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MESSAGE FROM THE CHIEF OF ARMY

Liddell Hart once wrote that 'the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old idea out'. In the new age of globalised security that we are now entering, the Army, more than ever before, needs to engage in vigorous debate about the past, present and future of military conflict. In less than four years, our land forces have been deployed on operations in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq. It goes without saying that each of these deployments will yield a treasure trove of experience, and ideas about war and conflict, for years to come.

We need to capture both our experience and our ideas in print. We need to debate, analyse and test both against the record of military history, present realities and future trends. In order to do this effectively, the Army requires a credible professional journal that will allow its members to discuss military issues openly and to exchange different views on the character of tactics, operations and strategy. Writing and fighting are, after all, not opposites but two sides of the same coin, and ultimately both activities define the profession of arms. With all of the above issues in mind, in October 2002, I directed the Land Warfare Studies Centre to assume responsibility for the professionalisation of the *Australian Army Journal*, with the support of an Editorial Advisory Board comprising both local and overseas members.

My aim, over the course of the next few years, is to move to a position where the Army possesses a professional military journal whose intellectual content reflects our status as one of the world's leading armies. The strength of the new *Australian Army Journal* will, however, be defined by the support it receives from within the Army. I want to appeal to all members of the 'Army family'—serving members, reservists, retired members, civilian writers and all academics with an interest in military affairs—to throw their support behind the new journal. I look forward to reading its content. It is my hope that the journal will become a regular feature of our Army’s life in the years ahead.

**Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, AO**  
Chief of Army
The Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC) is proud to present the inaugural edition of the new *Australian Army Journal* (AAJ). The LWSC’s aim is to provide the Australian Army with a world-class journal of the profession of arms—a journal in which Australian uniformed professionals can debate the latest trends in land and joint warfare, and reflect on issues of tactics, strategy, operations, and defence policy. Over the past four years the profile and reputation of the Australian Army as one of the world’s finest land forces has grown through operations in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq. The lessons from these diverse operations will shape the future of military strategy for the next two decades. It is therefore vitally important that the Army possess a professional journal in which its officers can record their views, ideas and experiences, and take issue with one another on the subjects of land warfare and joint operations.

Long-serving members of the Army and many in the retired community may remember that the original *AAJ* was published from April 1948 to October 1976. It was the initiative of the then Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee, and there were five editors over the next twenty-eight years: Colonel E. G. Keogh, A. L. Sweeting, Clem Coady, Major Charles Winter and K. I. Taylor. In 1999 an initiative to revive the *AAJ* was launched by Training Command, largely due to the energy of Brigadier Vincent Williams, Commander of the Combined Arms Training and Development Centre (now the Land Warfare Development Centre). Eventually, in 2002, that initiative resulted in the Chief of Army’s directing that the journal become the responsibility of the LWSC. The original aims of the *AAJ*, outlined in 1948, were fourfold: to be a medium for the latest trends in military thought, to assist in the education and training of officers, to stimulate the study of military art and to provide a basis for an Australian military literature. Over half a century later, all of these aims continue to remain relevant.

Readers will note that the LWSC has created an Editorial Advisory Board to oversee the content of the new *AAJ*. The Board comprises eminent Australian, British and American scholars, as well as several of Australia’s most distinguished defence specialists and retired senior military professionals. The appointment of an Editorial Advisory Board represents a commitment to publishing excellence.
All contributions to the journal will be refereed by the Editorial Advisory Board in order to ensure that the AAJ meets accepted international standards in content and presentation.

Furthermore, the LWSC has assumed the management of the AAJ according to a five-year development plan. Under the plan, we hope to institutionalise the AAJ as a fully-fledged quarterly journal by 2008. Two editions of the AAJ (June and December) will be produced in each of the years of 2003–04. In 2005–06, the LWSC intends to increase the AAJ to three issues annually, and in 2007–08, we hope to move to the status of a quarterly journal. For the AAJ to achieve its full potential, it must have quality material to publish on a regular basis. To this end, the AAJ welcomes articles, review essays and letters from all serving officers within the Army, from the retired military community, from academia and from within the Australian Department of Defence.

Readers of this inaugural edition will also find details of a new essay competition that is closely linked to the AAJ: the Chauvel Prize, named in memory of Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel. The Chief of Army has introduced the Chauvel Prize as an annual short-essay competition of 3000 words, with the deliberate intent of encouraging writing on land warfare and joint operations from within the Army community. The Chauvel Prize consists of a Light Horse Medallion and a cash award, and will be administered by the LWSC and judged by the AAJ Editorial Advisory Board. The winning Chauvel essay in each year will be published in the AAJ and the Chief of Army will present the Light Horse Medallion.

Sir William Butler once wrote, ‘the nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards’. With this adage in mind, regular armies throughout the world have always sought to maintain professional journals. An army’s professional journal is the primary means by which recent operational experience is captured forever and handed down to coming military generations. It is the LWSC’s hope that, in the years ahead, young soldiers will learn that it is in the pages of the AAJ that they will find an enduring record of what went before them. We are confident that in the articles of the AAJ they will discover how their peers thought about the conduct of operations and how they served in the field and, above all, what it was that made them proud to wear the uniform of an Australian soldier.

Dr Michael Evans
Head
Land Warfare Studies Centre
There are three great myths about Australia: Lasseter’s Reef exists, Phar Lap was poisoned and Australian Army officers do not write. Yet a roll call of Army officers that have written on military affairs with both elegance and influence is too long to list here. Suffice it to say that the modern tradition of writing by Australian military officers began with Federation in the pages of the *Commonwealth Military Journal*. In 1912, the then Lieutenant Colonel John Monash won the inaugural Gold Medal in the *Commonwealth Military Journal* for an essay on the American Civil War described as ‘an illuminating original article, expounded with utter clarity in a moderate scholarly manner but drawing firm conclusions’. Moreover, it must be remembered that it has been the Army that has given Australia some of its finest war studies scholars. Again, the list of names is too long to reproduce here. Any list, however, would include such Army alumni as T. B. Millar, Robert O’Neill, John Coates and David Horner. While in the world of legend, Australian Army officers care only for cold steel, in reality they have often embraced what Liddell Hart called the realm of cold print.

In this inaugural edition of the revived *Australian Army Journal* (AAJ), five serving officers, three retired officers and a former non-commissioned officer have put pen to paper and entered into cold print. The staff of the AAJ trust that these contributors are merely the point of a very long spear and that many more will follow their example in the future, thus giving us a rich vein of material with which to fill our journal. Our articles in the June 2003 AAJ cover a wide range of subjects including operational ideas, tactics, training, the military and the media, terrorism, and military history. In addition we provide obituaries for three distinguished soldiers, a review essay, a retrospect and several book reviews.

In *Point Blank*—our section for short, sharp and critical material—Brigadier John Essex-Clark (Retd) develops a critique of niche forces, arguing that the Army needs to be able to deploy larger and more self-contained forces. We also include in *Point Blank* a copy of Lieutenant Colonel Tim Collins’s inspirational speech to the British
Army's Royal Irish Regiment on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In our main articles, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy sets the scene by presenting his vision of how the Army will operate in a world of increasing failed states and non-state actors. He provides a candid assessment of our strengths and weaknesses in the early 21st century and outlines the Army’s commitment to manoeuvre operations in a littoral environment and to a philosophy of combined arms warfare.

The case for revising tactics of close combat and the need to maintain a combined arms capability are both well examined in two timely articles by Lieutenant Colonels David Kilcullen and Michael Krause. Colonel Andrew Smith then examines planning methodologies in responding to the new threat of mass-casualty terrorism, while Prakash Mirchandani brings his expertise as a journalist to bear in considering the role of the Army and the media. Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Tulley then looks at the lessons that the Australian Army might derive from the US experience of using combat training centres. Two interesting military history pieces by Dr Albert Palazzo and Dr Eric Villard follow, dealing with civil–military relations in the inter-war period and with US-Australian military operations in the Vietnam War, respectively.

In the AAJ's Insights section, we present two contrasting articles. The first is by Jim Truscott and analyses the impact of early-effect forces in East Timor in 1999. The second article is a chilling eyewitness account of the 1995 Kibeho massacre as seen through the eyes of Paul Jordan, then a paramedic in the Special Air Service Regiment. In Retrospect—a section in the AAJ dedicated to reproducing interesting and notable articles from earlier Australian military journals—we present an article on military leadership by one of the 20th century’s great captains, Field Marshal Sir William Slim. This article was written while he was Governor-General of Australia. Moving on to the AAJ’s Milestones section, we publish obituaries for three of the Army’s most eminent soldiers, Major Generals Ronald Hughes and Ross Buchan, and Lieutenant Colonel Phillip Roden. Our inaugural edition also includes a review essay on the Middle East by Michael Evans, and concludes with book reviews by Major Russell Parkin, Alan Ryan, Martin Sheehan and Alexandra Siddall, and with information on the Chauvel Essay Prize, a diary section and notes for contributors.

The staff of the AAJ trust that our primary constituency, the Australian Army, will find the contents of the June 2003 edition to be of important professional value. We also hope, however, to attract interest from our retired community, from our many colleagues and well-wishers in academia and in the world of joint warfare within the Department of Defence. We are confident that the AAJ will inspire a positive intellectual reaction and a spirit of debate and reflection, leading to a rich flow of contributions for consideration by the Editorial Advisory Board. Finally, on a philosophical note, we should all remember that, while there are three things that do not come back in life—the spent arrow, the spoken word and opportunity missed—the written word lives forever.
The phrases *niche force* or *niche capability* are currently being bandied about as a way to describe current Australian contributions to coalition operations. In a military, if not political, sense this concept may lead to the stagnation of the Army’s ability to conduct military operations. The concept of a ‘niche force’ is founded on the notion that it is appropriate to make force contributions whose specific capabilities are disproportionate to the actual investment of resources and personnel. This approach to multinational operations is alliance policy on the cheap. It might also be seen as a morally corrupt, economically short-sighted and operationally insignificant course of action. There is a danger that we might end up being considered by the United States and Britain, not so much as staunch military friends, but more as political opportunists.

We are in danger of treating our armed forces as a commodity, rather than as citizens who, by putting on uniform, have assumed the responsibility to fight in order to uphold our national values and interests. By focusing on *trading* our special skills, we derogate from the moral impact of our decision to send troops into combat. We would do well to consider the dictionary definition of a *niche market*:

A section of a market that can be highly profitable if the product supplied is specially designed to meet targeted needs; or trade or traffic especially as regards a particular commodity.
Is this the message that we want to send when we deploy our troops—that they represent a commodity in international terms and are not sent on operations as the coherent and self-contained demonstration of our national will and values?

The political and strategic rationale for being part of a coalition force in Iraq to support the national interest is reasonable. Coalition operations represent the future of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). However, the simple reason we have only sent a niche force to Iraq is that we do not have a modern conventional army capable of battlefield interoperability with our major allies. Being platform-based, the Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force appear to be more capable of achieving interoperability with allies by the simple integration of their environmental capabilities. Land forces face the more complex task of integrating human capabilities across a broader potential range of tasks. Furthermore, we may be sending a message that we do not yet possess the political will to maintain a modern army in terms of either the financial commitment required, or in terms of our willingness to accept casualties.

There are plausible reasons for the deployment of niche forces on alliance operations, particularly when the Australian contribution will be comparatively minor in relation to the American colossus. We need to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of investing in operational specialisation. We also need to consider whether we run the risk of developing as a ‘boutique’ force—available for some operational tasks, but incapable of broad-spectrum tasking.

The best argument for committing niche forces to coalitions is that it enables the ADF to operate, albeit on the margins, with the most powerful military force in the world today. It also simplifies the task of negotiating the size and composition of the force contribution, particularly when the lead nation is eager to establish the operation’s legitimacy by a display of ‘flags on the ground’. As we have witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is no denying that a small force has the potential to deliver high operational and political value to the coalition. That contribution can have a relatively low financial cost compared with the cost of forces needed for modern conventional warfare. Furthermore, by keeping the force small and specialised, and limiting the number of combat troops involved, the deployment of a niche force minimises the risk of casualties. There are operational advantages as well. Niche forces used at an operational level of war gain experience in conducting low-level joint and combined operations with our major allies.

This approach would also allow uncomplicated and cheap rotation of the force if the operation were to be extended. Finally, focusing on niche capabilities reduces the costs of providing, maintaining and training a force that would be needed for a conventional war.
Most of these arguments reflect an economic or political incentive. Unfortunately, perhaps, those incentives count for little when forces end up engaged in the one conflict that no-one anticipated. Cast your minds back a few years and consider which operations in which the ADF has been involved would have appeared likely only a year before they occurred.

Developing a niche philosophy holds particular perils for the Army. Some of these are already evident. First, if only Special Forces are used as the Army elements in a niche force, and these forces are expanded, it will drain quality and quantity from the remainder of the Army. It is doing this already. Second, the needs for special ‘niche force’ training and equipment can reduce and divert resources and funds from training for conventional war. Such reduction and diversion may already be happening. Third, niche force structuring does not exercise Australian senior tactical command and control at the operational level of war. Fourth, such structuring could cause our ‘principal allies’, who provide the major conventional forces and therefore ‘do the hard yards’ and take the major casualties, covertly to disrespect the Australian ‘niche’ force, though overtly praising the capabilities and actions of the force in order to satisfy political or strategic objectives. Fifth, developing a niche force structure may appear to some to dilute the requirement, and therefore the costs, for essential major military development needed to prepare for modern conventional war. Additionally, focusing on niche capabilities could diminish the scope of our ‘Training for War’ environment. Finally, we are in danger of creating a Defence culture of ‘special’ operations to the detriment of the rest of the Army. This culture could lead to a concentration on ‘niche’ operations rather than the ability to fight conventionally. Overspecialisation could lead to a further diminution in the quality and quantity of modern conventional weapons, especially in the Army, leading to further reduction of land force capabilities, and it is likely to lessen the quality of deterrence in our national strategy.

If we are going to fly our flag with pride alongside our allies, we should establish and train a larger and more combat-effective Army in order to enable an operationally and logistically independent force to fight alongside the much larger conventional forces of our major coalition partners. In the era of network-centric warfare, the capabilities of the force—that is, its firepower, manoeuvre, command and control, communications, intelligence gathering, and logistics management—must be compatible with the capabilities of our major partner. This is an expensive but
morally correct and balanced option for the longer-term effectiveness and deterrent effect of the Australian Army, and represents the only sound foundation for a firm relationship with our allies.

We need, at least, a modern conventional and fully deployable mechanised infantry brigade that can fight alongside our allies. The Army already possesses the structure. We need the modern combat and logistic equipment and technologies to make it useful as an independent tactical command within a coalition. For example, in Iraq we could have deployed elements of a cavalry regiment, plus a mechanised infantry battalion, artillery, combat engineer elements, aviation, Special Forces, and logistic support. They could have conducted reconnaissance-in-force probing missions or flank protection of the main force in the early days of the war, supported by Royal Australian Air Force ground attack and logistics. They could have then been used for lines of communication and area security in the latter stages of the war. Although deploying a more coherent, self-contained force would have represented a greater financial cost, it would have gained the ADF much in international dignity, and especially much-needed modern warfare experience in coalition operations. At the conclusion of operations, such a force would have had ongoing utility in the critical peace-enforcement mission that inevitably followed the combat phase. By maintaining a force commitment, Australia would not have faced the charge that it was squandering the moral (and it must be admitted, the political) capital that it had built up in assisting to overthrow the Ba’ath regime.

The choice of a ‘special-to-task force’ would have required the political boldness and national will to have funded, developed and deployed a brigade as part of a coalition force, but it would have improved the Army’s capability and morale significantly. We must consider whether this experience will become an opportunity missed or a lesson learnt.

The option of deploying a coherent, balanced and self-contained force package probably requires the ADF to access the expensive, yet highly politically attractive, modern technologies that enable network-centric warfare to operate within a coalition. However, we need not get too carried away by this prospect. Self-contained forces represent a stand-alone capability and can be employed as such. What is important is the establishment of operational synergies with alliance partners that will enable us to cooperate on the future battlefield. In pursuing the information edge over our opponents, we should not trade off the ability to manoeuvre or our
capacity to apply firepower. We certainly need good intelligence and an operational capability in the War on Terror and this, correctly, is influencing much of our thinking. Nonetheless, we must be wary of being seduced by a technological ideology exaggerated by extraordinary success against an enemy such as Iraq whose forces were ‘all show and no go’.

How do we determine the balance between ‘brain’ and ‘punch’, both operationally and financially? There is no doubt that the Special Forces elements of our Army should be designed and fully equipped primarily to support both counter-terror action and conventional operations in our geographic region of interest. If we need a niche force to satisfy a political desire and special operational need within a coalition, we should use only the elements within our current capability. However, there is much thought now within some military and political circles that special niche force capability should be enhanced. Without a significant increase in the size of the Army and the purchase of modern equipment, such enhancement could only occur at the expense of our conventional forces’ combat capability. But we are told that we should ‘fight better with what we have’ and that no increase in the size of the ADF is necessary. However, there is a very real danger that accepting an expanded niche force concept will require us to fight better with what we have left.

Unfortunately, a niche force appears to satisfy principally the political demands of showing the flag internationally, at the lowest cost possible to gain the maximum strategic and political kudos at the expense of a real warfighting capability. If we go down this path, our Army will pay the price with the loss of its capability to operate across the full spectrum of potential operations. The principal danger of such a policy is that a slow cultural change to a belief in soft-option warfighting will result in the loss of an aggressive and powerful winning capability in real battle. The Army must remain prepared for the unforeseen—the only certainty about our next deployment is that it will be unexpected. We do not want to be in the position of going to a gunfight armed only with a knife.

How can we prevent this danger to our Army culture? Irrespective of the attractiveness of special operations niche forces, we must never lose sight of our ability to fight alone and win. Importantly we must let our decision makers—both military and political—know precisely, accurately and irrefutably what we need if we are to maintain an essential degree of operational self-reliance. Communicating this message is a colossal and essential task for our Army leaders. Our current
Army niche forces are proven, gallant, and valuable assets but, in the end, a tough, committed and well-equipped Army is the only element of the ADF that can win a battle where the physical control of land or people is vital to success.

The Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, has made it clear that the twin challenges of operations in Australia’s geographical defence and operations in Australia’s interests ‘that may be far-flung’ must both be met and that there is no ‘either–or’ choice. I believe that, if we were ever to have to fight on Australian soil against a powerful opponent, we would inevitably be in a coalition with our allies. Therefore, rather than preparing to provide a niche force within a coalition, the preparation of a well-equipped modern Army that maximises the use of the available human resources remains paramount. The niche-force concept could be a serious distraction.

THE AUTHOR

Brigadier John Essex-Clark, DSM (Retd), served as a rifleman, infantry section commander, platoon sergeant, and as a platoon and rifle company commander in counterinsurgency operations in the then Rhodesia, Malaya, Nyasland and the Belgian Congo. He saw active service in South Vietnam as a battalion operations officer and commander of a combat support company. In his post-Vietnam Army career, he commanded an infantry battalion and is also a past commandant of both the Infantry Centre and the Army Command and Staff College. Brigadier Essex-Clark is Secretary of the Royal Australian Regiment Foundation and a member of the Board of Directors.
‘WE GO TO LIBERATE, NOT TO CONQUER’

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TIM COLLINS, BRITISH ARMY

On the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom on 19 March 2003, the Commanding Officer of the British Army’s 1st Battalion of the Royal Irish Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Tim Collins, addressed his 800 soldiers at Fort Blair Mayne desert camp, some 20 miles south of the Iraqi border. The rousing speech was commended by the Prince of Wales and was circulated by the White House. It is published here with the kind permission of the British Information Services.¹

We go to liberate, not to conquer. We will not fly our flags in their country. We are entering Iraq to free a people and the only flag that will be flown in that ancient land is their own. Show respect for them.

There are some who are alive at this moment who will not be alive shortly. Those who do not wish to go on that journey, we will not send. As for the others I expect you to rock their world. Wipe them out if that is what they choose. But if you are ferocious in battle remember to be magnanimous in victory.

Iraq is steeped in history. It is the site of the Garden of Eden, of the Great Flood and the birthplace of Abraham. Tread lightly there.

You will see things that no man could pay to see and you will have to go a long way to find a more decent, generous and upright people than the Iraqis. You will be embarrassed by their hospitality even though they have nothing. Don’t treat them as refugees for they are in their own country. Their children will be poor, in years to come they will know that the light of liberation in their lives was brought by you.
If there are casualties of war then remember that when they woke up and got dressed in the morning they did not plan to die this day. Allow them dignity in death. Bury them properly and mark their graves.

It is my foremost intention to bring every single one of you out alive but there may be people among us who will not see the end of this campaign. We will put them in their sleeping bags and send them back. There will be no time for sorrow.

The enemy should be in no doubt that we are his nemesis and that we are bringing about his rightful destruction. There are many regional commanders who have stains on their souls and they are stoking the fires of hell for Saddam. He and his forces will be destroyed by this coalition for what they have done. As they die they will know their deeds have brought them to this place. Show them no pity.

It is a big step to take another human life. It is not to be done lightly. I know of men who have taken life needlessly in other conflicts, I can assure you they live with the mark of Cain upon them.

If someone surrenders to you then remember they have that right in international law and ensure that one day they go home to their family.

The ones who wish to fight, well, we aim to please.

If you harm the regiment or its history by over-enthusiasm in killing or in cowardice, know it is your family who will suffer. You will be shunned unless your conduct is of the highest for your deeds will follow you down through history. We will bring shame on neither our uniform nor our nation.

[Regarding the use by Saddam of chemical or biological weapons] It is not a question of ‘if’, it’s a question of ‘when’. We know he has already devolved the decision to lower commanders, and that means he has already taken the decision himself. If we survive the first strike we will survive the attack.

As for ourselves, let’s bring everyone home and leave Iraq a better place for us having been there.

Our business now is north.

ENDNOTE

1 See the British Information Services’ website at <http://www.britain-info.org/iraq/xq.asp/SarticleType.1/Article_ID.3423/qx/articles_show.htm>.
Since becoming Chief of Army in the middle of 2002, I have been guided by a core question: ‘How will the Australian Army operate in a post–Cold War world of failing states and non-state actors?’ At the beginning of the 21st century, there can be little doubt that the Australian Army faces an environment in which the forces of globalisation and fragmentation are simultaneously challenging many of our traditional ideas about the character of military power.

We are faced with multiple challenges across a complex spectrum of operations. This spectrum requires the Army to be able to meet operations in defence of Australia’s interests that may be far-flung while at the same time being able to provide a direct geographical defence of Australia should the latter be required. The expansion of the Army’s role beyond the direct defence of Australian geography has been the biggest change confronting the land force over the past five years. It is a change that has led to a spirited debate within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) about the basic principles that govern force structure. Should the ADF be structured primarily for defending interests that may be far-flung, or should it remain structured, as it has since the 1980s, for the direct defence of the Australian continent?
Where does the Army stand in this debate? My background and professional training as a soldier have given me a preference for presenting 'my bottom line up front'. I do not believe that the defence of interests and the defence of geography present us with an ‘either–or’ choice. We need an ‘and–and’ response to what we might call the dialectic between Australia’s interests and Australia’s geography. We need to be able to defend Australia directly and also provide the government of the day with a series of options for use in the security of our region, or to secure our global interests. Put simply, in a borderless world in which many security challenges transcend nation-states, we cannot afford to close off any conflict scenario. While our primary responsibility is to provide for the defence of Australia, it is an indisputable reality that over the last decade we have been involved in a wide variety of operations, either in our regional neighbourhood or in other parts of the globe.

I believe that the Army, as a vital component of the ADF, should be capable of providing the Government with the flexibility and adaptability in order to be capable of operating away from our home bases in a wide variety of military tasks. Some defence critics have asserted that those in the ADF that have questioned the viability of a layered continental defence posture in new strategic conditions are, by implication, champions of expeditionary warfare. In particular, there is a suggestion that the Army aspires to create a force structure based around a capacity for high-intensity warfare in dispersed theatres around the world. This is wrong. Let it be understood without any ambiguity: it is not the Australian Army’s ambition to create a force structure that emphasises the acquisition of heavily armoured forces designed for operations in the Middle East or the Korean peninsula. Indeed, the 2000 Defence White Paper, *Defending Australia*, categorically states that the Army had decided against the development of powerful armoured forces suitable for contributions to coalition operations in high-intensity conflict. Our Army will develop the combat weight needed to achieve its missions as a medium-weight defence force, no more and no less.

It is important to realise that, as a medium-weight force, the Army operates within the context of an ADF force structure that is fundamentally joint in character and enjoys the support of both the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). For this reason, the Army is a strong proponent of the acquisition of the air warfare destroyer, airborne early warning aircraft (AWACs), and new combined fighter-and-strike capabilities—all of which are
designed to enhance Australia’s overall military effectiveness. Our military history clearly demonstrates the frequency with which we have conducted joint operations. These operations include the landings at Gallipoli in 1915, the 1945 OBOE series of amphibious landings during the Second World War, the Korean War in the 1950s and the commitment to operations in Vietnam in the 1960s. More recently, in the 1999 mission to East Timor, Australian land forces depended on vital support from the sea and air. The lesson is clear: the Army cannot work alone.

In the future, the ADF will need to be able to deploy and sustain itself as a joint force wherever it is directed to operate by the Government. The land force component of such an ADF is required to be highly versatile and adaptable. The Army must be capable of operations in the defence of Australia and in protecting our security interests in the Asia-Pacific region, as was demonstrated in East Timor. Land forces may also be required to serve our wider global interests—something we were accomplishing in Somalia in the early 1990s—and which, at present, we are undertaking in the current war against international terrorism and on the ground in Iraq.

What has been the impact of the 2000 Defence White Paper on the Army? The White Paper provided new guidance to the effect that the Army’s previous focus on low-level contingencies on Australian territory needed revision. The role of the Army was broadened in order to enable it to deal with a wider range of security contingencies, including a capacity for undertaking expeditionary warfare. In political terms, the phrase expeditionary warfare conjures up images of the Vietnam War and social division. Alongside the myth of the Army aspiring to be a heavily armoured force, the allegation is sometimes made that the term expeditionary warfare is merely code for the doctrine of Forward Defence. Such an allegation is more than false; it is an unfortunate simplification of military reality. In a professional military context, an expeditionary capability simply describes the range of characteristics that enable armed forces to deploy and sustain themselves away from home bases. Given the extraordinary size of our country, the Army could be described as engaging in expeditionary operations were it to deploy elements by air and sea to the Pilbara in Western Australia or to the Gulf of Carpentaria in the north.

Those that have attempted to portray the recent debate about the future direction of strategic policy as a simple clash between advocates that favour defending continental Australia and advocates of embarking on military adventures all over
the globe, are being disingenuous. They are reducing complex strategic issues to mere slogans devoid of intellectual analysis. The White Paper authorised the development of an expeditionary or offshore capability within the Army in the following way:

The development of our land forces needs to reflect a new balance between the demands of operations on Australian territory and the demands of deployments offshore, especially in our immediate neighbourhood.

In laying down this guidance, the White Paper vindicated the visionary work of one of my predecessors, Lieutenant General Frank Hickling. As Chief of Army in 1998, Lieutenant General Hickling laid the foundations for Army and, indeed, the ADF to enhance Australia’s strategic mobility and to improve our capacity to engage in littoral operations. Lieutenant General Hickling’s foresight was timely. Within a year of his decision, the Army undertook its most significant overseas deployment since Vietnam in the form of Operation *Stabilise* in East Timor.

Yet, in some ways, the mission to East Timor can also be seen as the climax to a decade of offshore operations ranging from Somalia and Cambodia to Rwanda and Bougainville. Such operations were often regarded as marginal in defence planning, but it is now clear that they represented another strand of strategic thinking. In the 1994 Defence White Paper there was a statement that the Army would develop its force structure for the defence of Australia with no exception other than at the margins. At that time I was involved in providing the Army’s input to the White Paper. I immediately asked the question, ‘How big is a margin?’. Nearly a decade later, I find myself still asking that question and I suggest that the answer is, ‘bigger’.

In my opinion, despite the views of the proponents of the Defence of Australia ‘concentric circles’ theology surrounding continental defence, such deployments were never conducted at the margins of strategic policy. The offshore operations of the 1990s were, in fact, a profound challenge to the continental defence orthodoxy of most Australian strategic planners. How could the strategic reality of operational commitments in support of interests be reconciled with a rigid strategic doctrine that upheld defence of geography? Ultimately, strategic planners developed a logic that forces structured for the defence of continental Australia could be peeled away to perform offshore tasks as a matter of routine.
The reality was starkly different. The experience of offshore operations seriously undermined the assumption that a land force structured primarily for continental defence could easily accomplish complex offshore operations. In truth, over a period of two decades, the Defence of Australia construct seriously eroded core land force capabilities and turned the Army into little more than a strategic goal-keeper. The theory of continental defence was simple: once the Navy and Air Force had won what might be called ‘the second battle of the Bismarck Sea’, the Army would mop up the defeated remnants of an invasion force that would scramble ashore in the Kimberleys. Lieutenant General Hickling rightly dismissed this approach to strategy as representing little more than a blue-water Maginot Line theory.

During the 1980s and for much of the 1990s, the strategic guidance given to the Army ultimately diminished land force capabilities. We gradually lost strategic agility; our units became hollow; and our ability to operate away from Australian support bases declined to a dangerous degree. Moreover, our capacity to generate, sustain and rotate forces in the field diminished alarmingly. When the ADF went to East Timor in 1999, it was only the tremendous efforts of our personnel in the field and in the rear that concealed these deficiencies in the Army’s capabilities.

During the East Timor deployment, the Army realised the critical need for increased readiness, enhanced mobilisation capabilities, better strategic lift, improved logistics and engineering capability. We also discovered the requirement for possessing reliable long-range communications and the ability to operate at strategic distance. East Timor provided us with a long list of deficiencies, many of which were later addressed by the 2000 White Paper. In the Army, the White Paper’s central purpose is to provide answers to the pressing questions: ‘What do you need to do East Timor again, but better?’ and ‘What capabilities does the land force require to ensure that it can operate away from its home bases in Townsville, Darwin, Richmond, Sydney and Perth?’

The 2000 Defence White Paper acknowledged that the Army had a significant role to play in Australia’s maritime strategy three years after that strategy was first enunciated in 1997. The crisis in East Timor served as a timely reminder that the maritime approaches to Australia are not composed merely of an ‘sea–air gap’, but in fact comprise a complex archipelago in which air, sea and land intersect creating a classic littoral environment. As an infantryman, I prefer to view the so-called ‘sea–air gap’ as a bridge with land at both ends. If the ADF is to be effective as a maritime force, it must be able to conduct littoral operations in all three environments: air, sea and land.
A littoral environment dictates the use of deployable, agile, balanced and joint forces. This is the reality that the 2000 Defence White Paper accepted when it stated that the Army must be capable of offshore operations in the region. We were directed to provide a capability to sustain a brigade deployed on operations for extended periods and, at the same time, to maintain at least a battalion group available for deployment elsewhere. In this manner, the Defence White Paper broke with fifteen years of strategic orthodoxy and committed land forces to expeditionary operations.

In order to operate effectively in the littoral, the Army must be part of a joint force. Land forces require the support of the RAN and the RAAF for strategic lift, air defence, communications, logistics and supporting fires. In this respect, the deployment to East Timor was a triumph for joint capabilities. The RAAF’s C130s and the RAN’s ships in Dili Harbour were as essential to the success of the mission as our infantrymen were in the field.

In the Mad Max world of complexity and ambiguity that makes up the current globalised strategic environment, Australia cannot afford ‘either–or’ solutions to security issues. I agree with the Minister for Defence, Senator Hill’s questioning of the geographic determinism implicit in the ‘concentric circles’ approach to threat analysis. The Army does not view the three categories in our strategic guidance—Defence of Australia, Contributions to the Security of the Immediate Neighbourhood and Support of Wider Interests—as autonomous strategic problems, arbitrarily defined by geography. On the contrary, they are closely interrelated because the ability to operate onshore and offshore is defence of Australia. In a world of borderless security, Australia cannot seek safety behind an Antipodean Maginot Line narrowly defined by a sea–air gap. That comfortable world of the 1980s has disappeared, and we must prepare to meet the realities of the new and unpredictable global security environment.

Let me return to the rhetorical question that was posed at the beginning of this article: ‘How will the Australian Army operate in this post–Cold War world of failing states and non-state actors?’ It is clear that land forces, designed solely to deny the sea–air gap to a conventional adversary, simply lack the versatility to carry out the diverse security functions that are likely to exist in the future. The Army is fortunate in that it can build on some sound foundations of reform laid down between 1998 and 2002 by my predecessors as Chiefs of Army, Lieutenant Generals Frank Hickling and Peter Cosgrove. Under their leadership, the Army began the complex transformation from being a land force structured purely for continental defence, towards becoming a more agile and versatile land force capable of sustained offshore operations.

Central to our transformation . . . is our adoption of the concept of littoral manoeuvre.
Central to our transformation from a continental to an offshore force is our adoption of the concept of littoral manoeuvre, known as Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment (MOLE). This concept envisages that our land forces will be capable of achieving strategic reach through entry from the air and sea. The MOLE concept also embodies the notion of decisive action, followed by a transition to peacekeeping or support operations. We believe that land forces structured for littoral manoeuvre will possess the ingredients for military success across any likely spectrum of future conflict, ranging from terrorism to conventional warfare. Forces configured for littoral manoeuvre will be capable of warfighting, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Excellence at littoral manoeuvre entails a baseline commitment to warfighting. Our troops in East Timor adapted well to peace enforcement duties largely because they were thoroughly prepared for warfighting operations. In the profession of arms, one can trade downwards, but one can never trade upwards.

A land force based on littoral manoeuvre offers a wider range of military options to the Government. The MOLE concept allows the Army to address the physical defence of Australia, the defence of our immediate neighbourhood and support for our wider interests as fluid elements of a single strategic problem. The term *arc of instability*, which has been applied to the region to our north, aptly describes the geopolitical volatility we may face in the future. There is a growing consensus in defence circles that Australia cannot be secure in an insecure region or an insecure world. The tragic terrorist attack in Bali on 12 October 2002 reinforces that consensus.

In the future, we will not be able to choose the character of the wars that we fight. There is a distinct likelihood that we will see more hybrid wars and merging modes of conflict. The US Marine Corps’s concept of the ‘three-block war’ is a useful means of describing merging modes of conflict. In such a war, troops may be simultaneously engaged in a pitched battle while, only several city blocks away, their comrades might be pursuing peace operations and distributing humanitarian aid.

In the 21st century, the existence of a highly fluid strategic environment makes it too risky to try to plan for specific outcomes. Instead, the Army now seeks to make assessments of broad trends and scenarios in war and conflict. Our focus on trend analysis is one reason that we are not leaping to immediate conclusions about the style of operations seen in Afghanistan. Indeed, operations in Afghanistan during 2001–02 yield many lessons, and not all of them are fashionable. In the first place, the campaign in Afghanistan reinforces the reality that close combat remains an
enduring component of warfare. While some success was achieved against the Taliban through small special forces teams ‘cuing’ air and space-based assets to deliver precision strike, most coalition casualties occurred in traditional close combat. The Western media ignored this unglamorous facet of the conflict, largely because ground operations were mainly conducted by proxy tribal forces belonging to the Northern Alliance. The Australian Army believes that close combat will remain a decisive element in any conflict in which the ADF might credibly engage out to the year 2020.

Second, a less spectacular lesson from the Afghanistan campaign was the necessity for land forces to possess organic indirect fires. In other words, and despite a popular fascination with precision attack, we must realise that mortars and artillery pieces are not yet museum pieces. General Eric Shinseki, the US Army Chief of Staff, has stated publicly that failure to suppress Taliban and al-Qa’ida mortar fire in Afghanistan cost unnecessary loss of American life. Despite their sophistication, air platforms and missile systems will not always be available due to weather, competing demands and problems of serviceability.

Accordingly, we need to be cautious in arguing that one particular aspect of combat in Afghanistan should provide the template for our future capabilities. Versatility is especially relevant if we accept that the ADF should be primarily focused on being capable of operating in our own diverse region.

Analysis of the Australian and South-East Asian littoral region suggests that we should exercise caution in seeking to replicate the ‘Afghan model’ of special forces, precision strike and local proxies. Our region, from Christmas Island to Fiji, features an archipelagic area of complex terrain, heavy jungle vegetation and some densely populated urban areas. In combination, all of these factors will almost certainly prove prohibitive to the performance of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) in South-East Asian conditions.

None of the above factors should be interpreted in a manner that suggests that the Army is in any sense luddite in its thinking. On the contrary, we support the ADF’s quest to introduce transformational technologies. We should, however, realise that there are limitations to the use of technology and clear financial limits to Australia’s acquisition of high-technology capabilities.

The ADF should therefore be discriminating in its high-technology choices. For example, streamlined command and control at the tactical and operational levels should be a priority in the application of technology. At the tactical level, there is little doubt that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are a significant force multiplier. These vehicles enhance both joint situational awareness and strike capabilities. In the
future, the ADF could achieve considerable operational synergy from a combination of UAVs, armed reconnaissance helicopters, and airborne early-warning and control aircraft. In broad terms, if we incorporate the characteristics of rapid deployment, adaptability, flexibility, lethal fires and acute situational awareness, we will have developed the kind of joint force that can decisively contribute to success in the range of operations that we are likely to face.

The post–Cold War era has not ushered in a golden age of peace and stability. The Army of the new era of 21st-century globalised security must be capable of meeting a set of diverse conflict scenarios at very short notice across a wide spectrum of operations. It is my belief that the Australian Army is capable of making the transition towards becoming a wide-spectrum force. Our ability to deploy and sustain ourselves away from our bases, coupled with proficiency in warfighting, will allow us to conduct operations from low to high—from domestic counter-terrorism through peacekeeping to conventional warfighting in coalition conditions.

For the foreseeable future, the capability to perform littoral manoeuvre with combined arms groups must be our focus. Such a capability will shape the Army’s capacity to deploy rapidly, fight decisively and make a transition to stability operations in order to win the peace. Such a capability will place the land force at the cutting edge of doctrinal and operational performance among Western armies. In order to respond to the challenges of an unpredictable future, the Army requires strategic agility, a degree of high-precision lethality, pervasive situational awareness, and highly networked sensors and shooters.

Finally, there is the key question of the Army’s size. Current strategic guidance requires that the Army field six fully manned infantry battalion groups and maintain these at a level of high readiness. Some defence analysts have suggested the addition of extra battalions to our combat and combat support forces. Given the high tempo of operations over the past four years, such sentiments are understandable. It is important, however, to avoid seeking increases to our forces based on simple reflex action. Not only must we be aware of current operational pressures, but we must recognise the requirements of emerging operations. Careful consideration should be given to developing forces that are capable—in terms of readiness, training, skills and equipment—of dealing with the demands of the new strategic environment. We can readily understand some of these new tasks, such as the provision of additional Special Forces. However, do we yet comprehend what requirements might be placed on the Army with the expectation that we will provide forces for domestic security?

These considerations apply particularly to our Special Forces. Over the past four years we have asked much of them and they have been on operations almost continuously since 1999. Moreover, since the attacks of 11 September in the United States, we have raised a second Tactical Assault Group from within 4 RAR (Commando) and
a new Incident Response Regiment. As Chief of Army, I am more concerned about the robustness and sustainability of our current forces than I am with a knee-jerk increase to the number of battalions. We need to carefully examine the requirements for sustainment of the present range of combat and support capabilities. There is also the requirement to produce more manpower for the full range of the Army’s new capabilities provided through the White Paper. We must, moreover, deal with considerable pressures on our core enabling elements such as Training Command. For all of these reasons, it is perhaps more important for the Army to make the current force fully capable than it is of raising additional battalions.

In conclusion, the global geopolitical situation is extremely fluid, and we seem to be hurtling into a future whose contours are difficult to discern. Despite our uncertainties, we cannot afford to stand still under rapidly changing conditions. The Army has to make considered judgments about the character of future conflict and try to ensure that its doctrine and force structure are capable of coping with change. The opening years of the new century have proved extremely challenging for the Australian Army. We are operating at a high operational tempo in order to meet demands imposed by the War on Terror, East Timor and other commitments around the globe. In addition, we face the unprecedented challenge of managing modernisation, adapting to changing strategic circumstances, and introducing new capabilities while simultaneously engaging in operations. The combination of these circumstances ensures that every day we live the reality of our motto of ‘Serving the Nation’.

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, AO, is Chief of Army. A graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, he has held many appointments throughout his career, including exchange postings with the British and US Armies, Commander 3rd Brigade and Deputy Chief of Army. This article is based on an address to the Defence Watch Seminar at the National Press Club, Canberra, on 19 November 2002.
This article is about contemporary dismounted infantry tactics. It argues that the Australian Army should reconsider some aspects of its approach to manoeuvre and suppression in the close battle. The article does not argue for a particular solution. Rather, it highlights some apparent problems with our current doctrine and poses a challenge to innovate, and to debate the issues. The aim is to encourage professional debate about tactical innovation within infantry. Whether that debate takes place in the pages of this journal or within some other forum is immaterial. What is important is that we have the debate, reconsider our approach to suppression and manoeuvre in the close battle, and validate our tactics for 21st-century conditions.

Operational experience is more widespread among Australian infantry than at any time since the Vietnam War, yet actual combat experience remains rare. Therefore, tactical doctrine—the way we fight, and how we teach our junior commanders—is more important than ever. If we do not constantly develop our tactical thinking, there is a real danger that we will apply inappropriate tactical methods in future conflict—with disastrous consequences. This article will first describe some experiences that have led the author to question certain aspects of our tactics. It will then briefly examine some historical and scientific evidence before issuing a challenge to reconsider the basis of our infantry tactics.
Between 1995 and 1997, I served as an exchange instructor on the British Army’s Platoon Commander’s Battle Course. During each course the students formed a company group and undertook several attacks in urban terrain, using simulation—similar to our Tactical Engagement Simulation System (TESS). These were two-sided exercises, conducted on instrumented ranges, with night-vision cameras and location systems that allowed us to ‘play back’ engagements and analyse them in detail. An extremely high degree of realism was achieved against an independent ‘free-play’ enemy.

During three years in Britain, I commanded twelve company attacks in the urban training facilities at Sennybridge in Wales and at Copehill Down on Salisbury Plain. Each attack was recorded and analysed, and tactics were changed over time in an effort to improve the company’s survival in the assault. The attacks were fought over the same terrain each time, against the same enemy, in the same scenario, with the same mission (‘capture’) and the same friendly forces. These exercises represented a significant body of experience in the urban assault. With high-fidelity simulation, it was possible to identify which friendly and enemy elements inflicted which casualties, at which point in the battle, and at what location.

The results were surprising. In the early attacks, an orthodox tactical approach was employed. The attack commenced with the establishment of suppressive fire, which enabled the assault platoon to break into the village and fight forward in order to secure key objectives. The reserve was then used to clear the remainder of the village. Held by a reinforced platoon in deliberate defence, the village would eventually fall. We would, however, always suffer heavy casualties, and it would take several hours to capture the village.

The problem seemed to be that of suppression. The company could establish sufficient fire superiority to ‘shoot in’ the assault platoon to the first houses but, as we attempted to manoeuvre, the assault troops would suffer casualties from depth positions that remained undetected and unsuppressed. By the time the objectives were taken, ammunition would be so low (and casualties so high) that we became extremely vulnerable to counterattack.

Watching the video ‘replay’ of these attacks and dissecting them in after-action reviews, I was often surprised by the behaviour and positioning of my troops in the assault. They did not advance by sections or fire teams, clearing house by house and establishing a neat ‘forward line of own troops’. Nor did they move in a straight line. Instead, their movement resembled that of a flock of birds—small independent groups working to a common purpose but without a fixed formation. They would move to a point from which to observe and suppress the next enemy position, then to a point from which the position could be cleared, then to a point from which
to observe the next position, and so on. This cycle of observe–suppress–move–
clear–observe was not based on lines of advance, forward lines of own or enemy 
troops, or indeed on anything linear at all. Instead it was based on ‘points’—points 
of observation, firing points, jumping-off points for assaults.

By the end of my time on the Battle Course, and through experimentation with 
tactics and formations, I had found a formula that worked. This formula involved 
employing almost three-quarters of the company in fire support, with only a 
small assault element comprising an overstrength section. This section was lightly 
equipped but carried engineering and demolition stores. A ‘reserve’ of firepower was 
also constituted, comprising several general-purpose machine-guns and light 51 mm 
mortars rather than a reserve of assault troops. The bulk of the company would 
suppress known enemy positions, inflicting casualties but manoeuvring only enough 
to achieve effective suppression. Enemy in depth would often reveal themselves by 
firing in support of forward positions, allowing depth positions to be targeted and 
destroyed. Because most of the company was in fire support, we could carry a heavier 
ammunition load, and hence sustain a heavy weight of fire for a long time. The assault 
element would be committed only after the enemy had cracked, and if possible from 
an unexpected direction. If necessary, the reserve would direct additional fire support 
to the most critical area once the assault group began to manoeuvre. The results were 
excellent: the village would fall much more quickly, 

This experience gave a clear indication that something was amiss with our doctrinal tactics. 
Doctrinally, we tend to organise groupings into neat 
thirds: assault, fire support, reserve. However, my 
personal experience indicated that this gave insuf- 
ficient suppression, while making the assault element 
a bigger target and consequently increasing casualties. We tend to regard reserves as 
primarily manoeuvre forces; in the company assault, however, we learnt that, where the 
initial assault failed, more assault troops alone would not succeed. Australian doctrine 
tends to express tactics in terms of lines—lines of departure, axes of advance, limits of 
exploitation. My experience would tend to suggest that (certainly in complex terrain 
such as urban environments) what matter are not lines but points.

Most importantly, our doctrine asserts that tactical success in the close battle 
is founded on manoeuvre. Doctrinally, we suppress the enemy purely to create 
favourable conditions for manoeuvre, and then we manoeuvre to defeat the enemy. 
Experience at Sennybridge was quite different: tactical success for infantry in 
complex terrain seemed to be founded on suppression. We suppressed the enemy 
until they took such casualties that their fire began to slacken. This suppression tilted
the force ratio sharply in the attacker’s favour, damaged enemy morale, but most importantly achieved ‘fire dominance’ over the enemy. Then, and only then, did we begin to manoeuvre, and often our manoeuvre simply consolidated a victory that we had already achieved through suppression. Indeed, sometimes the mere appearance of the assault element from an unexpected direction was sufficient to break the enemy’s resistance, provided that the suppression had been effective enough.

The fundamental importance of manoeuvre and the validity of a ‘manoeuvrist’ approach is not in question. Military lessons from the United Kingdom, however, indicated that manoeuvre was something that happened primarily before committing to the close battle. Effective manoeuvre allowed the company to commence the battle under the most advantageous circumstances possible, and this was clearly essential. Once actually engaged in close combat, however, suppression became the key.

TRAINING VERSUS REALITY

Returning to Australia in 1998 to command an infantry company, I had several concerns about our orthodox minor tactics. In Britain I had used a tactical methodology that worked for urban operations in a simulated environment, but doubt remained about its validity in the real world. For instance, my experience was limited to the execution of a full company attack only during training. More importantly, conditions in the United Kingdom were specific to the urban environment and were based on simulation; we had no way of replicating indirect fire, or the emotional and mental strain of combat. Like most infantry officers, I remained highly sceptical about conclusions drawn from simulation rather than from real-life combat.

Then reality came in the form of Australia’s deployment to East Timor in September 1999. My battalion was the first to land in Dili and deployed to the West Timor border within a few days. In the early period of INTERFET, operations on the border were primarily based on counterinsurgency rather than peace enforcement. After all, there was virtually no civilian population in many areas and there were frequent contacts with militia forces attempting to cross to West Timor. Elements of my company were involved in several contacts. I took part in a major firefight lasting about ninety minutes between a company tactical headquarters, two platoons and later an armoured personnel carrier section on our side, and an overstrength Indonesian Army platoon plus about twenty militia on the other. These contacts, and observation of the real-life combat experience of other soldiers, convinced me that there was a strong element of truth in the observations that I had derived earlier.

For example, it was evident that the lead element in a contact would often simply be pinned down, unable to manoeuvre and only able to return fire to protect itself and extract its forward scouts. Elements on the flank, out of the immediate contact, would be able to suppress, but would still be unable to manoeuvre except to achieve
better suppression. These flanking elements—in one case, tactical company headquarters—would create casualties through suppression, and ultimately cause the enemy to falter. In these situations suppression was paramount. No manoeuvre would happen—or would be possible—until the enemy had already cracked and fire dominance had been achieved. Then and only then could sub-units manoeuvre. In one case, after the enemy had been comprehensively suppressed and casualties had been inflicted, the mere arrival of the quick-reaction force mounted in armoured vehicles caused the opposition to seek a cease-fire.1

Similarly, linear manoeuvre was largely irrelevant. What mattered was not the position of our forward line, but getting to a point (or a series of points) from which the enemy could be identified and suppressed effectively. Once this was achieved, it was a matter of maintaining sufficient pressure through suppression to ‘win the firefight’. This would eventually suppress the enemy’s fire, allowing effective manoeuvre.

In summary, my personal experience and my observation of others’ experience in both simulated and actual close combat has led to the following conclusions. First, dismounted infantry combat in the close battle is about suppression more than manoeuvre, and it is about ‘points’, not ‘lines’. Second, the orthodox arrangement of a platoon in the assault, a platoon in fire support and a platoon in reserve does work, but it is costly in time and casualties. Third, an arrangement using a much higher proportion of the force in fire support, a reserve of firepower (rather than a manoeuvre reserve) and a small assault element works better in complex terrain. Fourth, infantry in the assault do not maintain fixed, linear formations. Trying to do so only increases casualties. Instead, they move from point to point on a cycle of observe–suppress–move–clear–observe.2

Again, I am not suggesting that manoeuvre is unimportant. What I am saying is that manoeuvre is something that happens before, after and around the flanks of the close battle. Manoeuvre transports one to the battle under the most favourable circumstances. Once committed, however, for infantry the close fight becomes primarily one of suppression rather than movement.

Australian infantry tactics have not been significantly updated since the early 1980s, and are based on experience from South-East Asian conflicts during and after World War II. Thus, our doctrine tends to assume the presence of jungle. For that reason, we assume comprehensive cover from view and hence the freedom to shake out into linear formations in order to maximise firepower to the front. Our doctrine then uses a fire support element—often deployed in extended line and ideally at
90 degrees to the axis (line) of assault—in order to assist an assault element (also usually in extended line) in pushing onto the enemy position, up to a linear limit of exploitation. These concepts are entirely linear and, as described, with modern weapons in complex terrain (where cover and space may not be available to shake out into linear formations), they do not appear to be particularly effective. Before we can generalise from these particular examples, there is a need to examine what historical and scientific analysis can tell us.

**SUPPLEMENTING PERSONAL EXPERIENCE: HISTORICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE**

Several serving infantry officers have commented that the idea of having a large fire-support element and a small assault group is nothing new, and that Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was doing it in World War I. That is certainly true, as Rommel’s own book *Infantry Attacks* demonstrates. Consider, for example, the German attack on Mt Matajur in October 1917. In mountainous terrain, Rommel’s detachment succeeded in infiltrating successive enemy defensive lines, capturing 9150 prisoners and eighty-one guns for the loss of only six killed and thirty wounded—an astounding casualty ratio for a battle in World War I.\(^3\) Rommel’s method was to employ ‘a supporting element, usually consisting of massed machine-guns, in position to suppress enemy forces while a small penetration element created and widened a gap and his exploitation element (which usually consisted of the bulk of his forces) passed through the gap and moved deep into enemy lines.’\(^4\)

Clearly there are differences between Rommel’s method and the approach described earlier. There is, however, a similar emphasis on achieving fire dominance through massed suppression before committing a smaller assault element to manoeuvre. The concept is therefore not new. It does, however, beg the question, ‘If the idea is so well-established, why is it not in our doctrine and why do we still teach minor tactics based on linear manoeuvre instead of point suppression?’ Our young commanders still focus on manoeuvring to victory instead of winning the firefight.

The experience of Rommel is not the only historical precedent. In 1982, the 2nd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment, had a similar experience at Goose Green in the Falklands. When ‘A’ Company was pinned down on Darwin Hill by concealed Argentine positions, they attempted fruitlessly for several hours to overcome the defence using orthodox, linear manoeuvre. This assault cost the company several lives, including that of the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel ‘H’ Jones.
Finally, the position was taken as a result of effective suppression. This suppression included heavy weapons fire from companies in depth, establishing fire dominance and causing the enemy positions to collapse suddenly. Then—and only then—could a small manoeuvre element secure the position.5

Sydney Jary—the only British officer to survive in command of a light infantry platoon all the way from Normandy to Berlin in 1944–45—once discussed company-level manoeuvre with my students in the United Kingdom. His view was that ‘at company level, you can manoeuvre as much as you want, but if you manoeuvre around one strongpoint, you will just strike the next strongpoint along. Eventually you must commit to the assault and when you do, you must rely on firepower’.6

Numerous other historical examples demonstrate that the idea of ‘winning the firefight’ through suppression and then manoeuvring to consolidate has been around for some time. For a variety of reasons, it seems that the contrasting idea of defeating the enemy ‘by manoeuvre’ (that is, by movement) and using suppression merely as a means to enable that movement, has come to dominate Australian tactical thinking. Because movement is easily described and controlled using linear concepts—axes, angles, lines of departure, and limits of exploitation—our thinking has, in turn, become quite linear. Unfortunately the battlefield is not linear, and arguably never has been.

Recent Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) studies support the notion that ‘suppression is paramount’ in the dismounted close battle. A study by D. K. Bowley, T. Castles and A. Ryan (2001) analysed the Restructuring the Army (RTA) trials to define the key mechanisms of close combat. The study focused on how troops in the close battle actually fight and win, as distinct from how they think they fight.

Using statistical modelling, historical studies, and computer wargames, DSTO attempted to define the nature of close combat. There were three key findings from their research. First, in open terrain, close combat is dominated by aimed fire and attrition. Second, in restricted terrain, close combat is dominated by area fire and suppression.7 Third, the effectiveness of infantry weapons in the attack in close country (that is, restricted or complex terrain) is their ability to suppress the defence.8

An earlier DSTO study conducted by D. K. Bowley and J. A. Millikan in 1997 found that direct fire support ‘has a huge impact on the conduct of the battle … about 40 per cent of all casualties were caused by fire support. In addition to the outright casualties, the fire support suppresses the defence. This allows the assaulting force to manoeuvre with a reduced probability of engagement’.9

Why do we still teach minor tactics based on linear manoeuvre instead of point suppression?
casualties and suppresses the enemy, and only when this is achieved can the assault element manoeuvre to close with the enemy. Fire support has its greatest impact early in the battle, and hence provides a basis for later manoeuvre.

Scientific analysis is always subject to caveats based on methodology and experimental design. There is nevertheless a pattern here: simulation, real-life combat experience, historical precedent and scientific modelling all seem to indicate that suppression and fire superiority ('winning the firefight') have a much greater impact on battlefield success than is reflected in our doctrinal tactics.

THE CHALLENGE OF INNOVATION

Some infantrymen would consider it premature to revise Australian tactics on the basis of simulation, scientific modelling and a few fairly light contacts in East Timor. They may be right, and it is certainly not the case that we should abandon our tactical doctrine, distilled from combat experience in nine wars, just because of new insights.

On the other hand, it needs to be appreciated that, in modern conflict—with casualty-averse governments and constant media presence—a few casualties in a small contact can have enormous consequences. Events at the tactical level can now have strategic and political consequences. If a few minor engagements had gone slightly wrong in the early days in Timor, the entire campaign might have turned out differently. TESS simulation, historical evidence, scientific analysis and recent real-life combat experience demonstrate that there is merit in reconsidering some aspects of our doctrinal minor tactics.

 Australians are justifiably proud of our combat record. The character of warfare is constantly changing, however, and if we are arrogant about our past without taking account of current conditions, we place ourselves in a dangerous situation. History has shown that regular armies are slower to innovate than unconventional forces, and successful regular armies are slowest of all. We now face unconventional, innovative opponents that pose a serious asymmetric threat against 20th-century armies. If we rest on our laurels, and keep doing what we have always done, there is a danger that we will suffer a significant defeat under the new conditions of 21st-century warfare.

Anyone who has ever participated in close combat, or debriefed troops after a contact, knows the conundrum that hampers our understanding of battle: ‘If you weren’t there, you don’t know what happened. If you were there, you probably can’t remember clearly.’ Close combat in complex terrain is so confusing and fast moving that even people a few dozen metres away do not know exactly what is happening. Meanwhile, those who are on the spot are subject to the psychology of crisis. Like those of people in a car accident, their sensory perceptions are influenced by the
expectation of imminent death or injury and the enormous shock of combat. For this reason, everyone remembers a particular engagement differently. This of course is not new, as this description from the battle of Waterloo demonstrates:

Afterwards, nobody in the Infantry ... had a clear consecutive memory of what happened. They only remembered isolated moments, glimpses through the battle smoke, sudden piercing expressions of sound or smell or sight: the rest was a daze of fear, excitement or horror.11

In close combat, personal experience alone is an unreliable basis for changing infantry tactics. Nonetheless, as shown above, there is a clear imperative to continually update and revalidate our tactics in order to ensure that they are appropriate for changing conditions. How then should infantry commanders seek to validate and improve their tactics? Methods include using simulation, observer–controllers, after-action reviews, and experimentation.

With reference to simulation, TESS—particularly when used on the new, instrumented ranges being developed around Australia—can be an extremely effective tool in analysing how we fight and in developing better approaches to close combat. As the Combat Training Centre (Live) develops further, it should ultimately be possible to provide high-fidelity battle simulation data that can be used to generate new tactical ideas and evaluate them. TESS remains in short supply for many units, but its benefits for training and experimentation are significant. If simulation is not available, the use of observer–controllers—who are able to observe tactical performance and facilitate unbiased feedback (as distinct from ‘assessment’ or grading)—can provide similar data that can be used to generate new ideas.

Too often, lack of time or resources lead us to conduct each serial of a tactical exercise only once, as a set-piece activity. The battalion dawn attack as a ‘finale’ to a battalion exercise is a good example of this approach. There is also value in conducting the same attack several times, aided each time by analysis and after-action reviews, and attempting to improve tactical performance. Clearly, such exercises only make sense if there is a degree of openness and trust between commanders at all levels.

The ‘debrief’ after tactical exercises all too often consists of commanders seeking to justify their mistakes. Troops are often harangued in order to improve what the commander perceives as tactical weaknesses. Instead, we should be moving towards a formal, standardised after-action review process, where independent and impartial observers discuss the unit’s performance. Every soldier’s opinion should be considered, and the primary objective should be to understand what happened in order that performance can be improved.
If the experiences described in this article suggest anything, they underline the reality that there is no universal, ‘one best way’ to conduct the close battle. Changes in technology, environment and organisation mean that the conditions under which combat occurs are constantly changing. Therefore we should be seeking to experiment constantly, with different formations, organisations and methods, in order to find appropriate methods of dealing with new conditions as they arise. Clearly, this will often lead to tactical mistakes, but we should be encouraging our junior commanders to experiment and make their mistakes in training, rather than waiting until real defeats force change on us.

CONCLUSION

In summary, this article has argued—using personal experience, historical evidence and scientific analysis—that there is a need to rethink some aspects of our approach to the close battle. In particular, we should consider the relationship between firepower and movement, the need to achieve ‘fire dominance’ before attempting to manoeuvre, the use of a ‘reserve of fire’ rather than solely a manoeuvre reserve, and the notion that suppression rather than manoeuvre leads to victory in close combat. Manoeuvre is still critically important, but it happens before, after and around the flanks of the close battle; in the close battle itself, suppression is the key to success.

Some readers of this journal may disagree with this point of view. The Infantry corps is, at times, the most conventional and traditional of corps. Yet, as this article has sought to demonstrate, such orthodoxy is highly dangerous, particularly under current circumstances. It is time to debate the effectiveness of our infantry tactics. We have the opportunity to ensure that we are well positioned to face the conflicts that will inevitably confront us in this new century. The challenge of innovation is staring the Australian Army in the face. Whatever one’s views on the nature of the military profession, every soldier has the opportunity to rise to that challenge.
This article is about innovation in Infantry tactics and, therefore, there is no space here to address armour directly. Nevertheless, it is clear that armour provides an enormous advantage in the close battle. On two occasions in the United Kingdom, my company had a troop of Challenger tanks under command for an urban assault, and on both occasions the village was taken very rapidly with greatly reduced casualties. Simulation and combat experience alike support the conclusion that tanks save infantry lives, and no sane infantry commander would ever commit to battle without armour were it available. Unfortunately, because tanks are a scarce asset in the Australian Army, few infantry commanders ever see the great benefits they bestow, and hence tend to underrate their value. This is a major mistake.

Again, it is worth noting here that, whereas infantry can only do one of these functions at a time, armour can do all of them—except clear—simultaneously. This is one of the key advantages of armour in the close battle. Of course, infantry are still needed to clear positions and to protect the tanks from a variety of close-range threats, while both infantry and armour rely heavily on engineers and artillery for their survival—a classic combined arms situation.


The study defined ‘restricted terrain’ as ‘terrain where likely detection ranges are shorter than effective weapon ranges’; in other words, by the time troops detect the enemy, they are already within weapon range. Conversely, open terrain is terrain where detection ranges are longer than weapon ranges.


THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen has served as a platoon commander with 6 RAR and 2 RAR, and in a number of overseas appointments including as commander of a Mobile Training Team with the Indonesian Army and Australian Exchange Instructor at the British Army School of Infantry. His operational experience includes service with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, Headquarters Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville, and with 2 RAR during the INTERFET campaign in East Timor in 1999–2000. Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen is a graduate of the Australian Command and Staff College, and holds a PhD from the University of New South Wales. His doctoral dissertation is a study of counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare in Indonesia.
LIKE many Australian soldiers who have served large parts of their careers between the end of the Vietnam War in the early 1970s and the deployments to East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq since the end of the 1990s, I have not participated in a combined arms assault. The long years during which the Army was confined to continental defence resulted in a dichotomy between our doctrinal theory and military practice. Since the adoption by the Army of a maritime concept of strategy, there has been considerable effort to understand the requirements of combined arms warfare. In the absence of experience, we have employed historical studies and experimentation based on data from World War II and from Vietnam. The Army’s study of military history and the use of experiments have been focused particularly on the Asia-Pacific region. This is an area in which the combination of political instability, a littoral environment and complex terrain provides an extraordinary operational challenge.

In the island archipelagoes to our north there are various operational scenarios: civil unrest in Papua New Guinea, chaos in the Solomons, a potential military uprising in Fiji, and the possibility of Islamist guerrillas using training bases on island ‘failed states’. As soldiers what should concern us in examining these possible scenarios is one common requirement: our need to be skilled in the art of combined arms warfare. Whether we are facing a company of regular troops with heavy machine-guns, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades; a band of militiamen with small arms; or guerrillas and terrorists with a mix of weapons, we will require combined arms to deal with them successfully. In our immediate region the terrain is complex due to the combination of jungle vegetation and intensive urbanisation.

In operations in complex terrain against an enemy who has dug in or who is holding a vital position, the requirement will always be for a carefully mounted combined arms assault—something that the Australian Army has not practically
undertaken since the Vietnam War thirty years ago. Not surprisingly, some officials of the Defence Department believe that technology now permits stand-off attack in a manner that precludes the use of expensive armoured vehicles in offensive operations. Such a view is incorrect and will ultimately lead to unnecessary deaths. Any assault based only on a combination of precision weapons and light infantry risks unacceptable casualties among the latter. Because casualties have become a critical political vulnerability for any Western army, professional soldiers are expected to carry an assault with a minimum of losses.

For both political and tactical reasons, an assault on any well-entrenched ground opponent requires a mixture of mounted and dismounted troops supported by direct and indirect fires—in short, we require the combined arms team. Combined arms teams first emerged in their modern form on the Western Front in 1917–18 during World War I. For example, British empire forces, including a hard-core of Australians, used a combination of artillery, infantry and tanks to win the battle of Amiens in August 1918. In World War II, combined arms warfare, not infantry or armoured operations in isolation, gave the Allied forces victory on the ground in 1944–45.

In Vietnam, Australian troops frequently employed combined arms operations against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese bunker positions. Despite the coming of precision-guided munitions and smart-bomb technology, the requirement for a combined arms approach to warfare in the 21st century has not changed. If Australian forces are confronted with bunkers or entrenched positions in a littoral environment, missiles and lightly armed infantry will not be sufficient to neutralise such positions without incurring significant casualties. Clearing fortified positions that are composed of defenders with automatic weapons is a combination activity. Dismounted and mounted troops—infantry sections and tanks—work together in such operations. The infantry act as the eyes and ears for armour while the latter provide the overmatching firepower required to provide cover for the assault on enemy positions.

Combined arms operations demand close teamwork between infantry section commanders and tank commanders, particularly during the break-in and the initial fight-through phases. In the break-in phase, supporting direct and indirect fire by armour allows infantry to go forward. In particular, direct fire from the assaulting tanks and infantry combat vehicles is essential and should continue right up to the forward edge of any contested position. In complex terrain, indirect fire may become difficult to employ. The much-lauded ‘sensor-to-shooter’ linkages that
require identification and designation of targets are difficult to achieve in complex terrain. Unlike in desert conditions, under a jungle canopy, visibility can be severely reduced. If a force stumbles into a firefight or ambush, then the effects of indirect fire will almost certainly be drastically diminished.

Added to jungle conditions there is also the challenge in littoral operations of fighting in built-up areas (FIBUA) using disengaged fires. The Australian Defence Force lacks experience in providing indirect fire support—whether from helicopters, field guns, or aircraft—in an assault in complex terrain. Suppressive fire using disengaged systems may not be effective in thick vegetation when distances become short, and engagement ranges even shorter. A ground force may therefore be compelled to mount an assault and a fight-through almost immediately, and without the benefit of indirect firepower.

Currently, the Army pays this problem insufficient regard in its doctrine. Most of our assumptions about the theory and practice of assault reflect a belief that any enemy will be obliging in his dispositions. For instance, there is a widespread assumption that an enemy will use emplaced obstacles leading to engagement areas that exploit the maximum range of his weapons. Yet it is perfectly possible that an enemy force would hug difficult and close terrain, whether in thick vegetation or in urban areas—two features that are abundant in our region. In northern Australia, the average observation range is some 200–400 metres in distance—a range not dissimilar from that which Australian troops encountered in East Timor, especially around the capital of Dili. At such a short distance one cannot simply employ stand-off fire; it is necessary to close on the enemy's position. Yet a distance of between 200 and 400 metres is still a long way for the infantry to traverse during an assault. The vast majority of infantry weapons are most effective well inside the range of 200 metres. It is this deadly gap—a 'zone of death'—that presents the most difficult problem in assault operations in complex terrain. The gap is too close for an attacker to apply mounted offensive support and yet it is also too far for a dismounted assault to be undertaken by troops.

If, in complex terrain, disengaged offensive support is not as effective as it is in open terrain, how then can the Australian Army increase its firepower in such operations? How can the Army deliver sufficient weight of effective but discriminating fires that allow infantry sections to close towards the enemy’s position? Clearly, such fires must overmatch those of the enemy, but at the same time avoid posing the threat of fratricide or ‘friendly fire’ to our own soldiers. One solution would be to equip Australian infantry with heavier weapons for bunker
busting. There is, however, a clearly set limit to how far a soldier can be burdened with equipment before the individual collapses from physical exhaustion. Another approach is to improve the direct fire that can be delivered from cannon and guns mounted on armoured vehicles. These vehicles can carry protected fire forward; they can discriminate in their targeting; and are immediately responsive to any form of threat. Moreover, armoured vehicles are capable of overmatching the enemy through the weight of their fires. If, in complex terrain, the Australian Army cannot rely on disengaged weapons systems to deliver an effective volume of fires and if our infantrymen cannot carry more weapons, then the Army must increase the effects from our armoured vehicles during an assault.

Since the late 1990s, the Army has investigated the use of armoured firepower in operations in difficult terrain. In particular, it has analysed the campaigns in Bougainville, New Guinea and Borneo during World War II and also in Vietnam between 1966 and 1973. The military history of these conflicts provided valuable insights into how to mount assaults in complex terrain and to conduct manoeuvre operations in a littoral environment. The Army’s analysts at the Land Warfare Development Centre discovered that there were significant problems in both World War II and in Vietnam in making indirect fire effective. The data also demonstrated the difficulty of moving infantry forward when they were pinned down by fire coming from concealed bunkers. Operations in Vietnam showed how tanks were often employed with the infantry in such operations. Armoured vehicles would provide the infantry sections with the necessary supporting fire for a successful advance. A significant lesson that emerged from the analysis of military history was that, if one can move tanks forward and protect them in complex terrain, then their volume of fire nearly always carried the assault to a successful conclusion.

Moving to contemporary operations, then, it is clear that in the break-in battle the key to success lies in achieving forward fire supremacy. If indirect fire cannot dominate in complex terrain, then our armoured vehicles must provide the requisite direct fire. In any future assault, Australian troops must advance and close with the enemy as quickly as possible. They must survive the delivery of fires as they cross the short engagement area, and overwhelm the enemy’s defensive positions. The Army’s armoured vehicles remain the only current weapon system with which to gain a decisive overmatch in firepower as infantry engage in the close fight with an enemy. In this respect, the Army must rely on medium-weight tanks rather than light armoured vehicles. The M113 remains an agile vehicle, but its firepower and
armour are weak and its current upgrade is long overdue. Similarly, the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) might be able to perform in some situations, but like the M113 it can take very little punishment and is at its best scouting and screening. In all key respects, the current Australian cavalry force is a light force designed and trained for shaping and protection missions in warfighting operations. The Australian Army will then have to rely on its medium Leopard tanks to move infantry forward in the combined arms assault—supported, in time, by the new armed reconnaissance helicopters.

Our present-day infantry need to appreciate the demands of their role in the combined arms assault. Until troops close with the enemy, they are the eyes and ears of the tank force. It is the tank, not the infantryman, that is the true killer in combined arms warfare. The task of the infantry is to identify targets for tank fire. The further from the enemy the infantry are, the less they can accomplish. At the same time, the further away from the enemy the tanks are, the more damage they can inflict with their guns without considering the welfare of friendly troops. As both parts of the combined arms team move to within effective small-arms range (perhaps 100 metres) so the infantry will become far more capable of discriminating in their choice of targets and of delivering effective fire. At this point, as the combined arms team fights its way through the enemy position, the infantry sections assume the tactical initiative by directing all fire and movement.

In operations in complex terrain, the aim should be to allow the tanks to set the tempo of the engagement. The achievement of close coordination between infantry and armour only occurs with careful preparation. Such preparation demands excellent communications, continuous training and refined tactical doctrine between mounted and dismounted troops. In the Australian Army, doctrine in the assault needs refreshing. On the one hand, the Army’s conventional doctrine remains largely based on operations through terrain that features rolling hills and maximum engagement ranges. On the other hand, unconventional or light doctrine seems to be based more on fleeting contacts with irregulars. These opposing tactical concepts need to become integrated into a modern operational doctrine for combined arms assault. It is imperative that the Australian Army learns to become expert at combined arms operations in complex terrain and to extrapolate this expertise to include operations in urban areas. In the latter days of the Vietnam War, the Army developed considerable expertise in this area. Yet it was not captured in subsequent doctrine or in lessons learnt, and we have been forced to recover it through historical analysis.
Despite changes in technology and the typology of conflict, in land warfare objectives can often only be achieved by means of a combined arms assault. This type of tactical activity may be part of a broader large-unit campaign such as we are witnessing in the second Gulf War of 2003, or it may be an isolated action in a peace enforcement operation such as East Timor. No modern army can afford to neglect the art of the combined arms assault in a world where globalisation permits the proliferation of vast numbers of automatic weapons. Any well-armed force—whether professional soldiers, paramilitary militia, terrorists or guerrillas—can fortify a building or entrench a position and present a highly difficult defensive problem to an attacker. For this very reason, tanks have much life left in them. We should remember that combined arms teams, including tanks and infantry, were first developed to overcome entrenched positions on the Western Front in 1918. This requirement still remains even in the age of precision weapons. The great tank armies of World War II and of Cold War Europe may have disappeared into history, but the tank, as an integral part of the combined arms team, remains an enduring symbol of modern combat.

In operations in complex terrain, the aim should be to allow the tanks to set the tempo of the engagement.

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Krause is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, and served with the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Armoured Regiment. He saw operational service in Iran–Iraq and with the British 1st Queens Dragoon Guards. His staff appointments have included Command and Staff College, Queenscliff; Directorate General Land Development; and as Military Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Army. Lieutenant Colonel Krause is currently serving in Quantico, Virginia, as the Australian Army’s Liaison Officer to the US Marine Corps, and to the US Army Armor Branch. He holds a Bachelor of Arts, a Graduate Diploma of Defence Studies, a Master of Defence Studies and a Master of Arts (International Relations).
On 11 September 2001, the United States homeland was subjected to a complex, coordinated and devastating terrorist attack. In less than two hours, New York’s World Trade Center and a portion of the Pentagon had been destroyed, and four commercial airliners had been lost with all passengers and crew. The death toll from these attacks was over three thousand, causing the United States to respond to the tragedy by declaring a ‘war on terrorism’. President George W. Bush stated that the elimination of terrorist groups with a global reach was to become a national strategic objective.

An anti-terrorist coalition has since destroyed the al-Qa’ida organisation in Afghanistan and has overthrown the Taliban regime. Yet, despite these achievements, the fight against terrorism will be long, costly and difficult. While military action is important, so too is the civil effort. To this end, the Bush Administration has created a new cabinet-level portfolio for Homeland Security while additional resources have been committed to improving the preventive security and intelligence capabilities for counter-terrorism. Outside the United States, other countries such as Australia and Britain are also reassessing their arrangements for countering terrorism.¹
The American response to the attacks of 11 September 2001 suggests that President Bush’s aim of protecting the United States and its allies from the threat of terrorism will require a comprehensive approach. A set of countermeasures is needed that can address every aspect of terrorism before, during and after an attack. The aim of this article is to propose a framework for dealing with a generic terrorist threat—a framework that can be used to evaluate the completeness of any strategy for combating terrorism. The proposed framework divides terrorists’ offensive efforts into three phases of preparation, crisis and consequence. It is argued that each of these phases involves a particular set of terrorist activities that, in turn, demand the application of specific countermeasures.

Over the past thirty years, the world has witnessed a significant shift in the techniques used by international terrorist groups—from limited hostage-siege situations to mass-casualty attacks. In the 1970s and 1980s, terrorist techniques tended to impose limits on the physical damage or casualties that could be inflicted in any particular attack. The historic use of bombings, a terrorist technique of choice, was often constrained largely because there were obvious limits to the size of the explosive devices that terrorist groups could assemble and transport. Similarly, attacks using small arms, including the use of submachine-guns, were nearly always limited in terms of casualties. The aim was to publicise a cause, rather than to kill large numbers of individuals.

Over time, most Western nations responded to the hijacking threat by developing sophisticated specialist capabilities aimed at resolving hostage-siege crises by force and by using improved security methods at airports, such as metal detectors to scan luggage. By the late 1980s, these efforts largely blunted the hostage threat posed by terrorists. Starting in the early 1980s and evolving rapidly during the 1990s, however, a disturbing new trend of religious terrorism began to emerge with an apocalyptic element that was used to justify inflicting mass casualties. Events such as the 1983 Islamic terrorist suicide truck-bomb attack on a US Marine facility in Lebanon that killed over 200 Marines foreshadowed the mass-casualty terrorism of the future. Another disturbing aspect of the changing character of terrorism was the use of unconventional weapons to try to inflict mass deaths. The Japanese Aum Shinrikyo (Aleph) sect’s 1995 attack on the Tokyo subway system used sarin gas and highlighted fears that terrorists would employ chemical and biological weapons in the future.

As with the hostage-siege phenomenon of the 1970s and 1980s, many Western countries have responded to the threat of mass-casualty terrorism by trying to develop dedicated counter-capabilities. These capabilities include measures aimed at the crisis...
and the consequence management phases of a situation in which a weapon of mass
destruction (WMD) or high-yield conventional explosive may be involved. The
term consequence management refers to the use of measures to mitigate the effects of
terrorist attacks, particularly attacks that might involve chemical, biological, radio-
logical or nuclear weapons, or high-yield conventional explosives (CBRNE).

The events of 11 September suggest that the crisis phase of a terrorist attack is
too fleeting to rely on immediate crisis management capabilities alone. The
11 September 2001 crisis phase of the al-Qa’ida attacks on the United States was over
in two hours and climaxed in the missile-style attacks using hijacked aircraft against
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. During the attacks, US crisis-management
options were limited to shooting down the hijacked airliners and accepting the loss
of the innocent passengers aboard.

The trend towards increasingly lethal terrorist tactics that culminated in the
11 September attacks has significant implications for how Western nations address
the threat of terrorism. There are two areas of special concern. First, there is the
possibility that the scale of the destruction achieved in the al-Qa’ida attacks of 2001
has ‘re-calibrated’ the scope of terrorist actions, opening the possibility that all
follow-on attacks will aim for similar casualty levels. Second, there is the likelihood
that the al-Qa’ida terrorist organisation and others like it are capable of foreseeing,
and planning to survive, a determined Western response on their infrastructure.
It is possible that a second strike may be
planned and be executed at an advantageous
time—perhaps after an apparently conclusive
Western counter-strike against al-Qa’ida and its
Middle Eastern supporters.

If the world is on the brink of a new age of
mass casualty or catastrophic terrorism, then
experience suggests that two imperatives are
necessary to combat the new threat. In the
first place, priority of effort should go into pre-empting terrorist efforts before
they coalesce into an active crisis. Once a crisis occurs, it may be impossible to
avoid devastating consequences. Second, the modern terrorist must be viewed
as an adaptive enemy that can be expected to defeat preventive measures, at least
some of the time. Crises involving terrorism will, therefore, continue to occur
and consequences will continue to be generated. As a result, highly effective crisis
and consequence management capabilities are essential for the security of modern
Western democratic societies.

The above conclusions suggest that the threat of terrorism can only be effect-
ively addressed by possession of a comprehensive array of capabilities that can be
employed at any point during an attack. It is therefore useful to examine the
anatomy of a generic terrorist threat in the age of mass-destruction terrorism. In analysing a generic threat, it is necessary to make a number of generalisations and assumptions. Without the latter, however, it is impossible to develop a functional model of counter-terrorism.

The 11 September attacks on the United States illustrated a trend that has been emerging in international terrorism since the 1980s: sophisticated terrorist groups are prepared to devote considerable effort to developing novel and devastating operational methods. A lengthy preparatory phase preceded several of the more devastating attacks of the past ten years. During this phase, capabilities were honed, operatives were recruited and trained, resources were positioned, and the mechanics of attack were researched and planned.

In contrast with the long preparatory phase, the terrorists’ actions coalesced into a crisis very quickly. On 11 September 2001, final ‘deployment’ for, and execution of, the attack by al-Qa’ida operatives took place within a few hours. As the events of that terrible morning demonstrate, the US Government lacked the quick-response capabilities to prevent the attack from being pressed home against any of its targets, much less save the innocent people aboard the airliners.

Consequences began to be generated even before the last of the four aircraft had crashed. Significantly, the 11 September attacks were assaults that generated immediate and catastrophic casualties. In contrast, in a successful large-scale CBRNE attack on a Western city, the consequences are likely to be more protracted. For example, unlike the 11 September attacks, in a nuclear or chemical attack, a massive decontamination of urban areas would be required, while delayed casualties would probably emerge over a long period. In such circumstances, a consequence management phase of perhaps two or more years is a realistic and chilling scenario.

The above brief analysis suggests that a mass-casualty terrorist attack might consist of a long preparatory phase (perhaps several years), a brief crisis phase (perhaps a few hours) and a long consequence phase (again, perhaps several years). When portrayed graphically, a mass-casualty terrorist attack might appear as illustrated in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: ‘Generic’ Terrorist Attack Timeline](image-url)
A similar schematic timeline could be applied to a terrorist campaign, in which a number of attacks are launched using a range of tactics and weaponry. In such a case, the crisis phase could be drawn out, with attacks and their consequences overlapping.

Using the generic model of preparatory, crisis and consequence phases, terrorists’ actions throughout the evolution of their plan of attack can be illustrated. Represented graphically, the attack sequence would be as illustrated in Figure 2.

Using this model based on phases, countermeasures can be identified and arrayed against terrorist activities, and a comprehensive suite of measures and capabilities then emerges, as illustrated in Figure 3.

Using the generic model, it is possible to compare the terrorist activities under way in each phase with the corresponding government countermeasures. In this way, it is possible to determine whether any serious gaps exist in counter-terrorist strategy.

**THE PREPARATORY PHASE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM**

During the preparatory phase, terrorist activities tend to be low profile and often difficult to link with hostile intentions. Counter-terrorist measures during this phase need to focus on intelligence gathering and surveillance aimed at detecting radical groups and determining their motivation and intentions. Such efforts may also yield benefits by detecting terrorist-related criminal activities, such as drug trading.

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**Figure 2: ‘Generic’ Terrorist Activities Timeline**

**Preparatory phase**
- Capability Development:
  - Recruitment
  - Training
  - Fundraising
  - Research & Development
  - Materiel Acquisition
  - Intelligence Gathering
  - Planning
  - Strategic Development/Basing
  - Network Development
  - Reconnaissance
  - Counter Intelligence
  - Information Operations

**Crisis**

**Consequence phase**
- Exfiltration
- Capability Regeneration
- Consequence Assessment
- Operational Analysis
- Information Operations
- Planning

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**Final Deployment**
- Rendezvous
- Equipment Assembly
- Final Reconnaissance
- Execution
- Extraction
Intelligence gathering may be successful enough to allow pre-emptive strikes to be carried out against concentrations of terrorist activity or capabilities. Intelligence efforts may also point to emerging terrorist tactics, enabling new crisis and consequence management capabilities to be developed. Selective use of information operations to give visibility to these defensive preparations (without compromising operational security) could have both a deterrent and a denial effect.

It should be noted that the above measures are largely reactive and, with the exception of possible pre-emptive strikes, cede the initiative to the terrorist. There are, however, proactive countermeasures available to democratic governments during the preparatory phase. These countermeasures fall into two classes: the direct and the indirect. Direct countermeasures consist mainly of law enforcement and military activities, including strike operations using air power or special operations forces.

Indirect countermeasures consist of programs aimed at addressing the antipathies that motivate terrorists’ actions. Examples include humanitarian aid programs, which should be synchronised with other diplomatic and economic initiatives, to deprive the terrorists of a recruiting base of aggrieved persons. Such measures operate most successfully through diplomatic or economic channels but they are part of a broader psychological or information operations campaign.

Figure 3: ‘Generic’ Terrorist Countermeasures
Indirect countermeasures seek to shape the strategic environment in which any terrorist war is fought. Such countermeasures are difficult to aim at any specific terrorist activity and must be viewed as long term in nature. Preparation is a key factor in formulating an indirect countermeasure strategy, and the generic phase model might be refined by depicting indirect countermeasures, or strategic shaping, as a permanent feature of a counter-terrorist campaign, covering all phases of action.

THE CRISIS PHASE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM

In the crisis phase of a terrorist attack, there may be limited opportunity to apply any tactical countermeasures—particularly if suicide cadres are used. Nevertheless, comprehensive tactical crisis-management capabilities are still essential, particularly if the crisis phase rapidly merges into a consequence phase. A competent response to the crisis by government agencies, however fleeting, is important to maintain public confidence and to avoid the possibility that terrorists may gain a psychological advantage. The deployment of credible crisis-management capabilities, accompanied by aggressive and robust information operations is a vitally important measure in establishing a public perception of a competent response.

Historically, crisis management techniques have tended to emphasise the types of counter-terrorist capabilities usually associated with traditional hostage-siege situations. The new dimension of threat posed by nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism demands a range of technical response capabilities such as bomb disposal, chemical and biological agent detection and identification, vaccine storage and casualty evacuation. These highly specialised and demanding areas of expertise are beyond the competence of small jurisdictions and suggest the need for a national counter-terrorist organisation.

THE CONSEQUENCE PHASE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM

During the consequence phase of a mass attack, terrorists’ efforts may be devoted to exfiltration of surviving operatives, and strategic and tactical re-positioning for follow-on operations. Government activities during the consequence phase need to be concentrated on relief and recovery efforts to ameliorate the effects of the attack itself on the public. In nuclear, biological or chemical attacks, the number of casualties and the extent of infrastructural damage may be reduced by the use of effective consequence
management. Civilian emergency services—including fire brigades, ambulance services, and public health and law enforcement agencies—are important assets, but may require a ‘surge’ capacity to which military forces or other resources may need to contribute. Moreover, a smooth transition to large-scale consequence management operations almost certainly requires frequent rehearsal to meet emergency conditions.

While consequence management is in progress, other government efforts should be devoted to direct countermeasures. These countermeasures include investigating the attack itself, and mounting appropriate military, diplomatic, economic and judicial responses. Early intelligence efforts need to be devoted to determining whether the attack is part of a coordinated campaign, assessing whether direct countermeasures such as pre-emptive strikes or the adoption of additional protective measures are possible. A close analysis of terrorist tactics is useful to guide the development of new protective and consequence management techniques in order to reduce vulnerability in the future.

The application of direct countermeasures during the consequence phase thus suggests a further refinement to the generic phase model: the division of the consequence phase into two sub-phases: detection of the perpetrators and action against the perpetrators. This type of government activity during the consequence phase is similar to many activities during the preparatory phase. There is, in effect, a cycle of countermeasures from preparatory to consequence phases that, if incorporated, make the generic model appear as illustrated in Figure 4.
PLANNING COUNTER-TERRORISM IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

The preceding analysis shows that an extensive range of countermeasures must be available if any country is to have a comprehensive response to the threat of modern terrorism. The generic model proposed in this article has some value in identifying these capabilities in the context of a federal system of government.

In such systems, responsibility for administration is divided between federal, state or provincial, and local or municipal levels. Federal responsibilities normally include economic, foreign and defence policies, with state and local governments being responsible for law enforcement, education and emergency services. In a federal system, however, all levels of government command resources and capabilities that are relevant to a national strategy for countering terrorism. When the sources of these capabilities are arrayed against our generic model, the result is as illustrated in Figure 5.

Federal resources can be applied across all phases—preparatory, crisis and consequence—while state and local resources become particularly relevant in the crisis and consequence phases. For at least part of the crisis and consequence phases, resources commanded by all three levels of government have an important role to play. Indeed, there may be duplication of effort and perhaps even jurisdictional conflicts that might inhibit the efficient application of resources.\textsuperscript{14} The exigencies of a ‘war on terrorism’ may eventually justify the abrogation of certain state and local government jurisdictions in favour of more efficient national management at the federal level.

![Figure 5: Terrorism Countermeasures by Federal Government Source](image-url)
CONCLUSION

The waging of a ‘war on terrorism’ poses significant challenges for liberal democratic governments. Perhaps the greatest challenge lies in the range and complexity of countermeasures that must be developed and implemented if a truly comprehensive national strategy is to be formulated. Successful execution of such a strategy requires a degree of coordination and planning. This type of planning has, heretofore, eluded most Western nations, especially those—such as Australia and the United States—which operate according to a federal governmental model. The high level of management needed for efficient and robust countermeasures in counter-terrorism may necessitate a centralised approach to planning and execution. Such a centralised, national approach may in turn necessitate the sacrifice of traditional autonomy by some intra-state jurisdictions.

This article has sought to develop a model that identifies all the elements of a terrorist threat and their corresponding countermeasures so as to gauge the comprehensiveness of any putative counter-terrorist strategy. Like the Cold War that preceded it, the ‘war on terrorism’ promises to be a long one. It is a struggle that is likely to provide ample opportunity to test the validity of this model, or any other construct that seeks to maximise the effectiveness of governments engaged in the vital task of protecting societies in liberal democracies.

ENDNOTES

1 For example, Australia has doubled its domestic counter-terrorist capabilities and established a Special Operations Command in December 2002.
2 For example, only 20 per cent of terrorist actions during the 1980s killed anyone. See Bruce Hoffman, *Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends and Potentialities*, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1992, p. 3.

7 In the United States, the Nunn–Lugar–Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program is aimed at developing a national consequence-management capability against CBRNE attacks. Hoffman, *Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum*, pp. 14–16.


10 Another prompt US Government response was the diversion of all inbound international flights and the grounding of all civil aviation within the continental USA. While these were sensible measures, they had a significant impact on American business and the American way of life, and thus magnified the effect of the initial terrorist strikes. An interesting sequel was the nationwide ‘grounding’ of Greyhound bus services after a (non-terrorist) attack on a driver.

11 The 1998 strikes against al-Qa’ida sites in Sudan and Afghanistan, although prompted by the bombings on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, could fit into this category.

12 The CBRNE response capabilities being developed in the United States under the Nunn–Lugar–Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program are an example.

**THE AUTHOR**

Colonel Andrew Smith graduated with a Bachelor of Arts from the Royal Military College, Duntroon and also holds a Graduate Diploma in Defence Studies from Deakin University and a master’s degree from the University of New South Wales. He is currently a PhD. candidate in the Department of Politics, University of New South Wales. He served with the United Nations Mine Clearance Training Team, Pakistan, and was instrumental in the formation of the Australian Defence Force Joint Incident Response Unit, which he later commanded. He was Australian exchange instructor to the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College. Colonel Smith is currently Director, Force Development Group, Land Warfare Development Centre.
MEDIA IN PROFILE

THE ARMY AND THE MEDIA

PRAKASH MIRCHANDANI

THE MEDIA IN ITS PRESENT FORM

The traditional concept of the media has been substantially eroded over the past decade with the emergence of a disturbing new trend. In a potentially confusing marriage of fact and fantasy, the entertainment industry has tightened its grip on the companies that produce news worldwide. CNN is now owned by Time Warner, of Warner Brothers fame, the 26 billion–dollar group that brought the world the Harry Potter phenomenon. The American ABC is owned by Walt Disney, the 23 billion–dollar conglomerate that produced the juvenile giants The Lion King and Lilo and Stitch. CBS is owned by Viacom, which has also purchased Paramount Pictures, Nickelodeon, MTV, Showtime and the Movie Channel. America’s NBC news channel is owned by General Electric, which also owns the Biography Channel, CNBC, Fox Sports, the History Channel and National Geographic, among others. Significantly, News Corporation is also the owner of Twentieth Century Fox Studios, and its Fox News Channel is a strong challenger to CNN.

News is now a market commodity, rather than the ethical value it once was.
This new ownership structure has an impact that is uniquely economic. The news arm in each of these corporations is now treated as a business unit, in the same way as the movies, and cartoons and sports channels. The equation is simple: either news draws advertising dollars and high ratings, or news programs and news personnel must change. News is now a market commodity, rather than the ethical value it once was.

The push to ‘market’ news has led to the advent of what is known as ‘soft’ news—stories that resemble movie themes, and analysis that is driven towards entertainment rather than enlightenment. ‘Soft’ news is modelled on the movie format, with heroes and villains, drama and action, laughter and tears. Such stories are typified by cameo accounts of the SAS in Afghanistan, or tearful family reunions as a warship returns from the Gulf. The Australian Army in operations today is a goldmine of such ‘soft’ news, and the Army should be milking the moment for all it is worth. ‘Soft’ news will see the transformation of 19-year-old US Army Private Jessica Lynch into a hero and a Hollywood star, and the immortalisation of her dramatic rescue from an Iraqi prison during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet the same process will allow the story of African–American prisoner of war Shoshana Johnson to go largely unreported.

The birth of the entertainment conglomerates has also heralded the arrival of the major corporate accounting practices that have accompanied these mergers. Again, the effect on the news media has been simply stunning. The economies of corporate accounting have led to a dramatic reduction in personnel staffing newsrooms throughout the world, and the increased ‘pooling’ of footage and stories. Nowadays, the journalist in an area of operations is not only filing for television, but doing interviews for radio subsidiaries and writing articles for newspapers. Enter the video journalist, the nom de guerre for that unfortunate journalist that not only researches and writes the story, and records all interviews, but is also responsible for shooting all the relevant footage with no crew to assist.

Martin Bell, the BBC journalist that covered the Bosnia conflict, rightly observed: ‘we were so busy filing that there was no time to go out and collect the news about what was happening’. Unhappily, this trend continues.¹ The ‘embedding’ of journalists with US and British forces in Iraq has ensured that vivid snapshots of a war and daily life on the battlefield are the food and drink of the screens, but the wider picture remains largely obfuscated.
Also on the increase is ‘parachute journalism’—militarily escorted, protected and cocooned bands of journalists given short-term and limited access to the peripheries of combat zones in order to satisfy the industry’s needs for pictures of any kind. Significantly, the cameramen in these ‘pools’ are the wholesalers of news as well as the retailers. Across every news channel from one side of the world to the other—in New York, in Sydney, in Hong Kong—the pictures are the same. The scripts may be altered to reflect local accents, but the core material comes from a small band of cameramen positioned around the globe to provide the pictures. The same applies to print and radio, with increasingly syndicated columnists and reporters that represent groups of radio stations.

THE REVOLUTION IN MEDIA AFFAIRS

The transformation of the media has been dramatic and far-ranging, and extends beyond even the aftershocks of the emergence of conglomerate ownership structures. The Revolution in Media Affairs has changed the media in three distinct ways: through technology, new business practices and the changing nature of journalism in a cyber-world.

The changes wrought by the advances in media technology have been extraordinary. Laptops, videophones, field editing gear and handheld video-cameras have changed the nature of reportage, allowing for instant—if somewhat limited—pictures, but starkly devoid of analysis of any form.

For good reasons, combatants from both sides want access to satellite television in order to convey their own message undiluted—the so-called ‘CNN wars’ syndrome. They are highly resistant to any analysis, distortion or filtering of their message by reporters. Today’s combatants use the new technology as a weapon to capture the ‘mediaspace’ while ruthlessly driving the media out of the battlespace.

For RMA-rich countries (in this context, the Revolution in Military Affairs), it means projecting the image of war without dead bodies, of precision-guided munitions hitting targets, not people. It is the comforting projection of what Michael Ignatieff calls ‘virtual war’ in his book of the same name. Ignatieff argues that:

war becomes virtual, not simply because it seems to take place on a screen, but because it enlists societies only in virtual ways. Nothing ultimate is at stake: neither national survival nor the fate of the economy. When war becomes a spectator sport, the media become a decisive theatre of operations.2

RMA-poor countries, for their part, certainly do not want the media to witness their excesses, including those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Timor and, currently, Zimbabwe. These countries are also particularly averse to having the media signal their military preparations.
Journalists are also increasingly being called to testify at international tribunals on war crimes. The BBC reporter Jacky Rowland, for example, is the latest to testify at the trial of Slobodan Milosevic. A natural consequence of such testimonials is that reporters are being given even less access to combat areas, in case they subsequently turn witness for the prosecution. It is interesting to speculate what legal testimony by journalists might mean for the future role of the International Criminal Court in examining coalition operations in conflicts such as Afghanistan. If courts can force journalists in war crimes trials to reveal their sources of information, it reflects a sea change in the way the military–media relationship develops. Hence the advent of what is termed ‘soldiercam’—pictures provided by the protagonists themselves, without the filter of journalism.

Soldiercam pictures from either side of the conflict are now readily provided to the media. Yet, the average journalist has no basis for judging whether these pictures are real or manipulated. There is controversy, for example, over the pictures of US Special Forces attacking Mullah Omar’s stronghold in Afghanistan on 20 October 2001. Allegations that the raid went horribly wrong and the pictures are, in fact, of a totally different parachute drop by the rangers on an airfield that had already been sanitised are rapidly gaining currency. Seymour Hersh reports that the real raid on Mullah Omar’s stronghold was anything but the ‘cakewalk’ it was purported to be. Yet, as is becoming increasingly obvious, if the soldiercam pictures are sufficiently exciting, the infotainment industry will use them, despite their dubious veracity.

Future combatants, particularly RMA-poor combatants, will devote as much effort to training soldier–cameramen to provide these pictures as they will for training combat soldiers. Indeed, the videos released of interviews with Osama bin Laden in recent times prove the efficacy of this tactic. The use of soldiercam amounts to a form of Information Operations waged on global television. Yet this is an admission that no news editor will make, since it imposes the obligation to adopt radical and dangerous new ways of gathering news to replace the current *modus operandi*.

As a postscript to this comment on technology, it is interesting to see the rise of Al-Jazeera television and alternative media sites such as <www.mediachannel.org>. Al-Jazeera is a new phenomenon, a purely Arab-owned network that has recently gained such extraordinary credibility that Western leaders are being forced to engage with it, rather than use the customary CNN channels to transmit their messages. During Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, this channel truly gained the ascendancy, with most global television networks using its footage, even while...
some of them decried it as Arab propaganda. Al-Jazeera’s success led to attacks on its English-language website by hackers, who apparently did not want another viewpoint seen by English-language speakers. It also saw the rise of rival television stations such as Abu Dhabi TV and Al-Arabia TV, which are attempting to capture a share of the vast Middle East viewership. Whether this trend will be replicated elsewhere in the world in a bid to combat the current Hollywood monopoly of news networks has yet to be seen.

In one sense, this infotainment approach to the coverage of major issues has given rise to the escalation of asymmetric warfare. Since blockbuster pictures are what the networks will use, blockbuster pictures are now what an RMA-poor enemy will aim for as the most effective means to transmit its messages. The World Trade Center attacks were as much intended for the American networks as the body politic itself. Similarly, it would be interesting to speculate which high-profile Australian target could be used by an enemy to create the same effect. The answer is that it may not be a military one at all. Certainly the targeting of the Sari nightclub in Bali delivered the message that non-military venues were equally pre-eminent as targets of terrorist attack.

THE IMPACT OF THE ACCOUNTANT

The ubiquitous accountant has scored a direct hit on the media’s combat reporting. The first symptom of cost cutting has been the departure of experienced and highly paid journalists in favour of younger and cheaper models. The appointment of less experienced reporters is a simple, but extremely effective, cost-cutting measure. These younger journalists have little combat experience and are more interested, as are their masters, in the immediate tactical drama, rather than an analysis of the wider strategic picture.

A second point of impact has seen an increased reluctance to put staff journalists in the field, and a corresponding increase in reliance on freelancers. Insurance premiums for staff correspondents are regarded as prohibitive. Conversely, there are no on-costs related to freelancers. However, since freelancers have to take greater risks than the staff correspondents, more and more of them are being killed in the frontline. These journalists are not only at risk from crossfire but also from bounties. The Taliban, for example, were allegedly offering $50,000 to Afghans who killed Western journalists in the early days of that conflict. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, at the time this article was written, twelve journalists had lost their lives, many of them as a result of the tragic accident of ‘friendly fire’, but others in circumstances of less clarity, marked with the suspicion that they were deliberate targets.
The high cost in lives has led to a sharp focus on tactical, dramatic images, with little questioning of the information that accompanies these pictures. Thus the military enjoys the ascendancy while the media scramble for the scraps. The one area where the media have taken a stand appears to be over the request by the ADF not to show pictures of US prisoners of war during the Iraqi conflict. Most stations ignored the advice, which this author believes was a result of pressure from the Bush Administration.

Yet, as media commentator Mark Day points out, journalistic bias has been part of one network’s deliberate plan to attract huge audiences. He quotes Peter Chermin, the Chief Executive Officer of the Fox Group, as addressing a management conference with the following thoughts: ‘Our content has to be the dramatic opposite of bland—increasingly innovative, ambitious and competitive. It has to seize the edge, because the most dangerous thing in the anti-bland world is to play it safe.’

Given this assessment of the nature of the public appetite, it is somewhat unsurprising that the chauvinistic, hysterically patriotic approach of Fox News has won the battle for US viewers’ hearts and minds so convincingly.

THE STATE OF AUSTRALIAN JOURNALISM

For the first time in the annals of Australian journalism, a generation of news editors and news executives has emerged that belongs to the post-Vietnam era and whose members have no service experience. True, most Australian reporters have done some kind of ‘battlefield survival’ course, but that is largely concentrated on combat first aid, rather than analysis of big-picture military activity. It certainly allows them, having been briefed, to use military terms with easy familiarity.

The ‘dumbing down’ of news stories in the electronic media has been accompanied by an excess of opinion over analysis in the print media. This opinion overload has had the effect of turning audiences away from the subject of defence, since the opinions being provided are consistently sourced from the same group of ‘experts’, with the same lack of relevant military understanding. The largest source of Defence writing at present resides in the Parliamentary Press Gallery. At the heart of the gallery is a core of reporters that value the political dimension of any story over the strategic dimension. These reporters are very much subject to the influence of the political lines that are purveyed on all sides of Parliament House. As one of them told me recently, ‘you can’t fight chauvinism with strategic analysis’.

News editors have not yet grasped the fact that the military has learnt significant lessons from past military–media interaction and applied these to reap a considerable military advantage. The military has been smart in second-guessing the way journalistic and editorial thinking works. Military operators watch with growing
satisfaction as initial military reports become headline news, while the corrections come many days later and are relegated to the back pages, with the original statements still largely in the public mind.6

The lesson taken from *Iraqi Freedom*—the first total ‘information war’ in history—is this: the initial report from the military will always be the one that captures the headlines. Even if that report is wrong or corrected later, the ‘information operations’ element of it is successful.

**THE ARMY AND THE CURRENT MEDIA ENVIRONMENT**

The Army is currently enjoying a media honeymoon as the halo effect from Timor and Afghanistan, and more recently Iraq, remains undiminished. Nowhere in the past five years is there a major blip or trauma such as the one that affected the US Marines and the Canadian Special Forces in Somalia. The Army has certainly been stung by unflattering accounts of activities within the 3rd Battalion, the number of unauthorised discharges from Steyr rifles, the Black Hawk tragedy and problems with acquisition. In the context of the bigger picture, however, these are not major catastrophes, though they do point to some challenges in the way these issues have been managed.

It is on the home front, then, rather than on operations, where the current challenges lie. Incredibly, there is still an extraordinary reluctance at all levels of the Army to accept the fact that issues management is as much core business as operational activity. Incidents are not managed by commanders, but rather are fed into a process-driven environment that almost guarantees that both the Army and the alleged victims or their families end up in the arms of the lawyers. Too often, this is followed by recourse to the media, with negative consequences for the Army.

The Army has a policy that espouses the axiom ‘people first’. Put to the test, however, it often translates to ‘process first’. This is plainly obvious in the number of stories that are highlighted in the main news and current-affairs programs that deal with alleged victimisation or neglectful treatment of individuals. These personal stories are the very essence of the new ‘soft’ news-driven media. They pit small heroic Davids against the Army’s rigid and unfeeling Goliaths. They are battlers against warlords. They are the widows and children of heroes, confronting an unfeeling bureaucracy. Time after time, the Army steps into this ring and takes a public beating.

… the Army does not view media preparation as core business …
Yet another indication that the Army does not view media preparation as core business is the number of times star-rank officers have been thrown to the current-affairs wolves without adequate preparation. The resulting images do nothing to enhance the reputation of the organisation, or the internal image of those hapless officers caught in the crossfire.

**THE KEY TO A BETTER PUBLIC IMAGE**

The Army must develop a more sophisticated incident and reputation management capability. In addition, media awareness courses at all levels of training, both for officers and senior soldiers, is crucial. Training in high public profile areas such as boards of inquiry and courts martial must also be embedded in the pre-command and post-command environment. Indeed, transcripts of recent boards of inquiry and courts martial often contain instances where the board and the presiding officer have been led to comment on areas that would be extremely damaging to the organisation’s reputation should the transcripts ever be produced before a court of appeal. Common transgressions include prejudicial comment, prejudging review outcomes, personal comment on individual witnesses, threatening letters to witnesses and allowing inadmissible evidence, to cite but a few. There is a lack of general guidance on how to handle the media in open courts martial, and the thorny issue of media access to transcripts, which also compounds this particular issue.

The Army must closely examine public interaction, particularly in areas that may ultimately damage its reputation. This is an issue that deserves more careful handling than has occurred in the past. Preparation and appearances before Senate committees is one such area that incurs much greater risk than ever before. The committee system is public theatre, and one in which the military players have yet to learn how to perform in order to allow the Army to reap maximum advantage.

The Army must also scrutinise the way in which the various commands engage the Australian public. Open days, parades, and exercise briefings are inevitably populated by the usual familiar coterie: the Mayor, the Chamber of Commerce, local sporting heroes, the Chief Minister or Premier. Notable omissions to these select gatherings include women’s groups, university and student bodies, arts communities and other such groups that form a significant part of the fabric of Australian society. How often are the conductor and staff of the various symphony orchestras or the heads of the major art galleries featured on the command invitation list to the mess?

In an operational sense, then, what are the challenges and opportunities for the Army in this current media environment? Not surprisingly, opportunities abound for maximising coverage from the vast range of operational deployments that characterise today’s Army. Pre-eminent among these opportunities is the chance to bolster
the morale of servicemen and women and their families by taking reporters on tours of Timor (the forgotten peacekeeping ground), of Bougainville, of Bosnia and Sinai and Sierra Leone (all equally forgotten). The benefits of deepening the understanding and awareness of the media include not only the implicit guarantee that tactical stories will remain in the foreground, but also the development of key relationships between defence and diplomatic correspondents and the Army. These relationships will provide crucial support when the Army faces its next media challenge.

THE MEDIA AND THE FUTURE

A significant question surrounds the way in which the media might respond to the challenges that it faces both internally and externally. The media is currently characterised by a lack of debate among news editors about how much the military controls the news and information agenda in various operations. Operation Enduring Freedom is clouding the vision even more. Looking beyond the present, past the current anti-terrorism operations, it seems inevitable that news editors will come to the conclusion that soldiercams are a good idea—yet these will be the media’s own soldiercams.

In a future media infiltration of the battlespace, former Special Forces personnel will be recruited and trained to use cameras and sent to infiltrate the very areas that are currently barred to journalists. Who better than a freelancer that knows how to survive in a terrain supremely hostile to the journalist?

Ultimately, however, the future of the media is linked to the exploitation of technology. Civilian high-resolution satellites, such as the space-imaging ‘ikonos’ series, will be used to overlook battlefields with real-time video. Since journalists are now increasingly becoming primary targets in an area of operations, editors may well embrace the technology of the unmanned aerial vehicle to gain pictures of the battlefield, however limited and grainy, to be analysed ad nauseam by armchair strategists.

The Internet will remain dominant as an information-gathering tool, continuing its spectacular rise since its initial use during operations in Kosovo. In the murky theatre of the Balkans War, journalists were universally barred from areas where atrocities were being committed; they resorted to the Internet to contact victims for their stories. The Internet and the new use of ‘Blogs of War’ (daily diaries on the web from civilians and soldiers in the area of operations), have been a vital battleground for the information warfare that characterised Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The use of webcams will be far more frequent, given the ease with which they can be secreted in strategic places, particularly in cities and towns. The webcam will become the primary tool for relaying pictures to news organisations increasingly barred from the area of operations. Interestingly, a Spanish company submitted a proposal to transmit webcam images from Baghdad during the war, although this request could not be implemented because it came too late in the operation.

Inevitably, the military will fight back, and greater restrictions will be imposed on the media. The strain on the military–media relationship will deepen as journalists pursue their stories through the families of soldiers, trying to gain their insights from sources outside the usual channels. For the Australian Army, a far less adversarial way to develop this relationship is to engage the media more than ever before. Journalists should be offered attachments to Australian peacekeeping units around the world so that they can write their stories and simultaneously develop an understanding of what peace operations are all about.

Media organisations should be offered places at the Australian Defence College, or on Chief of Army scholarships, so that a new generation of journalists is equipped with a deeper understanding of military strategy. Moreover, media organisations should be offered opportunities for their trainee cadets to visit and be briefed by divisional commanders, in order to gain an understanding of the Army. Ideally, journalists should be provided with a background brief by media-smart military officers prior to the commencement of boards of inquiry and courts martial, so that they have a greater understanding of the process.

Another way of projecting the military message is to encourage potentially good writers and thinkers at the various military institutions to submit articles for publication in newspapers, without fear that this might be a ‘career-threatening move’. Publication would create a core of informed commentators, who could represent the Army with a cultural familiarity, in sharp contrast to the current small band of ‘experts’.

Following the Tom Clancy model, the Chief of Army may wish to consider collaborating with a publisher to encourage the writing of novels on the Army. Clancy is renowned as an authority on the CIA and the US armed forces, and may provide a useful model for a promising Australian author.

Military leaders must also engage with the vast tapestry that is the multicultural media as well as understand and tap into Australia’s cultural diversity. Buddhism is the fastest growing religion in the country today. There are also many military men...
and women who are adopting Islam as their faith. Yet the Army still has its twin
denominational chaplains and a rabbi, to provide spiritual succour to its people.
Even the New South Wales Police Force has added a mullah to the ranks of its
spiritual leaders.

Of immense value would be the development of joint initiatives between the
Minister, the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force to brief the Canberra
Press Gallery, allowing its members to gain an insight into government thinking.
This would avoid the current climate with its high risk of misinterpretation, as press
secretaries and media liaison officers are left to guess at the nature of the Government’s
current approach.

In order to raise awareness of the Army’s role in the community, Army commanders
should hold information sessions for non-traditional audiences in the arts, business,
sporting and other sectors. Information dissemination has traditionally remained the
purview of the recruiters that have, correctly, a narrow focus for their aims. Above all, the Army must clearly understand that holistic
communication strategies are the responsibility of all commanders, from divisional to
platoon level, and that winning the media war is as much its core business as winning the
battlespace. Without an understanding of media relations, the military will reproduce
a variation on the old saying: ‘If you always do what you’ve always done, you’ll always
get what you always got’. The lessons drawn from Operation Iraqi Freedom will provide
strong comfort to an Army that has achieved all its objectives without sustaining any
media flak at all. It is on the home front, however, where the challenges lie ahead.

ENDNOTES

1 Interview in BBC documentary series Making the News, August, 2000.
3 Seymour Hersh, ‘Escape and Evasion. What Happened when the Special Forces
4 This comment was written two days before the Bali bombing.
5 Mark Day, ‘Bias all Part of Fox’s Battle Plan’, Media Supplement of the Australian,
10 April 2003.
6 Among the disproven statements: hundreds of coffins and corpses at a warehouse
near Zubayr were signs of atrocities; Private Jessica Lynch had multiple gunshot and
stab wounds when she was rescued; two British soldiers had been ‘executed’ after
being captured by Iraqis; drums of chemical weapons had been found in Iraq.
At the time of writing (February 2003), the glimmerings of such a debate are stirring, though not in the Australian media.

It is a two-way street, as the current controversy over anthrax injections for troops pre-deployed to the Gulf indicates.

THE AUTHOR

Prakash Mirchandani has worked as an international journalist and media consultant for three decades. He was a BBC correspondent (radio and television) in India and in London for twelve years, before moving to Australia. He was the first Defence correspondent in Australian television and the first accredited correspondent for the ADF. Mr Mirchandani was a founding member of the Defence Media Advisory Group. In 1995 he was awarded the Australian Institute of Management’s award for Excellence in Management of Australia Television. He is a member of the Prime Minister’s National Multicultural Advisory Council and the Media subcommittee for developing multicultural awareness in the Australian media.
Collective training in the Australian Army is undergoing a process of fundamental change. Over the next four years, the Army will introduce a live Combat Training Centre (CTC) in a revolutionary approach to readiness evaluation. The new initiative builds on the success of an Interim Combat Training Centre project and is aimed at preparing Australian soldiers for the new and diverse challenges of military operations in the 21st century. The new CTC is expected to use advanced exercises against a notional opposing force (OPFOR) in order to bring about the most modern approach to readiness evaluation and training.

In embarking on the creation of a fully fledged CTC, the Australian Army should carefully note the experience of other armies in modern combat training. As we create a CTC system, it is unnecessary to 'reinvent the wheel'. On the contrary, we stand to benefit greatly from the various lessons and insights that other armies have employed around the concept of advanced CTCs. Of all these current centres, those in the US Army are the most worthy of close consideration. This article examines how the Australian Army can derive operating lessons for training by identifying the main changes in the US Army’s use of CTCs over the last thirty years. While
the main focus of analysis is on the manoeuvre, or live combat training system, it should be noted that many of the observations in this essay apply to constructive, or virtual, CTCs.2

THE EVOLUTION OF THE US ARMY’S SYSTEM OF COMBAT TRAINING CENTRES

In the 1970s, following the Vietnam War, the US Army showed many of the symptoms of a defeated ground force. The American military returned from South-East Asia suffering from low morale, outmoded training regimes and poor readiness standards. In an attempt to renew its professional expertise and transform its capabilities, the US Army introduced a system of CTCs. The aim was to reshape the character of American land forces in order that the US Army would be capable of fighting a large-scale conventional air–land battle in central Europe against the powerful Soviet-led Warsaw Pact armies. Today, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, the US Army possesses a network of combat training centres that focuses on manoeuvre warfare. These centres include the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany; and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.3 While all of these CTCs share a similar training philosophy, each one has a different focus. For example, the Joint Readiness Training Center primarily trains light forces, including airborne, air-assault, light infantry and special operations forces. The National Training Center, on the other hand, specialises in the training of heavier armoured and mechanised units. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been considerable change in the development and character of US Army CTCs. These changes have occurred most notably in the realm of OPFORs, in the area of simulating realism; in the role of observers and controllers (O/Cs); and in the use of diversified training modes.4

A CHANGING OPFOR: ADAPTING TO A MORE DIVERSE THREAT ENVIRONMENT

A key change in the development of American CTCs has been in the realm of the OPFOR. US Army CTCs were originally designed to provide training to meet the relatively predictable, Soviet-based heavy conventional opponent of the 1970s and 1980s. By the beginning of the 21st century, however, notional enemies had been reshaped away from heavy conventional forces towards smaller, multidimensional and more agile opponents that more accurately reflected the reality of fragmented information-age conflict. Today, the typical opposing force in a training exercise is a flexible, combined arms antagonist, capable of operating across a spectrum
of conflict. Such a spectrum includes mass infantry attack; assault by small, independent manoeuvre elements; and operations by unpredictable and asymmetric forces that are organised to exploit the weaknesses of an unwary friendly force, or Blue Force.\footnote{5}

The current American military CTC seeks to provide an OPFOR that reproduces, as far as possible, Clausewitz’s concepts of fog, friction and uncertainty in war. An acceptance of creative thinking within a notional enemy force is essential to produce an exercise environment in which commanders and their staffs can employ a manoeuvrist approach to operations. Unless exercises present a credible and dynamic notional enemy, the friendly or Blue Force commanders cannot gain useful operational experience.\footnote{6}

**Observers and Controllers: More Mentoring, Less Instruction**

A second major area of change in the workings of CTCs in the US Army can be found in the role of O/Cs. At the moment, the most important component of any CTC is the role that O/Cs play as facilitators of operational learning. In the 1970s, O/Cs tended to operate like aloof teachers, but by the end of the 1990s, they had gradually evolved into mentors rather than instructors.

Experience has shown that mentorship by O/Cs in the CTC system is best facilitated by the skilled use of after-action reviews. Indeed, the after-action review is the key method by which O/Cs can shape the conflict environment at individual CTCs. In US Army exercises, the days of ill-equipped umpires delivering subjective performance debriefs to Blue Force personnel have passed into history. Today, the after-action-review is used in order to provide accurate position data from, and to adjudicate the results of, force-on-force engagements that employ realistic simulation systems. Effective after-action reviews help facilitate a learning environment within the CTC system. Such a learning environment is vital if all participants are to recognise both the causes of their actions and the need to identify new strategies to improve specific performance.\footnote{7}

The role of the O/C is of critical importance in maximising the CTC system. The O/C who sees his role as that of an effective mentor will usually seek to create a combat training environment in which there is an atmosphere of mutual respect, confidence, and rapport. For this reason, it is also important that O/Cs be removed from the task of assessment in combat training. If O/Cs are allowed to assess individual participants, then there is a strong possibility that any mentoring bond
between O/Cs and Blue Force officers will be damaged. Any deterioration in trust between mentors and the mentored results in a combat training system that has limited value as a military ‘learning organisation’. The responsibility for assessment of combat training results should ideally be confined to unit commanders. If superior commanders and their staffs are not deployed as players on a CTC rotation, they must nonetheless ensure strong and intimate involvement prior to, and during, any CTC activity.

Evidence from the US Army’s experience suggests that the quality of selected O/Cs is directly related to the effectiveness of combat training. Increasingly, the US Army appears to understand the significance of assigning the most capable officers and soldiers to CTCs in order to ensure that the experience gained approximates as far as possible to military reality. For instance, the US Army’s Warrior Program seeks to ensure that a combination of effective personnel and operational realism in the use of live CTCs is fully exploited for the benefit of the Army’s officer academies and non-commissioned officer branch schools.

The US Army’s experience suggests that, in order to reap the greatest benefits possible from a CTC, the Australian Army needs to consider the use of high-quality personnel to manage the system.

The need for carefully selected personnel means that the career management of future O/Cs will become an important factor in the success of any Australian Army CTC scheme. With the benefit of knowledge drawn from the US Army, we must seek to select the best O/Cs possible for the key task of mentoring the tactical leaders of the future. It must be understood that the ideal O/C in a live CTC is a unique individual—at once a mentor, a confidant, and a role model—to our future commanders.

**ACHIEVING MORE REALISM**

Perhaps the most onerous task for armies engaged in training during peacetime conditions is that of creating a credible exercise environment while at the same time maintaining appropriate levels of safety and environmental responsibility. Over the past two decades, the US Army’s manoeuvre CTCs have sought to resolve these types of tensions through the integration of simulation-based technology, the expansion of exercise scenarios, and the increasing use of civilians and non-military organisations in exercises.
The use of digital communications, advanced laser systems and position-locating technologies has permitted combat simulation to reach a sophisticated level. Advanced simulation techniques now allow mounted and dismounted forces to conduct force-on-force engagements in a relatively safe and realistic environment. Moreover, as the range and fidelity of instrumentation and communication systems continue to improve, the role and actions of the O/Cs and other players in the operating environment are likely to become more sophisticated. In particular, the power of technology allows O/Cs to become increasingly precise and realistic in relation to using operational data.

Developing an enhanced sense of realism in combat training means that the commanders and staffs learn to operate in credible warfighting scenarios. Increasingly, part of an American Army unit’s manœuvre CTC experience prior to deploying into the exercise area is spent conducting live-fire activities. Over time, this experience has reinforced the need for Blue Force troops to possess a sound understanding of weapon effects, and this knowledge assists simulation-based training. There is a natural preference in the US Army for units to arrive at CTCs with recent experience in combined arms, live-fire exercises. Often, however, such experience is rare. As a result, American CTCs have increased the range and complexity of their live-fire training.

Both operational realism and CTC outputs have also been increased by the use of civilians on the battlefield. In particular, the Joint Readiness Training Centre at Fort Polk has introduced civilian role-players in order to try to simulate the complexity of recent US operations in countries as diverse as Bosnia and Haiti. The US Army combat training system has also become adept at introducing the media into its training regimes. Media units attached to individual CTCs attempt to demonstrate the difficulty and tempo of operations that are accompanied, and sometimes shaped, by the reporting of local, national and international news outlets. Within the US Army, it is now accepted that those commanders that were exposed to CTC training involving the electronic media are far better prepared to conduct complex military operations in volatile areas such as the Balkans.

**CREATING THE RIGHT INFRASTRUCTURE: URBAN OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF CONTRACTORS**

Two recent and influential changes in the US Army’s CTC system relate to the use of multi-purpose urban operations sites and the increased profile of civilian contractors across the modern battlespace. Within the US Army context, CTCs have learnt to appreciate the crucial importance of integrating an urban environment into the military training experience. The days of Blue Force elements operating in a permissive environment such as a rural ‘free-fire zone’ have disappeared. The US Army’s experience of the support needs of CTCs in both the United States itself
and in Germany has led to the employment of civilian contractors to conduct a growing range of functions. Today, contract personnel tend to have replaced service personnel in both the plans and operations branches of various CTCs. Contract personnel are also employed to conduct first-line maintenance and repair of simulation equipment in the field, and to carry out many logistic support functions required to support the field training infrastructure.

**EXPLOITING THE CTC SYSTEM**

An important function of the US Army’s CTCs takes place outside the lead organisations such as the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National Training Center in the continental United States and the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany. This function is the cross-fertilisation of ideas, lessons, trends and insights, and their dissemination across the US Army from within the CTC system. The US Army’s CTC system has earned a good reputation as a source of valued advice on tactics, techniques and procedures. In this process, the expertise gained by the O/Cs at the CTCs across the US Army is an important factor.

Each CTC in the US Army often relies on short-term, or augmentee, O/Cs and OPFOR elements. Such augmented forces are necessary to ensure sufficient numbers of personnel within the operating forces. In nearly all cases, permanent CTC staff provide a short augmentee training session and subsequently act as mentors to the ‘short-timers’. The training received by each augmentee is of a very high standard, and invariably they return to their home stations as more competent and confident members of the US Army.

The Joint Readiness Training Center employs an ‘outreach’ program in which O/Cs are sent, rather like religious missionaries, to transmit their knowledge throughout the US Army. O/Cs help to influence Army instructors and doctrine writers, and help shape the subject matter discussed at the various US Army corps conferences.

In current conditions, the US Army requires its CTC system to undertake a growing and broader range of functions than that originally envisaged in the 1970s. For example, in recent years CTCs have been tasked to conduct mission rehearsal exercises (MREs) and advanced warfighting experiments (AWEs). MREs focus on the readiness of units to deploy on specific operations while AWEs serve as a means through which emerging concepts and technologies can be carefully studied and tested. Additionally, the Joint Readiness Training Center, the National
Training Center and the Combat Maneuver Training Center all maintain close links with US Army Training and Doctrine Command. The various CTCs also have a reciprocal relationship with the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Fort Leavenworth and its cadre of doctrine writers. The CTCs and CALL share lessons learnt, operational advice and material on emerging military concepts.

For US Army personnel that have had the opportunity to perform the duties of an O/C at one of the manoeuvre CTCs, either in a permanent or augmented capacity, the experience is invariably of tremendous value. Moreover, the importance of the CTC experience is understood by many in senior ranks within the US Army, and this bodes well for the future of the CTC system.

**CONCLUSION**

Over the past thirty years, the US Army’s CTCs have evolved from Cold War centres designed for heavy conventional warfare into multifunctional organisations designed to train forces in a range of new and flexible missions across a widening spectrum of conflict. Based on the lessons of the American experience, the Australian Army stands to benefit greatly from possessing a CTC (Live). Despite the obvious differences in size and numbers between the US and Australian ground forces, the Australian Army should seek to extrapolate and adapt relevant lessons from the American experience to suit the Australian military context. If this learning and adaptation is successful, then we can look forward to revolutionary changes in our readiness evaluation and training regimes.

The ‘long poles in the tent’ of a CTC system involve getting the basic building blocks into place. These building blocks include creating a credible and flexible OPFOR, and employing competent and skilled O/Cs that are trained to focus on mentoring first, coaching second, and only as a last resort, instruction. There is also a need to create operational realism through a right balance between simulation, live fire and role playing. Each CTC must be capable of providing operating forces with an opportunity to employ their warfighting capabilities, but to do so in a realistic environment that reproduces the fog, friction and uncertainty of modern operations.

Exploiting the results of an efficient CTC system involves the cross-fertilisation of all intellectual capital derived from training. In this respect, efficient outreach programs are an important means through which a ‘knowledge edge’—one of the current fundamentals of both Army and ADF doctrine—can be sought by Army
officers. Strong links between CTC personnel, doctrine developers, operational analysts and those Army officers involved in combat trend analysis must be systematically fostered.

In short, the CTC experience has the potential to provide the Australian Army with a powerful tool for ensuring that a manoeuvrist approach permeates our warfighting philosophy. We need, however, to pay close attention to the available lessons and insights offered by the US Army CTC system. Provided that the Australian Army is prepared to learn from the American experience, we have the opportunity to develop an Australian CTC system that is carefully tailored to meet our local needs. Ultimately, such an approach to combat training will have a dynamic and lasting impact on our future warfighting readiness.

ENDNOTES

2 Live simulation reproduces a combat environment. Constructive simulation utilises a synthetic battlefield. Virtual simulation trains individuals in a ‘simulator’, requiring the operator to conduct the functions required by specific equipment.
3 The US Army CTC program also includes a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). The BCTP is designed to train commanders and staff primarily at Division and Corps level, using computer-simulated exercises. The BCTP is not considered to be a manoeuvre CTC and is therefore not included in the analysis in this article. It should be noted, however, that the BCTP shares many of the characteristics of a manoeuvre CTC.
4 The Australian Army has adopted the title observer/training (O/T) rather than the US term observer/controller (O/C). As this article is focused on the US CTC experience, the term O/C is employed in the interests of consistency and clarity.
6 I am grateful to Lieutenant Colonel Clay Sutton for this insight. Lieutenant Colonel Sutton served as an Australian Army company commander at the US Joint Readiness Training Command during 1996.
Researchers in the United States have identified that after-action reviews are most effective when an Adaptive Thinking Training Methodology (ATTM) is employed to support the participant’s memory and cognition processes. The ATTM emphasises the role of the mentor in preparing for, and delivering, after-action reviews in order to optimise learning outputs. There is a focus on ‘scaffolding’ that enables a … novice to solve a problem, carry out a task, or achieve a goal which would be beyond his unassisted efforts’. See John E. Morrison and Larry L. Meliza, ‘Foundations of the After Action Review Process,’ Special Report 42, United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, VA, July 1999.

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Tulley wrote this article while serving as the Australian Army Liaison Officer to the US Army Infantry and Armor Branches and the US Marine Corps. He is now the Commanding Officer Combat Training Centre (Live), an element of the Combat Training Centre, based in Townsville, Queensland. He is a graduate of the British Army Staff College and Royal Military College, Duntroon; and holds a bachelor’s degree with the University of New South Wales and a Graduate Diploma in Defence Studies and Master of Arts (International Relations) with Deakin University.
For almost the entire period between the two world wars, Australia experienced what could at best be termed a cantankerous relationship between the Government and its senior Army officers. By the end of 1922, the Government and the Army had made conflicting assessments of the Australian national security environment and put into place divergent policies to address their separate concerns. At no point during this period were the two parties able to overcome their differing opinions and agree on a single concept for the defence of the nation.

The Army’s leaders based their requirements, plans and training goals on the belief that they should prepare to repel a Japanese invasion. They sought a large, well-trained army, capable of deterring or containing a hostile force until the British Empire mobilised its resources and came to the Commonwealth’s assistance. While they accepted that Australia had to make its preparations within the Imperial system, they insisted that Australia must have the capability to stand alone until aid could arrive. The Government, however, preferred a lesser degree of defence readiness. It believed that the Royal Navy was best suited to meet Australia’s defence requirements. From the Government’s perspective, Australia’s first line of defence was the
British fleet. Successive prime ministers declared that, as the Royal Navy would prevent an invasion, all Australia needed to prepare against was bombardment by Japanese raiders and landings by small parties of enemy troops. Consequently, Australia required only a small number of soldiers capable of resisting minor raids and protecting those installations that the Royal Navy might need.

In 1932 the impasse between the two parties actually deepened after the newly installed ministry of Joseph Lyons made a concerted effort to persuade the Army to adhere to an anti-raid defence policy. Instead, the Army chose to undermine these instructions while continuing to press on the Government its preferred mission of invasion defence. The deception reached its low point when the Army deliberately refashioned the First Line Component, an organisation whose designated purpose was raid defence, which actually became another method of invasion defence.

The conflicting requirements of the anti-invasion and anti-raid strategies dominated defence policy for the inter-war period. Neither changes in government nor the rotation of officers could alleviate the impasse. The inability of the two sides to direct their efforts towards the attainment of a single strategic purpose helped to undermine Australia’s military preparations, and served to distract defence thinkers from realistic assessments of the threat environment. In a period of strained budgets, the disagreement also made the task of allocating resources more difficult. Moreover, it brought into question the proper role of military leaders in a democratic society. The First Line Component deception represented the nadir of Australian civil–military relations, and was a factor in the decline of Australia’s military capabilities—a development so grave that, when war returned in 1939, the nation was virtually defenceless.

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

In 1920 the Minister for Defence, George Pearce, assembled a committee of the Army’s senior officers in Melbourne. He charged them with the responsibility of identifying the military requirements for the defence of Australia. The committee consisted of Lieutenant General Sir Henry Chauvel, Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, Major General Sir Cyril White, Major General Sir James McCay, Major General James Legge, and Major General Joseph Hobbs. The senior officers determined that the Army needed a force structured in such a way that it would be capable of either deterring a Japanese invasion or tactically delaying an invasion force until the arrival of reinforcements. They recommended a force of 180 000 men, organised into four infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, and three mixed
brigades that could unite to form a fifth division, as well as additional corps, army, and line of communication troops, and garrisons for the coastal defences. Following prewar practice, nearly all of the troops were part-time militiamen. The force’s only permanent soldiers were members of the staff and instructional corps, and the gunners and engineers who garrisoned the coastal forts. The response of Prime Minister William Hughes and the Minister for Defence George Pearce to the officers’ proposals was initially quite positive. Soon the Army began to raise the units that would make up the divisions and mixed brigades, and the Government acquired stocks of the equipment and stores—albeit at minimal levels.

Then, even before the Army could complete its formation, the Government suddenly changed the basis of its security policy. At the Washington Conference of 1922, the United States, Britain, France, Italy and Japan agreed on a number of issues for security in the Pacific. Among the matters decided was a naval disarmament treaty that set limits on the amount of capital ship tonnage that the signatories could maintain. Before World War I, Britain had set its fleet capabilities on the basis of a two-power standard. It defined this as a sufficient margin of strength to defeat the forces of the next two largest fleets. Now Britain accepted a capital ship limit of just 500,000 tons, which effectively reduced its naval capabilities to a one-power standard. Complicating the situation further was the fact that the United States and Britain had misjudged their future adversary. They mistakenly assumed that Japan was a contented power that did not have any further territorial ambitions. Furthermore, since the treaties reduced the ability of the United States and Britain to project power into the Western Pacific, it gave the signatories little ability to deter Japanese militarism. The terms of the treaty all but guaranteed that Japan would have a near monopoly of power in the Western Pacific.

Despite the Army’s misgivings, Australian political leaders lost no time in embracing the agreement, and the new Minister for Defence, Walter Massy-Greene, moved quickly to slash expenditure on his armed forces. The Army retained its seven-division organisation but had to accept a staffing reduction that left its units at barely 25 per cent of establishment, reduced training to only a few days a year, and essentially suspended the purchase of equipment and stores. In 1921 the Army had over 120,000 personnel on its establishment. By the end of the 1922–23 fiscal year, its posted strength had contracted to less than 33,000. In essence, the Army was a paper organisation bereft of soldiers, training and equipment.

The following year, the operational relevance of the Army deteriorated even further. At the 1923 Imperial Conference, the Australian Government accepted London’s commitment that, in case of a crisis in the Pacific, the Royal Navy would deploy to the east to deter or repel aggression against Australia and New Zealand. The Admiralty would dispatch the fleet to the as-yet-unbuilt base at Singapore, from which it would operate against the Imperial Japanese Navy.
conference also reasserted the longstanding principle that maritime supremacy was the basis of the Empire’s collective defence. The plan outlined at the Imperial Conference was known as the Singapore Strategy and became the cornerstone of the Australian Government’s security policy, although the Army’s leaders never accepted its principles.

The Singapore Strategy gave the Government a reason to maintain the Army at a minimum standard of effectiveness. The promised naval intercession guaranteed, theoretically, that no significant threat could reach Australian shores. Thus, the Government concluded, and defence assessments from London repeatedly confirmed, that the Army’s only field force role was to repel insignificant parties of raiders put ashore by small enemy warships that had managed to elude the Royal Navy. The onset of the Great Depression in 1929 further reinforced this dependency and led to even more reductions in defence expenditure.

THE INTER-WAR SECURITY DEBATE

By 1923 Australian decision-makers had put into place two contradictory national security policies. The Army’s leaders supported an anti-invasion role for their forces, while political leaders insisted that all the nation required was an anti-raid capability. Despite their subservient position, Army leaders never accepted their assigned responsibility and spent the rest of the inter-war period attempting to advance their preferred option—invasion defence. The Government, on the other hand, displayed little more than ennui on the subject of national security, failed to engage its military advisers, and abandoned the matter to Imperial authorities.

In order to reopen the question of the Army’s defence role, senior officers missed few chances to suggest that their political masters were deluding themselves if they thought that Britain would actually dispatch its fleet more than 10 000 miles from its homeland if a crisis loomed. As early as a 1923 meeting of the Council of Defence, the Army’s senior officers argued with Massy-Greene as to how he expected Britain to deter Japan with a fleet based on a one-power standard. The Minister for Defence stubbornly chose not to question British assurances. Twelve years later, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Major-General John Lavarack, again highlighted the decline of British naval strength from a two- to a one-power standard in an attempt to get the Council of Defence to reconsider security policy. His effort was also unsuccessful.
Whenever the Government asked for advice, the Army made sure to use it as an opportunity to exert its views on national security strategy. In 1928, for example, the Army’s governing body, the Military Board, provided the then Minister for Defence, Sir Thomas Glasgow, with a memorandum on army policy for his use at conferences in Washington and Ottawa. Both documents began with a polite concession to the idea that the nation’s defence depended on maritime power. However, they then noted that Australia’s distance from the centre of the Empire created a special situation. The Washington document reminded Glasgow that the Australian Government could not ignore the possibility that the Royal Navy might not be available for the direct defence of the Commonwealth. The Ottawa brief observed that, in the advent of war, the arrival of the fleet at Singapore could be delayed or even postponed indefinitely. The papers concluded that Australia had to improve its own defence capability and recommended the strengthening of the Army.  

In March 1930, in his capacity as CGS, Chauvel issued an ‘Appreciation of Australia’s Position in Case of War in the Pacific’. Chauvel followed the now-established pattern of conceding that in the past the security of the Empire depended on the strength of the Royal Navy. He then went on to explain how this policy was no longer relevant to Australia. Chauvel accepted that there was ‘little hope that the British Government and people will ever consent to the dispatch of a considerable portion of the main fleet . . . to a theatre on the other side of the world’. After all, he explained, the command of the Atlantic was vital for the British people while command in the Far East was not. He also observed with great prescience that Japan would choose to strike when Britain was fully focused on events elsewhere. He then summed up his conclusions by stating that ‘British sea-power has ceased to be adequate for the protection of all Imperial interests at any one moment . . . it follows that local security will demand the maintenance in Australia of mobile land and air forces’. 

For reasons of economy, Chauvel also served as the Army’s Inspector-General. In this capacity he used his annual report as another opportunity to argue for an anti-invasion capability for the Army. For example, in his 1927 assessment, he reminded the Government that defence of Australia ultimately fell on the Army and Air Force because circumstances could arise that would prevent the British fleet from sailing to Singapore. Australian politicians consistently ignored such entreaties and preferred instead the much more palatable advice of British advisers. They found comfort in reports such as an assessment by the London-based Overseas Defence Committee that identified the Commonwealth’s level of risk as not more than the bombardment or mining of its harbours by a raider. A 1925 report by the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) into the defence requirements of Australian ports, CID Report 249-C, maintained that the only attacks against which Australia should prepare were those that could be made by a cruiser, an armed merchant
cruiser or a submarine. The British Government considered that the arrival of a Japanese invasion fleet, or the bombardment of the Australian coast by a squadron of enemy battleships, was simply an impossibility. All efforts to get the Government to re-examine the 1925 assessment failed.

**THE FORMING OF THE FIRST LINE COMPONENT**

In 1932 the Prime Minister, Joseph Lyons, made the only attempt by an inter-war government to force the Army’s leaders to accept an anti-raid mission. Ultimately, Lyons and his Minister for Defence, once again Pearce, failed, and the Army continued to advocate its own defence ideas while also undermining the Government’s instructions. Although the surviving records do not outline the process precisely, it is clear that by 15 February Lyons had made his decision, and informed the Army that it was to formulate its plans around the requirement of resisting raids.

More specifically, the Government expressed its defence policy in terms of Imperial participation. The Government explained that ‘British seapower is the first line of Australia’s Defence against invasion’. Lyons was also direct on the Army’s role. He defined it as:

- Supplementary to seapower as a general defence against raids, the Army and Air Force organisation provide for the defence of vital localities by means of:
  - A) Artillery and anti-aircraft artillery defences and garrisons;
  - B) Military forces sufficient to deal with landing parties where such operations are feasible;
  - C) Co-operation aircraft.

In addition, the Army was to have the capability to raise an expeditionary force of one division for service overseas to help secure Australia’s line of communication with the Empire. The most likely destination for this formation was the Malayan Peninsula to bolster the Singapore garrison, although the Government accepted that it could serve anywhere from Gibraltar to Singapore. At no point did Lyons suggest that the Army’s mission was to defend against an invasion.

Shortly after establishing this policy, Lyons received Imperial confirmation of his decision. His Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs, John Latham, had asked the CID to answer the question: ‘[What is] the most effective apportionment of moneys available in Australia for purposes of defence [?]’. The
response, CID Report 372-C, reiterated Imperial maritime principles, namely that the basis of the Empire’s defence was the Royal Navy’s maintenance of sea supremacy. The CID defined the duty of the Australian Army as the defence of the ports and anchorages required by the fleet. The report also repeated the conclusion of CID Report 249-C of 1925 that all Australia had to fear was attack from ‘cruisers or armed merchant vessels and submarines’. Lastly, the CID agreed that it would be better for Australia to provide ‘efficient protection against raids rather than inefficient measures against invasion’.17

Lyons had recognised that the Army required a larger share of the defence vote, but virtually all new moneys went to the modernisation of the coastal forts. It was true that they were in a desperate state. Their design was obsolete and their weapons could not match the power of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s warships. In order to upgrade the coastal defences, the Government authorised new 9.2 and 6 inch guns. The selection of these calibres is significant. The weight and range of shell that they fired was effective only against vessels of up to the size of cruisers. They would be useless against the larger battleships and battle cruiser classes. An invasion fleet would certainly contain battleships, whereas an enemy would use lesser vessels for a raid. Thus the weapons met the Government’s anti-raid strategy. In effect, Lyons’s policy identified the Army as nothing more than a supplement to the Singapore Strategy.

The Army responded quickly to Lyons’s anti-raid initiative by suggesting a major reorganisation of its formations. The Army’s objective was to reduce the number of formations and units that it fielded, thereby lowering overhead and administrative costs. The Army would then apply the resultant savings to the remainder of its structure, thereby improving the smaller force’s readiness. The Adjutant General, Major General T. H. Dodds, went so far as to write to the affected commanders advising them of the imminent disbandment of their formations. A secondary benefit of this plan, the Army argued, was that, by improving the capability of the residual force, the Army would also have improved its ability to respond to a raid. In March 1932 the Military Board presented to Pearce its proposed reorganisation, namely a force of three cavalry brigades, two infantry divisions and four mixed brigades.18

Surprisingly, given the Government’s initial determination, Pearce postponed a decision pending the outcome of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, which was then under way. In fact, no formal changes in the Army’s organisation would eventuate. The Army revisited its proposed reorganisation several times over the next two years, but in each instance the Government demurred.19 Instead, the Army was to compose an anti-raid response force from within its existing organisation of four infantry and two cavalry divisions, and three mixed brigades. This response force was to become known as the First Line Component.
Surviving documentation does not clearly detail the emergence of the First Line Component, but by 1935 its conception was well developed.20 The First Line Component was to defend against raids and act as the source of troops for a one-division expeditionary force. The Army’s existing organisation of seven divisions was to serve as an expansion base in case of a full mobilisation.21 Oddly, the composition that the Army proposed for the First Line Component was the same that it offered to the Government in 1932.

Lyons’s statement of a clear role, the development of the First Line Component, and the Army’s seeming acceptance of an anti-raid priority had little effect on the pattern of Australian civil–military relations, however. Soon the Army’s old practices re-exerted themselves. In fact, for the Army the First Line Component became just another tool in its drive to undermine the Government’s anti-raid policy, overturn the Singapore Strategy and adopt an anti-invasion mission. Moreover, its leaders moved extremely slowly to implement the First Line Component idea. The result was that, instead of raising an anti-raid force, they succeeded in making the First Line Component into another form of anti-invasion defence.

The CGS, Major-General Julius Bruche, made a concerted effort to reopen the debate in mid 1934. He wrote to Pearce admitting to his confusion over the Army’s role and requesting clarification. While he agreed that in 1932 the Government set the Army’s priority as anti-raid defence, Bruche continued that, since the Government had rebuffed suggestions for a reorganisation of the Army, he could only conclude that the Government had abandoned this policy. The General then attacked the anti-raid policy by noting that it entailed great risks and staked all on the ability of the entire British battle fleet to move to Singapore.22

Pearce’s reply was terse and to the point: ‘the Defence policy as laid down by the Government in 1932, still obtains’.23

Undeterred, Bruche wrote again. This time he revealed that the Army had not yet developed any anti-raid plans because it had been too busy preparing its anti-invasion mobilisation and concentration plans. Bruche then explained that, if the Army were to prepare properly for the repulsion of raids, he had to know the magnitude and nature of these incursions. Pearce passed the matter to the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral George F. Hyde, for a reply. Hyde, originally a Royal Navy officer, naturally accepted the Admiralty’s position, and his response could have been drafted by the British Government. In Hyde’s opinion, major centres were safe from ground attack, and the enemy would risk a shore party only at remote areas such as in the mandated territories or possibly Darwin. The Chief of Naval Staff made it clear... under an anti-raid policy, the Army would have very little to do and required little more than a minuscule force structure.
that, under an anti-raid policy, the Army would have very little to do and required little more than a minuscule force structure. The subsequent development of the First Line Component showed that the Army rejected such an insignificant mission.\textsuperscript{24}

As Bruche’s successor, Lavarack continued the Army’s opposition. In early 1936, Lavarack admitted that, despite the passage of four years, he still had not finalised the organisation of the First Line Component. He stated that he regarded the subdivision of the Army into two parts as merely a means of giving priority for the allocation of funds for the next few years. Lavarack’s real desire was to improve the entire force, rather than just a section of it. Increased funds, he wrote, would prevent the development of a marked disparity between the capabilities of first- and second-line units. Lavarack’s sentiments were certainly not in the spirit of the policy that the Government had entrusted him to put in place.\textsuperscript{25}

It was not until the end of 1937 that Lavarack finally identified the units that would form the First Line Component. Even at this point, one must question his loyalty to the Government’s mandate. The resulting organisation was a lengthy list of unit mobilisations that called for the redeployment and redesignation of units, the raising of support units that did not exist in peace, and the downgrading of existing units to training establishments. A large component of the organisation dealt with the assignment of units to base and administrative tasks. Upon activation, the plan’s primary objective was to set up the foundation for the Army’s expansion, and this was greatly in excess of what was required to oppose a minor raid.\textsuperscript{26}

Another organisational plan, also prepared in 1937, illustrates the true intentions of the Army’s leaders. Called the ‘Strategic Concentration Plan’, it assumed that the Japanese would land at the Commonwealth’s most vital point in order to obtain a decisive result before Imperial help could arrive. The targeted area was the Sydney–Newcastle–Wollongong region—the nation’s industrial heartland. The plan called for the Army to concentrate in the Sydney basin to prevent its occupation.

What makes the Strategic Concentration Plan even more interesting is that, while it includes the same units that were listed on the First Line Component organisation, it assigns them a different role. Units that converted to training establishments or transferred to other formations in the First Line Component plan now appear as combat units on the anti-invasion order of battle. For example, the Melbourne-based 3rd Division, whose units became training establishments in the First Line Component organisation, now suddenly played a critical role in the nation’s anti-invasion defence. The Strategic Concentration Plan called for the 3rd Division to move to the Sydney basin.\textsuperscript{27}

The particular units that Lavarack finally selected for the First Line Component also support the conclusion that he was trying to undermine the purpose of the concept. In the end, he designated forty infantry battalions as First Line Component units. On initial examination, this appears a reasonable figure, given the great extent...
of the Australian coastline. However, at that time the Army had only forty-four battalions on its order of battle. This meant that 91 per cent of the Army’s infantry was a part of the First Line Component. In addition, eleven out of fifteen artillery brigades and ten out of fifteen field engineer companies belonged to the first line. These forces represented an overwhelming allocation of the Army’s strength to the First Line Component.

Lavarack’s list also distributed the Army’s support units between the First Line Component and the rest of the force. It is in examining these units that the Army’s utilisation of the First Line Component as a base for an anti-invasion force is driven home. For example, while any military operation would require medical support, Lavarack allocated to the First Line Component nine general hospitals with a total capacity of 6000 beds. If this was not enough to tend to the casualties resulting from a raid, the First Line Component contained a further 3250 beds in seven convalescent depots, and a multitude of motor ambulance convoys and field ambulances. Of the Army’s eighty-four medical units, seventy-one were part of the First Line Component. Lavarack committed other support elements in similar proportions.28

In effect, the First Line Component had become a means for the Army’s leaders to appear to meet the Government’s demands while continuing to maintain an organisation to defend against invasion. Although it must be admitted that many of these units existed only on paper, or in a cadre state, their inclusion in the Army’s First Line Component underscores the conclusion that Lavarack was developing an anti-invasion force under an anti-raid guise.

Both the troops allocated and the weaponry desired further reinforce the idea of the Army’s duplicity. In the final year before war, the Army sought to finish the equipping of the First Line Component. Among the multitude of deficiencies that Lavarack sought to rectify was a lack of: thirty-six 3 inch anti-aircraft guns, 228 2 pounder anti-tank guns, sixteen 60 pounder medium guns and sixteen 6 inch medium howitzers. These weapons represented a large increase in the Army’s firepower, and were far in excess of what was needed to repel small parties put ashore by an enemy raider. Moreover, it is beyond belief that the Army really expected a raiding force to include tanks and planes, thereby necessitating the anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns.29

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… the First Line Component had become the Army’s expansion base, with its true rationale being invasion defence.

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After 1937 the Army’s personnel numbers began to rebound, and as the force grew, the First Line Component also expanded. By early 1939 the Army had allocated to the First Line Component 5326 officers and 102 690 other ranks, out of a total establishment of approximately 175 000. To command this force the First Line Component received nineteen generals and forty-three brigadiers. This all suggests that the Army had successfully blurred the rationale for the First Line Component. In effect, the First Line Component had become the Army’s expansion base, with its true rationale being invasion defence.  

The Army also used its officer training to highlight the role of the First Line Component in resisting an invasion. At first appearance, the aim of a 1938 exercise without troops was to prepare officers to oppose a raid. However, the exercise presumed that the enemy would use small-scale landings as the initial phase of a larger enterprise. One example examined the enemy’s seizure of Coffs Harbour and its use as an air base to support other operations further south. Another study forecast the capture of Jervis Bay as a preliminary step to an advance on Sydney. The Army expected the raiders to establish a lodgment and use it to build up an invasion force, rather than return to their ships.

The Army leaders’ response to government statements on defence policy further demonstrates the extent to which the military were determined to resist the wishes of their political masters. In 1933 Pearce delivered a major address on Australian security policy. In it he concluded that Australian security was based ‘on the power of the [Royal] Navy to defend her against aggression’. The speech was well received in London, and the secretary to the CID, Maurice Hankey, claimed it was ‘one of the most remarkable expositions of Imperial Defence’ that he had read in years. The directives emanating from Army Headquarters, however, continued to take a different tone. Also in 1933, the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel V. A. H. Sturdee, wrote that ‘the present organisation of the Army is designed to guard against invasion as well as raids’. Clearly, a considerable difference of opinion still remained between the officers and the Government.

At the Government’s request, Hankey visited Australia in 1934 to conduct a review of the Commonwealth’s defence requirements. He presented predictable findings, which satisfied Lyons. Hankey discussed the importance of the Singapore Strategy, assured the transfer of the fleet to the Far East, and asserted the ability of the Royal Navy to defeat the Imperial Japanese Fleet single-handedly. The response by Bruche was brutal, direct, and bordered on insubordination. One by one he countered Hankey’s claims. Then he turned his attention to the Government and

As Bruche was of retirement age, he did not have to tread lightly.
testily asserted that its defence policy was wrong. Instead, Bruche believed that the Government should honour the recommendations of the Senior Officer Conference of 1920. As Bruche was of retirement age, he did not have to tread lightly. However, Lavarack, his successor, only moderated his tone slightly. Under his tenure, the Army issued its own position paper on the Australian security environment. Titled 'A Common Doctrine on the Organisation and Employment of the Australian Military Force', its aim was to convince the Government of the necessity to prepare against invasion. As in so many other instances, the Government overlooked the Army's advice, finding the assurances of London more appealing.35

CONCLUSION

World War II began in September 1939 and, despite twenty years of preparation, the Australian Army was unready for the conflict. The Army was unable to defend against invasion, readily dispatch an efficient expeditionary force overseas, or even safeguard the nation's shores against a raid. In part, this lack of military effectiveness was a result of government policies that were beyond the Army's control. The inter-war period had been an extremely difficult era for the force's leaders. They combated inadequate budgets and dealt with governments that were reluctant to purchase modern equipment or provide funds for adequate training. Despite these disabilities, the Army did have one great advantage. The Government had provided it with a clearly defined role—one that remained unchanged from 1923 to the outbreak of war.

The Army chose to disregard this advantage, however, and instead advanced its own preferred role of anti-invasion defence. As a result, its leaders spent nearly the entire inter-war period undermining and misconstruing official defence policy in order to make room for its own objectives. In the end, the Army ignored clear instructions to develop the First Line Component as an anti-raid force, and instead used this body as another means to secure for itself the desired anti-invasion mission. Thus the poor quality of the Army in 1939 was, in part, a condition of the officers' own making.

It was the prerogative of the Government to define the nation's defence arrangements, and the obligation of its military leaders to accept and implement their political masters' wishes. This practice holds true even when the Government's policy is wrong or foolish, as was certainly the case during this period. The Government's unquestioning adherence to the Singapore Strategy was not based...
on a realistic assessment of the Empire's security situation. Instead, Australian politicians accepted Imperial platitudes because they found them comforting and these platitudes allowed them to avoid hard decisions and extra expenditure.

The Army's interpretation of Australia's security situation was the more correct one. While the Admiralty did send a fleet to the east, it did so when Britain was fully engaged elsewhere, as the Army had predicted, and the Japanese had little difficulty in sinking these ships and overrunning Singapore. It is also correct that the Australian mainland never suffered invasion. Indeed, as predicted by British defence planners, the only direct attacks on the Commonwealth were raids: bombardment from either ships or planes. However, it was the United States Navy's turning back of the Japanese at the Battle of the Coral Sea that really safeguarded Australia. Had the Japanese landed at Port Moresby and finished the conquest of New Guinea, the Army's worst fears may have been realised.

Being correct does not mean that the actions of Australia's military leaders were proper, however. One of the cornerstones of Anglo-American military tradition is the absolute subservience of officers to the wishes of their government. It is not the place of officers to make policy, but to implement it. The First Line Component deception illustrates that even in Australia, a nation whose military officers are normally subservient, the balance of civil–military relations can go awry. Australia is fortunate that its officers never went further in their insubordination. This deception is a cautionary tale as to how easily the balance between a government and its military can go wrong.

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THE AUTHOR

Dr Albert Palazzo is a Research Fellow in the School of History, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. His publications include Seeking Victory on the Western Front: The British Army and Chemical Warfare in World War I, The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation from 1901 to 2001 and Defenders of Australia: The Third Australian Division.
A CLOSER LOOK AT
US–AUSTRALIAN OPERATIONS
IN THE VIETNAM WAR

OPERATION TOAN THANG I AND THE DEFENCE OF FIRE
SUPPORT BASE CORAL, APRIL–JUNE 1968

ERIK B. VILLARD

While historians have thoroughly examined the Australian and New Zealand role in the Vietnam War, much less has been written about the working relationship between the Australian and New Zealand forces and their American counterparts. Of particular interest in this regard is the 2d Battalion, 35th Field Artillery, a unit equipped with M109 155 mm self-propelled guns that operated alongside the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) from 1966 until 1971. Nicknamed the ‘Huskies’, the 2d Battalion had the distinction of being the only American unit during the war to serve as a regular, integral component of a foreign combat force. The US corps-level II Field Force headquarters, which had operational control over both the Australian Task Force and the 2d Battalion, assigned one of the 2d Battalion’s three batteries to 1ATF on a rotating basis after the Australians asked for medium-calibre artillery to augment their light pack howitzers. The United States was eager to fulfill this request because the two nations enjoyed a close diplomatic relationship, a shared language and compatible cultures, and a high confidence in one another’s military skill. The special arrangement yielded excellent results, rarely more evident than during Operation Toàn Thành I (Total Victory I) on the night of 15–16 May when the allies confronted the 141st PAVN Regiment at Fire Base Coral, located approximately 40 km north of Saigon.

When Operation Toàn Thành I began in early April 1968, the 2d Battalion of the 35th Artillery had been working with 1ATF for nearly two years. In May 1966 the advance party from the battalion flew from Fort Carson, Colorado, to their
new headquarters at Xuân Lộc, the capital of Long Khánh Province located 50 km east of Saigon. The province of Phước Tuy to the south contained 1ATF, a recently formed battle group composed of two infantry battalions, an artillery regiment equipped with 105 mm howitzers, an armoured cavalry squadron, a Special Air Service squadron, and other supporting elements. The Australian taskforce wanted regular and dependable access to medium-calibre artillery; it therefore asked the II Field Force headquarters, the American corps-level command for the southern half of South Vietnam, for an American 155 mm gun unit to be stationed at Núi Đât, the taskforce’s newly established base camp. As fate would have it, the soon-to-be executive officer of Battery A, Lieutenant Chuck Heindrichs, was at the II Field Force headquarters when the Australian request came in. He had flown to South Vietnam with the advance party but had time on his hands because the rest of his battery was still crossing the Pacific Ocean on a transport ship. The battalion commander decided that Heindrichs would make a good liaison officer. The gregarious West Pointer was therefore soon on his way to Phước Tuy Province to lay the groundwork for his battery’s arrival. When Battery A disembarked at Qui Nhơn in mid-June, it first went to Biên Hòa and then on 22 July moved to Núi Đất to begin working with 1ATF.¹

The Americans soon developed a close bond with the Australian Task Force to the extent that the battery thought of itself—in spirit at least—to be a part of the ‘Aussie’ Army. Most of the men adopted the floppy bush hat as their standard headgear and several even painted prominent red kangaroos on the hulls of their vehicles. The Americans admired much of the Australian equipment, especially those items custom-designed for jungle environments. The Australian lightweight tents and ingenious jungle showers (a canvas bucket that required only two gallons of water) rated highly with the men of Battery A, although they felt that their own fatigues were superior to the cotton, jungle-green uniforms worn by the Australians.

The Americans enjoyed socialising with the jocular, gregarious Australians and the equally friendly, if somewhat more decorous, New Zealanders.² The Husky gunners found their counterparts to be highly professional and extremely well trained but always ready for a good party when off-duty. Their ability—seemingly inherited as a birthright—to consume prodigious quantities of beer never failed to amaze the Americans, who were no teetotalers themselves. While some Australian habits—including their passion for tea and general indifference to sweets and candy—struck the Americans as a little odd, they shared with the Australians a love of sport. However, as a number of US servicemen learnt at the cost of their battered...
bodies, the Australian version of football, played without the benefit of protective gear, was considerably rougher than the North American style. Fortunately both groups were also fond of volleyball, probably much to the relief of their commanding officers and the medical staff.

The Australians, most of whom had never visited the United States, were full of questions about its culture and geography. They compared the idiomatic expressions used in their own country with those found in America, and swapped stories about common pastimes, including cars, music and women. According to Lieutenant Mel Moffitt, the Australians seemed particularly interested in Texas and its culture. While the Lone Star State was quintessentially American because of its historical and symbolic connection to the Wild West, the Australians could identify with it because of their own outback culture. The bushranger, jackaroo and cattle station were cultural icons not far removed from those of the American West.

The organisation and traditions of the Australian Army, based as it was on the British regimental system, offered some surprises to the men of Battery A. Lieutenant Chuck Heindrichs was amazed to learn that he, like all Australian officers, was entitled to a batman, a personal aide who looked after the mundane chores of his superior. This system enabled the officer to devote more of his time to professional duties, but Heindrichs could never bring himself to accept one. While the batman system reflected the class-conscious roots of the British military system, Heindrichs was intrigued to find that the Australian officers were on a first-name basis with one another in the field, eschewing some of the formalities of rank found in the American Army. Another surprise to Heindrichs was the Australian officers’ mess, a formal affair complete with linen, toasts, and a portrait of the British Queen displayed in a place of honour.

The men of Battery A discovered that their counterparts in the 12th Field Regiment—composed of the 102nd Field Battery, 108th Field Battery, and the New Zealand 161st Field Battery—used somewhat different methods and procedures from their own, although none of these prevented the American artillery from working effectively with 1ATF. Whereas the American gunners used stakes in the ground to calibrate the aiming of their howitzers, the Australian and New Zealand soldiers used a system based on mirrors to achieve the same end. The Americans, who calculated their firing missions with slide rules and tables, were intrigued to find that their allies did so with a circular wheel chart. The officers of Battery A were also surprised to find that a major commanded an Australian or New Zealand battery rather than a captain, as was standard in the American Army. However, that artillery major typically accompanied whatever infantry battalion his battery was supporting, which left the ‘two eye-cee’ (2IC, or second-in-command) in charge at the gun position.
Somewhat to their surprise and amusement, the Americans learnt that the Australians used a more formal radio protocol. Mel Moffitt, a second lieutenant when he joined Battery A in May 1968, noticed that the Australians sounded more dignified and cool-headed than most American soldiers when speaking on the radio. Unlike many American officers, the Australians rarely, if ever, used obscenities while talking on the radio. Their English was more grammatically precise and the Australian radio operators at headquarters began each conversation with a polite ‘Hello’ before relaying information. The radio operators also wrote down everything said to them and read it back to the speaker, a verification technique that Moffitt admired.

Despite their intensive training at Fort Carson, Colorado, Battery A needed several months of combat experience in Phu‘oc Tuy Province before they could tap the full potential of their 155 mm howitzers. The Huskies had to learn, sometimes by trial and error, the quirks of operating in a subtropical environment that was radically different from the high plains of North America. They discovered, for example, that the monsoon rains of South Vietnam—far stronger than anything they had experienced back home—would detonate their variable time fuse shells in mid-air as they collided at supersonic speeds with the heavy sheets of water. The men alleviated the problem by devising a simple cone to fit over the detonating trigger, a modification that later became a standard feature on 155 mm shells used in South Vietnam.

Despite some initial concerns about the inexperienced Americans and their powerful guns, the Australian commanders came to depend on Battery A. In the beginning they were cautious about the M109 system because the potential radius for error of the more powerful 155 mm howitzer shell was much larger than that of the 105 mm gun. Moreover, the 155 mm shells were more than three times as destructive as the 105 mm high-explosive round and had a much wider fragmentation kill zone. For these reasons, the Australian infantry were wary about using Battery A in a close support role. However, after the 155 mm howitzers had operated for several months without committing any major errors or mishaps the American gunners gained the complete confidence of the 1ATF. Battery A won special accolades from the task force on 18 August 1966, when the Husky gunners fired in support of two platoons from D Company, 6th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (6 RAR) that was trapped in a wood near the village of Long Tân and was in danger of being overrun by a reinforced battalion of Việt Cộng. Aided by Australian, New Zealand and American artillery, the surrounded Diggers
fought off the enemy until reinforcements came to their rescue. While the Australian commanders generally relied on the 12th Field Regiment to provide close-in fire support for infantry missions, they routinely used Battery A to hit suspected enemy staging areas and withdrawal routes, base camps, and fortified targets such as bunkers. The 155 mm guns frequently fired missions in direct support of the Australian armoured units, who presumably felt somewhat safer than the infantry in the event that a round landed a little too close. By the end of 1967, Battery A had become a tightly integrated part of 1ATF.

On the nights of 30 and 31 January 1968, the communist high command unleashed the Tết Offensive, sending approximately 84,000 Việt Cộng and North Vietnamese soldiers to attack urban centres throughout South Vietnam in a bid to topple President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s Government and force the United States to withdraw from the war. When the offensive began, the bulk of 1ATF was some 40 km north-east of Saigon in Biên Hòa Province. Their mission, codenamed Operation Coburg, in the vicinity of the Đồng Nai River, was to prevent the enemy from launching 122 mm rockets at the Biên Hòa and Long Bình military complexes. Battery B from the 2d Battalion was operating with the Australians because Battery A had temporarily moved north to Phước Long Province to support the 101st Airborne Division. The taskforce continued to operate near the Đồng Nai River for an additional two weeks, claiming ninety Việt Cộng dead and taking five prisoners, before it split into smaller groups and moved south to Long Bình and Phước Tuy provinces.4

On the night of 18 February, a battalion from the 274th Việt Cộng Regiment attacked Battery B and the 3rd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR), at Fire Support Base Anderson, located just west of Xuân Lộc in Long Bình Province. Australian casualties amounted to seven killed and twenty-two wounded, with Battery B suffering one dead and three wounded. The Việt Cộng battalion probably suffered severe casualties but the total number remained in doubt: the enemy removed most of their dead and their weapons from the battlefield before retreating. The battle of Fire Support Base Anderson marked the first time that a unit from the 2d Battalion had come under ground attack. Battery B acquitted itself well, using high explosive and white phosphorous shells at point-blank range to repel the attackers while also employing .50 calibre machine-guns and small arms to defend the perimeter. Although they did not yet know it, the men of Battery A would undergo a similar trial by fire three months later.

The Tết Offensive proved to be a military disaster for the Communists, particularly with regard to the losses that they suffered in the fight for Saigon. On 11 March, the allies launched Operation Quyết Thắng (Determined to Win), a massive counter-offensive to clear the Việt Cộng and North Vietnamese from the capital region. The month-long campaign resulted in the death of 2650 enemy troops and the capture
of thousands of small arms and crew-served weapons. On 8 April, II Field Force commenced Operation Toàn Thắng I to build on the success of Quyết Thắng and to establish a permanent security belt around Saigon. Despite the grievous losses they had suffered, however, the Communists intended to make a second major assault against Saigon and other major cities that Spring. In mid-April, II Field Force learnt from enemy defectors and captured prisoners of war that another massive communist offensive would strike within a matter of weeks. It remained to be seen whether Toàn Thắng I could pre-empt, or at least significantly blunt, the new communist offensive.

The taskforce, once again reunited with Battery A, joined the operation on 21 April. The taskforce deployed to the Hát Dích area, located on the border of Phước Tuy and Biên Hòa provinces, after receiving intelligence that a Việt Cộng battalion was lurking in the vicinity. When the Communists began their second or so-called ‘mini-Têt offensive against Saigon on 4 May, however, the senior Australian commander in Vietnam, Major General A. L. McDonald, instructed his liaison officer at II Field Force headquarters, Major A. B. ‘Alf’ Garland, to find a more aggressive role for 1ATF. In the meantime, the taskforce shifted north, moving into Area of Operations (AO) Columbus III, a region east of Xuân Lộc and south of Highway 1 that the Communists often used to launch rockets against the Long Bình/Biên Hòa complex.

At II Field Force headquarters, Major Garland proposed that 1ATF deploy to a region on the border of Biên Hòa and Bình Dương provinces known to the Americans as the ‘Catcher’s Mitt’. Located just north of the town of Tân Uyên on the bank of the Dông Nai River, the Catcher’s Mitt served as a rest-and-supply area for enemy soldiers infiltrating from War Zone D to Saigon. Controlling the area would block enemy withdrawal routes from Saigon and hinder communist replacements and supplies from reaching the capital district. The Americans approved Garland’s scheme and instructed the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, to perform a similar mission to the west of the Australians while the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, operated to their north and east. Major Garland code-named the area AO Surfers and began working with his staff to plan the operation.

Garland had no illusions that it would be an easy mission. Allied intelligence informed 1ATF that at least five enemy regiments—the 141st and 165th PAVN from the 7th Division, the 274th and 275th Việt Cộng from the 5th Division, and the independent Dông Nai Regiment—were thought to be in the vicinity of AO Surfers. Also present in the area were several Local Force units and the 83d Rear Services Group. The total enemy strength was imposing, potentially
more than a two-infantry battalion taskforce could handle, but the Australian commanders were not unduly worried. They thought that many units would be battered, disorganised, and probably demoralised as they retreated from Saigon after a week of fighting. Those communist forces advancing toward the capital would likely be under orders to move quickly and to avoid allied strong points. Although between 3000 and 4000 Main Force soldiers plus another several thousand Local Force and logistics troops might have been in the vicinity of AO Surfers, the Australian headquarters believed that the enemy could only concentrate a fraction of that total if they chose to attack the Australian Task Force.

The 1ATF headquarters planned on using speed and mobility to confound the enemy. The Australians decided they would insert two infantry battalions and two artillery batteries by helicopter and then bring armoured and logistical units as well as Battery A to AO Surfers by road. Unbeknown to the Australian planners, however, the site they chose for their initial helicopter landing—an abandoned plantation just east of Bình Mỹ—touched upon the forward base area of the 141st and the 165th PAVN Regiments of the 7th PAVN Division. The North Vietnamese had moved into the area during March and April in order to prepare for the May phase of the Têt Offensive. The 165th had orders to attack the north-east quadrant of Saigon while the 141st was to be held in reserve as an exploitation force. The communist high command also instructed the regiments and local guerrillas to protect the Bình Mỹ region once the offensive began. Although they did not yet know it, the lead elements of 1ATF would be landing right in the midst of a well-armed and highly disciplined communist force several times their size.\(^5\)

As the task force prepared to move from AO Columbus to AO Surfers, American patrols in the Bình Mỹ corridor collided with communist forces advancing on Saigon. On 5 May Company D of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, and Troop L of the 3d Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, engaged a battalion-sized North Vietnamese force 5 km south of Bình Mỹ, killing an estimated seventy enemy troops.\(^6\) The same day 8 km south-west of Bình Mỹ, elements from the 1st Infantry Division encountered the 165th Regiment as it marched toward the capital. The contact led to a ferocious two-day battle that resulted in the deaths of approximately 500 communist soldiers and the defection of the regimental commander. After breaking contact, the survivors of the 165th fled north-east to their base camp near Bình Mỹ.\(^7\) If these contacts were any indication, 1ATF could expect to see heavy action when it entered the Catcher's Mitt.
On 10 May, the II Field Force headquarters formally requested that the task-force deploy to AO Surfers. The following evening, the 1st Infantry Division sent company-sized patrols to sweep the Binh My area so that Australian helicopter insertion scheduled for 12 May would go smoothly. In the early afternoon, the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, and the 3d Platoon of L Troop, 3d Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry, made contact with an estimated company of North Vietnamese 3 km west of Binh My. The enemy proved to be resolute, well armed, and strongly entrenched. After several hours of battle, the commander of the 28th Infantry Regiment sent Company A of the 2d Battalion to reinforce the attack. Tactical air support, artillery, and light-fire teams pummeled the enemy position but the North Vietnamese held their ground until the fighting tapered off around midnight. When the Americans swept the area the next morning the enemy company was gone, leaving behind only a small rearguard that fought briefly before fleeing. Troops from the 1st Infantry found thirty-nine bodies among the bunkers and took two prisoners of war. The captured men revealed that they were from the 141st Regiment.

As that battle was heading towards its conclusion, a second infantry patrol from the 1st Division was marching through the darkness toward an abandoned plantation east of Binh My that was to serve as the taskforce landing zone. When the soldiers arrived at dawn they found no signs of the enemy. With the area secure, the Australian headquarters ordered its two infantry battalions—1 RAR and 3 RAR—plus the 12th Field Regiment to proceed to the landing zone. The taskforce depended on American helicopters because it possessed only a single Huey squadron. The first Australian infantry touched down shortly before 8 a.m. They discovered that the landing zone was covered with saplings, which led to delays in the successive waves coming in and forced the larger Chinook helicopters to unload the 161st Field Battery further south than was intended. Despite these headaches, all elements assigned to the mission had by afternoon debarked at the landing zone.

That evening, the four companies of 1 RAR were arrayed to the north, east and south of Fire Support Base Coral, which contained the headquarters of the 12th Field Regiment and 1 RAR. The 102d Field Battery, the mortar platoon and the anti-tank platoon of 1 RAR, D Company of 3 RAR and the battalion headquarters were positioned 500 metres to the west of Coral. The New Zealand 161st Field Battery was in an open field approximately a kilometre south-west of the fire base. The rest of 3 RAR, three companies strong, marched several kilometres to the west to scout the battlefield, they estimated that they had killed at least 100 North Vietnamese.
future location of Fire Support Base Coogee. The Australian Task Force headquarters, which subdivided AO Surfers to facilitate command and control, assigned the eastern portion of the zone, AO Bondi, to the forces built around 1 RAR, and the western portion, AO Manly, to those built around 3 RAR. By nightfall the bulk of the task force was sitting squarely in the middle of the communist infiltration corridor.

At approximately 1.45 a.m. on the morning of 13 May, an estimated enemy battalion to the north of Coral attacked the fire base with rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and mortar fire. A ground assault followed only minutes later. The mortar platoon from 1 RAR took the brunt of the attack, but they held their position with help of three 105 mm guns from 102nd Battery. While antipersonnel rounds tore gaps in the communist ranks, a collection of gunners, headquarters staff, and men from the anti-tank platoon counterattacked and stopped the enemy’s advance. American helicopters and a ‘Spooky’ gunship soon arrived on the scene, pouring a hail of rockets and machine-gun fire on the now-disorganised North Vietnamese. The enemy retreated at 8 a.m.

When the Australians swept the battlefield, they estimated that they had killed at least 100 North Vietnamese. A captured prisoner of war revealed that the attackers had been the 275th Infiltration Group. The unit had been marching from Cambodia to Saigon when it spotted the 102nd Field Battery arriving by helicopter. Sensing an easy victory, the group commander decided to assault the guns later that evening. That decision turned out to be a grievous mistake.9

Despite the one-sided nature of the battle, five Australians had been killed and another eight wounded. The seriously wounded men were airlifted to an American hospital, where they received emergency treatment before eventually heading back to the 1st Australian Field Hospital in Vũng Tàu.

On the afternoon of 13 May, the big M109s of Battery A rolled into Fire Support Base Coral along with A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, the Australian Task Force’s forward headquarters, and several logistics units. The sight that greeted the men of Battery A was one of Australian infantry combing the field to the north, collecting enemy equipment and picking up pieces of North Vietnamese soldiers killed the night before. Seeing the carnage of what apparently had been a ‘human wave attack’, the Americans realised that the enemy was prepared to pay a high price in order to destroy Fire Support Base Coral.

The taskforce improved the defences of Coral over the next two days while infantry patrols swept the surrounding area, engaging several North Vietnamese reconnaissance squads. On the evening of 15 May, Battery A was situated on the
southern flank of the fire base along with the headquarters of the 12th Field Regiment while the four infantry companies of 1 RAR guarded the western, northern and eastern quadrants. The 102nd Field Battery, the headquarters units and the logistics troops were positioned in the centre of Coral. The M113s of A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, stood ready as the counter-reaction force. Battery A created a berm in front of their position with their bulldozer, giving them an extra measure of protection. The Americans provided their own security detail armed with M-14 rifles, M-60 light machine-guns and vehicle-mounted .50 calibre heavy machine-guns.\(^\text{10}\) The Huskies also had with them a pair of M42A1 ‘Duster’ tracked anti-aircraft vehicles, each armed with two rapid-fire 40 mm cannon. The Việt Cộng attack against Battery B at Fire Support Base Anderson in February convinced the 54th Artillery Group to assign Dusters to all of its 155 mm howitzer batteries. While originally intended for use against Soviet aircraft, the M42s had proven devastating in a ground support role, especially when used for base defence.\(^\text{11}\)

The defenders of Fire Support Base Coral were thus ready when the main communist blow fell later that evening. At 2.15 a.m., the enemy launched an intense mortar, recoilless rifle, and RPG attack against the firebase, particularly aimed at its eastern side. Ten minutes later a battalion-sized infantry force assaulted that sector, which was held by A and B Companies of 1 RAR. Fighting from shallow pits and protected by a single row of wire, the Australians stopped the onrushing communists before they reached the perimeter. Meanwhile, the enemy launched probing attacks on Coral from several other directions. All were turned back, although a few North Vietnamese managed to slip inside the perimeter before being killed.

When the first mortar rounds landed, signalling the start of the attack, the gunners of Battery A slammed shut the hatches on their vehicles, levelled their barrels, and began firing high-explosive and white phosphorous shells across the open field to their south. In the darkness, the Americans could see the muzzle flashes of communist small arms and the sudden flare of light from RPG launchers. Along with the 155 mm howitzer fire, the Americans poured out 40 mm cannon rounds from the Dusters in long fiery arcs and raked suspected enemy positions with machine-guns and small arms. The Duster crews, positioned in the south-east corner of the base next to Company B, coordinated their fire with the Australian .50 calibre machine-gun crews, and thus created a deadly and overwhelming torrent of fire against any target that they observed.\(^\text{12}\)
Whether by prearrangement or due to the intimidating power of the American artillery, the North Vietnamese made only small probing attacks against the Battery A perimeter. The officer commanding B Company, Major Bob Hennessy, fighting on the left flank of the Americans, thought that it would have been ‘suicide’ for the enemy to face the M42s and M109s head-on. Although not directly subjected to an infantry assault, the American gunners still faced danger from mortar rounds, rocket-propelled grenades, and the occasional communist who found his way into the Husky sector from another direction. The executive officer of the battery, 1st Lieutenant David Meriwether, killed one North Vietnamese in hand-to-hand combat after encountering the man lurking among the American tents and vehicles. Only a few yards away, Lieutenant Moffitt was working the radios in the Fire Direction Centre, an M577 command vehicle that was ringed with sandbags for extra protection, when he heard mortar fragments ricochet into his compartment. Moffitt fervently hoped that his thin-skinned vehicle, conspicuous because of its height and radio array, did not attract any RPGs.

Minutes after the battle began, every available US artillery piece within range of Fire Support Base Coral came to its defence. At II Field Force headquarters in Long Binh, the senior commander, General Fred C. Weyand, monitored the battle with his staff and made sure that the Australians had all of the support that they needed. Soon a torrent of shells from 105 mm, 155 mm, 175 mm and 8 inch guns landed on suspected North Vietnamese staging areas and avenues of approach. First Lieutenant David McLeod, the Assistant Executive Officer, coordinated the incoming fire from his position in the Fire Direction Centre. Fortunately for the defenders of Coral, there were no other large battles going on in the area that evening; therefore the full weight of the II Field Force artillery could be brought to bear. Some of the shells landed within a few-dozen metres of the perimeter, alarming the defenders but fortuitously obliterating at least one North Vietnamese assault party just as it was rushing forward.

About an hour after the attack began, American helicopter gunships and a Spooky arrived to punish the enemy from above and to illuminate the battlefield with flares. The concentrated machine-gun and cannon fire made it difficult for the North Vietnamese to mass their troops and thus to coordinate a single powerful thrust against Coral. The helicopter pilots made repeated strafing runs against enemy machine-gun positions, often putting themselves at great risk in order to avoid hitting friendly troops on the ground. US Air Force F-4 Phantom and F-100 Super Saber fighter-bombers flew numerous sorties in defence of the fire base, descending to less than 200 feet as they dropped their bombs and napalm on North Vietnamese positions.
The initial communist thrust against the eastern perimeter stalled at 3.40 a.m., and for the next hour and a half the enemy conducted probing attacks elsewhere around Coral. At 5.15 a.m., the enemy mounted another battalion-sized attack, this time from the north-east, but it too failed. Finally, at 6.10 a.m., the North Vietnamese tried a push against the western side, held by D Company, but were repulsed before they could reach the wire.

The enemy broke contact at 6.30 a.m. and vanished within minutes. When the Australians swept the battlefield the next morning they found thirty-four communist dead and took one prisoner of war. The battle cost the Australians five killed and nineteen wounded, and the Americans suffered two wounded. Enemy documents captured later in the year suggested that the enemy force, 1300 strong, had lost approximately 600 soldiers in the battle. The documents identified the attacking units as the K2 and K3 Battalions of the 141st Regiment, the 269th and 275th Infiltration Groups, the C-17 Recoiless Rifle Company, and the C-18 Anti-aircraft Company. After breaking contact, the battered communist units apparently withdrew to concealed positions north of the fire base and then marched away from the area when darkness fell.

The defenders of Fire Support Base Coral had performed admirably, turning back a regiment-sized attack and badly mauling the enemy in the process. Interestingly, a North Vietnamese doctor, who was attached to the 7th Division and defected to the allies in July, told his interrogators a very different version of the battle. When he attended an after-action briefing at the 141st Regimental headquarters, he was told that the unit had overrun a ‘1st Infantry Division’ base camp in Tân Uyên District and had killed all 680 of its defenders before it withdrew, with losses of sixty killed and 100 wounded. Since they had never encountered the Australian Task Force this far north, the enemy probably assumed that they had fought a battle with American 1st Infantry Division soldiers. communist officers routinely exaggerated their accomplishments in after-action reports, but the fantastic claim of having wiped out 680 ‘Americans’ was excessive even by their inflated standards. While the rest of the 7th Division may have believed this propaganda, the survivors of the battle certainly knew better.16

The allies remained at Coral for another three weeks after the battle. The task force conducted aggressive patrols along the Bình Mỹ corridor but encountered only small groups of Communists, most of whom were attempting to retreat from the Saigon area. On the nights of 25 and 28 May the 165th PAVN Regiment attacked a second Australian fire base, Fire Support Base Balmoral, located to the north of
Coral. The defenders of Balmoral, which included a squadron of Centurion tanks, repulsed the North Vietnamese and inflicted heavy losses on them on both occasions. The 7th PAVN Division, now severely depleted, avoided further contact with 1ATF and at the end of July retreated back to the Cambodian border. Operation Tôan Thắng I concluded on 31 May and was immediately succeeded by Tôan Thắng II, a mopping-up operation that continued into the late summer. The task force departed from AO Surfers for Phước Tuy Province on 5 June. In all, Operation Tôan Thắng I claimed an estimated 7645 enemy lives, 164 prisoners, five ralliers, 1505 small arms, and 499 crew-served weapons. Among American and Free World Forces there were 587 killed—including twenty-one Australians, one New Zealander and one Thai—and 3719 wounded, including eighty-six Australians, nine Thais and four New Zealanders. At a time when Australians and Americans are again fighting together in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is useful to recall operations in Vietnam. Operation Tôan Thắng illustrates how the Australian Task Force and its American component, Battery A of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery, played a crucial role in the success of Tôan Thắng I and demonstrated the value of combined operations in the Vietnam War.

ENDNOTES

2 Author interview with Douglass Green, 14 June 2002, Historian Files, CMH. Green recalled that the behaviour of the New Zealanders reminded him somewhat of English gentlemen, while the Australians tended to be more irreverent and boisterous. During a research trip to Australia in 1987, the author heard several Australian veterans make this same observation.
3 Heindrichs, 12 June 2002, Historian Files, CMH.
4 AAR, Operation Coburg, 1st Australian Task Force, 22 May 1968, Historian Files, CMH.
5 ORLL, 1 April – 31 July 1968, 1st Inf Div, pp. 16–17, Historian Files, CMH.
6 ORLL, 1 April – 31 July 1968, 1st Inf Div, annex 3d Bde, 6 August 1968, p. 1, Historian Files, CMH.
7 ORLL, 1 April – 31 July 1968, 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div, 12 August 1968, p. 2, Historian Files, CMH.
8 ORLL, 1 April – 31 July 1968, 1st Inf Div, p. 8, Historian Files, CMH.

Battery A used the older M-14 rifles instead of newer M-16 rifles because, as a non-divisional unit, it tended to be last in line for new equipment—a fact that galled many members of the 2d Battalion. Author interview with Mel Moffitt, Historian Files, CMH.

Author interview with Jay Pennywell, 9 July 2002, Historian Files, CMH.


Author interview with Mel Moffitt, 6 June 2002, Historian Files, CMH.

McAuley, p. 156.

Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC) Interrogation Report, 3 September 1968, Report Number US 2437-68, Sub: Enemy Engagement with US Forces, Source: Returnee Pham Luc (Famv, Luvc), CMIC No 2296. Historian Files, CMH.

ORLL, 1 May – 31 July 1968, II Field Force Vietnam, p. 31, Historian Files, CMH.

Dr Erik B. Villard, a graduate of Occidental College and the University of Washington, is currently a historian for the US Army Center of Military History in Washington DC. He is in the midst of writing the official US Army history of the Vietnam War in the Tết Offensive period, October 1967 – October 1968.
From this place and this time forth commences a new era in world history and you can all say that you were present at its birth.

With these famous words, the great German poet–philosopher, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, captured the historical significance of the battle of Valmy fought on 20 September 1792. At Valmy, ragged French citizen–soldiers used a blazing cannonade to defeat Prussian regular troops and secured the French Revolution. The age of the Enlightenment abruptly gave way to an age of revolution and war. Since the al-Qa‘ida attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, astute political observers have sometimes invoked Goethe’s famous words to describe the symbolism of the revolutionary change that now infuse American thinking about the future of international security.

On 20 September 1792 Goethe was one of a handful of witnesses to the cannonade at Valmy; in September 2001, through television, we were all witnesses to the awesome sight of the aerial destruction of the Twin Towers. The whole world was ‘present at the birth’ of a new age in world security, an uncomfortable reality for those in the West who had seen the post–Cold War years as ‘the end of history’.

In 2002, two books—Yossef Bodansky’s *The High Cost of Peace: How Washington’s Middle East Policy Left America Vulnerable to Terrorism* and Kenneth M. Pollack’s *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq*—were published. Both studies
reflect the revolution that has occurred in the psychology of American national security policy following the terrible events of 11 September 2001. It is no accident that these studies were authored by senior policy-makers with long experience of the complex politics of the Middle East. Yossef Bodansky—Director of the US Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, and author of the bestselling 1999 book, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America*—has excellent Middle East credentials. Kenneth M. Pollack, served as Director for Gulf Affairs in the National Security Council from 1995 to 1996, and again from 1999 to 2001 in the Clinton Administration. In this position, Pollack was the principal working-level official responsible for US policy towards Iraq.

Although the works of Bodansky and Pollack predate the outbreak of the recent war against Iraq in April 2003, they remain indispensable in explaining the dramatic changes in US Middle East policy since 11 September 2001. Both authors come to the conclusion that US policy towards the Middle East in general, and Iraq in particular, has failed to secure American interests and must be rethought as a matter of urgency. Bodansky’s exhaustive study of the Middle East crisis, *The High Cost of Peace*, is a book based on a detailed examination of the region’s interacting indigenous dynamics and should be required reading for any policy maker or student who seeks to understand the political complexities of the Middle East. At the heart of the book is Bodansky’s belief that the ‘Middle East in the early 21st century remains the most volatile and dangerous region in the world’. Moreover, it is a region that has been gravely misunderstood by Western diplomacy in general and by American statecraft in particular.

While Western diplomacy has concentrated on creating a ‘peace process’ between Israel and the Palestinians, the region has become radicalised under the impact of political Islam. The author argues that the radicalisation of the Arab world has, from its roots in the 1920s, now broken to the surface at the beginning of the 21st century. The Muslim masses have been drawn into the world of ‘confessional politics’, that is, ‘contemporary politics based on the tenets of historic Islamic sociopolitical and military actions of the first four caliphs who succeeded Prophet Muhammad and uses religious jurisprudence as the sole foundation for decision-making and policy formulation’. The rise of militant Islamism in the region means that the Arab–Israeli conflict cannot be separated from wider regional considerations. It is a multifaceted problem that affects the most basic relations between the West and the Islamic world in areas such as
modernity, identity and socioeconomic influence. For radical Islamists, Israel is simply the forward post of the West in the cradle of Islam and represents ‘the illegitimate offspring of the Great Satan.’ The founding of Israel was, in this sense, a Nakba—a calamity for the Arab world that must be reversed.

Bodansky believes that many observers in the West do not understand the basic fact that ‘it is less that the Arabs and Islamists hate the United States for supporting Israel than they hate Israel because it furthers, by its very existence, the interests of the hated US-led West.’ Many of the youthful followers of Yassir Arafat and Osama bin Laden share a radical belief in a pan-Islamist state that defies the logic of political compromise. If the Ehud Barak Government, described as the most dovish in Israeli history, could not secure peace with the Palestinians by concessions and withdrawals from occupied territories, then the outlook for peace remains bleak. According to the author, in the face of suicide bombings and implacable hostility, the majority of Israelis ‘have reluctantly adopted the conviction of the nationalist camp that there is nothing to talk about and nobody to talk with.’

For Bodansky, America’s difficulties with the war on terrorism arise from a philosophical failure to understand the basic dynamics of Middle East politics. The reality is that Islamist confessional politics confront unpopular Arab regimes with social revolution while Israel must now consider a future in which possible annihilation from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has moved from the realm of fiction to reality. The Arab–Israeli conflict is confounded by the failure of the Arab world to create institutions of responsible governance and modern civil society. This failure has led unrepresentative and dictatorial Arab elites—from the House of Saud to the Ba’athist regimes of Iraq and Syria—to adopt a socio-political culture of chauvinistic militant Arabism, which is used as a shield to protect them against both militant Islam and American influence.

What is clear from this important book is that there has been a profound change in US policy towards the Middle East since the events of 11 September 2001. In Bodansky’s opinion, the United States has decided that the ideal of a ‘peace process’ between Israel and the Palestinians pursued by every Administration since the 1970s is no longer viable. From this perspective, Bodansky’s study foreshadows the present situation where American statecraft can now apparently envisage a future in which the Middle East is politically reordered. This reordering involves the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime followed by the sidelining of Yassir Arafat in favour of more moderate Palestinian political figures.
In his equally sweeping analysis of America’s long confrontation with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Kenneth Pollack argues that the United States has no option left but to take firm action to remove Saddam Hussein from power:

Unfortunately, the only prudent and realistic course of action left to the United States is to mount a full-scale invasion of Iraq to smash the Iraqi armed forces, depose Saddam’s regime, and rid the country of weapons of mass destruction . . . In the case of Iraq, we need to recognise that we have run out of alternatives and our options truly have come down to a dangerous deterrence or potentially costly invasion.

In a detailed 500-page survey of the Iraq crisis—a work that seems to have become almost a blueprint for action in current US policy and military circles—Pollack analyses the main five options for dealing with Iraq in the changed security conditions following the 11 September attacks of 2001. First, there is the option of continuing with a policy of containment using UN disarmament provisions and sanctions. Second, there is the potential to rely on deterrence using the US arsenal to deter Saddam in the future. Third, the United States could apply covert action to weaken Baghdad in an attempt to topple Saddam. Fourth, the United States could adopt the ‘Afghan Approach’ in a war using air power, special forces and indigenous allies to destroy the Ba’athist regime. Finally, there is the option of invasion and regime change, followed by the construction of a stable Iraqi state. To make his case for invasion as the only viable course that is left to the United States, Pollack’s book examines the reasons why the first four policy options are not realistic.

THE FAILURE OF CONTAINMENT

Pollack believes that containment based on sanctions, no fly zones and weapons inspections has failed. The United Nations’ (UN) weapons inspection process, in particular, has become a trap because it is impossible to get authentic compliance from the Iraqis. The French, Russians and Chinese are not prepared to pursue genuine disarmament. Such unwillingness has led to a situation where the burden of proof lies not in Iraqi compliance but in the inspectors’ having to prove that Iraq has not complied—an impossible task, given the character of the Ba’athist regime.

Pollack points out that Saddam’s track record is one of constantly playing for time combined with mastery of the method of ‘cheat and retreat’. Since the time for an effective inspection would be between twelve and eighteen months, the Iraqis can easily outlast any military deployment designed to enforce disarmament. This is the dilemma at the heart of the weapons inspection regime. In addition, the creation of mobile chemical and biological warfare laboratories, and the use of hidden factories and decoy facilities make elimination of WMD using air power difficult, if not impossible. For Pollack, the weapons inspection route is ‘a dead-end street’ and cannot yield a long-term solution.
THE UNRELIABILITY OF DETERRENCE

The core assumption of deterrence is that Saddam would, in time, acquire nuclear weapons but remain deterred by the US arsenal. In the calculus of the advocates of deterrence, Saddam is viewed as a rational actor within the international system. For Pollack, the case for the indefinite deterrence of Saddam is deeply flawed and rests on old-fashioned Cold War beliefs. While the Soviets were fundamentally conservative decision-makers, Saddam and his regime are the polar opposite of desirable characteristics for stable deterrence. Saddam ‘has a twenty-eight year pattern of aggression, violence, miscalculation, and purposeful underestimation of the consequences of his actions that should give real pause to anyone considering whether to allow him to acquire nuclear weapons.’ Pollack suggests that, in some respects, Saddam may be ‘unintentionally suicidal’ because of his history of miscalculation. Ultimately, with regard to Iraq, deterrence may not be the costliest policy, but it is certainly the riskiest one. This is because, in the long term, the United States and its allies are likely to face a much worse conflict with Saddam after Iraq has acquired nuclear weapons.

THE WEAKNESSES OF COVERT ACTION

Pollack believes that covert action is largely a substitute for policy and, as a result, is unlikely to succeed in toppling Saddam’s regime. The preconditions for regime change by internal means with covert backing from the United States and the West simply do not exist in Iraq. The Iraqi Ba’ath government is an Orwellian clan regime that has killed, imprisoned or exiled most of its opponents. Moreover, Saddam is surrounded by his Murabiqin bodyguard, wears a bulletproof vest, carries a pistol, and employs doubles and a food taster. A coup would be difficult to mount in a police state supported by the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard. Covert action may have a place in the disruption of the regime, but not in its overthrow.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ‘AFGHAN APPROACH’

The ‘Afghan Approach’ involves the use of proxy forces and limited US and allied military means to collapse the Iraqi regime, as was done in Operation Enduring Freedom. Yet, as Pollack notes, the Iraqi National Congress (INC) is not the
Northern Alliance and the Iraqi Army is not the Taliban militia. Saddam has a 300 000 army, with the elite Republican Guard of 80 000 organised in six divisions—three armoured, two infantry and one mechanised—at its core.

Relying on air power would not succeed. A bombing campaign in Iraq would resemble Kosovo rather than Kuwait or Afghanistan. Pollack notes, ‘under the likely circumstances in a future air war against Iraq, when the Iraqis would have better cover and concealment, as well as civilian populations nearby, we must expect air strikes to do worse than they did during Desert Storm [in 1991] not better.’ Under the ‘Afghan Approach’, primary reliance on air power might hinder, but cannot prevent, ground movement or destroy the Iraqi Army. For this reason, the use of air power, special forces and proxies would be unlikely to succeed.

**THE CASE FOR AN INVASION**

For Pollack, a US invasion of Iraq poses high immediate costs but has the advantage of minimising long-term risks. An invasion, followed by the reconstruction of Iraq, gives an opportunity to turn the country from a malignant growth poisoning the Middle East into an engine for change for the entire region. Pollack notes:

Strangely, then, invasion is actually the conservative course of action in the sense that it accepts higher costs to minimize risks. It is the one policy that would give us the greatest certainty that Saddam Hussein will never be able to threaten the region, the United States, or the world with nuclear weapons.

The military requirements of a US-led Western invasion would be between four and six divisions, with supporting forces supplemented by between 700 and 1000 aircraft. A main thrust would involve the mounting of a swift offensive towards Baghdad by US and British heavy divisions. A light or air-mobile division would be required in western Iraq to stop Scud attacks on Israel, and another light division would need to be deployed in the north in Kurdistan. Airborne brigades would probably have to be used to assault WMD facilities, seize Iraq’s largest airfields and to seal off Tikrit, Saddam’s tribal stronghold. In an invasion, a worst-case scenario would be a six-month campaign with possibly 10 000 US dead and the use of WMD by the Iraqis. A best-case scenario, however, would be a four- to eight-week campaign, with perhaps 500–1000 US deaths and limited WMD use.

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... the great question mark in any military operation to remove Saddam is the possibility of costly urban warfare in Baghdad.
Success in any invasion would depend on speed, momentum and initiative by air-ground forces, the much-touted ‘shock and awe’ approach favoured by the doctrine of rapid decisive operations (RDO). The paradox of an invasion is a simple one: the bigger the force, the faster it moves and the lower the casualties; the smaller the force, the slower it moves and the greater the risk of casualties. For Pollack, the great question mark in any military operation to remove Saddam is the possibility of costly urban warfare in Baghdad. There is the possibility of Baghdad becoming, in Pollack’s arresting phrase, ‘a Mesopotamian Stalingrad’, with Saddam and his hard-core Ba’ath followers fighting to a fanatical finish from underground bunkers.

The book concludes with an interesting consideration of the legal aspects surrounding an invasion of Iraq. Pollack believes that an invasion can be justified on two grounds: first, through the doctrine of ‘anticipatory self-defence’ in international law, as defined in 1837, and second, by employing UN Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687. Resolution 678 authorises member states to ‘use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area’. In 1991, Resolution 687 established the weapons inspection regime and sanctions, and was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that invokes the rights to collective security and self-defence. Iraq has been in breach of Resolution 687 since 1998, when it expelled all UN weapons inspectors. The author comments:

It would not be a terrible stretch for Washington to make the legal argument that Iraq’s constant, flagrant violations of UN Security Council Resolution 687, among others, requires the United States to once again invoke UN Security Council Resolution 678’s authorisation of ‘all means necessary’ to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein as being the only way to ensure that Iraq will abide by the relevant resolutions.

Pollack warns, however, that there needs to be strong awareness of setting the wrong precedent. ‘We [in the US] should be wary’, he says, ‘of making facile arguments based on Iraq’s support of terrorism or on its pursuit of WMD alone, that is, uncoupled from Saddam’s behaviour and Iraq’s clear violations of international law’. In taking action against Iraq, the United States and its allies should not set a dangerous precedent for other nations to make similar claims for pre-emptive action. In terms of a history of aggression, violations of international law and refusal to comply with multiple UN resolutions, many of them enacted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Iraq represents a unique case.

Whether one agrees with the views of Bodansky and Pollack or not, there is much in these two major studies to warrant sombre reflection. If the authors are right—and this reviewer believes that they are—we are in the midst of a change in US security policy as profound as that which occurred under President Harry S. Truman between 1947 and 1952. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 laid the foundations for
containment and deterrence, and created the security apparatus for the United States to wage the long Cold War. Similarly, President George W. Bush is creating a new 21st-century security system. The latter’s purpose is to defend America against the threat from ‘the crossroads of radicalism and technology’. The promulgation of the Bush Doctrine in June 2002, based on pre-emption and preventive war against international terrorism and rogue states, heralds the greatest strategic revolution in American security policy in over fifty years. Unlike Goethe at Valmy, we are all witnesses to this drama of change, or, to quote Truman’s Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, we have all been ‘present at the creation’.

POSTSCRIPT: THE END OF SADDAM

This review essay was written in March 2003. The following month, Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was removed from power in a post–11 September 2001 Middle East ‘security revolution’, as foreshadowed in the works of Bodansky and Pollack. The latter’s best-case scenario of a brief war of between four and eight weeks was easily fulfilled when the US-led Coalition swept into Baghdad in a swift, three-week campaign. The assessment made by Pollack that a successful invasion of Iraq would require up to six ground divisions proved to be an overestimate. In terms of combat numbers, the Coalition deployed the equivalent of only three ground divisions to smash the Iraqi military. Moreover, the most dangerous scenario, that of a ‘Mesopotamian Stalingrad’ waged by die-hard Ba’athists in the capital, Baghdad, failed to materialise.

In the wake of Saddam Hussein’s removal, the United States has attempted to use the momentum of Middle East change in order to broker a new Israel–Palestine ‘road map’ peace initiative culminating in a June 2003 US–Israeli–Palestinian summit in Aqaba, Jordan. This American diplomatic initiative seeks to introduce a new political dynamic by bypassing Yassir Arafat and dealing with the Palestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas. While the future of the Middle East is impossible to predict, the patterns of regional politics outlined by Bodansky have been irrevocably changed by the American-led intervention in, and occupation of, Iraq.

THE AUTHOR

Dr Michael Evans is Head of the Australian Army’s Land Warfare Studies Centre and coeditor of the *Australian Army Journal*. He was educated at the universities of Rhodesia, London and Western Australia, and served as a regular officer in the Zimbabwe National Army. He has previously held positions at Land Headquarters in Sydney and in the Directorate of Army Research and Analysis in Canberra.
The main and obvious difference between peace enforcement and war is impartiality. In peace enforcement, military operations are directed against anyone who has violated agreements or the formally expressed will of the international community. The key difference from war is that there is no designated ‘enemy’. In war, the enemy has to be rendered powerless. In peace enforcement, the idea is not to render him powerless—the aim of ‘victory’ takes second place to the achievement of measures, which will guarantee a more stable situation.

One of the less conventional force elements that landed in East Timor in the shadowy half-light of a September dawn in 1999 was the Response Force. A vital component of the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), the Response Force was employed as both the early-entry taskforce and, subsequently, as a light precursor force. The Response Force comprised specially selected and trained personnel drawn from all services, and possessed a particular and appropriate combination of unconventionality and discreet expertise. In East Timor the liaison and communications functions of the Response Force reflected the unique position that they occupied as a result of being directly responsive to the commander.

The raising of a Response Force represented a substantial challenge to conventional military thinking. Response Force doctrine is a recent development, a flow-on from the success of the Joint Commission of Observers in Bosnia. Within that conflict, observer
teams were used for a myriad of tasks that ensured liaison between supported and higher headquarters, and the provision of compatible communications. The observer teams' other tasks included requesting medical and casualty evacuation, calling in and providing close air support, staffing outposts, and negotiating and monitoring enclaves. The observer teams used in Bosnia were adopted as a model for the design of the Response Force.

The design of any Response Force must focus on the need to create a unit that will be able to take advantage of the defining moment in an operation. This point is normally reached when factions or stakeholders seek to assess the resolve of the force. While this challenge may take many forms, a robust, impartial and proportionate response is critical to establishing the credibility of the force. While the experiences of the Joint Commission of Observers were vital to the underpinning concepts, there were essential differences in the reaction of the stakeholders in Bosnia and those in East Timor. Unlike the Bosnian warlords, the East Timorese militia made an early decision to abandon their factional representation inside East Timor and to operate from enclaves in West Timor. The subsequent decision by Indonesia to abandon its sovereignty over East Timor was another crucial difference between the Bosnia and East Timor experiences.

The force’s primary function involved communication and liaison; its secondary responsibility was ‘ground truthing.’ This term emerged during the 1991 Gulf War when the United States embedded liaison teams with coalition forces in order to double-check their locations and to verify requests for fire support. The term refers to the ground verification of signals and imagery intelligence, and/or the verification that friendly coalition forces are actually occupying the position at which they claim to be. Additionally, the Response Force had the capability to conduct discreet and highly compartmented tasks under the direction of the commander. These tasks ranged from specific surveillance and monitoring to the selective apprehension of targeted individuals. Such capabilities were critical in countering false-flag activities and some of the more covert aspects of the Timor crisis.

Ground truthing proved to be a vital Response Force function. The speed at which media reporting took place and the interpretations that were often accorded to that news required the commander to be immediately and accurately informed of the situation throughout the area of operations. Complaints and problems—whether they originated from internal factions or from within the coalition—required a rapid response, and teams provided the commander with a direct and trustworthy ‘directed telescope’. Secure communications from critical areas at decisive times were key to the success of this process.

… a robust, impartial and proportionate response is critical to establishing the credibility of the force.
Response Force teams also established liaison between deployed national contingents as well as with local authorities. Boundaries were carefully constructed and sometimes crossed, in the pursuit of impartial and appropriate liaison. Teams were able to support follow-on force planning as they dispersed throughout the area of operations. This support included the identification of routes and important terrain in order to facilitate planning. In addition, the teams were able to identify key local figures and make incoming commanders aware of them. This knowledge helped conventional forces settle into their areas of operation.

Teams provided protection to the force commander and other key personnel, including local political figures, as they travelled about the area of operations. While team personnel themselves were vulnerable as potential hostages, their superior training and operating procedures minimised the likelihood of their being taken prisoner. They were equipped at all times with emergency beacons and iridium phones, and they carried signed letters of authority. Care was taken in the employment of other liaison elements that were not as well selected, equipped or trained. Given the particularly symbolic nature of Response Force operations to the entire INTERFET campaign, the liaison role became a key task, the value of which cannot be overestimated.

The ability of the Response Force to generate operationally necessary effects makes it essential that the force’s achievements be carefully analysed. Response Force operators are divided as to the reasons for the success of their efforts. Many believe that their success was due to the force’s ability to access information and to shape how that information was disseminated while also generating an intense operational tempo and denying information to potential opponents. Other operators argue that the Response Force was the product of its superior training and that the operation of the force demonstrated the value of the investment that had been made in its personnel prior to deployment. The key ‘drivers’ behind the force were technological advancement, conceptual innovation and organisational adaptation. Other reasons for the seemingly disproportionate success of this relatively small force ranged from the value of effective basic training, including rigorous selection, to the clever use of plain, ordinary innovation. A number of operators considered that perhaps this operation represented an opportunity to test non-linear, short-war concepts. Many of these ideas had been under development for some time, and this was the first time that Australian troops had the opportunity to employ them in an operational theatre.
Yet another perspective on the success of the Response Force is represented by the views of those operators who argued that their achievements simply demonstrated the advantage enjoyed by the Response Force over those other combat elements that had not updated their modus operandi. Admittedly, those units contributing to the Response Force had access to advanced technology; for example, the force was able to demonstrate the hunter-killer concept espoused by the US Army’s rapid force-projection initiative. Under this concept, when:

stand-off killers are used with advanced forward sensors and digital C4I, using appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures, training, leader development and organisation, then early entry forces will be provided with increased lethality and survivability and can operate at higher tempo.3

US doctrine aside, this article argues that the innovation represented by the formation of response forces constitutes a small-scale Revolution in Military Affairs. There was clear evidence of a simultaneous and mutually supportive change in the way that operations were conducted. This development was largely a result of the effective utilisation of the three key drivers: technological advancement, conceptual innovation and organisational adaptation.

The technological edge available to the force included advanced communications capabilities, the ability to apply force with extreme discrimination and the opportunity to promote security through the use of stealth. The Response Force was unique in its ability to manage large volumes of information. Combat elements were able to take advantage of strategic intelligence and to optimise military geographic information. Similarly, any tactical electromagnetic and optical information that was captured by combat elements could be transferred directly to multiple recipients using sophisticated, multi-band communications equipment incorporating e-mail and imagery. This information flow was directed through fixed and deployable communications stations that allowed real-time target data transfer. The use of permanent information exchange nodes provided a firm foot on the ground and reachback options from any tactical area of responsibility.

Another characteristic of the Response Force was its ability to employ a broad range of weapons. These included non-lethal weapons and an array of small arms including modular weapons systems. Consequently, each individual soldier had a variety of weapons options available to him. Their advanced night-fighting ability allowed teams to operate with impunity against the militia. As a result, the Response Force was able to employ a superior precision engagement capability that enhanced its stealthy activities.
Security was not just a consequence of producing a physical advantage. This principle of operations was upheld by the policy of identifying key local figures and, where possible, involving them in the creation of local conditions of security. Of course, the application of this concept involved a calculated assessment of risk.

The combination of doctrine derived from the Joint Commission of Observers’ experience in Bosnia with cutting-edge technology demonstrated the essential importance of conceptual innovation. Over a number of years prior to the operation, the units that contributed to the Response Force had embarked on a program to develop troops that are mentally agile, are capable of broad-spectrum operations, and adopt a problem-solving approach to countering asymmetric warfare. This was ably demonstrated in the crisis preceding the lodgment, in which the forward-deployed taskforce conceived the ‘continuum of personnel recovery.’ Under this approach, innovative and flexible force teams were simultaneously able to conduct both discrete evacuations and larger personnel recovery operations as well as carry out search-and-rescue operations. Crucial to the successful implementation of this concept has been the maturing of skill sets within the units that contributed to the Response Force. The result of this training has been the creation of multi-roled sub-units that are equipped to perform all assigned tasks. Furthermore, by successfully integrating Response Force and aviation elements, an operational focus has developed that allows deliberate ‘earliest available launch times’ to approximate those normally associated with emergency actions.

The synergistic effect that results from conceptual innovation led to the development of apprehension, detention and disarmament tactics that often allowed Response Force elements to assault on converging axes. This flexibility enabled a relatively small force to raid large targets and to truly fight above its weight. The ability of close-quarter, battle-disciplined troops to assault from 360 degrees was the result of applying apprehension tactics. These tactics included executing fight-through in multi-floor combat to the use of dead ground on converging axes. The Response Force headquarters initiated most of these apprehension operations, and it was able to bridge the gap between the tactical and operational information flows.

Many Response Force operators would argue that there was nothing new in their use of vertical envelopment tactics and the employment of patrol commanders in strategic battles. Nonetheless, at the conceptual level, these operations saw maximum strength and minimum force replace surprise, and offensive action

In East Timor, the Response Force was able to maintain impartiality with both the militia and the pro-independence forces.
become even more reliant on speed. On peace enforcement missions where the distinction between war and peace has become blurred, the interpretation of the conventional principles of war needs to take into account the often ambiguous context in which operations take place. In East Timor, the Response Force was able to maintain impartiality with both the militia and the pro-independence forces. However, by exercising support and positively influencing the pro-Independence FALANTIL forces, the Response Force was able to help launch FALANTIL on the path to demobilisation. This approach demonstrated the importance of establishing close contact with local stakeholders in the peace process and illustrated the complexity of the new art of war and peace. Accordingly, we need to adjust our thinking about the manner in which we apply traditional principles. On complex operations such as this one, maintenance of morale is best expressed as moral influence, which can be exercised through appearances, the maintenance of legitimacy and by fulfilling promises. Economy of effort involves maintaining the interest of the local populations and their key authorities so as to preserve order. The principle of flexibility amounts to providing local stakeholders in the peace process as well as the Response Force with an acceptable exit from any situation that might be a source of non-productive conflict.

While regrouping within units is a conventional tactic, the Response Force made tailored forces something of an art form in East Timor. In a display of organisational adaptation, combat elements continually reorganised every twenty-four hours. This reorganisation was comprehensive, and included changes to equipment and tactics. The ability to morph a five-platoon sub-unit was the result of a combination of factors, not least of which was the counter-asymmetric mindset of many of its members. These reorganisations allowed the force to generate a tempo that approximated battle speed. Combat elements were able to operate within this chaotic environment as they had routinely trained to do so. Other contributing factors included multiskilling, the high retention of skilled personnel in recent years, the presence of troops with linguistic skills, and interoperability with like foreign forces. Consequently, it was with relative ease that the Response Force packaged diverse groupings with skills that enabled them to conduct operations ranging from light strike through to developing situational awareness. The Response Force headquarters initiated and directed most of these options, and was able to exploit the nexus between the tactical and operational levels with a flexible but very light digital C4I centre. When command support systems proved too slow, however, operators made a hasty resort to paper as the tool of choice for developing situational awareness and issuing orders.
The inherent flexibility and utility of the Response Force allowed its combat elements to deploy quickly, unobtrusively and with operational-level awareness based solely on knowledge of the commander’s intent. In essence, Response Forces demonstrated the potential of the forecast Enhanced Combat Force concept in comparison with the current Army-In-Being. This observation begs the question of whether the innovation represented by this force was simply the test part of a model–test–model warfighting experiment. We must now ask what should early-entry taskforces or light forces do differently next time to achieve early effects? The ability to adapt constantly is a trait that is characteristic of a learning organisation culture and is one that must be fostered in training. There is no doubt that planners of future peace operations must remain flexible in configuring troops and equipment to the task. It is also important to maintain a sense of perspective when considering the lessons of East Timor. It should be remembered that the militia were merely ‘thugs in thongs’ compared with more sophisticated belligerents such as those encountered in Kosovo.

Notwithstanding this warning, in an increasingly unstable world, there are obviously many variations of peace enforcement that will take place. Contemporary deployed forces have to operate in the zone that exists between operations that enjoy the consent of the local population and those that do not. What is more, they have to be seen to act impartially in an environment where impartiality is increasingly difficult to maintain. Perhaps the real challenge is to apply Response Force doctrine to other peacetime asymmetric threats such as illegal immigration, drug running, and piracy. Increasingly, there is a narrowing of the operational continuum between peace and war, and the long-hallowed principles of war appear to have evolved to form the basis for a new art of war and peace. In this new environment, Response Forces represent an efficient and effective capability for the Australian Defence Force. As a force-packaged and task-organised capability, Response Forces have become the option of choice in those circumstances where we are confronted with opponents that are willing to wage conflict asymmetrically. To assert our own advantages we need to access high pay-off technologies; selectively apply digitisation; exploit innovative ideas, growth paths, and systems integration; and explore innovations in doctrine and organisational concepts. By doing so, response forces can provide potentially low-cost, high-return capability enhancements to the defence force as a whole.
ENDNOTES

2  ‘False flag’ is the term used for a type of covert activity in which the author of the action attributes the activity to a second party for propaganda or deception purposes.

THE AUTHOR

Jim Truscott, OAM, is an ex-SAS major currently operating as a corporate crisis practitioner. His 26-year Army career included service with a variety of headquarters, special operations and regional force units. He participated in a number of international expeditions to Borneo to trace the exploits of the World War II Special Reconnaissance Department and was a member of the Bicentennial Everest expedition in 1988 for which he was awarded the Medal of the Order of Australia.
WITNESS TO GENOCIDE
A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE 1995 KIBEHO MASSACRE

PAUL JORDAN

Editor’s Note: In April 1995 members of the Australian Defence Force Medical Support Force, a component of the Australian Contingent of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) were deployed to the Kibeho displaced persons’ camp. The camp had been surrounded by two battalions of Tutsi troops from the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which regarded it as a sanctuary for Hutu perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. In the ethnic slaughter that followed, the RPA killed some 4000 of the camp’s inhabitants. The following article is an edited version of an eyewitness account, never before published, of the massacre at Kibeho.

It was 5.00 p.m. on Tuesday, 18 April 1995, when thirty-two members of the Australian Medical Force (AMF) serving in Rwanda received orders to mount a mercy mission. Their task was to provide medical assistance to people who were being forced to leave what was then the largest displaced persons’ camp in Rwanda. This camp was situated some five hours west of the capital city of Kigali, close to the town of Kibeho, and was estimated to hold up to 100,000 displaced persons. I was a member of that Australian force deployed to Kibeho, which comprised two infantry sections, a medical section and a signals section. We left Kigali around 3.00 a.m. on Wednesday, 19 April, travelling through Butare and on to Gikongoro, where the Zambian Army’s UNAMIR contingent had established its headquarters. We arrived at the Zambian headquarters at around 7.30 a.m. and established a base area before continuing on to the displaced persons’ camp at Kibeho, arriving around 9.30 a.m. The camp resembled a ghost town. We had been told that the RPA intended to clear the camp that morning, and our first thought was that this had already occurred—we had arrived too late.
As we moved through the camp, we saw evidence that it had been cleared quickly. The place was littered with the displaced persons’ belongings, left behind in the sudden panic of movement. It was not until we moved deep into the camp that we found them—thousands of frightened people that had been herded closely together like sheep, huddled along a ridgeline that ran through the camp. The RPA had used gunfire to gather and drive these people into a close concentration. In the frenzy of sudden crowd movement, ten children had been trampled to death. As we drove closer, the huge crowd parted before us, and people began to clap and cheer: they obviously expected a great deal more from us than we could offer.

We set about the task of establishing a casualty clearing post and, after being moved on twice by RPA soldiers exercising their arbitrary authority, eventually negotiated a position just beyond the documentation area. We spent the day there and saw only one casualty: a UN soldier. We left the camp that day, dogged by the frustrating sense of not being needed.

The next day—Thursday, 20 April—we arrived at the camp at 8.30 a.m. and moved through to what was designated the ‘Charlie Company’ compound, situated in the middle of the camp. Zambian troops on duty in the compound requested medical treatment for a woman who had given birth the previous night because they thought that she ‘still had another baby inside her’. We arranged for the woman to be medically evacuated by air to Kigali, where it was discovered that she was suffering from a swollen bladder. We set up the casualty clearing post once again at the documentation point and this time went out to search for casualties.

RPA troops would frequently resort to firing their weapons into the air in an effort to control the crowd. At around 1.00 p.m., we heard sporadic fire, but could find no casualties. As the day wore on, tension mounted between the displaced persons and the RPA troops. We left the camp that evening amid the echoes of bursts of automatic fire. Leaving the camp was no easy feat because of the RPA roadblocks. We decided to follow a convoy carrying displaced persons out of the camp, but were held up when one of the convoy’s trucks became stuck in thick mud, blocking the exit road. Eventually we extricated ourselves and found a safe route out. Half an hour or so into our journey, we encountered a UNICEF official who informed us that he had received a radio message reporting that ten people had been shot dead in the camp. Because AMF personnel were not permitted to stay in the camp after dark, there was nothing we could do. We had no choice but to continue on to our base at the Zambian Army’s headquarters.

On Friday, 21 April, we arrived in Kibeho at around 8.30 a.m. to find that thirty people had died during the night. Although the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital was busy treating casualties, we were told that our assistance was not required at this stage. We set up the casualty clearing post at the documentation area (for what was to be the last time) and initially treated a few patients who were
suffering from colds and various infections. Most of these were given antibiotics and sent on their way. A number of ragged young children appeared and, out of sight of the RPA soldiers, we gave the children new, dry clothes, for which they were most grateful. We also found a man whose femur was broken and decided to remove him from the camp in the back of our ambulance when we finally left for the night.

That evening, as we were preparing to leave, we received a call for assistance from the MSF hospital. Six ‘priority one’ patients required urgent evacuation. We picked up these casualties, all suffering from gunshot and machete wounds, and prepared them to travel. We called in the helicopter and the patients were flown to a hospital in Butare. The man with the broken femur could not be flown out because the helicopter was not fitted to take stretchers; we therefore prepared him for an uncomfortable ride in the back of the ambulance.

We returned to the Charlie Company compound where we found a man with a gunshot wound to the lung—a sucking chest wound. He was in a serious condition. Because night was falling, we decided to evacuate him by road to the hospital in Butare along with the man with the broken femur. Darkness meant negotiating the RPA checkpoints as we left the camp. As we made our way through these checkpoints, Captain Carol Vaughan-Evans and Trooper Jon Church crouched in the rear of the ambulance, giving emergency treatment to the two patients.

We continued our journey, accompanied by two military observers from Uruguay who were guiding us. We made steady progress for the next two hours until our front and rear vehicles became bogged. As efforts continued to recover the vehicles, Lieutenant Tilbrook decided to send the ambulance to the hospital since the patient with the chest wound was deteriorating. The two military observers were to accompany the ambulance. After a further hour and a half on the road, and with additional help from Care Australia, the patient was eventually handed over to the MSF hospital in Butare.

On Saturday, 22 April, we arrived at the camp to be told that the hospital was teeming with injured patients, but the MSF workers were nowhere to be found. We went to the hospital, where the situation was chaotic. We saw about 100 people that had either been shot or macheted, or both. Their wounds were horrific and there was blood everywhere. One woman had been cleaved with a machete right through her nose down to her upper jaw. She sat silently and simply stared at us. There were numerous other people suffering from massive cuts to their heads, arms and all over their bodies. We immediately started to triage as many patients as possible, but just as we would begin to treat one patient, another would appear before us.
with far more serious injuries. As we worked, we were often called upon to make snap decisions and to ‘play God’ by deciding which patients’ lives to save. We were forced to move many seriously injured victims to one side because we thought that they would not live or because they would simply take too long to save. Instead, we concentrated on trying to save the lives of those people that, in our assessment, had a chance of survival.

At one point, a nongovernment organisation (NGO) worker took me outside the hospital to point out more casualties. There I discovered about thirty bodies, and was approached by a large number of displaced persons with fresh injuries. Jon Church and I were deeply concerned and returned to the hospital to triage patients. In amongst triaging priority-one patients, Jon drew my attention to the patient he was treating. This man had a very deep machete wound through the eye and across the face. I saw Jon completely cover the wounded man’s face with a bandage. There was no danger that the patient would suffocate since he was breathing through a second wound in his throat. The wounded man was very restless and difficult to control, and eventually we were forced to leave him, despite our belief that he would almost certainly die. Later that day he was brought to us again, his face still completely covered in a bandage. Whether the man finally survived his ordeal, only God knows.

As Jon and I worked with Lieutenant Rob Lucas (a nursing officer) to prioritise patients, members of the Australian infantry section stretchered them to the casualty clearing post. These soldiers worked tirelessly to move patients by stretcher from the hospital to the Zambian compound, which had become a casualty department. Meanwhile, the situation at the hospital was becoming increasingly dangerous, and we were ordered back to the compound. Some of the MSF workers had arrived by now and were trapped in the hospital. Our infantrymen went to retrieve them and bring them back to the safety of the compound.

As our soldiers moved towards the hospital, they came under fire from a sniper within the crowd of displaced persons. The infantry section commander, Corporal Buskell, took aim at the sniper, who, on seeing the Corporal’s rifle, disappeared into the crowd.

Our medical work continued unabated in the Zambian compound as the casualties multiplied relentlessly. At about 10.00 a.m., some of the displaced persons attempted to break out and we saw them running through the re-entrants. We could do little more than watch as these people were hunted down and shot. The RPA soldiers were no marksmen: at times they were within ten metres of their quarry and still missed their intended victims. If the RPA...
managed to wound some hapless escapee, they would save their valuable bullets, instead bayoneting their victim to death. This bayoneting went on for two hours until all the displaced persons who had run were dead or dying.

The desperate work continued in the compound. We separated the treated patients, placing the more serious cases in the ambulance and the remainder in a Unimog truck. The firing intensified and the weather broke as it began to rain. We worked under the close security of our infantry while automatic fire peppered the area around us. We continued to treat the wounded, crouching behind the flimsy cover presented by the truck and sandbag wall. At one point, a young boy suddenly ran into the compound and fell to the ground. We later discovered that he had a piece of shrapnel in his lung. We managed to evacuate this boy by helicopter to the care of the Australian nurses in the intensive care unit at Kigali hospital. Every time a white person walked into his hospital room, he opened his arms to be hugged.

The automatic fire from the RPA troops continued; people were being shot all over the camp. When we had gathered about twenty-five casualties, we arranged to have them aeromedically evacuated to a hospital in Butare. While the ambulance was parked at the landing zone a lone displaced person ran towards us with an RPA soldier chasing him. The soldier maintained a stream of fire at his fleeing victim, and rounds landed all around the ambulance. Jon and I ducked for cover behind its meagre protection. When the RPA soldier realised that some of his own officers were in his line of fire, he checked himself. The displaced person fell helplessly to the ground at the feet of the RPA officers. He was summarily marched away to meet an obvious fate.

It was about 4.00 p.m. by the time we started to load the patients onto helicopters, and by 5.00 p.m. the job was complete. People began to run through the wire into the compound, and the Australian infantry found themselves alongside the Zambian soldiers pushing the desperate intruders back over the wire. This was a particularly delicate task, since some of the displaced persons were carrying grenades. As the last helicopter took off, about 2000 people stampeded down the spur away from the camp, making a frantic dash for safety. RPA soldiers took up positions on each spur, firing into the stampede with automatic rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and a .50 calibre machine-gun. A large number of people fell under the hail of firepower. Fortunately, at this stage, it began to rain heavily, covering the escape of many of those fleeing. Bullets flew all around, and we made a very hasty trip back to the Zambian compound with the rear of the ambulance full of infantry.

Once back in the compound, we watched the carnage from behind sandbagged walls. Rocket-propelled grenades landed among the stampeding crowd, and ten people fell. About 50 metres from where we crouched, a woman suddenly stood up, with her hands in the air. An RPA soldier walked down to her and marched her up the hill with his arm on her shoulder. He then turned and looked at us, pushed the woman to the ground and shot her.
As the rain eased, so did the firing. I was standing in the lee of the Zambian building when a young boy wearing blood-soaked clothing jumped the wire and walked towards me. I put my gloves on and the boy shook my hand and pointed to where a bullet had entered his nose, indicating to me that the bullet was still caught in his jaw. We took the boy with us and, given that the firing had died down and darkness had fallen, we put him into the ambulance next to a man with an open abdominal wound, and prepared them for the long journey to hospital by road.

As we left the camp, Jon and another medic saw a small child wandering alone. They made an instant decision to save the child, putting her in the ambulance as well. We then faced the unwanted distraction of a screaming three-year-old girl while we were frantically working on two seriously wounded patients. We knew also that the RPA would search the vehicle and any displaced persons without injuries would be taken back to the camp. I decided to bandage the girl’s left arm in order to fake a wound. The first time we were searched, the girl waved and spoke to the RPA soldiers. So we moved her up onto the blanket rack in the ambulance, strapped her in, and gave her a biscuit. The next time we were searched, the girl just sat and ate her biscuit, saying nothing. The RPA soldiers never knew she was there. After being held up at a roadblock for an hour, the convoy, which included all the NGO workers, made its way out of the camp. All the patients were taken to Butare Hospital, while the little girl was taken to an orphanage where we knew that an attempt would be made to reunite her with her mother, in the unlikely event that she was still alive.

We re-entered the camp at 6.30 a.m. on Sunday, 23 April. While our mission was to count the number of dead bodies, Warrant Officer Scott and I went first to look around the hospital. Inside, there were about fifteen dead. We entered one room and a small boy smiled then grinned at us. Scotty and I decided we would come back and retrieve this boy. I took half the infantry section and Scotty took the other half, and we walked each side of the road that divided the camp.

On one side of the road, my half-section covered the hospital that contained fifteen corpses. In the hospital courtyard we found another hundred or so dead people. A large number of these were mothers that had been killed with their babies still strapped to their backs. We freed all the babies we could see. There were dozens of children just sitting amidst piles of rubbish, some crouched next to dead bodies. The courtyard was littered with debris and, as I waded through the rubbish, it would move to expose a baby who had been crushed to death. I counted twenty crushed babies, but I could not turn over every piece of rubbish.
Sketch Map of Kibeho Camp, April 1995

General info
Map drawn 1500 hrs 28-4-95
TPR J.G. Church
- Distance from church eastern side to RAP far western side = 1000 m
- Distance as seen extreme north to south 600 m
- Whole area dotted with lean tos and grass bivouacs
- All buildings and roads are on high ground
- The valleys either side are quite deep—up to 80 m at 45° angle

Key events
1. Woman surrendered then executed in cold blood
2. Ambulance closely grazed by two bullets shot at lone displaced person
3. ZAMBAIT (Zambian Battalion) latrine—displaced persons found hiding inside
4. Triage area—machine victims—Saturday morning 22 April
5. Highest ground in immediate area
6. RPA screening and processing—displaced persons’ exit point for general evacuation
7. Beginning RPA accommodation
8. Our entry point each day and RPA roadblock
9. Recoilless rifle set up am 24 April
10. Man with AK47 seen jumping from roof of building 24 April

Map legend
- Area displaced persons herded into (approx 100000) 18 April
- Last remaining displaced persons, approximately 400, as found am 24 April
- Direction of first breakout approximately 1030 hrs 22 April
- Direction of second breakout approximately 1700 hrs 22 April
- Mercy dash to safety of compound in ambulance 1700 hrs 22 April
- Prospective CCP/RAP points as dates denote
- Our positions covering casualty evacuation from sniper
- Snipers seen am 24 April
The Zambians were collecting the lost children and placing them together for the agencies to collect. Along the stretch of road near the documentation point, there were another 200 bodies lined up for burial. The other counting party had seen many more dead than we had. There were survivors too. On his return to camp, Jon saw a baby who was only a few days old lying in a puddle of mud. He was still alive. Jon picked the baby up and gave him to the Zambians. At the end of our grisly count, the total number recorded by the two half-sections was approximately 4000 dead and 650 wounded.

We returned to the Zambian compound and began to treat the wounded. By now we had been reinforced with medics and another doctor. With the gunfire diminished, we were able to establish the casualty clearing post outside the Zambian compound and, with extra manpower and trucks to transport patients, we managed to clear about eighty-five casualties. A Ghanaian Army major approached Scotty and me to collect two displaced persons that had broken femurs from another area nearby. We lifted the two injured men into the back of the major’s car. It was then that we noticed all the dead being buried by the RPA in what was probably an attempt to reduce the body count. The Zambians also buried the dead, but only those who lay near their compound.

We had been offered a helicopter for an aeromedical evacuation. We readied our four worst casualties, placing them on the landing zone for evacuation. The RPA troops came, as they always did, to inspect those being evacuated. At the same time, a Zambian soldier brought us a small boy that had been shot in the backside. The RPA told us that we could only take three of the casualties, as the fourth was a suspect. I argued repeatedly with an RPA major, but met with unbending refusal. He did tell us, however, that we could take the small boy, although we had not even asked to take him. We quickly put the boy into the waiting helicopter. The RPA officer then demanded that one of his men, who had been shot, be evacuated in the helicopter. I tried to bargain with the RPA major. In return for taking his soldier to hospital, I asked that we be allowed to evacuate the fourth casualty. His reply was final: ‘Either my man goes or no-one goes’. It was time to stop arguing.

The majority of patients we evacuated that day were transported on the back of a truck. The pain caused by the jolting of the truck would have been immense, but even this amount of pain was better than death. Jon and I took another load of patients to the landing zone, as they were to go on the same helicopter as the Commanding Officer and the Regimental Sergeant Major. To our amazement, we were recalled and watched in frustration as the helicopter was filled with journalists. That day, all our patients left unaccompanied.
Just before our departure that evening, Jon and I were called to look at a man who had somehow fallen into the pit latrine, which was about 4 metres deep. I suppose he thought this to be the safest place. We left the camp at about 5.00 p.m. and spent the night at the Bravo Company position, which was only half an hour away.

On Monday, 24 April, we returned to the camp, which at this stage held only about 400 people. The RPA had set up a recoilless rifle, which pointed at one of the buildings apparently housed Hutu criminals that had taken part in the 1994 genocide. Throughout the morning we saw displaced persons jumping off the roof of the building and, on two occasions, we observed AK 47 assault rifles being carried. The RPA gave us until midday to clear the camp, at which time they stated that they would fire the weapon into the building. We knew that such an action would kill or injure the vast majority of those left in the camp.

Meanwhile the Zambians were busy digging two men out of the pit latrines. They were quite a sight when they were pulled out. The Zambian major planned to sweep through the building and push people out, and wanted us to bolster his ranks. Obtaining permission from headquarters to help the Zambians proved something of an ordeal—to my mind, the result of a surfeit of chiefs. Consequently, we were a crucial ten minutes late helping them.

We discovered a number of injured people huddled in a room directly adjacent to the building containing the Hutus. As we moved in to retrieve the casualties, a Hutu pointed his weapon at us, but rapidly changed his mind when ten Australian rifles were pointed straight back at him. We used this building as a starting point, evacuating all those in the room in Red Cross trucks. It was at this point that we struck a major obstacle. The criminal element within the camp had spread the word that those that accompanied the white people from the camp would be macheted to death on reaching their destination. This was widely believed and, as a result, only a few people could be persuaded to leave the camp that morning. On several occasions, women handed over their children to us, believing that ‘the white people will not kill children’.

The attitude of these people was incredibly frustrating for the Australians. We could find no way to convince the majority of the displaced persons to leave Kibeho for the safety that we could provide. Many said that it was better to die where they were than to die in another camp. Even when we did succeed in persuading some to leave, a Hutu would often appear and warn those people that they would be macheted if they left with the Australians—a warning that never went unheeded.

... if Australians had not been there ... the RPA would have killed every single person in the camp.
At 2.00 p.m. that day, we were rotated out of the camp. We felt sick with resentment at leaving the job incomplete, but there was very little that we could have done for those people. We estimated that at least 4000 people had been killed over that weekend. While there was little that we could have done to stop the killings, I believe that, if Australians had not been there as witnesses to the massacre, the RPA would have killed every single person in the camp.

ENDNOTES

1 Captain Carol Vaughan-Evans was the Officer Commanding the Casualty Collection Post, Kibeho, at the time. Trooper Jonathan Church, SASR, died in the Blackhawk accident in 1996.
2 Lieutenant (now Captain) Steve Tilbrook is currently serving with the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment.
3 Corporal (now Warrant Officer Class 2) Brian Buskell is currently posted to the Royal Military College, Duntroon.
4 Medical Company Sergeant Major, Warrant Officer Class 2 Rod Scott.

THE AUTHOR

Paul Jordan served eight years in the Australian Special Air Service Regiment which included operational service as a member of the United Nations Mission to Rwanda in 1995. He currently works for AKE Ltd., a company owned and operated by ex-Special Forces soldiers from the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia. In his role as Operations Manager for AKE Asia-Pacific, Mr Jordan works closely with the media, non-government organisations and large corporations. He has recently returned from operations in Iraq, where he acted as security consultant to CNN journalists embedded with the United States 7th Cavalry.
Major General Ronald Hughes was an infantry officer whose distinguished career typified the critical contribution that the Australian Army’s officer corps has made to Australian security. His career spanned four decades: from entry to the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1937 until his retirement in 1977. He fought in three wars and served as Australia’s Military Attaché in Indonesia during the period of Confrontation. His was a varied and exciting career, in the course of which the Regular Army officer corps came into its own as the font of military professionalism in Australia.

On graduation from the Royal Military College in 1939, he was posted to the Darwin Mobile Force, which had been set up in anticipation of the likelihood of Japanese aggression in the Pacific. As a regular officer during World War II, he was mainly involved in operational and training staff appointments, but was able to break the mould by gaining regimental combat experience. He served in the New Guinea and Tarakan campaigns, taking part in the amphibious landings at Nassau Bay and at Tarakan, Borneo. His wartime service also included postings to the 2nd/3rd Infantry Battalion and Headquarters 1st Australian Corps. He witnessed the end of World War II as a member of the Australian Military Mission at General MacArthur’s Headquarters in Tokyo.

In 1951, he assumed command of the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, at Puckapunyal, Victoria, and the following year was appointed Commander of the 3rd Battalion in Korea. In 1956, he was posted to the Joint Services Staff College in the United Kingdom, initially as a course member, then as a member of the Directing Staff. He went to Indonesia as Military Attaché in...
1964. These were the ‘years of living dangerously’, and he and his wife Joan lived an unsettled and precarious life. On return to Australia in 1966 he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier and posted as Commander of the 6th Task Force. He followed this appointment with command of the 1st Australian Task Force in South Vietnam, a post that he held from 1967 to 1968. His command of the Task Force coincided with perhaps the most challenging period of operations in Vietnam, and embraced the Tet Offensive and the battles of Coral and Balmoral.

He attended the Imperial Defence College in London in 1969 and returned as the Army’s Director of Military Operations and Plans. He was promoted to the rank of Major General and became Director of the Joint Staff from 1971 to 1973 and Commander of the 1st Division from 1974 to 1975. His final appointment was as Chief of Reserves from 1975 until his retirement in 1977. His retirement years saw Major General Hughes actively assisting such organisations as the Royal United Services Institute, the National Returned and Services League of Australia, and the Red Cross. He died in Canberra on 2 February 2003, aged eighty-three.

Major General Hughes was in many ways the archetype of the Australian professional officers that made their way in the period from World War II. To him and his colleagues we owe the shape and standard of the modern Army.

MAJOR GENERAL ROSS BUCHAN, AO (RETD)
(1935–2003)

Major General Ross Buchan entered the Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1954, graduating into the Royal Regiment of Australian Artillery in 1957. His 37-year career thus mirrored the role that Australia’s professional army played in the Cold War and his personal development as an officer was forged by the active and varied military life that was open to a promising officer during this period. His was a rich and exciting life, and despite his too early death, he packed more experience into his years than most others will ever know.

His initial posting was to the 13th National Service Training Battalion, followed by an appointment to the 1st Field Regiment in 1959. His first overseas service came later that year when he was posted to Malaya with the 101st Field Battery. He became Adjutant to the 3rd Field Regiment in 1961, returning to the 1st Field Regiment in 1964. Operational service followed with a posting to the Australian Army Training Team in South Vietnam from 1966 to 1967, during which he was Mentioned In Despatches and received the Vietnamese Medal of Honour. He served as the senior Australian officer in I Corps in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. He
returned to Australia in 1967 and was posted as the Senior Instructor at the School of Artillery. He attended the Australian Command and Staff College in 1968, which was followed by a much coveted posting as an instructor at the Jungle Training Centre, Canungra in 1969–70. He served on the headquarters of the 1st Division in 1971.

He was appointed Commanding Officer of the 1st Field Regiment in 1973. He served in a number of staff appointments including as an exchange officer with the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command in Virginia. In 1977 he attended the Joint Service Staff College. He was Commandant of the 1st Recruit Training Battalion at Kapooka, Director Training Operations, and Director Training Plans, in Army Headquarters. He was promoted Brigadier in 1983 and appointed Director General Service Personnel Policy. His final appointment was as General Officer Commanding Training Command from 1987 to 1991. He was appointed an Officer of the Order of Australia in 1989 in recognition of his performance in commanding Training Command. On retirement, Major General Buchan remained active in support of veterans through his work as Services’ member of the Veterans’ Review Board. He died on the 7th of February 2003, aged sixty-seven.

Major General Buchan is remembered as a direct, energetic and personable officer—well-rounded, professionally educated and widely experienced. His service represents a considerable contribution to the Army and to Australia. His comrades and contemporaries remember him fondly and with great respect.

Alan Ryan

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHILLIP EDDINGTON RHODEN, OBE, ED (RETD) (1914–2003)

Reflecting on the 2/14th Battalion’s attack at Manggar Airfield as part of the Balikpapan operations in July 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Phillip ‘Phil’ Rhoden recalled that he refused to ‘rush in’, despite pressure from his superiors to do so. Instead, he bided his time, concentrated his battalion and progressively seized limited objectives, employing his considerable fire support to full effect. It was a strategy designed to save lives, and characteristic of Rhoden’s approach to command.

Rhoden’s military career began with the Melbourne Grammar cadets and led to a militia commission in 1933. A solicitor in the family firm at the outbreak of war, Rhoden initially continued to serve with the 14th Battalion, but in 1940 he
volunteered for the Second AIF. He quickly gained a reputation as one of the most efficient and conscientious officers of the 2/14th Battalion, and led its A Company through the campaign in Syria and Lebanon.

After Syria, Rhoden commanded HQ Company, and by the time the 2/14th was advancing to meet the Japanese drive along the Kokoda Track, he was second-in-command of the battalion. In this role he faced his greatest challenge as a commander. After the loss of the commanding officer during the withdrawal from Isurava, he was required to take in hand the ragged remnants of the battalion and lead them through the vicious and dispiriting fighting around Brigade Hill. He was only twenty-seven.

In March 1943, Rhoden was appointed to command the 21st Training Battalion. He returned to the 2/14th as its permanent commander during the Ramu Valley campaign and led it until the end of the war. Reserved in character, Rhoden earned the trust of his troops through professional competence and placed great store in keeping even the lowest ranks informed of the larger significance of their actions.

Rhoden resumed his legal career after the war and returned briefly to part-time soldiering as commander of the Melbourne University Regiment between 1948 and 1951. He retained a close relationship with the men of the 2/14th. He regarded these relationships as the greatest joy of having commanded a battalion.

Phil Rhoden—calm, conscientious, self-effacing (he described himself as ‘just a plodder’)—was a man who embodied the epithet ‘an officer and a gentleman’. He was also a member of a rapidly fading and most distinguished club. Close to 270 men commanded Australian infantry battalions during World War II; only half a dozen remain with us. With his passing we lose one of the quiet heroes of Kokoda. We do well to remember him.

Garth Pratten
The Retrospect section of the AAJ is designed to reproduce interesting articles from the Australian Army's earlier journals, notably the Commonwealth Military Journal and the Australian Army Journal (AAJ) from the 1940s to the mid 1970s. In this edition of the new AAJ, we are reprinting an edited version of an article by Field Marshal Sir William Joseph Slim, KG, GCB, GCMG, GCVO, GBE, DSO, MC (afterwards 1st Viscount Slim), then Governor-General of Australia. This article appeared in the November 1957 edition of the earlier AAJ. The Governor-General's article was based on the text of the William Queale Lecture, 'Leadership in Management', which he delivered to the Adelaide Division of the Australian Institute of Management in April 1957. The article remains notable both for Slim's articulation of a philosophy of leadership and for its exposition of how one of the great commanders of World War II viewed the relationship between leadership and management.
LEADERSHIP IN MANAGEMENT

FIELD MARSHAL SIR WILLIAM SLIM, AUSTRALIAN ARMY

In any great city—Adelaide, if you like—day and night, an immense variety of activities, public and private, go on. Hundreds of thousands of people are fed, clothed, housed, moved, educated and entertained. Vast quantities of materials are transported; large-scale construction, manufacture and maintenance are carried out; police, public health, water and communications services are provided. Churches are active; law courts function; the output of newspapers and the radio is ceaseless. A thousand other needs of a modern community are met. Yet there is no activity among all these that is not carried out on a daily basis also in the Army—and carried out too, often under conditions far more difficult than those with which municipality or industry has to grapple.

What industrial corporation has attempted an enterprise comparable in extent, complication or difficulty with the invasion of France [in 1944] or with any of a dozen operations of the last war? Yet generals planned, organised, coordinated and carried out those vast undertakings; they managed them and, on the whole, managed them successfully. Why should they not do so? After all, soldiers were the first to practise—and what is more to study—organisation and management. After the thousands of years we have been practising management and passing or failing our tests in it, we should have learnt something about it. So perhaps, after all, a soldier need not be too shy at speaking on management even to such an informed audience as this one.

There is one point, however, that must be made clear. People are always ready to tell generals what they ought to do, or more often what they ought to have done. I am not returning the compliment. I am not telling you how to run your own businesses. All I will try to do is to say something about the Army’s view of management. How far, if at all, anything I say could be applied to your work and your problems is entirely for you to judge. The problems met at the top of any great organisation, whether military or civilian, are basically the same: questions of organisation, transportation, equipment, resources, the selection of men for jobs, the use of experts
and, above all and through all, human relations. Now while the problems are much alike, there are certain differences between the military and the civil approach to them, and in the climates in which they have to be solved.

To begin with, in the Army we do not talk of ‘management’, but of ‘leadership’. The use of the latter term is significant. There is a difference between leadership and management. The leader and the men who follow him represent one of the oldest, most natural and most effective of human relationships. The manager and those he manages are a later product, with neither so romantic nor so inspiring a history. Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of personality and vision; its practice is an art. Management is of the mind, more a matter of accurate calculation, of statistics, of methods, timetables and routine; its practice is a science. Managers are necessary; leaders are essential. A good system will produce efficient managers, but more than that is needed. We must find managers that are not only skilled organisers but also inspired and inspiring leaders, destined eventually to fill the highest ranks of control and direction. Such men will gather round them close-knit teams of subordinates like themselves and of technical experts, whose efficiency, enthusiasm and loyalty will be unbeatable. What should we look for? Where are we likely to find it? When we have found it, how shall we develop and use it? Can the experience of the Army be any help?

In this tradition of leadership we in the fighting services have, of course, certain very marked advantages over civil life. The principle of personal leadership is traditional and accepted. There is a strict legal code for the enforcement of obedience to lawful direction. Officers and men recognise that they are on the same side fighting together against a common enemy. Commanders do not, in war at any rate, have to pay so much regard to the financial effects of their actions. I can well understand a businessman saying, ‘if we had all that, management would indeed be simple’.

Lest you should think that military leadership is easy, let me remind you that personal leadership exists only as long as the officers demonstrate it by superior courage, wider knowledge, quicker initiative and a greater readiness to accept responsibility than displayed by those they lead. Again, military command is not merely a matter of ‘bawling orders’ that will be obeyed for fear of punishment. Any commander’s success comes from being trusted rather than from being feared; from leading rather than driving. Officers and other ranks feel themselves on the same side only as long as the officers, in all their dealings, show integrity and unselfishness and place the wellbeing of their troops before their own welfare. In war, the general may not be
haunted by finance, but his is the responsibility for good management and economy in matters more important than money—his men’s lives. These things, not stars and crowns or the director’s Rolls-Royce, are the badges of leadership anywhere.

When we talk of leaders in the Army, what sort of individuals do we picture? Not the explosive old generals of the comic strips, whose complexions are indicative of blood-pressure and of the consumption of port—both high; whose conversation is limited to reminiscences of Poona and of blood-sports; and whose only solution to any political or social problem is: ‘Damn it, sir, shoot ‘em’. If these generals ever existed in real life, they were well on their way out before I joined the Army. No, the first qualities we require in a leader are character, which will be discussed later, and an alert mind. Of course, it will be a military mind. Every profession produces its own kind of mind that shows itself in its trained approach to any given question.

Other professions are trained quite rightly not to reply to questions until they have the exact and correct answer, some to give an answer made up of alternatives or possibilities. The military mind must provide not necessarily the perfect answer, but one that, in the circumstances as far as they are known, will work. The commander has to back his judgment, face the risks, force his plan through and stand or fall by the result. It seems to me that would not be a bad kind of mind to initiate and carry through enterprises in other fields—possibly even those of commerce and industry.

What is leadership? I would define it as the projection of personality. It is that combination of persuasion, compulsion and example that makes other people do what you want them to do. If leadership is this projection of personality, then the first requirement is a personality to project. The personality of a successful leader is a blend of many qualities: courage, willpower, knowledge, judgment, and flexibility of mind. Courage is the basis of all leadership, indeed of all virtue in man or beast. Courage is no less in the higher than in the lower levels of command, but the greater the responsibility, the more the emphasis shifts from physical to moral courage—a much rarer quality: rare, but essential to higher leadership.

Willpower is a most obvious requirement in a leader’s make-up. Without it, no man can remain a leader for he will have to force through his purpose, not only against the enemy, but against the weariness of his troops, the advice of his experts, the doubts of his staff, the wavering of politicians and the inclinations of his allies. These obstacles are undoubtedly duplicated in industry because willpower is as needed in the boardroom as in the council of war.
The main task of a leader is to make decisions, but if he has not the judgment to make the right decisions, then the greater his strength of will, the higher his courage, the more tragic will be his mistakes. When looking for your leader, make sure of his courage and his willpower but see that he has judgment, that he is balanced. I said a leader must have knowledge. A man has no right to set himself up as a leader—or to be set up as a leader—unless he knows more than those he is to lead. In a small unit, a platoon say, or maybe a workshop gang, the leader should be able to do the job of any man in the outfit better than he can. As the leader rises higher in the scale, he can no longer, of course, be expected to show such mastery of the detail of all the activities under him. A divisional commander need not know how to coax a wireless set, drive a tank, preach a sermon, or take out an appendix as well as the people in his division who are trained to do those things. He does, however, have to know how long these jobs should take, what their difficulties are, what they need in training and equipment and the strain they entail. As the leader moves towards the top of the ladder, he must be able to judge between experts and technicians and to use their advice, although he will not need their knowledge. One kind of knowledge he must always keep in his own hands is that of men.

Flexibility of mind is becoming more and more important to leadership. The world, in material and scientific matters, is advancing much more rapidly than most people can keep up with. A leader is surrounded by new and changing factors. What it was wise to do yesterday may well be foolish today. Some invention, some new process, some political change may have come along overnight and the leader must speedily adjust himself and his organisation to it. The only living organisms that survive are those that adapt themselves to change. There is always the danger that determination becomes only obstinacy, flexibility mere vacillation. Every individual must work out the balance between these for himself; until then he is no real leader.

Now if a man has all these qualities—courage, will power, judgment, knowledge, flexibility of mind—he cannot fail to be a leader in whatever walk of life he is engaged. Yet he is still not the leader we seek; he lacks one last quality—integrity. Integrity should not be so much a quality of itself as the element in which all of the others live and are active, as fish exist and move in water. Integrity is a combination of the old Christian virtues of being honest with all men and of unselfishness, thinking of others, the people we lead, before ourselves. Moral reasons are, strangely enough, the ones that both in war and commerce tell most in the long run. This spir-
ritual aspect, this attitude—and there need be nothing soft or sloppy about it—has a practical material value. The real test of leadership is not if your troops will follow you in success, but if they will stick by you in defeat and hardship. They will not do so unless they believe you to be honest and to have care for them.

I once had under me a battalion that had not done well in a fight. I went to see why. I found the men in the jungle, tired, hungry, dirty, jumpy, some of them wounded, sitting miserably about doing nothing. I looked for the CO—for any officer; none was to be seen. Then as I rounded a bush, I realised why that battalion had failed. Collected under a tree were the officers, having a meal while the men went hungry. Those officers had forgotten the tradition of the Service that they must look after their men’s wants before their own. I was compelled to remind them of the integrity and unselfishness that always permeate good leadership.

So much for the kind of man we want as leader. How in a big organisation are we to find him? In the Army we believe that it is vitally important to recognise the potential leader at an early stage in his career. Then, while cultivating the natural root of leadership in him, to graft on to its growth the techniques of management. I think we have done this more deliberately, more systematically and more constantly in the Army for the past forty years than has been done in industry. Our aim is to extract the potential officer at the start of his career and begin his grooming for leadership as soon as possible. Responsibility breeds responsibility; the best training for leadership is leadership.

The greater the size of an army, of an organisation, the more difficult it becomes for the leaders to make their ideas and intentions clear and vivid to all their thousands of subordinates. In my experience there are many things that can be done to keep in touch, but if they are to be effective, they must all be based on two other factors. The head man of the army, the firm, the division, the department and the workshop must be known as an actual person to all under him. Second, the soldier or the employee must be made to feel that he is part of the ‘show’, and that what he is and what he does matters to it. I believe that a good system is one that passes on to every man information of what is going on outside his immediate view.

From washing machines to electronic brains, we live increasingly by technology. Technicians are vital to our industry. We do not, however, make a man a general in the field because he is an expert in explosives; the most brilliant surgeon is not necessarily the best man to run a great hospital; nor the best-selling author to run a publishing house. The technically trained man is not the answer to the management...
problem. The only way in which the growing need for leadership in management can be met is to find the potential leader and then start his training and give him his chance to lead.

In industry you will never have to ask men to do the stark things demanded of soldiers, but the men you employ are the same men. Instead of rifles they handle tools; instead of guns they serve machines. They have changed their khaki and jungle green for workshop overalls and civilian suits. But they are the same men and they will respond to leadership of the right kind as they have always done. Infuse your management with leadership; and they will show their mettle in the workshop as they have on the battlefield.

**THE AUTHOR**

Field Marshal, Viscount Slim of Burma (1891–70) was one of the outstanding British and Allied commanders of World War II. Through his conduct of the 1942–45 Burma campaign, he became the only Allied general to defeat a major Japanese Army on the mainland of Asia and to liberate a conquered territory largely through ground fighting. His memoir, *Defeat into Victory* (1956), is regarded as a classic of its genre. He was Governor-General of Australia from 1953 to 1960.
In 1989 Francis Fukuyama, then Deputy Director of the US State Department’s policy planning staff, published a curious essay, ‘The End of History?’ in the journal *The National Interest*. Fukuyama’s argument was that, with the collapse of monolithic communism in the form of the Soviet Union, the last ideological threat to the dominance of liberal capitalist ideas had disappeared. With the triumph of Western capitalism, Fukuyama predicted that the threat of international conflict between advanced Western societies would also diminish considerably.

Fukuyama’s liberal triumphalism was influential in Western political and strategic thought during the 1990s, but suffered somewhat in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks on New York. There were other voices countering Fukuyama’s thesis: in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Samuel Huntington argued that future conflicts would be between civilisations—such as the Islamic, the Western and the Sino-Confucianist—rather than between nation-states. Huntington argued that the major areas of regional conflict would be along what he called the ‘fault lines’ between civilisations (for example, in areas such as Palestine).

Such a thesis did little, however, to dampen Western liberal optimism in the 1990s. Written during the euphoria following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the End of History thesis failed to recognise the potential for other forms of political strife and armed conflict in the world. With the threat of widespread terrorist attacks and disruption of the liberal capitalist West by Islamist and other militants, it is valuable to study a book dealing with the great strategic thinkers of world history.
The Strategists, edited by Hugh Smith, Associate Professor, School of Politics at the Australian Defence Force Academy, examines some of the influential strategic and military theorists—from Sun Zi in 6th century BC China, to the nuclear strategists of the Cold War period. The book also discusses the future of warfare, how and why wars will be fought in the next twenty to fifty years, and closes with a perceptive essay on the future of strategy by military historian Martin van Creveld.

Divided into three, the first part of the book deals with arguably the best-known classical military theorists, Sun Zi and Carl von Clausewitz. The second part looks at modern strategists, with essays focusing on Alfred Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett; J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart; Giulio Douhet; and Mao Zedong. Part three looks at contemporary strategic thinking, and speculates on the future role of strategy.

Hugh Smith’s splendid opening essay sets the tone with his elegant description of the good military strategist:

In short, the good strategist displays a historical depth, an intellectual breadth and an openness to new ideas—qualities which in turn stimulate the thinking of those engaged in the practical business of killing enemies and leading states. (p. 11)

These qualities are particularly relevant in a world of increasing military, political and economic complexity—a world in which threats are multiplying faster than anyone could have predicted even ten years ago.

James Cotton’s excellent piece, ‘Sun Zi: Diplomacy and War’, reveals the reasons that the ancient Chinese thinker is increasingly considered the important strategic theorist of the 21st century. Born at a time in which the state and the traditional order seemed threatened by rapid social and cultural change, Sun Zi faced the formidable task of formulating a comprehensive philosophy of war in a time of turmoil.

Sun Zi emphasises the achievement of victory over an enemy without fighting, through the use of cunning and deception. His perspective is particularly relevant in today’s world, where modern weapons of mass destruction make full-scale war between advanced states an exercise in futility. Sun Zi’s advocacy of obtaining intelligence on the enemy and the use of spies, so that enemies’ plans and/or networks can be attacked rather than his cities and/or civilians, is also of importance for the contemporary military commander. In the context of the decline of the Clausewitzian world of warfare, in which the sovereign nation-state stood supreme, strategic theorists are looking to thinkers such as Sun Zi for a new understanding of war and international relations.
Hugh Smith’s chapter, ‘Clausewitz: Apostle of Modern War’, analyses Clausewitz’s relevance in strategic thinking today. His now-famous dictum from *On War*, that ‘War is the continuation of policy by other means’, is discussed in the light of modern developments such as globalisation, the decline of warfare between advanced states and the possible decline of the nation-state. More importantly, Smith argues that what has changed in today’s world is the nature of warfare itself, which is less about large-scale conflict in the open field and more about low-intensity conflict and guerrilla operations.

Perhaps the most fascinating and thought-provoking essay in the book is Martin van Creveld’s chapter, ‘The End of Strategy?’. Declaring the Clausewitzian concept of state-based warfare to be essentially bankrupt—thanks to the domination of nuclear weapons since 1945—van Creveld argues that instead we are faced with new types of warfare for the nuclear age. The author states that since 1945 one modern Western army after another has been defeated by guerrillas of various political stripes—insurgents that have refused to fight by the Clausewitzian rule book. From American defeat in Vietnam, to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, as well as the many brutal bush wars fought against European colonial powers in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, the nature of warfare has changed dramatically.

In his 1991 book *The Transformation of War*, van Creveld argued the radical thesis that irregular movements will replace what we have understood as conventional warfare. As warfare becomes more and more the clash of small, highly trained, professional warrior elites, Western armies will be forced to downsize and restructure along similar lines. Territorial interests and high-tech weaponry may still figure in these future wars, but will not have the same importance they once had.

Faced with such a thoroughgoing transformation of the political, social, economic and military world, what is the contemporary strategist to do? In this postmodern world, how can the strategist assimilate such rapid social and cultural changes so that an integrated theory of the nature of warfare can be produced? These are the questions posed at the end of *The Strategists*, and the answers are by no means certain.

In the future it would seem that the role of the strategic thinker, and indeed the role of the warrior and the diplomat, will be to formulate a new understanding of war and international relations, to meet the circumstances of a post–nation-state era. Even if the nation-state does survive into the 21st century (after all, the death of the nation-state has been predicted for over a century now), it will be a less powerful, more circumscribed entity in comparison with the large bureaucratic states of the modern era. If the ordered and technological societies of the West are not to sink into barbarism and decline, our rulers have to begin to rethink the role of armed conflict in relations between states and cultures.
Martin van Creveld believes that, in order to reconstitute strategic thinking for the new millennium, we must begin with a reconsideration of the reasons behind why we fight in the first place:

If you open Clausewitz, [the question of what is a just war] is simply not there … For him, justice had nothing to do with strategy. And that, I believe, is where he was mistaken—the reason being that nobody is so foolish as to lay down his life for a cause that is not just. Hence, in any attempt to rethink strategy, we must start by asking ourselves not how to get the other side to submit to our will but what constitutes a good policy and a just war. (p. 127)

_The Strategists_ is highly recommended as an introduction to the history of strategic thought, and as a fascinating account of the state of contemporary strategic thinking. It should be compulsory reading for all our politicians, diplomats and defence planners, as well as our military leaders.

Reviewed by Alan Ryan, Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre

This extraordinary book examines the disastrous peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Rwanda, and it does so by analysing the role played in these disasters by three senior Canadians. The Lion of the title is Major General Romeo Dallaire, the commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The Fox is Major General Lewis Mackenzie, the sector commander in Sarajevo during the early part of the Bosnian War. The Eagle is Justice Louise Arbour, who became chief prosecutor for War Crimes in Rwanda and Yugoslavia at the Hague. The book charts the sorry record of United Nations (UN)–mandated ‘neutral’ peacekeeping in two failed states where robust intervention was required. Both countries experienced tragedies of horrific proportions and the inability of the UN to do anything to prevent or even ameliorate the genocides that occurred demonstrated the international community’s lack of preparedness for the conditions of global insecurity that succeeded the stasis of the Cold War.

Off’s book has prompted uproar in Canada, where peacekeeping has been regarded as a national specialty. The book has received wide attention among students of peacekeeping but has not been widely marketed in Australia. This unavailability is a shame, as the book is well written and addresses issues that Australia also has to face. What level of commitment should affluent and relatively secure states make to global security? When governments commit their troops to peace enforcement missions, what costs and what casualties will they bear?

Off is particularly critical of Lewis MacKenzie’s role in Sarajevo. MacKenzie brought with him all the old assumptions of first-generation peacekeeping. He saw himself as a mediator, whose presence might help restrain the excesses of the ethnic war that was brewing as Yugoslavia tore itself to pieces. He opposed intervention on the grounds that none of the parties to the conflict in Bosnia had clean hands. The UN stayed out of the war—and 200 000 people died. The ethnic cleansing only ended when NATO intervened with air strikes and the United States engineered a fragile peace by effectively imposing the Dayton Peace accords on the warring parties.

Romeo Dallaire’s story is the stuff of Greek tragedy. As the commander on the ground, Dallaire saw the most horrific genocide in recent history occur around him while he urged the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN to take
Something close to a million people died in the holocaust. His own troops were slaughtered along with Red Cross and other humanitarian workers, but with a Chapter Six peacekeeping mandate and limited military resources, he was powerless to intervene. The failure of the UN was total—no-one in the organisation was willing to acknowledge what was really happening. Within the UN bureaucracy, there were determined efforts to play down the extent of the carnage and no member state wanted to take responsibility for revealing the truth of Rwanda's descent into hell. In the aftermath of the botched mission, Dallaire has been active in trying to inform the world what went wrong and what must be done to prevent such carnage from happening again. Not surprisingly, today he is a broken man, both physically and mentally.

Louise Arbour was brought in as prosecutor to conduct the first international criminal trials since those at Nuremberg. She soon found that no-one was really interested in these trials; they were being conducted to give the appearance of an international response to the two genocides. She found incompetence in the conduct of investigations, disinclination to make arrests, and corruption throughout the bureaucracy. Off paints Arbour's efforts as something of a victory snatched from the jaws of total failure. The prosecutor pushed for indictments over the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. These indictments included those ultimately issued for Slobodan Milosevic and his colleagues. The tribunal has secured some convictions, though all too often of junior personnel and marginal political figures. Although Milosevic is on trial, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic remain at liberty. In Rwanda, it appears that few of the instigators of violence will ever see justice. As far as Africa is concerned, the international community shies away from involvement in what is generally seen to be an intractable problem.

Off has written a bitter and troubling book, which is essential reading for those who want to know the challenges that will face military forces employed on the more complex operations that will face them in the future. The world is gradually accepting that fundamental human rights take precedence over outmoded concepts of indefeasible state sovereignty. The author concludes, however, that few governments have the political will to invest their troops and their treasure in resolving conflicts in which they have no vital interests involved. As the Security Council deliberations over the fate of Saddam Hussein's brutal regime showed more recently, many governments will delay their commitment and oppose intervention unless their own security or economic wellbeing is affected. As Off concludes: ‘The real lesson to be learned from Rwanda is that no one gives a damn. The missing ingredient isn't a special force or better communications—it's political will, courage, morality.' Soldiers today inhabit a more complex moral universe than that of their predecessors, and their governments have generally yet to come to terms with this fact. This book provides a valuable road map to the ethical conundrums that will face us in a future where military forces will be needed for cosmopolitan as well as national purposes.
This analysis of the precision revolution by Michael Russell Rip and James M. Hasik has been described by the leading scholar of American air power, Benjamin S. Lambeth, as ‘a sweeping survey of the technologies of precision navigation and attack and an encyclopedic account of their combat employment throughout the 1980s and 1990s’. Professional soldiers should not be deterred by the focus on aerial precision in the title of this book. This study is, in fact, broad in scope and highly valuable, in that it examines the potential and the limitations of aerial precision, not only for air operations, but also for both land and joint operations.

In addition, Rip and Hasik, while highlighting the clear potential of aerial precision, are cautious proponents of this type of warfare. Indeed, they point out that the precision revolution should be seen as ‘a revolution with limits’. In particular, the authors pay considerable attention to the central paradox of precision warfare, namely that it often leads to destruction without decision. Between 1991 and 2001, American military strategy relied mainly on the use of long-range, stand-off, precision air power or ‘cruise missile diplomacy’. The authors believe that this approach represents a flawed understanding of military strategy. They suggest that, in the wake of 11 September and the War on Terror, there must be throughout the West ‘a profound military transformation’ that includes a willingness to deploy ground forces.

An overreliance on a precision strike strategy has created a situation in which Islamist political extremists have doubted the United States’ resolve to defend its vital interests. Rip and Hasik warn that, if the power to achieve almost nuclear results with ordinary explosives does not guarantee tangible political benefits, then strategy is clearly failing policy. In particular, they identify a gap between the often devastating physical effects of precision bombing and its indifferent political effects. The case of the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq is cited as an example of the paradox of ‘physical destruction without political decision’. Precision attack may have the advantages of yielding impressive battle-damage imagery on television and it may succeed in winning public acclaim at home because it saves lives. Ultimately, however, precision warfare is of little use if it has only a marginal effect on the political system of a targeted country—as was the case with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq between 1991 and the invasion of 2003.
The authors argue that US experience with precision attack in the 1990s offers a clear warning: technological prowess is important, but precision attack requires calibrated doctrine and a firm place in joint operations, because by itself aerospace power is not enough. ‘Constant reliance’, write Rip and Hasik, ‘on a single system to enforce foreign policy goals is dangerous’. When vital interests are at stake, political leaders must be prepared to risk the lives of their service personnel.

The study describes the way in which the Global Positioning System (GPS) underpins precision operations and has become the ‘single most important development in command and control technology since the wireless telegraph’. For land forces, GPS has made wide-area, rapid manoeuvre a reality, while the synergy between global positioning and night vision will be pivotal in future joint operations. Nonetheless, while GPS brings precision down to the tactical level, the system has weaknesses. The authors warn that ‘precision strike is problematical, and the strategy, doctrine and advanced technology that define it can be nullified by relatively simple and inexpensive asymmetrical responses such as decoy targets, camouflage, dispersal, and deception’.

Precision-guided munitions are also vulnerable to electronic warfare, especially jamming, while there are also serious intelligence difficulties in interpreting a flood of targeting data. Current methods of intelligence preparation of the battlespace and of the use of operational intelligence support are described as being woefully inadequate because, as the authors put it, ‘whether weapons will be able to fly through individual windows will be irrelevant if the precise windows to be targeted cannot be known with certainty beforehand’.

The ‘fatal visibility’ of immobile forces to aerial precision strike suggests that future adversaries will almost certainly place a premium on combat mobility. Unfortunately, autonomous precision-guided munitions are of limited utility against mobile enemies. Nearly all successes in precision strike during the 1990s were achieved against fixed sites. For Rip and Hasik, ‘if politicians are unwilling to send soldiers to hunt down evasive targets, their weapons may be found to be powerless against meaningful, mobile targets’.

In the future, enemy forces will adopt dispersible and resilient forces, and in order to deal with this challenge, intelligence will be essential. In the 1999 Kosovo conflict, maskirovka (the Russian art of strategic and tactical deception) was used by Serbian forces and in some areas was highly effective. The post-conflict Pentagon’s Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team (KMEAT) found the wreckage of only twenty-six tanks (although it accepts that ninety-three were destroyed). The authors conclude that the Yugoslav Third Army in Kosovo was never incapacitated as a fighting force by the NATO air campaign. As a result, if the Western allies had been forced to mount a ground invasion in the Balkans, Serb troops may have given a good account of themselves.
There are clear rules that must be recognised if the precision revolution is to become a true force multiplier in modern warfare. First, the advocates of aerospace power need to understand that precision-guided munitions can often be ineffective political instruments. Second, there must be an appreciation that the ability to target the enemy precisely often encourages the micromanagement of warfighting and unnecessary political interference in military operational matters. Other rules highlighted by Rip and Hasik include warnings that effective *maskirovka* can compromise precision weapons campaign planning, while the need for exact geographic coordinates in precision strikes entails a huge intelligence effort.

This detailed study warrants close reading. The book demonstrates that precision strike is as vulnerable to friction, miscalculation and human error as any other type of warfare. One is reminded of Clausewitz’s famous observation that, in war, the apparently simple things are often the hardest. All operations are undertaken in a resistant element since the opponent is a thinking human being and not an inanimate object. For these reasons, and despite its undoubted revolutionary potential, GPS and aerial precision warfare have to be seen not as military ends in themselves, but as military means to achieving political ends.
In *Bush at War*, Bob Woodward provides an informative and non-partisan account of the presidential decision-making process in the hundred days following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. During this period, the United States prepared for a war in Afghanistan against al-Qa’ida and the Taliban, took steps towards a pre-emptive strike against Iraq, intensified homeland defence, and began a well-funded CIA covert war against terrorism around the world. Woodward’s scrutiny of the meetings that led to these actions also gives insight into the personality of President George W. Bush and his cabinet.

Bob Woodward, an assistant managing editor of the *Washington Post*, has been a newspaper reporter and editor for more than thirty years. It is no surprise, therefore, that he uses a newspaper reporting style. His narrative is based on tape-recorded interviews of over a hundred sources, including four hours of exclusive interviews with the President, along with notes from National Security Council meetings and access to some classified reports.

This demonstrably high-level access to the Bush administration's principal players (something very few researchers obtain) is the strength of this work. Woodward gained access directly after events while minds were fresh and notes legible. This ‘virtual wiretap’ into the White House Situation Room reveals an interesting portrait of an untested president and his advisers.

Vice President Dick Cheney appears consistently hardline, always pressing for more urgency in Afghanistan and towards Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell is portrayed as the cautious diplomat and loyal solider, tasked with building an international coalition in an administration prone to unilaterism. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld emerges as the agitator and media star who led the military through Afghanistan and, he hopes, through Iraq. Surprisingly, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, the ever-present troubleshooter, emerges from the record as the President’s most important and trusted adviser. Bush is dependent on her for candid advice as well as for conveying his thoughts to his cabinet. Woodward’s description of the rivalries and interplay between cabinet members is intriguing, and supports recent analysis and commentary.
Woodward’s exploration of the president’s leadership style and his motivating forces is particularly interesting. Bush describes himself as a ‘gut player’ who relies heavily on instinct. Much of this instinct derives from his strong Christian, and almost Manichean, belief in good and evil. This is no more conspicuous than in his statements that Osama Bin Laden was wanted ‘dead or alive’.

Perhaps more importantly, Woodward provides insight into the process of policy development. He does an excellent job of exposing the seat-of-their-pants planning sessions, and on-the-run policy decision-making conducted at the highest levels of power. This tendency towards crisis management is exacerbated by Bush’s reliance on his ‘gut instinct’. The revelation that the President developed and publicly stated the so-called Bush Doctrine—the policy that the United States would not only go after terrorists everywhere, but also those governments or groups that harbour them—without first consulting Cheney, Powell or Rumsfeld is particularly telling.

Woodward included in his account a description of how CIA Director George Tenet prepared a paramilitary team to infiltrate Afghanistan and set the groundwork for invasion. This inclusion was particularly useful in making the link between policy development and implementation or application of policy. It also helped illustrate the new era of cooperation between the CIA and the Defense Department.

Although not pivotal to this account, the strained and sometimes explosive relationship between Powell and Rumsfeld (and to a lesser degree Powell and Cheney) exposes their differences over how to deal with Iraq and the appropriateness of coalition building. Moreover, this relationship is indicative of the perennial tension in US foreign policy—and between foreign policy makers—between the demands of multilateralism and the inherent US preference for unilateralism.

Woodward does not seek to provide an authoritative examination of US foreign policy in 2001–02, or on the politics of the War on Terror. He makes no evaluation of the events about which he is writing, nor does he add much to the narrative in the way of background information. Nevertheless, Bush at War provides a useful contribution to the academic literature on the process of presidential decision-making in the United States, and useful source documents for further research on this area.

The book was written before the recent war in Iraq and only contains a few references to the problems with Iraq, although it is constantly on the minds of the principals. I would enjoy reading a similar type of account from Woodward of the decision-making that took place leading up to and during the second war in Iraq.

The author has written a highly readable book with direct language and mostly fast-moving narrative. It is worthwhile, and in many cases, enlightening.

Reviewed by Alan Ryan, Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre

The concept of ‘asymmetry’ in conflict is one of the most abused buzzwords in the contemporary lexicon of warfare. It is most generally used to describe a situation where an adversary uses methods that avoid an opponent’s strengths while targeting their weaknesses. This definition is not very helpful because adopting the indirect approach is the very nature of strategy. At its most simplistic, it is often understood to mean the use of terrorism. Yet terrorism is a method, not a strategy. In this very valuable book, Roger Barnett, a professor emeritus at the US Naval War College and former Navy captain, argues that asymmetries are ‘those actions that an adversary can exercise that you either cannot or will not’. He contends that the Western world is particularly threatened by asymmetric conflict because we have been ‘de-conditioned’ from the expectation that state-sourced violence is an acceptable tool of statecraft. Most of the citizens in Western societies inhabit, in their own minds at least, a post-military civilisation.

Barnett argues that the fact that the international community is most reluctant to use force—combined with the proliferation of legal, political and moral restraints on the use of violence—makes pluralist and democratic societies vulnerable to attacks from opponents that recognise no such constraints. He lists a range of operational strategies—apart from terrorism—that those states that recognise international legal norms cannot counter. These methods include hostage taking, the use of weapons of mass destruction, environmental vandalism and illegitimate operational techniques. Such techniques include indiscriminate targeting, suicide attacks, using human shields, and illegal attacks on national infrastructure or computer networks. He cites the influential book *Unrestricted Warfare*, written by Senior Colonels Qiao and Wang of the People’s Liberation Army, to demonstrate that, given the unchallenged military advantage enjoyed by the United States, serious adversaries will inevitably be forced to embrace asymmetrical—and illegitimate—forms of warfare. They will do this in order to take advantage of the normative constraints on the use of force by the United States and its allies.
The publication of this book is particularly timely given that the Western world has just undergone a debate about the legitimacy of military action against Iraq. There was never any doubt that Saddam Hussein’s regime had defied the international community by acting asymmetrically. He had murdered his own population using gas—an illegal weapon. He had used his own troops (and children at that) to blow themselves up breaching Iranian minefields. In the First Gulf War he torched the Kuwaiti oilfields in a savage act of environmental vandalism. He also took civilian hostages during the same conflict. He funded and provided refuge to terrorist organisations such as Al Fatah and Hizbollah. During the recent war, Ba’ath extremists destroyed Iraq’s cultural heritage in an attempt to shape world opinion, and missiles were used that possessed no precision capabilities—simply to spread fear. Still, many countries argued in the United Nations, and many demonstrators voted with their feet on the streets, that no cause for war existed. As Barnett points out in this book, to consistently tolerate illegitimate asymmetrical attacks on the values espoused by the international system is to invite attack. Peaceable, satisfied states can no longer deter those states and non-state actors that do not accept or recognise the formers’ pacifist values.

Western military forces need to come to terms with the constraints that have been placed on them in waging war. Barnett argues that if recognising a constraint (such as rules of engagement that rule out certain categories of targets) is unnecessary, or gets in the way of achieving operational objectives, then it should be rolled back. Fighting in too mannered or conventional a way exposes our forces to asymmetric attack. The author does not argue that the use of military force should not be controlled, but is critical of those constraints that are not based on sound strategic or operational imperatives.

War is an obscenity, but as Barnett points out, we cannot avoid the fact that state-sourced violence is the ultimate sanction against, and deterrent to, international anarchy. After 11 September, apocalyptic terrorism has been unleashed on the world. We are unlikely to defeat that type of hydra by applying modes of violence suitable to wars between states that expect to continue to exist, no matter what the outcome of the war may be. Given an enemy that will kill us simply for who we are, we must be prepared to wage war in kind.

Reviewed by Alan Ryan, Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre

Collections of previously published essays can be unimpressive since they often lack a coherent theme. Not too many anthologies withstand the test of time and most end up as permanent exhibits on the remainder stands of high-street bookstores. That is unlikely to be the fate of this particular collection, which is, in a word, riveting. A retired US Army lieutenant colonel, Ralph Peters, is America’s premier strategic iconoclast. A highly successful novelist, he helped pioneer the genre of ‘real-time, alternative history’ combat accounts. His 1989 work *Red Army* saw him lauded as the ‘thinking man’s Tom Clancy’. Writing novels may help dispose of the mortgage, but Peters’s forte lies in tearing down the sacred cows of institutional strategic wisdom and examining the world as it really is. The eighteen chapters that make up this book have previously appeared in a number of forums. Many of them were published in *Parameters*, the quarterly journal of the US Army War College. Others are ‘think pieces’ written to tease out a particular theme or elucidate an issue.

For years before 11 September, the author was warning that the greatest threat to human security was not so much conventional interstate war but the re-emergence of ‘warriors’—erratic primitives of shifting allegiances, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order. We recognise them in the militia armies of the former Yugoslavia, in Chechnya, East Timor and Sierra Leone. We see them in the narco-marxist groups that infest south and central America. They exist in the armies of the warlords of Afghanistan, Somalia and the Sudan. While in the past we could depend on these groups being quarantined in the Third World, they are beginning to adapt themselves to the era of globalisation and are becoming transnational in nature. As the events of 11 September, and most recently in Bali, demonstrated, globalisation has given them the opportunity to travel, to construct alliances between disaffected groups and to find new sources of funding. They have found their ultimate expression in the apocalyptic terrorists of al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah. Peters’s core argument is that we inhabit a deeply and bitterly divided world. In this environment, conflict is inevitable. Our only hope of prevailing is to understand the root causes of violence and respond accordingly. So far as apocalyptic warriors are concerned, Peters argues that we cannot accommodate our world view with their eschatological philosophy. We must fight them, and we must destroy them.
Peters covers a lot of ground in this book, from observations on the role of intelligence in the national security establishment through to a bitter denunciation of the inadequacies of those ideologically straitjacketed academics whose postmodern dogmas cripple our ability to formulate sensible strategic policy. His opening sentence of that chapter reads: ‘A room filled with university professors makes me nostalgic for the Khmer Rouge’. It is a challenging statement, but one that is justified by his analysis of the sort of cultural relativism indulged in by those ivory-tower scholars that accord the same legitimacy to the Saddam Husseins and Robert Mugabes of this world as they do to their own liberal–democratic governments. Consideration of the Khmer Rouge is particularly apt, for at the same time that they were wiping out their own intelligentsia, many Western intellectuals were applauding their efforts. This shameful episode is thoroughly documented in Sophal Ear’s brilliant honours thesis ‘The Khmer Rouge Canon’, which is available on the Internet. A number of prominent Australian scholars are to be found in the ranks of the public intellectuals that continued to support the Khmer Rouge long after the scale of its crimes was made obvious.

Other chapters of this book that are of particular interest to military professionals include ‘The Human Terrain of Urban Operations’ and ‘Heavy Peace’. In the former, extremely prescient piece, he points out that the key variable in urban operations is not the built environment, but the attitude of the population. A hostile population may result in a Stalingrad or a Grozny, but without that level of opposition, you are likely to see a rapid collapse as in Baghdad. In ‘Heavy Peace’, Peters points out that the challenge of conducting peace operations in an era of complex insecurity requires the United States and its allies to invest in its soldiers:

While proponents of air-power claim it can accomplish every military mission by itself, infantrymen keep the muddy watch in the Balkans. Technology is seductive, but frequently irrelevant in the clinch. The age of heavy peace is the age of the skilled, disciplined soldier …

Presented in his usual confrontational and trenchant style, Peters’s book demonstrates that the author clearly enjoys writing and communicates that enthusiasm to his reader. His world is an uncomfortable one, and sometimes appears too uncompromising in its certainties. Nonetheless, this book should be prescribed reading for any military professional that seeks to understand the contemporary nature of human conflict.
The Chief of Army has introduced the Chauvel Essay Prize to encourage writing on all aspects of land and joint military operations. The prize is named in memory of General Sir Harry Chauvel, commander of the Desert Mounted Corps during World War I and subsequently Chief of the General Staff from 1923 to 1930.

The Chauvel Essay Prize will be administered by the Head of the Land Warfare Studies Centre, with the Editorial Advisory Board of the *Australian Army Journal* forming a panel of judges. Any candidate who wishes to discuss the eligibility of a particular topic for the competition should contact the Head, Land Warfare Studies Centre. The Chauvel Prize consists of the Chauvel Light Horse Medallion and a $1000 cash award to be presented annually by the Chief of Army. The prize will be awarded for the best essay entered in the competition and will be published in the *Australian Army Journal*. 
THE CHAUVEL ESSAY PRIZE

TERMS AND CONDITIONS

1. Entry to the Chauvel Essay Prize competition is open to all serving members of the Australian Army, to defence civilians working for the Army and to currently registered university postgraduate students in the fields of strategic studies and military history.

2. Essays should be approximately 3000 words in length, with footnotes and academic citations kept to a minimum.

3. Entries will be accepted from 1 March until 1 September of each year.

4. Entries will be judged by the Editorial Advisory Board of the Australian Army Journal.

5. The winning author will be awarded the Chauvel Light Horse Medallion, presented by the Chief of Army, along with a $1000 cash prize.

6. The winning essay will be published in the Australian Army Journal.

7. Entries should be accompanied by a covering letter providing the author’s name, address and personal details. Candidates should not list on their names on essays.

8. Entries using service essay format are not acceptable for the Chauvel Prize.

9. Essays are to be the original work of the author. Collaborative or jointly written work will not be accepted.

10. Entries should be one and half spacing on A4 paper in hard copy and be accompanied by an electronic disk copy. Only IBM-compatible disks can be accepted.

11. The decision of the judges’ panel shall be final.

12. Entries should be sent to:

   Dr Michael Evans
   Head, Land Warfare Studies Centre
   Ian Campbell Road
   Duntroon ACT 2600
The Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, AO, will open the inaugural Rowell Profession of Arms Seminar on Thursday, 17 July, at Adams Hall, Australian Defence Force Academy. The new annual one-day seminar series is conducted by the Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC) and is named in honour of Lieutenant General Sir Sydney Rowell, Chief of the General Staff (CGS) between 1950 and 1954. Lieutenant General Rowell was the first Duntroon graduate to become CGS and, along with Lieutenant General Sir Vernon Sturdee, was the architect of the present Australian Regular Army.

Rowell Seminars are designed to examine in detail areas of the profession of arms that are of particular interest to serving Army officers. The subject of the first Rowell Seminar is ‘Making Future Warriors: Developing an Australian Concept of Advanced Warfighting.’ The seminar will analyse the American experience of advanced warfighting, the role of advanced warfighting in professional military education, and perspectives from Australian Army graduates of overseas advanced warfighting programs. The seminar will also evaluate ideas for a future Australian advanced warfighting- and campaign-planning course.

The program includes presentations from three overseas speakers: Professor Richard M. Swain (Retd), formerly of the US School of Advanced Military Studies at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth; Dr Harold Winton (Retd), Professor of Military History and Theory, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, US Air University; and Colonel Art Corbett of the US Marine Corps University. Australian speakers include the Commandant Australian Defence College, Major General Jim Molan; Colonel Peter Singh; Associate Professor Jeffrey Grey; and Major Russell Parkin. The cost of the seminar is $250.00 per person (less retired military at $100.00 per person). Further details on the Rowell Seminar can be obtained from Lieutenant Colonel Ian Campbell of the LWSC on (02) 6265 9890 or by e-mail at <ian.campbell@defence.gov.au>.
The biennial Chief of Army Conference will be held on Wednesday, 1 and Thursday, 2 October 2003 at Adams Hall, Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA). The Conference is an international event that is attended by uniformed representatives, defence attachés, policy makers and academics from around the world and normally attracts an audience of between 300 and 400 delegates.

The 2003 CA Conference program involves eighteen local and overseas invited speakers, with a keynote address by Lieutenant General Paul van Riper, US Marine Corps (Retd). Other notable guest speakers include Anthony Cordesman, Arleigh Burke Professor of Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC and a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defence Studies Centre, ADFA; Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr (Retd), of Walden University; Dr Christopher Coker of the London School of Economics; Professor Williamson Murray of the US Institute for Defense Analyses; Dr Muthia Alagappa, Director of the East West Center, Washington DC; Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II of the US Army War College; Dr Thomas-Durell Young of the US Naval Postgraduate School; and Dr Thomas G. Mahnken of the US Naval War College. The conference dinner will be held at the Australian War Memorial on the evening of Wednesday, 1 October, with the after-dinner speaker to be Mr Paul Kelly, International Editor, The Australian.

The first day of the CA Conference will examine changing approaches to war and conflict in the early 21st century, including Western and non-Western ‘ways in war’ and security practice. The second day of the conference concentrates on joint operations and coalition strategy in recent conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq. A highlight of the second day will be the special Iraq War Panel, which will include first-hand insights on operations and coalition strategy from Brigadier Maurie McNarn, AO; Professor Anthony Cordesman; and Air Marshal Brian Burridge, Royal Air Force. The cost of the conference is $300.00 per person (less retired military at $100.00 per person). Further details on the CA Conference can be obtained from Lieutenant Colonel Ian Campbell of the LWSC on (02) 6265 9890 or by e-mail at <ian.campbell@defence.gov.au>.
NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The editors of the Australian Army Journal welcome submissions from any source. Two prime criteria for publication are an article's standard of written English expression and its relevance to the Australian profession of arms. The journal will accept letters, feature articles, review essays, e-mails and contributions to the Point Blank and Insights sections. As a general guide on length, letters should not exceed 500 words; articles and review essays should be between 3000 and 6000 words, and contributions to the Insights section should be no more than 1500 words. The Insights section provides authors with the opportunity to write brief, specific essays relating to their own experiences of service. Readers should note that articles written in service essay format are discouraged, since they are not generally suitable for publication.

Each manuscript should be sent by e-mail to <army.journal@defence.gov.au>, or sent printed in duplicate together with a disk to the editors. Articles should be written in Microsoft Word, be one-and-a-half spaced, use 12-point font in Times New Roman and have a 2.5 cm margin on all sides. Submissions should include the author’s full name and title; current posting, position or institutional affiliation; full address and contact information (preferably including an e-mail address); and a brief, one-paragraph biographical description.

The Australian Army Journal reserves the right to edit contributions in order to meet space limitations and to conform to the journal’s style and format.

GENERAL STYLE

All sources cited as evidence should be fully and accurately referenced in endnotes (not footnotes). Books cited should contain the author's name, the title, the publisher, the place of publication, the year and the page reference. This edition of the journal contains examples of the appropriate style for referencing.

When using quotations, the punctuation, capitalisation and spelling of the source document should be followed. Single quotation marks should be used, with double quotation marks only for quotations within quotations. Quotations of thirty words or more should be indented as a separate block of text without quotation marks. Quotations should be cited in support of an argument, not as authoritative statements.
NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

Numbers should be spelt out up to ten, except in the case of percentages, where arabic numerals should be used (and per cent should always be spelt out). All manuscripts should be paginated, and the use of abbreviations, acronyms and jargon kept to a minimum.

BIOGRAPHIES

Authors submitting articles for inclusion in the journal should also attach a current biography. This should be a brief, concise paragraph, whose length should not exceed eight lines. The biography is to include the contributor’s full name and title, a brief summary of current or previous service history (if applicable) and details of educational qualifications. Contributors outside the services should identify the institution they represent. Any other information considered relevant—for example, source documentation for those articles reprinted from another publication—should also be included.