hard". An Infantry officer who can't run a patrol cannot run anything.

(c) In some units, particularly those lacking experienced instructors, there is a tendency to repeat the same old activities year after year for no other reason than that those responsible are unaware that anything else exists. Too often we encounter a written exercise instruction or a syllabus which on closer examination turns out to be an amended rehash of last year's instruction.

(d) I will always support the contention that a CMF unit can reach a standard where even the most complicated exercise is within its capability. However, there does seem a tendency for CMF
units to rush into elaborate exercises without a prior training build-up, so that on the day the only people to get full value are the command, signals and administrative elements. It is a natural desire on the part of any commander to want to exercise his command but unless a logical sequence of sub-unit training leads up to a major exercise then we simply do not get full value for money expended.

(e) The unco-ordinated and haphazard approach to training results in dissipated energy. Even in metropolitan areas little effort is made by Commands or formations to combine the unit efforts in First Appointment and certain types of specialists' training. There have been exceptions - the RAA officer training programme in Victoria being one - but most higher headquarters remain apathetic to the problem. Lt.-Col. C. L. Thompson, in this Journal, has pushed the idea of a CMF Officers' Academy. If ever there was an opportunity for useful co-ordination of effort then this Academy is it. Even if its staff was extracted from units, I am confident that the loss to each unit would be less than the present diversion of resources to "penny packet" officer production.

(f) The effects of the AHQ Training Directive, although it is now based on a three years cycle, has had an effect on CMF training not readily appreciated by most. The high turnover of CMF junior leaders and the necessarily quick promotion of officers can result in grave deficiencies as a result of too-rigid observance of the Directive. For example, the phases of war for training in 1957/58, 1958/59, and 1959/60 were The Defence, The Counter Attack and The Withdrawal. During this time, in our battalion (and in others I presume) we had officers advance from First Appointment to Captain. Had we not (often surreptitiously) carried out training in all phases of war during this period these officers could have attained their rank without ever having commanded a platoon in an advance or attack exercise.

(g) By far the greatest defect in our approach to CMF training is the variance of standards as a result of the lack of higher interest or real supervision. There is no point in referring to all units as equal — some run first class training while others are a useless burden on the taxpayer. Some units are fortunate in having experienced officers or officers who have attended Army schools. Others, particularly in some rural areas, are not so fortunate — they often lack the field of officer recruitment. Some cannot even produce officers of any kind, while others have a surplus of officer material.
(One unit springs to mind immediately. In three years I doubt if they qualified one First Appointment candidate in four, even after many attempts). This unevenness is not the fault of units but rather the fault of our Army as a whole, by its refusal to admit that there are bad units, and to do something about it when they are bad.

Summarised briefly, the direct causes of the above defects are:

(a) Lack of higher interest in and supervision of training.

(b) The too rigid application of the AHQ Training Directive.

(c) Above all, the treating of all units in a like manner. The sooner we "pay on results" and give the live-wire unit credit for its efforts the better we will be. And as for the poor unit, the sooner it is shaken up, or reinforced by assistance from higher formations the sooner we will progress to a more efficient CMF.

I would, while making a plea for more higher interest in unit training, stress that the good unit should not have its initiative stifled. An original and imaginative training exercise on the part of an individual unit can be killed off very quickly by apathy, laziness or even jealousy on the part of a higher formation.

**Lack of Adequate Basic Training**

I do not try to pretend that it is either feasible or desirable to attempt a first class standard of individual training in the CMF. A bias toward recruit training may result in a CMF of trained privates but would certainly lose our potential leaders through sheer boredom. But the facts are plain — the basic training of the CMF soldier is usually so poor as to be non-existent. I have personally examined Infantry First Appointment candidates who could not prime a grenade. On one occasion I examined ten Infantry candidates for promotion to Captain. Not one had the remotest idea on how to go about removing an obstruction from the breech of an LMG. Perhaps it is not really vital that Captains should be 100 per cent. competent in their Tests of Elementary Training, but the fact that all candidates in one examination failed completely makes one wonder as to the state of their respective units' weapon training! The effects of this lack of basic training are:

(a) A recruit may progress on to higher rank possessing only the slightest degree of basic military training. I quote an example — Captain X, an officer of high potential, who enlisted in 1950. Without any recruit training he was posted to the Pioneer Platoon in which he passed through all ranks to First Appointment. On being commissioned he was posted to a rifle company, but through the lack of a suitable officer had to be re-appointed to command his old platoon. X's first lesson after enlistment was on how to blow up bridges, yet in all his service, although he fired the weapon, he has never received one of the basic lessons on the LMG. Thus
we are pushing up for promotion junior leaders whose military knowledge is based on insecure foundations. This may not be harmful whilst they are employed on specialist duties in which they may be competent, but once they attain field rank and are involved in the planning and execution of all aspects of unit training, the evil effects are soon evident. It is not necessary that a Major knows the lessons in the recruit syllabus, but it is vital that he at least is aware of their existence.

(b) The incomplete or non-basic training of the CMF recruit results in his being pitched forked into Corps training, where through his very lack of military knowledge he is unable to either appreciate or assimilate the specialist work. I can remember, as a CMF private being lectured in what I think must have been company battle procedure, when through lack of any elementary training I had no conception even of fire and movement. In the words of one CMF Bren-gunner in reply to a visiting staff officer: "Well, Sir, I know all about attacking battalions from the right flank but don't know how to load this bloody gun!" He was not entirely accurate, perhaps, but he at least put his finger right on the problem.

(c) Without a preliminary recruit training and with the (necessarily) lenient requirements for CMF enlistment, there is no early weeding-out of that minor — but always present — proportion of recruits who are unreliable and unsuitable for further training.

(d) Weapon training is currently at a low level of efficiency, though this is not a CMF monopoly by any means. However poor the annual musketry returns are, I presume they are poor, most Adjutants, past or present, will agree that these returns are at best inaccurate, and at worst, outright fakes. Whilst many factors militate against good shooting, the major one in the CMF is that very often the soldier was never taught how to handle the weapon in the first place.

The main reasons for this neglect of CMF recruit training are, I feel, the following:

(a) Many of our more senior Regimental officers, whose early commissioned background was in the AIF, fail to realise the importance of recruit training. Trained in operational units where (after the war was well under way) reinforcements arrived already recruit-trained, some have had little or no experience in the conduct and preparation of basic training, and thus tend to deprecate its importance.

(b) The lack of any real insistence by the Army on a mandatory basic training programme for all CMF recruits. In fact, after three years as a CMF Adjutant I can recall
only one staff officer from a higher formation ever enquiring as to whether my unit conducted recruit training, much less prying into its method of operation.

(c) The lack of a readily available (and practical) recruit syllabus, adaptable to part-time conditions, which units can emulate.

(d) The absence, in CMF unit establishments, of an organic recruit training organisation. Lt B. C. Major, Royal Queensland Regiment, in the December 1960 AAJ, has submitted a good case for such an organisation — somewhat lavish perhaps but a pointer to what is needed. Of course, country sub-units pose a problem, and smaller metropolitan technical units may have to pool their recruit training effort, but nevertheless a recruit training establishment should exist for every CMF unit. The only alternatives are the present system of ad hoc unit cadres, “milked” from the unit’s operational organisation, or no cadre at all.

(e) Even where the more enterprising units do try to meet the challenge, the lack of suitable CMF instructors (for the task is clearly beyond the resources of the Regular staffs of most) is a stumbling block. This is largely due to the perfunctory attention given to instructional ability in promotion examinations. The brightest soldier in the CMF is not much use to his unit if he is incapable of passing on the benefits of his talents. In one CMF formation, a senior “G” staff officer attempted to make a pass in instructional subjects compulsory for a pass in subject “A”, but his efforts were soon watered down by other officers, both Regular and Citizen Force, whose eyes were presumably on quantity rather than quality.

**Rapid Turnover of Personnel**

The rapid turnover of both officers and other ranks in the CMF is one of the greatest obstacles against war-preparedness. Unfortunately this is seldom realised by many, and the illusion is prevalent that a CMF soldier who enlists for two years and does not intend “soldiering on”, actually serves his full time. In fact he either leaves within a year, or stays on for many. In our battalion, in 1958, out of a volunteer/voluntary training list of 200 odd, the periods of service approximated as follows:

- Served 10 years or more 25%
- Served 5-10 years 5%
- Served 2-5 years 10%
- Served 1-2 years 15%
- Served less than one year 45%

CARO records would be interesting to see, for I would not be surprised if half of all enlistments fail to serve one full year. But even those records would give a false picture, for many non-attenders are not “Q” cleared and discharged until months (and in one unit I know, years) after their last parade. However, it is wrong to be despondent over this, for it is
merely symptomatic of any organisation based on a voluntary part-time basis. Many who join soon discover that they are not particularly interested while conversely many a faint-hearted recruit turns out to be a long-serving soldier. The problem is not the high turnover so much as the failure to appreciate it in training planning. We should, of course, be able to retain more recruits than we do at present, but the turnover will always remain high.

However bad the turnover of recruits, the turnover of leaders is even worse. This is a natural enough phenomenon. The fellow who displays qualities of leadership and intellect is usually the young man who is studying to further his civil vocation. Unless we wish to promote mediocrities we must obtain our leaders from this group and accept the fact that the turnover, due to occupational reasons, will be high. Some units (my own included) have sat back, having attained a good officer strength and let the machinery of junior leader production run down. Then suddenly one officer resigns, two others move to the country, one has domestic trouble, another applies for LWOP overseas, and they find themselves on the eve of an annual camp with yawning gaps in their ranks.

Not only must the CMF fill its ranks of leaders, but it must continuously train replacements in a never-ending stream. My estimate of the minimum annual production to meet the need would be 25 per cent. of officer and 40 per cent. of the NCO establishments. Admittedly we have an officer surplus due to the reorganisation but I will risk venturing an opinion that in less than two years this surplus will have melted away and once again we will be short.

Acceptance of Lowered Officer Standards

Captain E. M. McCormick (AAJ 132, May 1960) has rather scathingly criticised the standard of some CMF officers. While I am sure that his remarks do not apply to the majority, nevertheless one thing is clear — the quality of officers being produced, rank for rank, is very often deficient. The danger of the present system, left as it is (with the exception of the DA21A requirement) in the hands of units or formations, is that it is wide open to the effects of varying standards and even abuse. A half-trained officer could in turn produce quarter-trained juniors, who in their turn could produce worse — to the ultimate where a unit, or sub-unit can "inbreed" itself into inefficiency. The rather loose system of officer production results in three evils.

(a) The standard is often lowered to meet the demand. One can hardly blame a C.O. who, having a detached platoon in Bandywallip and no one to run it, tries to get through First Appointment the next best available NCO, even though the NCO is clearly not officer material. I have examined, four times in two years, a sergeant from an isolated
platoon centre who did not know that there were 360 degrees in a circle! No doubt this man was a loyal and hard working NCO but one shudders to think of what his map-reading must be like. It is pointless to argue that such a man should be commissioned if only because his personality can keep the sub-unit together. Granted, he would be most useful in that capacity, but tomorrow we may be at war and this man will be responsible for others lives. Lest I be misunderstood on this subject of First Appointment standards, I stress that the candidate should be examined more for his potential ability rather than on his present knowledge. But if he hasn’t got that potential ability then please let us not commission him.

(b) Practical promotion examinations are of varying standards, and being in the hands of formations are often marked at a lower standard, once again, to meet the demand. This I am sure will be hotly denied by some, but I can recall many incidents of such occurring. Last year I examined two Infantry candidates for Captain in a defence problem. The first candidate did not know the correct number of sections in a rifle company (he was a support company officer) and sited a whole company, believe it or not, in an area less than 70 yards square. The second had never heard of an Energa grenade, gave the range of a two-inch mortar as 1000 yards and gravely insisted that anti-tank weapons achieved their best result if fired head on to a tank! Both officers, who after vigorous prompting and “leading on”, gained less than 50 marks out of 400, proceeded on to pass the rest of the examination. I do not blame them, for both were very keen and acutely aware of their own shortcomings. I blame their units, and the system (or lack of one) which allows such anomalies to occur. Nor need we stop at the standard of candidates. Many nominations of Board members are based on each unit supplying a quota, not the choosing of qualified examiners. One examiner of my acquaintance was examining subject “B” candidates for Captain, when he himself had barely passed the previous year on the third attempt. To quote one CMF Commanding Officer present, “They need an examination for the examiners”.

(c) Much officer promotion is by automation rather than competition. In the past, the most unfair aspect of CMF promotion is that, in general, the speediest promotion goes to those in the least efficient units, i.e., the ones that are usually desperately short of officers. In the good unit there is often a surplus of qualified officers competing for the next vacancy. The reverse applies in the poor, where the promotion
awaits the first successful candidate to qualify — even if he made three attempts to get there. This can hardly be in the interests of the Army as a whole, for once promoted, an officer is very hard to dispose of if later found wanting.

The main causes for this weakness in the officer promotion structure are:

(a) Whatever official policy may state, the decision on who is to become an officer is in reality in the hands of the Commanding Officer. Once he signs the A22, unless something adverse is known about the candidate by higher authority, it is “plain sailing”. The C.O. usually will judge his prospective officers by the standards of his unit, and not by the standards of the Army as a whole. What is needed is some outside body, be it a Command selection board or the CMF Officer Academy, to make the decision. Let the unit nominate the candidate, but the final word on the subject must be an independent one.

(b) The decentralisation of practical examinations must lead to lowered or varying standards. I appreciate that the staffing problems for examinations are always a bugbear. However, we simply must have competent examiners who will demand competence from their candidates. But a word of warning — we must also watch the reverse — particularly the keen young Ad-

(jutant type who too often demands the knowledge of a full time Officer Cadet rather than the realistic standard — that of a potential wartime platoon commander.

(c) Once again, the old subject of units possessing varying standards of efficiency, and the failure to appreciate and correct it. If the 3rd Royal Centralian Regiment can’t produce really good Majors, then let the 2nd Royal Centralians, who have a surplus, provide them. The rather rigid walls of Regimental promotion and seniority will have to yield to the need for greater efficiency.

(d) The lack of preparedness in the subaltern ranks for higher promotion. Our subalterns are not usually sufficiently experienced after three years to carry a Captain’s appointment. Of course there are many brilliant exceptions, but a longer period in a platoon commanding is a must for the new First Appointee. I consider that the 18 months’ probationary period should be added to the three years’ service for promotion to Captain, and not deducted from it as at present. And isn’t it about time the probationers were called second-lieutenants, particularly in view of the current “one Army” doctrine?

Insufficient Training Time

The shortage of training time is, without saying, an inherent weakness of any part-time military system. It is one about
which we can do little except to squeeze into an already tight programme the maximum extra activities. Nevertheless the CMF has a genuine grievance on this score and I take the opportunity to air it.

Prior to National Service the CMF paraded for 24 days Home Training each year. Soon after National Service was commenced this time was cut to 19 days, in order to bring it into line with the decreased training liability of National Servicemen. Now that National Service has ended there has been no move to restore the missing five days. Of course the good units still do the training, paid or unpaid, by parading weekly, but the niggardly reduction of five days paid time should be speedily removed.

Whilst not strictly a training matter, poor discipline is all too common and as a consequence training suffers. The idea which seems to have influenced officers' both ARA and CMF, is that the Citizen soldier is a civilian and as such must be treated with "kid gloves". If we insist on obedience, frown on familiarity and work the volunteer until he drops — then he will merely walk out and leave. How utterly and completely false is this idea! Yet so few units insist on strict discipline of their soldiers that the results of such a policy are not widely known.

Without wishing to elaborate on this subject I feel that the results of the generally poor discipline are:

(a) A loss of the better type of soldier. The keener the recruit the more likely he is to leave. The keen soldier expects discipline — he thinks its "tough". To him the slap-happy arrangements of many units are a disillusionment. The other fellow — the one who neither expects discipline nor desires it — is rarely worth having anyway.

(b) Poor discipline usually begets poorer training. Yes, I know, we've all heard about the show whose "discipline is a bit rough but they'll do the right thing on the day you'll find". We should insure against possible failure on The Day by having our troops doing the right thing now.

(c) Although not a training problem, poor discipline must result in poor advertisement for the Army as a whole, particularly as in many centres the local CMF unit is very often the only image created of the Army.

**Poor Discipline**

The causes of poor discipline are fairly obvious, the most important being the simple fact that to insist on it is hard work, distasteful and to court unpopularity. The disciplinary problems of units located in small country centres where everyone is known to each other in civil life, are I agree rather difficult, but there is no excuse for a metropolitan unit.
PART II — HOW WE REMEDIED THE DEFECTS

On implementing his policy, our Commanding Officer set out to achieve simultaneous improvement in all aspects of training by ten methods.

(a) “Clearing the deck” by concentrating the keen, segregating the not-so-keen and eliminating the non-effectives.

(b) Making a clean sweep of overall unit training by:
   (i) Making it follow a system of logical progression.
   (ii) Bringing everyone’s thoughts “back to earth” from the lofty pinnacles of battalion tactics.
   (iii) Overcoming the effects of a too rigid interpretation of the “phases of war for training”.
   (iv) Achieving variety in training.
   (v) Looking outside the unit for “fresh blood” to inject into the training organisation, e.g. discharged ARA instructors.

(c) The raising of NCO standards by a permanently functioning Training Wing, through which all NCOs had to pass.

(d) The institution of a permanently functioning Officer Training Wing with the task of training all available officer material.

(e) Institution of a self-sufficient recruit training sub-unit.

(f) The raising of instructional standards.

(g) The strictest supervision of sub-unit training and its coordination at battalion level.

(h) The achievement of maximum training time.

(i) Last, but not least, the insistence on good old-fashioned regimental discipline.

To facilitate this programme the unit was internally reorganised with the following provisos:

(a) Segregation of the keen from the not-so-keen.

(b) Utilisation of existing sub-units to administer the intended permanently functioning cadres; NCO, officer and recruit.

(c) Without destroying the unit’s capacity to operate as a battalion in the annual camp or in the event of mobilisation.

The resultant organisation looked something like Figure 1.

---

Figure 1.
"Clearing the Decks"

The first task was to revive the volunteer spirit by sorting out the non-effectives. This started with the officers, who included the usual percentage of faint-hearted active list officers and some social drones on the Regimental Reserve. These were eliminated with speed, not without criticism from quarters more keen on numbers than quality. I may add that almost overnight the morale and attitude of the officers that remained soared high and stayed at that level until the very day of disbandment.

Next came the Other Ranks. Every volunteer soldier's attendance was checked and those found wanting discharged; from then on a monthly check of attendances was made and non-effectives were quickly discharged. Those National Servicemen who attended no voluntary activity (or in some cases just no activity at all) were pooled, under the command of the Training Company for administration. With only six parades to attend yearly (two of these pay parades) most of these gentlemen didn't have much idea of what company they belonged to anyway, so esprit-de-corps suffered little. When camp and obligatory bivouacs came around, we merely allotted the "pool" to sub-units as complete platoons, the recipient sub-unit finding the NCOs. We of course, tried to keep the "pool" in platoon groups. The result of this simply amazed us. In our first annual camp after this arrangement was instituted, the Training Company, whose privates were all "pool" soldiers, was well ahead. This happened again in the 1960 camp. But not only one group improved as a result of this — its effects were beneficial to all. The volunteers, concentrated together, picked up in enthusiasm and attendance. The minority of voluntary attending National Servicemen soon increased, once concentrated in sub-units of all-volunteer component. And needless to say, training prospered.

I realise that this segregation was not strictly "by the book", but can anyone tell me just how you amalgamate two groups of people, one who parade weekly and the other once per two months?

Anyway, it worked.

The Approach to Unit Training

One of the Commanding Officer's first steps was to ensure that everything we did was in accordance with a long range plan, based on a logical progression of training culminating in the annual camp. To this end an annual training directive was issued well before the commencement of the training year, with a block syllabus to cover the whole period. The detailed syllabi and camp syllabus were worked out as early as knowledge of outside commitments permitted. Each exercise was set as the outcome of a training programme leading up to it, and not as something "out of the blue". However, our good intentions were often frustrated, particularly by the imposition of other activities too late
to be foreseen by us. I'm afraid, even though I used to deliberately procrastinate until the eleventh hour, that our parade card invariably went to print long before Command had allocated the bivouac sites listed in the programme.

The battalion was ruthlessly brought "back to earth" with a jolt. The old Home Training syllabus of battalion tactics was replaced with weapon training, fieldcraft, map reading, patrolling and platoon tactics. Our officers' TEWTs became weighted in favour of sub-unit tactics, and the results of our officers in subject "B" examinations soon proved the wisdom of this. When we did have a battalion exercise, care was taken to debrief every man in the unit, pointing out where things went wrong at the lower level. The best move, however, was the institution of an annual "platoon commanders' exercise" where all officers (myself included) were formed into a platoon for a two days' exercise in patrolling and platoon tactics, each officer taking turns about as section or platoon commander. This, I am sure, was the best two days worth of training I have ever seen. The comparison between the more senior officers and the younger products of the new regime were, I'm afraid, rather odious. Still, the senior officers themselves were the first to concede the value of such an exercise.

While, naturally, the annual training had to be weighted in favour of the laid down phase of war for study, we made sure that training in all phases was carried out, both in TEWTs and sub-training. It is amazing the variety of tactical training that can be sneaked in under the heading "The Defence — fighting patrols"!

Though we emphasised the more elementary aspects of training, every endeavour was made to introduce variety into training. We aimed to conduct at least one bivouac each year of a more novel character such as a battalion attack with live artillery support and an amphibious exercise with small-craft (rather shadily described as a "defence and withdrawal" exercise). The maximum live firing was carried out and I think we can claim to be one of the very few units who used to fire every weapon on charge (from HE rifle grenades to the flame-thrower) as a regular event. These exercises were of course connected to a previous depot-training build up, but to the troops who did not suspect this, they were something novel and entertaining.

**NCO Production**

Our main crying need was for officers. There is only one place to obtain these in the CMF — from the NCOs. But we also needed NCOs. So here commenced our hardest, most laborious, but to my mind most important task — production of junior leaders.

Apart from the fact that we only had about a half-strength of NCOs, most of these consisted of "old and bold" volunteer types unqualified by examination and promoted for faithful service, or National Servicemen of
TRAINING IN THE CMF

the non-voluntary attending species. First move was to sack every VE NCO of poor attendance. Where these gentlemen were tardy in returning equipment we reduced them to the ranks by disciplinary or administrative channels. The reduction of one warrant officer certainly made our VE NCOs sit up and take notice! The next step was the elimination of all National Service NCOs who did not attend voluntary parades. As it so turned out most never ever wanted the rank and one corporal didn’t know how he possessed it. That left us with exactly 20 per cent. strength of non-commissioned officers, all uniformly mediocre but at least loyal workers and good attenders.

The plan for NCO production was as follows:

(a) NCO promotion was placed on a battalion basis, thus ensuring fairness and maximum use of all available talent.

(b) Every possible source of talent was tapped.

(i) Each private soldier’s record was regularly checked to see if he possessed the slightest degree of NCO ability.

(ii) Every National Serviceman, on reporting, was personally interviewed by the Commanding Officer as to his aspirations (this was time-consuming but well worth the effort). The reports from the NS Training Battalion were also studied and any National Serviceman of possible NCO talent was invited to start on the next NCO course. These men were subsequently to prove the backbone of our NCO element.

(iii) Every VE recruit was reported on and if suitable was placed in the first NCO course to commence after the conclusion of his recruit training.

(iv) A “follow up” book was maintained, detailing every single soldier of possible NCO ability, and his subsequent progression or otherwise through the NCO production machine.

(c) The NCOs were trained by a permanently organised Training Wing, which ran three courses annually, each of 24 days over a 3½ month period.

(d) An examination was held three times each year, to coincide with the conclusion of each course.

(e) No NCO promotions were made, other than thrice yearly, after the examination, when the whole NCO situation could be reviewed.

(f) No promotions were made without prior qualification (although temporary rank was sometimes granted where the NCO had passed two subjects and the necessary vacancy existed).

(g) NCOs transferring in from outside had to undergo the course before acceptance in their rank. (In fact we
seemed to attract NCOs from other units like bees to a honey pot!

(h) NCO production aimed at was 50 per cent. of the establishment each year; both to cover wastage and to hold a qualified reserve as a threat to any existing NCO not giving of his best.

Our NCO Training Wing was run by the most competent instructors in the unit, an officer, an ARA warrant officer and three young sergeants. It took us three months to train our first instructors before we could start, but I would back these as basic instructors against those I have seen in Regular training battalions. The wing had its own Q store and administrative set-up run by the Headquarters of the Training Company. On unit exercises they (and selected students) made up the NCOs of the “pool” troops of that company, which doubtless accounted for its continued prowess in Aeld training.

The course was deliberately designed to be tough, with the aim of exterminating the faint-hearted who merely wanted quick promotion. To this end we instituted the following:

(a) The 24 days course (8 weekends and 24 night parades) was deliberately unpaid. (Many people from other units used to enquire as to how we got them to turn up!)

(b) The course commenced with a weekend where the students were mercilessly drilled. The whole course was run with a strong accent on discipline.

(c) Every parade started with a dress inspection and 30 minutes drilling. Extra drills were awarded for any faults found.

(d) The net result was that 20 per cent. left after the first weekend and an average of 50-60 per cent. survived the whole course. We did not concede this a failure — in fact we achieved our aim, for if we accomplished nothing else we at least established the candidate’s genuine desire to become an NCO.

The subsequent examination took one whole day and one evening, many hours of staff preparation, the employment of some 30 hand-picked examiners who had to be carefully briefed, and some 20 volunteer fatigue-men from the recruits (older soldiers being well aware that this was one day to avoid!) In short, the work was immense, but certainly worth it. In subject “A” every weapon was included down to the more obscure grenades, and a pass in the Mutual Instruction question was mandatory for a pass in the whole subject. In subject “B” the First Promotion candidates actually commanded a section in an advance to contact and put in a section attack when fired on. A pass in this was also mandatory, although bitter were the complaints of the first candidates to front up — the fellow at the end had quite a well trained section to handle by the close of the day! No other aspect of subject “B” was overlooked including
Voice Procedure, Map Reading and all phases of war as applicable to each rank.

By now it will be apparent that all this meant a prodigious labour effort. Initially we took upon us too much work and the system nearly broke down, but once the products of these courses made themselves felt in the unit then the load lightened. For instance, by the 5/60 examination half of all the examiners were themselves ex-graduates of the NCO Training Wing.

On our last annual camp the reward was reaped. Every platoon was commanded by a commissioned officer who had started out on the NCO Training Wing and every rifle section was commanded by a graduate of these courses. Some have argued that the results did not justify the effort, and admittedly at first the NCO Training Wing looked like swallowing the entire unit resources. Many graduates, while possessing the ability to complete the course lost interest once the tempo and enthusiasm of the course concluded. However, having been trained by our original NCOs in 1948, and having helped to train the 1960 generation, I can say that we handed over to our successors a uniformly better-trained crew of NCOs than the war-time Army handed over to us.

Officer Production

The logical outcome of the NCO Training Wing was the production of possible officer material. Gone were the days when company commanders recommended people to sit for First Appointment as this was centralised in the hands of the Commanding Officer. As prior attendance on the NCO course was a requirement for First Appointment nomination, we were able to assess the whole of the available talent for likely officer types.

The intention was to put the unit into the position of having a surplus of qualified First Appointment candidates, both to fill gaps as they occurred and to use this surplus as a threat to any existing probationary lieutenant who might be wavering. We therefore aimed at qualifying 20 per year by placing suitable graduates of the NCO courses straight into an Officer Training Wing. This of course meant that some able, but inexperienced and immature candidates would be nominated, but we devised a scheme to overcome this. Before entering the Wing each candidate had to sign a certificate waiving his right to First Appointment in strict date and examination result order. Of course if they insisted on their rights under the regulations they could do so, but would not attend our course. The legality of this was challenged and put to the test when three candidates were put up for commission ahead of a more successful, but still immature NCO. We were upheld. I may add that the candidates themselves never worried about the matter and fully understood the reasons for it.

Two courses were run annually by the Wing, to coincide with the examinations. Each consisted of 9 weekends and 26 night parades,
all unpaid, culminating in two weekend TEWTs. A fortnightly home study quiz was mailed to candidates and various written exercises were also done in students' own time. At the end of each course the Psychology Corps conducted an assessment of each student.

Having to wait until our NCO Wing began to produce likely starters, we could not get under way until January, 1959. By our disbandment date we had put up 31 candidates in 3 examinations. 30 passed subject “A”, all passed subject “B” but only 15 qualified in “C”. As I gave the instruction in this last subject I suppose I must take the blame! The resultant effect on the unit was good to see. The first “crop” of seven young officers were the best the unit had ever commissioned and were soon embarrassing some of their seniors with their knowledge. As more candidates qualified, prior attendance on the Officer Training Wing became a requirement for promotion to sergeant. One company went to camp in 1960 with all three sergeants fully qualified, and five corporals qualified in two subjects for First Appointment.

We did, of course, have setbacks. Some excellent candidates had to drop out through lack of time to attend the training. By the end of the third course it became apparent that production was outstripping the available talent and that the quality was starting to deterio-rate. I am sure, however, that had the unit survived the reorganisation, the revival of the voluntary system would have solved this problem.

Recruit Training

To overcome the recruit training problem one rifle company was stripped of its privates and left with a Headquarters, store, officers, and a number of NCO instructors. This became a recruit training company but functioned as a rifle company on exercises.

A basic syllabus was devised of 12 night parades of three periods each and a weekend, stripped of all but the barest essentials of drill and weapon training. As fieldcraft was a major subject in the normal unit Home Training syllabus this was deleted to save time. The results of this recruit course were:

(a) Every VE soldier had at least some form of basic training.

(b) Available NCO talent could be spotted early in each soldier's career.

(c) Recruits who had initially joined to belong to a particular company soon acquired a unit rather than a company outlook and were easily talked into going where we needed men most.

I will not pretend that we were completely successful. Until our NCO and Officer Training Wings started to produce their material the quality of the instructors was very poor. In addition, to run a night's training of three periods for three squads each at a different stage of training (we started one each month) meant the preparation of nine periods. This meant, allowing for reserves
in case of unexpected illness, etc., an almost insurmountable instructor problem. In the end we had to overcome this by completing each of the three main weapons (rifle, LMG, Machine Carbine) in one month, starting each new squad off on whatever weapon was being covered that month, and thus combining squads for instruction.

**Instructional Standards**

The raising of instructional standards was achieved in several ways:

(a) By the teaching of Methods of Instruction to both NCO and Officer Training Wings.

(b) By devoting a large part of both courses to mutual instruction.

(c) By making a pass in the instructional question mandatory for qualification in subject “A” for both corporal and sergeant.

(d) By sending a suitable officer to visit each sub-unit in turn on Home Training parades, to assess and report on each instructor.

(e) By the compulsory attendance of all officers (from the CO down) at a course specially run for us by the Command Methods of Instruction Team.

This last method was most productive in that for the first time the more senior officers really woke up to just how poorly they had been trained, and just how well the rising generation had. No, the Adjutant did not come top, that honour went to a probationary lieutenant!

**Supervision and Co-ordination of Training**

We created the appointment of Unit Training Officer, although of course the Commanding Officer and Adjutant still kept their finger on the training pulse. This officer’s duties included the co-ordination of home training accommodation (for which we were sorely tried), allocation of training stores and the maintenance of a store and library of training aids. His main task was the assessment of sub-unit instruction, for both CO and Adjutant could rarely more than briefly emerge from the paper war on Home Training nights. He was also a most useful officer in both bivouacs and camps.

Most bivouac and camp training was co-ordinated by battalion in order to economise on the labour effort and to make maximum use of available talent. (We did not put an officer in charge of some training activity merely because he was a Captain — we only put him there if we knew that he really knew his stuff. This attitude may have hurt many feelings but at least produced results). However, care was taken to preserve sub-unit identity, so that the Battalion did not degenerate into one big training cadre.

I will give one such example of co-ordination — a voluntary weekend bivouac at the rifle range. Previously each company conducted its own shoot, even though some were lucky to have 20 people attending. Details would be changed at each firing mound (a method which is
universally — and to me, mysteriously, alleged to save time), but meanwhile various duties, butt parties, etc., would be called for. That meant that many troops never even completed the full practice and right up to the last hour no one had much idea on just how the shoot was progressing.

Our plan was to have all details organised at a central point run by the Training Officer. One detail was on essential duties, one carried out Owen “dry run” training, one fired the Owen, two carried out LMG “dry run” training and fired a magazine into the stop butts, two fired the LMG course, two acted as number twos to the firers of the LMG course and two marked the butts. This made 11 details so the total attending, 200, were divided into 11 equal details. The Training Officer had line communication to each firing/training point so was able to ensure an even flow of details (the signal platoon laid no less than two miles of cable on the Friday night). Company identity was retained by appointing a company to control a specific activity, and by forming details in company groups. Instead of changing details at each distance fired, a detail would fire the complete course and then move on to the next activity. As a result the Training Officer became aware of re-shoot requirements early in the day and could start planning his re-shoot details.

In one day we successfully fired more men in more practices than we had done in the previous year. Every man present had fired the Owen and LMG courses and we were free to proceed on to other training.

It is perhaps true that too much co-ordination destroys sub-unit initiative, but one well-run show will produce more worthwhile results than half-a-dozen puny and “half-baked” efforts.

Achievement of Maximum Training Time

At the commencement of our unit reorganisation, we paraded, in common with most CMF units, on paid and listed parades, about every second week. The old volunteer idea of turning up to whatever was on hand had died, and I struck some cases of VEs insisting that they need not turn up to a voluntary activity. To overcome this attitude we paraded weekly, paid or unpaid, and failure to attend even the unpaid parades was treated as AWOL. Needless to say, I encountered much opposition from certain hide-bound Command pay types who objected to us marking such parades in the roll book. But it paid off; within six months no one ever knew whether a parade was paid, unpaid, obligatory or voluntary and the attendance at unpaid activities consistently equalled that of the paid. We had re-created the habit of regular attendance.

Bivouacs commenced on Friday nights, though, were not so successful, due to our large volunteer element of bank employees. Progress in training was accelerated by the running of courses on everything and anything. We must have caused
many headaches to the people responsible for training funds, continually wheedling out of them other units' unspent allocations. All this had its result. In 1959-60 we ran purely unit schools and courses (not including recruit training) to the tune of 8 days for every man on posted strength. As half of these were National Servicemen of the non-attending variety this really meant 16 days' course training for every volunteer attender. This to some may be a little hard to believe; all that I can say it that it proves what can be done if the people running things have the desire and energy to do it.

**Discipline**

I know that it is unpopular these days to be a disciplinarian. Perhaps it is old-fashioned; well, if it is I hope I am downright obsolete. Fortunately our Commanding Officer had no illusions on the subject, and knew what few CMF and almost no ARA officers seem to realise — that the harder you are on CMF volunteers the better they like it.

The days of officers pleasing themselves as to what they did passed rapidly and I am pleased to say that at the finish the discipline of the officers was the highest I have seen in any unit, Regular or CMF. This does not mean that they were unduly suppressed, in fact there was a complete lack of the childish mess bullying of subalterns that one often sees. It merely meant that officers were told to do things, not beseeched, and that they did what they were told without argument. The only officer who disputed this arrange-ment no longer holds the Queen's commission.

NCO discipline was even more quickly achieved, for reduction or discharge was invoked where necessary. There was no mercy shown because "Bill was a good bloke" or "had been with us for 10 years" or "was well known locally" or any of the reasons by which time servers survive indefinitely in the CMF. Of course, with the production of a new generation of graduates of our training wings this improvement was even more marked, for discipline was preached to them as a Gospel.

Before the unit died we had a show that looked like an Army, where people moved as if they meant it, where soldiers always saluted, and liked it. I still smile at the bewilderment on the faces of officers of other units, who simply just couldn't understand how we treated the soldiers so brutally, without their leaving en masse!

This does not mean that we tried to emulate the Prussian Guards, if we had our soldiers just wouldn't have turned up. But to the VE the unit was "tough", to the NS man it demanded merely the standard of discipline to which the NS Training Battalion had accustomed him. Ours was, I am sure, one of the few units where a CMF corporal would, if the occasion so demanded, have the moral courage to place a soldier into close arrest — and one of the even fewer where the troops expected it of him.

Of course, this all helped to stimulate Regimental esprit-de-
corps. Having a long and distinguished history (as a complete battalion, too, and not as a succession of vague units raised in the same district) we had much background to exploit. This we did to the extent of teaching Regimental history to recruit and NCO courses and even including it in promotion examinations. By these methods we helped to re-create the fierce unit pride which had characterised the battalion prior to National Service.

Conclusion

Looking back, I sometimes wonder how our Commanding Officer had the colossal “hide” to attempt so much with so little to build from. Even though we had not reached some of our objectives at the day of disbandment, not even the most ardent enthusiast could have foreseen even half the success that was achieved. All I know is this — if you have a goal, if you know where you’re going, then the battle is already half won.

In this article I have stated plainly what seemed to me to be the most serious shortcomings of the CMF while I was directly associated with that part of the army, and I have shown what one unit actually did about them. Although that unit disappeared in the recent reorganisation, its success stands as a challenge to all units of the new CMF. What they did others can do — if they have the will to do it. The measure of their success will be the measure of the Australian Army’s readiness for war.

COMPETITION FOR AUTHORS

The Board of Review has awarded first place and the prize of £5 for the best original article published in the September issue to “The Elements of Power”, by Major N. R. Charlesworth, Royal Australian Infantry.
A piquant aspect of the now historic Moscow-Peking dispute has been the part played by the Soviet Union's smallest, and at times it would seem, almost forgotten European satellite - Albania. The idea that this tiny country with its insignificant industrial or commercial potential should side with Communist China against the Soviet Union and all the other satellites is at first sight incongruous or even amusing, but there are deeper implications and these cannot be ignored.

Albania may be the smallest of the satellites, but it is very far from being the least important. Admittedly its importance to the USSR has diminished and changed in the past 10 years, but its importance to the cause of Communism has increased out of all proportion. At one time, it looked as if Albania was providing Russia with a "window on the Mediterranean", but with the strengthening of the NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean and the establishment of IRBM bases in some of the other satellite countries, Albania's strategic value and importance have declined. Now it is in the field of politics and ideological dispute that this little satellite has the power to play a very big role.

Up to the Italian occupation of the country in 1939 Albania's chief claim to fame seemed to lie in the fact that her ruler had a name more likely to be found in the "Dramatis Personae" of a Ruritanian music-comedy than in a list of crowned heads of Europe. How could anybody seriously regard a country ruled over by a King Zog! After he had fled, the country seemed to have been swallowed up by the Italians and subsequently the Germans, and little was heard about Albania for the rest of World War II.

The elections of 1945 saw the emergence of a Communist-controlled Assembly which on January 11, 1946, proclaimed Albania a "People's Republic". In 1955 Albania was admitted to the United Nations, after her application had been vetoed for nine years by the Western powers.

ENVER HOXHA

The country is ruled by the Communist "Albanian Party of
Labour". The supreme governing body is the Politburo consisting of 9 full members and 6 candidate members. The titular head of state is Major-General Haxhi Lleshi, Chairman of the Praesidium of the People's Republic. The First Secretary of the Communist Party is Army General Enver Hoxha. The relationship between Lleshi and Hoxha is a close parallel to that existing between Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who is nominally head of the Soviet Union, and Nikita Krushchev, the real wielder of power and authority.

Indeed, Albania's position and influence in the Communist bloc really boils down to the personality and mercurial character of Hoxha. This cultured and educated son of a rich Moslem merchant was converted to Communism whilst studying at the University of Lyons in France. It may well be that his childhood environment of wealth and luxury accounts for his extremist approach to Communism, but he is without doubt the most intransigent doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist of the European satellite leaders. He greatly admired Stalin, and rules Albania in a manner alarmingly reminiscent of the late Marshal. Travellers and visitors are not encouraged and news of any kind is rare from Tirana the capital, or from any other part of the country, but perhaps the most ominous resemblance to Stalin manifests itself in Hoxha's habit of attacking indiscriminately all foes of the regime and issuing blanket condemnations which enfold such assorted bed-fellows as Marshal Tito, the Greeks, the American Sixth Fleet, each and every one of the NATO countries and President Kennedy.

Tito is without question Public Enemy No. 1 in Albania and it is more than likely that the main cause for the coolness that has arisen in relations with the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin is lack of support in the quarrel with Yugo-Slavia. Not alone has this made the Albanian Government resentful towards the Kremlin; it has also made them "odd man out" in the ideological dispute between the Chinese on one hand and the USSR and remainder of the European satellites on the other. Although Hoxha in his address to the Albanian Communist Party Congress in February, 1961, paid the usual fulsome tributes to the USSR, he singled out China for special praise and was at pains to emphasise the affinity between the two countries.

From Peking's point of view the situation could not be bettered. As long as Albania takes the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet rift, the whole affair is prevented from degenerating into a simple East-West difference of opinion with potential ugly undertones of racism. Both the Russians and Chinese are too astute to allow this to develop, so the present situation gives Mao Tse-Tung a European ally without lining him up with the "revisionist" Tito; in fact, with the present state of relations between Albania and Yugo-Slavia, the Chinese have the double advantage of supporting one side
in the dispute, whilst giving the appearance that Mr. Krushchev is "soft" on Tito.

In March, 1961, it was reported that two high-ranking officials of the Albanian Ministry of External Affairs had been arrested and charged with spying for the Soviet Union. This unprecedented step for a satellite government seemed to indicate that a first-class cleavage was about to occur in Communist Europe, but significantly, nothing much has happened to worsen or alleviate the position.

The plain fact of the matter is that Albania's importance to the USSR has considerably diminished in the past few years. The strengthening of NATO naval power in the Mediterranean makes the use of Tirana as a base for Soviet submarines a rather hazardous matter; the establishment of IRBM bases in the other satellite countries makes the Kremlin indifferent to the possible loss of what is now as much a liability as an asset. This does not mean that Albania has broken away from the Communist bloc. The Western powers can take no action to hasten this end without appearing to ally themselves with Tito, which would set up a chain of reactions which could have disastrous consequences when it got to Communist China.

— M.D.B.
THE REAL MEANING OF NUCLEAR STALEMATE

Commander John G. Dillon, United States Navy

Reprinted from the July 1961 issue of MILITARY REVIEW, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA

As long as capitalism and socialism (Communism) exist, we cannot live in peace; in the end, one or the other will triumph — a funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or world capitalism.

In Lenin’s belligerent declaration of more than 40 years ago we perceive the ultimate form and enduring nature of the threat to the Free World. Smiling blandishments, convenient denials, and a partnership in World War II notwithstanding, the Communists have not withdrawn this threat. On the contrary, it has been reinforced.

Distracting propaganda, willingness to negotiate their own unrealistic demands, and offers of peaceful co-existence — none of these lessen the strategic potential of Soviet nuclear capabilities, of the 20 Red divisions lurking behind the Iron Curtain, or of the 150 divisions available for employment as the dictates of communism may order. Not only are we faced with a threat of massive proportion, but one that is constant, poised to strike in diverse ways as the mistakes or weaknesses of the West create the opportunity.

For the past 15 years the foundation of Western strategy for deterring the threat and containing Communism has been our nuclear superiority. Now this advantage has been counter-balanced by a fully adequate Soviet nuclear technology and their apparent leadership in the ultimate means of delivery — the intercontinental ballistic missile. This creates a condition of nuclear stalemate.

Does this new condition of delicate equilibrium imply that the use of strategic nuclear weapons will not be risked by either side? Or does it indicate that our own strategy has been neutralised?

The Soviets view their ultimate goal of world domination through a series of interlocking, progressive objectives constituting their combined political and military strategy. An early Communist objective is a divided Free World, this to be attained
by forcing discordant issues upon the West, creating dissenion, and sowing seeds of doubt and distrust. In order to mislead and retard the Western Nations while she is gaining time in the missile field, the USSR attempts through the alternating of ambiguous with direct pressure and the varying of pressure points to convey an indication of her own changing objectives, of vacillation, and of random effort. To the Communist mind, a confused and uncertain Western Alliance is a step forward for the cause.

**Expanded Neutrality**

A lesser objective, but contributing to the breaching of that unity so vital to our survival, is that of expanded neutrality. No longer does the Kremlin divide the world into pro- and anti-Communist camps with the neutrals being ipso facto anti-Communist. On the contrary, neutrals now are considered as an asset. First of all, such nations are not contributing to the strength of the organised Western blocs; second, they offer a convenient source of international friction; and finally, they constitute a potential addition to the Red Empire by way of infiltration and subversion — hence the continuing Soviet campaign to encourage neutrality, while attempting to entice or bully these same countries into the Communist camp.

Progress attainable through neutrality and division furthers the objectives of dominating Western Europe and then the entire Eurasian continent. With the acquisition and control of Free Europe, the Communists would gain those values and resources that now accrue to the Free World; the balance of power would swing unquestionably to the East. Additionally, and essentially by default, with Europe would come the Middle East, the neutrals of Asia, and the control of emerging Africa. North America, the final goal, is on the time schedule, but its occupation must await Communism overrunning those areas from which an economic, political, and military assault could be mounted and supported.

The foregoing demonstrates the key position the control of Free Europe holds in the Kremlin plans. Its worth justifies armed forces capable of capturing and occupying the area.

**Political Strategy**

The contribution of the Soviet military machine to the political strategy is twofold:—

1. To provide the shield or deterrent strength necessary to afford politics' wide latitude.

2. To supply the aggressive force to enable politics to pursue its objectives with direct military action when indicated.

To support the ultimate goal, the Soviets require a military strategy of comprehensive dimension. That is now in hand, and in effect is a moulding together of nuclear capabilities, huge land armies, full tactical air support, naval doctrine, and related weapons systems in preparation for all types and conditions of warfare.
To the Soviet military mind the direct purpose of military operations is the destruction of the enemy forces. Underlying this principle is an apparent belief that wars will not be won by a nuclear exchange, however complete. They can logically reason that random and massive destruction of the industrial capacity, military targets, and even of the population centres of the enemy may contribute to victory, but this will not assure or be victory in itself. In the final analysis victory goes to the side able to capture, hold, and exploit those enemy areas critical to success — again, justification for huge conventional forces.

This is not to suggest a disregard for nuclear weapons; the latter obviously have a vital place in their comprehensive strategy. But there is a moderating concern for survival. To deal out nuclear devastation is not adequate in itself, particularly when risking in return more destruction than a political order could accept and still survive. Forty years of Communist progress are not held lightly. Thus a nuclear exchange, even when initiated with complete surprise, loses some attractiveness. This is especially so since this nuclear capability can be used to further political objectives without its actual employment.

Conventional Warfare

To the Red leaders a nuclear arsenal offsetting that of the United States reduces the probability of the West employing nuclear weapons for less than nuclear aggression. There develops a condition of nuclear stalemate wherein the Soviet nuclear force, without firing a missile, effectively neutralises that of the West. As a consequence, the Soviet Union can revert to a military strategy for which she is historically prepared, tautly trained, and fully equipped — conventional warfare.

With stalemate, conventional forces become the final measure of the effectiveness of military strategy, and here the USSR at present excels and points to constant improvement in weapons, armour, training, and air support. She has retained and refined this conventional feature throughout the perfection of her nuclear capability and the build-up to a state of counter-deterrence.

The USSR is well-aware of the relative strength of NATO forces. The use of her conventional superiority as an arm to political blackmail, to exert pressure, to create border incidents, and to support limited aggression becomes increasingly safe. Such ambiguous aggression is encouraged by a decreasing likelihood of employing the United States Strategic Air Command, for with stalemate the price to unleash our ultimate deterrent multiplies. In effect, the unmatched conventional arms strength of the Soviet Empire becomes the new basic deterrent in the cold war.

Tactical Employment

It is easy to visualise the Soviets, with a counter-balancing nuclear capability and a superiority in conventional
forces, moving into Western Europe while disclaiming the use of tactical nuclear weapons and threatening the United States with nuclear devastation if we should invoke such tactical employment. Should the bluff be called and tactical weapons employed, the eventuality has been provided for in the training and numerical superiority of Soviet troops as well as in the adequacy of their own nuclear arms.

True, the pressing of limited aggression and other means of expansion might trigger general war, but not necessarily an all-out war. The Communists have ample reason to doubt that America would invite her own destruction in order to destroy the Soviet Union in an attempt to save Europe. Their logic is particularly valid since a US-Soviet nuclear exchange would leave Europe standing to serve as an arsenal for the overrunning Red troops.

**Soviet Naval Doctrine**

If such general war should remain restricted to conventional arms, there simply is not the NATO means in being to prevent the Communists from occupying Europe prior to mobilisation and adequate reinforcement. Soviet naval doctrine completes the strategy here, since it is for the primary purpose of interdicting reinforcements of men and materials that the 400-plus submarines have been readied.

Thus while prepared for a nuclear war, the Soviet Union probably does not expect to fight one. Moreover, she doesn't have to since her military strategy, and in turn her political strategy, is not bound to nuclear combat. The older Soviet political strategy of diverse and constant pressure now has been augmented by the deterrence of their conventional capability.

From an implemented military strategic concept of providing the means of fighting all types of wars flows the guarantee of a flexible, full spectrum, political strategy. This advantage is extended by the Soviets' success in control of the initiative.

In answer then to the two questions posed earlier, nuclear parity does lessen the possibility of a strategic exchange. But such condition increases the possibility of major conflict short of all-out war. A strategy, founded on massive retaliation, is neutralised essentially by stalemate, while the Soviet position is strengthened by the return of conventional forces to their pre-nuclear era position of dominance.
SOUTH EAST ASIA
World Focal Point

Staff Sergeant P. G. Gittins.
Royal Australian Engineers

"Henceforth, European commerce, European politics, European activity, although actually becoming more intimate, will nevertheless sink in importance while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast regions thereafter, will become the chief theatre of events in the world".

—William Seeward, American Secretary of State.

The centre of gravity in world affairs is moving from Europe to Asia — from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. From the outset, the high priests of Communism have understood the significance of this historic migration. Lenin declared "The highway to the West is through the East, through Calcutta and Peking".

Later, in his famous Baku pronouncement, in outlining the future course of Communism, Stalin accredited China as the Asian leader in the "Holy War" that would change the face of the globe.

This vision of Asia, as the determining factor in the future of mankind, has not been a monopoly of the Communist hierarchy. Some fifty years ago the American, Henry Adams, warned the West that:

"China is bound to go to pieces and if Russia organises China the drama of history will end in the overthrow of our clumsy Western civilisation".

At the same time, Secretary of State, John Hay, in a memorable statement, referred to China as: "The future strategic field on which the destiny of mankind will be determined".

By a subtle and clever manoeuvre the high priests of international Communism are succeeding in diverting attention from their main purpose — the conquest of Asia — and the West is falling into their trap. The artificial "Berlin Crises" are part of the Communist manoeuvres. But it is in Asia and in South-East Asia in particular and not in Europe that our destiny will be determined. Of course, if the Communists find a loophole elsewhere, they'll move in quickly, as in Cuba, but the main threat will come from the capture of that soft under-belly of the Free World, South-East Asia.

Today, nearly sixteen years after the end of World War II, the symptoms of social unrest, race hate and violence, are more widely manifest and menacing than ever before. In Indo-China,
Korea, the Middle East, the Berlin Airlift, in the Formosan Straits, and once again in Berlin, the Western and Soviet blocs have held trials of strength.

Today's epidemic of military turbulence and political tremors is a new phenomenon. Oversimplified, the epidemic of crises throughout the world today is due to the collapse of two historic doctrines and the impending collapse of a third.

(a) There was Lenin's doctrine of the "inevitability of war". This has collapsed in the face of the inevitability of mutual annihilation.

(b) There was the Monroe Doctrine, the mainspring of American foreign policy, aimed at guarding the whole American hemisphere against outside interference. It is beginning to collapse because American private enterprise has not found a cure for the social ills of Latin America, and because American democracy will not, by its very nature, clamp a military straitjacket on its economic satellites in the way that Khrushchev and Mao clamp down on Communist satellites.

(c) There was (and is) the Truman-Eisenhower doctrine of building and bolstering a ring of anti-Communist states around the Communist heartland. But this is becoming no longer possible. By rules of conventional warfare, as long as nobody dares to upset the Balance of Terror, Russia and China will assert their local military advantage in such countries as Hungary, East Germany, Laos, Tibet and Vietnam.

Warning Signs in Asia

The recent revolutions in Iran and South Korea were warning signs about the situation on the periphery of Asia. They were warnings that it is not only in Laos that there is trouble for the American "client" states. They were an ominous warning that in Asia the policy of containment by American satellite states is breaking down.

In these countries, the Governments have been American "clients", indeed, they have been American creations. All of them are crumbling, and in the final analysis they are all crumbling for the same reason. In relation to the rising popular feeling of independence and the rising popular expectations of material welfare, these American client States are not only corrupt, but they are intolerably reactionary. The fact that they are also under the protection of a foreign and non-Asian Power is an additional liability.

Restlessness within the "free" states of South-East Asia was noticeable before the latest turn of events in Laos.

Unlike Europe, where the neutral countries may be respected and useful but are not politically powerful, Asia has two neutral nations — India and Indonesia — which are politically influential. Their success in getting American aid has not passed unnoticed in Asia, and their techniques of absorbing Communism in their national life have
so far proved at least as successful in Asia as the technique of banning Communism and fighting it on all fronts.

SEATO

SEATO, which since its formation in 1954, has had to withstand the epithets of the Communists and Neutralists in Asia, is now bespattered actively by some pro-Western Asians, including SEATO members. Spokesmen for both Thailand and the Philippines are on record in the past few months with sharp criticisms of SEATO for being unable to prevent what they believe is a gradual encroachment of Communism in Indo-China.

Factors justifying this criticism can be listed as:

(a) The unanimity rule which makes quick action impossible and any action at all difficult.
(b) The fact that none of the Western Powers in SEATO was ready to contemplate World War on behalf of Asia.
(c) The lack of ready military forces and the uncertainty over some supposed to be available, such as the British Commonwealth Forces based in Malaya.

Mainly, however, the prestige of SEATO has been undermined by the growing value of the neutralist nations in Asia. But with five Western members and only three from Asia, SEATO has never expressed Asian sentiment very fully.

It would be difficult to find a more apt symbol for the ineptitude of Western policies generally in South-East Asia than the SEATO forces practising mock war while the region crumbles under the impact of another sort of war that tragically few understood.

After one recent SEATO conference, it was claimed "SEATO had been given new significance and force". But what significance? And what force? Force to batter Borneo palm trees, but not to preserve or to improve the way of life for the people of South-East Asia.

What the criticism in Bangkok and Manila seems unable to take into account is that the retreat in Laos which they lament is a retreat from an impossible policy. It was an impossible policy because it supposed that China would accept an anti-Communist nation on its border and because ultimately it posed the force of SEATO against home-grown guerrillas with an inexhaustible logistical hinterland.

Impartial observers in Asia are more inclined to credit the new Washington Administration with the wisdom of recognising the inevitable failure of an old policy in Laos and salvaging a neutral Laos (if that is possible of course) from the wreckage.

The Laotian situation has exposed the basic weakness in the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation as an instrument of security. Because of these weaknesses there is no doubt that the Communists will be emboldened to take further action in the area. There is also a strong possibility that Thailand will be-
come neutral. Angry and afraid in the wake of the West's failure to act effectively in Laos, Thai officials think that friendship with the Russians may well be the best way to protect Thailand from its gravest threat — Red China. Even in the Philippines, where the predominant view is for strong alignment with the West, neutralist ideas are still alive — and who can foretell the future?

British Policy in Indo-China

In essence, Britain's policy in Indo-China is that anti-Communism is both useless and perhaps dangerous. Her attitude, as shown in her early recognition of the Peking Government, is that the fact of a Communist China makes anti-Communism on its borders a constant threat to peace and has a self destructive effect on the political and economic life of the border nations. She has long believed that anti-Communism in Laos is a wasted effort.

Both the USA and Britain are now agreed that a non-Communist neutralist Laos is the answer, although they may differ on what that means. If Laos is neutralised, Thailand and South Vietnam become the only two anti-Communist countries in the region.

Thailand is flanked by neutral Burma and neutral Cambodia; South Vietnam by Communist North Vietnam and Cambodia. Both have borders with Laos.

Seen this way, the idea of Indo-China as a focal point, or rallying point against the Communist underbelly — an idea which was implicit in the late Mr. Foster Dulles' conception of SEATO when it was formed in 1954 — does not look healthy.

Britain's military reaction to the problem of Indo-China has been to think more and more of a strong line of defence through Malaya, Singapore and Borneo, backed by more assistance from Australia. From a military point of view, it regards West Irian as a greater problem than Laos. Generally speaking, Britain is against SEATO "overreaching" itself in Indo-China.

British Far Eastern Defence Lines

Britain has NATO, CENTO, and SEATO commitments. They have obligations in the Persian Gulf to regimes whose internal stability is, in the long run, doubtful, and in Singapore and Hong Kong Britain has obligations to multi-racial mercantile communities whose survival is of importance to the West in general and to Britain in particular. But how far does this justify the elaborate apparatus of military communications which the British attempt to maintain at so much trouble and expense?

Should Singapore be so largely a British responsibility when its independence is a matter of far greater importance to, for example, Australia and India? Ought British army units to carry out "internal security" duties in Hong Kong? Do they wish irrespective of developments in the Middle East, to underwrite indefinitely the independence of Bahrein and the sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf, in view of their decreasing dependence on the
oilfields under the control of their rulers? There are no easy answers to these questions, but they can legitimately be asked.

The maintenance of Britain's network of overseas defences linking Britain, Cyprus, Aden, Kenya, the Maldives, Singapore and Hong Kong is carried out, it would appear, less as a matter of conscious policy than as one of unreasoning instinct. When the network is rent asunder by war or by local difficulties, they automatically apply themselves with spiderlike industry, to knitting it together again. But what is it really for?

Where, in the future, will it be possible (or necessary) for Britain to intervene with arms except as part of a UN Force?

Finally, there is the inescapable British commitment to Europe. British naval forces must still be available in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean, and British units, both army and air force, must still be stationed in the NATO front line.

Even though both the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand have, since 1941, looked to the United States as their shield, it is obvious that they must take an ever increasing part in the Western military responsibilities of South-East Asia.

American Policy in Asia

President Kennedy, after some seven months in office, has not, to the ordinary educated Asian, settled into any predictable policy on Asian affairs.

The ordinary educated Asian who reads the news, cannot bring current American Asian policies into focus as he could — no matter how much he disapproved of them — those of the Eisenhower administration.

One of the most serious problems America faces in Asia (and in Africa too for that matter) is how to support Asian anti-colonialism while at the same time not lose the friendship of the Western European Powers.

America seemed to be striking a new policy when she withdrew her acceptance of the Dutch invitation to be represented at the West New Guinea Council that opened in Hollandia some months ago. But since then, President Kennedy has had talks with President Soekarno of Indonesia and the Dutch Foreign Minister, Dr. Luns. No statements of importance were issued, nevertheless this must be most confusing to the average Asian.

If America supports anti-Communism, she may also be supporting dictatorship; if she supports democracy, she may be supporting weak and corrupt government, if she supports anti-colonialism she may lose the support of her NATO allies. It is not to be wondered then, that she finds it difficult to formulate a firm predictable policy on Asian affairs.

American Defence Policy in Asia

America's defence in the Far East is based — apart from Japan — on the support of anti-Communist countries off the mainland, such as Formosa and the Philippines.

Mr. Johnson, the American Vice-President, who recently re-
turned from an Asian tour, stated:—

"The US will not surrender free nations in Asia without a fight. It will make any sacrifice and risk any danger that might be necessary to defend free nations against Communism".

To a conference of news editors, he outlined steps which the US must take to halt Communist advances in Asia:

(a) American objectives must be clarified so that Asian nations knew that America did not seek them as satellites.

(b) Asian defences generally must be strengthened.

(c) The US must help Asians raise their living standards.

(d) Increased efforts and more efficient "policing" must be made to ensure American aid went to people who needed it.

(e) Americans must go directly to the people themselves and remove the image of America as a well dressed official who "whizzes through the streets in a chrome-plated Cadillac to an air-conditioned palace to drink tea and make a deal".

The Kennedy Administration's request for military aid was raised from 1600 million dollars in March to 1870 million dollars because of stepped-up Communist pressure in South-East Asia and elsewhere. There is in Washington a sense of crisis about the conflict with Communism, and a feeling that the world's "strategic real estate", however like Laos, must not be owned even partially by Communists. In spite of her political agreement to go along with the idea of a neutral Laos, America's military reaction to Indo-China continues to be based on the possibility of intervention.

The difference in policies between Britain and America are probably no more or no less than the differences between Russia and China over the same area. They are however, a reflection of different interests and a cause of strain within SEATO—caught between two views—for Australia especially.

But the cold war in Asia is not lost for the West. Communism is not riding a tide of inevitable triumph in Asia. However, observers claim that at this point of history, anti-Communism in America runs too deeply for President Kennedy to counter if he wanted to. He must channel anti-Communism into positive acts abroad and run the risk of fanning the flames of war.

No nation willingly contracts its strategic perimeter. The Kennedy Administration may have a strategic outline based on a policy with which it does not agree—but, before its policy can be implemented, the Administration must be prepared to rely on the old technique of real and threatened force. This argument gains power from the fact that in South Vietnam there does not seem any present alternative for America to that of blunt military support. American policy is to get President Diem to enlarge his sympathies and to tolerate other loyalties than those to himself, but this is no immediate answer to one hundred terrorist murders a week.
As it was in Malaya, the only real alternative to Communist control of South Vietnam, is to fight the terrorists on the ground and win.

America's adversary in Asia is China, not Russia. And China's attitude is that if 100 million Chinese die in the destruction of the American way of life, they will not have died in vain. China may not want war because she has a lot of building to do, but she has yet to get over a terrible hatred of America. This increases the danger of war, but, as there seems no hope of reasonable negotiations between the two countries, America's only course is a declaration of strength and a calculation of the risk.

Laos

The best that can be expected from the present situation is an ostensibly "neutral" Laotian Government in the initial years, but under Pathet Lao (Communist) domination and due for an eventual Communist takeover.

This "neutral" Laos, which is being negotiated with such care at Geneva, is a reaction to an ill-founded and unsuccessful effort to force Western anti-Communism on to a small nation which did not understand this conception of its role. But it is also part of a more general acceptance of the respectability of neutralism in Asia today.

Vietnam

The Communists in South Vietnam have been following Mao Tse-tung's classic tactics of guerilla warfare. They have almost complete control of the rural areas where they have either won over or intimidated the local populations. Only the cities remain in the uneasy hands of the pro-Western Government of President Diem.

The Thais, in particular, fear that South Vietnam (as well as Laos) may end in the Communist camp, and have made their fears known to Washington. There are now reports that President Kennedy's Administration has decided to give more aid to the Diem Government and if necessary send in troops to save the country. Already there are American "guerilla warfare experts" in the country training the Vietnam forces, and recently there have been encouraging reports that these US supported Vietnamese troops have been scoring small but significant victories against the Communist Viet Cong guerillas. But the Russians also have been intervening actively in the area. They have been supplying arms and equipment to the North Vietnam Communists operating against the South Vietnam Government.

But, and this is important, it is in South Vietnam, that for the first time a South-East Asian country suffering Communist terrorism has hit back with the same methods inside enemy territory.

Thailand

Mr. Thanat, the foreign minister of Thailand, recently painted an unpleasant picture of his country's prospects, arguing that Thailand must look more to itself and "less to other collectivities which prove to be ineffective". He said that Thailand
should now realise that “it was perhaps a mistake to cast our glance too far away”.

In a bitter reference to Laos poverty, Mr. Thanat said: “The defence of freedom should not be conditional upon the existence of oil wells or mines or investments”.

In April this year (1961) President Kennedy pledged the Prime Minister of Thailand that in no circumstances will the US permit Communist forces to advance to the Mekong River frontier of Laos and Thailand, or to seize any Laotian centre — Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Savanakhet or Paksane. This undertaking was confined to the US and was completely independent of any action or inaction by SEATO.

The Philippines

From the Philippines comes more caustic comment. A former SEATO Director of Public Information, Mr. Vincente Pacis, in a magazine article described SEATO as “one more obsolete weapon in the Free World’s junkyard”.

This reflects the feeling against Britain and France, which, although usually unstated, is implicit in criticisms of SEATO in the Philippines and Thailand. These two Asian SEATO members suspect that while America might have been prepared to intervene militarily in Laos, Britain and France would never have agreed. They suspect more deeply that with dwindling vital interests in the East, Britain and France will never extend themselves in this part of the world as they might in Europe, the Middle East or Africa.

It is beginning to be the feeling in the Philippines that all Britain wants to do in this part of the world is to make a gesture of support, that does not include involvement. Britain will do everything, including appeasement, to avoid becoming embroiled because its real interests are in Europe.

France has already stated in clear terms that it will not take part in any military action in Laos. Mr. Pacis stated: “It’s sickening. We have been talking in SEATO without meaning what we say. It is dishonourable”.

By the same reasoning, the Philippines argue that Australia is more likely to commit itself in Asia. If Australia would take the initiative the people of Asia could be provided with the means to create a NATO-like organisation. It would cost the US much more, but it would pay. The need was urgent.

The US must be convinced of the need, and its response must be in concrete measures, not exuberant assurances.

Russia and South-East Asia

The German crisis has obscured the intense pro-occupation of the Communist bloc with South-East Asia. Some of the Communist interest in this important strategic area has been marked by the visits to Moscow by the Premier of North Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, and the Premier of North Korea, Kim Il Sung. Mr. Khrushchev returned from a visit to Kazakhstan to
conduct personal talks with the South-East Asian delegations as he did recently to meet the Laotian princes.

Diplomatic observers believe that the leaders of North Korea and North Vietnam, with Russian support, will shortly launch an all-out campaign calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops and for negotiations on reunion.

In respect of Laos, little hope is held in Washington that the Communists will show themselves friendly to Western aims and objectives, although Russia itself has always taken the view that neutralism was the next best thing to Communism. The most they are likely to concede is a formula labelling a distinctly pro-Communist Government as "neutral". This might save the face of the West, but will not save Laos.

Conclusion

There is a growing conviction in the West, that, other than a "shooting war" the only workable alternative to Communism in backward Asian countries is a strong military administration, this instead of pseudo-democracy steeped in demagoguery and corruption.

The West's agonised reappraisal of what is good for Asian (and African) peoples is reflected in Western acceptance of General Ayub of Pakistan, General Gursel of Turkey, President Nasser of Egypt, General Nasution of Indonesia and a dozen other military leaders or "strong men" who are proving that a "brass hat" brand of "democracy" is required to impose disciplines in under-developed countries.

Furthermore, SEATO is trying to present another front to its critics by engaging in a programme of scholarships and other cultural activities. In publicity statements from Bangkok it is suggested that the programme will rival the Colombo Plan or the Asia Foundation.

But it has raised many suspicions in Asian minds. Some of these can be seen in the quick negative response by Government officials in Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok and Manila to the idea of a common market in Asia with Australia as a member. None of the three members of the Association of South-East Asian States (Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines) is unfriendly to Australia or the West, but they will think twice before they cast their glances too far away.

Perhaps the military aspect has been best expressed by General MacArthur during a recent tour of the Philippines. He warned that no nation or alliance should recklessly commit troops to fight on the Asian mainland without preparing for total war. He told an informal joint session of the Philippine Congress that South-East Asia was now the focal centre of hostile pressure and that SEATO might have to intervene to shore up local defences. "I would unhesitatingly observe that, with the lessons of Korea in the so recent past, no nation or no alliance of nations should be so reckless as to commit troops to fight on the mainland of Asia without considering the potentiality of the reaction
of the enemy supported by his Communistic allies'.

He went on further to say that any nation or alliance fighting in Asia should be prepared to destroy the centres and supply lines of vastly larger armies enjoying marked logistical advantages. Defeatist military doctrines should not be permitted as in Korea under what he called misleading phrases like "passive offence, aggressive defence, privileged sanctuary, and police action". There can be no half-way measures, no soft blows, no enemy sanctuary. The only limitation is the degree of violence essential to ensure success. A great nation that entered upon war and did not see it through to victory must ultimately suffer all the consequences of defeat.

A COMMUNIST GLOSSARY

In an address to the National Press Club on 10th July the US Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, pointed out how in the Communist glossary "the very language of international intercourse becomes distorted and contrived".

"Peace" has become a word to describe whatever condition would promote their world revolution.

"Aggression" is whatever stands in its way.

"People's democracy" is a term applied to regimes no one of which has been chosen by free election.

"Negotiation" is used as a weapon, for the only subjects to be negotiated are further concessions to Communist appetite.

"Agreements" are offered, but against the background of a long and sobering list of broken promises; an agreement is apparently a rest camp, where one pauses and reforms for a further advance. New assurances are offered in the very act of withdrawing those earlier given.

"Law", as one of their spokesmen put it, "is like the tongue of a wagon — it goes in the direction in which it is pointed". And the gains of lawlessness are cited as the "new conditions" which justify new invasions of the rights of others.
A FORGOTTEN ARMY

Major K. J. Stanley,
Royal Australian Armoured Corps

"Waste not and ye shall want not"

A COUNTRY we should all know very well has a population of more than 10 million people. It maintains a part-time army of 36,500 officers and men. Although a volunteer army, all of its platoons are full and every battalion up to establishment. In fact, most of this army's units want to increase their establishment. They have a tremendous waiting list of potential recruits.

The training this army undertakes is very similar to what we expect from our own CMF — parades at least once a week, weekend bivouacs, schools and courses and a compulsory annual camp. The regularity of attendance would amaze anyone concerned with our CMF; never less than 90 per cent. of posted strength, often 100 per cent. This, in spite of the fact that only the officers are paid and then only for camps. A platoon commander gets about 4/- a day during camp.

The keenness and efficiency of this army is even more amazing. Young NCOs and officers really know the work they teach. They have learnt under the stern and ever correcting eye of qualified regulars during schools and courses. Lesson plans are a model of what good lesson plans should be. Teaching aids are widely used, prepared by the NCOs and officers during their own time. Close supervision is kept on all instructional periods, again by qualified regulars.

These part-time soldiers are the cream of the country's youth. Intelligent, well educated, physically fit, keen to seize on any new experience thrust at them, willing to give of their best at all times. They are at the age when impressions, both good and bad, are easily formed and long lasting. Yes indeed, this is an inexpensive army of tremendous potential. But quick to blossom these soldiers are early to die. Fortunate, if this country was a potential enemy of ours, but, in reality, so very tragic, for the country is Australia and the army part of our own military forces — the Australian Cadet Corps.

With potential so great, material so good, why doesn't this army mature? This question can be answered very simply. It is a
cast off, a neglected army, a forgotten army. The CMF in particular, and the AMF in general do not take enough active interest in the Corps.

But much can be done to remedy this situation. First, and by far the most urgent is that the Army should realise the importance of the Cadet Corps, and the value of the work that is being done. Financial restrictions should never interfere with the development of the Cadet Corps. It is virtually an unpaid army so extra finance would produce more concrete assets. The same cannot be said for the CMF or ARA where an extra allocation of money is often absorbed in basic wage adjustments.

The attitude of the ARA needs attention. Too many of the ARA officers and NCOs when transferred to the Cadets look upon the posting as a very poor one indeed. The statement “Who wants to be a housekeeper to a large number of kids” is often heard. Yet the work the Cadet Brigades do is so important and so rewarding that it should be known to be an honour to get such a posting. The impression that a well turned out soldier, who can teach well, who is wise and knowledgeable and who can shoot well, makes on the young is tremendous. The young learn by imitation; they model themselves on such people; they would like to be such men. The cadet posting enables the regular soldier to set a standard that will be modelled for years to come. The standard can be a good or bad one. Never underestimate youths’ ability to detect weakness. Any lack of character, any lack of enthusiasm for the job in hand and what would be hero worship is replaced by ridicule, not only of the person but of the army he represents.

Cadet postings for officers should never be terminal postings. Graduates fresh from Duntroon should be given Cadet work. These are the men who are most fitted for sharing the enthusiasm they have for the army with the young. If the best recruit is to go to Duntroon he must see the best that Duntroon can produce. The Cadet Corps is the place to parade the finished product. If this were done Duntroon would become Australia’s most sought after University. The present shortage of really able students at Duntroon would be overcome.

But it is the CMF that does the least to encourage the future development of the Cadet. CMF training is the logical follow on from Cadet training. At the end of this year there will be at least 10,000 well trained cadets leaving school, yet less than 10 per cent. of these will join the CMF, in spite of the fact that they are the best material a CMF unit could get. There are few recruit training problems with cadets. Unit indoctrination, a short course on the SLR, perhaps taking four to six parades, and the cadet is ready and keen to take an active part in more specialised training. Another advantage of cadet material is that these recruits are all available at a given time; at the end of the school year. Surely a C.O.’s biggest training headache is the
A dribble of recruits spread over the year, and lack of continuity of training these people get.

Like the ARA, the CMF should also advertise its wares to the cadets, and try to sell what they have to offer. Cadets should be invited to see the training that is done, and there should be a close liaison between the schools and the CMF. The schoolmaster officer of cadets often needs help and encouragement to achieve that something extra in training that lifts the morale of a unit; that something that makes a good unit better. The cadet staff can help here admittedly, but so can the CMF. A CMF officer should be made responsible for liaison between the affiliated cadet unit and the CMF unit. The CMF should do its utmost to make the schoolmaster feel a very important part of the army, as he is, but he often fails to appreciate this. This works both ways — the schoolmaster in turn will make the CMF important, as it is, to his cadets. But he must know more about the CMF if he is to become a good salesman for it. Teachers follow closely the post-school academic progress of their students because, firstly, they prepare them for the University, and secondly, they are familiar with University work. They do not follow the post-school army progress of their cadets because they are not familiar with the CMF, and know little of the army, other than in their own field. But surely the success or failure of cadets is bound up with the number of passes a unit gets; a pass being a cadet who is keen and willing to continue his army career after leaving school.

The above argument does not imply that the Cadet Corps should become more military than it is. Far from it. It must always be remembered that a cadet unit is a school activity using military techniques, and not a military training depot situated at the school. The cadet corps would do better to have more adventure training, plenty of shooting, and very basic infantry training as its core subjects. Leave it to the CMF to develop further military skills. Do not bring the CMF to the cadets — bring the cadets to the CMF; do not deepen cadet work but broaden it. Do not neglect Australia's largest army. It would be tragic if the present wastage of first-class youth were continued, for the want of just a change of attitude — from apathy to encouragement. Can Australia afford this waste?
CHARGE TO GLORY, by James Lunt (William Heinemann Ltd., London, and 317 Collins Street, Melbourne).

In his foreword to this book, the author, Lieutenant-Colonel James Lunt, 16/5th Queen's Royal Lancers, say that it is a story about cavalry. But it is much more than that. Whether he intended to or not, Colonel Lunt has given us a fascinating account of military life in peace and war during the last 150 years.

Colonel Lunt takes 10 battles or engagements to illustrate the development of the cavalry spirit, a spirit which has been aptly described as a combination of independence of thought, quickness in decision, and boldness in action. (One may be forgiven for interjecting that this spirit is not exclusive to the mounted arm.) Beginning with the battle of Marengo in 1800, when the initiative of a cavalry commander turned defeat into victory, Colonel Lunt describes cavalry actions in Spain in 1812, India in 1846, the American Civil War in 1863, the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, the American Indian Wars in 1876, World War I in 1918 and World War II in 1943. Each episode is drawn against a background packed with military information about the period in which the action occurred. Organisation, weapons, tactics, uniforms, pay, recruitment and maintenance are recounted in an unusually lively and entertaining style.

People whose business it is to think up bright recruiting slogans might find inspiration in an advertisement issued by the 16th Lancers about 1759:—

"You will be mounted on the finest horses in the world with superb clothing and the richest accoutrements. Your pay and privileges are equal to two guineas a week, you are everywhere respected, your society is courted, you are admired by the fair, which, together with the chance of getting switched by a buxom widow or of brushing a rich heiress, renders the situation truly enviable and desirable. Young men out of employment or uncomfortable — there is a tide in the affairs of men which taken at the flood leads on to fortune — nick in instantly and enlist".

We don't know how the recruits felt when they found that numerous charges and deductions reduced their pay to 1s. 2d. a week, or what they said when their first foreign campaign took them to the barren hills and impoverished hamlets of Portugal. Perhaps they felt a little better when they got to India, where
one diarist recorded that the regiment of 560 officers and men had some 5,600 camp followers to look after them.

The 17th Lancers was one of the regiments which participated in the famous charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava in the Crimean War. Eighty-nine years later the same regiment charged in its tanks in another death or glory ride into a similar deadly defile in North Africa.

One of the strongest impressions gained from Colonel Lunt's book is the great value and importance of regimental traditions, a point which many people think was not given sufficient weight when the recent reorganisation of the Australian Army was being planned. "Happy the soldier who can fight with glorious traditions to sustain him in adversity, and foolish the army which ignores them".

Books of this kind often make heavy reading. This one doesn't. It is both informative and entertaining, and its perusal cannot help but improve the reader's understanding of the spirit of the military profession. Anyone wondering what to give a soldier for a Christmas present cannot go far wrong with this book.

—E.G.K.