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Editorial

OF MARS AND MAMMON

In late December 2004, a suicide bomber entered the mess hall of the US Army’s Forward Operating Base Marez, near the city of Mosul. The resulting explosion killed twenty-two people and wounded sixty-nine others. The Marez incident, similar to thousands of other attacks in Iraq, soon passed from the world’s media headlines. However, the reasons why this particular attack was so lethal are worthy of further consideration. The large death toll was due to the lucrative target offered by the base’s huge centralised dining facility. The facility was run by contractors and, despite being located in an operational area, was managed on the basis of commercial values—efficiency and profit—instead of the usual military tenets of dispersion and security.

Commerce and war share a long history. Mercenaries from Sir John Hawkwood through Munzio Sforza to Mike Hoare and his Wild Geese have been a persistent feature of warfare. Similarly, merchant contractors offering a range of services have had an equally long history in the annals of armed conflict. In the 20th century, the necessity of two World Wars and the global nuclear stalemate of the Cold War compelled governments to take control of almost every aspect of warfare. Since the end of the Cold War, however, large-scale cuts to many Western defence budgets have caused the rapid growth of private corporations that offer an array of services to armed forces. During the 1991 Gulf War, the use of private companies to provide niche logistics to Coalition forces was thought unusual enough to be newsworthy. A decade and a half later, there are now a number of large corporations that offer a wide range of military services and capabilities. In an age of globalisation, security has not been exempt from the march of private capital propelled by electronic networks.

Contractors and large corporations have become a significant feature in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the post-Saddam Iraqi state. Observers have estimated that there are more than seventy such companies in Iraq, resulting in a ratio of military to civilian personnel of around one to seven. In contrast, during
EDITORIAL

the 1991 Gulf War the military–civilian ratio was about one to one hundred. Today, reduced budgets and the requirements of military pragmatism mean that commercial contractors have become a permanent feature in zones of armed conflict. Yet it is important that both the mass media and Western electorates continue to recognise the vital distinctions between private and public entities in operational areas. Such distinctions are, unfortunately, no longer easy to make. For example, many contractors now bear arms, and the military’s monopoly over the use of force has been eroded. However, one singular difference remains between contractor and soldier: that of liability. Ultimately, a commercial contractor’s primary responsibility is financial in character. There can be no comparison between a contractual obligation to provide services for profit and a sworn obligation to serve a nation in the profession of arms.

The distinguished Australian-born British soldier, General Sir John Hackett, memorably described the essential basis of the military life as ‘the ordered application of violence under an unlimited liability’. The key clause of unlimited liability—that is, the willingness to die in defence of civilised values—is the special, unwritten contract that exists between the soldier and society. This contract has not changed in the 21st century. Soldiers serve Mars, not Mammon; the profession of arms continues to be based on public duty and private excellence. As a consequence, the wellbeing and personal security of professional soldiers should never be compromised for reasons of commercial expediency.

The wide range of topics covered by the articles in the Autumn 2005 issue of the Australian Army Journal (AAJ) reflects the eclectic interests of practitioners and students of the profession of arms both in Australia and overseas. In our Point Blank section we present an informative interview with retired US Army General, Tommy Franks. General Franks, the former Commander of the US-led Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, discusses the problems of coalition warfare and highlights several aspects of Australia’s involvement in recent campaigns. In the main body of the journal, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, sets the scene in the Ideas and Issues section with an article that outlines his vision for land–air manoeuvre. The Chief of Army highlights the need for a seamless integration of air and land forces in operations in the future battlespace.

Aspects of two current operations are covered in important articles by Barak Salmoni and by Lieutenant Colonel John Hutcheson of the US and Australian armies respectively. In the first part of a two-part article, Major Salmoni outlines the development of Iraq’s new security forces. Lieutenant Colonel Hutcheson’s article provides an Australian commander’s perspective on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). In the AAJ’s section on joint operations, Wing Commander Chris Mills of the RAAF presents the case for developing a multi-mission ship capability for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The AAJ’s
OF MARS AND MAMMON

analysis of contemporary tactics embraces three interesting articles by Australian Army officers. Colonel Michael Krause analyses the potential for adopting minimum-mass tactics in the Australian Army, and Captain Ian Langford considers the problems of suppression and manoeuvre for the modern infantry platoon. In the third article, Lieutenant Colonel John Simeoni discusses some of the lessons learnt from recent US Marine Corps urban combined-arms operations in Iraq.

In the area of military technology, Lieutenant Colonels Michael Ryan and David Schmidtchen provide two interesting perspectives on network-centric warfare. These articles are followed by a consideration by Brigadier General Philip Coker from the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command of military transformation under the impact of high operational tempo. Brigadier General Coker’s essay is followed by Major Lynda Liddy’s analysis of the idea of the ’strategic corporal’. She seeks to identify some of the training and educational requirements that might be necessary in order to develop ’strategic corporals’ in the Australian land force.

Two further articles are devoted to problems of civil–military relations and of military law and ethics. Officer Cadet Iain Henry of the Australian Defence Force Academy offers an analysis of the prospects for democracy in Indonesia as the involvement of the armed forces in politics is progressively reduced. Colonel David Kelly then discusses the legal factors in the planning of coalition warfare and interoperability, and their implications for the ADF. On the subject of terrorism, the AAJ offers both local and overseas perspectives. Peta Tarlinton of the Department of Defence examines the work of the Egyptian theologian, Sayyid Qutb, in an attempt to provide an insight into the roots of radical Islam. A second article by the leading American scholar of the Middle East, Dr Daniel Pipes, considers the West’s need to reconceptualise the War on Terror as an ideological struggle.

The AAJ’s section on terrorism is followed by sections on the media and on military history. In a topical article, the Sandhurst scholar, Stephen Badsey, examines the interactions between the media, strategy and military culture. In terms of military history, the AAJ offers three articles. Lieutenant Colonel John Blaxland reflects on the role of signals intelligence in Australian military operations from World War II to Vietnam. Journalist and former Army Reserve cavalry officer, Nicholas Stuart, ponders the elusiveness of victory against Western military practice and Major Paul Rosenzweig discusses the concept of mission command in the context of the ANZAC landings at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915. In the Insights section of the AAJ, we present two contrasting articles. First, we publish a first-hand analysis of conditions in the Darfur region of Sudan by aid worker, Andjela Jurisic. Jurisic offers a disturbing account of the armed conflict in the Sudan and of the challenges that aid workers must confront in a zone of crisis. Second, the AAJ provides an analysis of the psychological dimensions of military uniforms by Recruit Sean Kikkert from South Australia.
In the Retrospect section, the *AAJ* once again draws on Australia’s first military journal, the *Commonwealth Military Journal*, and reprints Colonel James Whiteside Mackay’s incisive 1911 article, ‘The True Principles of Australian Defence’. Mackay’s meditation on Australian defence is as relevant today, nearly a century later, as it was in the years leading up to World War I. In the Milestones section, the *AAJ* publishes the obituaries of five distinguished soldiers: Major General Duncan Francis, Major General William Watson, Brigadier Noel ‘Chic’ Charlesworth, Brigadier O. D. Jackson and Colonel Charles Stuart. *Vale!*

The review essays for this issue of the journal are by Lieutenant Colonel Graeme Sligo and Michael Evans. Sligo considers Sir Arnold T. Wilson’s book, *Mesopotamia 1917–1920: A Clash of Loyalties—A Personal and Historical Record*. He explores the British experience in Mesopotamia during the period between 1917 and 1920 with a view to improving our understanding of contemporary operations in Iraq. In the second essay, Evans reviews the current state of urban military operations and their significance for future armed conflict.

Three book reviews follow; they are by Captain Lachlan Mead, Colonel Terry McCullagh and Russell Parkin. The Autumn issue of the journal concludes with letters and commentary, and diary notices. Finally, the editorial staff of the *AAJ* trust that the diverse content of this volume will find a wide readership within the Australian profession of arms and its supporters.
EDITOR’S NOTE

Coalition warfare has a history that stretches back at least as far as the Trojan War. Homer’s epic, *The Iliad*, details how easily the members of coalitions can fall out over matters of policy or clashes of personality. Australia’s military history is deeply rooted in coalition operations. The very first mission of the Commonwealth’s armed forces, the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force’s successful seizure of German New Guinea in late 1914, was a coalition operation with both French and British participation. From that time onwards, Australia’s armed forces have never engaged in a military operation that was not part of a wider coalition effort.

In this candid interview, General Franks, the former Commander in Chief of US Central Command (CENTCOM), gives his perspective on some of the problems of coalition warfare as he experienced them during operations in the war on terror between September 2001 and July 2003. After he stepped down as Commander of CENTCOM, General Franks wrote *American Soldier*, which is a memoir of his experiences as the commander of the US-led, multinational coalition campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. This article is based on the edited transcript of an interview with General Franks recorded by Dr Russell Parkin of the Land Warfare Studies Centre on 9 September 2004 in Tampa, Florida.
Dr Parkin: Sir, had you worked much with Australians before 2001?

General Franks: I worked with Australians on and off over the years in many field exercises. I had also served for several years in Korea and had come across Australians in many different meetings and war games. I was aware of Australian activity with US Pacific Command (PACOM). However, until the war in Afghanistan there was not any specific operation in which I was involved with Australians—just a long period of mutual cooperation.

Parkin: What expectations did you have of the Australian forces, the SAS (Special Air Service Regiment), and other Australian Defence Force units who joined CENTCOM after 11 September?

Franks: The Australians were very competent, well-trained and well-equipped troops. The planning staff, in particular, was excellent and very responsive. As a staff they never, if I may use an American expression, ‘jump off half-cocked: The forces and their command elements were thoughtful and responded rapidly to anything that the Australian National Command Authority demanded of them. Generally, you can bet that the Australians will produce exactly what they say they will produce. As a result, I had, and continue to have, a very high level of confidence in Australian military personnel.

Parkin: That sort of confidence must be a very important consideration when you are dealing with a very large coalition such as the one you built within CENTCOM?

Franks: That is absolutely true. There are times when political circumstances will require caveated responses. What I found in every case when a caveated response was necessary was that [CDF] General Peter Cosgrove would tell me, ‘This is what I think we will do but I will not know this until a certain point in time’. He was right in every case. I spent a good deal of time on the telephone with Peter [Cosgrove] from the very early days of our planning for operations in Afghanistan and then again throughout the lead-up phase to operations in Iraq. I thought of Peter Cosgrove as a friend and I thought of the Australian Government as an ally that has never wobbled throughout the course of the global war on terror.
Parkin: Did this high level of confidence at the political and strategic levels translate through to the operational and tactical levels?

Franks: Definitely. All the way down to the tactical level I found the same situation. The ‘flash to bang’ time for planning by the Australians for the conduct of tactical- or operational-level missions was always very quick and efficient. The commitments made were always solid and the Australians showed up when and where they said they would, whether we were talking about naval power, air power or special operations. They never disappointed me.

I found that the best practice for the United States was to ‘plug and play’ with different military organisations in accordance with their own proclivities and training regimes. The example that I have given many people is that of the Afghanistan operation, Anaconda. During this operation, it was necessary to conduct close-in-work in the Shahi Kot Valley. Although it was mostly conventional work, it was still found necessary to form bands that provided an interdiction capability along major infiltration routes. The Australian SAS were exceptionally good at this task. They possess some incredible tactical skills, and sniping is not the least of these. The Australians conducted several interdiction operations that were among the most highly effective actions that we conducted in Afghanistan. So, from top to bottom I liked working with the Australians in Afghanistan and Iraq. Australia had a very competent military force. There was never any confusion; there was never any bullshit.

Parkin: What kind of impact did the rotation of forces by coalition members, not just the Australians, have on your operational capability?

Franks: The coalition—if you count all the aspects of it—amounted to sixty or seventy nations. Then there were twenty or thirty nations that were actively involved in providing forces. I had to try to figure out how to get the best balance, realising that the needs of each nation are going to be a little bit different. There is no armed force on this planet that is just going to send someone
to war and say what we in America said during World War I: ‘We’ll come home when it’s over, over there’. Nations require force rotations because they may need to conduct other military tasks. You Australians have been involved in other things at the same time you were doing [Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom].

For example, when I told Peter Cosgrove that, for the sake of continuity, I did not want to have all the special operators from Australia change at the same time that we were doing a force rotation with our US special forces, he was understanding. He never took what I would call unilateral action or presented me with a fait accompli. He understood the value of continuity, but balanced it against Australia’s own national requirements. In every case it was a consultative arrangement, and I appreciated that approach. Peter [Cosgrove] kept me—I hate the word—‘sensitive’ and he kept me well grounded. We would have short conversations and get right down to the issues involved.

**Parkin:** From your perspective, does the US do coalition warfare well? For example, in CENTCOM you really don’t have much choice about working with other nations because the command doesn’t really have assigned forces.

**Franks:** I think that the US CENTCOM’s approach to coalition warfare is far beyond any other capability that we have in our country. This is not only because of the nature of the global war on terrorism; it goes back to the days of Operation Desert Storm when it was also necessary to build a coalition. Over the course of time CENTCOM has learned how to perform that task. It is one thing to manage various tactical inputs—five infantry divisions or three air entry points—in operations. Most of the commands in the American military can do that type of activity. It is a different matter when you are managing contributions that are not only tactical, but in many cases strategic, to the nations that are providing capabilities. The only organisation that I know of that the United States has a good understanding of, and a lot of experience in doing coalition operations with, is CENTCOM.

It is probably because the CENTCOM commander, going back long before me, is as comfortable dealing with a head of state as he is dealing with a pure military problem. This is a characteristic of the command. CENTCOM is not at all like operating in a NATO environment. There is no nineteen- or eighteen-nation umbrella
organisation. What you find in CENTCOM is a set, or an aggregation, of bilateral arrangements. If you go to NATO it’s like going to the United Nations, where they vote in blocs. When CENTCOM works with a coalition, in a sense it’s much easier because its commander can go directly to Australia, or directly to [Prime Minister] Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, or the Crown Prince in Saudi Arabia. In my view, this ability makes it possible to build a strong coalition.

I think it is also healthy to recognise that the contribution from Australia and the contribution from Bangladesh are not going to be at the same level. What I found is that, at McGill Air Base [CENTCOM Headquarters in Tampa, Florida], not everything needs to come from United States Central Command. By working closely together, each of the senior national representatives comes to realise the strengths and shortfalls of the other coalition members. It is this kind of cross-talking within the coalition that is truly remarkable. It is unlike anything I have ever seen and I am not sure whether anything like it has ever existed before. For example, if you take a country such as Jordan, which offers troops but not the means to move them, then you soon find from the cross-talk between senior national representatives that there is a country that is willing to provide the aircraft necessary to move the Jordanians.

Such cooperation is very powerful. I have pushed my own Government and will continue to push it in order to plan on building a standing coalition within CENTCOM’s region because it seems to be a problematic area for the world. Over the past three years the United States has created a sort of standing coalition, and I predict in the future it will remain that way. I think we will probably wind up at some point with a standing coalition of between seventy to ninety nations. But it will take time for some nations to appreciate the value of such a coalition. Initially they are likely to use liaison officers who can come in and watch the dialogues that occur. When the various liaison officers come to understand that there are not going to be any Soviet-style demands on particular countries to produce troops or materials, then the political leaders will make their own decision to become a part of the coalition. At this point relations become more permanent, and you find one nation after another beginning to take out leases on houses around Tampa for their senior national representatives. That is what I think is the future for a coalition in this region, and it is unlike any that has ever been built before.

**Parkin:** To what extent do you think that the political conditions necessary for this kind of coalition to develop were the result of the attacks of 11 September 2001?

**Franks:** Partly the coalition was related to the events of 9/11 and its aftermath, and partly to the natural proclivity of the present American administration under the President [George W. Bush]. One reason I have become a little more political lately, more than I ever have been before, is that I have seen first hand how the President
The President is a pragmatist; he does not necessarily care whether the Secretary of State or some general is doing the work with various countries and their heads of state. This is a different situation from having a more bureaucratic style of leadership that wants the State Department to handle foreign affairs and the Defence Secretary to handle defence matters. This administration, in the person of George W. Bush, will look at a group of people and ask who has the right connections. As a result you would find Central Command doing State Department diplomacy. On other occasions CENTCOM conducted purely military matters, leaving [Secretary of State] Colin Powell to work the diplomacy. It is an interesting time in American history, and I have always thought that I was blessed beyond most people to be part of it. If President Bush decided that I had the knowledge and connections, he had absolutely no compunction in saying, ‘Well, go there and figure out access, basing, staging and overflights.’ That’s a very interesting circumstance for a military officer.

Parkin: You obviously found that kind of flexibility useful in achieving your tasks?

Franks: Correct. It is the nature of CENTCOM. In many ways CENTCOM is a different kind of command from Pacific Command. The latter is much more rigorously organised. But in CENTCOM, when you’re involved in one war and one crisis after another, then the approaches that follow need to be very flexible. What that means is that one takes what coalition assets are offered and then attempts to figure out the battlefield mosaic that makes everybody a player. Every member contributes in accordance with what is in the best interests of both the receiving nation and the providing nation. I had, I must confess, a great deal of trouble with people in Washington on that very point.

I will never forget the first conversation that I had with people in Washington right after the attacks of 9/11. There was great consternation and I would receive calls from Washington saying, ‘Give us a list of how many tanks, ships and aircraft you want and we will go to countries around the world and get them.’ My response was to say that the first step was to get nations to sign up to the proposition that terrorism is a factor today and that we’re going to have to fight it. Once people sign up to such a proposition then they will be what I call willing. That’s where the term ‘coalition of the willing’ came from. It took me about ten days to sell the notion of a coalition
of the willing in Washington. I said that, when nations stated they were interested in being members of a coalition of the willing, the next step was for Washington to invite them to send a representative to Tampa, Florida. I predicted that we would eventually have somewhere between fifteen and one hundred nations involved. I told Washington that some nations will just walk in and tell us, ‘What we have is four mess kits and one old boat’. But CENTCOM will figure out a way to make them a contributing member of the coalition. This is where [Colonel] Michael Hayes became closely involved as the Chief of Staff of CENTCOM. Almost immediately we found the necessary real estate for coalition members and started hooking up house trailers in parking lots. It was as in the movie Field of Dreams, ‘if you build it [the village], they will come’.

Parkin: Did you ever feel that it was a lot of work when all you might get was a small contingent or just political or moral support?

Franks: It does not make any difference what size or kind of contribution a nation gives. The first rule of statecraft is that every nation on this planet will do what it perceives to be in its own best interests. The United States of America has commitments, so does Australia and so does Saudi Arabia. In the United States we get ourselves into trouble when we have an expectation that Australia ought to provide 3000 people.

If you dampen expectations and accept what a nation believes can be afforded, then I have found that there has been honest, open and transparent dialogue between coalition leaders. In every case in which we took this approach there was mutual respect in the process of building an effective coalition. Where there was not transparent dialogue, and for example when the US Government made its own demands, there were friction points. In the case of Australia, I thought it [the size of the ADF contingent] was perfect. I knew the size of your armed forces and I looked at Australia’s commitments in naval and air power, for special operations across a very small conventional force. I was never disappointed that Australia was doing militarily just exactly what it believed it could afford.

There is a consistency about the British and the Australians that one can count on. It would be easy, in a very simple world, to expect that to be the model. I do not think, however, that we can do that in the United States; we have to be intellectually
malleable. We have to appreciate the fact that there are two issues in every country. One is the relationship between the leaders and the outside world. The other is the relationship between the leaders and the people of that country. It would be a little too simple to condemn—quote—‘Old Europe’ and praise New Europe. It is easy for me to praise the Ukraine and condemn the French. But you need a longer sweep of history just to isolate this thing [the war in Iraq] before you try to ‘grade people’s papers’. In some cases, I think the United States is not good at making such assessments and there is no easy recipe available. I think the best assessments available are in CENTCOM because it is an organisation that is more understanding of the character of military contributions.

Parkin: Yes, historically coalition warfare has always been a great challenge.

Franks: As I have said in my book [American Soldier], it is a good thing that wars are not more convenient because we would have too damn many of them. If it were easy for Prime Minister Howard to wake up one morning and use the military without political effect or impact, then he might be tempted to do it too often. The same is true of President Bush. Politicians need to be uncomfortable with the use of military force. There is a certain discomfort involved in making the decision to go to war, not the least of which is when our children come home dead.

Parkin: Thank you for your time General, I know you’re very busy.

Franks: I have tried to give you an overall impression of a coalition. And within a coalition there always exist some alliances. One would never want to underestimate the power at every level of the alliance between the United States and Australia.
IDEAS AND ISSUES

THE ARMY IN THE AIR

DEVELOPING LAND–AIR OPERATIONS FOR A SEAMLESS FORCE*

LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER LEAHY

The land force’s development towards the Australian Defence Force (ADF) Seamless Force of 2020 embraces the Hardening and Networking the Army (HNA) initiative. The HNA scheme is designed to deliver land power through the use of combined arms teams of infantry, armour, artillery and engineers to a battlespace defined by networks and interdependence. Yet, as the ADF moves towards the Seamless Force, there are several HNA capabilities that will increasingly enable the Army to begin thinking about its role as a force that operates not simply on the ground but also as a force that operates from the air.

The capabilities that enhance the Army’s potential in the air include the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH), additional troop-lift helicopters (the arrival of which is… it is entirely feasible that in 2030 the Australian Army will be constituted as a force that operates largely from the air.

* This article is based on an address by the Chief of Army to an RAAF Conference at the Laverton Air Show in Victoria on 14 March 2005.
imminent) and tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (the acquisition of which is nearing finalisation). Collectively, the introduction of these capabilities opens a new era for the Australian Army—the era of ‘the Army in the air’—in which the land force’s combined arms potential will be transformed by a growing ability to fight in, and from, the air. Indeed, it is entirely feasible that in 2030 the Australian Army will be constituted as a force that operates largely from the air.

This article seeks to describe my vision as Chief of Army for how the land force will deploy combat power from air and space. It does so in two ways. First, the article outlines what the Army considers to be the essential requirements that govern the contemporary battlespace in order to highlight the imperative for increased land–air operations in the future. Having established these requirements, the article goes on to consider the type of partnership, cooperation and support that the land force will seek from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in the years ahead.

ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONTEMPORARY BATTLESPACE

Most authoritative assessments of Australia’s likely threat environment indicate that a traditional state-on-state conventional attack on Australia is a remote possibility. While the land force will maintain capabilities that are focused on the defence of territorial Australia, it is far more likely that soldiers will be deployed either in the Asia-Pacific region or further afield to uphold Australia’s interests.

What kind of battlespace are Australian soldiers likely to encounter when deployed offshore? The Army believes that the framework of the contemporary battlespace is bounded by the reality of exponentially increased lethality in modern weapons systems and the pervasiveness of communications technologies. Unfortunately the availability of these systems is not confined to conventional military forces, but has become globally diffused, thereby empowering non-state and trans-state forces. As a result, we are witnessing what one political scientist has aptly called ‘the globalisation of informal violence’. ¹

Increasingly, non-state and insurgent movements have access to an array of sophisticated weapons systems, including anti-armoured and anti-aircraft missiles. Moreover, the enemies that advanced militaries are likely to encounter in the future no longer seek to fight conventional forces on a tidy or linear battlefield. Rather, they are far more likely to operate in complex terrain—particularly cities—in failed or weak states.
Urban terrain is a leveller of military power in that it dissects the battlespace, creating separate segments that must each be taken and secured. In order to fight and win in this complex environment, conventional land forces must become harder to hit and yet be able to hit the enemy harder. Land forces must be capable of two basic skills: the first is bringing precision firepower to bear and the second is to practise the art of discrimination when applying military force.

As recent military operations in Iraq have demonstrated, the 21st-century adversary is comfortable when exploiting complex terrain in order to negate Western advantages in information technologies and precision munitions. Much of the warfare that the Australian Army is likely to encounter in the early 21st century is likely to consist of scrambling miniature battles of the type fought in Mogadishu in 1993. US Marine Corps Commandant, General Charles C. Kulak, was correct when he stated in the mid-1990s that the future of war was not the son of Desert Storm but rather the stepchild of Chechnya and Bosnia. For the Army, there are seven important requirements for success in future warfare. These requirements are outlined below.

REQUIREMENT ONE: ‘FIRE WHERE AND WHEN YOU NEED IT’

In future operations, Australian troops on the ground will require immediate and guaranteed indirect fire in order to bring tactical and operational effects to bear rapidly and decisively. What is meant by rapidly is deliverable fire in a matter of minutes, or even seconds. The need for rapid response is one of the principal lessons learnt from the current insurgency in Iraq. In operations in Iraq, insurgents momentarily dart out of crowds of noncombatants in order to attack Coalition forces with rocket-propelled grenades, improvised explosive devices or simply to engage in sniper fire.

REQUIREMENT TWO: ‘THERE IS A NEED TO HOLD GROUND’

The Army must be capable of holding ground. In the final analysis, there is no substitute for a soldier on the ground who is capable of influencing the behaviour of adversaries and noncombatants alike. It is professional soldiers who must execute multidimensional operations, ranging from the use of lethal force in warfighting through humanitarian relief to stabilisation operations. The strength of an effective and modern 21st-century Army lies in its ability to protect, support and influence the populations among which it is likely to operate.
REQUIREMENT THREE: ‘ACHIEVE SUPERIOR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS’

The need for situational awareness remains vital in contemporary military operations. Land forces must be able to locate small enemy groups and defeat them before they can launch attacks of their own choosing. If a joint force does not achieve superior situational awareness quickly, it will almost certainly face problems in applying rapid and accurate suppressive and supporting fires for troops on the ground. At all times, the application of military force must be aimed at facilitating tactical and operational effects that culminate in a strategic end-state.

REQUIREMENT FOUR: ‘HARNESS THE POWER OF NETWORKING’

In the future, devolving mission execution to small combat teams under the leadership of junior non-commissioned officers and even private soldiers will only be possible through mastery of network-enabled rather than network-centric operations. The distinction is an important one. Networking is not a centric element in operational activity but rather an enabling one. Enabling, or empowering, the soldier on the ground permits devolved operations to occur. In such operations small teams act in a semi-autonomous manner. The small combined-arms team must, however, possess the networked ability to be able to reach back to a military headquarters in order to request fire and combat support from joint forces.

Networking should aim to permit higher commanders to maintain an ‘eyes on’ function across the battlespace. Higher commanders need to direct and realign small teams in order to ensure that their activities continue to meet defined mission requirements. Essential to military success in operations across a battlespace is the provision of a shared, or common, operational picture. The availability of such a picture permits all elements of a joint team to provide information to those units that are best positioned to engage the enemy most effectively.

It is through an understanding of the workings of a common operational picture that the envisaged Seamless Force will be built. Once a comprehensive array of communications and weapons systems is successfully networked into a grid, ‘sensor and shooter’ connectivity becomes practical. It is important to note, however, that the term sensor does not always imply sophisticated technology attached to a UAV. The term has a direct human dimension since the ultimate sensor in warfare remains the soldier on the ground.
REQUIREMENT FIVE: ‘BALANCE COMMAND AND CONTROL’

As the land force moves towards the Seamless Force, soldiers will increasingly be required to deal with a series of complex command-and-control issues. The key to winning the type of fleeting engagements that characterise much of contemporary warfare is, and will continue to be, devolved command-and-control arrangements. Local commanders must be empowered to make snap decisions and to apply effects from weapons and tactical actions that conform to a particular mission’s aims. The problem of balancing high-level control with the need for low-level command presents a pressing cultural challenge for all professional armies. It is entirely possible that the lower-level commander of the future will be a junior non-commissioned officer or even an individual soldier rather than a commissioned officer.

In the future, if enhanced networking fulfils its great promise, then every soldier will ultimately become a human node in a vast ‘sensor to shooter’ network. Despite the science fiction imagery and jargon that often surrounds connectivity, the latter is not a futuristic scenario. After all, Australian Special Forces mastered exactly this mode of ‘sensor to shooter’ warfare in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002, and again in Iraq in 2003. What the ADF needs to do in the future is to develop networking skills widely throughout the entire combat force. Indeed, the ADF may find that mastering the technology is, in fact, the easier part involved in this complex transition. By 2020, it is likely that cuing an air strike will be the equivalent of making a mobile phone call today. The difficult component in a general transition towards a networked force will be human; it will be the challenge of preparing soldiers and junior commanders for operations in a transparent battlespace.

REQUIREMENT SIX: ‘UNDERSTAND BOTH PRECISION AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE USE OF FORCE’

Improved professional judgment, the exercise of discrimination in the use of force and knowledge of precision warfare will all be key areas of warfighting that will require close attention in military training in the future. Precision warfare must be
matched by discrimination in the use of lethal force. The decision to unleash a smart munition is ultimately a human, not a technological, decision—and such decisions must reflect the morality and ethics of warfare. As the recent battle for Fallujah in Iraq demonstrated, there is ultimately no substitute for human decision-making in the employment of military force. This is particularly the case in insurgency conflicts where combatants and civilians intermingle with media cameras and television crews. Only professional training and military experience can hope to prevent the possibility of an incident involving innocent civilians ending up on the screens of CNN or Al-Jazeera television.

**Requirement Seven: ‘Develop Trust in Joint Warfare’**

The devolution of warfare and the extraordinary technological capabilities available to small units highlight the question of responsibility or, to put it more colloquially, ‘who owns the bomb?’ Is it the land force element that calls in strikes or the air forces that deliver precision attack? The answer to this question is important because we are on the cusp of an era in which specific air-delivered munitions may be able to loiter in-theatre while awaiting a deliberate targeting directive.

The growing interdependence between fire and manoeuvre in modern military operations makes control of fires an important issue. Within the range of land force organic weapons—usually up to 40 km—ground commanders must have air control in order to integrate direct and indirect fires. Beyond that range, however, an air commander is likely to control air attacks. Nonetheless, both land and air commanders should view their activities in the context of joint warfare since both are likely to work for a common joint force commander. It is clear that, in a future marked by joint operations, there will be a growing need for trust and cooperation between land and air commanders when delivering fires.

**Developing Land–Air Operations: What the Army Needs from the RAAF**

A recent study by the RAND Corporation has suggested that the future of land–air operations is one of partnership in which either or neither partner may predominate, depending on the operational and tactical situation. The study states:

The most fruitful relationship between air power and land power is not for one to support the other, but rather for both to act in partnership. At any given time in a battle or campaign, air power or land power might predominate. The joint force commander
oversees this partnership and determines which partner should play the predominant role at any given time. Geographic lines drawn across the battle space should not be allowed to define these roles.²

In Australia’s strategic circumstances, there is much to recommend this cooperative approach. Such an approach does, however, involve soldiers and airmen developing an intimate knowledge of both land and air capabilities. From the perspective of a land commander, air power is most valuable when it reduces enemy forces by attrition before they can close with friendly forces. From the perspective of an air commander, land power is most effective when it fixes enemy forces that can be targeted from the air. Yet, interestingly, in both scenarios, the common denominator is ultimately that of cooperation. In the future, land–air cooperation must embrace cultural knowledge, support new RAAF capabilities, encourage close air operations, improved fire support, airlift and strategic UAVs. Both the land and air forces must also jointly seek to prevent one of the curses of the modern battlespace: fratricide. Finally, the Army and the RAAF must emphasise long-term land–air interdependence through an improved relationship between precision and discrimination in targeting.

ARMY AVIATION AND RAAF CULTURE

There are many aspects of RAAF culture that the Australian Army’s aviation element can benefit from studying. For example, the RAAF has always possessed a more individualistic, ‘dog-fight’ culture based on the small aerial combat unit, whether fighter or bomber. Given that the Army’s aviation is organic to the combined arms team, military pilots can only benefit from emulating the ‘mongrel’ ethos of fighter pilots. The Army’s aviation culture has traditionally been based on ‘reconnaissance and scouting’. However, in a multidimensional battlespace without front and rear, the ARH may become part of the close as well as the deep battle. Among its pilots, the Army must develop the type of quick reaction skills and aggressive instincts that have long been inculcated in fighter pilots.
LAND FORCES, COMMAND OF THE AIR AND NEW RAAF CAPABILITIES

Like any other advanced force, the Australian Army cannot fight alone in a modern joint battlespace. Land force elements cannot deploy, survive, fight, sustain themselves or redeploy without support from air and naval forces as part of a joint warfighting organisation. In order to be effective, ground troops must be enabled by command of the air, strategic lift and effective aerial fire support. The Army cannot operate in the modern battlespace unless control of the air has been established by either the RAAF or by coalition air forces.

Thus, despite the expansion of the land force’s tactical lift fleet and the introduction of the ARH, the Army will continue to rely on the RAAF for a wide range of support. This support includes counter-air missions, offensive air operations, close air-attack and airlift. Offensive and defensive counter-air operations are vital in joint operations. As a result, the Army fully supports the decisions to enhance the RAAF’s counter-air capability through acquisition of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and other force multipliers such as advanced radar systems and airborne early warning and control aircraft. The Army remains supportive of further development of the joint tactical air controller (JTAC) capability as we prepare for the introduction of the JSF.

INTEGRATING LAND FORCE MANOEUVRE AND AIR ATTACK

The integration of fire with manoeuvre in land–air operations was a feature of the campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In the future, as sensor technology and joint warfare both mature, the role of the soldier in directing air attacks onto targets is likely to increase in importance. In contemporary warfighting, both air attack and land manoeuvre should be seen as interdependent activities. The closer that air attack and ground force manoeuvre can be integrated, the easier it becomes to isolate segments of the battlespace and to sweep them of enemy forces.

As the Army devolves its traditional formations into smaller combined-arms units and teams, it is likely that dispersal will become a major feature of operational deploy-
The ‘emptying’ of the electronic battlespace makes the factor of air operations in support of friendly soldiers on the ground vital. In a dispersed battlespace, precision strike and bombing by air power may be vital in preventing a situation in which a small land-force unit is threatened by swarming enemy ground forces.

**FIRE SUPPORT, AILRIFT AND UAVS**

As the American film *Black Hawk Down* demonstrated so well, every soldier’s nightmare is being isolated in complex terrain without reliable aerial fire support and casualty evacuation. Joint forces must ensure that they successfully exploit improved features in networking and sensor–shooter connectivity in order to empower small teams in combat operations. Airlift too is crucial to ground troops. The airlift support provided to the Army by the work horses of the RAAF—C130 and Caribou aircraft—is fundamental to the execution of successful land operations. Despite tight budgets, an improved capability to move troops and equipment both strategically and tactically needs to be developed even further in the future.

**SPACE CADETS**

In the years ahead, the Army will also make increasing use of space through the tactical use of UAVs. As the land force introduces UAVs, it will enhance its situational awareness and targeting capability. Nonetheless, the Army will continue to rely on the ability of the RAAF to improve the land force’s higher-level situational awareness and command-and-control enhancements through the use of strategic UAVs and various space platforms. A useful area of joint exploration in the future is likely to be the use of aircraft and UAVs as retransmission platforms in order to improve joint communications. Improved communications that are enabled by aircraft could be an enormous joint-force multiplier in the years ahead and should not impose a great liability on RAAF aircraft.

**LAND–AIR OPERATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF FRATRICIDE**

Yet another area that Australia’s land and air forces must address urgently is the problem of ‘blue on blue’ or fratricide. In the history of warfare there has never been such a flow of operational information, much of it real-time data, as there is today. Yet, at the same time there have been unacceptable levels of fratricide in coalition operations in Iraq. Just as the Army and the joint force of the future must master precision in striking the enemy, so too must we provide operational security for our own troops by seeking to ‘deconflict’ the battlespace. To date, the ADF has been successful in avoiding fratricide, but we need to remain alert to its devastating potential. Since prevention is better than cure, a joint land–air approach is required in order to deal comprehensively with this problem.
Land–Air Interdependence: Precision Tempered by Discrimination

Just as the RAAF offers the Army some important capabilities, so too the reverse is true. In this sense, both land and air forces must learn to think in terms of interdependence of fire and manoeuvre—in an operational partnership. The land force offers the air force a useful degree of ground-based air defence, protection of close-range airfields through manoeuvre operations and, perhaps, most importantly, through deployed soldiers who may double as human sensors in the battlespace. Moreover, by providing discrimination in the use of force against complex targets, soldiers can complement and, if necessary, temper the excellent precision delivered by air personnel.

In a cluttered battlespace, any incident that involves civilian casualties has a pernicious double effect. First, such incidents tend to fuel bitter feelings against ground troops among civilian populations in any area of operations. Second, the deaths of innocents carried graphically into the living rooms of Australia also works to undermine national will, and to reduce electoral support and legitimacy for military operations. The only solution to battlespace management in an era of networks is a joint one. The ADF must achieve ‘eyes on’ when locating potential targets. Ultimately, the soldier on the ground is not only the military representative of the nation, but, by helping to arbitrate the use of destructive power, effectively a manifestation of its conscience. The responsibility for military decision-making is unalterably human and cannot be delegated to artificial intelligence or to a technology network.

Conclusion

The arrival of the ARH, additional troop-lift helicopters and tactical UAVs are likely to increase dramatically the Army’s ability to fight in, and from, the air over the next two decades. The notion of ‘the Army in the air’ is a long-term transformation that the land force must begin to conceptualise and to prepare for. If the ADF is to develop effective land–air operations concepts and doctrine for joint warfare, then the Army and the RAAF must build an operational partnership that is based on a mutual recognition of the interdependence between fire and manoeuvre. The land
The Army in the Air

force cannot hope to meet all of its needs for fires, information, networking and strategic lift from within its own capabilities. In all of these areas land power will need significant assistance from air and sea power. Over the next decade and a half, as the ADF moves towards the creation of a Seamless Force, the Army and the RAAF have much to learn from each other. Despite our different cultures and operating environments, our histories are as one, our futures are joint, our destinies are interwoven, and we can be sure that any operations that occur will belong to all of us.

ENDNOTES


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More than democratic institutions, a civil society or economic reconstruction, Coalition leaders consider that the ability of the interim Iraqi Government to enforce its own security is essential to the resuscitation of the Iraqi state, and—at least at this point—a precondition to Coalition troop withdrawals from Iraq. Recruiting, training, and fielding indigenous Iraqi security formations have therefore become the highest priorities. The desertion, or collusion with insurgents, of large numbers of Iraqi soldiers and police during the late spring disturbances around Autumnuja, Ramadi and Najaf reinforced the pressing need to create credible, cohesive Iraqi security forces in the run-up to sovereignty in late June. As anti-Coalition and anti-Iraqi government violence continues, this urgency remains constant, even as Coalition forces’ relationships with indigenous government and security officials changes.
American, British and other selected Coalition partners currently in Iraq undertake most training and equipping of Iraqi forces, though private security contractors and Coalition-friendly governments have assisted with some of this training. Since late spring 2004 the various Iraqi security formations have been nominally reorganised as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). However, the unification on a national level of recruitment, training and equipping standards for the ISF has lagged behind, as has the standardisation of order of battle. Among different Coalition areas of responsibility and even within one Coalition member’s operational areas, the ISF’s standards of training and equipment can vary greatly. A vision for the roles of each branch of the ISF, their future and the relationship between branches of the security services also remains undefined. The extension of the now-sovereign Iraqi Government’s authority into increasing realms of national life is likely to either aggravate or accelerate this process of definition for the ISF.

THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: STRUCTURES

In Iraq, security services that in the West would possess different, clearly delineated competencies often overlap in the course of providing public safety. For the near to medium term, several elements of Iraq’s law-enforcement agencies will engage in combat-like operations and thus it is necessary for any assessment of the ISF to include all agencies involved in security, not just ‘military’ forces. However, this significant caveat already hints at some of the emerging problems in the overall operational and logistical conception for the provision of security in Iraq.

It is just as important to bear in mind a basic difficulty in comprehending the size, efficacy and equipment of these services. Since the Autumn of 2003, widely differing statements about numbers of Iraqi recruits, trainees and personnel actively serving have emerged from a variety of official and unofficial sources. These sources include the civilian Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the Combined Joint Task Force–7 (CJTF–7) and now Multi-National Force—Iraq (MNF–I), the US Departments of Defense and State, the Interim Iraqi Government, as well as various Western think-tanks. Such statements routinely confuse different categories, such as Iraqis arriving at recruitment stations who may never actually enlist; those receiving wages in spite of rarely showing up to train or patrol; Iraqis in training but not service-ready; Iraqis serving without undergoing training of any sort; Iraqis in service with minimal ‘transitional’ training; and finally, fully trained, regularly serving members of the ISF.¹

Further, some reports asserting satisfactory levels of training and manning use older target goals, even though these goals continually shifted through the Winter and Spring of 2004. Likewise, when reporting equipment provision, not all statements distinguish between equipment pledged and equipment delivered, with
reference rarely being made to quality of equipment, arms, and ammunition. Just as with training, discussions of equipment often rely on outdated requirements. To complicate the picture further, the names of Iraqi or Coalition organisations have also continued to change. As a result, reports from such different sources with varying motivations have recently been criticised as ‘a far less honest reporting system that grossly exaggerates the actual level of training’, such that ‘status reports do even more to disguise the level of true progress’ to a ‘simply unacceptable’ degree. References to quantitative data thus produce a haze of numbers, despite some recent heroic efforts to add clarity to the picture.4

Numerically, the largest service is the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), under the administrative control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. The Interior Ministry is intended to gradually take over operational control of the Police from Coalition units. With 85 000–95 000 personnel nationally, it has the highest degree of continuity from the period before March 2003. In any given locality, a number of commanders and patrolmen have either continued in place or returned to the job, either with or without Coalition-provided retraining. In blue uniforms, Iraqi police carry a combination of 9 mm pistols (increasingly foreign-supplied Glocks) and 7.62 mm Kalashnikov Avtomat (AK) variants, and transportation for the most part consists of light, non-armoured vehicles. Tactical radios are of limited capability, and some officers possess body armour. Additionally, attached to the Iraqi Police is a multi-company–sized formation to be deployed on the pattern of American police special weapons and tactics teams (SWAT) while there is also a Counter-Insurgency Force that is separate from the Police. Consisting of 3000 men, the Counter-Insurgency Force has three battalions designated as public-order forces concerned with securing demonstrations, riots and other incidents. The remaining two battalions of the Counter-Insurgency Force are dedicated counterinsurgency formations, to be focused on specific trouble spots as they emerge.

The Interior Ministry currently controls two more services. The Iraqi Border Police concentrates in particular on managing transportation corridors in proximity to border outposts. These outposts include Rafha and Ar Ar with Saudi Arabia; al-Turaybil with Jordan; al-Walid, al-Qa‘im and al-Rabi‘a with Syria; and al-Munthriya with Iran. As of late June, the Border Police included between 12 000 and 18 000 personnel, partially armed with AK variants, body armour and 9 mm pistols. Cars, light trucks (ranging from pick-ups to troop carriers) and...
sports-utility vehicles provide the main means of service-organic transportation for the Border Police. A minority of vehicles are fitted with mounted radios. In addition, a Customs Police and civilian Customs Service actually operate at the border posts. Finally, a Facilities Protection Service was created in the Autumn of 2003, and is intended to protect strategic infrastructure from insurgent attacks, as well as individual ministry assets. On a monthly basis, the Ministry of Finance delivers funds to individual ministries, which then hire out elements of the Facilities Protection Service. Often recruited on a local–tribal basis, the FPS has grown in size from 14,500 members in December 2003 to more than 70,000 in April–June 2004.

The Ministry of Defence controls fewer personnel, though the organisations are more substantive. The Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF), previously dubbed the New Iraqi Army, is intended to be a small force (between 25,000 and 35,000 men) organised as twenty-seven battalions in three divisions. Plans call for designating between three brigades and a division’s worth of these troops (nine battalions equals 6,600 troops) as an Iraqi National Task Force (now referred to as Iraqi Intervention Force), to combat terrorists and foreign anti-Coalition forces within Iraq. A separate force of two battalions will combine the Iraqi Counterterrorist Force and Commandos (about 1,600 troops) into an Iraqi Special Operations Force. Members of the latter served competently under Coalition special operators in the Spring of 2004, and possess weapons and equipment qualitatively similar to those of US infantrymen. In the current operational concept, the role of the army is specifically directed away from domestic security enforcement and towards defending Iraqi territorial integrity—although in the past few months recently formed army units have been deployed domestically, with mixed results. The IAF has an outward focus, with brigades tethered to fixed bases due to limitations in fuel, provisions and ammunition. These logistical restrictions mean that the brigades have about a 70 km combat radius. By June 2004, the IAF’s hub-bases were located at al-Numaniya and Talil in the south, Taji and Kirkuk in the centre and north-east, and Mosul in the north-west.

Rather than the old Iraqi Army’s mechanised infantry model, the primary tactical formations of the IAF are motorised rifle battalions operating most frequently as companies. Thus, rather than tracked heavy tactical vehicles mounting missile launchers, automatic cannon or heavy machine-guns, the IAF will be truck-mounted with light armour and light machine-guns. A 120-man company, for example, will field six crew-served Pulemyot Kalashnikov (PKM) 7.62 mm machine-guns and eighteen (RPK-2) light machine-guns. The company is mounted
in trucks with intentionally limited fuel rations. The remaining personnel are armed with AK variants and/or 9 mm pistols. Uniforms are a combination of dark-green old Iraqi Army pattern fatigues, as well as tan, dark brown uniforms, with some ‘chocolate chip’ desert camouflage fatigues. Due to the level of their armament, the IAF’s formations are for sector defence. Without the traditional rocket-propelled grenades, recoilless rifles or tactical vehicles of the Saddam-era Soviet-equipped forces, IAF would be decimated by any of their regional neighbours. Likewise, Iraqi air and naval assets are limited both quantitatively and qualitatively. For example, the air force will have only several hundred personnel and provide only transport assets (C-130, UH-1H) with capacity for several companies at any one time. The Coastal Defence Force is envisioned solely as a brown-water navy, and currently operates out of a training base in Umm Qasr. Rather than operating as separate services, an Iraqi joint headquarters will unify the command of a small army and minuscule air force and navy to a much higher degree than in other Middle Eastern armies, with the exception of Israel. Ultimately, given the threats posed by Syria and Iran, as well as tensions between Turkey and the Kurds, the small Iraqi army will require a Coalition presence for an extended period. However, political expediency and Coalition manpower difficulties might force a hasty expansion of the IAF both quantitatively and in terms of the weapons systems it could field.

Currently, there is a predisposition not to use the IAF in operations to enforce domestic stability. If limitations on the IAF’s table of organisation and equipment continue, these two factors will ensure that the Iraqi National Guard (ING) becomes the most significant force contributing to the internal security of Iraq. Until it was renamed by the Interim Iraqi Government under Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, the ING had been known as the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC). The ING has been a problematic service, with an always uncertain future. Emerging in late Autumn 2003 as an adjunct to Coalition units, its purpose evolved over Winter 2003–04 to fill in the gap between the Police and the Army (the latter was in fact only notional during this period). In the first half of 2004, the ICDC was considered a constabulary force comprising light infantry with some tactical vehicle mobility. ICDC units were able to deploy operationally with American units that would train, advise and assist them. The hope was that joint deployments would improve Coalition force protection and more duties could be undertaken with, or turned over to, locally recruited forces. Coalition planners also envisioned that ICDC–Coalition
deployments would increase linguistic capabilities and reap intelligence dividends. Likewise, it was important to Coalition leaders to portray the ICDC as a leading and successful element in the indigenisation of Iraqi government and security, thus demonstrating the sincerity of the Coalition in returning sovereignty to Iraq.7

The growth of the ICDC reflected this policy. By December 2003 there were 15 000 members of the ICDC, with battalions of over 800 personnel, each designated to serve in all of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. By April 2004 the ICDC had ballooned to about 32 000 personnel, and currently stands at over 41 000 members, almost twice that of the Army. Their uniforms consist of the ‘chocolate chip’ camouflage pattern, supplied from American surpluses or produced by foreign and local contractors. Weapons include AK variants from Iraqi depots as well as central European manufacturers, a limited number of light machine-guns (RPK), and pistols for officers. Vehicles include cars, pick-up trucks and some heavier troop transport trucks.

The ICDC was originally under the control of the Ministry of the Interior until Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 73 handed it over to the Ministry of Defence. The Coalition Provisional Authority Order refers to the ICDC as ‘a component of the Iraqi Armed Forces’, but its units remain under the operational control of local Coalition assets.8 The ING’s future administrative and operational command is uncertain. Some Coalition authorities, but especially the ING’s own command, advocate its continued existence as a service separate from the Iraqi Army. Others have proposed that, over time, the ING be trained more as a military force, in preparation for its eventual absorption into the Army. Another proposal suggests that the ING be divided between the other Iraqi security forces, with up to 25 000 of its personnel going towards doubling the size of the Army, 10 000 going to the police, and the remainder joining the Iraqi National Task Force. Each scenario possesses ramifications for the cohesion, strength and potential political power of the forces concerned. Until the interim Iraqi Government makes a clear decision, Coalition commanders and trainers as well as Iraqis will find it difficult to think strategically.

… it was important to Coalition leaders to portray the ICDC as a leading and successful element in the indigenisation of Iraqi government and security …

… initial training of the army went poorly, with Coalition personnel accusing the contractors of misunderstanding the Iraqi environment …
By mid-June 2004, only four of the Army’s projected twenty-seven battalions had undergone training. The Kirkush base northeast of Baghdad is the primary location for recruit training. Initially, basic training was provided to Iraqis by US contractors from the Vinell Corporation, and was supervised by Coalition military personnel under the overall command of US Army Major General Paul Eaton. Eaton, previously commander of the United States Army School of Infantry, was until June 2004 the Coalition’s senior military assistance officer, in charge of the Office of Security Cooperation. However, initial training of the army went poorly, with Coalition personnel accusing the contractors of misunderstanding the Iraqi environment, instilling poor discipline in the training process and not cultivating sufficient commitment to the job. The first battalion to form during training suffered nearly 50 per cent attrition even before it left its training base. These losses were partially due to the training deficiencies but also in some measure due to the CPA offering the recruits wages that were woefully insufficient, even by Iraqi standards. Speaking in December 2003, Eaton remarked that ‘soldiers need to train soldiers. You can’t ask a civilian to do a soldier’s job’. By mid-2004, he reiterated his criticisms, asserting that contractor-led training ‘hasn’t gone well. We’ve had almost one year of no progress’. By the end of 2003, US Army units assumed closer control of basic training, with additional assistance from Jordanian and Australian forces.

For the near future, barring any extreme contingencies, the ICDC–ING will remain the main effort of Coalition trainers, followed by the Iraqi Police. A Coalition training initiative emerged in the Summer of 2003. However, the political timetable driven by Western capitals and Iraqis themselves soon outpaced the security training timeline, just as various training infrastructures have differed from area to area and are only now taking the initial steps towards unification on a national level. By some estimates, only 30 per cent of Police, ICDC and Border Police officers had undergone training by Coalition forces when sovereignty was handed over to the Iraqis on 28 June. One difficulty for the Coalition is that the Iraqis have widely differing skills, experience, maturity, motivation and basic education.
One may assume that the overwhelming majority of those Iraqis joining the Police and National Guard have been attracted by the possibility of steady pay, and not sympathy to the Coalition or even Iraqi national pride. This factor influences levels of motivation to undergo the difficult training, show up regularly for fixed hours of work and undertake often dangerous missions. Likewise, many recruits served either in the old army or police forces, with the majority of ICDC officers having previous service. The major problem arising from personnel with previous service is not one of latent pro-Ba’thi sympathies, but rather the level of skill. In the Autumn of 2003 there was a sense of urgency in the re-establishment of Iraq’s security forces. The initial training programs of between ten days and three weeks were developed in the hope that Iraqis with previous service would need very little retraining in basic police or infantry skills. Not only did these training programs prove insufficient to eliminate old ways and assumptions, but they could not fully account for those raw recruits with no significant prior service or training.

In fact, at the platoon level in the ICDC, some soldiers had no prior experience and were extremely young, between the ages of thirteen and fifteen, having been encouraged to join by families desiring the funds. These inexperienced, ‘immature’ recruits make the most enthusiastic, open-minded soldiers who are ready to learn. They often prove quite devoted to Coalition trainers. This enthusiasm, however, only partially makes up for illiteracy. New soldiers and police cadets as well as veterans often cannot fully comprehend written points of instruction. Training time is taken up with literacy classes and tests. Local instructors often help their students to cheat in these tests and American trainers frequently turn a blind eye to the test results as they struggle to increase the number of serving soldiers and police. Likewise, trainers often bend rules regarding age requirements, so much so that recruits as young as twelve or thirteen years of age have entered service, sometimes becoming the most energetic, loyal soldiers.

With the exception of unconventional units such as US Special Forces and UK Special Air Service, whose direct-action mission load remains quite heavy, Coalition forces do not possess units or programs specifically designed to train foreign forces.
In the Autumn and Winter of 2003–04, the responsibility for providing basic training to the Iraqi National Guard resided with the individual Coalition units deployed to areas where ING elements operated. In March–June 2004, standardisation of basic training for larger ING brigade and regiment formations began. Since then, it appears that division-level training standardisation has also proceeded.\(^\text{16}\) In every case, the trainers have been Coalition troops whose military specialties have not included training. The trainers have included infantrymen, military police, and armoured and artillery corps personnel. By contrast, personnel whose regular functions are training-related, such as drill sergeants and combined arms exercise trainers, are accustomed to very different operating environments and standards from those experienced in Iraq.

Compared with the problems faced in training the Iraqi military forces, the nascent law enforcement agencies have fared better. The Coalition forces have relied on reservists with strong backgrounds in their countries’ police, fire and investigative departments to carry the training load. In fact, it is often these reservists—and especially the senior noncommissioned officers (NCO)—who are best equipped as trainers. Instinctively and through experience, senior noncommissioned personnel understand how to adapt instructional methods and programs to the local environment. In the words of one such reservist, ‘we know how to take a class designed for a cadet from Des Moines, and make it work out here.’\(^\text{17}\) Certain Army and Marine civil affairs units also possess similar skills because of the civilian backgrounds of their largely reserve personnel. The US Marine Corps also deploys Combined Action Platoons after their personnel have received training in foreign culture, language, and weapons systems.\(^\text{18}\) Still, in the majority of cases, trainers arrive on scene without the requisite instructional, cultural or linguistic preparation, and often with insufficient logistical or materiel support. These problems are exacerbated by the fact that many trainers experience very abbreviated predeployment notices and also because training formations, by their very nature, do not possess organic intelligence or information operations (IO) capabilities, which are necessary both to monitor and motivate Iraqi recruits.

Since the Spring of 2004, especially after the events of April and May around Najaf and Autumnuja, Coalition forces have begun providing follow-on training to Iraqi Police and ING units. These forces have carried out such training at facilities loosely collocated within the areas of responsibilities of the Coalition units. Though the format of the training varies, such continuation training often includes an enhanced platoon course for enlisted men and their commanders, who on graduation go on to operate as
platoons. Additionally, an NCO course focuses on strengthening both the NCO corps and the concept of an NCO in a military that has traditionally not conceived of NCOs in the same sense as NATO armed forces. An officers’ course is attended by company- and battalion-level officers sent by their ICDC commanders. Following graduation from both the NCO and officer courses, graduates return to their parent commands and are distributed among units, in the hope that they will communicate their new skills to other Iraqi soldiers. By May 2004, US, British and Australian trainers had instituted squad leader and NCO courses for the Iraqi Army as well. The content of these courses focused on counterinsurgency and urban warfare.

By the end of May the British- and Australian-run courses at Kirkush had produced 1000 graduates, with plans to run similar courses at the Army’s bases in Taji, al-Numaniya, Kirkuk and Talil. Coalition trainers plan on indigenising the training over time, with graduates of the first NCO courses teaching subsequent raw recruits. By late June 2004, about 1500 Iraqi officers had also graduated from the King Abdullah Military Academy in Zarqa, Jordan, with US officials deeming them fit to take over training new recruits and officers in the future. In the law enforcement realm, police returning to the job with prior service often undergo a three-week Transitional Integration Program. The instructors on this course are often reservists with law enforcement backgrounds, in addition to international police advisers who also evaluate police operations. Over time, the vision is to indigenise the training staff for police courses as well. Fresh recruits, as well as returning veterans, also attend an eight-week Police Academy, either in Baghdad or Jordan.

**STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS?**

These training courses for Iraqi security service personnel and ongoing Coalition mentoring programs are part of an overall security assistance framework that continues to evolve. Before May 2004, foreign forces operating in Iraq functioned under the umbrella of CJTF–7. During this period, the individual land components themselves mostly directed training of indigenous Iraqi security personnel, particularly for the ICDC. As mentioned above, US Army Major General Paul Eaton oversaw CJTF–7’s Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), which was divided into a Coalition Military Assistance Training Team and a Police Assistance Training Team. The military team commander was British Brigadier Nigel Alywin-Foster, and his team focused on the Army and the ICDC. British Brigadier Andrew Mackay led the police training team and concentrated on the Police Service, Border Patrol and
Facilities Protection. The training efforts of the OSC appear to have been rather ad hoc, with some trainers called away to other tasks, and others with disparate backgrounds volunteering for duty with the training teams. In late May, General Eaton commented: ‘this is a pick-up team … with all branches, skills, and nine nations in between.’\textsuperscript{21} From the perspective of commanders in the field and trainers, the OSC provided insufficient direction, feedback and equipment. In fact, many soldiers and Marines involved in setting courses of training and provisioning at the local level were uncertain of OSC’s exact role or utility.\textsuperscript{22}

Since May 2004, CJTF–7 has been replaced by the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF–I). MNF–I is currently commanded by a four-star general (General George W. Casey), unlike CJTF–7, which was commanded by a three-star officer (Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez). In this new command arrangement, the Multinational Corps—Iraq (MNC–I), commanded by Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, is subordinate to MNF–I. Training structures come under MNC–I and are managed through an ISF coordinating office at the Corps level. These structures and arrangements have been grafted into the evolving relationship between MNC–I and the Iraqi Ministries of Defence and Interior. The OSC has since expanded. Now commanded by Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, it is an ‘up-ranked’ version of American Military Cooperation offices in Egypt and the Gulf. OSC’s military and police assistance offices must now develop training policy jointly with MNF–I, and serve as the point of direct senior-level liaison with the Iraqi Ministries of Defence and Interior, both of which are to be run by senior Iraqi flag officers. OSC now apportions tasks to the ISF assistance office at MNC–I, which is empowered to provide feedback and suggestions to OSC. As OSC and MNC–I are both run by three-star officers, this arrangement has the potential to generate a certain amount of friction and the OSC will have to work hard in order to avoid becoming an added level of operationally obstructive bureaucracy.

By all accounts, General Petraeus was wisely chosen to lead Coalition training of Iraqi forces. The former commander of the American 101st Airborne Division, he was successful in working with indigenous forces in north-central Iraq in Summer–Winter 2003. It should be noted, however, that the mostly Kurdish composition of those indigenous forces facilitated their cooperation with the Coalition. While General Petraeus and his staff have been conscientious in determining the shortcomings of previous training efforts and in learning the training needs specific to various regions of Iraq, by mid-July 2004, he and his office had still to make a noticeable impact on local-level Coalition operations.\textsuperscript{23}
The ISF office at the Corps level provides orders and direction to the actual field components of the MNC–I. These components are now organised as six Multinational Divisions (MND) distributed throughout Iraq on a geographic basis. Each MND has its own ISF training cell, further subdivided according to Coalition personnel working with individual Iraqi services. For example, in the US 1st Infantry Division area, on any given training initiative, the MNF–I and OSC staffs will formulate policy. When this step is completed, the OSC’s police and military training teams communicate the policy to, and coordinate it with, the Iraqi Ministries of Defence and Interior. The OSC then orders the ISF training office at the Corps level to enact the policy. The ISF office relays orders to MND–North-east, which is the 1st Infantry Division. Divisional command will then filter instructions to its organic ISF coordination cell. These command arrangements require coordination and agreement among Coalition and Iraqi four-star officers, two Coalition three-star officers, and communication through to the Coalition two-star level (division), and execution through senior field-grade officers commanding company-grade officers and enlisted personnel.

Though not abnormal for joint, multinational or security assistance relationships, this arrangement is nonetheless potentially quite cumbersome and time consuming, especially as there is an abundance of over-interested participants. The arrangement invites tangles of input, direction and feedback. It also entails practical and operational difficulties involving, for example, timelines for providing equipment. Furthermore, greater complications might ensue in areas where forces are truly multinational and have multiple commanders, such as in the central-south of Iraq. Other problems might arise in situations where US forces have intermediary commands between MNC-I and the divisional level, such as the west where the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, a three-star command, is in overall control of the 1st Marine Division.

CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS

One persistent conceptual difficulty is that, by and large, US forces have yet to substantively implement the train–advise–assist model for creating indigenous military and constabulary forces. Coalition units tasked to train Iraqis are often either structurally or by regulation unable to patrol with them. These impediments mean that the personal relationships and training-operating continuum, which
The Evolving Iraqi Security Forces

historically have been essential to effective indigenous force creation, are inadequate. In most regular militaries, particularly the American, depersonalisation and discontinuity are built into the training and operating dynamic in order to encourage a unit-as-machine conception and greater interoperability. However, in training foreign and ethnically different forces, depersonalisation and discontinuity create problems with establishing trust, rapport and problem-solving abilities. ING officers themselves have repeatedly complained about Coalition trainers’ and units’ aloofness from Iraqi soldiers and their disinterest in interacting meaningfully with them.24 The exceptions to these problems are among those Special Forces units recruiting, mentoring and operating with Iraqis, as well as those Marine Combined Action Platoons whose areas of operation permit them to live, train and patrol with ING and Iraqi Police.

A parallel problem creating the same effect is the short time span of training programs, most of which last no more than three weeks. In part, the brevity of the training programs has been politically dictated, to provide the appearance of ‘Iraqification’. The hope is that this policy will translate into greater acceptance of the Coalition as well as a greater indigenous desire to support or join the ICDC or police. Likewise, the essential need for more Iraqis to be out on the streets performing fundamental public-security tasks has driven the requirement for shorter training courses that produce graduates quickly.

On the other hand, some trainers have themselves lamented the ineffectiveness of short training periods, but still favour them as a measure to inhibit Iraqis’ developing skills that could be turned against the Coalition if they were to join the insurgents.25 Of equal concern is the bias that the Coalition currently displays towards training initial cadres of Iraqi soldiers and National Guardsmen who then go on to instruct and train other Iraqis in situations where the oversight of the Coalition is gradually scaled back. This approach to training is known in the military as ‘train the trainer’. While some Iraqis are pleased to be seen as autonomous from foreign forces and appreciate the ability to command fellow Iraqis, ‘training the trainer’ raises the likelihood that the mentoring and monitoring bond between Coalition forces and Iraqi counterparts will be broken too soon. The consequences of breaking these links too quickly may be a precipitous decline in standards, accountability, and operational dependability within the ISF. In contrast to Coalition authorities’ overly enthusiastic public statements about the ‘Iraqification’ of security and accelerated indigenisation
of training, senior US officers intimately familiar with the ISF have cautioned that several years and a sustained Coalition human and material commitment will be necessary to train credible Iraqi forces.26

This article will be continued in the next issue of the *Australian Army Journal*.

ENDNOTES


15 Interviews with Police and ICDC instructors, al-Anbar province, Iraq, June–July 2004; observation of training sites.


17 Interview with Marine training Iraqi Police, 10 June 2004.


Correspondence with division-level ISF trainers, July 2004.


Interviews with several anonymous Coalition officials, June 2004.


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For Australia, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was the first effects-based or ‘whole of government’ response to restoring law and order in a failed state in the South Pacific. RAMSI collected and destroyed some 2627 weapons and 6561 munitions while the mission’s military support component enabled the police to undertake thirteen successful arrest operations. The rebuilding of the Royal Solomon Islands Police force has commenced, and there has been a reduction of the military component of RAMSI, with only a small element remaining in order to provide a coordinating headquarters and an in-theatre response force.

The success of the mission since July 2003 has led many observers to comment that RAMSI should provide the template for future ‘permissive interventions’ in the South Pacific. Nevertheless, there remain a number of issues in relation to the conduct of operations that need to be carefully considered in planning for future inter-agency operations. The author commanded the third rotation of Combined Joint Task Force 635 (CJTF 635) that deployed to the Solomon Islands from March to August 2004. This article seeks, from a military commander’s perspective, to highlight some of the critical lessons that need to be learnt from the Solomon Islands operation in order to permit the Army to adapt and be ready for the next RAMSI-style mission.
THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS, MARCH–AUGUST 2004

The underlying theme that ran through the planning and conduct of operations in the Solomon Islands was the reality that CJTF 635 was to provide support for the civil and police forces restoring law and order. The Task Force’s official mission was ‘to provide military, security and logistic support to the Participating Police Forces (PPF) within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)–led mission to restore order as part of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands’.

The aim of RAMSI was to ensure that PPF elements dominated, with the mission’s military personnel remaining in the background. At no time did the military forces involved in RAMSI act independently in order to arrest suspected criminals or to restore law and order. The bulk of the Task Force’s military activities in the Solomon Islands consisted of protection and security duties, the provision of logistic support and transport to various civilian agencies, and the maintenance of an in-theatre quick-reaction force (QRF) composed of a rifle platoon. An examination of the way in which these diverse tasks were performed by CJTF 635 reveals the need to absorb a number of lessons that will help to ensure the Australian Army’s readiness for any subsequent inter-agency operation within the Asia-Pacific region.

PLANNING ISSUES IN INTER-AGENCY OPERATIONS

A number of the military activities conducted in support of the PPF in the Solomon Islands mission demonstrated that significant differences existed in the planning methodologies and descriptive language that each agency employed. For instance, while the Australian Defence Force (ADF) possesses a proactive planning culture, the PPF were largely reactive in character and had little appreciation of the response timings that might be required to conduct actions on foreign soil. Simply, the PPF did not fully grasp the concept of an operation with multiple tasks as part of a wider campaign plan. As a result, the police approach led to many short-notice requests for military support, an inability to prioritise tasks (and assets) to achieve a particular outcome and a tendency to take inadequate force protection measures. The police approach was characterised by compartmentalised activity—an approach that was further exacerbated by the existence of different threat assessment methodologies.

… while the Australian Defence Force (ADF) possesses a proactive planning culture, the PPF were largely reactive in character …
The PPF’s lack of an overall campaign plan made it difficult to ensure that military activities supported the civil authority in an efficient manner—for instance, during the process of making arrests of suspected criminals. During the planning of military support in which a platoon of troops was involved in assisting the PPF to apprehend a particularly high-profile criminal, there was a distinct lack of shared information between the police and the military. Lack of information resulted in insufficient time for briefing, rehearsals, and the preparation of police and soldiers for a potentially dangerous inter-agency operation.

This situation could be improved by arranging a system of military secondments to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in order to provide that organisation with a basic understanding of ADF planning methodologies and military culture. Given the current threat environment from terrorism, both the ADF and the AFP need to develop intelligence and operational procedures that ensure the evolution of what might be described as a common operating picture. The production of an inter-agency handbook based on the RAMSI experience (and modelled to an extent on the *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook*) would provide a useful document for joint doctrine development. Doctrine should be designed to facilitate common procedures in inter-agency planning, command and control, intelligence assessment, and the conduct of operations. Doctrine should also assist in the assessment of the requirements for logistical support.

THE NEED FOR INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUPS

The RAMSI approach was designed along single-agency lines, with civil, police and military planning staffs not situated together or even capable of using a common Local Area Network. The resulting ‘stovepiping’ of information and activity created significant interoperability issues that were only alleviated by the efforts of key military personnel in building effective inter-agency working relations. This personal approach was supported by the collocation of military staff in PPF (but not DFAT) functional areas. RAMSI created several working groups in order to ensure unity of effort. These groups included a Joint Operational Planning Group (to ensure that all operations were properly integrated); a Transitional Oversight Steering Group (to handle arrangements for resources to be transferred to contracted services); and the Technical User Group (to manage information efficiently within RAMSI). These groups succeeded in forming the basis for a collaborative effort between the various...
agencies involved in RAMSI and should be the model for future inter-agency missions. A working group approach could be improved by better cooperation between ADF, AFP and DFAT officers in terms of such initiatives as inter-agency scenario-based planning and attendance at various training courses in order to develop improved understanding and mutual confidence.

**CREATING AN INTER-AGENCY OPERATIONAL CULTURE**

A critical factor in the success of RAMSI was the fact that PPF and CJTF personnel were able to work together at the tactical level in order to maximise their respective capabilities. There were, however, cultural distinctions between the PPF and CJTF that created a number of psychological barriers. A major difference between police and military culture resides in the former’s eight-hour shift mentality and the latter’s ‘24/7’ (twenty-four hours, seven days a week) focus. This cultural difference was broken down over time as police–military cooperation deepened, personal relations developed and an inter-agency awareness was gradually created. The conduct of a number of in-theatre training sessions, designed to build civil–military familiarity and to ensure that the PPF employed military personnel and resources effectively, also improved the situation.

In most cases the security provided by CJTF 635 consisted of a military presence (no less than a section) at designated PPF outposts and various patrols that were designed to deny freedom of movement to any potential adversary. The various patrols sought to communicate with outlying communities and to gather information in order to improve RAMSI’s situational awareness. The aim was to disrupt criminal activity by restricting access to provisions and secure hideouts while countering any intimidation tactics that might be used by dissidents to try to win control over the local population.

The use of military patrols in the Solomon Islands would have been greatly assisted by the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The latter would have aided the Task Force in building its situational awareness in village geography (including entry and exit points) while providing visual deterrence. The employment of UAVs would have been effective in a country where the majority of the
population live in outlying rural villages and have a high opinion of the power of technology. UAVs should be considered as essential assets in future RAMSI-style missions.

Military commanders supporting the PPF received guidance to the effect that each police patrol should contain two radio-equipped soldiers as a minimum requirement. These soldiers were essential for the provision of protection and communications. If a police patrol was considered likely to encounter a person of interest (POI) who might be armed, then the Task Force regarded a four-man fire-team including a medic as the minimum-security requirement. This operational guidance was designed to reduce the risk of the military being unilaterally involved in the arrest of any POI without a police presence. This approach, coupled with various presence patrols, ensured that the military appeared ubiquitous whilst actual force numbers were being slowly reduced in preparation for repositioning. Ultimately, the PPF and/or members of the RSIP conducted most arrests and the success attributed to those organisations reassured the local population that normalcy had returned to the Solomon Islands.

SHAPING AN INTER-AGENCY INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The information environment in the Solomon Islands was controlled through the Office of the Special Coordinator of RAMSI. DFAT personnel had to approve all media contact from RAMSI, but there was no requirement for information operations to be conducted in order to support a campaign plan. From a military planning perspective, more work needs to be done to educate other government agencies about the benefits of developing a campaign plan that is supported by a communications strategy. The benefit of a communications strategy is that it can contribute to the task of influencing the perceptions of the population in the theatre of operations and, also, of the general public in Australia.

COMBINED MILITARY FORCES IN INTER-AGENCY OPERATIONS

In the rotation to the Solomon Islands that occurred between March to August 2004, military forces from Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga were deployed. These countries usually contributed as a minimum a rifle platoon each alongside a national command element. As with the activities of any combined military force, there are differences between the various contingents in terms of perceptions about the character of the mission, levels of acceptable risk, and attitudes towards the local population that any Australian commander must consider.

The use of military patrols in the Solomon Islands would have been greatly assisted by the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles.
As a result, there were a number of situations that highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of each national contingent. For example, the skill and ease with which personnel from Pacific Island countries were able to establish a good rapport with the local population was noticeable. In particular, the ability to speak and understand Pidgin greatly assisted patrols conducted by Papua New Guinea troops, who were able to gather relevant and timely information. In contrast, personnel from the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and ADF personnel never achieved a rapport with the local people beyond the level of a smile and a greeting. However, operations by Pacific island military contingents were often hampered by differing types of doctrine, by a lack of operational experience and by diverse standards of training. These weaknesses were partly alleviated by the conduct of in-theatre training packages designed to build a collective capability in order to conduct sub-unit operations and reinforced force preparation training schemes already conducted in Australia. The next step must be the instigation of a regional initiative—beyond the largely bilateral objectives of the Defence Cooperation Program—to develop doctrine and standardisation of training across the South Pacific in order to support the rapid deployment of a combined military force anywhere in the region.

SOCIAL POLICIES IN INTER-AGENCY OPERATIONS

Another lesson that can be drawn from the experience of RAMSI is that the morale of soldiers in an inter-agency operation is as important as it is in any standard military deployment. There was conflict between the PPF and military personnel with regard to social policies, including alcohol consumption, standards of accommodation and the perception that the PPF somehow ‘looked down’ on soldiers. In order to deal with these issues, RAMSI took measures to encourage PPF and CJTF joint activities, including a Friday night ‘happy hour’ and a combined sports afternoon each Saturday. Such initiatives assisted in building better personal relations between members of the police and the military.
Another social area that may require attention is the monotonous character of much of the daily activity during RAMSI-style operations. There is a need for clearly defined policies on rest and relief, on participation in local civic projects, on sporting activities and a need for frequent briefings in order to pass on information. In low-threat environments social activity requires regulation lest police and soldiers forget that they are in an operational zone.

**RESERVE FORCES IN INTER-AGENCY OPERATIONS**

The Army reserve personnel who deployed to the Solomon Islands performed to a high standard and demonstrated once again that there was little difference in quality between them and their full-time counterparts. Most reservists were employed in logistical support tasks such as driving, store control and contract management, and they were often able to use aspects of civilian experience. In the context of RAMSI, it was particularly advantageous to have a number of reserve personnel who were civilian police officers. Such reserve personnel proved invaluable in developing better military understanding of the PPF’s operating culture. In the future, the ADF should seriously consider expanding military career management to include the creation of a database that highlights the skills and competencies of reserve soldiers available for deployment. The Army should be in a position to approach a reservist for assistance in critical skill areas such as contract management and police liaison rather than issuing a request for any available person—reserve or regular—to take up relevant positions.

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**MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL POWER AND INTER-AGENCY OPERATIONS**

A final lesson from the Solomon Islands mission was the constant need to reinforce to soldiers that the military was operating in support of the police. In the Solomon Islands this situation meant that the PPF dictated the tempo and type of operations conducted—which for some soldiers was initially difficult to accept. For example, from the outset of RAMSI there was a clear need to develop an extensive military patrolling program in order to provide a secure environment. The adoption of an immediate patrolling regime was the initial advice given by senior military officers to their PPF counterparts. However, a patrol system is not how the PPF wished to conduct initial operations. In such a situation the
best that a military commander can do is to advise, perhaps remonstrate, and then try to influence decisions that have an impact on the welfare and safety of his deployed troops. In future RAMSI-style missions, it will be important in force preparation courses and in-theatre reception packages to ensure that the conditions military personnel are likely to meet in an inter-agency operation are clearly outlined from the outset. This is vital in order to pre-empt any surprise, disappointment or frustration that might develop concerning each agency’s different techniques. There remains, as always, a need for soldiers to be constantly aware of the character of any mission involving civilian agencies.

CONCLUSION

It is possible that, in the near future, Australia will face another RAMSI-style operation in the South Pacific that will involve the Army. Because of the ADF’s capabilities in providing logistical support, there is always likely to be military involvement in any civilian-led offshore operation in the South Pacific. However, it is highly likely that, in most circumstances, there will be a need for a military quick-reaction force—either in-theatre or on reduced notice in Australia—in order to guarantee the type of secure environment that allows other agencies to achieve their goals in support of the Government’s objectives.

There is a requirement to ensure that work is now undertaken to develop inter-agency doctrine for command and control, intelligence assessment, the conduct of combined operations and for the delivery of logistical support. In particular, persuading civilian agencies to adopt a suitable variant of the Joint Military Appreciation Process as a methodology for inter-agency planning would be a positive step. In inter-agency operations the key aim must be to find a commonality of procedure that permits the achievement of political goals. Developing a common appreciation system needs to be accompanied by review aimed at devising an inter-agency campaign plan. Any campaign
Helping A Friend

plan also requires two key facets: a communications strategy that seeks to shape the information environment and the development of in-theatre training packages to build familiarity and confidence-building measures between the various civil–military agencies deployed. Finally, the ADF might explore the feasibility of a regional initiative to develop common doctrine and standardise training regimes across South Pacific militaries and paramilitaries. The aim should be to facilitate the rapid deployment of a regional military force in order to deal with any crisis in the South Pacific.

ENDNOTE


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This article presents the case for the development of a multi-mission ship (MMS) in the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The author argues that, by combining the investment of Sea 4000 (the Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) Project costing between $4 and 6 billion) and Sea 1654 (the Maritime Operational Support Capability project costed at between $600 and 800 million) and blending these with an appropriate design, a viable MMS could be produced. A multi-mission vessel has many attractions for the ADF. First, such a vessel could provide missile coverage of local airspace. Second, a multi-mission vessel has the ability to carry large quantities of equipment, personnel and supplies. Third, such a ship could serve as an operational base for the F-35 Carrier Version of the Joint Strike Fighter, and it could carry troop-lift helicopters, armed reconnaissance helicopters and the new Abrams main battle tank. If the ADF possessed an MMS capability of between two and five vessels, it would have the capacity to field a
joint taskforce equipped with a potent suite of weapons systems and appropriate logistics support. Such a taskforce would be resilient and self-contained when deployed on operations.

THE MISSILE THREAT: DEFENDING SURFACE VESSELS AT SEA

Modern warfare often involves prosecuting military operation over long distances in which naval surface vessels are a key capability. Yet, such vessels are also vulnerable to attack from ballistic and cruise missiles. The large radar-reflecting and hot structures of modern ships on a flat, cool sea make them easily detectable to adversaries employing stand-off strike attack. As a result, any advanced defence force involved in force projection operations must consider how best to defend its surface fleet. Surface vessel survival has been a strategic and operational problem ever since US air crews under Billy Mitchell showed the potential of air power at sea by sinking the German battleship *Ostfriedland* with 2000lb (907 kg) bombs during a trial in July 1921. In the 20th century, through World War II to the development of air- and sea-launched anti-ship missiles during the Cold War, the vulnerability of surface ships of all sizes has gradually increased.

In the ADF in the mid-1970s, there was a bitter struggle over the replacement of the aircraft carriers, HMAS *Sydney* and HMAS *Melbourne*. One argument that helped to turn the tide against aircraft carrier advocates was a growing belief throughout Australian defence circles that, in the future, carrier vessels would not be able to survive an attack made against them from precision missiles. By 1982, the ADF had dispensed with its carrier capability in favour of a mixed force of frigates, destroyers and submarines. Yet, today, at the beginning of the 21st century, antimissile defence at sea has greatly improved. However, in order to attain a sufficient level of antimissile protection, a surface ship must be large enough to carry a mixture of both defensive and offensive weapons systems and electronic countermeasures that allow it to deal with a missile attack.

Close-in-weapons systems such as the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) are capable of repelling massed attacks of anti-ship missiles and other air and surface threats. Australia’s Nulka decoy systems degrade the terminal kill-probability of incoming missiles. Surface-to-air missile weapons, such as the RIM-161 SM-3, are capable of engaging enemy targets at ranges of up to 75 nm. In addition, the SM-6 ERAM offers a semi-autonomous engagement capability at a distance of about 200 nm. Finally, in a ship that is capable of prosecuting air combat operations, the maritime or carrier version (CV) of the F-35 equipped with an air-to-air weapons system can ‘shoot the shooters’ at ranges of up to 600 nm.
Surface-to-air missile systems employ various aerial technologies, and given the steady development of networking links, there is potential for the carrier version of the F-35 to become the long-range sensor and terminal guidance for missiles such as the SM-6. Aerial technology and networking also offer techniques by which it may be possible to overcome the close-radar horizon problem involved in low-altitude attacks launched from ships. If a future Australian MMS capability were of adequate ‘carrier’ length—that is, about 270 m—it would be capable of lifting an arsenal of some seventy-five SM-3 and SM-6 missiles along with a squadron of twenty CV F-35s. The mixture of sea and air assets embodied in the MMS offers the ADF formidable defensive and offensive firepower and a level of maritime security that is impossible to achieve with smaller and less capable ships.

JOINT OPERATIONS: THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM CONCEPT

The Australian Army’s combined arms team is a useful concept and, if applied across all three services, would enhance the combat power and force projection of the ADF. However, a methodology is clearly required that permits ADF planners to acquire and develop weapons systems that are compatible in a joint operational environment. All weapons systems must be blended into providing an overall capability matrix that consists of survivability, lethality, multi-dimensional manoeuvre, flexibility, range and persistence.

Figure 1 provides a weapons system assessment of an ADF force deployed to a location that is 1000 nm from a main operating base against an enemy that can mount an air threat. Combining the individual combat capabilities of the joint taskforce at that location using the combined arms team concept delivers superior results than if the various weapons systems were to be considered individually.

An MMS capability is an essential player in any joint taskforce based on combined arms. For example, a multipurpose vessel could protect itself in an area of operations through a ‘bubble’ of air, surface and sub-surface defensive weapons systems. Being a large and capacious vessel, it has the capacity to transport land and air forces and to provide fuel and supplies for ongoing operations. An MMS is also capable of making a
substantial contribution to the range and persistence of air assets, thus ensuring that deployed ground forces can enjoy air superiority in their area of operations. If armed with weapons such as the Tomahawk cruise missile and/or the SM-4/RGM-165 Land Attack Standard Missile, an MMS could also contribute to both deep-strike attack and to close fire-support. The key to the success of a multi-mission vessel is its self-defence capability, particularly when pitted against ‘leaker’ missiles that might be encountered during a massed cruise-missile anti-shipping attack. An MMS fleet of between two and five vessels could also provide facilities such as a mobile joint taskforce headquarters, a deployable field hospital and logistics support.

DEVELOPING A MULTI-MISSION SHIP IN THE ADF

An argument for merging the AWD with the Maritime Operations Support Capability ships into a single multipurpose ship project needs to be based on the issues of cost, ability to survive and crew numbers.

COST

A determining factor in the ADF’s acquisition process is the cost of a project. However, the art of life-cycle costing is not well developed in the ADF. For example, the recently released Defence Capability Plan includes acquisition, but not the through-life support, costs. Yet, it is recognised in most defence planning circles that the latter
can be much higher than the former. Capability and life-cycle cost equations should always be combined into a single equation that measures the worth of a platform, or weapons system, against the price involved in its long-term maintenance.

Cost is also related to ship design. In recent years, given the intense competitive pressure in private industry for vessels that have lower acquisition and support costs, there have been rapid advances in naval architecture. As a generalisation, commercial ships today are larger, cheaper, and cost less to own and operate. The design of the MMS should incorporate useful considerations from standard commercial ship design. In US defence capability circles, especially in the joint strike fighter project, one of the new development concepts that the US Air Force has adopted is the notion of ‘capability as an independent variable’. This concept reverses the argument that a defined level of capability will be purchased, with cost as the dependent variable. Viewing capability as an independent variable places a premium on planners to try to avoid large cost-‘blow-outs’ and to contain costs by means of appropriate original design and assiduous methods of project management. If the ADF seeks to limit, or to fix, available financial investment in platforms and weapons systems, then original design should take into account the requirements for lower acquisition and support costs in order to maximise fleet capability.

The multi-mission vessel design outlined in Figure 2 is based on a catamaran configuration and includes two decks; elevators between the upper air operations deck and the flight deck; crew housing in the hulls; and missile and sensor housing in the walls of the upper deck. In the design presented, space is provided for air warfare weapons systems, including sensors, launchers and missiles. If a ‘marginal cost’ procedure is adopted, then capability can be added incrementally. Adding capability ‘at the margin’ to a single ship is generally much cheaper than concentrating on the production of two distinctive ship-types. Distinctive ship-types often incur large overhead costs that tend to accumulate in such critical areas as design, construction, engine propulsion and in crew amenities.

SURVIVABILITY

A second consideration in the argument for an MMS concerns the ability of surface vessels to survive air and missile attack. Projects such as Sea 1448 (ANZAC Anti-Ship Missile Defence) illustrate the requirement to provide each of the larger ships of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) with some form of self-protection. The ramifications of an enemy missile strike sinking an unprotected maritime operations support capability ship with an embarked Army brigade group aboard would...
Figure 2: The multi-mission ship design
be heart-rending and might involve the loss of several hundred lives. It is essential, therefore, that in any deployment, an air warfare destroyer escort a maritime operations support capability ship. Indeed, the air and missile threat at sea effectively ties both vessels together. Yet this twinning begs a larger question: ‘Why not put all the required capabilities in a single ship which may be cheaper to build and operate?’.

A single multi-functional vessel may be more efficient since in a low-threat environment, AWDs risk becoming ‘non-performing assets’. In contrast, an MMS can be employed across a spectrum of operations spanning humanitarian assistance through peace operations to anti-missile warfighting.

CREW NUMBERS

A third argument that may be advanced in favour of acquiring an MMS capability revolves around the issue of supportability in terms of crew numbers and their sustainment in an era of declining demography. Given Australia’s falling birth rate, in the future, the ADF in general and the RAN in particular are likely to experience a severe decline in its main recruitment pool of those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four. This recruitment decline is likely to be well advanced by 2015—the date that coincides with the beginning of the life-of-type (length of service) of the proposed MMS fleet. Like equipment, any workforce incurs both price overheads and marginal costs. In this respect, it is worth noting that commercial shipping has long recognised that crew costs impact on efficiency and profitability. As a result, most modern merchant ships are designed to be operated with as few crew members as possible.

A proliferation of ship types within a single fleet has the effect of increasing the inevitable ‘stovepipes’ throughout a navy. In contrast, possessing fewer distinctive ships assists in the management and organisation of relevant skill-sets within the context of diminishing human resources. Thus, a fleet of between two and five MMS has a better chance of being crewed than a diverse fleet consisting of different types of ships. In this respect, the difficulties experienced with crewing the Collins submarines are indicative of the personnel problems that the RAN may find to be routine from 2015 onwards.

... an MMS can be employed across a spectrum of operations spanning humanitarian assistance through peace operations to anti-missile warfighting.
DESIGNING A MULTI-MISSION SHIP

Figure 2 presents an indicative design of an MMS. The configuration shows a ‘Small Waterline Area—Twin Hull’ (SWATH) system—a system that is stable in rough seas and provides good fuel efficiency. The catamaran design offers large internal deck volume and, in keeping with modern oil tanker construction practice, each hull is double skinned in order to improve the vessel’s ability to survive high-tech attack.

EMBARKED FORCES AND PROPULSION

In general, land forces would be embarked on the lower deck, and air forces on the upper deck of an MMS. Moreover, when in dock, side-loading doors with in-built ramps facilitate rapid embarkation by troops and equipment. A series of movable ramps and the aircraft elevators are included in the indicative design; they facilitate movement between decks. Aircraft elevators must be capable of moving large helicopters such as the Chinook or the troop-lift helicopter to the ‘flat-top’. The crew’s quarters are built into the walls of the lower deck while fuel is carried below the waterline to reduce fire risk. Ballast tanks ensure the trim and draft of the ship in order to ensure that the SWATH sea-keeping benefits of the vessel are maintained.

The MMS bridge is located on the upper deck, looking forward and outward in order to provide a clean ‘flat-top’ surface for air operations. Because marine propulsion has improved markedly over the past couple of decades, two gas turbines in the underwater hulls driving high-capacity alternators are suggested for an MMS. In order to minimise the risk of collision with dangerous objects at sea—such as semi-submerged containers—hydraulic jets are shown at the bow of the vessel alongside conventional propellers at the stern. In an indicative MMS design, ‘rudderless’ steering is achieved through a propulsion system that is facilitated by propellers with adjustable and reversible pitch. In addition, the ship’s exhaust could be ducted to emerge under the lower deck in order to reduce turbulence and infra-red emissions that might be detected by satellites and enemy patrol aircraft.

LANDING CRAFT

The launch of amphibious landing-craft is achieved from the lower deck of the vessel using a ‘wet’ ramp deployed from the stern. This wet ramp permits landing craft to be launched and recovered while the ship is under way. Am MMS is also capable of carrying extendable ramps and pontoon jetties for the delivery of vital equipment across the shore. Because SWATH ships are generally water-ballasted in order to keep the two hulls just below the surface, it might be possible to reduce the MMS’s draft when unloading equipment and so facilitate better ship-to-shore logistics supply.
MMS SELF-PROTECTION

A key to the MMS is the issue of self-protection, which is achieved by means of a ‘layered defence’. RAM launchers would be situated at each corner of the flight deck, thus giving each weapons-station a 240-degree arc of fire. This wide arc would have the effect of exposing any incoming missile, aircraft, or a fast-moving attack craft to at least two and possibly three RAM launchers. Given the projected dimensions of the ship, such a configuration would provide RAM coverage of most of the volume of the battlespace around the ship, including outwards to the distance of the radar horizon.

Another layer of protection for the MMS might be provided by a series of SM-3/SM-6 missile launchers operating as seventy-five vertical tubes firing from the flight deck. Each missile would ideally be available for rapid launch in order to counter any massed attack by enemy missiles. The provision of on-board missile reloading for the launch tubes while the ship is simultaneously under way would also facilitate mission resilience. Finally, the carrier version of the F-35 could be operated either as an offensive or defensive counter-air platform as required. In short, an MMS would have a substantial strike capability from its missile weaponry and organic naval aviation. It is important to note that the vertical launch tubes are large enough to house Tomahawk cruise missiles while the ADF may, in the future, choose to convert its remaining SM missile stock into the SM-4 land attack missile.

ORGANIC NAVAL AVIATION

The projected MMS is designed to be capable of operating the maritime or CV version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The CV version of the Joint Strike Fighter has a larger wing area than the Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) version in order to provide the former with additional fuel, a lower landing speed, larger control surfaces and a strengthened undercarriage. Because the CV version of the Joint Strike Fighter is more expensive than the CTOL version, there can be little doubt that any decision by the ADF to employ the former on an MMS would have a financial impact on the Air 6000 project. However, it needs to be understood that
the F-35 CV is likely to be superior in terms of its range and multifunctionality in maritime operations from sea, land and air. If the F-35 is eventually deployed on an MMS, the question of the ship’s size immediately arises. Aircraft can generally land on smaller ships using an arrestor system, but take-off distance is always a critical factor that planners must consider. Take-off distance depends on several variables such as the aircraft’s weight and thrust, the speed of the wind over the deck, the level of assistance derived from launching devices—by, for example, a catapult or Rocket-assisted Take-off (RATO)—and whether a ‘ski-jump’ is fitted to the vessel.

The maximum all-up weight (MAUW) of the F-35 is about 50,000 lbs, and its thrust is 35,000 lbs. In conditions of 20 knots of wind over the deck and a 140-knot lift-off speed, a 200 m take-off run would require a catapult thrust of about 30,000 lbs to achieve a MAUW take-off. A 200 m take-off run would place the MMS’s overall length at about 270 m. However, since the gas turbines on the MMS are capable of providing a substantial amount of electrical power, electric ‘rail-gun’ launchers also could be fitted. These devices are used in electric trains and amusement parks, and on a multi-mission vessel they could, in the future, be used to launch aircraft.

The SWATH configuration of an MMS provides sufficient flight-deck width to allow two parallel ‘runways’ to operate on the ship. These runways permit aircraft movement systems such as lifts, catapults and arrestor cables to be used. They also allow more rapid aerial deployment, the fast recovery of aircraft, and simultaneous take-off and landings alongside operations undertaken by dissimilar aircraft types. The MMS design permits aircraft to be fuelled and armed on the air-operations deck and then towed to the aircraft elevator. Finally, since all ships are vulnerable to attack from submarines and mines, the envisaged MMS would carry a complement of Sea-Hawk or similar aircraft. These assets would be used to place submarine sensors in waters around and in front of the ship in order to provide a submersible detection and engagement capability.

RADAR

Detection of threat remains critical in the operational viability of any surface vessel. In the proposed MMS, a telescopic Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar is included. An AESA radar system has the advantage of being able to track an enemy and to direct counter-fire on several incoming missiles or aircraft while simultaneously continuing the search for other potential attacks. Provided a 100 m extension above the waterline can be established, the radar horizon can be

The projected MMS is designed to be capable of operating the maritime or CV version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
situated at between 22 and 41 nm. Such distances are normally sufficient to permit detection of incoming sea-skimmer missiles and to allow time for the ship to prepare its RAM and Nulka close-in-defensive systems.

An MMS would be large enough to carry and operate a powered, dirigible-borne radar. The advantage of this type of sensor is that it can operate at considerable height and at a distance from the vessel, thus denying enemy electronic surveillance assets any opportunity to detect and track the MMS. For example, a dirigible operating at 25 000 ft has a radar horizon of about 200 nm and can detect a launch of cruise missiles at long range. The dirigible radar can also be networked, and therefore provide sensor support and terminal guidance to ship-borne missiles, especially the SM-6 weapons system. In terms of selecting sensor systems to support the MMS, surface-wave radar—currently being deployed in the Torres Straits—should be included in any evaluation. The MMS has large, flat-faced sides to minimise radar emissions, and these surfaces might be suitable as the projection plane for radar ducting. If this type of sensor could be placed on the MMS, it would provide the vessel with an over-the-horizon–style capability.

CONCLUSION

A multi-mission vessel, as described in this article, would have the potential to deploy an array of missile systems alongside the maritime version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, so providing the ADF with a powerful sea-borne capability. If these weapons systems were then combined with remote sensors such as a dirigible-borne fire-control radar, then the MMS would represent a capability that is less vulnerable to attack in comparison with both the Air Warfare Destroyer and the Maritime Operational Support Capability vessels.

There are two critical factors involved in modern naval ship acquisition and development: vulnerability and cost. In examining the possibility that an MMS capability might replace the Air Warfare Destroyer and the Maritime Operational Support Capability ships in the ADF, this article has taken account of both of these factors. In making any formal comparison between the viability of these three vessels in the future, the ADF needs to pay close attention to issues of design and configuration that simultaneously counteract areas of vulnerability and financial cost. At the same time, planners should also undertake detailed life-cycle costs and not rely solely on acquisition cost. Life-cycle costs might be contrasted against current methodologies that are used to determine existing capability proposals. Another
measure that the ADF might also consider as part of any formal assessment process might be to hold a well-funded design contest for the best plan of a multi-mission vessel that meets Australian operational needs. Such a contest would exploit current innovations in international ship design and direct these towards the naval sphere. Finally, a design contest may also provide a unique opportunity for state-of-the-art commercial shipping design to be merged with the challenge of producing vessels that meet Australia’s contemporary maritime warfare requirements.

THE AUTHOR

Wing Commander Chris Mills joined the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in 1964 and completed his officer training at the RAAF Academy. His career has included operational tours in transport and fighter aircraft. Wing Commander Mills planned and flew many air-to-sea operations in Mirage aircraft based in Butterworth and Singapore, before joining an operations research unit in the Defence Science and Technology Organisation. He assisted the Defence Capability Review in 2003 and transferred to the Air Force Reserve in January 2004. Wing Commander Mills is currently involved in the areas of future warfare and capability development.
The Australian Army’s current organisational structure is reminiscent of the fable of the rally driver who would not change his Cooper S Mini after he gave up racing and married. When the rally driver’s first child arrived, he retained the Mini as the family car on the assumption that he would eventually return to racing. A second child soon followed and the family could barely fit in the car. Yet the rally driver refused to dispose of his beloved racing vehicle. A third child duly arrived and the family found that it could not fit in the car at all. In order to resolve this dilemma, the rally driver, rather than recognise that he had the wrong car, insisted on undertaking two trips whenever it was necessary to transport his family.

Like the rally driver, the Australian Army also has ‘the wrong car’ and must change its approach to military organisation if it is to be an efficient 21st-century land force. With considerable investment in modern equipment and the important advances that the Hardening and Networking the Army initiative will bring, the land force cannot afford to retain an organisational structure that is designed for 20th-century, industrial-style armed conflict. Without significant and wide-ranging organisational reform, the emerging 21st-century Australian Army risks being squeezed into roles and situations for which it is neither designed nor suited.
Organisational redesign to meet the needs of future conflict is an imprecise art, but it is clear that the Army needs to develop an adaptable and agile structure over the next two decades. Such a structure would be capable of taking maximum advantage of emerging technologies while remaining true to the human character of war. The longer the Army delays change to its base organisation, the more obsolescent that organisation will gradually become.

Although predicting the future of war is an exercise fraught with difficulty, intellectual effort must be expended on it. In the 1990s, advocates of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) argued in favour of a future conflict environment dominated by information technologies that recalled the spirit of Jomini rather than Clausewitz. Their approach was one of narrow science, without always considering the fundamental uncertainty at the heart of war as a basic human activity. However, one of the nuggets of great interest that emerged from RMA-style speculation was the concept of minimum-mass tactics. In broad terms, advocates of minimum-mass tactics argue that the age of the mass military formation has ended because detection and surveillance technologies have greatly enhanced the use of small teams of soldiers. In the future battlespace, small teams are likely to be capable of operating within a powerful information-technology network, which will permit greater situational awareness, decision superiority and tactical discretion in operations.

Early arguments in favour of minimum-mass tactics were, however, often exaggerated. For example, there was an unjustified belief that stand-off air strike would ameliorate the problem of close combat by land forces. This was an approach to combat that ran contrary to the entire history of warfare waged by armies, and one that has been exposed in the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001. Nonetheless, although often exaggerated in its utility, the concept of minimum mass remains worthy of intellectual exploration within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Army particularly since it holds promise in the key area of future organisational design. The caveat is that the concept of minimum-mass tactics must not be removed from the context of realistic ground-combat conditions and must be seen within the contours of joint warfighting.
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THE RISE AND FALL OF MASS IN WARFARE

The adoption of minimum-mass tactics is not an argument for or against the use of advanced military technology. Rather, the concept of minimum mass is related to exploiting the physics of the modern battlespace. Mass may be defined as the ability to concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time. A salient lesson from military history from ancient to industrial warfare was that the combatant fielding the larger forces often won battles, campaigns and wars. As Napoleon once put it, victory usually went to the big battalions. A dominant theme in modern military history, particularly after warfighting became industrialised in the late 19th century, was the drive to outnumber and overwhelm an opponent with larger armies and bigger fleets. In World War II, quantity tended to overcome quality, particularly on the Eastern Front between 1943 and 1945 when the German and Soviet armies became locked in a war of mass and materiel.

Modern warfare, especially in the era of the two world wars between 1914 and 1945 was ultimately about a clash of industrial and materiel resources. During the Cold War from 1947 until 1989, mass continued to matter. Indeed, until the coming of precision weapons in the late 1970s, it was the size of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies that convinced many Western observers in NATO that a Soviet-led mass attack on Western Europe could only be stopped by recourse to tactical nuclear weapons.

Since the late 20th century, the concentration on mass has declined principally for four reasons. First, in the wake of the end of the Cold War, the conventional power and high technology of the US military is largely unmatched by any other modern military. The 20th-century trend of matching symmetrical strength on the battlefield has been reversed, and gradually asymmetrical strategies such as insurgency, guerrilla warfare and terrorism have received more attention in military circles. In modern conflict characterised by the spectrum of peace, crisis and war, there are often no convenient targets for mass fires. Rather, civilians, aid agencies, refugees and combatants are frequently intertwined in an operational area.

This type of situation demands great discrimination in the use of force. Second, technological advances have made smaller weapon systems such as precision-guided missiles significantly more lethal. Most contemporary weapon systems possess sophisticated fire-control systems that enhance accuracy and destructive impact. In World War II, it took the Allied air forces 1000 bomber raids to destroy German cities. Today, precision firepower and Tomahawk cruise missiles are capable...
of demolishing selected urban targets with great accuracy. Hub-to-hub artillery pieces are being replaced by a variety of accurate weapons capable of precise applications of fire. In short, in the early 21st century, technological advances have made it no longer necessary to mass firepower in order to achieve tactical effects, as was the case during the era of the world wars in the 20th century.

Third, in an age of instant media images and electronic reporting, mass fires that produce mass effects—including large numbers of civilian casualties—are no longer acceptable or sustainable. Discrimination in targeting and restraint in inflicting destruction are required, and armies have become as concerned with how they fight as much as who they fight. The problems of collateral damage inflicted on both innocent civilians and their vital urban infrastructure have become areas of legitimate and pressing concern. Low-yield precise engagements are required far more often than mass saturation strikes. Modern armies cannot employ mass fires in an age in which the rehabilitation of an enemy and the reconstruction of his resources may be required as political imperatives.

Finally, in contemporary social conditions, armed forces are expensive to build and maintain. In particular, mass conscript armies have become not only unnecessary but also unaffordable. In post-industrial conditions, there has been a return to the small and highly trained professional forces that were the hallmark of pre-industrial limited warfare in 18th-century Europe, as practised by Frederick the Great of Prussia. Contemporary armies seek to become more highly trained and professional and in post-industrial societies must compete for scarce, high-quality manpower. In sum, the age of the great standing army supplied by conscripts as citizens in arms has passed. Small, professional armies are the norm in most of the modern West.

The combination of the above four factors raises serious questions about the value of relying on mass organisation in warfare. Mass has become a receding requirement and is losing its utility in an age when precision technology, low demography and postmodern social conditions call for a more discriminating and skilful form of warfare. The trend away from maximum numbers and indiscriminate firepower ushers in the possibility of, and indeed the need for, the adoption of realistic minimum-mass tactics.
TOWARDS MINIMUM-MASS TACTICS

Minimum-mass tactics may be defined as the use of multiple small teams in the battlespace, each capable of producing military effect both alone and in combination. Such tactical teams are characterised by a low electronic signature yet continue to possess an exponential combined-arms capability for battlespace effectiveness. Teams executing minimum-mass tactics require access to disengaged joint fires both from within and outside the battlespace.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SMALL SIGNATURE

Since mass is gradually becoming redundant in military operations, teams engaged in minimum-mass tactics need to be small in order to survive detection in the electronic battlespace. Small teams have the advantage of emitting a low electronic signature while retaining combat agility. In modern combat conditions it is easier to hide and move a platoon rather than a battalion. It is also more effective to concentrate scarce military resources into smaller combat groups rather than larger, perhaps unwieldy, field formations.

Of course, there are some military contingencies—such as peace enforcement and urban operations—that continue to require relatively large numbers of troops to be deployed. It is arguable, however, that contemporary peace operations involve multiple government and non-government agencies as well as police. As a result, fewer troops may be required in the future. Similarly, the adage that urban operations require large numbers of infantry may be exaggerated. Urban operations require not infantry so much as multiple and effective combined-arms teams. The trend in both peacekeeping and urban operations now tends to be downwards, away from large numbers of troops.

SURVIVABILITY AND SINGLE EFFECTS

One of the problems in viewing minimum-mass tactics within the context of the RMA school of thought has been the fallibility of information networks. In a digital battlespace, highly networked teams are envisaged as sharing continuous battlespace awareness, thereby becoming capable of avoiding uncertainty and surprise. Yet a presumed ability to conduct operations through an immaculate battlespace overlooks the continued reality of fog and friction in warfare. Fog and friction might be reduced by technology but they can never be eliminated. Small-team operations using minimum-mass tactics must be able to survive the degradation or collapse of an electronic network.
electronic network. The best method of achieving this ability is by ensuring that each deployed team possesses an organic combined-arms capability for both mounted and dismounted combat. Each small-unit team must ultimately be capable of generating its own singular set of combat effects.

NETWORKED WARFARE AND COMBINED EFFECTS

While minimum-mass combat teams must be capable of executing singular effects, the combination of networked teams in the field remains the most effective way of applying combat power. Although networks are fallible, a network-centric or network-enabled approach to warfare exploits the tremendous advances in information volume and exchange that are now available to modern militaries. A networked force has great operational potential, and the employment of minimum-mass tactics assumes that a network approach *enhances* the combined effects of deployed teams. Such combined effects may be achieved by modular teams sharing situational awareness in order to speed their reaction times, by greater tactical agility in transitioning from task to task and by a greater capacity to call for indirect fires.

DECISION SUPERIORITY AND PROFESSIONAL EXCELLENCE

In their training, minimum-mass combat teams require an emphasis on perfecting small-team skills, and the ability to operate singularly. The adage should be ‘the network makes me better, but I do not rely on it. I can still achieve my task by myself when necessary’. Such a decentralised tactical approach requires an emphasis on achieving decision superiority through the combination of advanced combat skills, high small-unit morale and good leadership. The minimum-mass team requires guidance but not control from a network-centric approach to warfare. Acting semi-autonomously in the field, the aim should be for the small team to self-synchronise alongside other teams in order to meet different battlespace situations that might arise.

SPECIAL FORCES AND THE USE OF MINIMUM-MASS TACTICS

Many military observers would argue that Australian Special Forces teams have already perfected the minimum-mass tactics described in this article. It is certainly true that small Special Forces teams epitomise the concept of small-unit warfare through the massing of effects rather than numbers. The question that arises is: should more of the Australian Army become Special Forces in character? This
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approach is not practical as a base structure for a modern land force. Military success cannot be achieved solely by the use of small, covert teams calling in disengaged fires. The Army continues to require a capacity for all arms warfare, and in this context minimum-mass tactics teams might operate using some Special Forces techniques but should retain a capability for heavier combat.

The only non–Special Force teams in the Army that have come close to adopting a minimum-mass tactical concept are cavalry units, whose troops often operate as miniature combined-arms teams. Australian cavalry have become used to operating independently with adaptability and agility. Cavalry units have, however, tended to be under-resourced, particularly in the vital and complementary area of dismounted warfare. Nonetheless, while mounted forces have often been either under-utilised or misemployed on operations, they represent a useful example of incipient minimum-mass tactical teams.

TOWARDS ADOPTING MINIMUM-MASS TACTICAL TEAMS IN THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

How should an ideal minimum-mass tactical team be composed? In the first place, such a team needs to be small yet still retain a capacity for combined arms action, including both dismounted and mounted warfare. A team's approach to dismounted warfare needs to include the ability to patrol on foot and to close with and kill or capture the enemy. The team also requires the capability to remove physical obstacles, protect vehicles and conduct tactical surveillance.

An effective minimum-mass tactical team needs armoured personnel carriers (APCs), armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) and scout vehicles. A pair of APCs would transport between six and eight dismounted soldiers in each vehicle. A pair of AFVs mounting cannon in order to destroy enemy vehicles, and neutralise bunkers and other entrenchments would be another essential component in any minimum-mass tactical team. An AFV should be protected against attack by enemy hand-held weapons, so permitting the vehicle to support dismounted troops in close fighting.

... small Special Forces teams epitomise the concept of small-unit warfare through the massing of effects rather than numbers.
A minimum-mass tactical team based on two APCS, two AFVs and sixteen dismounted soldiers might be further enhanced by the inclusion of two lighter scout vehicles. A pair of scout vehicles armed with cannon and capable of carrying up to four soldiers adds flexibility and a reconnaissance capability to a tactical team.

In essence, then, the APCs with dismounted soldiers provide the minimum-mass teams with an infantry and scout capability; the scout vehicles would provide a cavalry and engineer capability; and the AFVs provide a tank and artillery effect. A minimum-mass team of six vehicles might be split into two three-vehicle patrols (one of each type of vehicle) in order to cover a wider area of territory. Such a six-vehicle team would have access to the electronic network and be able to upload and download data as required. The team vehicles would also have the ability to designate, compute and adjust disengaged fires from other teams or joint forces deployed in the field.

In the battlespace, future minimum-mass tactical teams will require headquarters and support elements. However, these need to be as small as possible and be located away from the battlespace, ideally on a sea base or on another sanctuary. Relevant aviation assets—including air lift capability and UAV reconnaissance—might be based away from the battlespace and be called forward only when required. Aviation would provide deep fires beyond the capability of the minimum-mass tactical teams. As there are no separate artillery units envisaged, the minimum-mass teams need to provide their own indirect fires or call for disengaged fires from joint assets, either air or naval. Moreover, the teams will be unsupported by separate field engineer units and must provide their own mobility and counter-mobility support. There are unlikely to be any separate vehicle-only armoured units, with all minimum-mass teams permanently grouped as mounted and dismounted combat teams.

THE MODUS OPERANDI OF MINIMUM-MASS TACTICAL TEAMS

In warfighting operations, minimum-mass tactical teams can be deployed into a battlespace employing a version of ‘swarm’ tactics. Each tactical team can operate semi-independently, but remain close enough to each other in order to give mutual
support through indirect fires and reinforcement. However, all teams would seek to avoid becoming a concentrated target by prevention of an established detectable pattern to a specific operation. The various tactical teams supported by aviation elements might superimpose their firepower over that of the ground units, or conduct independent operations in secondary sectors.

On contact with the enemy, team scout vehicles might attempt to use on-board sensors to designate targets for aviation fire support and other elements capable of providing disengaged fires. Dismounted soldiers and AFVs would in response try to close with and to defeat fixed adversaries. A minimum-mass tactical team outclassed in an engagement with an enemy force might seek to call for fires from other teams and call to be reinforced. In complex terrain, the various tactical teams need to possess sufficient combined-arms capability in order to operate without additional support.

In stability operations, minimum-mass tactical teams support other agencies through ‘presence patrolling’ and by establishing route and static defence of key communication nodes. Since members of the team patrol either mounted or dismounted, it is possible to adapt a force posture as required. Given the integral mobility of the teams, they can be task-organised for specific missions and be transported by air to their objectives.

**THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND MINIMUM-MASS TACTICS**

Acceptance of a minimum-mass tactical approach within the Army will require a conscious movement beyond our present industrial-age corps organisation. The Army cannot continue to try to mould an industrial-age force structure into a post-industrial security environment. While it is necessary to retain the traditional functions of infantry, artillery, engineers and armour, these force elements need to be grouped not at battalion level but at a lower level, preferably that of minimum-mass tactical teams. The adoption of minimum-mass tactical organisation is not about an increase in soldier numbers, but rather is concerned with the most efficient use of troops. The number of battalions required should be replaced by a calculation based on how many minimum-mass teams the land force is capable of fielding.

If, in the future, the Army does not permanently organise its combat power into tactical teams, then the need will be to compensate for this deficiency by a focus on combined training and by emphasising professional development...
in training courses and officer training. If, for instance, the Army tried to splice together a minimum-mass team structure from current equipment, scout vehicles might have to be drawn from ASLAVs along with engineers, and APCs for the infantry. However, no infantry or engineer unit is currently mounted in ASLAV. The AFVs or support vehicles might be tanks, but the latter currently lack an indirect-fire capability. In terms of artillery, towed guns would, in minimum-mass conditions, have to be left behind. Moreover, self-propelled guns mounted on trucks lack the ability to close with and support the infantry. The Army’s bewildering array of different corps, vehicles, mobility and gun calibres means a long support train that conflicts with training requirements.

The Army needs to develop a team capability from scratch. Training and logistics need to become operations-led and serve the needs of the fighting soldier. There are considerable efficiencies in training if the land force was to prepare soldiers on the basis of a single building-block to train the entire Army, rather than cater for the peculiar requirements of each corps.

A transformed 21st-century Army involves the following six features. First, there should be a continued Special Forces organisation, but with 4 RAR concentrating less on company-level operations and far more on small-team operations. Second, the land force would benefit from an expanded cavalry regimental capability in order to create true minimum-mass teams. Such an approach requires the adequate provision of dismounted troops and mortars in order to conform to doctrinal requirements. Manpower and direct fire for dismounted troops might be drawn from reorganised infantry and artillery units. Ultimately, expanded and reinforced cavalry units might form the Army’s standard minimum-mass teams.

Third, armoured and mechanised infantry units can be reorganised into minimum-mass teams, with additional dismounted troops possibly drawn from engineer formations. In the future, armoured and mechanised formations, supplemented by current and future equipment, can form ‘heavy’ minimum-mass teams. A fourth measure is to develop light infantry, artillery and engineering elements into either Special Force–style formations or into ‘light’ minimum-mass teams that retain combined arms functions. Fifth, the Army’s aviation elements might reorganise themselves into a functional air–ground minimum-mass formation. Finally, the Army’s construction engineer capability could be expanded in order to support stability operations.

... expanded and reinforced cavalry units might form the Army’s standard minimum-mass teams.
CONCLUSION

The Australian Army is currently organised for the last war, not the next. We need to appreciate that we do not require mass forces in the future and that our tactical organisation is designed for an obsolescent form of warfare, namely industrial-age warfare based on numbers of soldiers. Ultimately, the number of battalions we have is irrelevant if those battalions are organised incorrectly or are regularly broken up in order to meet the contingencies of real-world operations. The Army of the future must organise from the bottom up, structuring itself along minimum-mass lines in order to create an effective base-fighting element. The land force requires an available combined-arms capability at all times and it needs to train in expectation of likely combat conditions. Such an approach means that the Army needs to ‘organise as it will fight’.

The Australian Army has always held the belief that its small-unit teams are the foundation on which its professional reputation has been built. The fine performance of our individual soldiers and small teams in East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere continues to justify this belief. Let us then build on the small-unit foundation as the basis of a 21st-century army and ensure that effective military teams employing minimum-mass tactics provide the way of the future.

THE AUTHOR

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This article seeks to review the relationship between suppression and manoeuvre in infantry platoon tactics. It is argued that current Australian Army doctrine has not paid sufficient attention to the advent of precision munitions, the development of all-arms combat teams, and the introduction of information technologies such as intra-section communications. Nor has Australian military doctrine fully appreciated how these new developments have ‘force multiplied’ the combat power of an infantry platoon.

In a recent article on the future structure of the Australian infantry battalion, Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen suggested that, in the relationship between firepower and movement, the achievement of fire dominance and the use of a ‘reserve of fire’ required greater emphasis rather than reliance solely on a manoeuvre reserve.¹

The notion of compromising manoeuvre assets in favour of an increase in suppression capabilities sits uncomfortably with many Australian infantry officers.
many Australian infantry officers. The tried-and-tested section tactics of ‘two up, one back’ or ‘one up, one in depth, and one in fire support’ has been fundamental to all courses of instruction in platoon tactics for all ranks since the 1960s. However, this focus underestimates the possibility that new technologies may require a change in tactical focus.

THE INFANTRY AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARDENING AND NETWORKING THE ARMY

In his Hardening and Networking of the Army (HNA) initiative, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, has explained the challenge facing the land force in the following terms:

Our Army must move from a light infantry force to a light armoured force with increased protection, firepower and mobility. The alternative is for us to steadily lose capability over time as existing systems age and are overwhelmed by the emerging threat environment.²

One of the tenets of the HNA initiative involves the ‘upskilling’ of Australian infantrymen in order to complement the acquisition of new equipment. The dual mechanism of multiskilling and new equipment may provide a paradigm shift in the dynamics between manoeuvre and suppression. The introduction into the Australian Army of both the Javelin anti-armour weapons system and the Mark 19 automatic grenade launcher have significantly enhanced a rifle platoon’s ability to concentrate lethal force at a precise moment within the battlespace at a definite time. No longer does the platoon commander necessarily have to fight a battle in complete isolation. Moreover, the notion of the ‘strategic corporal’—that is, the potential strategic effect of individual soldiers deployed in a tactical operation to call in long-range fires on the enemy—now requires absolute precision with regard to the employment of lethal force.

The current challenge for the infantry is to consider how best to exploit its growing ability within the battlespace to apply force and to coordinate external suppression assets with small-unit operations. The use of professional targeters as forward observers or forward air-controllers as well as such targeting devices as ground-based laser target designators (GBLTD) increases the suppression effect that small
numbers of infantry may be capable of generating in proportion to their physical size. As has been recently noted in the pages of the AAJ, in operations conducted in complex terrain, combat may increasingly involve the application of highly accurate firepower delivered from relatively static fires. Thus, in the battle for Basra during the warfighting stage of the 2003 Iraq War, British sections often possessed no riflemen, but nearly every soldier carried a fire support weapon.3

In terms of combat capability, the intellectual challenge for Australian infantry is the need to determine the correct balance within the platoon between training and equipping for manoeuvre and suppression tasks. Given the increased mobility, protection and firepower proposed under the HNA scheme, it will be possible to execute both manoeuvre and suppression through the combination of improved weapons in armoured fighting vehicles and better equipped individual soldiers. It is likely that an increase in the suppression capability of a future HNA infantry platoon may also require additional anti-armour weapons, anti-materiel sniper weapons and heavy machine guns.

Regardless of eventual platoon tactical composition, one of the key strengths of HNA infantry units is certain to be enhanced organic firepower. The fundamental difference between an HNA attack and the standard infantry attack is therefore likely to be the factor of suppression. In the future, it is probable that an HNA infantry attack would seek to place a relatively small dismounted assault element against a vulnerable penetration point supported by the overwhelming firepower of an organic vehicle-mounted suppression element. There may also be an ability to coordinate support from tactical and operational suppression assets. In theory the tactical effect would be complete—an enemy would be suppressed with fires supporting the friendly forces assault element manoeuvring to close on the objective.

… the intellectual challenge for Australian infantry is the need to determine the correct balance within the platoon between training and equipping for manoeuvre and suppression tasks.

It is important to understand that modern manoeuvre is not about size but rather effect.
If the Army sacrifices traditional small-unit manoeuvre in favour of an increased suppression capability, what are the consequences? It is important to understand that modern manoeuvre is not about size but rather effect. In a paper discussing the future of Australian infantry, Alan Ryan, formerly of the Land Warfare Studies Centre, observed:

[Australia needs] first-class infantry of the information age—highly mobile, and able to operate in small units and orchestrate effects across the full spectrum of operations. Mass infantry are obsolete, and as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated, will invariably be defeated by more intellectually adept and technologically superior forces. Information-age infantry will inherit the flexibility, the ability to discriminate and the lethality of their forebears; however, properly led, trained and organised, they will not be the cannon fodder that their less fortunate colleagues are.

In the future, it is likely that the Army will require a more modular form of tactical organisation to meet sub-battalion needs. The HNA initiative presents the infantry with a powerful opportunity to ‘value add’ both to the Army and to itself through the restructuring of infantry units and the enhancement of organic suppression capabilities. Armoured mobility, helicopter mobility and amphibious capability will enable a rapid manoeuvre effect, whether in platoon or larger force element. For example, under a combat team system of manoeuvre, an infantry element operating in a built-up area could be supported by tanks as well as by organic light armour. Highly mobile suppression assets such as armoured fighting vehicles could move with infantry manoeuvre elements and remain in support throughout an engagement.

An HNA infantry platoon of the future might comprise the following assets: two manoeuvre elements, each of twelve soldiers (possibly mounted in two vehicles); a suppression element of twelve soldiers (also mounted in two vehicles); and a command group, perhaps composed of six personnel (including a forward air observer, medic and communicator) mounted in a command vehicle. It is possible that the command group might ‘re-role’ into a situational reserve if required. The dedicated reserve could come from either the manoeuvre element or the suppression element, depending on the tactical situation. The configuration of the platoon would be all-arms, and the unit would be capable of both suppression and manoeuvre.
Improved information-age weapons provide for a discriminate application of lethal force. In this context, Australian infantry have already benefited from such information-age equipment as the introduction of night aiming devices (NADs) under Project Ninnox. In addition, the recently introduced Javelin anti-armour weapons system, optical sights, thermal imagery and GBLTD demonstrate the potential for improved operational effect. The introduction of these and other devices at the platoon level increases suppressive capability and facilitates effective support for a manoeuvre group that may need to be ‘stealthy’ in its movements.

One of the key recommendations from US combat teams’ experiences in the war in Iraq has been the need for all-arms action, particularly in suppression, in close urban combat. The recent action in Fallujah in April 2004 saw tanks effectively employed by infantry commanders as support-by-fire and attack-by-fire platforms. Quick-reaction forces were used to mark a Forward Line Own Troops (FLOT) in order to facilitate close air support, conduct reconnaissance by fire and execute platoon-level feints. These lessons from the US Army are relevant to Australian infantry. Lieutenant General Peter Leahy has made the following observation in relation to the HNA project:

Close combat remains the Army’s core business; it is the acme of professional skill. Moreover, close combat is what the Government directs the Army to provide to the ADF’s joint capability … [T]he Army seeks to take prudent steps to maintain its vital close-combat capability in order to achieve tactical decision. Close combat is dependent on effective combined-arms teams comprising balanced elements of infantry, armour, artillery, engineers, aviation and signals, supported by a range of ground- and air-based indirect fires and logistics support … [D]ecisions or mistakes in targeting become a weapon in insurgent information operations and are used to undermine Coalition attempts to bring stability.

While configurations of the ideal tactical combat team in urban warfare remain a subject of considerable debate, one aspect is clear: operations on the urban fringe or within city areas are an all-arms business. The need for an all-arms effect in modern ground and joint combat means that there must be effective communications in the battlespace. In terms of infantry section communications, there are several significant capability gaps that HNA must address in the future. Currently radio compatibility problems exist in the ADF; these problems tend to limit an infantry formation’s ability to coordinate offensive fires, manoeuvre assets and supply supporting assets. There is also an inability to operate in a joint environment. For instance, Royal Australian Air Force and Royal
Australian Navy assets operate predominantly in the high-frequency/ultra-high-frequency (HF/UHF) spectrum while Australian infantry operates in the very high frequency (VHF) band. Although there are communication modes available that span these different spectrums, significant training problems remain to be overcome, and a degree of communications incompatibility was demonstrated on the Crocodile exercise in 2003. If an infantry platoon is to be used to its full all-arms potential, then it must possess a first-rate communications capability in order to allow it to facilitate effective coordination of offensive fires in the joint domain.

CONCLUSION

Redefining the roles and capabilities of the Australian infantry is essential if infantry soldiers are to remain a potent and effective force in the battlespace. In Australian Army doctrine, suppression (through firepower) and manoeuvre are two of the three elements of combat power (the third is morale). As manoeuvre is more about efficiency and mobility rather than combat ratios, there should be a reassessment of its relationship to suppression. Historically, the weighting of suppression versus manoeuvre has been in favour of the latter. Today, with the advent of precision weapons, advanced battlespace communications, smaller and more powerful combat teams and the use of combined arms, a commander has the means to ensure that manoeuvre can be supported by effective and accurate suppression.

There is thus a requirement for the Australian infantry to reconsider its capability in a post-HNA environment, particularly in the area of organic suppression capabilities and in coordinating supporting fires in a joint environment. Paul Harris believes that change is necessary in order to ensure that foot soldiers do not become intoxicated by technology or blinded by science; it is all too easy for soldiers to lose touch with reality in warfare. After a couple of centuries of extremely rapid technological change the world’s most sophisticated and adaptable instrument of war is still the infantryman. 8
ENDNOTES

3  Kilcullen, ‘Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close Combat’, p. 38.
7  The Pintail team radio has provided effective communications internally to infantry platoons. However, the radio operates only in the VHF band; there is no UHF or HF capacity (unless issued by exception).

THE AUTHOR

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This article discusses US Marine Corps combined-arms tactics in Operation Iraqi Freedom in March and April 2003 by examining the way in which live force-experimentation was converted into actual combat effectiveness. Live force-experimentation conducted by Project Metropolis at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory proved to be a useful indication of real combat conditions. As a result, an analysis of Marine experimentation and its relationship with operational experience holds valuable lessons for the Australian Army as it embarks on the Hardening and Networking the Army (HNA) initiative.

**FIGHTING IN THE URBAN LITTORALS:**
**THE US MARINE CORPS FOCUS**

Improved urban combat capabilities became an integral part of Marine Corps operational thinking during the tenure of General Charles Krulak as Commandant in the mid-1990s, and a Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory was developed during 1995. General Krulak’s personal interest in preparing for urban combat was clear from his
frequent use of the phrase ‘three-block war’ as a means of capturing the complexity of military operations. An experimentation program named Urban Warrior was initiated by the Marines and was aimed at improving warfighting capabilities in cities. The program identified a number of key technologies for urban warfare, including intra-squad radios, thermal sights and mechanical breaching equipment. In addition, live force-experimentation quickly identified deficiencies in individual and collective training skills. Despite the advantages of advanced technology, specific techniques and tactics were required for urban combat.

**PROJECT METROPOLIS**

As a result of lessons drawn from the Urban Warrior program, the Marine Corps established Project Metropolis in 1999. The primary aim of this project was the development of a ‘base line’ training package aimed at increasing individual and unit proficiency in urban operations. The project’s hypothesis was that a properly trained and equipped Marine Air and Ground Task Force (MAGTF) could succeed in urban combat and sustain acceptable casualties. The development of such a training package was aimed at a general-purpose force employing combined-arms teams in an urban environment. A distinction of this nature was important because current close-quarter battle techniques—used by more specialised elements such as special operations forces and force reconnaissance units—were unsuitable for high-intensity urban warfare.

**BASIC URBAN SKILLS TRAINING**

Over a period of six years, Project Metropolis developed a Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST) syllabus designed to provide Marine infantry with urban combat skills. Employing mainly live force-experimentation, the BUST syllabus provided training for Marines in individual and collective skills within fire teams composed of four men and within squads consisting of thirteen men. Subsequently, the BUST syllabus was expanded to embrace a wider range of formations and tactics. These formations and tactics included platoons employing heavy weapons and snipers in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), and battalion-size landing teams operating as part of a MAGTF.

Marine divisions became willing to provide forces to the Warfighting Laboratory and Project Metropolis for the following reasons. First, the BUST syllabus was regarded as a valuable initiative. Second, the Warfighting Laboratory provided the latest training equipment that was often not readily available through normal service channels. Third, the use of ammunition from a Special Effects Small Marking system (SESAM) in the experimentation process proved to be an invaluable training tool in preparing for urban combat. The use of SESAM ammunition permitted a degree of
realism in the fire experimentation since at ranges of 75 m or less the effects could be painful. Moreover, the use of SESAM ammunition demonstrated that concealment did not equal cover. Through experimentation, Marines soon learnt that taking cover behind a plaster wall inside a house was unsafe and could result in quick casualties. The final advantage of the SESAM system was its employment of coloured ammunition that allowed participants to quickly see the results of exchanges of fire and to take appropriate measures in order to avoid fratricide. Through the above measures, the Project Metropolis team developed a training package whose value was soon understood within the Marine Corps.

**BUST AND COMBINED ARMS EXPERIMENTATION**

The final step in the development of the BUST program was the conduct of an experiment requiring the full integration of combined arms teams in forcible-entry operations. During the summer of 2002, Project Metropolis personnel conducted an experiment aimed at testing battalion-landing teams that would transition from warfighting to peace enforcement tasks in an intense and dangerous operational environment. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (3/7) became the designated experimental force. Attachments to the battalion included an M1 tank, armoured amphibious vehicle (AAV), and light-armoured vehicle (LAV) platoons. Other force elements assigned to the experimentation force included combat engineers and reconnaissance-and-combat service support troops.

Initially the entire battalion-landing team was trained in BUST techniques. Such an approach was important because it recognised the fact that all participating forces in urban combat, regardless of their tasks, must be trained to be familiar with the complexities of urban operations.\(^1\) BUST training for the experimental force was based on a three-week training schedule split into four five-day phases. The first five-day phase involved general training in urban operations for all participant elements, including infantry, armour, artillery and combat support troops. The second five-day training period was more specific in character and focused especially on close combat. A third five-day period involved platoon-level training concentrated on understanding vehicle capabilities and on the limitations of integrating combined arms in close combat. The final five days in the program involved company-level combined-arms teams training that was conducted within a battalion group command-and-control structure.

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… participating forces in urban combat, regardless of their tasks, must be trained to be familiar with the complexities of urban operations.

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On completion of build-up training, preparation of an urban warfare scenario commenced, in which the Marine Corps used role players and an opposing force. This sequence of training involved a battalion-landing team initiating an entry operation into the ‘city’. As the scenario unfolded, the battalion-landing team underwent a transition through the ‘three-block’ sequence—in particular from the Block III high-end fight to Block II operations involving peace enforcement. The experiment revealed a number of valuable lessons. First, the urban facility required in simulating an operation involving a battalion-landing team must be large—indeed, substantially larger than any urban training facility currently available to the US Marine Corps. In the 2002 experiment, the Marines made use of a former US Air Force facility, George Air Base in Victorville, California. Nearly 400 buildings, ranging from single to four stories in height, were made available from a former married quarter. This type of building complex is probably the minimum requirement for any realistic battalion-level activity in urban warfare. A second important lesson was the realisation by the US Marine Corps that the transition in operations from Block III to Block II modes is a true test of a military organisation’s adaptability and skills. Possessing military personnel that are capable of dealing with humanitarian issues while simultaneously fighting a highly trained enemy is a valuable capability for any unit in the field.

Project Metropolis produced a valuable training package that spanned all levels of activity for Marine battalion landing teams. The Third Battalion came away from the experimentation program with a level of experience whose full benefit would not be apparent until deployment as part of the 1st Marine Division to Iraq in 2003.

**PREPARING FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM**

Operation *Iraqi Freedom* presented numerous challenges to the 1st Marine Division, most notably in the area of distributed command and control. Despite significant advances in information collection at the operational level, the advance to Baghdad in April 2003 was largely based on information that Marine battalions had collected. Before D-Day, Coalition planning concentrated on the ‘opening gambit’ or the initial push into Iraq. Military activity aimed at seizing the Iraqi gas–oil separation plants before these were damaged—an action that operational planners saw as critical to the achievement of the Coalition’s strategy. The Commanding General 1st Marine Division, Major General James Mattis, gave clear and succinct guidance to all Marines down to unit level while in holding areas in Kuwait.

General Mattis’s clear exposition of the mission proved to be crucial once communications became difficult during operations. There were numerous instances in which battalion commanders were required to make decisions based on minimum
information from higher sources. Commanders relied on two primary means of information: that provided by organic manoeuvre elements and that provided by personal communication with higher commanders.

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications technology had advanced significantly since the Division’s previous operations in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Based primarily on very high frequency (VHF) communications, battalion-level command and control during Iraqi Freedom was often overstretched. Battalion forward elements often found themselves attempting to communicate with a headquarters situated 20 km in their rear. At the same time, the headquarters would, in turn, be trying to direct logistic elements another 20 km further back. Because VHF communications were often inadequate, satellite communications proved to be invaluable. Particular systems such as Blue Force Tracker provided enhanced situation awareness, while individual commanders could communicate with each other using satellite phones.

Communications at small-unit level were, however, greatly assisted by new VHF and UHF communication systems. Of particular importance was the employment of the UHF personal role radios (PRR) at the individual and small-team levels and the VHF/UHF Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) at the squad and platoon levels. These two radio systems permitted increased situational awareness within the urban combat environment of Iraq. Personal role and multi-band team radios allowed squad leaders to manoeuvre their fire teams in accordance with their platoon commander’s directions. In addition, multi-band team radios allowed squad leaders to direct critical close air-support from both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The ability of ground forces to bring air support to bear was vital because in urban combat conditions in Iraq, traditional forward air-controllers were often unable to view targets. Personal role radios allowed Marines at the team level (four Marines) to communicate with their squad leader at ranges of between 100 and 500 m. This ability was valuable during convoy operations, when vehicle commanders were able to pass fire directions to Marines operating missiles and heavy guns from the turrets of vehicles.

Earlier, Marine Corps experimentation in tank and infantry cooperation had demonstrated that use of a tank telephone would be important in integrating infantry–tank efforts in urban combat. As a result, shortly before Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps Abrams tanks were retrofitted with the VIC 3 tank telephone. This communications device proved critical during combat, particularly for tank crewmen who were unable to discriminate between military and civilian targets in urban areas. The telephone provided an additional ‘eye’ for tank crews and increased their ability to engage targets with confidence and precision.
THE COMMANDER’S PRESENCE

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine commanders often placed themselves well forward during close fighting. It was not uncommon for a divisional commander to be physically present at a battalion action while coordinating manoeuvre elsewhere by use of a satellite telephone. Similarly, battalion commanders often moved forward with rifle companies to those locations that they considered to be at ‘the point of most friction’. While these command techniques were often successful, it was also risky since the history of warfare is replete with exposed commanders killed by sniper fire. Fortunately, in Iraq there were few encounters with trained snipers and, as a result, most unit commanders felt comfortable moving forward during combat engagements.

COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS

It was evident from the author’s discussions with individual Marines that the enemy, although fierce when encountered in pockets of resistance, was not coordinated at any high level in Iraq. Indeed, there were some instances in Iraq in which dispersed enemy groups would ambush a Marine armoured column, only to fire on each other because of their lack of tactical coordination. Ultimately, many Marines felt that there was no opposition in Iraq that could not be overcome by well-trained and well-equipped combined-arms teams, ranging from rifle companies to battalion-level units. Marine battalions fighting as landing-team entry forces and employing combined arms possessed significant warfighting capability. A battalion-level team fighting as part of a MAGTF could also call on rotary- and fixed-wing air-support.

… many Marines felt that there was no opposition in Iraq that could not be overcome by well-trained and well-equipped combined-arms teams …

COMBAT IN IRAQ AND BATTALION LANDING TEAMS

During Iraqi Freedom, assaults by Marine Corps battalion-landing teams were often spearheaded by M1AI Abrams tanks. The tanks would penetrate urban areas, seeking to secure any high-speed routes for follow-on logistic elements. Tank and mechanised units also would secure specific advantage points near built-up areas in order to allow combined arms teams to begin penetrating urban areas. If contact was made with the enemy, the Abrams tanks would seek to identify the source of the hostile fire. If the armour could not identify the source of enemy activity, then mechanised infantry teams would deploy and ‘talk on’ the tanks until they located and destroyed the enemy positions. The mechanised infantry team employing
Some Observations of US Marine Urban Combined-arms Operations in Iraq

Heavy machine-guns, grenade launchers and other weapons systems would seek to mark the path towards targets for the Abrams tanks. Under these conditions, the choice of munitions was critical. For instance, the SABOT round usually proved unsuitable in the urban environment because of its powerful capability to penetrate multiple buildings. In its place, the multipurpose antitank (MPAT) round with variable fuze settings proved to be far more effective for urban combat.

Close Air-Attack and Fire Support in Iraq

In Iraq, the type of close air-support employed by the four US services—the Marines, the US Air Force, the US Navy and the Army—was based on three tactical levels determined by a risk assessment of collateral damage occurring. Type one of close air-support required forward air-controllers to synchronise attacking aircraft and the designated target using visual means. This tactic was important in situations where carefully coordinated control of air attack was necessary due to the proximity of friendly troops or innocent civilians.

Type two of close air-support was employed whenever a forward air-controller could not see the target, but might still be able to vector the aircraft attack onto its objective based on a ‘talk on’ from a forward observer. This tactic was useful at night, or in adverse weather conditions. Finally, type three of close air-support attack was used when the level of risk to friendly forces and civilian noncombatants was low. When in contact with aircraft, forward air-controllers would normally announce the close air-support type that was to be employed. The most common close air-support types used in Operation Iraqi Freedom were types two and three.

Other methods of fire support involved combat elements that were formed into combined anti-armour teams. Such teams—equipped with grenade launchers, heavy machine guns and tube-launched optically tracked wire-guided (TOW) missiles—supported Marine infantry fighting through the urban centers or deployed to the flanks of towns in order to interdict the reinforcement or withdrawal of enemy forces.
forces. The combined anti-armour teams provided accurate suppressive fire, with TOW missiles being used to strike at point targets in the upper stories of buildings. These teams could also undertake snap engagements with TOW missiles since the weapons system could also be used as a general weapon of suppression.

The tactics that the Iraqis employed often involved fighting from entrenchments situated at the base of buildings or under palm trees in order to avoid aerial observation. The Iraqis assumed that attempting to engage American forces from within buildings would quickly lead to targeting by US aircraft and cut off any chance of withdrawal and escape. As a result, enemy units would often wait until the lead elements of mechanised and armoured teams were within 100 m of their positions and then open fire with a volley of rocket-propelled grenades. Upon coming under fire, Marine tanks and mechanised elements would break into small groups in which armour would cooperate with infantry squads. The infantry would direct armoured firepower onto enemy positions, with tank telephones providing communications between the two fighting elements.

SOME LESSONS FROM CLOSE COMBAT IN IRAQ

One of the most important factors in the ultimate success of the Marines in urban close combat involved the ability of the Abrams tank to survive multiple hits from a variety of anti-armoured weapons and thus remain in close support of the assault infantry. Both Marine infantry and tank crews developed an intimate knowledge of each other’s capabilities and limitations. Without such knowledge and cooperation each combat arm was vulnerable in urban operations. Significantly, those Marine units with training experience in combined arms warfare conducted prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom enjoyed early operational success.

Another useful lesson from urban operations in Iraq was the need to equip the infantry with suitable organic firepower for close-range fighting at both below street
level and in elevated buildings. A weapons system that requires ‘powering up’ and optical target acquisition is unsuitable in an urban combat environment. Marine infantry discovered that there was a critical requirement that all elements of the combined arms team possess a detailed knowledge of the effects of their various weapons in close combat. This knowledge is critical when employing air–ground weapons systems in close proximity to friendly troops or civilians. Thus, the Marines expressed preferences for MPAT over SABOT, for using direct and indirect weapons in close fighting and for precision artillery.

The Marine Corps also discovered that individual fire from the M-16 rifle at close range was not always effective in bringing enemy combatants down quickly, especially if those combatants were fighting under the apparent influence of narcotics. Moreover, grenades thrown in close combat would be tossed back at friendly forces if the latter did not allow them to ‘cook off’ initially. The Marines also discovered that thermobaric weapons, employed at the infantry squad level, had limited effect if personnel armed with them lacked live firing practice. Many Marines reported that it was only when troops mastered the correct techniques that thermobaric weapons proved devastating in urban combat.

**SOME COMPLICATIONS IN THE URBAN BATTLESPACE**

There were several complicating factors experienced by Marine forces operating in Iraq that are worth noting. A unique feature of the fighting throughout Iraqi urban areas was the constant presence of civilians. Regardless of the intensity of a battle and the power and range of the weapons being employed, Iraqi residents usually remained at home and in some cases watched the fighting closely. Many Marines found this behaviour to be somewhat unusual, until they realised that the Iraqis had endured decades of dictatorship and that the presence of military forces and weapons on the streets was not foreign to a majority of them.

Most Marines believed that the persistent presence of civilians in a warfighting zone is an operational aspect that needs to be incorporated into future urban combat training. In addition, the intermixing of

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**Another useful lesson from urban operations in Iraq was the need to equip the infantry with suitable organic firepower for close-range fighting ...**

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**A unique feature of the fighting throughout Iraqi urban areas was the constant presence of civilians.**

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Iraqi civilians with Iraqi combatants created complications for the Marines. For instance, despite configuring battalion-landing teams for warfighting, the Marines found that some elements had to be dedicated to humanitarian activities. There also appeared to be little or no time between the end of a close-combat engagement and the appearance of civilians on the streets. Many Marines were amazed by this phenomenon. Local people and vehicles moving immediately into close proximity of the Marines often compromised the safety buffer that followed completion of a successful fire-fight. Under these conditions, operational security, especially the risk of an attack by suicide bombers, became a real problem.

In conditions of urban warfare, the Marines also found that friendly, non-combatant and enemy casualties often required medical treatment simultaneously. On a number of occasions the Marine medical system was overwhelmed by a large number of noncombatant casualties. Yet another lesson was that language barriers were not confined to the spoken word. Marines on the streets discovered that the common Western hand signal for halt was, in Iraq, regarded as a sign to continue approaching. Given the threat of suicide bombers in vehicles, the problem of a misunderstanding by noncombatants approaching military checkpoints became another difficult problem for the Marines to control. Finally, it is useful to note that the use of non-lethal weapons by the Marine Corps in Iraq was largely ineffective. The majority of the Iraqi people had never seen a baton gun, beanbag or CS canister fired before. As a result, crowds could not discriminate between weapons. As a result, the brandishing of non-lethal munitions could result in a violent response from Iraqi crowds and escalate an incident. Accordingly, to avoid confusion and escalation of a crisis, the 1st Marine Division decided not to employ non-lethal weapons.

**CONCLUSION**

From the mid-1990s onwards, the US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory began to prepare for urban warfare through concept development and experimentation. The aim was to uncover improved methods to fight, survive and win in built-up urban areas. The development of the BUST package allowed the Marine Corps to develop a combined arms team approach to urban combat that was, and is, probably the best in the world. The Marine Corps’ long preparation for urban warfare was vindicated by the fighting during Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and by its insurgent aftermath. As the Australian Army embarks on the HNA initiative and seeks to...
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develop a combined arms capability in the land force, two important lessons can be drawn from the US Marine experience. The first of these lessons is the vital need for any military force to use concept development as a prelude to urban combat. The second lesson is that there is no substitute for live force-experimentation when a professional military force trains for urban combat.

Endnote

1 Experimentation had shown that all combat elements that enter the urban environment must be capable of fighting in that environment regardless of specialty.

The Author

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The Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) interest in networked operations is hardly recent, although it may seem so at times. Since the 1991 Gulf War, Australian military professionals have understood that better networked forces would be one of the key aspects of the future battlespace. Since that time, in various guises, we have been developing a range of networking capabilities in all three Australian services but usually with an environmental rather than a holistic or joint focus. For the ADF, network-centric warfare (NCW) is a means to an end and not an end in itself. We anticipate that it will assist us to achieve the strategic priorities that the government has given us—namely the defence of Australia and its national interests, and support for allies and friends.

Within the ADF, the NCW program office has been established and a network implementation team has commenced its work. Moreover, the Defence Department has devised and is implementing the NCW Roadmap. In the face of these developments, it is time to begin exploring what lies a little further down the road in the evolution of networking.
It is time to look forward in order to try to identify those alligators that may, in time, disrupt our collective boat on the journey towards a networked and seamless defence force. This article seeks to pose a variety of questions about NCW by relating the process of networking to the intellectual study of the future security environment. Identifying the key drivers of the future security environment is an exercise that the ADF has become intimately involved with over the course of the past decade. However, the aim of this article is not to cover the precepts or costs and benefits of NCW.

In his book *Foundations of Future Studies*\(^1\), the Canadian scholar, Professor Wendell Bell, examines the history of futurology and the aims of what is often called futures studies, along with its linkages to strategic planning. This article will examine the future of networked warfighting through the lens of Bell’s interesting work. In particular, the framework of Bell’s nine assumptions about future studies will be employed as a starting point to pose some questions that may be at the heart of networked warfighting.

**ASSUMPTION 1: ‘TIME IS CONTINUOUS, LINEAR, UNIDIRECTIONAL AND IRREVERSIBLE’\(^2\)**

Professor Bell’s statement alerts us to the problem of time in achieving military modernisation. In the history of military innovation, the length of time taken to implement significant change is generally between ten and twenty years. Such a gestation period approximates to an entire Army career. Over a period spanning up to two decades, an officer moves from a lieutenant in command of a platoon to eventually assume the rank of lieutenant colonel in command of a battalion. Indeed, most military innovation in the 20th century has occurred not only over a long period, but also generally in between conflicts.\(^3\)

A good example of the phenomenon of lengthy innovation is the development of carrier-based aviation between the world wars. The inter-war period was an era in which enemies such as Japan and Germany could be identified and military organisations such as the US Navy could concentrate on preparing for a war at sea in which naval aviation would play a key role. In short, in the 1920s and 1930s, military organisations possessed the precious commodity of time to innovate and develop their force structures and weapons systems. In the early 21st century we no longer have the luxury of time or of clearly defined opponents.
The character of warfare has changed over the past decade and, as a result, we face a variety of transnational adversaries and other non-state actors intent on avoiding traditional interstate combat while seeking to change the global security environment.

In an era of asymmetry and surprise attack, Western militaries no longer have the breathing space of ‘inter-war’ periods to innovate and change. Indeed, in retrospect, the 1990s proved to be an inter-war decade; however, given the first Gulf War, multiple peace enforcement operations and crises in Bosnia and Somalia, few security analysts recognised those years in such a way. In the first quarter of the 21st century, we may be constantly involved in military operations; as a result, our efforts at innovation and attempts at organisational change must occur in the midst of deployments. Because of such realities, any form of innovation—including NCW—must involve a greater degree of risk than it did in the 20th century. One could argue that NCW is an initiative in our Defence Force that is being implemented in a wartime environment, albeit one that does not involve mass military mobilisation on the 20th-century model.

While it is arguable whether Australia is at war in the traditional interstate sense, we must move forward and not wait for a more ‘peaceful’ period in which to network our force. It is precisely because of this reality that the ADF adopted a ‘learn by doing’ approach to the NCW program. It is a conceptual approach to change that accepts that mistakes will be made in the development of networked forces. However, if it is accepted that we are in a period of prolonged conflict, too much focus on organisational change such as NCW may have the effect of compromising current operations. The lack of a classic ‘inter-war period’ means that achieving a correct balance of investment between current and future operations is more important now than ever before. A reasoned assessment of this balance will determine whether or not we can afford NCW as we currently envision the initiative.

**ASSUMPTION 2: ‘NOT EVERYTHING THAT WILL EXIST HAS EXISTED OR DOES EXIST’**

In many respects, Bell’s second assumption contradicts the old saying that ‘there is nothing new under the sun’. Whether something is new is, of course, partly a matter of perception. For example, to the Germans in 1940, *Blitzkrieg* doctrine represented an evolution in warfare based on twenty years of reflection on the lessons of World War I. *Blitzkrieg* was a technique that combined some older capabilities such as combined arms warfare and indirect artillery fire with some new ones such as...
mechanisation, tactical aviation and radio communications. For the French, however, the 1940 Blitzkrieg represented the shock of the new and unknown, as can be seen by the results of German operations in the Ardennes and around Sedan.

Similarly, as Bell’s second assumption suggests, NCW is an aggregation of existing and emerging concepts and technologies. However, it is the emergent properties of NCW that hold the possibility of innovation in terms of linking sensors, weapons systems and command support elements to achieve a more collaborative approach to decision-making in combat. The people that will use the enhanced networks in a decade from now will not be those that grew up without the Internet. In 2015, networks will be dominated by those that cannot imagine a time without 24-hour access to mobile phones with digital cameras. NCW technologies of the future are likely to include some foreseen but also some new and disruptive innovation. As a result, we may discover that 20th-century methods and organisations may not be suitable for future challenges. If military forces are to engage in enhanced networking and eventually make connectivity as reliable as combustion engines, one side-effect may be to invalidate many of the underpinnings of our current organisations and styles of command and control.

**ASSUMPTION 3: ‘WE CAN’T CONsciously ACT WITHOUT THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE’**

Strategic planning, that is long-term planning, is an essential component of any approach to the development and implementation of a NCW system. As the late American scholar, Carl Builder, once wrote, ‘every organisation needs an idea of itself—a concept, a strategy, a notion of who it is and what it wants to be, of what it is about and what it wants to be about. A concept which is a source of inspiration and a means for explaining its actions, if only to itself’.[sic]

The ADF’s NCW Roadmap provides some useful insights into what the Australian military aspires to be. Networking is a combat support system and is aimed at making our military personnel more effective at warfighting.
Accordingly, a vision of the future ADF is required that encompasses our aspirations for NCW. While we have taken the first steps with prescriptive documents such as Force 2020 (2002) and the Future Warfighting Concept (2003), it is not apparent that the ADF yet has a coherent view of future warfare and of the effects that may be generated by new weapons technology.

Other nations have attempted to grapple with future warfare planning through assorted ‘transformation plans’. The best known of these is the United States Department of Defense approach as seen through the Office of Force Transformation headed, until recently, by Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski. While the use of the term transformation engenders a degree of resistance within the ADF, we need to consider a similar program. Such a program is necessary in order to ensure that we are able to measure the effectiveness of the implementation of NCW and balance investment in networking against other vital components of capability in the future ADF.

**ASSUMPTION 4: ‘IN MAKING OUR WAY IN THE WORLD, BOTH INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY, THE MOST USEFUL KNOWLEDGE IS KNOWLEDGE OF THE FUTURE’**

One of the most important aspects of activity in the work of any modern military organisation is the effort to explore the contours of the likely future security environment. Currently, such study is focused on examining globalisation, demographic trends and the structure of international relations. In terms of implementing NCW, however, it is the examination of the impact of technology that is the most important feature of futures analysis.

While ADF efforts in the field of future technology remain in their infancy, there are already interesting questions related to NCW in the areas of quantum computing and quantum encryption. For example, if we are, in the future, able to develop and employ quantum encryption (as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology recently demonstrated), such a development would enhance the reliability of information shared in the

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In the ADF we must ensure that we employ experimentation in a way that enables us to make the best decisions about the level of networking that is possible and desirable.
network. Encrypted information systems may act to increase the level of trust in networked systems, and such communications may mean that signal intelligence capabilities may begin to become obsolete.

Another useful tool in the development of futures analysis is our experimentation capability. Experimentation offers a military organisation the ability to explore potential futures—across a range of subject areas—prior to investment in highly sophisticated and very expensive new weapons, sensor, transportation, and communications systems. In the ADF we must ensure that we employ experimentation in a way that enables us to make the best decisions about the level of networking that is possible and desirable.

**ASSUMPTION 5: ‘THE FUTURE CAN’T BE OBSERVED, AND THEREFORE THERE ARE NO FACTS ABOUT THE FUTURE’**

Military organisations are often accused of designing the future rather than predicting it. In stating that NCW will deliver a range of benefits, we are assuming that the ADF’s specific design will succeed. Yet there is no certainty that NCW will significantly enhance the way we as a military force conduct operations. Does, then, the ADF need a hedging strategy in case the NCW experiment falls short of expectations in terms of delivering decision superiority within the battlespace? In the ADF we need to be aware of the law of unintended consequences in the sense that collaborative and devolved decision-making via networks may cause information overload, command gridlock and even a degree of chaos in operations.

**ASSUMPTION 6: ‘THE FUTURE IS NOT TOTALLY PRE-DETERMINED’**

In the future an Australian networked military force may well not conform to our assumptions. This lack of conformity between assumption and reality may emerge simply because the single services tend to design their future operations around current (or slightly modified) forces with an overlay of network improvements based on today’s knowledge. In 1914 the European armies expected to fight a more sophisticated version of the 1870 Franco-Prussian War or, at worst, of the 1905 Russo-Japanese War. Very few military analysts anticipated a trench warfare deadlock on the Western Front. Similarly, the reality in the early 21st century may be that future networks will create an operational environment that cannot be anticipated or predetermined.
Finding Alligators

The professional military inclination is always to seek to control change since control means order and predictability. It is a military characteristic to try to plan, to the last detail, the evolution of the ADF’s networked force. Yet it is almost certain that the consequences of networking the force will contain unpredictable features.

Unpredictability should not be feared. It is a situation that can be advantageous in the sense that such a situation is capable of yielding opportunities. The ADF needs to introduce the network and follow its implications in a ‘learn by doing’ approach. In his book on the Manhattan Project of the 1940s to construct the first atomic bomb, US Brigadier General Leslie Groves, who directed the project, noted that ‘nothing would be more fatal to [American atomic] success than to try to arrive at a perfect plan before taking any important step’.11 It is necessary for the ADF to adopt Groves’s philosophy in the implementation of the NCW Roadmap. The latter provides us with a general direction, but we must possess the imagination to exploit unforeseen opportunities as they arise.

**Assumption 7: ‘To a greater or lesser degree, future outcomes can be influenced by individual and collective action’**12

At a 2004 conference on NCW in London, the theory of networking and its possible implications in the human dimension were subjects of discussion. Interestingly, the theoretical sessions attracted over 150 delegates. In contrast, discussion of the all-important human dimension was confined to little more than a dozen conference participants. Yet the future of NCW as a theory of war is dependent on the interaction of the network with human beings. In the ADF, we have sought to ensure that the human dimension of networked warfare is not neglected and a study team led by Leoni Warne has attempted to develop insights into what a networked force may mean for the individual warfighter.

Several of the Warne team’s findings are of interest. First, the team found that the element of human trust is vital to networking. A military technical network does not negate the requirement for individual and group relationships. On the contrary, information-sharing and collaboration require interpersonal skills and a degree of group interaction. Second, for successful networking to occur, the study team found a distinct requirement for a robust military education and training system that is both joint and professional. Such a system would produce high-quality personnel. In other words, the ADF needs to invest in human intellectual capital as much as tech-
nology. What financial investment advisers call the miracle of compound interest may be applicable in the human dimension of NCW. Such an investment in human intellectual capital requires that the professional military education continuum include areas such as economics, geopolitics and technology as subjects of study. In an age of whole-of-government security strategy, military professionals require an expanded curriculum and a broad-based education.

ASSUMPTION 8: ‘INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE WORLD INVITES A HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE AND A TRANS-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH’

In the ADF’s projected NCW Roadmap, the Military Strategy Branch recommended a more holistic approach to developing military capability. Such a holistic approach to implementing NCW will require more than examining intended and unintended overlaps in capability and various enhancements to equipment connectivity. Rather, a robust NCW capability should be concentrated on enhancing interdepartmental connectivity, and forging common staff and organisational procedures. To this end, the ADF has become involved in exploring what has been termed a national effects-based approach to strategy. To date, this approach has primarily examined the procedural aspects of interdepartmental coordination as an important aspect of our NCW implementation in both the human and technical dimensions of different organisational cultures. A national effects-based strategy demands wide synchronisation of activities through a harnessing and channelling of the diversity among different departments.

Another important aspect of NCW involves examining the convergence of different types of technological innovation. The focus on networking development has been through the lens of information technology. Yet, it is clear that a range of other disciplines—such as quantum effects, nanotechnology, bio-nanotechnology, biotechnology and genomics—may, in the future, influence the ADF’s capacity to develop a better-networked force. The road to an efficient networked force requires a multi-disciplinary intellectual approach.
ASSUMPTION 9: ‘SOME FUTURES ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS’

A neglected area of NCW endeavour is the ethical dilemmas involved in networking. Ethics and networking are related in that information overload is a hazard of information systems. Recourse to automated decision-making and artificial intelligence systems as a means of dealing with the huge quantity of data delivered raises an ethical dilemma. This dilemma concerns how much decision-making should be devolved to machines when that decision-making vitally affects military personnel in the battlespace. This is a fundamental question that may have to be addressed in the ADF’s search for better connectivity and collaboration.

CONCLUSION

In the past twelve months, the Chief of the Defence Force and the respective Service Chiefs have endorsed the concept of a future networked force within the ADF. The ADF’s Military Strategy Branch has developed a NCW Roadmap, and an NCW Program Office and Implementation Team has been established. A Rapid Prototyping, Development and Evaluation Program is also about to begin operating in 2005. Yet our implementation of networked warfighting demands that we continue to engage in a rigorous intellectual examination of the basics of the concept. Important questions remain unanswered as we forge into a future that is uncertain and unknown. For example, what is an appropriate balance of investment in NCW as opposed to other elements of military force development?

Will NCW deliver military professionals the kind of capabilities that they anticipate? We can be sure of only one factor: futures analysis, being a human activity, is always hazardous, with great margins for error. In many ways, when examining the future, the journey is as important as the destination. A methodology of analysis and how to develop sound analytical assessment can be a valuable product of futures analysis. In this respect, the alligators are ever present and they surround the ship of the future. We can only avoid a collision with the alligators if our navigation is sure and our capacity to react and change as circumstances demand has been honed by intellectual rigour.

In many ways, when examining the future, the journey is as important as the destination.
ENDNOTES

2 Ibid., p. 140.
4 Department of Defence, Enabling Future Warfighting: Network Centric Warfare, Canberra, 2004, p. 4-2.
5 Bell, Foundations of Future Studies, p. 141.
6 Ibid., p. 142.
8 Bell, Foundations of Future Studies, p. 144.
9 Ibid., p. 148.
10 Ibid., p. 150.
11 Leslie M. Groves, Now it can be told: The Story of the Manhattan Project, Da Capo Press, New York, 1983.
13 Ibid., p. 155.
14 Ibid., p. 157.

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OVER the past decade, the combined impact of change in the strategic environment and the development of network-enabling technologies have propelled proponents of network-centric warfare (NCW) into the mainstream of military thought. Although defining NCW remains problematic, advocates such as John Gartska, the Assistant Director for Concepts and Operations in the US Defense Department’s Office of Force Transformation, have argued that the term describes how a networked force fights. Gartska defines NCW as:

A robustly networked force [that] improves information sharing. Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information and shared situational awareness. Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command.¹

In many ways, NCW appears to be an idea that is driving policy formulation in several advanced military organisations, including the Australian Department of Defence. The philosopher Donald Schön would recognise NCW as being an ‘idea in good currency’.² Ideas in good currency are powerful because policy-makers can win resources through the use of such ideas to shift the language of policy debate by establishing new vocabulary and syntax.
Schön goes on to argue that ideas in good currency change over time, are usually few in number and often lag well behind changing events. A society has only enough space to absorb a limited number of ideas. Because a social system is usually conservative in its structural, technological and conceptual dimensions, what precipitates ideational change is a disruptive event or sequence of events, which sets up a demand for new ideas. At this point, ideas already present in marginal areas of the society begin to penetrate into the mainstream and are diffused. As Schön puts it:

The [new] ideas become powerful as centres of policy debate and political conflict. They gain widespread acceptance through the efforts of those who push or ride them through the fields of force created by the interplay of interests and commitments... When the ideas are taken up by people already powerful in society this gives them a kind of legitimacy and completes their power to change public policy. After this, the ideas become an integral part of the conceptual dimension of the social system and appear, in retrospect, obvious.

The purpose of this article is to show that the philosophies accompanying NCW technology will have their greatest impact on the sociology of Australian defence. It argues that the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) capacity to absorb, manage and integrate technological innovation will be the key step in making the transition to a network-enabled force. Networked warfare may be a new ‘idea in good currency’ but it must mature before it is in Schön’s words an ‘integral’ and ‘obvious’ part of the Department of Defence’s social system.

‘TOTO, I HAVE A FEELING WE’RE NOT IN KANSAS ANYMORE’: NCW AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

Philosophically, proponents of NCW believe that the power of technology can resolve uncertainty and so lift the age-old ‘fog of war’. Such a technocentric philosophy appeals to many of the ADF’s uniformed professionals because the idea that every problem has a mechanistic solution remains central to Australian military culture. As the leading historian of technology, Professor Elting E. Morison noted in 1966: ‘military organizations are societies built around and upon the prevailing weapon systems. Intuitively and quite correctly the military man feels that a change in weapons portends a change in the arrangement of this society.’

Unfortunately, a technological philosophy ignores the reality that each new technical development redefines the connections between the various social components of the military and often demands a change in collective and individual behaviour. Focusing narrowly on technical innovation can inhibit an organisation’s ability to identify the corresponding social and educational changes. While many Australian military professionals profess a theoretical commitment to the human dimension
of NCW, in practice, the organisational focus of strategy, policy and resource allocation continues to remain firmly fixed on resolving the technical issues of military change.

The movement towards NCW is overwhelmingly a technology-driven transformation. Various champions of NCW, notably Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski—until recently the Director of the US Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation—believe that the transition towards networked warfare represents a ‘paradigm shift’ for the profession of arms. Yet, the veracity of this claim depends on the ability of today’s military leaders to introduce and support a regime of change that is not only technical but also cultural in character.

US military operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq between 2001 and 2005 have shown how an advanced military force benefits from possessing increased connectivity between its combat arms. During the 2001–02 war in Afghanistan, the US Office of Force Transformation noted:

In Afghanistan, Special Operating Forces are lightly armed, but very well connected to networks. They know where they are in relation to other Special Operating Forces and they also know where the enemy is. Our fighting forces are themselves sensors and they are connected to weapons systems and platforms that are capable of delivering enormous firepower.

Operations in Afghanistan conferred a degree of new credibility on networked warfare and, as a result, heightened the desire of the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) to keep abreast of the technical developments in connectivity. However, as with all new ideas, there remains a persistent concern that, if the ADO does not manage the complex transition towards a networked force with holistic skill and dexterity, then Australian forces may be able to operate faster but not necessarily with greater capability. In 1854, the American writer, Henry Thoreau, noted that introducing technology without social change merely created a situation in which ‘inventions are wont to be pretty toys, which distract our attention from serious things. They are improved means to unimproved ends’.

… a technological philosophy ignores the reality that each new technical development redefines the connections between the various social components of the military …
TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANISATION: THE ABU GHRAIB SCANDAL OF 2004

The impact of technology on organisation is well demonstrated by the 2004 Iraqi prison scandal. In response to questioning from the US House Armed Services Committee on the treatment of Iraqi prisoners, the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, highlighted the challenges posed by widely available and connected modern technologies:

I wish I knew how you reach down into a criminal investigation when... it turns out to be something that is radioactive, something that has strategic impact in the world. We don't have those procedures. They've never been designed. We're functioning... with peacetime constraints, with legal requirements, in a wartime situation, in the Information Age... People are running around with digital cameras and taking these unbelievable photographs and then passing them off, against the law, to the media, to our surprise, when... they had not even arrived in the Pentagon.9

The innocent surprise expressed in the Secretary of Defense's voice as he spoke these words seem odd for an individual who had worked hard for technological solutions to military problems. However, as he continued to speak, Rumsfeld seemed struck by the realisation that, in an organisational sense, the worst facet of the Iraqi prisoner scandal was the novelty of digital photography:

My worry today is that there's some other procedure or some other habit that's 20th century, that is normal process, 'the way we've always done it,'... a peacetime approach to the world, and [then] there's some other process that we haven't discovered yet that needs to be modernized to [meet] the 21st century... in this case, for example, of digital cameras [sic]. And trying to figure out what that is before it, too, causes something like this [the prison scandal]... is my nightmare.10

It is important to note that Rumsfeld's nightmare was not about technology per se, but about its social impact on traditional organisational systems. In the Abu Ghraib scandal, commonly available networked digital technology placed on the World Wide Web outpaced the ability of established American legal and organisational practices to respond to a crisis. Once the photographs were aired globally in April 2004, their pervasive reality eclipsed the fact that Central Command (CENTCOM) had publicly addressed...

In the Abu Ghraib scandal, commonly available networked digital technology ... outpaced the ability of established American legal and organisational practices to respond to a crisis.
the abuse issue in a January 2004 press release. However, CENTCOM treated the photographs as an official criminal investigative matter rather than as an issue with explosive public relations and therefore, political, ramifications. As a result, when the photographs became publicly available, the senior levels of the Department of Defense were not adequately prepared to respond to the outcry from Congress and the American public.11 In short, 21st-century networked, digital technology simply short-circuited 20th-century organisational practice and the actions of a few soldiers undermined US government policy over Iraq.

The Abu Ghraib incident highlights the difficulties and complexities of force transformation and demonstrates that a technological focus is never enough. Among ADF military professionals, NCW is described as achieving ‘a greater level of situational awareness, coordination, and offensive potential than is currently the case’12. Increased situational awareness is viewed as a technological phenomenon; yet, if the pace of fundamental organisational reform is neglected in favour of technology, then the likelihood of eventual failure in networking increases markedly. In a broader organisational sense, Rumsfeld’s ‘nightmare’ is perfectly valid. Just like Dorothy in Frank Baum’s famous Wizard of Oz, we, in the advanced militaries in general and in the ADF in particular, are ‘not in Kansas any more’.

MILITARY SYSTEMS AS SOCIO–TECHNICAL NETWORKS

Networks are complex systems that, unlike hierarchies, thrive on connectivity, flattened command structures and ‘peer-to-peer’ nodes of communication.13 In large interdependent networks, a long chain-of-command dependency means that small failures can echo across a network. In the future, as network complexity increases, solutions to problems in one node are likely to require parallel adjustments to behaviour in other nodes. Hence, the strategic effect of the Iraqi prisoner images was to ‘gridlock’ the US diplomatic, administrative and military networks.

Node relationships within a network are constantly shifting in shape. As dependency and connectivity grow across a network, so the size and influence of existing nodes begins to lessen. The Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, has tacitly admitted this...
phenomenon. In a recent speech, he noted that ‘we [in the Army] are on the cusp of an era when every soldier will be an individual node in the networked battle group: a strategic private’. Effectively, networks and instant connectivity now permit tactical actors to have strategic impact—as was the case in the Abu Ghraib crisis, when the actions of a few prison guards enveloped the White House in the ensuing scandal.

A utopian view of NCW is often a ‘clear fine day’ in which the commander can see all before him. Yet the reality may be ‘a pea soup fog’ in which no commander can act with any certainty. Networked technologies may reduce uncertainty, but they may also amplify uncertainty. Three scenarios are worth considering. First, while technology can deliver a greater quantity of accurate data, the decision loop involved might be so radically shortened that response time may be reduced to a bare minimum, thus affecting time for considered military judgment. Second, although technology may enable a potential strategic private to draw on an array of battlefield assets, he is likely to be increasingly disassociated from the results of his decentralised decision-making. Third, while technology promises a theoretical decentralisation of battle control, it offers senior commanders greater central direction of warfighting. In conditions of uncertainty, commanders might prefer centralisation of responsibility in a headquarters to decentralised control. In a fluid, decentralised battlespace in which mistakes can be magnified from the tactical to the strategic levels, cautious senior commanders may not wish to rely on decision-making by junior personnel.

The above scenarios reflect the difficult questions that NCW poses for Australian military professionals and defence policy-makers. Most of the problems emanating from networking are not technical or economic, but cultural and social, in character. Unfortunately, cultural and social issues are those that the ADF has the greatest difficulty in confronting and resolving. Unlike technological issues, cultural and social problems do not have clear-cut solutions. Increasingly, we must view the Department of Defence as a complex and interdependent socio-technical network if change is to be successfully implemented. If the Department adopts such a mental approach, then ADF planners will be in a better position to work towards creating the seamless force of 2020.
A socio-technical approach towards networking offers two major advantages. First, viewing the social and technical challenges of NCW as mutually dependent enables analysts to examine a broader range of problems. Second, a socio-technical approach to networking allows uniformed professionals and defence policy-makers to manage organisational issues in the context of an evolving learning system. At present, the hierarchical model of the ADF continues to operate on the central principle of ‘declared wisdom’—that is, knowledge and expertise are directly proportionate to the rank and status of individuals in the hierarchy. A social learning approach to networking would assist in a move toward a more inclusive ‘social learning model’—a model that seeks information, knowledge and experience regardless of positional status. A learning approach to organisational evolution would maximise the strengths of increased connectivity and interdependence.

According to defence industry, the ADF’s aspiration to be a network-enabled force positions it as an ‘astute second-phase early adopter of new technologies’—a position that is closer to the leading edge of technology. However, the corollary of such a position is that the ADF should also be at the forefront of continued cultural and social change. For the ADF, rich in history and tradition, these types of changes are likely to represent a significant challenge. It is unclear whether Australia’s military leaders and defence policy-makers have the ability to generate sustained changes to an organisational culture and create an ‘institutional architecture’ that allows innovation to flourish. As the godfather of NCW, Vice Admiral Cebrowski has remarked: ‘the inherent cultural changes [of force transformation] are the most difficult and protracted.’

**THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF CHANGE**

Military intellectual trends tend to reflect the social trends of the day and, in this respect, NCW is a clear reflection of the process of globalisation. Balancing the natural tension between the nature of war and the inclinations of civil society requires the military to manage the interactions between the four main ingredients of institutional change: technology, ideas, people and organisation. These are the four horsemen of change in any transition from an industrial-age to an information-age military.
The leaders of defence transformation tend to treat each horseman or area of change as separate and isolated. Yet, in reality, the combination of technology, ideas, people and organisation represents the best foundation for an operational view of change management with regard to the introduction of networking. Decisions taken in one area heighten or constrain the possibilities in the other three areas. In other words, like a cavalry charge, the four horsemen must move to the gallop in unison, coordinating their movements over time and space.

TECHNOLOGY

Of the four horsemen of change, technology may be described as being the first among equals. New technology is the key driver of capability growth in modern military organisations. Networked technologies open access to what is always rare in warfare—information—and the real challenge facing the ADF is to use the other three areas of ideas, people and organisation in a manner that capitalises on technological innovation. A fascination with technology alone is counterproductive in that it frequently leads to a narrow approach towards change that displaces a need for holistic capability as a strategic end. As one leading historian of military innovation, Alan Millet, has written:

Sheer technological innovation … does not win wars. Instead, the interaction of technical change and organisational adaptation within realistic strategic assessment determines whether good ideas turn into real military capabilities. 20

IDEAS

A search for new ideas, for an asymmetric advantage, has become critical in many advanced military organisations. Yet ideas must be translated, absorbed and integrated within a relevant cultural context. Networking doctrine emphasises the need for a process of constant innovation and identifies two key capabilities as being an ability to produce new ideas, and organisational effectiveness in turning these ideas into practice. The ADF needs to transfer relevant ideas across the services in order to nurture them through research and analysis—to make them, in effect, ‘ideas in good currency’. When an idea and a real-world demand intersect and match, then change takes place.

In the Australian military, ideas are often divorced from systematisation through doctrine production. It is insufficient to insert ideas such as multidimensional manoeuvre or the notion...
of a seamless force into a doctrinal publication in the hope that organisational change will occur. The promotion of ideas requires persistent effort to align thought to action. In the Department of Defence there is sometimes a tendency for high-level concept development to stop once an idea has been developed. Yet, in innovation, the success of ideas depends on their transmission and interaction with technology, people and organisation.

PEOPLE

Central to successful institutional change is an investment in human capital. The human dimension of transformation is usually rhetorically acknowledged at the expense of practical reform of personnel practices. Yet if technology is to be implemented successfully, then personnel policies require significant adjustment. Refining the bond between people and technology is a critical part of NCW.

To date, the most obvious expression of the Defence Department’s interest in the bond between technology and people has been centred on the danger of ‘information overload’ on military commanders and their staffs. The challenges of networked technology on military theory and practice are potentially far-reaching, especially in the areas of hierarchy, leadership and combat organisation. Of the four horsemen of change, the human dimension is the most complex and difficult to influence. There is a need to concentrate greater effort and resources on reforming personnel systems in order to deal with the impact of network-enabling technology. Unfortunately, the ADF has a long history of pursuing short-term human resource maintenance rather than investing in a long-term human resource strategy.

ORGANISATION

Organisation helps to promote strategic change in three ways. First, organisation is essential for specialist knowledge and skills. Second, organisation is a system of social patterns and practices that are as much cultural as functional. Third, it represents a system of processes for sharing resources and resolving conflicts between functional groups within a bureaucracy. Combined, these three manifestations of organisation define the social composition of the ADF. Rapid technological change involving networking technologies has the potential to alter the prevailing social order within both military and civil hierarchies. Such alteration is of central concern to the ADF because the institutional history of its constituent single services (Army, Navy and Air Force) is a wellspring of morale, ethics, resilience and cohesion on operations. The organisational character of the armed forces is at once a source of capability and an instrument for change.
CULTURE AS THE ENEMY OF INNOVATION

The American cultural commentator, Neil Postman, argues that all change is a battle between new and old ideologies. In contrast, some historians of military revolution have put forward a ‘punctuated equilibrium evolution’ theory to explain change. This is a pattern of change drawn from the pioneering work of evolutionary biologists such as Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould. Punctuated equilibrium theory, as used by military historians, postulates that the history of Western military institutions generally involves periods of violent change, followed by periods of relative calm in which armies have adapted to major changes in their environment. Applied to organisational cultures, the punctuated equilibrium theory is useful in trying to understand why change embraces both spurs of rapid change and periods of apparent stability or inertia.

In assessing the process of change in the ADF, it is important to understand that, in terms of punctuated equilibrium evolution, any process of transition is mediated by an ADF that is in essence a federation of military subcultures represented by the single services. Each service culture has a different attitude towards technology and change. These different attitudes are apparent in popular adages such as ‘the Navy and the Air Force man the equipment but the Army equips the man’. All new technology represents a challenge to an existing social order and implies gain for some constituencies and loss for others alongside an intra-organisational competition for resources and status. As a result, any organisation contemplating transformation must decide on the internal ground rules against which innovation will be considered and the speed at which it will be implemented. The general conservatism of institutions means that change is usually incremental rather than radical in character.

There are two co-evolving patterns of change within the ADF: a knowledge-based pattern and a decision-based pattern. The first argues that, in order to ensure capability, the ADF must position itself as close to the leading edge of new technology as possible. In contrast, a decision-based pattern of change is political, social and cultural in its imperatives, and seeks to ensure the continuity and viability of the institution by lessening disruption through incremental adjustments.

It is important to note that the culture of any institution tends to embody history and as such is the enemy of innovation. As Niccolo Machiavelli put it in his famous treatise, The Prince, written in 1513:

There is nothing more difficult to carry out nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order. The lukewarmness arises partly from the fear of their adversaries who have the law in their favour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have actual experience of it.
CONCLUSION

The Australian military’s NCW strategy is aimed at creating the seamless force described in Force 2020. The characteristics of NCW—speed, precision, knowledge and innovation—are all reflective of the process of globalisation and its unprecedented levels of connectivity. It is connectivity that is challenging long-held assumptions about power and culture, and the social architecture of organisations.

The ADF understands that there will be consequences for doctrine, organisation and training stemming from the realisation of greater connectivity. However, the Department of Defence, as a whole, may have underestimated the speed and depth of the response needed to move towards new organisational norms. For example, a recent Strategic Workforce Planning Review stated:

The Review scanned future technology developments but was unable to identify a potential paradigm shift in Defence capability before 2020. The most prominent trend is the evolution of the information environment. We believe that the workforce implications of emerging technologies will be manageable with improved planning and implementation.

The review goes on to suggest that Australian defence planners may have between ten and fifteen years to prepare personnel for the impact of innovation. Since the results of networked technologies are likely to have their greatest impact on the sociology of military organisations, the greatest challenges that the ADF will face are likely to be cultural, in the form of introducing changes in thinking and behaviour. Australian military innovation is likely to be defined by its human ability to respond to technology’s impact on organisational structure. Accordingly, in order to achieve success, Australian defence planners will be compelled to look closely at personnel policies and human resource questions if they are to manage a transformation from an industrial-age force towards an information-age networked force.

Finally, the character of military institutions is perhaps the key factor in any attempt to absorb new technologies. Institutions provide continuity and security for the activities of their members and, because they are human, are not easily changed with rapidity. Finally, Australian defence policy-makers must grasp the reality that technology is only one source of strength in a military arsenal. True military capability stems from a holistic appreciation of organisational power that is simultaneously technical, organisational and human in character. The real challenge, then, that NCW poses for the Australian Department of Defence is that of harmonising the different components of its institutional capacity in a way that successfully absorbs the new ideas and techniques that are likely to be vital in 21st-century warfare.
ENDNOTES


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., p. 128.


10 Ibid.


15 A senior executive in Australian Defence Industry made this observation during an interview with the author.


This approach towards transformation is an amalgam of Snooks conceptualisation of dynamic change in society and the author’s practical experience of change management in Defence and the ADF. See Graeme Snooks, *The Dynamic Society: Exploring the Sources of Global Change*, Routledge, London, 1996.


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The next six years are likely to be extremely difficult for the US Army, both operationally and on the organisational front. This article will concentrate on the organisational changes that the Army is attempting to make in order to meet its many operational commitments. It is important to understand the challenges of the environment that the US Army faces, not only from an external standpoint, but also from an internal point of view. The article concentrates on trying to explain why the US Army has had to rethink its philosophy of transformation and then outlines how the process of transformation might occur. Since it is not possible to discuss these aspects without some consideration of their context, this article begins with an analysis of the rationale behind change.

* This article is based on an edited transcript of a presentation delivered by the author to the Australian Chief of Army’s Exercise in Canberra in October 2004.
WHY THE US ARMY MUST CHANGE

In the present war in Iraq there is no uniformed, or uniform, opponent. Iraq represents not just the Three Block War; it is the Three Block War under a microscope. Everything that the US Army does on the ground takes place in an atmosphere of accountability in which every individual action, from the level of a private soldier to that of a high ranking officer, is open to scrutiny by higher authority. Under these conditions of heightened scrutiny, some individuals have become infamous, with Private Lynndie England of Abu Ghraib being perhaps the most well known. There are no heroes in the war in Iraq. Indeed, it is not possible to name one private soldier that has performed a heroic act in this war, at least not in the US Army. While many American people believe that they are at war intellectually, they are certainly not aware of the fighting on an emotional level. Those of us in the Army mourn our losses, but with the realisation that many of our fellow citizens probably do not feel our sorrow. Such a gulf between soldier and nation creates a danger that the US Army may become increasingly isolated from the wider society from which it springs and whose safety military professionals are sworn to uphold.

OPERATIONAL TEMPO AND MILITARY PERSONNEL

While the US Army is faced with many challenges, perhaps the greatest challenge that it confronts at the moment is that its combat forces are overcommitted in the field. Currently, the US Army has 350 000 soldiers deployed around the world. One quarter of its Reserve Forces, both National Guard and Army Reserve, have been called up for active duty at sometime since 2001. The present high level of deployment shows little sign of diminishing. Of the Army’s thirty-three brigade-sized force, between seventeen and eighteen brigades are required for the Afghanistan and Iraq theatres. Based on deployment requirements soldiers know that they are going to be at war about every two years or on an almost continuous series of deployments with a rotation pattern of 1:1. However, there are other contingencies outside the current war in Iraq—contingencies that require a military reserve of approximately four or five brigades. As a result, the US Army will soon reach a point where its soldiers are almost continuously deployed.
A recent study of military personnel found that somewhere around 47 per cent of soldiers are the sons and daughters or brothers and sisters of soldiers. As a self-perpetuating group, professional soldiers are being drawn from an increasingly narrow part of American society. The risk is that the commitment of military personnel to uniformed service will become a personal affair rather than an issue of public awareness. At the same time, as noted above, the Army’s reserve component has also been heavily committed to operational duty. Indeed, the volunteer US Army has now reached a situation where, if it continues to operate as it has in the past, its personnel will ‘burn out’ very quickly.

In the late 1990s, 60 per cent of the Army’s personnel were married. Today, that figure is less than 50 per cent. The reason for this decline is not necessarily that of divorce and separation; it is simply that soldiers do not stay in any one place long enough to form relationships that can lead to the status of marriage. What such statistics mean is that the US Army’s operational tempo is determining the lifestyle of its soldiers. In the long term, the sheer pressure that contemporary military service produces on the personal lives of soldiers and officers will lead to military personnel making decisions about quality of lifestyle that are likely to be detrimental to both the Army’s retention system and its recruitment base. In order to avoid these problems in the future, the Army must change its personnel practices.

**RETHINKING MILITARY TRANSFORMATION**

When General Peter Schoomaker became US Army Chief of Staff, he examined the concept of military transformation and decided that it had to change. In the late 1990s, under General Eric Shinseki, the Army had come up with a concept for transformation that was lovingly called ‘The Big Bang Theory’. Essentially, the Shinseki theory of transformation was based on the premise that the global strategic environment would change gradually rather than rapidly. This model of gradualism allowed the military to take advantage of a strategic window of opportunity in which it was believed that it was unlikely that the United States would have a peer, or even near-peer, competitor for the foreseeable future. In addition, by around 2010 or 2012, the process of transformation would begin to deliver a great number of new military capabilities. Indeed, the Army concentrated on investing US $1.4 billion a year on science and technology and research and development that, with a very few exceptions, did not change the lives of American soldiers.
MILITARY CHANGE AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

General Schoomaker’s new assessment is that the strategic window of opportunity of the 1990s has now closed simply because the world of the early 21st century has changed fundamentally. The Chief of Staff now believes that the new model for transformation is one in which the Army will move from the present to the future but never achieve the future force that was its goal in ‘The Big Bang Theory’. Instead, the US military will now focus on those ideas and technologies that have the potential to save soldiers’ lives in contemporary operations. While there is a degree of uncertainty about the way in which the US Army’s future plans will be executed, it is important to understand that changes will happen quickly. The current plan for change will focus on four main points. The first and most pressing need is for the Army leadership to try to stabilise the current land force. Second and third, once this stabilisation has been achieved, the force will be rebalanced and made more modular in structure. Finally, while stabilisation and restructuring occurs, it will be important for the Army to maintain the warrior ethos and martial spirit in its personnel. All four of the above changes are closely interrelated, and all of them present military leaders with the challenge of maintaining the best features of the US Army’s organisational culture.

Military culture is, of course, a strange phenomenon. The author’s father was a soldier. Just before the writer’s commissioning he said, ‘You know, it’s very important that you get engraved name cards and that you understand that if you visit an officer’s house, there will be a silver dish next to his door. If you go by yourself, you must fold over one edge of the card’. In the author’s service he has never been to an officer’s house where there was a silver tray by the door. The author’s son is also an officer and has even less idea about the cultural relevance of name cards and silver trays. The point that must be grasped by observers is that aspects of the US Army’s culture have changed from

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generation to generation. The challenge of change is to maintain a balance between what features can be discarded and those vital aspects of organisational culture that must be preserved.

In the US Army, it is normal for a soldier to undertake a three-year tour of duty in a posting. Such a career pattern has had the benefit of making the Army a homogeneous force with wide experience. For example, the author has served in seven different regions of the United States, spent twelve years in Germany, and has served in South Korea. However, the drawback of such a career pattern is its impact on non-commissioned officers. For instance, a sergeant in the US Army will go into the operational force and may stay there for his or her whole career. The commitment to service involved is enormous because, at the same time, that sergeant will receive a new posting every three years.

BREAKING WITH THE MILITARY PAST

In the future, continuous rotation will cease. The goal of the Army leadership is for units to stay in one place and for military personnel to engage in a seven-year appointment. Such a reduction in posting will mean that the Army will need to reconsider what qualities make a good officer or a good non-commissioned officer. In the past, personnel who sought to stay in a single posting for an unusual length of time gained reputations as being ‘homesetters’.

Their punishment came in being overlooked by promotion boards, usually in the form of having their files stapled shut. In the future the US Army will have to move away from that punitive model. The military leadership will have to understand that a new system of longer assignments will help to develop soldiers and officers who gain detailed knowledge of a particular niche of the ground forces, but whose breadth of general experience will differ from that of the past. Another change in the future will involve the way in which military personnel are to be assessed and provided with feedback. In this area, the US Army is moving toward a 360-degree performance-rating process. Beginning with the national training centres, military personnel will write a report about their superiors at the end of a rotation of duty. The 360-degree rating process is already in use for general officers, and it can be a very emotional experience for senior leaders.

NEW PERSONNEL PROCESSES AND EDUCATION

In the future, because Army officers will not be moving every three years, they will not receive the full range of developmental experiences that traditionally has equipped them for new environments. Longer postings will present challenges in equipping officers to undertake complex assignments, for example in joint operations. Such problems are not easily solved, but the Army has created a special
taskforce that will undertake modelling of new and longer assignment patterns. The US Army believes that, in the future, it will be possible to develop a system of training and education that will produce officers who are competitive for both Army commands and senior joint positions.

In the case of non-commissioned officers, the Army’s intention is to maintain the current system of education. In general terms, when an aspect of knowledge is removed from the current training and education process, it is often replaced by a subject that is likely to make the process more responsive to the needs of the future. For example, the Army will re-examine the role played by knowledge of history in professional military education. This approach is based on recognition by the Army that there has been neglect of one of the great laboratories of the profession of arms.

UNIT STABILITY AND CAREER PATTERNS

In order to accommodate new changes, the Army will need to institute a number of new processes, beginning with the individual replacement system. Historically, the Army has operated with a system of individual replacements because it did not normally rotate units; it rotated individuals. In fact, the US Army only started tracking people by name after the Korean War of 1950–53. Before the early 1950s, the Army’s personnel method was to assign unnamed soldiers to particular units. When soldiers reported to a company headquarters they were entered on the company roll, thus creating a personnel system. It was a wonderfully inefficient system, and the Army has begun to study alternatives.

For example, the US Army has given some attention to the personnel system of the German Army during World War II. The Germans suffered terrible losses in the Russian campaign of 1941–45. Yet, when the size of the corps sectors is examined, the size of each sector is remarkably constant. In 1944 the German High Command questioned this situation. The High Command discovered that field divisions tended to report back at 30 per cent strength, while fielded corps levels were calculated at 60 per cent of their strength overall. Despite these losses, both divisions and corps on the Eastern Front continued to occupy the same ground. When the Wehrmacht command pursued this issue, it discovered that commanders in the field were giving their diminished formations the same mission once performed at full strength and that most units were performing to a high military standard. The reason for this
efficiency, despite disparities in numbers, was human bonding by teamwork. Field veterans on the Eastern Front tended to form close-knit primary groups that were militarily proficient. Even at 30 per cent strength, a German unit often proved as capable of performing a mission as a brand-new formation at 100 per cent strength. In short, despite losses that stability of service brought, an operational success was its own career reward.

Another benefit of unit stability is that such a situation clearly aids the process of building quality performance in an army. In a high-quality, long-service army, it becomes possible to rotate units in the same way it is possible to replace one modular building block with another. As far as recruiting and retention goes, the reality is that soldiers enlist, but families must be re-enlisted. In the future, when stability is restored in the US Army, the overall aim will be to try to re-enlist the soldier’s spouse. The process might operate as follows. A combat unit on a three-year cycle of duty might go through a reconstitution process that lasts about two months. New personnel will be brought in to the unit as some 50 to 70 per cent of personnel rotate to new postings. These moves will occur in sequences that support the training process. Soldiers will enlist for a three-year period, during which time the unit will undergo a process of being stabilised. There will not be a two-year enlistment, while there will be an attempt to avoid any four-year enlistment of personnel.

After a unit is formed, it will be equipped, trained and, most importantly, fashioned as a team. At about the six-month mark, the unit will be declared ready and, for a thirty-month period, while its personnel are at their performance peak, they will be deployed. This new process should provide a unit that is capable of two six-month deployments over a thirty-month period. Of course, such a scenario is based on a relatively light operational tempo. In periods of high operational tempo, the unit may be deployed for a year or even two years. However, the benefit will be that many of the soldiers will have lived in a single area for about seven years. This new career pattern will mean that their families will have some familiarity with their posting environment and they will have been able to develop the community support mechanisms that, in many cases, the families of current Army personnel lack.

The seven-year career pattern will not apply to everyone in the US Army. Some combat units—special operations forces, for example—will not be able to work in such a way largely because there simply are not enough personnel for the longer process to work. Similarly, the Army’s logistics forces are not established on a one-for-one basis. Such a process would be inefficient because one logistics unit can usually support several line formations. The logisticians cannot have the same
personnel cycle as the line units. Instead, they will have a yearly cycle in which they will go through a sustainment period of about one or two months. During that time, the logistics units will be allocated their new personnel and, after equipment and training, it will be some ten months before they are ready for deployment. The deployment period for these units will be about six months, depending on the nature of the operation. Another group in the Army that will need to be treated differently has been designated as high-demand, low-density (HDLD) units or personnel. These are units such as Civil Affairs or Psychological Operations and skilled individuals such as interpreters. About 85 per cent of these HDLD units and personnel are in the Reserves, and about 70 per cent of them have been mobilised four times in the past seven years. The idea of Reserve Forces is that they are not mobilised with any great frequency. However, the Army has been forced to violate that rule due to its all-volunteer post-Vietnam restructuring which, for reasons that made sound political sense at the time, saw many HDLD category units placed in the Reserves.

BREAKING WITH THE PAST: NEW ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES

The restructuring of the US Army will involve changing the work of 100,000 personnel. Many of those 100,000 people are in the Reserves and, during the restructuring process, some Reserve units will have to change into Regular units and vice versa. As General Shinseki once said, ‘when you go through a transformation, some things are actually going to change’—and change hurts people. As an old cavalryman, the author knows that God’s chosen soldiers are going to suffer hurt. However, the Army has to make changes because it needs to be able to meet the demands of today—and those of tomorrow—with the force that it has.

THE AMERICAN THEORY OF WAR AND MILITARY ORGANISATION

In order to understand how the US Army will change, it is necessary to understand what the ground force looks like today. The current organisation (Figure 1) flows from soldier to army level. In the American theory of warfare the divisional level was, to borrow a grammatical term, parse the battlefield. The operational employment of forces starts at the upper end of the divisional fight, where ground forces begin to move into joint operations. At the corps level, ground units move from the operational level to the joint campaign plan. Below divisional level the
The Organisational Transformation of the US Army

fight was viewed as being at the tactical level of war. This theory of warfare and its hierarchical organisation gave the US Army a neat hierarchy of threes, beginning with the basic formation of the squad. Three squads make a platoon with each successive formation consisting of three sub-units in order to form a company, a battalion, a brigade and finally a division. There were some exceptions in which the Army fielded four platoons in a company and two or four brigades in a division, but generally the combat organisation was based on a hierarchy of threes, and it has proven to be a workable arrangement.

However, a tripartite combat organisation is also a highly expensive arrangement of forces. For example, in a typical infantry division deployed to South Korea, one quarter of the 16,000 involved soldiers would have the status of a maintained Military Occupational Specialisation (MOS). If all the soldiers with an MOS that related to command and control were removed, another 3000 personnel would be involved. Stripping away the support functions, the personnel in the division are finally reduced to the infantry, who number about a third of the formation’s strength. This ratio of

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Figure 1: US Army Fighting Forces Today
‘teeth to tail’ in a large combat formation is an imbalance that the US Army must redress. At the heart of the problem is the methodology involved in employing ground divisions. As General Schoomaker has put it, ‘it’s like buying candy bars with a hundred dollar bill. You can’t get any change’. The US Army’s employment of a division was similar to the hundred dollar bill because, regardless of the scale of the operation and, even if only a small part of the division were employed, the whole formation would be incapacitated. General Colin Powell once said, ‘the night before every fight, I completely reorganised’. In that sense the US Army could get ‘no change’, no resilience, no campaign quality from its divisional structure.

Towards a Modular Force

At this point, it is necessary to consider the concept of modularity. The theory behind modularity is that a military organisation can build a set of units that look remarkably alike. General Schoomaker has directed the US Army to devise a division-level structure in which there are elements of the division whose MOS personnel perform combat duties while other elements are designed to provide the service and support capability required to conduct a military campaign. With such a structure, it will be possible to use a brigade from the 4th Infantry Division, and regiments from the 3rd Cavalry and the 101st Brigade respectively. Each formation might leave the United States from different airports but once united on the ground they would be capable of working together as an efficient amalgam. Unlike the current divisional structure, a modular approach will allow US ground forces to take part in a division and put it into combat without debilitating its chain of command. In the future, it will not be necessary for the Army to deploy the whole division in order to field the capabilities that are required for operations. Instead of following the historic American tradition of sending large, composite formations off to war, the Army will develop the capacity to employ smaller, tailored forces. In turn, these smaller units simplify logistical challenges while creating a larger pool of units that rotate into operations.

Critics of modularity argue that the division is a well-tested formation that goes back to the Napoleonic era. However, when an Army is searching for a new approach to warfare, it cannot become too bound up in military tradition. As part of modularity, the Army has deliberately distanced itself from traditional structures.
and terminology in order to ensure that the process has some intellectual rigour. Instead of the basic element of the new organisational system being called a brigade, it was initially referred to as a Unit of Action (UA). Other formations received different names as well. For example, divisions and corps were designated as Unit of Employment X (UEX) and Unit of Employment Y (UEY) respectively. The X and Y label indicates the size of the operational formation and its commitment. In late September 2004, the US Army made the decision to call these UA modular units Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). Yet, ultimately, whether the new modular formation is called a brigade or a UA is not the point of restructuring. What matters in restructuring units is that the UA, like the brigade, is still commanded by a colonel and still has a brigade-like structure, but its essential elements have a much more combined-arms flavour alongside the resources necessary to sustain itself in battle.

Currently, one of the major challenges that the US Army faces is the reality that half of America’s ground forces are committed to operations. Yet, the Army is simply not large enough to sustain such an operational tempo. If American ground forces are to continue operating at the present tempo, there will be a need for more brigades. However, recruiting another 10 000 military personnel will cost US $1.2 billion per year. Given such a financial cost, the Army cannot afford to increase markedly in size. As a result, the need is to find a way to create more brigades from the number of troops currently in service. Between 2004 and 2010, the US Army will seek to create a schedule that will add a fourth brigade to every single division. In the case of some formations, this process will mean adding two brigades to bring certain divisions up to a four-brigade strength. Eventually all American ground divisions will be similar in terms of their density of units.

Army Reserve and National Guard forces are likely to present another organisational challenge to change because, in many cases, these units have long been underresourced. Currently, there are about three Reserve component brigades deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army will continue to employ its reserve component while bringing reserve units up to the same state of modularity as the regular forces. In this manner it will be possible to add ten or eleven brigades to the Army’s entire strength up until 2010. Such a transformation will be carried out while operational commitments are maintained. The likely result will be a US Army that consists of both Active and Reserve components, and one that fields eighty-two brigades.

__As part of modularity, the Army has deliberately distanced itself from traditional structures and terminology in order to ensure that the process has some intellectual rigour.__
Figure 2 shows the schedule for this process of reorganisation. Formations such as the 10th Mountain Division will be assigned two additional brigades, because in the past it only had two.

The aim of American military reorganisation is to obtain greater density and create a deeper rotation pool in order to sustain the current war and meet the United States’ worldwide commitments. During the reorganisation process, the US Army will convert thirty-three brigades to a modular structure, thus generating about ten additional active-component brigades from within the current force's strength. Formations such as the 3rd Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) are at the cutting edge of this process of organisational change. At the same time the National Guard divisions will be similarly converted. By Financial Year 2010–11, it is expected that the US Army of the early 21st century will be a completely modularised force.

From the current structure of divisions, corps and armies, the US Army will move to UA, UEX and UEY designations. While the brigade unit of action will still fight battles and engagements, it will also take some of the functions that, classically, have been assigned to a division. The Army also plans to possess the capacity to employ a brigade unit of action independently in certain operational situations.

The aim of American military reorganisation is to obtain greater density and create a deeper rotation pool in order to sustain the current war and meet the United States’ worldwide commitments.
A brigade unit of action will not go into battle by itself. However, in cases that require a stability force or military presence, a UA will have the capability to deploy as an entity and perform that type of mission without drawing on the strength of other units.

Other aspects of military activity also require improvement. Joint interoperability is one of these areas. Moreover, the US Army has not adequately focused on combined operations until its most recent deployments, and it is now accepted that such operations require development over the next few years. New organisational arrangements will also mean that the Army command structure will have to be flatter. A brigade unit of action will remain a colonel’s command, but for three years, rather than the traditional two-year period. There will be a military requirement for further training for UA commanders and, with the seven-year assignment pattern, a major will stay in the same posting for three years. To a degree, there will be winners and losers in the command stakes of the new organisational system, and there will be majors and lieutenant colonels that stay in their commands for a much longer period than they do at present. However, the Army’s planners believe that it will be possible to give all officers the necessary skills to become the type of independent brigade commanders that modern military operations require.

CONCLUSION

This article has outlined some of the major organisational changes that the US Army will undertake until 2010. There is little doubt that this period will be difficult for many military personnel. However, the benefits that the Army will eventually reap from these changes will be significant and will make a difference to American battlefield performance. General Schoomaker has realised that, in the current strategic environment, a ‘Big Bang’ approach to military transformation is no longer feasible. As he put the problem to some of his senior staff, ‘I’m in a war and most of my money is already committed… I can cancel some things and then I’ll have some money, what should I buy?’ The US Army will invest in its people and its structure over the next few years. As the General has repeatedly underlined, it is a process of change that may concern technology, new organisations or new processes, but it is not about these three factors. Rather, the process of change is about soldiers. Soldiers are at the heart of the American Army, and that truth must be grasped as a fundamental parameter in the new process of transformation. All of the US Army’s new developments must be focused on the soldier or else change will fail.
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THE STRATEGIC CORPORAL

SOME REQUIREMENTS IN TRAINING AND EDUCATION

MAJOR LYNDA LIDDY

‘The era of the strategic corporal is here. The soldier of today must possess professional mastery of warfare, but match this with political and media sensitivity.’

Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, Chief of Army, 18 October 2002

In most modern Western armies, soldiers are expected to be not only technically proficient in warfighting, but also capable of supervising civil affairs, providing humanitarian aid and performing a range of activities relating to order and stability. As networked technologies flatten command structures, new doctrine and revised training regimes are likely to be required in order to prepare individual soldiers to assume greater responsibility on the multidimensional 21st-century battlespace.

As a result of these trends, the Australian Army must begin to foster a military culture that is aimed at preparing non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to become what has been described as ‘strategic corporals’. The term strategic corporal refers to the devolution of command responsibility to lower rank levels in an era of instant communications and pervasive media images.
This article has three aims. First, it seeks to investigate the idea of a strategic corporal and to identify the skills that such an individual should possess. Second, it examines whether the current Army training system is capable of producing strategic corporals. Finally, the article attempts to identify those adjustments that may be necessary in land force training in order to develop soldiers that are capable of assuming greater responsibility in a complex and multidimensional battlespace.

THE IDEA OF A STRATEGIC CORPORAL

The notion of a strategic corporal has become popular in the Army in recent years. This situation has arisen largely because of the increased responsibility that is being assigned to junior military leaders and to small military teams across a spectrum of military operations, ranging from warfighting through peace operations to humanitarian missions. In military circles, the basic premise underlying the idea of a strategic corporal is a general belief that future operations will be more complex in character and will require an increased level of junior leadership.

As a result, the Army may need to consider new training requirements in such areas as the Law of Armed Conflict, cultural awareness, and the discriminate use of force, as well as improved liaison and mediation skills.

While there is no general agreement on the meaning of a strategic corporal, for the purposes of this article the term is defined as follows:

A strategic corporal is a soldier that possesses technical mastery in the skill of arms while being aware that his judgment, decision-making and action can all have strategic and political consequences that can affect the outcome of a given mission and the reputation of his country.¹

In some respects, a type of strategic corporal has always been a feature of the Australian Regular Army’s small-unit military culture. As the US commander in Vietnam in the 1960s, General William Westmoreland, noted in his memoirs:

Small in numbers and well trained, particularly in antiguerrilla warfare, the Australian Army was much like the post-Versailles German Army in which even men in the ranks might have been leaders in some less capable force.²
This ‘post-Versailles’ tradition continues in the Australian Army but arguably must be adapted to 21st-century conditions. Discussion of the strategic corporal often includes supplementing traditional military proficiency with modern media awareness, cultural and foreign language knowledge, and understanding of the Law of Armed Conflict. There is also a requirement for soldiers to grasp specific Rules of Engagement on particular missions and to be capable of adapting to a spectrum of operations that embraces peace, crisis and war.

**PRODUCING A STRATEGIC CORPORAL: TRAINING, EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

The Army regards military training as a planned process to modify skills, knowledge and attitudes through learning experiences in order to achieve effective performance in an activity or range of activities. The Army has a well-developed training continuum that focuses on individual and collective training as a means to develop proficiency. The purpose of individual training is to produce a self-confident and disciplined soldier who is physically fit, well motivated, and equipped with the basic competencies and fighting qualities needed to survive in the battlespace. Such a soldier should also be capable of operating as a member of a team or crew. For its part, collective training builds on individual training and team drills to develop cohesive, competent and operationally ready units. Collective training embraces every aspect of a unit’s or formation’s mission, including tactics, all-arms cooperation, command and control, and control and administration. When applied correctly, collective training can be a significant force multiplier.

In the land force, education is defined as those activities that aim at developing the knowledge, skills, moral values and understanding required in all aspects of life, rather than skills and knowledge relating to only a limited field of activity. Soldiers require more than skill to perform their tasks. They must also have a broader understanding of concepts and processes, and the knowledge and understanding to justify their actions. The essential function of academic education in any context (both civilian and military) is to develop an individual’s intellectual capacity. Academic education seeks to achieve cognitive development and allow individuals to question and hypothesise, and to explain and solve problems. However, military education is also concerned with how people, individually and collectively, apply their non-material resources of intellect, emotion, motivation and leadership. The ability to apply these resources is regarded in the Army as a critically important element in the human dimension of warfighting. Although soldiers may need further education to perform their various tasks, it is important to note that the skills involved in developing a potential strategic corporal do not
necessarily require an academic approach. Rather, what is needed is the development of a soldier's professional education. Making a distinction between academic studies and professional development is of great importance when discussing the idea of a strategic corporal.

**THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

Professional development occupies a position between academic education and military training. Education in topics such as military law and leadership, military history, current affairs and ethics should be considered as part of professional development studies. Such studies should be aimed at providing knowledge that is of direct value to soldiers in the execution of their duties. Most soldiers do not require in-depth academic education in subjects such as military history or international relations. Rather, they require a basic applied knowledge of these subjects alongside a ‘lessons learnt’ approach that assists in soldierly decision-making and judgment. The Army needs to recognise that the cultivation of the skills and knowledge necessary for a soldier to be operationally effective is an outcome that draws on both training and education processes. It is not a choice between two opposite poles of activity but a question of embracing both in the right balance and proportion. In short, training and education are complementary in the professional development of military personnel. For example, training routines teach soldiers to perfect procedures in order to master their military environment. For its part, military education provides the individual soldier with a deeper understanding of the profession of arms.

Achieving an effective balance between training needs and education requirements is one of the most important challenges facing the Australian Army at the beginning of the 21st century. The challenge is to retain the land force’s excellent training regime while ensuring that new educational requirements are not neglected. In order to inform future training decisions, the Army needs to be fully aware of both the strengths and weaknesses of its current training system, of lessons learnt from past operations and of trends in military education. In general terms, the Army training system is robust and is effective in producing good-quality soldiers and junior non-commissioned officers. The Regimental Sergeant Major of the Army considers that Australian soldiers are highly trained in basic infantry skills and have a good knowledge of such areas as Rules of Engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict.8
The Strategic Corporal

Training Lessons from East Timor

An examination of the experience of the 5/7 Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (5/7 RAR), on Operations Warden and Tanager in East Timor is also instructive with regard to Army training. The battalion was in East Timor from 7 October 1999 until 21 May 2000. Before its deployment, officers and NCOs detected a number of training deficiencies. One of these deficiencies was that reinforcement personnel received only six weeks of Initial Employment Training. This period of training was insufficient to prepare soldiers for operations and further training in collective infantry skills was necessary before reinforcements were deployed.

The bulk of security work that 5/7 RAR carried out in Dili, the capital of East Timor, concerned the security of the population, vital asset protection and management of relations with the Indonesian armed forces. In addition, soldiers had to engage in humanitarian assistance and the supervision of internally displaced people. The battalion was highly successful in handling these diverse tasks on its tour of duty largely because of the abilities of its platoon and section commanders. In this respect, training in the Rules of Engagement and in standard operating procedures governing operations in East Timor were important measures in preparing junior commanders to assume responsibility on the ground.

Briefings by military liaison officers and language training for soldiers prior to deployment were also invaluable in readying soldiers for service in East Timor. During the mission in East Timor, Australian soldiers at all rank levels were often called on to mediate or negotiate with a variety of institutions, ranging from civilian police to non-government and humanitarian agencies. The Army subsequently identified that an increased emphasis on mediation and negotiation training would be a necessary part of military training in the future.

Based on the experience of East Timor, the training of soldiers during pre-deployment should, in the future, include improved Asia-Pacific cultural awareness and language training wherever possible. For example, all soldiers in a deploying force should be able to exchange greetings with local citizens and should be made aware of indigenous cultural courtesies. There is, however, also a need for soldiers to possess sufficient skills to understand basic guidance requirements in more complex legal areas such as the provisions governing ceasefire resolutions and memorandums of understanding.

The Army’s current training continuum effectively equipped soldiers for the deployment to East Timor and provided some instruction in cultural awareness and language training. However, training in negotiation and mediation techniques was often either insufficient or ad hoc in character. As a result, the current training continuum probably needs to be expanded to include courses in media awareness.
and an advanced interpersonal skills program that embraces instruction in liaison, negotiation and mediation techniques. The experience of the British Royal Marines in these areas may be of value to the Australian Army. In the Royal Marines, the rank of corporal is now considered as the first critical level of junior leadership. The training approach of the Royal Marines is a direct legacy from the British military experience of small-unit operations in Northern Ireland and the Balkans. The Royal Marines supplement this operational experience with specific preparation for contingency deployments. An understanding of strategic issues and theatre-specific problems that may occur at junior level are stressed in training and linked to operational performance. The Royal Marines also conduct media and cultural awareness training for junior NCOs.15

**TRAINING AND EDUCATIONAL CULTURES**

Observers have suggested that, in order to meet a more complex operational environment, the 21st-century Australian Army must move beyond a ‘training culture’ towards an ‘educational culture’.16 It has also been argued in some military circles that the constabulary role of troops on peace operations demands a range of skills that are qualitatively different from those of conventional military training.17 For example, on peace operations, soldiers are often confronted with incidents that require restraint in the use of force, impartiality in action and the resolution of crisis by mediation. Developing such skills may require a new balance between training and education that transcends competency standards in favour of more educational and cognitive problem-solving skills.18 The 2004 Senior Officer Study Period argued that there is no overarching training philosophy within the Army that encompasses education, training and professional development. As a result, individual military training is often ‘just in case’ training.19

**HNA AND THE STRATEGIC CORPORAL**

The emerging debate between training and education is an important one for the current Hardening and Networking the Army (HNA) initiative. Under HNA, the Army is undertaking studies designed to illuminate operational requirements over the next decade. These studies have included the 2004 Senior Officer Study Period on ‘Social Learning in the Army Environment’; tactical lessons learnt from the Land Warfare Development Centre at Puckapunyal; and the development of complex warfighting doctrine and a projected rewriting of Land Warfare Doctrine 1 (LWD1)
by the Directorate of Future Land Warfare in Army Headquarters. In addition, the Combined Arms Training and Development Centre at Puckapunyal has undertaken a ‘gap analysis’ of tactical and training requirements between Army-in-Being (AIB) and the future HNA Objective Force. Finally, the Land Warfare Studies Centre is examining some of the cultural changes that might be required in a hardened and networked land force.

Under HNA, it is likely that individual soldiers will require a broader, more ‘educative’ approach to training. Indeed, there has been some speculation that future junior NCOs may need to possess attributes that traditionally have been the province of the Special Forces, particularly in the realms of cultural awareness and language proficiency. However, it is important to note that an enhanced training regime designed to produce a strategic corporal does not necessarily require wholesale Special Forces training. Rather, what is needed is a systematic program to master a range of additional proficiencies, most of which are currently being taught within the Army but on an ad hoc basis.

Areas such as media awareness, improved foreign-language proficiency, comparative cultural differences and educational measures to develop a soldier’s basic understanding of Australia’s strategic circumstances demand greater formalisation in training and education programs. An enhanced command and leadership component focused on legal issues and Rules of Engagement in the context of the US Marine Corps’ formulation of ‘Three-Block War’—in which warfighting, peace operations and humanitarian action may occur simultaneously in a concentrated area—might also be useful. Finally, the acquisition of new equipment and weapons platforms—including the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, Abrams tanks and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—are likely to necessitate a revision of both training content and delivery.20

FUTURE TRAINING, RECRUITMENT AND THE STRATEGIC CORPORAL

How are new training and education measures to be achieved in the Army? In terms of the current training system, promotion courses offer one obvious vehicle for specific training courses relevant to strategic corporal requirements. Unit collective training is another avenue in which tactical and operational problem-solving could be practised, thereby honing soldierly judgment through simulation. A carefully designed, scenario-based individual and collective training regime might represent an additional method for training alongside a greater use of experimentation.
When considering changes in training, observers need to appreciate that the Australian Army’s individual and collective training system cannot be disrupted or overloaded. Although complex warfighting doctrine may require a soldier to participate in both a military and a humanitarian role, the intrinsic warfighting role of the soldier must always be first and foremost. Accordingly, the best option for the Army may be to reinforce the current individual training regime and to enhance collective training through standardisation and improvements in specific areas of pre-deployment training.

An expansive interpretation of the concept of a strategic corporal is likely to founder. Any presumption that superior fortitude, endurance, intellect and training readiness can be induced in every soldier is unrealistic and may even be counterproductive.21 The Army must be coldly realistic and must understand that the training system can only deliver what finance and time—both of which are always in short supply—can permit. The land force also needs to consider seriously whether all, or only some, of its junior NCOs need to be trained as strategic corporals. There may even be a case for a degree of specialisation that runs counter to the generalist ethos of the Army. The key task for trainers is to conduct a systematic analysis of the skills that are likely to be required on operations for general-purpose soldiers in the future.

Another important area with which the Army needs to come to terms is Australia’s faltering demography. This factor will critically affect recruitment and retention. Over the next decade, the Army will have to compete against corporations and industries that will be seeking an economic version of the strategic corporal. The Army, in common with the other services and with the Defence Department as a whole, is short of a range of skilled and educated personnel. For example, in the area of artisans, the land force has identified forty-seven trades as being ‘problematic’ and twelve more as being ‘critical’ in terms of manning.22 The greatest problem that the Army may face is this: can a strategic corporal be produced in an Army whose parent society is scrambling for human resources because of demographic decline?

The publication of The Defence Personnel Environment Scan 2020 in August 2001 noted that interest in military service among young people is in deep decline. One of the report’s major conclusions was that, without major changes being made to personnel policies and conditions of service, the ADF would struggle to meet adequate recruitment and retention rates. These warnings were echoed in a subsequent Defence Personnel Environment Scan published in April 2003.23
CONCLUSION

In some respects, a ‘post-Versailles’ type of strategic corporal has been a feature of the Australian Regular Army’s small-unit military culture since the 1950s. There is, however, no exact belief within the Australian Army as to the skills that constitute a strategic corporal. Although the concept is open to continuing debate, in general many senior officers view a strategic corporal as a highly trained professional soldier whose competence in warfighting must be supplemented by specific areas of educational knowledge that permit him or her to operate effectively in multidimensional operations.

The current Army training system is robust and effective, as is evident from the performance of soldiers on recent operations. However, some refinements in education are probably necessary in order to develop modern proficiencies in foreign language, cultural awareness, media training, negotiation techniques and conflict-resolution skills. These educational skills need to be formal rather than ad hoc in character and must be aligned to effective pre-deployment training. The main task facing trainers and military educators in the early 21st century is how to best equip the individual junior leader both mentally and physically for the challenges of a transformed security environment. In this sense, the strategic corporal concept is about adapting the Army’s ethos and older values to a range of new attitudes and codes of behaviour that today’s complex battlespace demands.

ENDNOTES

1 Author’s definition.
4 Ibid., p. 1.3.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p. 1.16.
8 Author’s interview with Regimental Sergeant Major—Army, 29 July 2004.
Major Lynda Liddy is a Research Fellow in the Land Warfare Studies Centre. This article is based on her research into cultural aspects of education and training in support of the HNA initiative.
Since President Suharto’s fall from power in May 1998, the Indonesian armed forces have continued their participation in politics. However, while the military has remained a strong political force for much of the post-Suharto era, a program of reform is now under way in Indonesia that may see the armed forces withdraw entirely from the political process. The central issues in Indonesian civil–military relations can be clearly understood by analysis of the careers of former Generals Wiranto and Yudhoyono, both of whom participated in the 2004 presidential election. This article examines the role of the armed forces in Indonesian politics since the fall of Suharto and illustrates how the nation is undergoing a process of reform that will result in greater civilian control over the armed forces, especially if current trends continue.
Dwi Fungsi: The Traditional Role of the Armed Forces

Under Suharto’s rule, senior officers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) were integral participants in any decision-making within the Indonesian Government. The concept of dwi fungsi—dual function—that ABRI officers could fulfil both military and political roles simultaneously, was altered to Suharto’s exact specifications. Suharto decided that ‘ABRI’s representation at the national, regional and local levels should be strengthened for the sake of security and stability’. While this increased Suharto’s power, it also satisfied ABRI’s desire to maintain a degree of political power after the coup of 1965. Suharto’s action was an assurance to the military that they would remain a significant force, and that a coup to consolidate their position was unnecessary.

The establishment of ABRI representation in the Indonesian Parliament secured their position further. However, it also raised new challenges, and in order to prevent factionalism within ABRI, members of the armed forces were denied the right to vote. These moves were designed to dissuade ABRI from launching a coup against Suharto, but by 1993 his effective control of the political machinery had weakened to the point where a military member of the parliament ‘bluntly stated that the military would be the arbiter of presidential succession’. The political power of ABRI at this time is well documented, but in some important areas there was also a high degree of civilian control of the military. A good example of this power was the decision made in 1993 to purchase a number of East German vessels at a cost of over $US10 million. The influential Minister of Technology, Professor Dr Baharuddin Jusuf (B. J.) Habibie, who controlled the ship-building and aeronautical industries, made this purchase without input from, or discussion with, the military.

Pressures for Reform

In the mid-1990s, as Indonesia’s economic hardship worsened, due in part to Suharto’s siphoning of funds to off-shore accounts, ABRI could be loosely divided into two groups: the pro-Suharto ‘green’ faction (led by General Prabowo) and those who desired reform (led by General Wiranto). After the disastrous riots at Trisakti University in 1998, the split in ABRI became glaringly obvious. The Marines, under the command of Wiranto, refrained from taking action against the student demonstrators and in some instances even encouraged them. Sections of the military loyal to Prabowo (notably KOPASSUS—the Indonesian Special
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Forces) kidnapped some student leaders, but the majority of ABRI tolerated the demonstrations. Besieged by protesting students, the parliament began to issue calls for Suharto to resign. In this chaotic environment the demonstrations only worsened, to the point where even military figures expressed their dissent, with Major-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (now the President of Indonesia) delivering a letter from former Generals to the then Commander-in-Chief, General Wiranto, requesting Suharto’s resignation.  

Terence Lee believes that confusion regarding the position of ABRI in this instance placed ‘doubt on the armed forces’ claims to fulfilling their self-assigned dual function role in the country’. However, there were also indications that other high-ranking officers within the military had grown tired of dwi fungsi. Suharto originally sought to hand power over to Wiranto, but the latter refused, proffering his support for B. J. Habibie on the proviso that democratic elections would be held quickly. Wiranto later observed that he could have easily launched a coup at this time, but his hand was stayed by ‘a desire for a smooth transition to a more stable post-Suharto period, and by a respect for the 1945 constitution’.

After the fall of Suharto, the military indicated their intent for a gradual withdrawal from the political sphere, ‘in an apparent response to the growing tide of public discontent towards their presence in politics’. In October 1998 a document titled ABRI in the 21st Century was published; it frankly admitted that ABRI had become a political tool under Suharto. The import of this momentous confession was quite considerable, as the dual-function role of ABRI still existed. ABRI now faced a ‘new paradigm’. The ‘new paradigm’ catchphrase, first put forward by Yudhoyono in November 1996, was based on four principles: that the military would no longer be ‘in the forefront of politics’, that they would only influence the political process indirectly in the future, that the military would ‘shift its sociopolitical position from that of occupier to that of influence’ and that some of these roles would be transferred to civilians. In this same spirit, there would be a significant reduction of military officers appointed to positions within the civilian power structure (this arrangement was known as the kekaryaan system).

During this period, there was some downgrading of military political power. There were also concerted efforts (most notably by Wiranto) to rebuild the armed forces into an effective fighting force. In an effort to reform ABRI, the upper echelons
were culled of any ‘green’ officers who were blatantly unwilling to submit to civilian control. In January 1999, some 100 officers were removed from their posts and reassigned in an effort to rid ABRI of those who belonged to the ‘green’ faction and considered themselves Muslims first and nationalists second. A deal brokered by Yudhoyono also saw ABRI representation within the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) or People's Representative Council reduced by 50 per cent to thirty-eight seats, with ABRI seats at the regional level also reduced by 50 per cent to ten seats. The military head of GolonganKarya (GOLKAR—the main political party) was replaced with a civilian, and at the next GOLKAR congress a civilian was supported by ABRI over an ex-military candidate. Although ABRI was seemingly trying to distance itself from politics, some of its senior members (most notably Wiranto and Yudhoyono) were still heavily involved in the reformasi movement. The aim of this movement was the reform of the Indonesian political system in order to end the abuse of power that was such a noticeable feature of the Suharto era. A specific move in this regard was Yudhoyono’s call to restrict future presidents to a maximum of two terms.

In one particular area, however, the status quo continued. ABRI remained firmly entrenched in many industries and businesses in Indonesia. Discussing this issue, Bilveer Singh treats ABRI quite sympathetically. He justifies ABRI’s involvement in commercial activities as vital ‘in supplementing its income as well as keeping its key personnel knowledgeable about business practices in the country’. This reasoning (while perhaps practical) does not excuse the fact that, if ABRI were a truly professional military force, there would be little need for such specialised knowledge. In further efforts to reform, Wiranto organised public apologies for the excesses of ABRI in Aceh and during the Trisakti riots. Responding to specific incidents, the government made great efforts to punish ABRI offenders, and the disciplinary process was open to public scrutiny. These efforts towards reformasi on behalf of the military were clear indicators that key figures such as Wiranto and Yudhoyono recognised the need for stronger civilian control and took whatever steps they could to achieve such reforms.

The Presidencies of J. B. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid

Civil–military relations were strained under the lacklustre presidency of B. J. Habibie. Dissatisfied with his governance, the university students of Jakarta rioted again in November 1998. Despite a direct command from Habibie, Wiranto refused to order his troops to quell the riots. Habibie offered the position of Commander-in-Chief to Yudhoyono if he would quash the riots, but he too refused. Kingsbury stresses that ‘Yudhoyono remained loyal to Wiranto, not to Habibie’ and that ‘Wiranto’s refusal to resign indicates that Wiranto was probably, in practical terms,
the most powerful individual in Indonesia at that time.\textsuperscript{18} The conflict between Habibie and Wiranto would come to a head over the East Timor referendum.

Habibie obviously felt indignant about Wiranto’s insubordination. In retaliation he did not consult Wiranto about the East Timor referendum before presenting it to the cabinet. According to Kingsbury, this affront set Wiranto ‘on the path of at least allowing, if not actively planning, for the undermining of the coming East Timor ballot’,\textsuperscript{19} even though the number of troops in East Timor had been reduced in an effort to ‘discard the old security-driven paradigm’.\textsuperscript{20} Although it was disastrous for Indonesia on the world stage, the ‘aftermath of the ballot would be the point at which the newly reorganised Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) developed a new sense of cohesion, representing both an affront to the core ‘nationalist’ values held by the army and, in practical terms, a defeat for the army by a section of the civilian population’.\textsuperscript{21} Wiranto appointed Major-General Makarim as the Liaison Officer to the United Nations Assistance Mission East Timor (UNAMET). Because he had the allegiance of other key military figures, Wiranto was able to arm militias and disrupt the referendum. Wiranto and twenty-one other officers were later tried as war criminals. These trials were an obvious setback for the military and engendered further resentment towards Habibie because he was breaking one of the Pancasila principles of the unitary state.\textsuperscript{22} With his chances of re-election rapidly declining, Habibie invited Wiranto to run for Vice-President, an offer that Wiranto publicly refused.\textsuperscript{23} Shortly after, Wiranto was removed from the position of Commander-in-Chief and Habibie withdrew from the electoral process.

Civil–military relations during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) were characterised by his repeated attempts to bring the military under firm civilian control.\textsuperscript{24} Wiranto was dismissed as the Commander-in-Chief in 2000, but was granted a cabinet position and still held considerable sway within the TNI.\textsuperscript{25} At the same time Wiranto was removed, President Wahid also transferred seventy-four commanders and staff officers in a reshuffle reminiscent of the Suharto era.\textsuperscript{26} Some commentators have even referred to this reshuffle as the ‘dewirantoisation’ of the TNI.\textsuperscript{27} After details emerged of Wiranto’s questionable involvement in assisting the militias in East Timor, Wahid asked him to resign his cabinet post and ultimately, end his role in reformasi. Wiranto refused, and ‘briefly, Abdurrahman Wahid appeared to accede. But then the president did an abrupt about-turn and on 14 February 2000 relieved Wiranto of his Cabinet position’.\textsuperscript{28} This action led many observers to ‘conclude that the president had cleverly outmanoeuvred the military and secured a degree of civilian control’.\textsuperscript{29}
While Wiranto was now theoretically powerless, Kingsbury is quick to emphasise the role he still played, including exercising a ‘guiding—if not controlling—hand in Cabinet meetings’. Although the key players such as Wiranto and Yudhoyono were seemingly eager to relinquish control, situations arose (through coincidence or design) in which ‘the balance of political power in Indonesia seemed to lie just as firmly, or even more so, with the TNI as it had done during the latter part of Habibie’s presidency’. After public condemnation following a cabinet report on the misappropriation of funds, Wahid endeavoured to secure support from the military and enact martial law. However, the TNI refused and their ‘withdrawal of support for Wahid was certainly a key element in his political downfall’. Although there were again murmurs about the feasibility of a coup, the TNI stayed its hand and tacitly supported Megawati Sukarnoputri’s election as President in July 2001.

**PRESIDENT MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI AND THE 2004 ELECTIONS**

Under Megawati, who was viewed as ‘politically pliable’, the TNI was free to conduct the business of reformasi in a manner and to a timetable of its own making. Megawati offered the military a ‘welcome degree of predicable and stability after Wahid’s erratic leadership’. As Vice-President under Wahid, she had built solid relationships with many senior military officers. She now used these contacts and appointed many TNI officers to cabinet positions. These appointments represented a setback for civil–military relations, especially at a time when the armed forces were attempting to become depoliticised.

Due to the political power that the TNI wielded, ‘elites therefore continue to seek the support of TNI, paradoxically ensuring that the military retained its central role in politics precisely at a time when segments of civil society were calling for civilian supremacy and demilitarisation’. At a conference in August 2001, the TNI discussed the dismantling of the territorial command structure. This process would be quite complex and intricate, especially as the local command structure would ‘need to be replaced with a civil security system, such as the police, a proper functioning judiciary and greater regional autonomy’—concepts foreign to most Indonesians. TNI leaders decided that, for the immediate future, the territorial system would need to remain, if only to ensure economic stability, ‘but without excessive military intervention in politics, law and order issues or the economy’. Despite the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Widodo,
many senior officers felt that the conference ‘was trying to push the reform agenda too hard, and that it lacked consultation’. However, some commentators believe that, at this point, without pressure from Megawati, the reform process stalled or even ended. With Wiranto no longer having an official position and Yudhoyono stuck in a cabinet post, the main reformers within the military had lost the initiative and the power needed to push for further reform of the TNI. There were also signs that the former ‘green’ faction within the armed forces was ‘operating with impunity in many of Indonesia’s trouble areas, often fomenting trouble’ and as a consequence of this unauthorised activity, had ‘reclaimed as its own prerogative the right to determine policy both in conflict areas and in regard to Indonesia’s status as a unitary state’.

Interestingly, both Wiranto and Yudhoyono became involved in politics after they retired from the TNI. While both men actively sought to reform the TNI, Kingsbury argues that only Yudhoyono pushed for its withdrawal from politics. Wiranto agreed, but although he supported the concept in principle, he still ‘continued to play his political hand’, with aspirations of a ‘Cabinet position, the vice-presidency or even the presidency’. Yudhoyono can be seen as the more genuine advocate of reformasi, whereas Wiranto can be considered to have acted only when the circumstances favoured the increase of his personal power, or as Kingsbury notes, Wiranto ‘played godfather to the reform process while also managing to effectively quarantine it from his own activities.’

Leaning on his considerable ministerial experience and influence, Yudhoyono continued to advocate reform, but ‘never at the expense of the TNI’s self-appointed core political functions of security and stability.’

Yudhoyono has come under fire for refusing to resign his TNI commission when he was appointed as a minister. Kingsbury’s assessment is that ‘Yudhoyono promoted the idea that the TNI should disengage itself from the political process; Wiranto agreed with this in theory … [but] pushed a ‘nationalist’ line, with a slightly reduced but continuing role for the TNI in the political process’. Despite Yudhoyono’s efforts, Megawati’s reliance on the TNI to aid in the formulation of policy ensured that ‘the TNI was again in the central position of the politics of the state’.
Dissatisfied with Megawati’s failure to eradicate corruption, the Indonesian people sought a new leader with the strength and wisdom to stop peculation, increase economic prosperity and combat terrorism. Yudhoyono formed the Democratic Party in order to run in the 2004 general election. In a somewhat surprising result, Wiranto narrowly won the nomination of GOLKAR over the party’s serving leader, Akbar Tanjung. The willingness of the Indonesian people to support former generals may indicate a desire to return to the stability of the Suharto period, but primarily it reinforces the conception that it is military figures who wield true power in Indonesia.

Even under democratically elected presidents such as Wahid and Megawati, the TNI has exercised its power and proven vital in ensuring the unity of the Indonesian nation. In the second-last round of elections, Wiranto was defeated by both Yudhoyono and Megawati. This result is perhaps a reflection of concern over allegations of human rights abuses in East Timor. In the final round of elections, Yudhoyono won 61 per cent of the vote, giving him a clear mandate to carry on with the reform process.

CONCLUSION

The election of a former general has potentially serious implications for the democratic process in Indonesia. Although Yudhoyono has repeatedly expressed his desire to aid democracy by cooperating with both houses of parliament, his election does represent the desire of the Indonesian people for a strong leadership, capable of ensuring stability within the turbulent country. The Democratic Party’s ‘foundation is religious nationalism, while its policy position is similar to that of the TNI, to defend the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia based on the state ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 constitution’. Most Indonesians will support a return to the principles of the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, but under Megawati the TNI ‘reclaimed as its own prerogative the right to determine policy both in conflict areas and in regard to Indonesia’s status as a unitary state’. Surrendering this prerogative to a strong civilian leader may cause friction between Yudhoyono and the TNI. However, any dissent by the TNI would be glaringly undemocratic as the armed forces have recently lost their remaining thirty-eight seats in the parliament. Alternatively, Yudhoyono’s status as a former TNI senior officer may enable him to bring the armed forces under firm civilian control. The majority of the TNI would be comfortable submitting to him. Observers will watch Yudhoyono’s actions quite carefully in the hope that the reformasi will be completed under his presidency.
Many observers are quick to lament the slow process of democratic reform in Indonesian politics. However, considerable progress has been made since the fall of Suharto. The TNI has evolved from the strict dual-function role that it held under Suharto and was even instrumental in his (relatively) peaceful downfall. Civil–military relations were stretched to breaking point under President Habibie, but the democratic election of President Wahid marked a significant shift in the TNI’s traditional role in national politics. Wahid consistently tried to bring the TNI under civilian control, but he was hampered by TNI leaders such as Wiranto and Yudhoyono, who made it clear that reformasi would be conducted according to the timetable of the TNI. By withholding their support, the TNI ensured that Wahid would fail to be re-elected; he was replaced by Megawati, who was more amenable to the assumption by the armed forces of a greater role in government and the formulation of policy.

Megawati’s failure to tackle the problem of corruption ensured her political demise and the democratically contested 2004 presidential elections resulted in the ascendency of former TNI general, Yudhoyono. The results of the 2004 poll brought the future of civil–military relations in Indonesia to a critical point. Western observers fervently hope that President Yudhoyono will complete the reformasi process, rather than allow the armed forces, either directly or indirectly, to continue to rule Indonesia and determine policy direction in many critical areas. Given Yudhoyono’s personal history and his track record as a supporter of the reform movement, high hopes for the future of a peaceful and democratic Indonesia are in all probability not amiss.

ENDNOTES

1 Bilveer Singh, Civil–Military Relations in Democratising Indonesia: The Potentials and Limits to Change, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 2001, p. 106.
2 Ibid., p. 107.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 161.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p. 162.

The results of the 2004 poll brought the future of civil–military relations in Indonesia to a critical point.
9 Kingsbury, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
12 See Kingsbury, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
18 Kingsbury, *op. cit.*, p. 166.
19 *Ibid*.
22 The Pancasila principles were five principles on which the Republic of Indonesia was founded in 1945.
24 In April 1999 the police force became independent of ABRI, though it remained under the command of the Minister of Defence and Security. In further restructuring reforms, the senior defence leadership proposed that the name ‘ABRI’ be reverted to the 1947 title of Tentara Nasional Indonesia—the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). This move was supposed to ‘unify all the armed units in the country and prevent them from being used by various politicians or political groupings.’ See Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
25 Kingsbury, *op. cit*.
32 Angel and Haseman, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
33 *Ibid.*, p. 44.
34 Chandra and Kammen, *op. cit*.
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37 Kingsbury, op. cit.
38 Ibid., pp. 186–7.
40 Ibid.
41 Kingsbury, op. cit., p. 240.
42 Ibid., p. 176.
43 Ibid., p. 187.
44 Ibid., pp. 186–7.

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Among the most significant factors in conducting coalition operations are the national legal considerations that govern the deployment of military forces and the way in which they are employed. Legal factors have a bearing on everything in alliance and coalition operations—from determining basic ‘troop-to-task’ considerations to decisions regarding the targets to be engaged—and the types of ordnance that may be used. It is often believed that, in the heat of battle or in the pressure cooker of operations, legal considerations can be quickly resolved. Experience has shown the opposite to be true, with legal factors in military planning in a coalition environment often proving to be difficult to resolve.

Legal factors have a bearing on everything in alliance and coalition operations …
While there has been considerable effort expended over recent years in formal alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), to work towards standardisation issues, legal planning has generally lagged behind. This situation has been exacerbated by differences between Western states in relation to major features of international law, beginning with the Hague Cultural Property Convention in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954.¹ In particular, the advent of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 has led to differences in interpretation of laws relating to armed conflict and the use of force.²

Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions merged the traditions of victim protection law (known as 'Geneva' law) with the law regulating the actual conduct of hostilities (known as 'Hague' law). This protocol contains much detail concerning military targeting and the actual planning and conduct of military operations. Problems have continued with the introduction of international legislation, such as the Conventional Weapons Convention of 1980 and its four Protocols,³ the Ottawa Anti-Personnel Mines Treaty of 1997 (Ottawa Treaty)⁴ and the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC) of 1998.⁵ In particular, the difficulty posed by the Rome Statute relates not only to the development of the law of armed conflict, but to operations in which the jurisdiction of the ICC may come into play. Since the United States remains firmly opposed to the ICC, the Rome Statute has caused procedural problems for signatory states working with the Americans in military operations.

This article examines the implications for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) of legal factors in coalition operations. It examines how legal issues have affected multinational operations in Kosovo, East Timor and Iraq. The article analyses how Australia has sought to deal with Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions and with the Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel mines in the context of coalition missions. Finally, a number of recommendations are made regarding the need for improved management of legal factors in military planning through the American, British, Canadian and Australian (ABCA) agreement.

LEGAL ISSUES IN MILITARY PLANNING IN RECENT OPERATIONS: KOSOVO, EAST TIMOR AND IRAQ

Legal factors in military planning played an important role in coalition operations in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 and in Iraq in 2003 and 2004.

KOSOVO

The first occasion on which legal factors in military planning affected interoperability was during the Kosovo war of March to June 1999. Operation Allied Force, the NATO air campaign conducted against the Serbian Government of Slobodan Milosevic, was designed to halt Serbian ethnic cleansing of the Albanian community.
Legal Factors in Military Planning

in Kosovo. In 1999 NATO possessed nineteen member states. Of these, the United States, France and Turkey were not signatories to Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. While NATO, as a body, had asserted that its members would respect Protocol I, tension quickly emerged. The United States conducted some 80 per cent of the air strikes against the Serbs and the Americans increasingly chafed at the legal restrictions that other members considered applicable under Protocol I. The situation was compounded by the fact that NATO had no mechanism designed to enforce common legal standards.

As a result, NATO policy permitted member states to refuse bombing assignments if they regarded a particular target as being illegitimate. In theory, if a NATO member refused to strike a particular target, the mission could not be reassigned to another alliance member. In practice, however, most of the Serbian targets that were rejected by various NATO members were subsequently attacked by the Americans. A good example was the bombing of the RTS television studio in Belgrade; this incident resulted in the deaths of sixteen civilians. On sensitive targeting issues, opposing member states attempted to prevent US aircraft based on their territory from using their airspace. Lieutenant General Michael Short, the US and NATO air commander, later commented that this approach often resulted in missions being either cancelled on the ground or even turned around when American aircraft were in flight. Lieutenant General Short concluded:

We (the US) need to understand going in [sic] the limitations that our coalition partners will place upon themselves and upon us. There are nations that will not attack targets that my nation will attack. There are nations that do not share with us a definition of what is a valid military target, and we need to know that up front … You and I need to know that all aircraft based in the UK are subject to the rulings of the UK Government about whether we are about to strike a valid target or not.\(^6\)

The air campaign placed a severe strain on NATO and at times there was a danger of irreparable political rifts being caused. Tensions became particularly acute after all the strictly military targets had been exhausted and the United States sought to expand the air campaign to include political and economic pressure on Milosevic by attacking various non-military targets.

In the final analysis, the NATO bombing campaign lost its effectiveness largely because it broadened its targeting regime. The consequent targeting errors included the bombing of Albanian civilian refugees and an attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. It was the political pressure brought to bear by the withdrawal of Russian support for Milosevic that eventually forced the Serbs to agree to a political solution, so saving NATO from undergoing further tension and disagreement.
EAST TIMOR

There were also legal problems among members of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) led by Australia. Australian planners confronted the dilemma of putting together rules of engagement that would meet with the approval of all INTERFET participants. One of the most contentious aspects of the mission concerned legal provisions for using lethal force in operations designed to defend property. Australia and the United States accepted such provisions, but Britain, New Zealand and Canada did not support the use of lethal force to defend property because of domestic legal considerations.

The three countries argued that the use of lethal force in order to defend property could only be countenanced in circumstances where a direct association with the protection of human life could be established. The British, New Zealand and Canadian positions had direct implications for the ‘troop-to-task’ analysis being carried out by INTERFET planners. For example, troops from a country under legal limitations with respect to using lethal force in defending property could not be assigned to airfield defence.

IRAQ 2003–04

Any analysis of recent operations in Iraq must be considered in terms of two different phases: one of warfighting and one of pacification. The warfighting phase in Iraq, which lasted from March to April 2003, raised issues from the conventional conduct of operations under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). The pacification phase, which ensued from May 2003 until 30 June 2004, raised issues associated not only with LOAC but also with human rights conventions and domestic legal considerations under the law of occupation.

The warfighting phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated that significant progress in legal considerations had been made since the Kosovo air campaign of 1999. This situation was undoubtedly helped by American concern to minimise unnecessary casualties and damage in targeting Iraq’s infrastructure prior to the country’s occupation. For the ADF, the Iraq campaign marked the first time that ordinance was delivered by RAAF aircraft in anger under the changed legal environment created by Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions in 1977.
During the warfighting phase Australia had to come to grips with a targeting process used by the United States. The American targeting system was shaped by precautions that related to the lawfulness of striking individual targets and by a general need to minimise casualties and damage to vital installations. The system involved a ‘tiered’ process of approval in which various levels of authority were required in order to ‘weaponeer’ a target and to minimise damage or eliminate assessed risk. As a consequence, Australian military personnel were forced into the unenviable position of having to develop doctrine, practice and ultimately rules of engagement during actual military operations.

Iraq proved to be a lesson for the ADF in terms of the need both to appreciate the importance of legal requirements in contemporary combat and to keep abreast of the way in which legal theory and military practice interacted among its close allies. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, legal differences in assessing legitimate targets created by Protocol I tended to be resolved by the use of the ‘red card’. This card involved coalition partners being able to indicate disapproval of their involvement in targeting or tactics in any mission that ran contrary to their legal obligations. The United States generally accepted these decisions by its allies. The red card system assisted in the management of both international and domestic perceptions of the legitimacy of operations in Iraq—perceptions that were important given the brisk debate over the decision to use force in the first place.

Another legal issue that proved difficult in the context of coalition operations was Australian and British adherence to the Ottawa Treaty prohibiting the use of anti-personnel mines. The Ottawa Treaty will be considered in further detail later in this article, but for the moment it is important to note that Australia was unable to refuel any US aircraft that was fitted with air-delivered anti-personnel mines such as the scatter-based and mixed munition GATORS system.
During the pacification stage of the war in Iraq after April 2003, there were unanticipated legal differences between coalition members. The pacification phase was characterised by the application of the laws of occupation, a situation not experienced by the various coalition partners since the end of World War II. Legal issues of concern to the British involved using lethal force in defence of property and their adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In terms of the former, once the Coalition Provisional Authority created the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC), the latter organisation was given the power to use lethal force to protect certain critical properties. The British refused to accept this situation in their area of occupation in southern Iraq. Eventually, coalition and Iraqi authorities reached a compromise that involved ICDC elements in the British area of operations being governed by rules of engagement determined by the British military command.

The implications of British adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights were also problematic. The relationship between the European convention and the law of armed conflict in the context of an occupation remains unclear, and there is litigation currently before the UK courts on this subject. Confronted with legal uncertainty, Britain acted cautiously on a number of legal issues. For instance, Britain was unable to support the use of the death penalty by Iraqi courts during the occupation. Moreover, the question of whether British forces could hand over prisoners directly to the Iraqi criminal authorities was also contentious, given the reimposition of the death penalty.

Another serious point of contention between the coalition partners was the extent to which the occupation authorities could pursue reform agendas in Iraq under the law. The debate centred initially on the Hague Regulations of 1907 and whether these applied to the situation in Iraq. In certain quarters of the US legal establishment there was a view that the regulations did not apply in Iraq. However, such a view was unacceptable to both Australia and Britain. As matters transpired, the application of the Hague Regulations was in fact reinforced in the relevant United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions and ultimately the United States pursued policies commensurate with the UN decisions. However, discussion continued to occur regarding the extent of the authority possessed by the occupying powers in matters such as economic reform. Considerable cooperation was required in order to achieve unity in such matters among the key Coalition partners.
The sphere of detention management in Iraq was not an area that seemed to be contentious in terms of legal theory. However, the practical implementation of detention proved difficult during the occupation. For example, once the legal termination of the occupation occurred on 1 July 2004, the source of authority became the Chapter VII mandate contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1546. As a result, Britain indicated its intention to institute a process of detention that was independent of that employed by the Americans. The British approach was characterised by efforts to ensure that legal advice—but not legal representation—was available to security detainees. This approach may have been less than ideal, but since it concerned only security detainees and had no bearing on criminal processes, it could be legally sustained. Given the highly publicised problems and failings of prison conditions for detainees in Iraq, it is clear that much work needs to be done in order to standardise different approaches towards interrogation, command and control, and reporting requirements.

**PROTOCOL I OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, THE OTTAWA TREATY AND COALITION OPERATIONS**

The examples cited above highlight the practical importance of legal factors in contemporary coalition military operations. While it is impossible in a single article to deal with all the legal issues that might cause friction in coalitions, two particular conventions are immediately relevant. The first is Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions where, for the United States, there appear to be areas that have now moved ahead of customary law.

**PROTOCOL I OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS**

While the United States has accepted that large parts of Protocol I are expressions of the current state of LOAC, it has also made it clear which provisions it regards as not having reached that standard. These provisions include the extension of the applicability of Protocol I to ‘wars of national liberation’; the prohibition on causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment; the prohibition on the use of enemy emblems and uniforms during military operations; the definition of combatant; the prohibition on the use of mercenaries; the prohibition on reprisals; the definition of military objective; and the protection of dams and dykes.

Some of the concerns that emerge from these conventions can be dealt with in special Declarations of Understanding, and Australia has adopted this approach to Protocol I and in the Ottawa Treaty. Among Australian Declarations for Protocol I is a tighter definition of the combatant criteria. This declaration involves confining the definition of a combatant to those persons engaged in fighting, as set out in Article 1 (4),
including those struggling against ‘colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination’. In order for persons to qualify as lawful combatants under Protocol I, they are required to visibly carry weapons while deploying for an attack. Australia requires that armed deployment include any movement towards the point from which an attack is to be launched. The phrase ‘visible to the adversary’ while engaging in a military deployment is interpreted by Australia to include not only binocular range but also ranges determined by the use of infra-red and image intensification devices.

In addition, in order to ensure that targeting restrictions are realistic in character, Australian military commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding on or executing attacks necessarily have to reach their decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information from all sources available to them at the relevant time. More importantly, in relation to the definition of a military objective, the ‘military advantage’ element of the definition is intended to describe an attack considered as a whole. The ‘concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’ must exist in order to justify an attack. Finally, Australia has argued that the limitation of attacks to military objectives in Article 52 (2) does not deal with the issue of collateral damage.

While these declarations have made it easier to manage contending approaches in targeting between the United States and Australia, differences continue to exist. The United States has adopted a broad application of the use of kinetic means in military targeting. However, recent military practice has suggested that, when working in a coalition environment, the United States is prepared to modify this approach in the interest of harmony with its military partners. Frequently, the management of legal factors for interoperability has involved determining the lowest common denominator that is acceptable to all parties and then proceeding on that basis.

THE OTTAWA TREATY ON ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

The Ottawa Treaty poses even greater difficulties for managing the practical implications of coalition operations, especially with the United States. The treaty bans the use of anti-personnel mines, either directly or indirectly, and raises questions as to whether Australia can be associated with coalition partners—such as the United States—that continue to use these weapons. This association may include the activities of embedded personnel from the ADF working in a US headquarters,
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De-mining actions and the involvement of ADF personnel in refuelling allied aircraft armed with anti-personnel mines. Other situations include the problem of ADF occupation of a territory that may be protected by coalition anti-personnel mines and the issue of requests from Australian personnel for fire support from a coalition partner that might use mines.

Given the potential criminal liability for ADF members involved in the above scenarios, resolving these issues is more than an academic exercise. In general, Australia has sought to manage such legal problems through Declarations of Understanding. The most important of these declarations states:

It is the understanding of Australia that, in the context of operations, exercises or other military activity authorised by the United Nations or otherwise conducted in accordance with international law, the participation by the Australian Defence Force, individual Australian citizens or residents in such operations, exercises or activities in combination with the armed forces of States not party to the Convention which engage in activity prohibited under the Convention would not, by itself, be considered to be in violation of the Convention.

In further declarations on use, assistance, encouragement and inducement, Australia has refined its approach. Australia believes that in the context of the Ottawa Treaty, ‘use’ means the physical emplacement of anti-personnel mines and does not include any indirect or incidental benefit derived from these weapons when they are laid by another state. Furthermore, in the context of the Treaty, Australia interprets ‘assist’ to mean direct physical participation in prohibited activity with respect to anti-personnel mines, but not indirect support (such as the provision of security for personnel engaging in those activities).

Australia considers ‘encouragement’ to mean a request for the commission of prohibited activity and ‘inducement’ to imply active engagement in the offering of incentives to obtain the commission of a prohibited activity. Finally, in dealing with the need to de-mine territory under ADF jurisdiction or control, Australia has asserted that any interpretation should not include the temporary occupation of, or presence on, foreign territory where mines may have been laid.

Future Legal Cooperation in Coalition Operations

Over the past two years, a legal Information Exchange Group (IEG) has begun to operate under the umbrella of the ABCA standardisation agreement. While progress has been slow, the IEG has agreed on terms of reference, on a definition of key issues and on the identification of points of contact. Further steps must involve dedicated project research into legal issues and the production of a series of position papers designed to obtain either consolidated interpretations or a documentation of varying interpretations.
Coalition handbooks and sub-pamphlets dealing with national legal doctrine, with risk management, with ‘troops-to-task’ issues and with the intricacies of ‘weaponeering’ are also required by armies.

A recent development that makes legal cooperation easier has been the establishment of exchange postings between the US Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) and the ADF Military Law Centre (MLC). In addition, a British officer is also about to join the CLAMO, and American military officers will reciprocate with both Britain and Canada. The CLAMO–MLC relationship has been developed as an engine for generating progress in the IEG. In this process, the ADF officer at CLAMO has played a significant role in distilling lessons learnt from the war in Iraq, and the first volume of the results has been published. The development of national doctrine is continuing but there is much that still needs to be done in relation to incorporating legal lessons into military training and exercises. In the near future, Australia and its closest military partners must aim for command and planning staff to include legal officers, who are well versed in the nuances of Coalition operations.

**CONCLUSION**

This article has examined how legal factors in military planning may impinge on both coalition operations and interoperability. Since there are limitations to the workings of the multilateral international system, Australia depends heavily for its security on bilateral defence relationships, particularly the ANZUS Treaty. However, because the United States has chosen not to adhere to a number of international conventions to which Australia is a signatory, legal factors pose a significant planning challenge in future Australian–US military operations.

Over the next decade, coalition standardisation in the crucial legal area must be dramatically improved through the use of existing frameworks such as the ABCA forum. Legal planning for military operations remains an important area for the ADF to understand and to develop. In order to sustain successful military operations, Australia must uphold its moral authority and legitimacy in international and domestic spheres and, not least, in the actual area of operations.
ENDNOTES


7 Added to this was the fact that the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War came into effect in August 1949 and neither the US nor the UK had had experience with the regime that this Convention establishes in occupation situations. Australia had this experience through applying the Conventions to its operations in Somalia in 1993 during the UNITAF period, and in East Timor as guidance for the management of the operation during the INTERFET period.

8 Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, CPA Order No 28 (CPA/ORD/3 September 2003/28), Section 3(4).


10 Article 1(4).

11 Article 35.
12 Article 39.  
13 Article 43, Article 44 & Article 45.  
14 Article 47.  
15 Article 51(6).  
16 Article 52(2). This article has emerged in US practice as opposed to official statements in this respect.  
17 Article 56.  
18 The Treaty came into effect for Australia on 1 July 1999 and was implemented by the *Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Act 1998*. The Act creates individual criminal liability for members of up to 10 years in prison and a fine.

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The al-Qa’ida terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001 acted as a catalyst in revealing the new dynamics of a global security environment in which radical Islamism has emerged as a violent and dangerous opponent to liberal democracy. These attacks were symptomatic of how, in the latter half of the 20th century, a cycle of Islamic radicalism had swept through the Middle East, fuelled by the works of powerful ideologues. One of the most influential of these Islamist ideologues was the Egyptian scholar, Sayyid Qutb. Indeed, many observers consider Qutb to have been the key figure in providing the ideological template of contemporary militant Islam and its philosophy of terror.¹

The aim of this article is to try to provide an understanding of the roots of modern Islamist ideology—both in its historical context and its current employment by groups such as al-Qa’ida and the Muslim Brotherhood—through an examination of the beliefs of Sayyid Qutb. The article explores two areas. First, Qutb’s career and the key themes of his works that form a template for modern Islamism are examined. Second, the article briefly analyses the impact of Qutb’s writings on the radicalisation and militancy of al-Qa’ida—the prototypical Islamist terrorist threat of the 21st century.
SAYYID QUTB’S CAREER AND IDEOLOGY

Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian, was born in 1906 and received a conservative Islamic education. He attended university in Cairo and began a career in the Egyptian Ministry of Education. In the late 1940s, Qutb studied education at the University of Northern Colorado, receiving a master's degree. The experience of three years in America from 1948 until 1951 convinced Qutb that US society was materialistic, decadent, in thrall to consumerism and technology, and had little to offer the Arab world. Moreover, he viewed American support for the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 as a rejection of Arab equality. As a result, Qutb developed an uncompromising hatred towards the Jewish and Christian civilisations. This hatred would come to shape the remainder of his personal and professional life. He believed that, in its division between church and state, the West had created a ‘hideous schizophrenia’ in modern life, causing personal alienation and contributing to the rise of secularism—both of which threatened Islamic society. Returning to Egypt in the early 1950s, Qutb joined the Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, and soon became its leading theoretician.

In 1952, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and a group of officers overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in a military coup and inaugurated a nationalist and pan-Arab revolution. Nasser initially looked to the Muslim Brotherhood for support. However, Qutb wanted Nasser to introduce an Islamic ‘community of belief’, or umma, rather than pan-Arab nationalism. It was not the promotion of Arab civilisation as much as the promotion of Islamic civilisation that concerned Qutb. By 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood had been banned and many of its leading figures had gone into exile to Saudi Arabia. One of these figures was Qutb’s younger brother, Muhammad Qutb, a religious scholar, who became a professor of Islamic studies and later taught Osama bin Laden. Sayyid Qutb remained in Egypt. In 1954 he was accused of conspiring to assassinate President Nasser and was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. During his incarceration, Qutb wrote his thirty-volume interpretation of the Qur’an entitled, In the Shade of the Qur’an, and his 1964 manifesto Milestones. Finally, in 1966, as the Egyptian regime moved towards a form of Arab socialism and closer links with the Soviet Union, Qutb was executed for treason. In the words of his biographer, Hasan, Qutb ‘kissed the gallows’. He became ‘the martyr of the Islamic revival’ throughout the Middle East and his books came to form the nucleus of the modern Islamist movement.

For Qutb, the Qur’an was not merely a body of belief; it was a way in which to live, based on a oneness with God. Both Marxism and Western democratic liberalism ran counter to Qutb’s view of the totality of religious life.
liberalism ran counter to Qutb’s view of the totality of religious life. Marxism denied God while liberalism restricted God and translated faith into private rather than public morality. As Paul Berman has observed, what Qutb disliked the most about the modern West was ‘the split between the sacred and the secular in modern liberalism’. Such a split threatened the purity of Islam as a total belief system. From this perspective Qutb viewed Kemal Atatürk’s secular reforms in Turkey in the 1920s as retrograde and marking the end of the Islamic Caliphate. The spread of Western-style liberalism into the Middle East threatened to create ‘partial Islam’, which could only lead to annihilation of the faith. Atatürk’s reforms amounted to little more than an offensive against Muslim countries. Such an offensive, wrote Qutb, was ‘an effort to exterminate this religion [of Islam] as even a basic creed, and to replace it with secular conceptions having their own implications, values, institutions and organizations’.

Qutb’s answer to creeping secularism was for a vanguard to begin the renovation of Islamic life globally. The key elements of his writings that inform contemporary political Islam as a movement include the concepts of hakimiyyah, jahiliyya and jihad. All three concepts are central to understanding the ideological foundation for current anti-Western attitudes and modern Islamic terrorism.

HAKIMIYYAH

One of the intellectual tools that Qutb uses to explain his Islamist philosophy is the term hakimiyyah. This term is derived from the Arabic word hukm, meaning to rule or govern, and Qutb uses it in a divine sense, referring to the absolute sovereignty of God. Islam stands entirely on the belief in the Oneness of God, its institutions and all its laws, and insists on man’s total bondage to God alone. When the belief that there is no deity except God (la illaha illa Allah) dominates human existence—including government, law, education and individual private life—Islam fulfils its true purpose in securing freedom for all individuals.

Central to the practical manifestation of Islam in society is the implementation and acceptance of Shari’ah (Divine Law). While denoting legality, Shari’ah is not to be confined to law or government and is to encompass everything pertaining to the organisation of human life, including principles of faith, justice, morality, behaviour and knowledge. Such an approach requires a complete dismissal of all man-made social systems. Since the Shari’ah is viewed by Qutb as the embodiment of God’s will on earth, anything less than complete submission is heretical.
JAHILIYYA

The term *jahiliyya* means to be ‘in ignorance of divine guidance’. In his manifesto, *Milestones*, Qutb writes that the world is divided into two kinds of societies: Muslim and non-Muslim *jahiliyya* (ignorant) societies. In Muslim societies, Islam is applied to all aspects of life through observance of Shari'ah. Consequently, Qutb believed that Islamic society was, ‘by its very nature, the only civilised society, and the *jahili* societies, in all their various forms, are backward societies. It is necessary to elucidate this great truth’.7 Qutb defined a *jahili* society as any society that ‘does not dedicate itself to submission to God alone, in its beliefs, in its observances of worship and its legal regulations’. *Jahili* included all Christian and Jewish societies as well as all ‘idolatrous societies’, with specific reference to countries such as Japan and the Philippines, and some countries in Africa.8

As Qutb believed that Jews and Christians had distorted their original beliefs in the infallibility of God’s law by conceding legislative power to secular authority, they were *jahiliyya*—the enemy. The West’s defection from the ‘way of God’ came through its secularism of political and administrative life by a conscious separation of church and state. Qutb ruled out any accommodation with the *jahili* system. The only proper Muslim relationship with *jahiliyya* was one of complete rejection. As such, those Muslim societies that chose to incorporate elements of *jahili* systems into the Islamic framework—that is, through the adoption of a secular government or legal systems—were also *jahiliyya*. As the enemy of Islam they were to be destroyed. For Qutb *jahiliyya* societies are incapable of offering an individual true freedom. He argues:

> When, in a society, the sovereignty belongs to God alone, expressed in its obedience to the Divine Law, only then is every person in that society free from servitude to others, and only then does he taste true freedom. This alone is ‘human civilisation’.9

In Qutb’s view, Western society bestowed higher value on materialism rather than on the dignity of the individual. If materialism dominated, as was the case with the United States and Europe, and ‘all other human values are sacrificed at its altar, then such a society is backward’.10 Consequently, such a society could not confer freedom in the real sense but offered only a degraded and regressive existence. Submission to a human authority not sanctioned by God meant that individual freedom would be lost to a material world susceptible to corruption. In this way, the roots of *jahili* society became mere human desires, ‘which do not let

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In Qutb’s view, Western society bestowed higher value on materialism rather than on the dignity of the individual.
people come out of their ignorance and self-importance. Qutb believed that true Muslims in the vanguard movement must engage in a constant struggle against the influence of *jahiliyya*. Qutb believed that revolution, not reform, was required. It is only through the total destruction of secular societies that the Islamic system could be secure. Thus Qutb wrote, 'the foremost duty of Islam in this world is to depose of *jahiliyya* from the leadership of man, and to take the leadership into its own hands and enforce the [Islamic] way of life.'

**JIHAD**

The term *jihad*, meaning 'struggle' or 'striving' (in the way of God), was central to Qutb's radical form of Islam. *Jihad* was necessary in order to make the Islamic way dominant in the world and was commanded by the Qur’an. Qutb believed that 'since the objective of the message of Islam is a decisive declaration of man's freedom, not merely on the philosophical plane but also in the actual conditions of life, it must employ *jihad*.' According to Qutb, *jihad* is a legitimate method by which Islam may seek victory over the influence of *jahiliyya*, thus ensuring the sovereignty of God on earth. Qutb rejected the writings of those who stipulated that Islamic *jihad* is only permissible in a 'defensive war'. Indeed, he condemned such as an attempt to separate Islam from its method of affirmation.

Qutb's rationale for using armed violence was associated with the notion of justified conflict against one's enemy. The reasons for *jihad* are 'to establish God's authority on the earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by God; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems in life; to end the lordship of one man over others.' The Egyptian ideologue believed that the struggle to secure such a victory could not be achieved under a national banner, but only under the banner of faith alone. *Jihad* is a revolution of ideas and a war of ideologies unlimited by geography or state sovereignty; it is a universal phenomenon that necessitates the revolution of a community of believers (*umma*) in order to achieve the destruction of *jahiliyya* and the restoration of God's command over life. *Jihad* is the physical power that Islam should bring to bear in order to abolish the jahili system.
QUTB’S INFLUENCE ON CONTEMPORARY MILITANT ISLAM: THE CASE OF AL-QA’IDA

Qutb’s revolutionary writings and his execution at the hands of Nasser have had a significant impact on the leadership of al-Qa’ida. In particular, Qutb has been one of the most important influences on Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri—the man considered to be the intellectual architect behind much of al-Qa’ida’s rhetoric and campaign planning. In Montasser al-Zayyat’s recent critical biography of al-Zawahiri, The Road to Al Qaeda: the Story of Bin Laden’s Right-Hand Man, al-Zayyat describes the extensiveness of Qutb’s influence on the leader’s ideology and principles:

In Zawahiri’s eyes, Sayyid Qutb’s words struck young Muslims more deeply than those of his contemporaries because his words eventually led to his execution. Thus, those words both provided the blueprint for his long and glorious lifetime, and eventually led to his end. 17

This admiration was reinforced by the fact that al-Zawahiri’s uncle, Mahfouz Azzam, was a lifelong friend of Qutb and was engaged as his lawyer until his death in 1966. Like many in Egypt and the broader Islamic community, al-Zawahiri saw Qutb as a revolutionary and a martyr whom he aspired to emulate by membership of the Islamic Jihad Group. 18 Subsequently, almost every publication by al-Zawahiri included admiring references to Sayyid Qutb and his contribution to modern Islamic revival. For example, Zawahiri notes:

Although Qutb… was oppressed and tortured by Nasser’s regime, [his] influence on young Muslims was paramount. Qutb’s message was and still is to believe in the oneness of God and the supremacy of the Divine path. This message fanned the fire of Islamic revolution against the enemies of Islam at home and abroad. The chapters of this revolution are renewing one day after another. 19

Osama bin Laden also clearly identified with Qutb’s Islamist ideology. As mentioned earlier, while a student at King Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden was tutored by Qutb’s brother, Muhammad, and close friend Abdullah Azzam. The latter was bin Laden’s Islamic Law professor and later went on to found Afghan–Arab terrorist training camps in Peshawar, Pakistan. Of Palestinian origin, Azzam chiefly instructed his students with the works of Islamist ideologues such as Qutb. Heavy instruction in Qutbian philosophy provided bin Laden

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Heavy instruction in Qutbian philosophy provided bin Laden with an ideological basis for the evolution of his revolutionary ideas.
with an ideological basis for the evolution of his revolutionary ideas. His numerous public announcements since the mid-1990s have continually reflected key Qutbian beliefs, indicating an earnest desire that he and his followers in the al-Qa‘ida network are the spearhead of the modern international Islamic movement, committed to restoring Islam to the glory of its medieval days.20

Militarily, the al-Qa‘ida leadership has adopted Qutb’s understanding of jihad and embraced his overall objective—that is, the destruction of jahiliyya for the creation of ‘freedom’ defined in an Islamist sense. This view is reflected in al-Qa‘ida’s rhetorical emphasis on an overall international strategy. By appropriating Qutb’s interpretation of the justification for jihad, al-Qa‘ida has been able to rationalise war against the United States. The adoption of Qutb-style ideas have also allowed al-Qa‘ida to establish a strong international support base through the unification of diverse Islamist movements, nourished on anti-Western hostility and emphasising their holy duty as Muslims to carry out jihad.

CONCLUSION

For Sayyid Qutb, Islam was not divisible into the sacred and the secular. An Islamic system means the abolition of man-made laws in a theocracy based on the shar‘iah. The enemies of such an Islamic system were Jews and Christians as well as Muslim hypocrites who perpetrated corruption. Understanding Qutb’s ideology and its influence is a step towards comprehending the motivation behind political Islam and its use of terrorism as a tool of warfare. Western understanding of Islamist ideology remains weak and is framed by a secularism that is rejected by movements such as al-Qa‘ida.

While military force and law enforcement are essential in the global war on terror, the West must engage in the war of ideas being waged in the Islamic world. In the 1990s such an engagement was not pursued effectively and, as in the 1930s with fascism, the West slept while danger gathered. In the 21st century, we require intellectual ammunition to win what is a global struggle. Sayyid Qutb’s writings provide a convenient entrée into the radical ideology of contemporary political Islam and, as such, deserve critical evaluation by Western strategists and intelligence agencies. As daunting as the global struggle against Islamist terror may be, in terms of knowledge of its enemy, the West can afford to sleep no longer.

ENDNOTES

3 Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 101.
5 Berman, *Terror and Liberalism*, p. 87.
14 Haddad, 'Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival', pp. 84–5.

THE AUTHOR

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The great failing in the US war effort since September 2001 has been the reluctance to comprehend the enemy that America confronts. As long as the anodyne, euphemistic and inaccurate term ‘the war on terror’ remains the official nomenclature, the struggle will not be won. The genesis of the term war on terror goes back to 11 September 2001 when, twelve hours after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush addressed the American nation and launched a war against terror. At the time, the use of this term was correct since, in the immediate aftermath of the surprise attacks, there was no confirmation as to the identity of those responsible. Within days, however, it became apparent that the al-Qa’ida movement was responsible for the 11 September attacks. Yet the term war on terror remained in official use. Why? It is because as a term it has no dire implications and does not point to any group within society. As a result, the term is both useful and relatively inoffensive since most of us are against terrorism.

It is far better, however, and certainly more accurate, to describe the kind of war in which the United States has been engaged since 11 September 2001 as a war against Islamist terrorism. Even more precise would be to call the struggle a war on political Islamism. If the Islamist dimension were to be recognised as the central threat, then
it would be possible to examine the totalitarian ideology that drives the instrument of terror. From this perspective, it is encouraging that the 9/11 Commission Report views the terrorist threat against the United States not in generic terms but as being of a particular type, namely Islamist terrorism. Indeed, the Commission calls Islamist terrorism the ‘catastrophic threat’ that faces the United States in the early 21st century.¹

Why does it matter that the Islamist dimension of contemporary terrorism be specified? It is a simple case of diagnosis. Just as a physician must identify a disease in order to treat it successfully, so too must a strategist identify an enemy in order to secure victory. The point of this article is to emphasise the importance of knowing one’s enemy. For two years during the 1980s, the author taught a course in strategy and policy at the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The key text of this course was Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War*. Some of the student officers found it mildly odd that a strategy and policy course should take its inspiration from a Prussian soldier who had been dead for a century and a half. Yet Clausewitz’s *On War* contains a timeless message, and it is this: one must define one’s policy before one can decide on an appropriate strategy. At the Naval War College, the author conducted a historical survey of warfare, starting with the ancient Greeks and concluding with the Falkland Islands campaign of 1982. Students examined how various politicians and military leaders from antiquity to modern times had analysed their war aims and how correctly or how mistakenly they had then conducted their strategy.

The author learnt from teaching this course that, not only in military affairs but in life more generally, one must determine one’s aims and goals before one can plan to reach them. In theory such action, of course, sounds obvious. Yet it is seldom obvious in practice. It is, for example, far from obvious in what is called the war on terror, even though the term is unfortunate. The important question to ask in the war on terror is: what is the overall goal of the struggle? Is it the seizure of an enemy’s capital? Is it taking land? Is it influencing public opinion? What have US politicians defined as the purpose of fighting?

In the United States in October 2001, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated that America’s strategic goal was to end terrorism. Yet the threat is not simply one of terrorism, which, after all, is a method. The threat is altogether...
Defeating Militants and Winning Moderates

something more profound. For the United States, World War II started with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941. Pearl Harbour was a surprise attack, but the war that followed was not conceptualised as a war on surprise attacks. The surprise attack was a tactic employed by the Japanese. Similarly, in August 1914, World War I started because of an assassination in Sarajevo. Again, the combatants of World War I did not conceptualise the war as being waged against assassinations. In short, the current war on terror cannot be classified as a war against terrorism because terrorism is a tactic.

In classical wars such as World War I, the central issue was which state could deploy the greater industrial resources to produce the maximum number of shells, tanks, rifles, aircraft and ships. Industrial resources of this type are not an obvious issue in this war. Economically and militarily, the war on terror is a case of what is now called asymmetric warfare. The enemy has chosen terrorism because it does not have ships, planes or tanks to deploy against the United States. However, if the enemy did have a conventional capability, or the capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction, the war would no longer be confined to terrorism. The true enemy in the war on terror is the belief system that motivates the use of terrorism—a belief system that is larger than war and that transcends crime. The enemy in the war on terror is an ideology—a radical utopian ideology known variously as Islamism, militant Islam, radical Islam, political Islam and fundamentalist Islam. It is important to note that Islamism is not the same as Islam—the personal faith of over one billion people. Rather, Islamism is a form of religious belief transmuted into a radical utopian ideology. As a result, the best way to understand the Islamist phenomenon is to examine it in the context of other modern and radical utopian ideologies. The two main radical ideologies of the modern era against which our forebears—both American and Australian—fought were the fascists in World War II and the Marxist–Leninists in the Cold War. Islamism represents a third totalitarian ideology. However, it is different in many ways from fascism and communism. First, it is non-Western in character. Second, it has a religious quality that is not found in the secular ideologies

... Islamism is a form of religious belief transmuted into a radical utopian ideology.
of the fascists and Marxist–Leninists. Third, Islamism is not the product of a great power such as Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union or Mao Zedong’s China.

Wars are fought for underlying political beliefs. In World War II, the true goal of the Western allies was the destruction of fascist ideology in those states and its influence as a world force. Indeed, since 1945, fascism—while still present as a body of ideas—is now a minor phenomenon that has never threatened the world as it did in the inter-war years. After 1945, the fascist states such as Germany and Italy were resurrected as liberal Western democracies. Similarly, the struggle against Marxist–Leninism during the Cold War involved a fifty-year ideological struggle that culminated in 1991 with the implosion and end of the Soviet Union. Today, in the early 21st century, Marxism–Leninism is no longer an ideological threat to democracy. Even in China and Vietnam, Marxist–Leninism has been transformed by free-market ideas. Moreover, the international communist movement has largely disappeared as a political force.

The West’s strategy in the war on terror must be to bring about another 1945 and 1991 in order to end the international phenomenon of an Islamist totalitarian ideology. While there are considerable differences between European totalitarianism and radical Islamism there are also similarities present. Like the fascists and the communists, contemporary Islamists are devoted to a body of ideas that are powerful, convincing and inspiring, and for which adherents to the cause are willing, in many cases, to give up their lives. As in communism and fascism there are several distinct currents of Islamism. For example, in Saudi Arabia there is Wahabbism; in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood; and in Iran, the Khomeni ideology that overthrew the Shah in the late 1970s. Employing a communist analogy, these Islamist currents are similar to the Stalinist vision, the Maoist vision and the Ho Chi Minh vision of revolutionary Marxism–Lenisim. Each Islamist strand has differing emphases, involves different personalities and contains different temperaments, but like the various communist parties of the 20th century, ultimately they form part of a worldwide Islamist movement.

Like the ambitious European totalitarians, the Islamist goal is to expand in order to achieve ideological hegemony.
The Islamists view themselves as the Elect, the Chosen—a messianic vanguard whose task is to further their peculiar ideology globally. Like the ambitious European totalitarians, the Islamist goal is to expand in order to achieve ideological hegemony. Since there are no serried ranks of Islamist soldiers, the movement undertakes special operations such as the 11 September assault on the United States, the 2002 Bali bombing in Indonesia and the 2004 Madrid train attack. Afghanistan under the Taliban was the purest example of what we can expect from an Islamist state. For five years during the 1990s, the Taliban regime’s control of society was comparable to that exercised in Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia in the 1930s.

In the course of expanding its influence, the Islamist movement sees the modern West as its primary obstacle. Like the fascists, as with the communists, the Islamists view the West as an implacable enemy. The West has enormous military and economic power, and possesses an alternative liberal ideology that stands in opposition to illiberal Islamism. The West has the material appeal to lure the young of Islam away from Islamism. As a result, we in the West are the main enemy.

While the terrorism practised by radical Islamism is of a new type and is bound up with criminality, it is a mistake to attempt to treat it as a law enforcement operation. The law enforcement model of counter-terrorism was employed in the 1990s and proved incapable of securing Western societies from attack. Under the law enforcement approach, there was no concerted counterattack on the Islamist international movement, no global effort to restrict their funding and little direct military involvement in disrupting Islamist command-and-control networks. Instead, police and intelligence agencies concentrated on tracking individuals and attempted to capture the most visible foot-soldiers of the movement.

It is imperative that we look beyond law enforcement towards the strategic requirement of countering the concerted political effort that drives Islamism.
the West from Islamism lies in its termite-like infiltration of liberal democratic societies. It would be more logical for an Islamist strategist to say: ‘Let’s have much less violence. Build radical mosques. It’s legal.’

In order to destroy the threat of militant Islam there must be a struggle waged against both the military–criminal and the political–ideological dimensions. The first dimension involves the exertion of physical force and political will to defeat Islamist military–criminal action. However, it is the second—the political–ideological dimension—that is the vital battleground. Politically, we must concentrate on assisting anti-Islamist Muslims, our natural allies in this war, to promote the merits of moderate Islam. In other words, the ultimate strategic goal must be for the West to encourage a Middle East that is tolerant, modern and, above all, anti-Islamist.

While visiting Australia, the author has been asked what should be the role of this country in the war against radical Islamism. First, in part, Australia’s effort must be regional in character because the country possesses expertise on conditions in South-East Asia—particularly those in Indonesia and Malaysia—that is far beyond the capacity of most other Western states. Second, Australia has an important role to play in assisting the evolution of an ‘anti-Islamist Islam’. Western governments, media, academia and the churches must develop a clear understanding of the character of Islamism, and they must help further the cause of moderate Muslims everywhere. Our strategic enemy, as the final 9/11 Commission report stated, is an ideology, not a religion. Just as we had to understand fascism and communism in order to defeat them, so too will we have to comprehend political Islamism as a global movement.

Before 11 September, we saw terrorism as criminal and fought it mainly with law enforcement means. After that date, we declared war on terror and have adopted a stronger military component. Yet our struggle transcends both law enforcement efforts and military campaigning, both of which are methods. Ultimately, we are engaged in what is a war of ideas. In such a war, the military, intelligence and law enforcement dimensions are secondary to the vital political battle of contending ideas. The key political task is to convince moderate
Muslims around the globe that the radical utopian path of Islamism is self-defeating. In short, if militant Islam is the problem, then moderate Islam must become the solution.

Will the modern West come to terms with the grave challenge of countering Islamism expeditiously and with a minimum loss of life? Our use of euphemism, our pluralism and our frequent unwillingness to define political challenges realistically often prevent clarity of thought and timely action until catastrophes such as 11 September and Bali occur. We in the West have a tradition of what might be dubbed ‘education by murder’. We often only learn the harsh reality of the ways of the world when our people die violently and tragically—as they did in terror attacks in New York, Washington, Bali and Madrid. We need to prepare ourselves with an education that analyses and researches the roots of Islamism as a radical utopian ideology, in much the same way as our forebears learnt to understand the challenge of fascism and communism. Only through such preparation will we learn that our struggle is not against a tactic or a method but against an anti-democratic, illiberal ideological movement. When we have grasped this central truth, we will be in a position to know our enemy, to fight him effectively and, ultimately, to defeat him decisively.

ENDNOTE

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Until recently, discussions of the relationship between the media, strategy and military culture appeared only briefly, or by inference, in mainstream Western military thought. The neglect of this relationship is remarkable given that it has featured prominently in the practice of war for over a century and a half.¹ Not until the early 1970s were studies of the interaction between the media, military strategy and the conduct of operations regarded as being worthwhile scholarly undertakings. Only comparatively recently has investigation turned towards the implications of the mass media on military culture, with scholarly interest focusing on how the armed forces of developed countries have responded to media intrusion.

* The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not those of the British Ministry of Defence or of any other institution. An early version of this paper was first given to the Oxford University Strategic Studies Group at All Souls College, Oxford in November 2002.
THE MEDIA, IMAGERY AND MILITARY FORCE

The unprecedented media coverage of Operation *Iraqi Freedom* in 2003 highlighted the importance of the role of the news media in military strategy. The stated aim of the United States in its invasion of Iraq was that of ‘regime change’ through the removal of Saddam Hussein’s government. To that end, the United States identified an important part of Saddam’s power as being his formidable reputation for survival in Iraqi popular culture. As a result, iconic or emblematic structures of the regime such as Saddam’s palaces—and even murals and statues of him—were deliberately captured or destroyed as ‘regime targets’. The American use of embedded reporters inside coalition military units was seen as being an integral part of the attack on Saddam’s regime.

Embedding represents a recognition that technology had conferred on journalists the ability to transmit real-time reports from the battlefield in a manner that was increasingly independent of direct military control.\(^2\) The electronic imagery of the destruction of the symbols of Saddam’s power culminated on 9 April 2003 with the symbolic toppling in Baghdad by Iraqis of a large statue of Saddam. President George W. Bush highlighted this particular incident in his victory speech on board USS *Abraham Lincoln* on 1 May. The President proclaimed that, ‘in the images of falling statues, we have witnessed the arrival of a new era… With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians’.\(^3\)

The combination of force and imagery in the 2003 attack on Iraq highlights the obvious and close connection between modern military strategy and media policy. Yet the importance of the connection has not been significant in the writings of many prominent conventional military analysts. Observers often view the place of imagery in US strategy as portrayed in the media as a manifestation of the failings of ‘public diplomacy’. As the *Wall Street Journal* put it on 17 May 2004, ‘the scale of the war was based on the fundamental strategic misconception that the primary objective was Iraq rather than the imagination of the Arab World’. The leading American strategic

\[\ldots\] the United States identified an important part of Saddam’s power as being his formidable reputation for survival in Iraqi popular culture.

\[\ldots\] the greatest impact of the information revolution has been to convey a negative image of the United States globally.
commentator, Anthony H. Cordesman, also noted that the United States failed to project a persuasive public image to the Iraqi people. Moreover, the military analyst, Ralph Peters, has argued that the greatest impact of the information revolution has been to convey a negative image of the United States globally. The power of Hollywood, he argues, has made the global masses aware of their inequality and poverty while portraying a fictional United States saturated in wealth, ease and sexuality. In this way the United States becomes the object of hatred, envy and blame for all the failings of less fortunate countries.

PROBLEMS IN THE STUDY OF MILITARY–MEDIA RELATIONS

Part of the problem is that the study of the interactions between the media and military culture is relatively recent, and is part of the new academic field in the West of cultural studies. As a result, the relationship between the news media and armed forces is not sufficiently acknowledged in current military thought. For instance the literature on the media and the military is relatively large, but remains highly compartmentalised in different academic disciplines. Diverse academics writing about the media and the military often reach similar conclusions, but usually by different approaches and methodologies. This diversity in commentary and analysis has obscured the reality that, for at least a decade, the military–media relationship has been of sufficient importance to begin to constitute itself as a new branch of strategic studies. Yet, for many observers, the subject of ‘the media and strategy’ still lacks definition and profile and, as a result, has found no widespread acceptance within strategic studies.

One of the dilemmas encountered by scholars seeking to understand the new interaction between the military and the media is the reality that there is no such thing as ‘the military,’ and no such thing as ‘the media.’ Both the military and the media are marked by diversity, and the recent interaction between the two fields reflects such issues as globalisation, exceptionalism, cultural meaning and causality. Understanding the military–media interaction requires a working knowledge of a variety of different intellectual disciplines, ranging from military history through strategic theory to communications technology and cultural studies.

MILITARY–MEDIA RELATIONS AND THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The main reason for the new importance of the media in military thought can be attributed to the dramatic changes in the strategic environment during the post–Cold War decade between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2001 War against Terror. The post–Cold War era has brought into sharp relief the extent of the changes stemming
The Military and the Media

from the impact of economic globalisation. In particular, some writers have questioned the place of the nation-state in a world of many more trans-state actors. One extreme argument that some military theorists have advanced is the belief that the state system is dying and that the world is entering a ‘New Middle Ages’ of growing and decentralised anarchy. 7

In the 20th century, industrialised warfare along the lines of the world wars required the mobilisation of the resources of the developed states of Europe. More recently, as Western economies move from industrial to post-industrial modes of production, there is an unwillingness to mobilise society and its economic resources. For example, in 1991 even the United States struggled to project industrialised warfare into the Persian Gulf region to fight a comparatively small war. 8 In addition, since 1991 major Western states have faced the difficulty of having to engage in conflicts that do not appear to be wars in the traditional interstate sense. The overt declaration of war by President George W. Bush in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks has served to highlight the controversy surrounding the extent to which recent US military operations are wartime rather than peacetime acts. Some leading British strategic commentators have, for example, disputed the idea that the 11 September attacks should qualify as an act of war in the traditional sense. 9

Scholars such as Mary Kaldor and Mark Duffield have popularised the concept of ‘New Wars’ in the Third World and in regions such as Eastern Europe. Such wars are characterised by Western military concerns with humanitarian assistance as much as with the use of lethal force. 10 The present British Government has, in its use of military force overseas, maintained that the promotion of fundamental human values should be part of foreign policy and the pursuit of the national interest. 11

Such military operations are often inherently paradoxical in that they threaten, or employ, organised lethal force in the name of humanitarian assistance. In consequence, even before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the role of Western public opinion both domestically and internationally in supporting such military operations had assumed much greater importance. Michael Ignatieff described the 1999 Kosovo conflict as a ‘virtual war’, and in an even more colourful coinage Colin McInnes characterised Western military involvement as ‘spectator-sport war’. Similarly, the radical theorist, Noam Chomsky, has written of the rise of ‘the new military humanism’. 12

... the new importance of the media in military thought can be attributed to the dramatic changes in the strategic environment during the post–Cold War decade between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2001 War against Terror.
THE MASS MEDIA AND CLASSICAL MILITARY THOUGHT

What has not yet been absorbed into military strategic thinking is the reality that media portrayal of such operations reflects much wider changes within civil society itself. What is emerging is greatly increased influence of the media in affecting strategic decision-making. The implications for the conduct of military operations under new conditions of media intrusion are considerable. The presentation of a military action has become indivisible from its conduct. Increasingly military force is being employed not simply to achieve a decisive result as in classical military theory, but in order to shape a resolution by political means.

In the past, the arrival of the armed forces and the creation of a war zone meant the suspension or subordination of ordinary civilian life. Today, in contrast, military operations often take place within the organic structure of civil society, enveloping themselves around ordinary events. This change in operational character requires a corresponding change in military thinking and in the way in which military force is conceived.

In many respects, the use of the media to announce the deployment and arrival of Western military forces into a theatre has now replaced the traditional needs of operational security. It is startling to discover that the one statement by Clausewitz in *On War* on the subject of the media makes this very point. In *On War*, Clausewitz complains that strategic security has become non-existent because the newspapers now warn the enemy of an army’s despatch before it reaches its zone of operations.¹³ Wars of choice take place in the context of domestic politics that are shaped by the mass media, and this reality has produced some major changes in strategy. Given the overwhelming conventional power of the US armed forces, its enemies have sought to follow strategies that limit traditional military effectiveness. Thus Iraq first sought to prevent the start of the 1991 Gulf War. Then, when hostilities broke out, Iraq sought to dictate the war’s political agenda by firing Scud missiles at Israel—essentially a propaganda ploy.¹⁴ Since that time, attempts to influence international media representatives in war zones have become standard practice. For example in 1999, during the Kosovo war, while the United States and NATO fought an air power campaign, the enemy—Serbia—replied by employing the strongest weapon available to it, namely ‘media power’. By using the electronic media as a propaganda tool, Belgrade was successful in shaping the limitations on how the United States and its NATO allies were prepared to fight that war.
However, as with air power, the effects of the media in warfare are often difficult to assess. In the cases of both Iraq in 1991 and Yugoslavia in 1999, the use of the media did not bring the success that Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic had hoped for. Studies of Northern Ireland and the Middle East on the long-term effects of the media in framing the context of conflicts confirm that, once a particular side has been identified as a villain, only sustained propaganda effort over a long period of time can alter that perception.\(^{15}\)

**THE CASUALTY FACTOR AND PUBLIC OPINION**

One aspect of warfare that is uniquely vulnerable to the influence of media intrusion is the belief that casualties in armed conflict (where the pursuit of state objectives is involved) are increasingly unacceptable to advanced democracies. The importance of this belief in current strategic thinking and the centrality of the media in reporting on casualties cannot be overstated. As General Wesley K. Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander—Europe (SACEUR), noted during preparations for the war in Kosovo in 1999, ‘Nothing would hurt us more with public opinion than headlines that screamed, NATO LOSES TEN AIRPLANES IN TWO DAYS’.\(^{16}\) On available evidence, the casualty aversion hypothesis is not very convincing, but it can only be tested by the unpalatable method of engaging in military activity. A belief that there exists a high public sensitivity toward sustaining casualties in military operations has also been extended to include losses inflicted on the enemy. Indeed, bombing and targeting policies that produced little or no Western domestic reaction in Iraq in 1991 were highly controversial in Yugoslavia in 1999.

One notable factor following the 11 September attacks on the United States is an apparently increased American tolerance for casualties, as demonstrated by Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan in 2001 and the war in Iraq since 2003. Currently, there is a debate in strategic circles as to whether there exists a ‘threshold of violence’ that must be crossed in order to justify the employment of strong military action.

After 11 September 2001, there was an important shift in the United States towards a war mentality, or even a war culture. This development was assisted by the long-accepted—if tacit—understanding that, in a democracy at war, the relationship between the government and the national media is different from that which exists during peacetime. The official belief that the rules with regard to media manage-
The behaviour of the media, and the reaction of military culture to that behaviour, provides further evidence of these strategic trends. The transformation of the military–media relationship from that of military control during the two world wars to that of the present day has been studied by scholars in terms of examining socio-political, institutional and technological changes. These approaches are compatible with the debate surrounding the changing character of war known as the Revolution
in Military Affairs (RMA). If current changes to war are temporary, then strategy and military culture need not change and military establishments can continue to treat industrialised warfare as their main function. However, if the changes in warfare are fundamental and long term, then both strategy and military culture must change in order to meet new realities.

The strategic theorist, Colin S. Gray, has compared the debate over the RMA to the development of theories of nuclear deterrence and limited war in the 1950s. He has argued that the main contribution of theorists to such a debate is to explore and influence the meaning of transformation and change in their early stages. Once the practitioners of defence and warfare absorb a new paradigm of strategy and settle on particular definitions and doctrines, then their institutional and military cultures become highly resistant to further ideas. In the United States this process has largely been accomplished. The RMA is now perceived as essentially an argument for increased computerisation, electronics and space systems for use in military operations.

In a phrase popularised by the futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler, there appears to be a close link between ‘the way we make war and the way we make wealth’. The RMA is a military version of the ‘e-business’ boom of the 1990s and is based on decisive military advantage being conferred by access to information. In the early 1900s the United States developed an ‘American way in war’ based on an interaction between military concepts and industrial methods that proved immensely successful during the 20th century. Similarly, at the beginning of the 21st century, the RMA debate is concerned with a search for a new conception for the use of military force according to new information concepts.

To date, the only country outside the United States to have fully embraced the RMA is Australia, which in 1997 adopted the ‘Knowledge Edge’ as one of the foundations of its defence policy. The official British position, as described in the 1998 Defence Review, is that the RMA debate is still continuing and that any fundamental restructuring of British armed forces or their doctrines is premature. This military approach has not been altered by the Review’s ‘New Chapter’ of 2002. Most other countries either lack the resources, or do not have the inclination, to try to adopt the RMA and its associated technologies.

An important facet of the RMA debate is the belief—probably first articulated by the Italian airpower theorist, Giulio Douhet, in the 1920s—that changes in technology dictate the character of warfare in any given era. This view is frequently accompanied...
by claims that the changes have been so radical that military history is either dead or has nothing to contribute to a new understanding of war. Yet the confinement of the idea of the RMA to changes in technology represents an impoverishment of strategic thinking. Historians and strategic theorists familiar with history have responded to the RMA’s technological bias (perhaps rather cruelly) by studying the RMA itself as being part of the history of ideas. RMA theorists sometimes clash sharply with orthodox Clausewitzians. The latter argue that the nature of war cannot change even if its methods may. An alternative term that is sometimes advanced by scholars is that of a ‘Military Technological Revolution’ (MTR)—a notion that derives from Soviet theoretical writings of the 1960s. An MTR may be described as an important but limited set of changes to warfare, rather than as the fundamental and permanent shift that is explicit in the idea of an RMA.

The contemporary military revolution debate may be further illuminated by the research that has been conducted into the development of communications technology in commerce and business practice. This research often stresses the social nature of communications technology. In the history of technology, the intertwining of social impact and military applicability is often evident. For instance, the military application of television followed long after the technology was introduced into civil society. Even more complex is the case of the Internet. Initially developed in the 1960s for military purposes, the Internet’s real impact was on society. The Internet returned to military importance in the 1980s and 1990s when evidence of its networking value had been demonstrated by civil society.

THE MEDIA AND THE MILITARY: INCORPORATION, MANIPULATION AND COURTSHIP

Classical military and strategic thought has long been concerned with describing warfare chiefly in terms of the development of firepower and logistics. However, the development of post-industrial warfare can be conceived and described in terms of changes to communications and their impact on the development of such new military theories as effects-based operations. The relationship between the armed forces and the media is largely concerned with the power to control information both in an institutional and a physical sense. In his work on the postmodern military, the military sociologist, Charles C. Moskos, has proposed a simple three-phase model...
of modern, late modern and postmodern in order to explain changes in the history of the military profession and the military–media relationship. In the Moskos model of military professionalism, the ‘Modern’ era (defined as being the period 1900–45 but more accurately until about 1955), the media were ‘incorporated’ into the armed forces and into the war effort, both as institutions and as individuals. The main method used by democratic governments in the world wars was to control the sources of information, but to allow the media to present that information largely as they wished.

According to the second part of the Moskos model, in the wars of the ‘Late Modern’ era between 1945 and 1990, the media were no longer incorporated but were ‘manipulated’. Although media institutions were not formally placed under government or military control, various methods were used to influence their portrayal of a war, usually by mutual agreement. News organisations accepted military restrictions on their reporters in war zones in return for access to operations. One aspect of this era was the debate over the extent to which the methods of control used during the world wars could be applied to the media in an age of limited wars.

The third part of the Moskos model is the post-1990 or ‘postmodern’ era, in which the media are now ‘courted’ by military establishments that have increasingly adopted the methods of public relations gurus and of spin doctors. These changes exhibit all the characteristics of a true RMA. For example, the cultural and societal basis for traditional ‘incorporation’ of the media into a national war effort has been weakened, as evidenced by the US media’s response to 11 September. Many media institutions have become international in their scope, and news as a commodity has become globalised. As a result, there has been much less success in appealing to the patriotism of a reporter or a news organisation. In the past, the main advantage to the media of accepting ‘incorporation’ and ‘manipulation’ was that of access to the battlefield and to military communications, both for physical movement and for the transmission of information.

Today, the rapid changes in commercial communications technology have largely removed any need for special access to military communications in war zones or operational areas. Indeed, reporters in a 21st-century war zone may often possess better and faster means of communication than the armed forces. Unlike the era of the world wars, the reality of limited wars and the increased employment of military forces among civilian noncombatants has meant that the media retains access to the whole infrastructure of civil society.

… military culture has itself been influenced by the wider social and political currents of the mass media.
Moreover, a growing realisation by modern militaries that public image and the presentation of events is now a primary rather than a secondary part of operational activity demonstrates how military culture has itself been influenced by the wider social and political currents of the mass media.

‘MANUFACTURING CONSENT’ AND SPECTATOR WARS

The adoption by defence establishments of many of the methods of corporate public relations as an integral part of the conduct of military operations has not gone unnoticed. For example, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky have developed a radical critique based on the idea of ‘manufacturing consent’. This radical critique has found further expression in the works of such British writers as Richard Keeble and the Australian journalists John Pilger and Phillip Knightley. Indeed, if one considers the works of two other Australians, Peter R. Young and Peter Jessel, on this subject, it is possible to speak of a distinctively Australian school of strategic thought on media–military relations.

The radical critique of the military and its relationship with the media takes its inspiration from President Dwight Eisenhower's warning in 1961 about 'influence sought or unsought by the military–industrial complex.' The radical school has argued that the issue of generating popular support through the media is now a primary military objective. Simultaneously, various institutional changes to the news corporations have made the media particularly susceptible to co-option by the military. These institutional changes have included the decline of analytical reporting in favour of entertainment or 'infotainment', and the rise of multinational media corporations led by powerful moguls have made the news media willing partners in their own seduction. In the radical interpretation, McInnes's 'spectator sport wars' involve the United States and other Western countries propagandising their own people through the media. The aim has been to manufacture an artificial level of support for a particular war through a tissue of lies that can only be exposed after hostilities have commenced.

A significant feature of the radical critique is the way in which the military move towards a new relationship with the media. The new approach is justified, and even praised, by political and military leaders on the basis of the need to inform the public and to win support for declared policies. At least one American analyst, A. Trevor Thrall, has argued that changes in military relations with the media since Vietnam are best explained as delayed responses to the growing institutional power of the media in relation to state authority.

Yet it is also possible to suggest a different explanation for the behaviour of the armed forces towards the media in the new strategic environment—and an explanation that is once more realistically related to military culture and its historical develop-
ment. It is no coincidence that the period of history that saw the emergence of mass politics and the mass media also saw the establishment of the idea of professionalism. In Europe a claim to professional status, including self-regulation and control over a special body of knowledge, arose and became widely accepted in the 20th century.

CONCLUSION

In the first half of the 20th century, wartime propaganda and the control of the media were largely civilian-led activities. However, since 1945, discrete distinctions in war between civilian and military spheres have become increasingly blurred. Nuclear weapons, doctrines of military limitation, insurgency and terrorism, and the new strategic realities of globalisation have all accelerated this process. Thus, perhaps the most convincing explanation of present Western military behaviour towards the media is that, having recognised the growing importance of electronic news, the armed forces are now seeking professional competence in an area previously left to civilians.

The military’s approach has meant an intrusion into the wider politics and culture of society with which most uniformed professionals are traditionally unfamiliar. Yet both the strategic studies establishment and military organisations remain uncomfortable with the military–media relationship. Indeed, many defence analysts treat the new relationship as transient or exceptional rather than as a manifestation of a permanent new development.

Ultimately, the starting place for any realistic discussion of military involvement with the media should be the role of the armed forces in protecting the core values of society and the media’s place in those core values. If the role of the media is one of the most visible aspects constituting evidence of a genuine RMA, then considerable changes will be necessary in military culture in the future. Such change will have to encompass how the military now view their own place in society. However, the present status of Western military thought and practice suggests that achievement of this goal is still a long way off.

ENDNOTES

1 The author gave a paper exploring this relationship, ‘The Media and the Art of War in the Western World 1792–1975’ to the XXIXth International Congress of Military History on ‘War, the Military and the Media from Gutenberg to Today’ in Bucharest, August 2003.
The Media, Strategy, And Military Culture


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THE ROLE OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN AUSTRALIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1939–72*

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN BLAXLAND

With the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) heightened operational tempo over recent years, analysis has been focused on the role of traditional combat arms and combat support elements during military deployments. Soldiers have given comparatively little thought to one of the most significant, but little-understood, combat-power multipliers of the Army, namely signals intelligence. In many respects, signals intelligence has been the poor cousin of human intelligence. In the 1990s, for instance, the benefits emanating from human intelligence were apparent

to Australian commanders through operations in Somalia, Bougainville and East Timor. Yet historically, signals intelligence also has been a significant, albeit highly secret, combat asset, with its responsibilities shared between the Australian Intelligence Corps and the Royal Australian Corps of Signals.

One of the reasons that an awareness of the importance of signals intelligence has not registered more prominently in the Army’s consciousness has been the fact that, following the end of the Vietnam War in the early 1970s, there was a lull in operational deployments until the early 1990s. Yet, despite the role that signals intelligence has played in recent operations, notably in East Timor in 1999, it remains an asset that is not well understood by many in the Australian Army. This article provides a historical review of signals intelligence since World War II. It argues that signals intelligence deserves closer attention and greater appreciation by land force commanders and their staffs. While security considerations prevent a discussion of signals intelligence’s direct application on recent and current operations, a brief historical overview of the capability’s role may help commanders and operational planners better appreciate what remains an enigmatic but important operational asset. In the history of the Australian Army, signals intelligence played a significant role throughout Cold War–era operations in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam and previously during World War II.

**AUSTRALIAN SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II**

During World War II, a number of special-function signal units were raised in Australia. These units included the New Guinea Air Warning Wireless Company and Special Wireless (or electronic warfare) Signals units. As early as December 1939, a signals detachment from the militia’s 3rd Division in Melbourne had been detailed to intercept enemy wireless transmissions. In June 1940, No.1 Australian Special Wireless Section was formed in Seymour, Victoria, in order to intercept and evaluate enemy wireless communications.

In 1941 the unit, now renamed No.4 Australian Special Wireless Section, commenced operations in the Middle East as part of the 1st Australian Corps. In February 1942, with the onset of the Pacific War, the section was posted back to Australia in order to monitor Japanese signals traffic.¹ During 1941, several additional small signals intelligence sections were established in Australia, including

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¹ Despite the role that signals intelligence has played in recent operations, notably in East Timor in 1999, it remains an asset that is not well understood by many in the Australian Army.
an organisation designed to crack Japanese codes at Sydney University, although it was the intelligence efforts of the Royal Australian Navy that ultimately succeeded in this endeavour. The Australian Army’s signals network expanded during the war under the direction of two complementary organisations: an intercept organisation and a research-and-control centre. The electronic interception organisation, incorporating the bulk of the No. 4 Special Wireless Section, came to be known as the Australian Special Wireless Group. The research-and-control centre, established in Melbourne in April 1942, became the Central Bureau and included a mixture of Australian Army, RAAF and US Army personnel. By 1944, the Central Bureau was intercepting and transcribing ULTRA information on a prodigious scale, thus contributing significantly to the successful conduct of Allied military operations. The unit’s success was mainly due to the application of both traffic analysis and cryptography. Traffic analysis involved the study of enemy wireless circuits, call signs, procedures, traffic volumes and messages that were intercepted in plain language. In addition, cryptography, involving the breaking of enemy codes and ciphers, combined with translation, derived a great deal of useful intelligence material—much of which was shared with the Allies.

During World War II, there was close coordination at the highest level of signals intelligence between Britain and the United States. This coordination was gradually extended to include Australian and Canadian code-breaking facilities. In the Pacific theatre, as in the European theatre, the breaking of the enemy’s codes proved vital in turning the tide of war in favour of the Allies. In fact, the role of the ULTRA code-breaking system, which was derived from enemy high-grade ciphers, was recognised as being decisive by the Allied high command. As General Willoughby, General Douglas MacArthur’s intelligence chief, put it, ULTRA ‘cut two years off the war’. Information from ULTRA dramatically shaped Allied strategy, enabling their forces to pre-empt Japanese military actions repeatedly.

In the history of the Australian Army, signals intelligence played a significant role throughout Cold War-era operations in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam …

During 1941, several additional small signals intelligence sections were established in Australia, including an organisation designed to crack Japanese codes at Sydney University …
THE EARLY POSTWAR ERA: THE FORMATION OF THE SPECIAL WIRELESS REGIMENT

In December 1947, the wartime success of signals intelligence persuaded the Chifley Government to authorise the integration of the various Australian agencies into the United States and United Kingdom (UKUSA) system that also included Canada. This agreement helped create what Australian scholars Desmond Ball and David Horner describe as ‘the most important secret intelligence co-operation regime ever organised.’

The postwar Australian Army also recognised that the most important means of gathering information about an enemy in any future conflict would be by deciphering intercepted signals. Consequently, the Army’s establishment included, for the first time, a unit that was raised in peacetime and was designed specifically for signals intelligence. The unit concerned was No. 101 Wireless Regiment, originally commanded by Major T. R. (Dick) Warren, and based at Cabarlah near Toowoomba in Queensland. Cabarlah, which began operation in the course of 1947, was to become the permanent home of Army signals intelligence.

The new Wireless Regiment’s operational tasking was controlled by the Joint Services organisation in Melbourne. Operational, as opposed to administrative, control was exercised by the Defence Signals Bureau in Melbourne, later renamed the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD). During this period, No. 101 Wireless Regiment’s main role was the strategic interception of telecommunications from, and within, the Asian region.

In terms of the Army signals intelligence, the fact that operational control of No. 101 Wireless Regiment—renamed 7 Signal Regiment in late 1965—was vested in an external agency meant that the unit was divorced from the mainstream of the Army. Nonetheless, the Wireless Regiment did participate in Army exercises. In April and May 1959 in Exercise Grand Slam, a regimental detachment was included as part of the notional enemy force opposing the 1st Independent Infantry Brigade Group. One participant observed that, despite the limited time involved in which to exercise electronic countermeasures,

By 1944, the Central Bureau was intercepting and transcribing ULTRA information on a prodigious scale …
effective jamming, so much so, that the opposing brigade signals officer complained, so we were ordered to stop in order to allow the exercise to proceed… One of the nasty things we could do was to tape-record rendezvous points for orders groups, fire orders and other important administrative messages, and, with minor alterations, play them back on the same net, thus creating a tremendous amount of confusion—it’s a dirty trick! The result of that was that the higher levels of the Army became aware of the great potential of electronic warfare to disrupt [their] command and control [in battle].

Following Exercise *Grand Slam*, the Wireless Regiment adopted a policy of ‘passive’ electronic countermeasures, involving mainly listening as opposed to interference procedures. The regiment adopted such an approach because the prevailing philosophy emphasised the importance of gaining intelligence rather than engaging in jamming and active counter-electronic measures. As one signals intelligence specialist, Peter Murray, later explained, ‘jammers were great in a battle, if you were winning, but they [also] reveal your presence and it’s much better to be a silent listener, not revealing your presence’. Traffic analysis and cryptography sections processed information derived from intelligence sources in the Wireless Regiment. Traffic analysis personnel examined the network system building ‘net’ (user network) diagrams and establishing frequencies, call signs and other technical information from which an ‘order of battle’—a list of units, command structure and organisations in a given activity—could be established.

Apart from exercises, the Army also gave signal operators the opportunity to demonstrate their skills when they helped to detect that a coup was likely to occur in Indonesia on 30 September 1965. Australian signals specialists intercepted an enormous volume of traffic from Indonesian networks, including news of the murder of many senior military officials as a precursor to a coup. In terms of cryptography, encoded messages were intercepted, broken and assessed by linguists.

Peter Murray recalled:

> I got into awful trouble because it was a Friday night and I turned on the [communications] link, but I could only raise one very co-operative warrant officer (who had had a few drinks) at 4 Signal Regiment in Brisbane. We subsequently passed an enormous amount of traffic down the line to Melbourne…

The Wireless Regiment also participated in various Australian overseas military commitments during the 1950s. For instance, from 1951 to 1959, 101 Wireless Regiment maintained a detachment in Singapore and Malaya as part of the 1st Australian Observer Unit. The detachment was a Wireless Troop type ‘F’ and included one officer and fifteen other ranks from the Regiment. According to one officer, the detachment ‘roamed around the jungle doing tactical intercept of Communist Terrorist communications (of which there were not a great deal)’. 
Signals Intelligence in Borneo

Between 1959 and Confrontation in 1964, the signals intelligence detachment in Singapore was initially known as 201 and then 121 Signal Squadron. The squadron’s wireless intercept role was such a well-kept secret that even many military personnel did not know that it performed radio intercept and analysis tasks for intelligence purposes. Indeed, following the Labor Party victory in the Australian Federal election of 1972, the newly elected Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, caused a stir by publicly announcing the previously secret nature of the roles and tasks of 121 Signal Squadron. Shortly afterwards, the forces stationed in Singapore were withdrawn. However, by the time of the withdrawal, another set of operational experiences had been added to the Australian Army’s signals intelligence credentials in Borneo and later Vietnam.

During Confrontation in August 1964, the Australian Government gave approval for 693 Signal Troop to be deployed to perform wireless interception in place of a British Army signal troop. The Australians were deployed to the island of Labuan, off the coast of Sabah, and personnel from Australia’s Singapore-based 201 Signal Squadron staffed the troop. On Labuan, the troop provided valuable intelligence information, and following the end of Confrontation its personnel were re-absorbed into 201 Signal Squadron.

Operations during Confrontation were successful largely because the intelligence information gathered from wireless intercept and interrogations was combined with the effective tactical application of that information. In Borneo individual patrols benefited directly from information received by electronic interception. Britain’s Director of Operations in Borneo was noted as having praised the signals intelligence effort during Confrontation as being a significant force multiplier that helped wrest the initiative in favour of the British and Commonwealth forces.

Signals Intelligence in Vietnam

As Confrontation was winding down, and with the lessons of Borneo in mind, signals intelligence was once again called on to assist in the conduct of Australian military operations. In 1966, following the build-up of the Australian combat force contribution in Vietnam, Australia was allocated its own brigade-sized Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) in Phuoc Tuy province. There the First
Australian Task Force (1ATF) included 547 Signal Troop. The troop consisted of two officers and thirty-five other ranks and, from 1966 until December 1971, was located in the signals sector alongside the Task Force Signal Squadron at Nui Dat in South Vietnam.

547 TROOP AND THE BATTLE OF LONG TAN

547 Troop conducted the initial operations from Nui Dat in 1966. It aimed to secure the base area and destroy any Viet Cong installations in the area of operations. From mid-July to mid-August 1966, battalion group operations tried to expand the controlled area. On 18 August, D Company of 6 RAR fiercely fought its famous battle against the North Vietnamese 275 Army Regiment (NVA) in the Long Tan rubber plantation 3 km to the east of Nui Dat. By the following day the enemy dead totalled 245, and D Company 6 RAR had suffered eighteen dead and twenty-five wounded.

Signals intelligence had begun revealing unusual enemy activity to the east of Nui Dat in late July 1966. Indeed, before the battle of Long Tan, 547 Signal Troop operators monitoring radio traffic had detected enemy activity. It was, in fact, the NVA that had been located, but the members of the taskforce had not realised this situation at the time. No enemy radio network suggesting the presence of such a large formation had yet been pieced together from the signal intercepts that the Australians were monitoring, and the enemy was, in any event, using runners between two of the battalions in the regiment. It was only on 14 August that signals intelligence personnel informed Brigadier Jackson that 275 Regiment was within 5000 m of the taskforce base. In response, Jackson ordered company patrols into the area where 547 Signal Troop had reported the possible location of 275 Regiment. The patrolling did not reveal any signs of enemy activity until the actual engagement at Long Tan commenced on 16 August. Consequently, as McNeill notes:

[Brigadier] Jackson can hardly be criticised for ignoring supposed evidence regarding the presence of 275 Regiment. Priorities were nevertheless convoluted, and in this instance could have led to catastrophe, when the need to protect the nature of SIGINT weighed more heavily than the need to inform [the Commanding Officer of 6 RAR, Lieutenant Colonel] Townsend of the suspicions it had engendered.

One of the results of the battle of Long Tan was that Australian and Allied staff officers were increasingly attentive to information derived from signals intelligence. Nonetheless, significant communications problems continued during the Vietnam War, often because of the poor standard of Australian and Allied communications security—a shortcoming that made eavesdropping a relatively easy and profitable task for the enemy.
The Australian Army, however, made the best use of its equipment to engage in its own limited eavesdropping operations. In particular, 547 Signal Troop provided special communication facilities, often under hazardous conditions, and became an intermediary between Allied radio research units and Australian Task Force Headquarters. The troop operated under the strategic control of the US signals intelligence organisation in Vietnam through an Australian Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) liaison officer. Nonetheless, the troop provided valuable tactical information, enabling the United States to take effective counteraction against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army. The troop conducted independent ‘communications research’, using antennas made of ‘star pickets’ welded together to a height of about 35 ft. The up-to-date information that the troop gathered clearly indicated the extent to which information coming from other sources had been superseded.

In Australia, a special Pre-Vietnam Orientation Course was set up at the Army’s signals base in Cabarlah in order to prepare replacement operators for the unique and difficult intercept role in South Vietnam. The course used live tapes sent back by 547 Signal Troop. Meanwhile, the troop manned a ‘set room’ with technical maintenance, a ‘single-station locator’ cell and other complex equipment, including computers for processing information gathered. In fact the demand for such processing increased as the war continued on the ground and in the air, and collection methods improved.

VIETNAM: AIRBORNE COLLECTION

An important development in signals intelligence in Vietnam was the Weapons Research Establishment’s accurate airborne radio direction finder (ARDF). According to Peter Murray, the Officer Commanding 547 Signal Troop in 1968, the ARDF was probably the single most important intelligence gatherer apart from the ‘eyeball’ of infantry patrols. Early in 1967, the troop began to conduct aircraft experiments by using the new equipment. Once equipment tests proved effective, a pattern was established based on using ‘shush’ flights with Cessna aircraft that could be flown up to six times per day in order to eavesdrop on enemy radio traffic. The aim was to try to pinpoint enemy headquarters and unit locations for taskforce intelligence and operations staff involved in planning. The name ‘shush’ came about when the Officer Commanding was asked by a senior officer visiting the flight line, ‘what’s the Cessna with all the electronic equipment inside it for?’ The reply to the senior officer was ‘shush, we can’t talk about it.’
The success of Cessna ‘shush’ flights depended on the aircraft flying steadily at the same speed, height and bearing. This uniformity was necessary for a manually operated directional antenna pod under the plane to take a series of ‘listening shots’ (giving bearings and time along the flight) about the enemy’s location, and the entire process yielded accurate information. Murray recalled:

If we knew the location and type of unit we would sometimes say ‘leave it alone’. On one occasion the [Special Air Service] went out and took a radio station which had 14 people. They came out with the radio set and their cipher books. The cipher books opened up a lot of information to us.

The resources available to the Australians for these missions were small in comparison to those of their American counterparts. For instance, the Americans had at their disposal the aviation arm of the 1st Signal Brigade composed of forty-five aircraft. In contrast, the Australians relied on two aircraft from 1 ATF’s 161 Reconnaissance Flight, both of which had to be flown on a level straight course purely on instruments—a dangerous mission at that height over enemy-occupied territory. Although the Americans used similar aircraft, usually Otters—and later U-8 and RU-21 aircraft—their aircraft bristled with antennas. As a result, the enemy could easily realise what an aircraft’s mission was once the aircraft appeared overhead.

On one occasion a Viet Cong ambush was discovered in the area over which an Australian reconnaissance aircraft was flying. A US company of infantry was moving towards it, and at Troop Headquarters two Australians, Captain Hugh Nichols and Corporal Ron Biddle, worked frantically to ascertain the identity of the troops moving into imminent danger. Operational files showed the company to be part of the US Army’s 199th Light Infantry Brigade. Word was immediately passed via the aircraft system to the US brigade headquarters that was able to redeploy the company and mount a counter-ambush. In the ensuing engagement, thirty Viet Cong and one American soldier were killed. Later, the company commander sent a message of thanks to the Australians, endorsed by the brigade commander with the comment ‘instead of a US body count we were able to do a VC count’.

547 Signal Troop’s success in signals intelligence caught the attention of the US Commander, II Field Force, Vietnam, Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer Jnr. Realising the accuracy of the Australians’ information, General Palmer insisted on
sending an American liaison officer to the troop in order to exploit their signals intelligence. Palmer believed that his own organisation’s reports were too vague—a view shared by fellow commanders of the US 9th Infantry Division and 11th Armoured Cavalry Division working near the Australians. An Australian signals expert observed:

The signals intelligence soldiers who did repeated tours of duty overseas may only be described as a highly dedicated group of soldiers. They were held in very high regard by all other nations at the highest level.

Yet, despite the accuracy of the signals intelligence gathered, on its own such intelligence could not win the war for the Americans. At best, access to signals intelligence contributed to minimising the fog of war and simplifying the complexity of operations.

GROUND-BASED INNOVATIONS

The complexity of operations in Vietnam continued to stimulate innovation in electronic eavesdropping. For example, signals operations began experimental work in 1968 when a site north east of Nui Dat Hill was cleared for a new installation nicknamed ‘cell’. Aerials and airconditioned equipment shelters along with a computer were installed to investigate the ionosphere.

Experimental work commenced in conjunction with the Weapons Research Establishment in search of a ‘single station locator’. The approach was based on the World War II German Wullenweber aerial system erected in a circle. The aim was to detect the source of a radio wave by measuring the phased time and angle difference between two incoming radio waves striking the antennas in the circle. The angle of deflection from the ionosphere was then calculated. According to Lieutenant Colonel Whyte, the techniques followed at Nui Dat were very successful in reinforcing the utility of signals intelligence.

By late 1968, the taskforce’s forward deployments had resulted in the use of armoured command vehicles by the Task Force Signal Squadron. One of these vehicles, equipped with appropriate communications, was issued to 547 Signal Troop in order to ensure that, wherever the force deployed, signals intelligence support would be available. It soon became a part of standard operational procedure for the 547 vehicle to accompany the Task Force Headquarters and Signal Squadron on forward deployments. The appellation ‘547 Airmobile, Cavalry and sometimes Signal Troop’ jokingly came into being.
The combined efforts of the employment of an airborne radio direction finder, a single station locator and a deployable armoured command vehicle ensured that 547 Signal Troop’s contribution to the Australian Task Force was far greater than its size suggested. The high profile of signals intelligence declined in the Australian Army following the end of the Vietnam War. However, it is clear that the capabilities demonstrated in South-East Asia remain valid.

SIGNIFICANCE FOR TODAY

This article has sought to demonstrate the importance of signals intelligence by briefly surveying its history in the Australian context between 1939 and 1972. Today, as the Army grapples with how best to operate in a much more technologically complex era, it is even more important for operational commanders and their intelligence staff to appreciate the value of signals intelligence both for situational awareness and for time-sensitive combat support.

Indeed, perhaps the most significant area in which communications technology has had an impact on the conduct of military operations is in the area of signals intelligence. In World War II the Allies introduced the techniques of signals intelligence, with great strategic effect. As technology improved, that capability could be deployed to provide support down to the lowest tactical levels. In the Australian context, the conflict in Borneo demonstrated this fact—although only a few key individuals at the time were made aware of its significance. For the first time in the history of Australian military operations, the effectiveness of signals intelligence led to a brigade-sized formation (1ATF) having its own signals troop assigned to it in order to provide direct tactical signals intelligence support. That troop’s effectiveness ensured its retention as part of 1ATF. As the land force moves towards the Hardened and Networked Army, the utility of signals intelligence support will almost certainly increase in importance. In this sense, the lessons of yesteryear retain considerable value in providing a guide to the future.

As the land force moves towards the Hardened and Networked Army, the utility of signals intelligence support will almost certainly increase in importance.
ENDNOTES

1 The unit was later re-designated as 5 Special Wireless Telegraphy Section in February 1942.


4 Ibid., p. 275.


7 CRS A816, 43/302/18, Defence Committee Minute No. 10/1940, 15 February 1940 cited in Horner, High Command, p. 224.

8 Royal Australian Corps of Signals Museum (RASCM), ‘7th Signal Regiment Unit History’, prepared by Captain S. W. Foley, June 1986.


10 K. Whyte, interview with author, August 1989; and Desmond Ball, Australia’s Secret Space Programs, pp. 2–3.

11 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel K. Whyte, August 1989.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Interview with Peter Murray, former Officer Commanding 547 Signal Troop, in Vietnam in 1968 (August 1989).

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.


18 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel K. Whyte, August 1989.


21 Staff Sergeant J. E. Danskin letter to the author, September 1989; and interview with Danskin, October 1989.

22 Danskin, letter to the author, September 1989; and interview with Ron Ratchford, August 1993.

23 Ron Ratchford, interview with author, August 1993.
26 Murray, interview, August 1989.
28 Ibid., p. 360.
30 Whyte, interview, August 1989.
35 Murray interview, August 1989.
38 Dennis in Australian Aviation, p. 39.
40 Ibid., p. 13; and Murray, interview, August 1989.
41 Whyte, interview, August 1989.
43 Murray, interview, August 1989.
THE AUTHOR

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'La Garde recule!' The unbelievable news spread like wildfire through the ranks of the French army… [which] stood momentarily aghast. Sensing his opportunity, Wellington waved his hat, and 40000 Allied troops, led by Vivian and Vandeleur, swept forward from Mont-St-Jean with a mighty cheer and flung themselves against the dazed ranks of the spellbound Armée du Nord. A moment later, the cohesion of the French army snapped, and with cries of ‘Sauvé qui peut’ and ‘Trahison!’ unit after unit dissolved into a horde of undisciplined fugitives.¹

The Campaigns of Napoleon
David Chandler

This moment, sometime after eight o’clock on the evening of 18 June 1815, has come down to us as one of the quintessentially decisive moments of conflict. Throughout the day, the battle of Waterloo had swung in the balance, as assault after assault was unleashed against a thin and weakening British line. Indeed, if the fury of the Guard had been directed at that same point just an hour earlier, the attack may well have penetrated the Allied centre and decided the battle the other way.
Napoleon had earlier ignored Marshal Ney’s desperate appeals for reinforcements (‘More troops! Where do you expect me to get them from? Do you want me to make some?’), because his subordinate had already squandered too many soldiers in futile onslaughts against Wellington’s position. Instead, the Emperor gave the Iron Duke the hour that he so desperately needed in order to rush forward reinforcements in an attempt to shore up his centre. The attacking French columns drifted to their left; a quick-thinking Colonel (Colborne, of the 52nd) threatened their flanks; and suddenly the redcoats of the British Guard rose up from the ground, opening a rapid musketry that tore through the French ranks.

The dense French columns could not deploy, nor charge through the fatal hail of lead coming from sixty paces to their front. The front row shuddered as the lead balls smashed into heads and bodies. The second rank could not move forward. It is difficult to imagine the horror that the French soldiers experienced in two dense ‘close columns of grand divisions’ (frontages of about eighty men). Unable to advance without clambering over the bodies of fallen comrades, they endured the carnage wrought by lead shot unleashed at close range.

As the Guard broke to flee, so too did the hopes of Napoleon and his Grande Armée. The battle snapped the spirit of any serious resistance to the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. A few further sharp skirmishes occurred over ensuing days and weeks, but the inexorable progress of the Allies continued unchecked. The willpower that had nourished defiance collapsed, and the destruction of Napoleon was, finally, complete.

So was this moment, on the slope before Mont-St-Jean, really the climacteric that inexorably decided Napoleon’s future? The myth suggests it was, because Wellington’s victory turned on that instant, and the defeat of the Imperial Guard. This was the hinge that decided the battle, campaign and war.

What if this supposedly seminal event had never occurred? What if, for example, the columns beating the pas de charge had actually moved forward an hour earlier, when Ney had originally requested his reinforcements? At that time two batteries of French artillery were successfully blasting holes in the centre of the thinning Allied line. Wellington himself had been forced to ride in front of some wavering Brunswick battalions in order to keep them steady, while exhausted soldiers streamed to the rear, unable and unwilling to fight any longer.
A decisive charge then could well have scattered the thin British screen masking the high ground, allowing the French to seize the ridge, the centre and, with it, the key to Wellington’s position. A lucky assault might also have caught the Duke himself, depriving the Allies of one of their best generals. After all, just two days earlier the Prussian General Buchler had been trapped beneath his dying horse as French Cuirassiers galloped past him at the battle of Ligny. Earlier on the 18th, Wellington’s brother-in-law had lost his leg, which was blown off by a cannon-ball as he was riding beside the Duke.

‘By God, I’ve lost my leg!’
‘My God, sir, so you have,’ replied the Duke.³

Yet could a victory at Mont St Jean have saved Napoleon? Probably not. The mauling of the Prussians at Ligny had resulted in their defeat, but not their destruction. They were still ready to fight. It was, in fact, the arrival of the Germans on Napoleon’s southeast flank at Waterloo at the critical moment that had caused the delay in launching the Guard’s assault against the British positions. Wellington, too, had other forces that were not committed to the battle, because he had failed to anticipate exactly where his opponent’s main blow would fall. Because of this, the exhausted French forces would have been unable to convert their victory into the subsequent total destruction of the allied army. Perhaps not in June, but certainly by August or September, Napoleon would, eventually, have met his Waterloo.

The point is that France’s strategic defeat had already been assured, well before the battle, because of a lack of material, men and money with which to prosecute the war. On 18 June France stood alone against not just England, but also Prussia, Austria, Russia, Sweden and an assortment of other countries. Large armies were already moving east to threaten the French frontier while their monarchs declared themselves implacably opposed to any deal with Napoleon. The strategic situation was worse than bleak and explains why the French army dissolved so suddenly.

VICTORY BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD

Normally, we focus on the particular tactics of the battlefield to work out why one side is successful and the other is vanquished. That is the way to analyse the success of the British line against the French column. However, that does not tell us why the
rest of the army broke and fled so rapidly. In order to understand the reason for the French defeat, we need to distinguish between tactical (or battlefield) success and the strategic reasons that wars are won and lost.

Looking back, we can determine that the Emperor’s fate had already been sealed by 1813, at Leipzig in the ‘Battle of the Nations’. During this battle, which stretched over four days in October, it became obvious that France could no longer support a military force powerful enough to dominate Europe. The material resources necessary to fuel the French attempt did not match the vaulting ambition of the Emperor. He had been unable to replace the losses of his Russian campaign the year before—there were simply not enough men in France.

When the Emperor sailed back to France to raise his standard again in 1815, it was obvious that the scales were heavily weighed against him. Only a daring campaign, designed to grasp a rapid succession of victories, could provide the moral advantage that might force the coalition to the negotiating table. One lost battle would be decisive, for the Emperor had always staked everything on the verdict of combat.

As the Guard abandoned the forward slopes of Mont-St-Jean and fled, the impossibility of defeating the Allies in battle sank in. The rout of the elite was fiercely rammed home, like a musket ball slammed against the bottom of the barrel, as the triumphant British line advanced.

**VICTORY IS A COMPLEX EQUATION**

A modern historical writer might quibble with David Chandler’s broad-brush description of the last moments of the battle. What, exactly, does Chandler mean when he claims ‘the cohesion of the French Army snapped’? Could one literally hear a crack flying through the smoke-filled air as formations fell apart?

In his account of Waterloo, John Keegan places far more emphasis on the real experiences of individual soldiers. After all, he says, these are the people whose actions determine the outcome of the conflict. He alerts us to the obvious fact that the reality of battle is vastly different for each individual participating in the event. The encounters of Captain Mercer (Royal Horse Artillery) on that day differed significantly from those of a rifleman (Sharpe, of the 95th) or, indeed, a French conscript such as the novelist Stendhal. Three accounts, all of the same battle, vary so widely that it is difficult to believe that all three men participated in the same event. Multiply these individual accounts by nearly 200,000, and we have the babble of accounts that describe what really happened on that day.
The key to reconciling these and other eyewitness accounts of Waterloo is not just that they describe events within the same five square kilometre location in southern Belgium on one day in 1815. It is, rather, that everyone present on that day accepted that, between eight and nine that night, the Imperial Guard was defeated. This was the moment of decision that ended the Napoleonic era and exiled the Emperor to St Helena. Nearly two decades of war, which had irrevocably changed society and power in Europe, had drawn to a close.

The rout of the Guard provided the signal that the army’s morale had broken. Napoleon’s strategic defeat had already been assured by the resurrection of the grand coalition arrayed against him. The fleeing bearskins, tumbling down the hill, were a sign that hope had finally deserted the Emperor’s Eagles. At that moment, the soldiers abandoned their training and discipline and the bonds that linked the individuals to their units did indeed snap apart.

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**Waterloo is the epitome of the so-called ‘Western way’ of war—all resources focused on a specific moment in a conflict, a terrible clash of arms, and then total agreement about the result.**

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**THE WESTERN WAY OF WAR**

The shattering of the Guard also explains why there was no further significant resistance as the Allies moved towards Paris. The battle of morale had been lost at Waterloo—finally and irrevocably. Waterloo is the epitome of the so-called ‘Western way’ of war—all resources focused on a specific moment in a conflict, a terrible clash of arms, and then total agreement about the result.

The idea of a specifically Western way in warfare is relatively new. Victor Davis Hanson has become particularly identified with this analysis of fighting, which suggests that Greek city–states effectively created a new form of war—one that placed decisive battle at the apex of military endeavour.

This theory has obvious appeal. Every young lieutenant is taught to achieve victory by directing his effort at a vital point, after which remaining resistance can be crushed. This is the focus of everyone in the military, from section commander to commanding general. Self-evidently, the aim of war is victory, and only decisive action aimed at destroying the enemy’s capability to fight can guarantee that result.

Napoleon was a pre-eminent practitioner of this style of warfare. His great campaigns are remembered to this day for their brilliance and ability to create these decisive moments. He possessed a remarkable capacity to anticipate the critical
point in battle, striking fiercely and leaving his opponents stunned and reeling before being defeated in detail. So why did such a brilliant proponent of the Western style of warfighting fail?

The pink answer-sheets (so beloved of staff college solutions) suggest that the factors leading to victory can be distilled into simple explanations. Base your answer on particular principles of war, shape it to take account of factors such as time and location, add just a touch of ‘wow’, and the Directing Staff should be impressed. However, determining the causes of success or failure for a nation at war is not as simple. Grasping for easy answers risks the wrong conclusions being drawn. The more all embracing the solution appears, the greater the danger is that the answer being provided is actually seriously, even fundamentally, flawed.

**NAPOLEON IN RUSSIA**

We can learn far more about success in war by examining broader strategic factors than ascribing everything to a decisive moment of tactical judgment.

In a conversation with Caulaincourt shortly before his recall to Paris, the Tsar said: ‘if the Emperor Napoleon decides to make war, it is possible, even probable, that we shall be defeated, assuming that we fight. But that will not mean that he can dictate peace. The Spaniards have frequently been defeated; and they are not beaten, nor have they surrendered. Moreover, they are not so far away from Paris as we are, and have neither our climate nor our resources to help them. We shall take no risks. We have plenty of space; and our standing army is well organised… your Frenchman is brave, but long sufferings and a hard climate wear down his resistance. Our climate, our winter, will fight on our side.’ This statement proved amazingly prophetic. 5

Before dismissing the Tsar’s warfighting techniques as characteristically Oriental, it is worth remembering that this conversation with Caulaincourt was conducted in perfect French—the normal language of the Russian court. Napoleon was undoubtedly the pre-eminent practitioner of the operational Art of War of his time. Nevertheless, his failure in Russia stemmed from an inability to understand that converting tactical victory into something more substantial requires much more than just brilliance on the field of battle.
Tsar Alexander destroyed the logic of Napoleon's search for decisive battle. He insisted that no battle could be conclusive, because the war would go on. Napoleon's war aim was always total conquest; whereas Alexander only needed to deny his enemy victory in order to win. The Emperor invaded on 22 June, crossing the river Niemen and marching to Smolensk. Although he brushed aside opposition, the Russians denied the French the decisive battle that Napoleon so desperately wanted until the invaders reached Borodino, at the very gates of Moscow itself.

Neither side displayed any finesse in that battle. It was a drawn-out slugging match. When it finished, Napoleon had won and the route to the Russian capital lay open. From that moment of military triumph onwards, reality did not match the script dictated by the Emperor. The Tsar played for time, spinning out negotiations while his armies (and Cossacks) circled the French. Napoleon vacillated, sitting in the burnt-out Russian capital (a fire had consumed three quarters of the wooden buildings of the city), as the winter drew closer. Time became his nemesis, stalking every moment. The Russians still refused to come to terms, even favourable ones proffered by the Emperor. The French could not force the Tsar to sue for peace.

Soon, Napoleon began his retreat. The clear skies turned dark with autumn rains, and fordable streams turned into raging torrents. On 3 November, snow flurries gusted around the greatcoats of the retreating soldiers. The remnants of what had once been the largest army that Europe had ever seen struggled across the Niemen at the beginning of 1813. Fewer than one in six survived. This was a catastrophe from which the Emperor was never to recover. Napoleon's forces were devastated, and yet he had won a series of battlefield victories both on the way to Moscow and during the retreat. At the heart of the disaster was a blunder of perception. Napoleon thought that success on the battlefield would bring victory, whereas the only thing his victories actually achieved was success on the battlefield.

It is worth remembering these events when we consider the validity of the strategy of seeking out a decisive battle. If battle is to accomplish anything, both sides must agree to accept the result. By simply ignoring the obvious vital ground—his capital—the Tsar deprived Napoleon's battle-winning tactics of their objective. The promise of decisive battle proved illusory.
CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THE ‘WESTERN WAY OF WAR’?

Strategic triumph is based on much more than just the search for decisive battle. Material superiority, morale, and tactics suited to the struggle are far more important than any supposed Western cultural practice. The problems of a strategy that relies on decisive battle are being horrifically demonstrated, day after day, in Iraq.

The announced objective of the war was depriving Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction. This aim was achieved by military means in an operation of stunning efficiency. Unfortunately, the mission was not quite that simple. The destruction of a regime can be brought about by military means with a degree of rapidity and precision. That is what happened between seven and eight o’clock at night on the battlefield of Waterloo. It is also what occurred in the period between the beginning of the ground offensive against Iraq and the fall of Baghdad. In both cases straightforward military objectives were identified and achieved with a directness that appears to prove the continuing validity of the ‘Western Way of War’.

The battle for Iraq was won, yet the fact that there is still conflict and turmoil inside the country, with large swathes of territory under only nominal central government control, does not bode well for the future. Even if the mission has been accomplished, the war is continuing. The art of strategy is more than just arranging the defeat of the enemy in battle. Sometimes it is necessary to avoid battle in order to achieve victory. That is the case for the insurgent, who wins by not losing, while the government loses if it does not win.

In Iraq, the continuing dominance of the ‘Western’ methods of warfighting was conclusively demonstrated in the first weeks of the Second Gulf War. The United States rapidly destroyed the Iraqi Army and swept it from the field. It was a complete triumph; no formed body of troops opposed them. Soon the US Army found and captured Saddam Hussein, hiding at the bottom of a hole in a little hut. It had been a classic victory in the Western style. However, it is now clear that the government in Baghdad does not control large parts of the country. Inability to bring a stable and sovereign form of government to Iraq will be perceived as a US failure, no matter how successful the American Army was in battle.

Sometimes it is necessary to avoid battle in order to achieve victory. That is the case for the insurgent, who wins by not losing, while the government loses if it does not win.
Indeed, one is reminded of the now-famous exchange between US Army Colonel Harry Summers and his North Vietnamese counterpart, Colonel Tu. Back in Vietnam in 1974 as part of a US delegation attempting to resolve the status of Americans listed as missing in action, Summers had remarked to the North Vietnamese Colonel, ‘You know you never beat us on the battlefield’, to which Tu responded, ‘That may be so, but it is also irrelevant’.6

The aim of war is victory, but that is not the same as asserting that the aim of battle is decision. The Iraqi insurgents know they have no hope of defeating the US forces in battle, but they still think that they can win. They understand the limitations of conventional forces. Ordinary Iraqis do not have to support them for the guerrilla war to be successful. Society needs peace if it is to function. If the United States cannot provide a public sphere with a secure space in which to operate, it will have failed, and so will the strategy of searching for decisive battle.

ENDNOTES

2 Ibid., p. 1085. Napoleon actually said, ‘Des troupes! Où voulez-vous que j’en prenne? Voulez-vous que j’en fasse?’
5 David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, p. 746.

THE AUTHOR

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n contemporary military doctrine, the operational commander’s intent conveys the end-state, or the desired result, of an overall campaign. This focus is derived from the German Army’s concept of \textit{Auftragstaktik} (mission-based tactics or, as it is currently termed in Australian Army doctrine, ‘mission command’). In 1940, General Heinz Guderian stated the purpose of the concept with characteristic precision: ‘Good-looking operation orders are immaterial. What counts are clearly stated intentions which can be executed with all one’s heart and determination.’\textsuperscript{1} Twenty-five years earlier, in April 1915, at the very beginning of the land offensive on the Gallipoli Peninsula, soldiers from the 10th Battalion, 3rd Division, 1st Australian Imperial Force (AIF), demonstrated an instinctive understanding of mission command when they reached the objective that was to elude their comrades for the rest of the campaign. This article details how, even at the lowest levels, subordinates with a clear understanding of the commander’s intent can react to the situation on the ground and make the best of the opportunities that they are afforded by both chance and enemy action.
In 1915, the Hellespont of the classics—the heavily mined constriction of the Dardanelles known as the Narrows, gateway to ancient Constantinople, modern Istanbul—would not yield to naval might alone. A decision to take the peninsula by a land offensive saw Australian and New Zealand troops make the now-famous landing one late April morning in 1915. Their principal objective was the ‘Third Ridge’, the prominent high ground on the Gelibolu Peninsula. The inability to seize and hold this objective at any time throughout what became a protracted and costly campaign has seen some call the Australian involvement on Gallipoli a failure. However, a number of Australians did reach the Third Ridge on the morning of 25 April. With a clear understanding of the commander’s intent and fired by the determination that would make Australian troops renowned, these men caught sight of the elusive Narrows and gave their fellows reason to doubt the impregnability of this Turkish stronghold.

From the very beginning of the war, the men of the 10th Battalion were imbued with a spirit of adventure and determination. The South Australian Governor, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry Galway, KCMG, DSO, heaped platitudes on these volunteers at their camp in the converted Morphettville racecourse as they trained to prepare themselves for overseas service. In the parched sands surrounding Mena Camp in Egypt, under the shadow of the great pyramids, the men of the 10th Battalion practised drill and musketry, responding to the exhortations of their company commanders to ‘get it right’ before deploying on whatever operation the campaign planners had in store for them.

During their initial training at Morphettville, Captain Mervyn Herbert had commanded the 10th Battalion’s D Company, predominantly made up of Port Adelaide boys, while his friend Captain Felix Giles had command of G Company. Herbert’s antecedents had been miners at Sandhurst in Victoria (now Bendigo) and his grandfather’s brother had been killed in New Zealand in 1864 while serving with the Waikato Regiment. From the Ballarat goldfields, Mervyn Herbert moved to Adelaide to pursue horticultural interests. Felix Giles was born to a family of explorers and adventurers, son of the first white woman to live on a station in the Northern Territory. His father had been deputy of the party responsible for surveying the Overland Telegraph Line route from Adelaide to Port Darwin in 1870–71, and before that his uncle had been a surveyor in the expedition that had in 1869 established the township of Palmerston (now Darwin). Herbert and Giles had been prewar militia officers, serving together at Torrens Depot with the South
Australian Scottish Infantry, and had then commanded companies under the 1912 Universal Training Scheme. In Egypt, when the Australian battalions changed from eight to four rifle companies, A and G companies amalgamated and Giles became Herbert's second-in-command.

Before their departure from Adelaide, the Governor-General, the Right Honourable Sir Roland Craufurd Munro-Ferguson, had sternly warned the members of the 10th Battalion that they were about to fight for ‘the future of the Empire’, while Sir George Reid, the High Commissioner for Australia, told them in Mena Camp that their mission was ‘pure and noble’. General Sir Ian Hamilton, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, told them that this great feat of arms would bring the war ‘one step closer to a glorious close’. Others spoke in patriotic terms of ‘deeds that will last forever’ and foresaw a unit flag bearing ‘stains of honour won by valour’. Finally, they learnt that their destination was to be the Gallipoli Peninsula, with the battalion to form the spearhead of the covering force, the 3rd Infantry Brigade. These were the men who would shortly enter the realm of legend. They would soon wear a bronze ‘A’ for ANZAC on their colour patch as recognition of their exploits and later march on a day of national commemoration established in their honour. Those who did not return from the war would have their names etched in permanent tribute on cenotaphs and memorials in Australia, Turkey and France. After the tedium of the eight-week passage to Egypt and the routine of camp life at Mena, Herbert recalled in his memoir the anticipation that all the men felt: ‘What matters it even if we are going to lose 70 per cent of our strength, as the pessimists predict? Have we not been chosen as the covering brigade—the place of honour? Are we not the envied of the envious?’

In the week prior to the anticipated landing, however, talk was more prosaic and of more immediate practical matters. General Birdwood, commanding the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, directed his troops to carry three days’ worth of everything at the landing and to ration their water intake and use of ammunition. He emphasised concealment, covering fire and communication. Their brigade commander told them that there was no going back—‘Forward’ until they reached their position, then ‘Hang On’ until the reinforcements arrive. Of the scene in Mudros Harbour on the Island of Lemnos, Herbert wrote: ‘There are battleships, clean cut and stately, moving out to their allotted stations—cruisers pregnant with possibilities, destroyers moving like lightning in line-ahead formation, twisting and gliding in and out’.

These were the men who would shortly enter the realm of legend. They would soon wear a bronze ‘A’ for ANZAC on their colour patch as recognition of their exploits …
out amongst the transports like things of life. He noted that there was, among the men, ‘a strong current of suppressed excitement—a stern resolve to do or die in the attempt. Wavering there is none. Buoyancy of spirit—even amongst serious-faced officers—everywhere.’

During their unit preparation and training, Herbert and Giles had their focus squarely on developing unity of effort in order to facilitate decisive action. As the two captains saw their men into the boats in the pre-dawn Aegean Sea, Herbert was intimately aware of the brigade commander’s intention to occupy the Third Ridge, and ensured that several of his men put their heart and determination into achieving it. From the moment the boats moved towards the Turkish coast they were heading towards ‘rapid action’, which they carried out as the first shots rang out from the enemy dug-in on the cliff tops. From that instant, and essentially for the rest of the day, actions were largely decentralised (based on the concept of what we now term ‘mission command’) with those closest to the problem entrusted to solve it as they saw fit. Australian soldiers later wrote of the ‘tremendous welcome’ that they received as the first boats landed: ‘we had a whistling good tune of Mausers from the shore, and pompoms, etc, flying all round and splashing and zipping overhead.’ This welcome, from elements of the 27th Regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Khalil Sami Bey’s 9th Division, only further encouraged the Australians in their assault directly up the hillside, ‘with bayonets flashing in the rising sun.’ The brigade commander’s intention was to assault up the narrow tracks and precipitous gullies to the scrubby heights of the ridge overlooking the beach. From here they were to fight through to the Second Ridge, and then to push inland and seize the Third Ridge. Despite the landing error, this intention initially held firm and the men were directed to keep pushing forward. Several groups raced ahead at speed. Captain Herbert sent forward at least three parties to scout ahead in order to determine Turkish strengths and dispositions, the ‘going’ of the ground, and to find access routes that might provide cover from machine-gun fire.

Private Joseph Weatherill, a member of Herbert’s original D Company, was in one of the parties sent forward immediately after the landing. In the course of this reconnaissance he led a successful attack on a Turkish position and captured two enemy guns. Herbert also sent forward one of his platoon commanders, Lieutenant Noel Loutit, with a party of thirty-two men, to reconnoitre the terrain beyond the First and Second Ridges. Several scouting parties of various sizes were also sent forward from the other battalions and companies. In total, some two hundred men...
found their way to the forward slopes of the Third Ridge—the Australian objective. Many were pushed back by advancing Turks, but some of the larger parties remained out as a screen for the Australian battalions, to warn of any impending Turkish offensive and to impose delay on any assault launched by the enemy.

In the valley, Loutit’s party encountered Lieutenant Haig from A Company, an Imperial Reserve officer and nephew of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. Loutit and Haig reached a spur at the western foot of the Third Ridge plateau by around 8 o’clock in the morning, and found Turks in large numbers advancing on them in skirmishing formation. These men were reinforcements from the 27th Regiment, deploying to bolster the Turkish defences north of Gaba Tepe. While Haig engaged the Turks with rifle fire, Loutit and Private Fordham moved up to the crest of the Third Ridge. They were about 200 metres south of ‘Scrubby Knoll’, which was the 10th Battalion’s objective. From this position, Loutit later recalled that he ‘saw the waters of the Narrows’ not quite 5 km away to the south-east.\(^9\) They saw no other Australians, but were engaged by Turkish fire and were forced to withdraw. By the time Loutit returned to the 10th Battalion position, after four days of screening and interdicting Turkish reinforcement columns, his party had been reduced to eleven men. In the original publication of Volume I of the official history of ANZAC (1920), Loutit’s penetration to the Third Ridge was recorded as being the nearest anyone came to the objective of the expedition.\(^10\)

Meanwhile, from the beach the D Company men had run inland to where dips in the ground sheltered them, dropped their packs and fixed bayonets. ‘Until broad daylight the bayonet is your weapon’, their brigade commander had told them. One short mad rush, and those Turks who had dared to wait were no more. Then the coo-ees rang out to let those in the rear know that the hill was won. Having seized the First Ridge, they were under strict orders to push on. A message from the commander was passed up from the beach, ‘Get the next ridge and dig in’. Herbert and Giles led their men into Shrapnel Gully where they re-formed into platoons. From here they moved eastwards into the steep branch of a valley, past ‘the Razorback’, over the foot of a spur of Braund’s Hill, and up ‘Bridge’s Road’ towards a gap at the head of the valley alongside the 400 Plateau. The Second Ridge in fact comprised a range of hills that runs from Hill 971 in the north, through Chunuk Bair, Battleship Hill, Baby 700 and the 400 Plateau, and thence to the coast via Bolton’s Ridge. It had taken the 10th Battalion three hours to fight through to the Second Ridge, just a mile inland from the coast. On the edge of the 400 Plateau the companies dug protective shelters, and prepared for an advance across ‘Legge Valley’ to the Third Ridge.

\[\text{‘Until broad daylight the bayonet is your weapon’, their brigade commander had told them.}\]
When the third edition of Volume I of the official history of ANZAC was published in 1934, it recorded that evidence had come to hand of a party reaching further than Loutit’s.\(^1\) Lance Corporal Phil Robin and Private Arthur Blackburn had apparently not only reached Scrubby Knoll, but had gone beyond it. The historian Charles Bean assesses them as reaching further inland than any other Australian. Robin and Blackburn were early volunteers at Morphettville and former students of St Peter’s College in Adelaide (as was Felix Giles).\(^12\) From the beach, Blackburn had raced forwards through the prickly arbutus and up the face of the First Ridge. He met up with Phil Robin and another of the battalion scouts in the valley, and the three of them took off for the next ridgeline. They found D Company digging in on the 400 Plateau, and Captain Herbert directed Robin and Blackburn to scout forwards to watch the company’s flank and the valley to their front in order to give him a degree of protection and early warning.

The pair moved inland so quickly that, in his diary, Robin called it ‘a chase’. They scaled the ragged slope and crossed the peak of the Third Ridge at a plateau just north of Scrubby Knoll. Blackburn later wrote in a letter of the ‘decidedly lively time’ that they had racing across the valley while being constantly engaged by Turkish snipers.\(^13\) Loutit’s party was visible some distance off, to their right rear (south-west). Blackburn and Robin then moved southwards past Scrubby Knoll on its eastern face, with a clear view of the glistening Narrows, to a position south-west of the knoll. They were then forced to retire into Legge Valley as Turkish reserves began moving towards their position. The Turkish occupation of Scrubby Knoll, by two battalions of the 27th Regiment, was achieved by about 8 o’clock that morning. The Anzac positions were subsequently shelled by Turkish gun batteries positioned on the reverse slope of the Third Ridge, which then became known to the Australians as ‘Gun Ridge’; the Turks called it Topçuluk Sirt (‘Artillery Ridge’).

These scouting parties would have been of inestimable value had they been able to lead an Australian advance onto the Third Ridge. As it happened, the delay that they imposed on the Turks was invaluable in allowing defensive lines to be prepared. Although the covering force battalions could easily have pushed on to the Third Ridge as originally intended, it became apparent that, had they done so, they would have faced the risk of being encircled and cut off. The Second Ridge was not yet properly held, and the flanks were insecure, so the covering force battalions were held back and told to dig in on the Second Ridge. Loutit’s party was not sufficiently strong to overcome the Turkish group he encountered, and by 10 o’clock that morning the Third Ridge had been fully evacuated by those Australians who had penetrated that far.
As Bean noted, Loutit and the others ‘had carried out to the letter the plan of the day’, fuelled by little other than an understanding of the commander’s intent. It is interesting to speculate how different those first few days might have been had the advance companies been allowed to continue in their race to the Third Ridge, where their additional firepower might have bolstered Loutit’s party and held the Turkish reinforcements at bay.

Scrubby Knoll is today known as Kemalyeri (‘Kemal’s Place’) because it was here that Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal Bey’s divisional headquarters was located from the night of 25 April until the Allied forces evacuated. A Turkish monument on this site records his direction given in a Divisional Order of the Day on 3 May, reminding his men that ‘there must not be one step towards the rear’. Just as Kemal Bey had directed his men that there must be no withdrawal, so Australian commanders had imbued their troops at all levels with the idea that they were to ‘hit the beach and go like hell’ for the Third Ridge. Weatherill came close before being committed to an engagement, in which he was successful. Loutit was the first person to reach the crest of the Third Ridge and see the Narrows, and Blackburn and Robin actually reached the farthest inland of anyone on the day of the landing or at any time during the Allied occupation of the Peninsula throughout 1915. Significant to each of these exploits, according with the commander’s intent, was the role of Captain Mervyn Herbert in sending them forwards.

Mervyn Herbert was shot by a sniper three days after the landing, forcing his evacuation and the subsequent amputation of a finger. While recuperating in Egypt, he recorded his recollections of the first and most dramatic phase of the Dardanelles campaign. Herbert observed that the continuous Turkish bombardment, a certain prelude for a counterattack, was too late as far as he was concerned ‘for the occupation of the famed impregnable Gallipoli Peninsula was an accomplished fact’.
ENDNOTES

1 Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.0—*Operations*, para. 3.49.
5 *Ibid*.
6 Letter to the Editor, undated: *The Northern Territory Times and Gazette*, 1 July 1915.
7 Joseph Weatherill's bravery and initiative as a scout immediately after the landing was reported by Herbert, and he was 'mentioned' in the 1st Dardanelles Despatch. Herbert also nominated him for the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM), one of only two DCMs awarded within the battalion for actions on the day of the Gallipoli landing. Herbert reported Noel Loutit for his exploit on the Third Ridge, and he was 'mentioned' in Army Corps Routine Orders; Loutit was later twice awarded the Distinguished Service Order for actions in France. Herbert and Giles were themselves 'mentioned' in the same Routine Orders for their gallantry and devotion to duty on the day of the landing and immediately afterwards. Herbert went on to serve with distinction in the 50th Battalion, held senior appointments in France and England, and was accorded the great honour of being escort to King George V at the opening of Parliament in London at the beginning of 1917.
8 Loutit had been a 1912 Universal Training Scheme compulsory trainee under the tutelage of Mervyn Herbert in the 78th Infantry Battalion ('Adelaide Rifles'), and then became an original member of Giles's old G Company in 1914.
Phil Robin, a bank accountant from Adelaide and Australian Rules champion before
the war, was killed on 28 April, and his name is commemorated at the Lone Pine
Memorial. Arthur Blackburn, the son of a clergyman and a practising solicitor,
received an immediate field promotion to Lance Corporal and then in August was
commissioned in the field as a Second Lieutenant. He went on to distinguish himself
in France as a platoon commander in a company of the 10th Battalion commanded
by Major Felix Giles, who nominated Blackburn for the Victoria Cross for his
outstanding gallantry at Pozières. Giles himself was recommended for honours
on six separate occasions throughout the war, finally securing the award of the
Distinguished Service Order, as well as being Mentioned in Despatches. Robin,
Blackburn and Giles were among 1800 old scholars and masters of St Peter’s College
who had their names inscribed in gold lettering on the face of the balustrade of an
impressive Great War Honour Roll in the Memorial Hall.

Carlyon, Gallipoli, p. 146.
Captain M. J. Herbert, ‘Description of the landing at Anzac, Gallipoli’, 1915.

THE AUTHOR

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a collector of orders, decorations and medals. He has contributed to the Northern Territory
Dictionary of Biography and the Australian Dictionary of Biography, and has had three books
on history and biography published, including Ever Vigilant, the regimental history of the
North-West Mobile Force. He was awarded the Centenary Medal in April 2003 for ‘long
and outstanding research on Australia’s military history’.
Since the early 1990s, many hundreds of Australian Defence Force personnel have had experience as peacekeepers in humanitarian interventions in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. However, the reality is that the military are often the last group to arrive in areas devastated by war, genocide and famine. Aid workers from a variety of non-government organisations (NGOs) are usually the first on the scene. At great personal risk, such people work to bring aid to distressed populations long before the journalists and the military arrive. This report by Andjela Jurisic details the situation in the troubled Darfur region of Sudan in July and August of 2004, shortly before the arrival of peacekeeping troops from the African Union.
THE SITUATION IN THE DARFUR REGION

The conflict in the impoverished Darfur region of western Sudan began in early 2003. Following claims that the central government in Khartoum was neglecting the region, a rebel group began attacking government targets. The rebels maintain that the government is oppressing black Africans in favour of Arabs. Historically, there have been tensions in Darfur between the Arab and the African communities over land and grazing rights.

The government has mobilised an Arab militia, known as the Janjaweed, to tackle the insurrection. Numbering several thousands, this proxy force has been carrying out attacks on villages and towns. The attacks follow a pattern in which Janjaweed forces, mounted on horses or camels, conduct ground assaults on a village after it has been bombed by government aircraft. Human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have accused the militia of numerous abuses aimed at bringing about the ethnic cleansing of the non-Arab population in Darfur. However, the Sudanese Government denies being in control of the Janjaweed, and President Omar al-Bashir has called the Arab militia ‘thieves and gangsters’.

By the end of July 2004, one million people had fled their homes and at least 10,000 people had been killed. Nevertheless, the Government of Sudan has done nothing to rein in the Janjaweed militias, who continue to terrorise the people of Darfur. The lack of effective action by the Khartoum government is in breach of commitments that it made to United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, during his visit to Sudan in early July 2004. These commitments were formalised in a joint communiqué that was signed on 3 July. Following the Secretary-General’s visit, reports of Sudanese military forces assisting the Janjaweed in launching attacks against African villagers continued. These attacks have claimed hundreds of lives and displaced many thousands of Darfur’s African population.

During the first two weeks of July 2004, aid workers learnt of numerous attacks. The reports below are drawn from a variety of sources, including Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and other humanitarian agencies:

- On 12 July, more than 400 armed horsemen attacked the village of Donki Dereisa. The attack was supported by a fixed-wing aircraft that bombed the village and also by several military vehicles filled with Sudanese soldiers. The...
death toll was reported to be as high as 150 villagers, including six young children (ages three to fourteen), who were captured during the assault and burnt alive later that day. A man who tried to save them was beheaded and then dismembered.

- At around the same time, the Janjaweed attacked the village of Talha, burnt it to the ground and killed at least twenty people.
- On 13 July, an attack on the village of Abu Noura by hundreds of Janjaweed was again supported by a fixed-wing aircraft and two military vehicles. Approximately twelve men were killed in the attack and the village was looted and burnt.
- Two attacks by the Janjaweed occurred in the village of Ghanja. The first attack took place on 1 July and was launched by a group of 400 horsemen, accompanied by a fixed-wing aircraft, a helicopter and several military vehicles. Eight men were killed during the assault and seventeen were injured. Hundreds of cows, goats and sheep were stolen. The second attack, by about 200 mounted militia, took place approximately three weeks later on 19 July. This time, the Janjaweed, escorted by four land cruisers filled with Sudanese soldiers, killed five villagers and wounded three others.
- On 7 July, an attack on the outskirts of the village of Janjawannah, by approximately twenty Janjaweed fighters, killed three men and stole livestock.
- In mid-July, mounted Janjaweed—accompanied by Sudanese soldiers in vehicles with machine-gun mounts—attacked the village of Moraia Jenge. The village was looted and a woman was shot in the thigh.
- Also in mid-July, dozens of Janjaweed attacked the village of Mosabikra. Sudanese soldiers in military vehicles also accompanied them. Livestock and personal belongings were stolen and one villager was shot dead.

In order to contain the violence, the Sudanese Government has allowed a small contingent of 300 unarmed observers from the African Union into Darfur to monitor compliance with the UN-brokered cease-fire agreement. However, by the end of July, only fifty of the 300 observers had been deployed. Importantly, these observers lacked the transport and logistical capacity necessary to carry out their mission. Furthermore, under the agreement governing their deployment, the African Union observers must have representatives from all sides present when investigating alleged viola-
tions of the cease-fire agreement. This requirement severely undermines the ability of the African Union observers to monitor human rights abuses effectively, since victims are understandably reluctant to tell their stories in the presence of Sudanese Government officials. Moreover, Khartoum has been extremely loath to allow experienced human-rights monitors into Darfur and has only recently given the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights permission to send a small team of monitors into the region.

Despite the continuing violence in Darfur, the Sudanese Government has adopted a policy to encourage displaced persons to return to their communities. The government has been attempting to persuade IDPs to return home by telling them that the security situation has improved and that their villages are now safe. There are also reports of bribes being offered to village chiefs if they will encourage their people to return home. In some instances, due to the paucity of aid reaching the existing IDP camps, Sudanese Government officials have lured displaced people back to their homes with promises of a generous return package. On 12 July, about 100 hungry families were returned to the village of Sania Dalaiba. The village is only 40 miles south of Donki Dereisa, which was attacked on the same day by Janjaweed and government forces. The Sania Dalaiba returnees later informed aid workers that the government had failed to make good the promise of assistance and now the inhabitants of the village were, not without good reason, also afraid for their safety. There are reports that returnees in other villages have been killed, beaten, raped and/or threatened by roaming bands of Janjaweed.

Other IDPs have been unwilling to accept the government's assurances that the security situation has improved because the environment around the camps where they have sought sanctuary is dangerous. While there has been little violence in the camps themselves, camp residents have been the subject of frequent attacks when they have dared to venture out into the surrounding areas. In particular, a large number of women have been assaulted and raped by Janjaweed fighters when they have left the camps to plant crops or gather firewood. In one recent incident, four young women were abducted when they went to collect firewood outside the Otash Camp in Nyala. Women have been routinely raped while collecting firewood outside Kass Camp, and one recently died from her wounds after having been brutally gang-raped. In another incident, a woman from the Nerti Camp was gang-raped by ten Janjaweed, who then mutilated her breasts and genitals with a sword.

In response to these attacks, Sudanese police officers, both male and female, have started a course of training on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Camps, which is conducted by the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF). Trained police officers have already been deployed to some of the camps and villages, but women continue to feel reluctant to report attacks and rapes to the police. Under Sudanese law, women who have been raped
require two men or four women to witness the rape in order to be able to bring the case to court. Women and their families do not see much sense in reporting attacks and sexual assault, particularly as medical and psycho-social services are either nonexistent or not provided for free. In addition, in some camps, the government has instructed police not to take reports of alleged rapes. This policy means that victims do not have access to a referral document that would allow them to receive immediate medical attention. Even basic medicines are not manufactured in Sudan, and the general security situation in Darfur prevents immediate distribution of imported medical supplies to those in greatest need. This is particularly true when it comes to meeting the needs of raped women, especially considering that the Government of Sudan does not officially allow dissemination and use of the 72-hour ‘morning after’ contraceptive pill.

**THE IMPACT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN DARFUR ON THE WORK OF RELIEF AGENCIES**

Under the conditions outlined above, the support of the Sudanese Government is obviously essential to the work of relief organisations if they are to act in time to save thousands of lives. To assess the needs of IDPs in Darfur effectively, UN agencies and NGOs require unhindered and sustained access to the region. However, until recently these agencies have not had such access, and while access to Darfur has improved, humanitarian agencies must also rely on the cooperation of the rebel forces—something that cannot be guaranteed. In theory, freedom of movement for humanitarian workers was improved when the Government’s Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) issued identity travel cards that enable aid workers to travel whenever and wherever they wish. In reality, the facilitation of movements of food and other aid supplies is still poor. Trucks required to deliver aid are impounded by Customs officials for several weeks at a time. By August, seasonal rains had exacerbated an already-complex operating environment since the roads deteriorate in the bad weather. Heavy trucks and four-wheel drive vehicles have become essential for the delivery of aid to IDPs in camps and villages. However, the continuing violence in the region makes travel a dangerous undertaking for both locally employed and international aid agency staff.

Under Sudanese law, women who have been raped require two men or four women to witness the rape in order to be able to bring the case to court.
In mid-August a local staff member of the US–NGO CARE was murdered in Kalma Camp, which is just ten minutes drive away from Nyala township. The response of the Sudanese local authorities, HAC and the police was to limit access to the camp by relief agencies. This constraint interrupted the provision of basic services—drinking water, food and hygiene facilities—for several days while the police carried out investigations in the camp. The relief agencies operating in Kalma Camp were thus put in the difficult position of having to work under tight restrictions imposed by the local authorities. Under the prevailing security situation, aid workers do not have sufficiently strong grounds to push for the unrestricted access to the camp that they require for continuation of their work on a full-time and regular basis. The continuing poor security environment is thus not only disrupting the provision of humanitarian services, but is also creating significant safety concerns for both the IDPs and aid agency staff. The government’s campaign to return and relocate IDPs is exploiting this problem. The campaign is also making it virtually impossible for humanitarian agencies and other organisations to verify the extent to which IDPs have been properly informed of the security situation and whether they have consented to participating in the return and relocation program.

International aid workers have also been the target of attacks and harassment. In June 2004, a female aid worker travelling in a car stopped in the market area of Nyala. When she opened her car window, a man approached and hit her in the face. This attack occurred at 10 a.m. when the market was crowded with people. A few weeks later, another female international aid worker was walking along the street from her office to her guesthouse. Although it was evening, she was using a busy street. According to her account, three young Sudanese men approached her, pushed her into a corner, sexually assaulted her and then said, ‘This is Sudan, Americans leave!’ In other instances of harassment, both expatriate and local aid agency staff have frequently been arrested and held in police custody. The justifications given for these arrests and investigations include allegations that aid workers were taking photos of ‘sensitive’ buildings or simply that they were present in a location where a crime had recently been committed.

Sudanese security forces in civilian clothing are a constant presence. These men are easily recognisable by their sunglasses, fancy shirts and new motorcycles. Many local staff employed by international relief agencies are also working for Sudanese military intelligence. Ironically, in July 2004, Nyala’s Chief of Police stated that ‘NGOs
are all spies for their governments’. Aid workers are used to operating in sensitive and dynamic situations. However, in Darfur they are also working in an environment where they are regarded as the vanguard of a prospective military intervention (UN resolution due on 31 August). Even without the presence of foreign troops, aid workers are being treated as if they are not in Darfur for humanitarian reasons. This attitude puts them at real risk.

EDITOR’S NOTE

On 30 July 2004, the UN Security Council gave the Sudanese Government a thirty-day deadline to ‘disarm the Janjaweed and bring them to justice’ (UN Resolution 1556). When the deadline expired on 29 August, the Secretary-General reported on the state of the conflict. According to his report, the situation ‘has resulted in some improvements on the ground but remains limited overall’. In particular, he notes that the Janjaweed militias remain armed and continue to attack civilians (contrary to Resolution 1556). He also noted that the Sudanese Government’s commitments regarding their own armed forces have been only partially implemented, and IDPs continue to report attacks involving government forces. On 9 September 2004, the United States put forward a draft UN Security Council resolution threatening Sudan with sanctions to its oil industry. This resolution was adopted, in a modified form, on 18 September 2004 as Resolution 1564. These resolutions and peace accords signed in November 2004 have had little effect on the situation in Darfur.

THE AUTHOR

Andjela Jurisic gained substantial experience in civil–military and humanitarian affairs in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, and later in post-conflict situations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. She was involved in public information campaigning during Operation Allied Force with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Brussels, Belgium. In November 2001 she had a similar role while working for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the lead-up to the first parliamentary elections in Kosovo. Ms Jurisic has also studied European Integration at the University of Bonn and Development Management at the University of Sussex. Her article, ‘Is the Humanitarian–Military Relationship Moving in Reverse?’, was published in vol. 15, no. 3, Winter 2004 issue of the journal, Small Wars and Insurgencies.
INTRODUCTION

In most armed forces, the uniform is such an important aspect of the collective identity that failure to wear it properly is considered a serious breach of military discipline. This article will discuss the psychological significance of military uniforms, examining why they are such a quintessential part of the military, and what purposes they serve in enabling the armed forces to achieve their objectives.

MILITARY UNIFORMS AS EMBLEMS OF STATUS

The most readily apparent purpose of uniforms is to serve as a symbol of status within the military structure. Uniforms are used not only to distinguish the officers from the enlisted personnel, but also to indicate a person’s rank, job speciality and previous awards. Insignia, hat style, trade badges, and the pins and ribbons above the right chest pocket all serve as additional symbols of status. For recruits, special items of clothing—such as an
Training and Doctrine

Recruit Sean Kikkert, RAAMC

Arm patch, beret or lanyard—are often used to mark the change in status that occurs once a person has completed their initial training and is officially recognised as a soldier. The United States (US) Navy has also found that placing potential recruits into uniform is an effective recruitment strategy. With the use of morphing photography, Navy recruitment kiosks are able to show prospective sailors what they will look like in uniform. The photographs are then sent to the potential recruit, along with recruiting information.

As symbols of rank, uniforms serve a number of practical purposes. First, they ensure that each person’s skills, training and expertise are immediately apparent to all. Second, by emphasising the hierarchical structure of the military, uniforms indicate where respect and deference must be shown. Finally, the officer’s uniform serves as a reminder that the officer’s authority is derived not from his or her followers, but from the organisation itself.

The Badge of Honour: Symbolism Behind the Uniform

While uniforms are used to differentiate those of different status, paradoxically they are also used to create unity. There is a deep and powerful symbolism that pervades every uniform, regardless of whether the wearer is a cadet or a general; their common attire creates a shared sense of identity. As the French scholar, Sarah Maza, has explained, the uniform is the outer expression with which the person identifies, and will be identified by others, as a soldier.¹ The military uniform is also perceived to reflect the ideology of the wearer. Commenting on the link between uniform and ideology, cultural theorist, M. R. Jaster, has called the wearing of uniform a ‘public statement of belief in a system’. Literary scholar, John Reed, notes that the uniform can be considered a symbol of ‘manhood’, and many soldiers see wearing uniform as a badge of honour.² In 2001, Time Magazine captured this ethos superbly when it described the military uniform as a ‘shield against vulnerability, as a constant reminder of a mission far greater than individual sorrows or insecurities’.³ Indeed, the service uniform has become so closely linked with the military ideal that those who do not conform to the military ethic are often described as not being ‘worthy of the uniform they wear’. There is a strong cultural consensus about what the uniform represents, and because this symbolism is so deeply endowed with an emotional component, an understanding of the uniform’s symbolism can be useful in real-world situations. For example, researchers in Israel found that the presence of uniformed officers at the funerals of killed Israeli personnel gave great comfort to the families, due to the uniform’s symbolism.⁴
GROUP COHESION: THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF MILITARY UNIFORM

Often, in order to accomplish their objectives, armed forces must subordinate the individuality of their personnel. Uniforms help to do this by creating a homogeneous identity. Military training is geared towards conditioning the new recruit to see himself or herself as a soldier and to inspire devotion to the welfare of the group. The identicalness of appearance instituted by uniforms and haircuts serves to strip each person of their individuality, thereby not only creating feelings of cohesion, but also reducing inhibitions about expressing aggression.⁵

In combat, uniforms take on a whole new meaning. Not surprisingly, elements important in peacetime, such as the display of status, become irrelevant. Evidence from researchers such as psychologist and former US Army Ranger, David Grossman, and combat veterans such as Major General Hal Moore suggest that, when soldiers pick targets, they aim to cause the greatest damage to the enemy, with a disproportionate amount of fire being directed at leaders.⁶ Combat thus creates a paradoxical situation where uniform, rather than distinguishing officers from enlisted personnel, is designed to make them impossible to tell apart. As Grossman notes, General James Gavin even insisted that he carry the same standard infantry rifle that his soldiers were carrying, and ordered his infantry officers not to use any equipment that would make them stand out.⁷

The bonding effects of service uniform also play an important role in combat. Research points to the idea that the extent to which a soldier identifies with the group is highly predictive of combat behaviour.⁸ Joanna Bourke, Professor of History at Birkbeck College in London, explains that even a timid soldier feels secure by being in a powerful group. Furthermore, she argues that the uniform identity of soldiers results in the displacement of self-love into the group, which in turn reduces the individual’s fear of death.⁹ Military historians, John Keegan, Richard Holmes and John Gau, also note that uniforms contributed to soldiers’ feelings of security and order, thus preventing panic in battle.¹⁰

While the helmet is probably the most practical component of the battle-dress uniform, it has been documented as causing a dangerous response from enemy soldiers. According to Grossman, it is psychologically easier to kill an individual who is wearing a helmet than to kill a bareheaded person. Grossman believes that surrendering soldiers should throw down not only their weapons, but also their helmets. He cites the example of Brigadier Peter Young, who had no inhibitions to throw down his helmet.

Research points to the idea that the extent to which a soldier identifies with the group is highly predictive of combat behaviour.
about shooting a helmeted German soldier, but was quite unable to shoot a bare-headed man. Grossman notes that it was a consideration of this principle that led United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces to adopt the beret as their uniform, rather than the helmet, despite the obvious protection offered by the latter. Working in such politically sensitive areas, and being constantly outnumbered by potentially aggressive forces, it is no surprise that the UN avoids anything that might increase the vulnerability of its peacekeepers.  

**WOMEN IN UNIFORM**

For women, the right to wear military uniform was only won after fierce struggle and heavy sacrifice. While Western governments began to allow women to join the military during World War I out of sheer necessity, they nevertheless often denied them the full privileges of military membership, especially the wearing of uniforms. For example, when women were finally allowed to join the British Home Guard, they were given plastic badges to wear instead of uniforms. Even when uniformed women were officially accepted by the military, society at large seemed more comfortable in pretending that they did not exist. W. Webster, for example, found that, in all the films of the colonial war period of the 1940s and 1950s, there was only one sequence showing a woman in uniform.

Despite the intense prejudice that they suffered, women in uniform were more accepted by early 20th-century society than were those who wore ‘male’ attire for other reasons. For example, Laura Doan—Professor of Cultural History and Sexuality Studies at the University of Manchester—has noted that women who chose to wear trousers in the 1920s were ridiculed, while those who wore them as part of their uniform—for instance women working in munition factories—were not. According to Doan, it was generally accepted that ‘uniform was immune from jeer or sneer’.

While both society and the military are currently more accepting of women in uniform, discrimination still exists. In a study of the US armed forces, Elizabeth Lutes Hillman—former US Air Force officer and Professor at Rutgers University School of Law—argued that women are discriminated against in court martials because they do not look as ‘soldierly’ as men do in uniforms. In the 1940s, when women began to join the US military in greater numbers, there was a heated debate about whether to allow women to wear the same uniform as the men, or whether a more ‘feminine’ outfit was necessary. The result was that women were given a separate, slightly modified uniform.
During the 1970s and 1980s, women in many armies were wearing uniforms cut and styled differently from those worn by men. Women’s uniforms were characterised by the shirt being worn outside the pants, instead of tucked into the pants. However, as these uniforms began to be phased out, women started to purchase male uniforms. Great confusion followed, as no one knew whether women should continue to wear their shirts outside their trousers, or, since they were wearing the exact same uniform as men, they should wear it the same way. Finally it was decided that both men and women should wear their uniforms with their shirts tucked in.

Herbert also noted that women in the US armed forces often perceived a conflict between looking feminine and wearing uniform. They often violated uniform regulations in order to appear more feminine, such as not wearing t-shirts under their fatigues, wearing their caps further back on the head, or having their uniform skirt too short. These violations resulted in punishment and reprimands from their superiors, as well as ridicule from their peers, who stereotyped them as not being serious soldiers. Nevertheless, in the 1980s, the US Army acknowledged the need for women to look more feminine and granted them permission to wear earrings with certain dress uniforms.

While women in the military are currently more content and fairly treated than in the past, the issue of discrimination has not been fully resolved. Obviously the roots of this issue run much deeper than simply conflicts about uniform. Indeed, the crux of this problem may reside in the fact that armed forces have failed to resolve the contradiction between two opposing ideals: the homogeneity imposed by uniforms versus the desire to acknowledge gender variation. Nevertheless, it is likely that, until the perceived conflict between gender and uniform is solved, there will continue to be discord, discrimination and prejudice associated with this issue.
CONCLUSION

Uniforms have had such a long and proud tradition in the military that one can be inclined to take them for granted. However, it should be recognised that uniforms are central to the armed forces precisely because they serve very distinct psychological purposes. Increased understanding of the psychological dimensions of military uniforms can enhance the use of this powerful instrument in the formation of a cohesive and unified defence force. Such knowledge can allow the Australian Defence Force to maximise the effectiveness of uniforms across a spectrum of purposes—from instilling community pride in the ADF to providing soldiers with greater protection in combat.

ENDNOTES

7 Ibid., p. 174.
8 For example, see studies such as Quincy Wright, A Study of War, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965; and P. Neumarkt, ‘The Orgy of Self-renunciation: An Analysis of the Motif of War in Modern Literature', Journal of Evolutionary Psychology, vol. 8, 2000, pp. 152–65.
9 Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, p. 87.
10 Keegan, Holmes & Gau, p. 43.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.

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Once again, the Retrospect article for this issue of the AAJ is drawn from the pages of The Commonwealth Military Journal. The article is based on an address delivered to the United Services Institution of Victoria in 1911 by Colonel, the Honourable, James Whiteside McCay, Director of Intelligence, Commonwealth Military Forces. McCay’s subject was ‘The True Principles of Australia’s Defence’. The principles governing the defence of Australia was a topic much in vogue in 1911. The Commonwealth’s Labor Government had just launched its first universal conscription scheme, which enlisted all males from the age of twelve upwards for compulsory military training.

McCay was a rare phenomenon in Australia—a serving soldier with political experience. Between 18 August 1904 and 5 July 1905 he served as Defence Minister. While his tenure in office was brief, the period was notable for a number of key defence reforms, including the establishment of the Military Board and continued debate over a report on the Military Forces of the Commonwealth handed down by the General Officer Commanding, Major-General Sir Edward Hutton. McCay was forced out of Parliament when his electorate was abolished in 1906. Although he subsequently ran for the seat of Corio and for a Victorian Senate seat in 1910, he never regained political office. However, his military career prospered, and on 6 December 1907 he was appointed to command the new Australian Intelligence Corps.
with the rank of full colonel. In this capacity, he was able to advance the career of his old school friend John Monash. For most of his military career, McCay was a controversial figure. He frequently quarrelled with both superiors and subordinates, perhaps because he possessed a fiery Irish temperament. In 1913, a dispute with the Military Board had led to his dismissal from the post of Director of Intelligence. Nevertheless, as this article demonstrates, McCay was an intelligent and deeply thoughtful man.

At the heart of this article is perhaps the earliest elucidation of an issue still debated today: ‘What is the purpose of the Army in the defence of Australia?’ Now, as in McCay’s day, some Australians argue, as the article puts it, the ‘… Army’s duty is … to sit in trenches and await attack. The picture in the mind’s eye of the public is one huge ditch round the Australian coast with soldiers in khaki at regular intervals peering over its edge, and gripping rifles with tense hands.’ In terms that are echoed in the current debate, McCay believed that ‘nothing could be more grotesquely far from the real needs of the situation’. He went on to state: [Australia’s] ‘…vital commercial and strategic points must be protected … but apart from this, our field army must be in the highest degree mobile, ready to concentrate anywhere, march anywhere, and fight anywhere—not everywhere.’ ‘Anywhere’ refers to the ability of the army to defend the national interest, as part of a coalition, at any point on the globe, because, as McCay pointed out, it was not possible for the Commonwealth’s small land forces to defend everywhere on the vast Australian continent.

The strategic dichotomy expressed in this article remains contentious. Moreover, the inability to resolve this policy dilemma during the course of the past century has at times seriously threatened the Army’s ability to play its proper role in national defence. As McCay recognised, soldiers ‘… are thankful to have nothing to do directly with this part of the work, but their plain duty nevertheless is to insist …, when advising those who are responsible, that Defence is a strategic question, … and that strategic considerations are paramount over all others, … most of all over those of political expediency’.
THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF AUSTRALIA’S DEFENCE

COLONEL THE HONOURABLE JAMES WHITESIDE McCAY

Those of you who have taken part in a Staff Ride have experienced the refined torture called ‘appreciating the situation’, and have probably also apostrophised it in unmeasured language before you were finished. But you also realised very quickly that it was impossible to carry out the campaign without an appreciation of it beforehand, or to carry it out successfully without a correct appreciation. Your individual experience is only a personal confirmation of the teachings of military history about ‘the real thing’, of which it has been said by high authority that no skill during the operations can retrieve the situation created by an initial strategic misapprehension.

In considering the problem of Australian defence, we must approach the matter in precisely the same way as the general planning his campaign. The situation is a larger one, with greater and more permanent, and yet at the same time in some ways vaguer factors, but it is a situation to be appreciated, and correctly appreciated beforehand, for no subsequent exertion or expenditure in preparing for war will atone for initial error. We may spend money like water on defence, but unless it is spent in the right way, it may as well not be spent at all. Robert Browning may be speaking the truth about the formation of character when he says that ‘All instincts immature, All purposes unsure’ have their value, but this does not apply in preparation for war, where the plan must first be absolutely definite, and the performance afterwards absolutely exact.

Applying the suggested method to the determination of the true principles of Australian defence, the very first thing to be settled is ‘What is the object to be achieved?’ That decided, the most vigorous watchfulness is needed to ensure constant striving after that object, and after no other. Secondary objects are continually presenting themselves close to the mind’s eye, and assuming great proportions because of their mere proximity, so as to hide, for a time at least, the main—the only—object,
and to lead the actor quite astray. In war none but leaders of the very first rank have been able always to avoid ‘sidetracking’ themselves. In the stress of war, only the finest intellect and the most determined character can protect men from this error. In the day of preparation, we may make shift with intellects not of the first ranks, but only if they deliberately stop at intervals, and ask themselves: ‘Are we still pursuing the object, or have we gone aside to follow after strange gods?’

What, then, is the object to be achieved? The man in the street would probably have his answer pat: ‘To protect Australia against an enemy’. One needs to consider this answer only briefly in order to realise that, although it is quite correct, it is unfortunately ambiguous. The recruit who was directed to select a point to march upon, and chose a wandering cow, was in no worse plight. Protecting Australia against an enemy has, at any rate, two main interpretations, leading in many respects to utterly diverse provisions to effect the desired result. It may mean guarding against temporary local reverses and losses (the ‘raiding’ danger), or it may mean securing us against that permanent occupation of the whole or part of our territory by an alien power that would end or seriously interfere with the development of our national desires. It is just because these two interpretations have not been kept separate that our defence policy has wobbled, now this way and now that, and is even today rather nebulous and hesitant in some important respects. So far as raids are concerned, the worst of raids would do infinitely less harm to our continent than the mildest of droughts, and the worst of droughts is not more than an annoying episode in our national career. If, then, the two interpretations are set side by side, the second so enormously overshadows the first that we might well suppose that no patriotic Australian would hesitate to declare that raids might come and raids might go, but permanent occupations must be prevented forever. Yet there is a definite school of thought in Australia that urges purely local protection by local effort, and leaves to Britain the assuring of the permanent inviolability of our shores. If self-interest dictated this course (which it does not), it would still be a horribly ignoble course, not to be endured by Australians once they realised its meanness.

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So far as raids are concerned, the worst of raids would do infinitely less harm to our continent than the mildest of droughts …
It may then be taken that the essential object of all Australian defence is to prevent permanent alien occupation of any part of our soil. The object being determined, and not till then, we proceed to the next stage of the problem, and ask the question, 'How is the object to be achieved?' A general planning his campaign is wise if he follows the ordered consideration of the matter which long experience has proved good. This order is briefly:

1. the situation of the enemy
2. the situation and position of our own forces
3. morale and efficiency
4. political and geographical considerations
5. courses open to the enemy
6. courses open to ourselves
7. our decision as to what to do

It will not be necessary, nor would it be interesting, to take these headings in detail, the one after the other, and all that is required for our present purposes can be summarised in these five statements:

1. Australia is part of the British Empire.
2. Half of Australia is not effectively occupied.
3. Australia is an island.
4. There are possible enemies within striking distance of any part of our coasts, either for raiding or for occupation, if the sea is open to them.
5. Our morale (we hope) is, and our efficiency must be, at least equal to any enemy’s.

As to the first and vital part—that Australia is part of the Empire—it is not so long since men said, and were not derided for saying, that Australia might thereby be dragged into a war with some great Power of the Old World, from which she would otherwise be free. She would also be free from the protection of the Imperial Navy; but that, it seemed, was immaterial, for ‘so long as we interfered with nobody, nobody would interfere with us.’ This particular kind of mush is no longer a favourite breakfast food, but traces of it still linger on some unwiped lips, and there is still to some extent a vague feeling that civility will be as effective as it would be a cheap way of making ourselves safe. However, ‘Half of Australia is not effectively occupied.’ Apart from the century of undisputed claim to the whole of Australia by the Union Jack—for which our British nationality and the British Navy alone are to be thanked—international jurists could easily be found to say that our great North West has never been so effectively occupied as to justify alien settlements there, even today, being regarded as a true casus belli. Moreover, with the sea unsafe for us, but
safe for the enemy, half of Australia is, in a military sense, nearer to any of the Great Powers than to the Australian people. Even transcontinental railways will only bring us as near as the enemy to our unused millions of acres.

There is more than this in the fact of our vacant spaces. Wars in the past have been waged for dynastic reasons, to gratify insane ambitions, to salve wounds to individual vanity. However, for a generation and more, whatever the surface causes may have been, and whatever the spark that actually set fire to the gunpowder, the root of every war in the world has been the desire for more territory. When a great, growing and prosperous people finds its country too small for its population, national earth-hunger—the giant child of individual earth-hunger—overwhelms and submerges every consideration of ‘brotherhood’, every courtesy of diplomacy, every moral influence for peace. Nothing but naked fear of consequences, and an opposing front of physical force will prevent this hunger from insisting on being fed. Our fertile acres, lying vacant beneath a temperate sky, are a call and a lure that many a nation hears and feels. If we remember also the standing challenge that we have issued to almost half the world by our White Australia policy, we must realise that there is ‘ample room and verge enough’ for danger to Australia’s national integrity.

Australia is an island, and so her first line of defence is on the ocean. The high seas must be kept safe for all vessels flying the British Flag, and kept unsafe for others. While that condition of things continues, for we believe it to exist today, Australia is secure from permanent injury, even as is the United Kingdom. The great tradition of our race is that our fleets go forth to find the foe and crush him. So must it be hereafter. Australian vessels of war must fight in line with the rest of the imperial Navy, in whatever sea the contest may be. Our cruisers must guard commerce on the high seas, even though their special sphere be the great trade routes of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Someone here may say ‘That is all very fine, but what if our Imperial dominion of the seas be lost?’ Well, in that case, our Australian dominion of half our continent is lost also if someone choose to challenge it. ‘But what of temporary loss of sea command? Must we not have local naval protection then, to save our cities and our coasting trade? Does not Britain herself always keep a fleet in Home waters?’ First of all, Australia is infinitely better off in such a case than Britain. Britain starves if her overseas food supplies are cut off. Australia could, at a pinch, sustain herself
for an indefinite period. She is, again at a pinch, self-sufficing to an almost incredible degree. The desirability of protecting coastal trade and coastal towns is obvious, but the confusion of thought as to what protecting Australia really means is strikingly exemplified by the critic’s questions—and still more striking is the obscuration of the main object, the permanent integrity of our soil, by the secondary and infinitely smaller, though more alluring, object of preventing local losses. Besides, though it may not so appear at first sight, our land defences, if properly conceived and wisely prepared, will secure us against the worst of these misfortunes. We may not unnaturally want to stay at home, and protect against the swift and solitary burglar our silver teapot, and each of our six silver spoons, while our kinsmen are fighting the massed hosts of brigandage, but if our kinsmen fall, our spoons¹ will soon be in the melting pot, despite all our housewifely care.

A recent cablegram informed us that the deliberations of the Imperial Conference had not affected Australia’s intentions in relation to her control of her own fleet. It is not very easy to understand what this means, as official utterances on the matter in Australia have always been cryptic, and sometimes conflicting. The general impression to be gathered from what has been said by persons entitled to speak authoritatively is that, for constitutional reasons, our ships of war are to be exclusively Australian and exclusively under Australian control in peace time; that in war time they are not to pass automatically under Admiralty control, but that (to paraphrase) ‘undoubtedly the Commonwealth will hand control over to the Admiralty’. This article has neither justification for, nor intention of, entering the constitutional or the political arena, and on this point all that may be said is that, if war comes and we are not properly prepared, nothing can be hoped for from sending a messenger to the enemy under flag of truce, to explain that for constitutional reasons we are not quite as fit as we would otherwise have been, and would he kindly make allowance for it and equalize matters by fighting with one arm tied behind his back. It is indeed an optimistic view to take of weak erring human nature to suppose that, while we will not agree to automatic transfer of control, now that we rejoice in the piping times of peace, with no danger imminent, we will voluntarily part with control of our ships of war and risk their disappearing over the horizon to Madagascar or Formosa, at a moment when every primitive instinct has leapt to the surface in us, and self with a capital ‘S’ is dominant.

Settling questions for ‘constitutional’ reasons cannot in any case be justified in a proper consideration of defence problems, for these are strategic matters first, last, and all the time.
Settling questions for ‘constitutional’ reasons cannot in any case be justified in a proper consideration of defence problems, for these are strategic matters first, last, and all the time. The man who wishes to deal rightly with defence must possess imagination; he must travel forward on a mental time-machine (to use Mr H. G. Wells’s term) to the day when war is declared; he must then review his preparations as they appear at that moment, see whether they are sufficient to meet the danger actually existing—and previously foreseen, and he will find defects. Some of these defects will be due to defective instruments used to carry out his plan and will in part be unavoidable. The worst of them he will find to be owing to his having in time of peace permitted peace considerations to outweigh war ones; if such be not the case, he will have been a man in many millions. Then back he must come with Mr Wells to today, and frame his policy and avoid its defects; in other words, civil, popular and constitutional considerations must never prevail against war considerations in times of peace if they would have to yield to them in times of war.

War is a conflict of brains backed by physical force, and the framer of the fighting policy must work in an atmosphere of imagined war, or the men who do the fighting, and the country for which they fight, will pay dearly. Imagination, intellect, and invincible determination all are needed. Moreover, because the electorate in the long run controls the policy, the electorate has to be taught the right thing, and led in the doing of it. As the electorate is as much an emotional as an intellectual entity, the statesman requires still further qualifications for his task. The sailor and the soldier are thankful to have nothing to do directly with this part of the work, but their plain duty is to insist in season and out of season, when advising those who are responsible, that defence is a strategic question, and that strategic considerations are paramount over all others, most especially over those of political expediency.

Our possible enemies, with a safe ocean, may strike anywhere they please, in any fashion they please. For our sea forces and our land forces alike, the moral is obvious: they must be mobile. With Australia’s ten thousand miles of coastline, her scattered population, her vast distances and her numerous landing places, it will be just sheer good luck that will find our forces at the spot where the enemy is striking our shores. The best that we can normally hope for is that we may reach him soon enough to make him sorry he came. Our fleet must be a unit, and a sea-going unit at that, to move with
speed and in strength to the point of danger, when it has been ascertained. Given a
safe sea, the enemy may strike when, where and how he chooses, and can get in the
first blow. Given an unsafe sea, he cannot strike effectively anywhere.

Now that the enemy has reached or is threatening to reach Australian shores, it
is necessary to refer to our land forces. Soldiers have much reason to deplore the
name of ‘Defence Force’ in lieu of the name ‘Army’. The public mind is in the mass
highly emotional as has already been observed, and with it words have weight far
beyond their true value. It is consequently not too much to say that the laudably
intentioned words ‘Defence Forces’ have created a most injurious and widely spread
feeling that our Army’s duty is, so to speak, to sit in trenches and await attack. The
picture in the mind’s eye of the public is one huge ditch round the Australian coast,
with soldiers in khaki at regular intervals peering over its edge and gripping rifles
with tense hands. Nothing could be more grotesquely far from the real needs of the
situation. To attempt to be prepared for the enemy at every point is to result in being
able to meet him at none. A classic instance is that of the Austrian army behind the
Mincio waiting for Napoleon in his first years of command in Italy. Every bridge,
and every ford, was guarded by a detachment of Austrians. Napoleon lay west of
the river, screened his front, made his plans at his own convenience, chose his own
point for crossing the stream, moved to it with his whole army, scattered the weak
Austrian detachments before him, and was over the river marching away before any
other Austrian troops could come near him.

Strategically the situation is identical in Australia, once we lose the ocean. The
enemy may land when, where and how he pleases. If we try to be prepared for
him at every point we shall be strong enough at none. Our vital commercial and
strategic points must be protected by forts and garrisons, but apart from this, our
field army must be in the highest degree mobile, ready to concentrate anywhere,
march anywhere and fight anywhere—not everywhere. It is as likely to have to
fight at Cambridge Gulf as at Geelong; it has little chance of opposing the hostile landing; but
if it be truly mobile and efficient, it has every
chance of destroying the landed enemy. It must
be big enough to compel the enemy who wishes
to occupy our soil to bring a force of such a size
that the transports conveying it, and the war-ships
convoying it are a mark large enough to be easily
found and easily hit by the Navy. Larger than that
it need not be, and should not be.

There is no potency in mere numbers. This
is an age that prizes numbers unduly and craves
for numerical records, to the exclusion of a true

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appreciation of things. Pianos should be played for the pleasure of player and listener, not for seventeen and a half hours as a proof of endurance. Clubs should be swung for healthy exercise, not that someone should boast that he swung them for 82 ½ hours, and beat the previous record of 76 ¼ hours. Everyone ought to be as bored to read it as to see it, but they are not. The popular test of everything is quantity; it should be efficiency. There is a definite danger of this arithmetical obsession blinding us to the real test of our army. To have 100 000 men trained to arms is of no use unless they form a real mobile army of 100 000-strong, a living organism, properly coordinated and capable of fulfilling with a single impulse the will of a mastermind.

Last rule of all, our efficiency must at least equal the enemy’s. For our Navy is a small navy and, other things being equal, will not be as efficient as a large one. Moreover, allied fleets never do as well as a single fleet, if only because of the differences of training and thought. To be a true unit, delivering its single blow with crushing effect in war, a navy must have been trained as a unit in time of peace. The ideal for the Australian Navy, therefore, is that it should be in training and work an integral portion of the Imperial Navy. There is no insuperable difficulty to overcome in order to secure this result, and still maintain a just Australian pride in seeing a definite portion of the Imperial Navy, and not merely individual men or even individual ships characterised as Australian.

To develop this fully would require another lecture, but the ideal to aim at is that ‘the Australian Squadron’ shall no longer mean British ships on the Australian station, nor even Australian ships, manned from truck to keelson by Australians, serving in Australian waters. It shall, instead, mean an integral and definite portion of the Imperial Navy, paid for by Australia, manned by Australians, and serving wherever the Empire’s enemies (who are also Australia’s enemies) are to be found, fought and beaten. The Army’s mobile field force should be trained as nearly as possible to the Imperial standard, taught beyond doubt in the same school of military thought, and capable of moving overseas to the enemy before he moves overseas [sic] to us. It is better to invade than to be invaded; better to carry the war into the enemy’s country than to wait for war to come to you; better to attack than to defend; and better to go to the firing line than to be a reserve that waits for the enemy’s firing line to come to it.
The True Principles of Australia’s Defence

To discuss how far the ideal is being carried into effect today is to tread on delicate ground without proper warrant. The object of this lecture is to emphasise the fact, too easily forgotten, that Australian defence is a strategic question and not a political one. In times of peace, strategy may be subordinated to politics, and while peace lasts no harm is done. But peace lasts only because the rival fears war, and this fear ceases when strategy is scorned by us. In times of war, politics are only a part (and often a small part) of strategy—which being the case, all true preparation for war implies that politics must be subordinated to strategy, even though every other public question is but a part of politics.

While this lecture avowedly deals with the question purely from the Australian point of view, it so happens (as reflection would show it must happen) that the building up of our Navy and our Army in the fashion best suited to save Australia permanently produces a Navy and an Army of the kind best suited to protect us against raids and, what is more, best suited in the protection of the Empire as a whole. In this matter, at least, Australian interests and Imperial interests not merely march together, but they are one. He who wants better reasons for treating Australian defence in a truly scientific way—and war is the most difficult of the sciences—must seek them elsewhere, for here none better are known.

Endnote

1 The six Australian States.

The Author

Lieutenant General James Whiteside McCay, KBE, KCMG (1864–1930), was the son of an Irish immigrant family and was commissioned into the Victorian Rifles in 1886. Promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1900, he was elected to the Federal Parliament in March 1901. Between August 1904 and July 1905, McCay was Minister for Defence and presided over the Hutton reforms that brought about the amalgamation of Australia’s colonial forces into a single national force. In World War I, McCay served as Inspector General of the 1st Australian Imperial Force, as Commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade at Gallipoli and of the 5th Division on the Western Front. He was knighted in 1918 and retired from the Army in 1926.
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IN MEMORIAM

BRIGADIER NOEL RUSSELL (CHIC) CHARLESWORTH, DSO
(1928–2004)

Noel Russell ‘Chic’ Charlesworth was born on 3 January 1928 in Balgowlah in New South Wales. In 1945, after completing his secondary education at Sydney High School during which time he played rugby union for Sydney’s Combined High Schools, Charlesworth applied for a cadetship at the Royal Military College (RMC), Duntroon, and entered the College in February 1946. Charlesworth’s intake was the last of the three-year wartime courses and he graduated in December 1948, having reached the cadet rank of sergeant in his final year and having played for the RMC 1st XV.

Charlesworth was allotted to Infantry, and after completing a young officers’ course at the School of Infantry at Seymour, he was posted as a rifle platoon commander with the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in Japan. Early in 1950, with the expected end of the occupation, he commanded a platoon escort for a shipload of Japanese war criminals who had been sentenced to imprisonment on Manus Island. In September 1950, Charlesworth was part of 3 RAR’s deployment to participate in the Korean War.

He took part in 3 RAR’s advance from Pusan in the south to Pakchon in the north, just short of the Yalu River. At the end of October 1950, during a two-company attack on a Chinese Red Army position, Charlesworth was wounded in the lower legs by fragments from a grenade. He was evacuated to the British General Hospital in Japan and completed his medical recovery in Australia at Repatriation General
Hospital Concord. After a short period of service with 1 RAR at Holsworthy and after much urging on his part, Charlesworth was posted back to Korea in December 1951 to rejoin 3 RAR as the battalion’s antitank platoon commander.

In August 1952, he attended the British Army School of Infantry at Nether Avon in the United Kingdom. The following year, Charlesworth returned to Australia in order to take up a three-year posting as an instructor at the School of Infantry at Seymour. In 1956, he was appointed Adjutant of the 41st Infantry Battalion (Byron Scottish) and later attended the Command and Staff College at Fort Queenscliff. In the late 1950s and first half of the 1960s, subsequent postings included instructing at RMC Duntroon, as a company commander with the 1st Battalion, Pacific Island Regiment, and service in the Directorate of Military Operations and Plans at Army Headquarters. Promoted to lieutenant colonel, Charlesworth became the Army member of the Joint Intelligence Staff.

In January 1967, Charlesworth assumed command of 2 RAR and led the battalion on its first operational deployment to South Vietnam. There, 2 RAR was joined by two attached companies and supporting elements from the 1st Battalion, the Royal New Zealand Regiment, to form 2 RAR/NZ (Anzac) Battalion under Charlesworth’s command. This was the first occasion on which New Zealand troops served directly under the command of an Australian unit commander. During the Anzac Battalion’s service in Vietnam, the unit took part in fourteen successful operations in which 187 enemy were killed, sixty-seven wounded and twelve captured for the loss of twenty-four Australians and four New Zealanders killed in action. These operations included Coburg, in which the battalion deployed with the remainder of the 1st Australian Task Force to the province of Bien Hoa to take part in the defence of the eastern approaches of the US Army logistics complex at Long Binh. During this deployment, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army launched the countrywide 1968 Tet Offensive in which the Australian Task Force was instrumental in countering the enemy’s movement through the Bien Hoa area. Charlesworth received the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for his leadership of 2 RAR during its tour of duty in Vietnam.

After completing his service in Vietnam, Charlesworth was posted to Britain as an instructor at the Staff College at Camberley. Later postings included the Directorate of Infantry and, on being promoted to colonel, the position of Chief of Staff at Headquarters Northern Command. When the 1st Division’s headquarters was reactivated at Enoggera Barracks in 1973, Charlesworth served as its Chief of Staff for six months before being appointed to command the 3rd Task Force at Lavarack Barracks in Townsville with the rank of Brigadier. In 1976, Brigadier Charlesworth became Australian Army Attaché in Washington and concluded his career in 1982 in the position of Chief of Staff, Headquarters Field Force Command at Victoria Barracks in Sydney.
In retirement, Brigadier Charlesworth served as the military member of the New South Wales Veterans’ Review Board between 1982 and 1992 and was later President of the Sydney Legacy from 1998 to 2000. He married Bettie in 1952 and had two children, a son Phillip (who followed him to RMC and the Regular Army), and a daughter, Sueanne.

Colonel J. M. Church, DSO (Retd)
Canberra

MAJOR GENERAL DUNCAN FRANCIS AO, OBE
(1937–2004)

Major General Duncan Francis, who made a significant contribution to the formation and development of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and to materiel management in the Australian Army and defence organisation, died in Canberra on 26 October 2004 after a short illness. Major General Francis was born on 20 March 1937 in Perth, Western Australia, and was the son of Lieutenant Colonel Duncan Duncgan Francis. Educated at Aquinas College, he chose to follow his father into a military career. In 1957 he graduated from the Royal Military College (RMC), Duntroon, where he was awarded the Queen’s Medal for academic excellence.

After completing a degree in civil engineering at Melbourne University in 1959 and following a posting to 21 Construction Squadron in 1960, Francis served at the Maralinga Atomic Range Support Unit from 1961 to 1962. He was then posted to the United Kingdom for further training in 1962–63 and completed specialist engineer courses ranging from bomb disposal to missile disarmament. Subsequent postings between 1964 and 1966 included instructing at the School of Military Engineering, lecturing in the Engineering Department at RMC, Duntroon, and serving as Officer Commanding 18 Field Squadron.

Between 1967 and 1968, Francis saw active service in South Vietnam as Officer Commanding 17 Construction Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers. On returning to Australia from Vietnam, he was posted to the School of Military Engineering as an instructor and attended the Command and Staff College in 1970. During the early 1970s he served in Headquarters Papua New Guinea Command, where he occupied a number of advisory appointments. In 1974, he returned to Australia to take up a three-year appointment as a member of the Directing Staff at the Australian Command and Staff College. His later military education included attendance at the
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Australian Joint Services Staff College and the Canadian National Defence College. Between 1977 and 1980 he returned to Papua New Guinea to serve in an advisory capacity. In 1980 Francis, now a colonel, was recognised for his outstanding service to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force by being appointed as an Officer in the Order of the British Empire (OBE).

Brigadier Francis was appointed Commander of the 2nd Military District in 1984. Throughout the 1980s he was involved at the highest level of defence management in materiel acquisition, serving as both the Director General Materiel and Chief of Materiel. He was promoted to the rank of major general in 1985, and in 1988 was appointed an Officer in the Order of Australia (AO). Major General Francis retired from the Army in 1991 after a career spanning thirty-four years. He became involved in a range of community work for the Catholic Archdiocese of Canberra and Goulburn, with the Returned and Services’ League and with a range of other non-government agencies. Major General Francis was also active in the Royal United Services’ Institute, serving both as Chairman of the Australian Capital Territory Branch and as National Chairman. He was widely regarded as a superb leader and manager and was highly respected by those with whom he served. Major General Francis was buried with full military honours.

Nick Francis
Canberra

BRIGADIER OLIVER DAVID JACKSON, DSO, OBE
(1919–2004)

Brigadier Oliver David Jackson, one of the ‘elder statesmen’ of the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR), died on 7 May 2004. Jackson has the distinction of being the only officer to command all three original RAR battalions and, over almost forty years, he led Australian infantrymen in five theatres of war: the Middle East, New Guinea, Japan, Korea and Vietnam. Jackson was in command of the Australian Task Force in South Vietnam when it fought, and won, its best-known action at the Battle of Long Tan in August 1966.

Jackson was born in London in 1919, the son of Major General Robert Jackson, a professional soldier and veteran of World War I. Oliver David (known throughout his life as either David or O.D.) was named after his uncle, David, who had been killed at Gallipoli while attempting to rescue a fallen comrade. Following the Great War, the Jackson family returned to Australia, where young David
attended numerous schools, including secondary education at Scotch College in Melbourne. In March 1937 Jackson, following in his father’s footsteps, chose to pursue a military career and commenced his training at the Royal Military College, Duntroon.

Jackson graduated in December 1939, two months after the outbreak of World War II. A few months later, in July 1940, he assumed his first command appointment as a platoon commander with the 2nd Battalion, 25th Australian Infantry Brigade. The battalion was deployed to the Middle East the following year, and Jackson saw action against the Axis in North Africa and Syria. By late 1942 the battalion returned from the Middle East and was subsequently deployed to fight against the Japanese in New Guinea. Later, Jackson was among those Australian diggers who fought doggedly from Gona through the Ramu Valley and the Finisterre Ranges to the New Guinea north coast. From June 1944 until the end of the Pacific War in August 1945, Jackson served as an instructor at the Canadian Staff College.

With the end of World War II, Jackson returned to Australia and served in a variety of staff appointments at the Royal Military College, in Army Headquarters and in Headquarters Western Command. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1949 and became a colonel in 1951. On 21 June 1956, he assumed command of the 1st Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR), and was responsible for overseeing the unit’s final operational activities in Korea. Colonel Jackson then took up a two-year appointment in the United States as Australian Military Attaché in Washington. At the beginning of the 1960s, he returned to Australia as Director of Infantry at Army Headquarters. Subsequently he assumed command of the 3rd Battalion RAR during 1963, before transferring in order to become commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion RAR later in that year.

In 1965, Colonel Jackson was appointed commander of the Australian Army Training Team—Vietnam, the first Australian unit to serve in the Vietnam War. Promoted to Brigadier in 1966, he remained in Vietnam and became Commander, 1st Australian Task Force, located in the southern province of Phuoc Tuy. Enduring extreme personnel shortages alongside constant harassment from a Viet Cong insurgent enemy, Jackson commanded the task force in large-scale operations during 1966–67 against both the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units.

These operations included the Battle of Long Tan in August 1966—an important action that ensured the Task Force’s physical dominance of Phuoc Tuy for the remainder of the war. An immensely practical man, Brigadier Jackson championed any initiative in Vietnam that would save the lives of his soldiers. For example, he insisted on the removal of the doors that inhibited troop movement and casualty evacuation to and from Australian helicopters operating in Vietnam. In June 1967,
Brigadier Jackson returned to Australia and served in a number of headquarters appointments before his final posting as Chief of Staff at Headquarters 1st Division. Jackson retired from the Army in May 1974 and spent his retirement years in Sydney and the Southern Tablelands, where he indulged his passions for sailing and gardening.

During his thirty-seven years of distinguished military service, Jackson was awarded the Order of the British Empire in 1956 and the Distinguished Service Order in 1967. Further recognition of his ability as a commander came in 1966, with decorations from the United States and South Vietnam in the form of the United States Meritorious Unit Commendation and the Unit Citation of the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm respectively. Jackson’s leadership, drive and practical wisdom made a profound impression on all those soldiers who served with him, and his example remains an enduring influence on the young infantry officers of today’s Australian Army.

Lieutenant John Bathgate

COLONEL CHARLES STUART, MC, ED
(1917–2003)

Colonel Charles Stuart—a distinguished medical officer with service in the British, Indian and Australian armies in World War II and in Vietnam—was born on 28 August 1917 in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, Northumberland, England. He was educated at the Royal Grammar School, Newcastle, and studied medicine at Durham University. Graduating in 1941, Stuart spent six months as a resident at the Royal Victoria Infirmary, Newcastle, before being called up for service in the British Army in 1942.

He was commissioned into the Royal Army Medical Corps, and after general army training at Aldershot and a course in Urdu at the School for African and Oriental Languages at the University of London, he joined the Indian Army. Stuart served on the North-West Frontier and in the Punjab as a medical officer and later recalled that he had ‘got wide medical, surgical and cultural training here [in India] and loved [the] environment, medicine and cross cultures.’ In 1943, he joined the 1/9 Gurkha Rifles based in Syria and subsequently became medical officer in the 5th Brigade of the 4th Indian Division. In Cairo he treated wounded soldiers from the desert war, recalling ‘[I] was here during the Battle of Alamein. Not in it; but [I] got casualties from it.’
After service in North Africa and the Middle East, Stuart was posted to Italy and served as medical officer to the 1/9 Gurkhas during the fierce battles for Cassino in 1944. From January until May 1944, American, Indian and New Zealand troops assaulted the German Gustav Line, symbolised by the Benedictine monastery atop Monte Cassino, and suffered heavy casualties. Stuart received the Military Cross during the battles for his bravery in retrieving wounded soldiers in terrible conditions from the mountainous terrain. Accompanied in his efforts by ten Gurkha stretcher bearers, Stuart later wrote of his ‘love and respect for them [the Gurkhas] as men, soldiers and [for] their selflessness’. In later years, he named his Australian farm at Boddington Bahadur (Gurkhali for ‘the brave’). On one occasion during the battles for Cassino, he was captured briefly by German troops, but was returned to the Allied lines accompanied by fifty wounded soldiers.

After the war, Stuart undertook postgraduate studies in radiology at the Hammersmith Hospital in London before emigrating to New Zealand in 1949 and then to Perth, Western Australia, in 1953. In Perth, Stuart resumed a military career in the Australian Army Reserve. He rose to the rank of colonel and was appointed Director of Army Medical Services in Western Australia. In 1970, at the age of fifty-three, he volunteered for service in South Vietnam, becoming Commanding Officer of the 1st Australian Field Hospital in Vung Tau. For his service in Vietnam he was awarded the Efficiency Decoration and Clasp. His military medical report relating to the use of radiology was reproduced in the 1996 study *Australasian Radiology—A History*, and is the only report of its type by a radiologist working in a military field unit overseas to have appeared in print since World War II.

In his civilian life, Stuart was a distinguished consultant neuroradiologist in Western Australia and was a coeditor of the *Proceedings of the College of Radiologists of Australasia*. From the 1970s, he travelled widely overseas, serving as a radiological consultant in Europe for the Australian Department of Immigration. Stuart also undertook various visiting positions at hospitals in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Jordan in the 1980s and 1990s. He was a man of fine intellect with exceptional leadership skills that were demonstrated in his career as a medical officer. Stuart relished the Australian lifestyle and developed his love of exotic cars (which was legendary in Perth). He was also a devotee of military history and classical music. Colonel Stuart is survived by his wife, Margaret, and by two sisters, three sons and seven grandchildren. The eulogy at his funeral was delivered by former Western Australian cabinet minister Bill Hassell.

Dr Paul Harris
Perth
MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM JOSEPH WATSON, AO, MBE, MBBS, FRACMA
(1924–2004)

Major General William Joseph Watson, who died just three weeks short of his eightieth birthday, was widely recognised as the pre-eminent planner, designer and commander of Australian Army hospitals since World War II. He commanded two overseas military hospitals and a Field Ambulance, and later became the Director General of the Australian Army Health Services and the Medical Superintendent of the Calvary Hospital in Canberra.

Watson was born on 30 May 1924 in Cloncurry, Queensland. He attended Townsville Grammar before joining the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). During World War II, Watson saw active service in the Pacific Campaign as a navigator on Catalina aircraft with 43 Squadron and 111 Air Sea Rescue Flight. In the early 1950s he studied medicine at Sydney University as part of the postwar Commonwealth Repatriation Training Scheme. In 1956, at the age of thirty-one, he was appointed as a lieutenant in the Regular Army Supplementary Reserve as an undergraduate medical officer. On medical graduation he undertook residency training at the Mater Hospital North Sydney and was posted to the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR). He served in 1 RAR for two years as regimental medical officer and saw active service during the Malayan Emergency.

On his return to Australia from Malaya in October 1960, Watson was appointed Officer Commanding the 1st Camp Hospital at Yeronga in Queensland, with the rank of major. It was here that he began a lifetime of hospital service in the Australian Army with a passion and skill that was outstanding. In June 1963, while at Yeronga, Watson was honoured as a Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE) for his service in caring for and treating military patients, in particular one patient suffering severe burns. As a medical officer, he quickly mastered the element of command while studying and applying the latest processes of hospital design, development and control. These efforts were rewarded with a posting to Melbourne to undertake two years of long-term schooling for postgraduate medical studies during 1963 and 1964.

In February 1965, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and posted as Commanding Officer of the 2nd Camp Hospital (later redesignated as the 2nd Military Hospital). Faced with the challenge of upgrading a small camp hospital, he designed programs to ensure that the medical establishment could properly care for military casualties. This situation soon occurred. In 1965, the new military hospital began to receive medical evacuees from the war in South Vietnam.
The following year, Watson was briefly attached to the 6th Task Force as the senior medical officer, and the Commanding Officer of the 8th Field Ambulance, for Exercise Barrawinga. By early 1968, he had been posted to South Vietnam with the task of commanding the 8th Field Ambulance, and then to develop the unit into a field hospital at Vung Tau—the logistic base of the 1st Australian Task Force in Nui Dat. This was a difficult assignment for Watson to undertake because the new field hospital was to be formed under wartime conditions and was to continue to receive battle casualties. Nonetheless, he was successful and on 1 April 1968, the 1st Australian Field Hospital became operational, with Watson as its Commanding Officer. Throughout this demanding period, Watson not only directed the organisation of the new hospital, but also actively worked as a surgeon when casualties arrived from the battlefield. Before he left Vietnam, Watson’s duties also included service in Saigon as senior medical officer of the Australian Forces in Vietnam.

On his return to Australia in 1970, Watson was appointed as staff officer, first to Major General Colin Gurner, Director General of Medical Services, and then to the Chairman of the Joint Services Medical Committee based in Canberra. In these positions, Watson was involved in hospital planning for all three services. The Army benefited with new health facilities being built at Canungra, Duntroon, Enoggera, Puckapunyal, Singleton and Kapooka. During this time Watson was also the Australian representative on the tri-nation planning team to establish the requirements for medical support for the Australian, New Zealand, United Kingdom (ANZUK) Force in Singapore.

In January 1971, Watson became Deputy Director of Medical Services and was promoted to the rank of colonel. However, later that year, when Australia became responsible for the newly created ANZUK Military Hospital in Singapore (formerly a Royal Air Force hospital at Changi), Watson was chosen to command the facility. On returning to Australia from Singapore in 1974, Colonel Watson was appointed Director of Medical Services—Army in the Directorate of Army Health Services. In September 1975, following the appointment of Major General Gurner as Joint Services Medical Advisor, Watson was promoted to brigadier and then to major general as Director General of Army Health Services and Chairman of the Services Health Policy Committee. He was appointed Honorary Physician to Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II, on 1 September 1976. In June 1980, Watson was appointed an Officer in the Military Division of the Order of Australia (AO) for his services as the Honorary Physician to the Queen and to the Army’s health services.
Following his retirement from the Army in January 1982, Major General Watson applied his unrivalled knowledge of hospital planning and organisation to the civilian sector. He assisted the New South Wales Government in hospital reviews and became a much-respected Medical Superintendent of Calvary Hospital in Canberra. When he retired from Calvary Hospital, he employed his vast knowledge and experience to the task of performing medical file reviews in the Directorate of Army Health Services at Campbell Park offices. As Doctor Watson he proved to be a source of wisdom to many young staff officers posted to Campbell Park who knocked on his door to ask for advice. Major General Watson was a man of great strength and wisdom who represented his country, the Australian Army, the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps and the profession of medicine with distinction.

Major General Digger James (Retd)
Colonel Ian J. Pennell (Retd)
Lieutenant Colonel Barry Morgan

Sir Arnold Wilson was a British political officer in the service of the Government of India during World War I. He published two volumes on his experiences in Mesopotamia between 1914 and 1920. The first volume covers military operations from 1914 to 1917, when the British captured Baghdad; the second, released in 1931, dealt with the problems of civil administration in the British Mandate of Mesopotamia, including a revolt that swept the country in 1920. The author of this review essay was idly perusing the shelves in the library of the Royal United Services Institution in Sydney when he came across these volumes, noting with interest that the two most recent borrowings of *Mesopotamia 1917–1920* had occurred in 1936 and 1981. Immediately, the question arose whether a perusal of Wilson’s

A violent rebellion, some might say a nationalist insurgency, occurred in Iraq in 1920. What relevance, if any, do the events of the past have to the present?
Mesopotamia 1917–1920 might yield anything of interest to the observer of the current events in Iraq. A violent rebellion, some might say a nationalist insurgency, occurred in Iraq in 1920. What relevance, if any, do the events of the past have to the present?

The musings set out in this essay are not intended as a conventional review of Mesopotamia 1917–1920. Instead, the author, reading the work from a contemporary rather than an historical viewpoint, found that four distinct themes emerged. The first of these themes was the unity between political and military aspects in the calculation and execution of British policy. This factor remained a constant despite disputes, errors and feuding between various personalities and government departments. The second theme was the importance of the regional and international context on events in Iraq during 1920. For example, within the region, Turkish intrigues in the north, Persian (Iranian) and Soviet influences, and the impact of actions in Syria all had some bearing on events in Iraq. On the international stage, British officers who had served in the Arab revolt and in Syria were able to sway policy during the negotiations of treaties and agreements, including Versailles, San Remo and Sèvres, and later at Lausanne. Third, in the light of contemporary events, is the recurrence of many place names that featured in the 1920 revolt: those of cities such as Baghdad, Nasiriya, Mosul and Karbalah. Finally, Wilson’s account provides ample evidence of the importance of experience, knowledge (including linguistic ability) and commitment by both the British civil servants and some military leaders to solving the problems that confronted them in Mesopotamia from 1917 to 1921.

In 1914–15, the British had anticipated that their military offensive against the Turks in Basra (and later Baghdad and Mosul) would lead to the withdrawal of the Ottoman authorities and produce a political power vacuum in the region. To deal with this likelihood, three senior and experienced political officers accompanied the British and Indian Forces sent to Mesopotamia: Sir Percy Cox, Sir Arnold Wilson and Gertrude Bell. As the senior member of this team, Cox was appointed, with admirable flexibility, an honorary Major General. Aged fifty in 1914, Cox initially accompanied the military force as Chief Political Officer. He later served as Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia (1916–18), Acting Minister in Tehran (1918–20) and High Commissioner to Iraq (1920–23). Cox had served in the Middle East since 1893. He had previously been a civil servant in India and was fluent in Arabic and Farsi.¹

Arnold Wilson was Cox’s deputy. Aged thirty in 1914, he had already served as a civil servant in Persia since 1909. Wilson had been the British representative on a commission surveying and settling the border between Persian and Turkish territory, finishing his work near Mount Ararat. When the war broke out in August 1914, he was forced to exit the region through Russia and returned to England via the Baltic before joining the Mesopotamian force in early 1915. Wilson was appointed
to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel for the performance of his political duties with the force. He was later awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for his reconnaissance under fire at Nasiriya in 1917. Wilson was Deputy Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia (1916–18) and Acting Civil Commissioner and Political Resident (1918–20), thus bearing the brunt of the Iraq rebellion. He was also a pilot and often visited his staff in remote parts of Mesopotamia by air. Wilson was proficient in Farsi, Arabic, French, Spanish and three Indian languages.  

The third influential member of the political staff of the Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia was Gertrude Bell, a lady of independent means. At the start of the war, the British needed civilians with knowledge of the Middle East, and Bell joined the Arab Bureau in Cairo in 1915. She served with military intelligence in Basra from March 1916, and joined Cox and Wilson as Oriental Secretary three months later. Bell had lived in Teheran and Jerusalem in the 1890s and published translations of Persian verse. She conducted major expeditions from Jerusalem to Asia Minor (1905–06), from Aleppo through Mesopotamia along the Euphrates Valley (1909) and into central Arabia in 1913–14. She spoke Persian and Arabic, was highly influential in the establishment of the Iraqi monarchy in 1921 and founded the national museum in Baghdad. 

The unity of purpose between the British military and political personnel is a persistent feature of Arnold Wilson’s memoir. Even when describing his unhappy relations with General Aylmer Haldane, the Commander of the Mesopotamian Force from 1920, it was clear that Wilson knew how a good military–political partnership could work from his experiences with General Marshall (November 1917 – May 1919) and General MacMunn (May 1919 – February 1920). For Wilson, the nature and quality of military actions had to be linked with the political factors, and the political staff had to comprehend the limitations and logistics of the military forces. This close interrelationship had impact at both the operational and tactical levels.

At the operational level, the relationship translated into how much of Iraq and the Near East the available military force could dominate. For example, could the military control just the former Turkish provinces of Basra and Baghdad, or was there adequate military power for operations in ‘Kurdistan’ and Persia? The answer to this question rested, in turn, on deliberations of high policy from the British Cabinet and the sometimes differing
policy ‘lines’ of the Foreign Secretary and the Secretaries of State for War, for India or for the Colonies.\(^6\) In balancing means with ends, there were a range of problems. The most immediate was the military problem of inflicting defeat on the Turks (including operations in Palestine and Syria) with the available forces. A second-order problem was the politico-military one of how to occupy and control the territory and population of the area once the Turks had vacated. This problem came with an additional query: was that occupation in line with eventual British wishes for territorial influence in the region?

At the tactical level, it was essential that military actions complemented political authority. Northern Iraq—noting that Iraq was not established until 1921—provided examples of both the negative and the benign. Kirkuk, then as now, was an ethnically divided city; both Kurds and Arabs sought control of the city. General Marshall was pressured by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) to take Kirkuk from the Turks in May 1918 in order to relieve Turkish pressure on Persian Azerbaijan. This move was part of broader British policy in Trans-Caucasia. Lack of forces, however, compelled Marshall to evacuate Kirkuk, and the Turks reoccupied the city seventeen days later. Wilson cited the moral effect of this ‘loss of face’ on the local population, together with Kurdish doubts as to Britain’s intentions in the former Mosul province, as directly leading to the problems that British forces faced from tribal rebellions in South Kurdistan in 1919.\(^7\) However, in the following year, professionally executed military operations (including punitive operations) in Kurdistan, along with some outstanding work by British local political officers, limited the impact of the 1920s troubles among the Kurds.\(^8\)

The unity of political and military aims was apparent in the Instructions sent in November 1917 by the CIGS to General Marshall. Quoted by Wilson, these instructions made it clear that the military commander was to operate in consultation with, and in certain areas on the advice of, the accompanying Chief Political Officer.\(^9\) None of this is to deny that there were quite serious policy differences between the political officers on the ground and London, Delhi or Cairo, and also between the different ministers and their supporting department of state. In addition, faced with diminishing forces, British policy evolved in response to events. These events included the turmoil caused in the Middle East by the Turkish defeat, the influence of the Versailles settlement in the region and pressure from American President Woodrow Wilson—all of which resulted in a putative diplomatic settlement with the Turks at Sèvres.\(^10\) Despite these factors, throughout Wilson’s account, the unity of political and military actions, and the firm interrelationships between military commanders and ‘the politicals’ are a continuous feature of the narrative.

Against this background, the causes of the rebellion—or perhaps the insurgency—of 1920 were manifold. However, above all they reflected the power vacuum created by the military defeat of the Turks. Other influences were local manifestations of the
The British and the Making of Modern Iraq

recasting of the international order or the grievances and muscle-flexing of various ethnic, religious and political stakeholders. These stakeholders included Arab nationalists (mainly Sunni officers with Syrian experience who had served with Faisal in the Arab Revolt in 1916–18); the adverse influence of Shi’a divines and leaders, with strong links to Persia, who were opposed to secular government; and the Kurdish tribes, whose instability Wilson believed was due to the influence and intrigues of Turkish agents. Combined with all these local factors was the perception of British weakness following the San Remo announcement of a mandate and delays in revealing what British policy for the region would be. Arab perceptions were that ‘mandate’ meant British sovereignty and sparked a brief commingling of Shi’a and Sunni interests and cooperation prior to Ramadan in May 1920.11

For Wilson the troubles of 1917–20 really were two rebellions, not one. In the first, a series of incidents and revolts in South Kurdistan occurred between January and December 1919 in the vicinities of Sulimani, Zakho, Amadiya and Aqra, which included the killing of British officers and officials. In part, this instability was caused by expectations of autonomy or independence by the Kurdish tribes, as well as the vacuum left by the Turkish withdrawal and a failed experiment in indirect rule. The situation was stabilised by a brigade-sized force that combined punitive operations with the withdrawal of political officers from the mountainous northern sector, back to a line near Aqra-Dohuk.12

More seriously, the revolt in the Mesopotamian plains had its roots in the city of Najaf. The instability developed from 1917 and was spread along the pilgrim routes from Persia into the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, and from Syria (Dair-ez-Zor) into Najaf and generally down the Euphrates. Wilson noted the role of secret societies (nationalists) of Mesopotamian officers, formerly of the Ottoman army.13 In 1920 Wilson saw the centres of Sunni agitation as being Baghdad and Mosul proper, while the predominant Shi’a disturbance had its roots in regional areas of the old Turkish province of Baghdad. Substantial amounts of money flowed into Mesopotamian tribal and nationalist movements from Sharifian officials and officers in Syria. Ironically, the original source of these funds was the subsidy paid by the British to the Arabs who fought against the Turks in World War I. In late July 1920, when the French occupied Syria and deposed King Faisal this source of funding ended.14 In addition, Wilson believed that £7000 worth of gold from Turkish sources reached Karbala in May–June 1920.15
British punitive actions were severe. When a number of British officers and men were killed in an ambush at Tal’Afar in early June 1920, the British sent a column from Mosul. The column laid waste the harvest between the two localities, destroyed the suspects’ houses ‘chased the entire population of Tal’Afar, innocent and guilty alike, into the desert.’\(^\text{16}\) (Since 2004 Tal’Afar has been the location of the Australian Army training team in Iraq). In hindsight, the rebellion had roughly four phases. The first was the build-up phase from January to May 1920, in which urgings of jihad and influences from Syria and Persia reaching Mesopotamian centres resulted in a few acts of violence. During this period, Wilson believed that the decision was made to take violent action against the British civil administration. From May 1920 there were mass-meetings in Baghdad, taking place in turn at Sunni and Shi’a mosques, creating a dangerous and unusual confluence of interests.\(^\text{17}\)

In the second phase of the rebellion, from June to July 1920, a series of armed attacks occurred in areas as far afield as Tal’Afar (4 June), and Baghdad and Najaf (in the last week of June). British outposts were besieged in July, at Kufa near Najaf (20 July – 17 October) and at Samawa on the lower Euphrates (4 July to the end of August 1920). Also in July, Hilla, Kifl and Rumaitha—all south of Baghdad on the Euphrates—were major problem areas. In the same month, when a major British column advanced south from Hilla to attempt to relieve Diwaniya and Rumaitha, the enterprise ended in disaster near Kifl and the column was forced to retreat. By late July rebels controlled much of the mid-Euphrates region. In the third phase, during August 1920, the rebellion spread to the west and north-east of Baghdad, to Fallujah, Ramadi, Baquba and Shahraban.\(^\text{18}\) From late August to September 1920 there were incidents, killings and sieges in the north, at Kifri, Arbil and Aqra. By October 1920 British forces had regained control, but they had used harsh measures, including air attacks and punitive expeditions to burn villages and impose heavy fines.\(^\text{19}\)

Wilson paid tribute to the soldiers of the Indian Army, mainly Muslim, who made up the bulk of the British forces. He also acknowledged the loyalty of the local Arab police and levies. These forces, trained and officered by the British, had remained loyal to their commanders. Certainly that loyalty had been severely tested as, The Islamic rites of burial were refused to those who had died in the service of the Civil Administration; the wives of those who remained loyal to us were in some cases compelled to return to their fathers’ tents, in other cases publicly violated, and their children cruelly beaten in the streets.\(^\text{20}\)
Casualties in the rebellion amounted to about 6000 Iraqi and 500 British (British and Indian) dead. In March 1920 the British forces comprised 133,000 men, of whom 47,000 were combatants. Much of the force was in Persia or protecting lines of communication to Persia, and only about 34,000 were available for duty in Mesopotamia.\(^{21}\)

Wilson believed that a range of external and internal actors influenced the agitation and rebellion from 1917 to 1920. The principal ‘external players’ were Turkey, Syria and Persia. Wilson’s comments on Persia and the Shi’a religious leaders have contemporary echoes:

The Shi’a priesthood of Karbala and Najaf were bound to Persia by the closest ties of religion and financial interest and, in many cases, of race; they were in intimate touch with their colleagues in every important town in Persia, and their religious bigotry was informed by a measure of rugged patriotism … The uprising amongst the Shi’a tribes of the Middle Euphrates in 1920 was fostered by and owed its success primarily to the intervention of the ulama, who in their turn were influenced to some extent by British policy in Persia, though mainly by a desire to prevent the establishment in Iraq of any form of Government strong enough to be able to ignore them.\(^{22}\)

Of the internal players, Wilson also remarked on the attitudes of some tribal chiefs:

The disturbances of 1920 were essentially a clash of loyalties — loyalty to the behests of religious leaders and Shaikhs, themselves little respected and often openly despised, [and] loyalty to racial ties and to oaths reluctantly made.\(^{23}\)

The historian Charles Tripp specifically noted:

The spread of the revolt was largely determined by the view taken by local leaders about the ways in which British rule might affect their own situation. Thus, the tribal sheikhs of the regions of Kut and Amara not only refused to join the revolt, but also worked against it.\(^{24}\)

Wilson tended to stress both external and internal factors, including the delays in articulating British policy. Many commentators are highly critical of Wilson for the Indianisation of the civil service, noting that he favoured direct rule, which had been used in much of British India. He was reluctant to adapt to the realities of the post-Versailles reordering of international affairs that were forcing the British to move towards a model of indirect control or influence.\(^{25}\) The move towards a policy of indirect control occurred when Faisal became King of Iraq in August 1921. Military operations only take one so far, and as Lord Ashdown has noted in a contemporary context, there must be ‘a political destination’.\(^{26}\)
The last major theme in Wilson’s account was the dedication, experience and knowledge (including linguistic ability) of the British civil servants and some military leaders in Mesopotamia from 1917 to 1921. Of the political officers, Wilson mentioned Major E. B. Soane, who went into Khaniquin in 1918, well north-east of Baghdad on the Persian border. Wilson describes Soane as:

a scholar, with a first-rate knowledge both of Persian and Kurdish languages and dialects, with a profound understanding of the mentality of the peoples amongst whom he had lived and worked for many years before the war. He professedly embraced the Shia’ [sic] faith in 1905, having first equipped himself so thoroughly with a knowledge of the details of religious observances and doctrinal tenets of the Shia’ schism … Kurds served him with a loyalty that they scarcely ever vouchfaced to their leaders: their leaders obeyed him because they feared as well as admired him, and because only by obedience could they hope to continue to exercise authority over their countrymen, and of all motives the desire for power is, amongst unsophisticated communities, the most powerful.\(^{27}\)

Another political officer of a similar stamp was Lieutenant Colonel Leachman, of whom Wilson wrote:

In dealing with Arabs, particularly with nomad tribes, Leachman had qualifications unrivalled in Mesopotamia and not excelled by any British officer in all Arabia … His personal courage, his mobility, and his intimate knowledge of the people with whom he dealt, had made his name a household word amongst Arabs, and children named after him were to be found in every tribe on the Tigris. His death [near Fallujah on 12 August 1920] was the signal for a series of outbreaks on the Euphrates between Fallujah and Hit.\(^{28}\)

There were many other remarkable examples of the extraordinary character and ability of political officers, including Captains Hay and Littledale at Arbil with some local levies, who held out against the rebels for over a month, from 12 August until relieved on 14 September 1920. Wilson’s narrative conveys the enormous determination of the political officers to relate to the various inhabitants, and despite the influx of officers from India, a willingness to learn the languages and engage with their troops and local levies or those for whom they were responsible. By 1917 Wilson had served in Persia and Mesopotamia for ten years. Cox had been in the region for thirteen years in the rank of Political Resident

Men such as Cox and Wilson, who had commenced their service in the Indian Army, were compelled as subalterns to learn the dialects of their regiments, and there was a ready acceptance of the need for fluency in the local languages.
or higher, while Soane had fifteen years’ experience in Persia and the region. Men such as Cox and Wilson, who had commenced their service in the Indian Army, were compelled as subalterns to learn the dialects of their regiments, and there was a ready acceptance of the need for fluency in the local languages. Wilson recounts that, during the Mesopotamian campaign, on hearing a familiar tone, he rushed out of his tent to discover and converse excitedly with soldiers from the 32nd Sikh Pioneers—his original regiment.

Sir Arnold Wilson has been criticised on many counts, especially for his handling of the rebellion and his preference for direct rule in Iraq. He ceased his duties as Acting Civil Commissioner in October 1920. Sir Percy Cox resumed the role of Civil Commissioner in Teheran, and with Gertrude Bell ‘created’ the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq. However, Wilson’s connection with Iraq did not end in 1920. Before being elected to the House of Commons as a member for a constituency in Hertfordshire, he was resident director in Persia (1921–26) of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later known as British Petroleum or BP). He also worked for the company on his return to the United Kingdom. With the outbreak of World War II, at age fifty-five, he was unwilling to remain sedentary while others served. In 1939, though still a Member of Parliament, Wilson volunteered for the Royal Air Force. While serving as gunner the following year, he was killed when his aircraft was shot down in May behind German lines.

Military commanders and their staffs working at the campaign level must seek to comprehend the political or strategic objectives and aim to achieve military conditions that satisfy those objectives. Yet the vicissitudes of politics, the turn of events and the chance inherent in military operations can conspire to create a very fluid environment for the formulation and administration of policy. The initial intentions of the British in Mesopotamia in 1914 may have been pre-emptive. There was certainly the need to impress the Arab chiefs in the Gulf and secure Abadan and Basra as important points in the lines of communication infrastructure between India and Suez. As the war progressed, policy remained fluid as the Allied Powers considered the consequences of Turkish defeat and the power vacuum that it would cause in the region.

The events in Mesopotamia between 1917 and 1920 have been described by one writer as ‘Inventing Iraq’. Certainly, it is a fascinating case study of military operations within a highly complex political and ethnic scenario, where the defeat of one entity—the Turks—created a myriad of complexities for British political officers

The reader of Mesopotamia 1917–1920 does, however, become aware of the fractured and complex society that became Iraq.
such as Wilson and Cox to deal with. The contemporary situation in Iraq is not the same as that in 1920—each is of its own time. The reader of Mesopotamia 1917–1920 does, however, become aware of the fractured and complex society that became Iraq. The tribal and religious intricacy, and the removal of Turkish administrative structures and Turkish-supported Sunni officials, created a legacy that has many enduring features.

Wilson’s account of events in Iraq is personal and somewhat idiosyncratic, but it does reward the reader with some important historical context about Iraq. For this reviewer, the unity of purpose between the British civil and military officers was a significant factor in determining the fate of British policy in Iraq. So too were the political, cultural and religious influences from Turkey, Syria and Persia. Wilson’s recounting of the religious themes and hotspots of the 1920 rebellion—Najaf, Tikrit, Karbala, Fallujah among them—also has much contemporary resonance. Tikrit, for example, is described by Wilson as ‘a town which, though the birthplace of Saladin, had gained an evil reputation throughout the centuries as the home of brutal and boorish folk …’

Finally, whatever verdicts historians may pass on the events of 1917–1920, it is unmistakable that the achievements of the British rested on a small number of political officers, such as Wilson, Cox, Bell and others. These were people with enormous administrative talents and linguistic skills who committed their lives to an imperial ideal. Of course, it is impossible to draw conclusions about the fate of modern Iraq and the American-backed Iraqi Government from the events of 1920. However, as British intellectual and commentator, Malcolm Muggeridge, once observed, ‘History, like wood, has a grain in it which determines how it splits.’
ENDNOTES

5 For example, ibid., pp. 27–8, 43–4, 311–2.
6 Some examples are at ibid., pp. 260–1, 264. In particular there were disagreements between the Foreign Office (Curzon) and the India Office (Montagu), and on the ground in 1920 between Wilson (India Office) and General Haldane (War Office).
7 Ibid., pp. 8–9, 86–8, 127.
8 Ibid., pp. 154–5, 290–1.
9 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
13 Ibid., pp. 251–2, 310–12.
14 Ibid., pp. 146, 151, 153.
16 Ibid., pp. 259–60, 266.
17 Ibid., p. 310.
20 Ibid., p. 298.
21 Ibid., p. 271; Tripp, op. cit., p. 44.
22 Ibid., p. 34.
23 Ibid., p. 71.
24 Tripp, op. cit., p. 44.

27 Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–3.


30 Dodge, *op. cit.*

31 Wilson, *ibid.*, p. 274.


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In the Old Testament Book of Joshua, it is recorded that, when the Israelites took Jericho, ‘they utterly destroyed all in the city, both men and women, young and old, oxen, sheep, and asses, with the edge of the sword’. This passage is a chilling reminder that human history has frequently witnessed war for, and in, cities—from the sack of Carthage in the Third Punic War through the savage destruction of Magdeburg in the Thirty Years War to the bloody siege of Stalingrad in World War II. Because cities symbolise human progress in architecture, artistic culture and social organisation, their descent into the violence and chaos of armed conflict strikes a deep chord in the popular imagination. Over the past century, the power of cinema has increased our imaginings of the horror of urban warfare. Films such as Gillo Pontecovo’s *The Battle of Algiers* (1966), Joseph Vilsmaier’s *Stalingrad* (1992) and Ridley Scott’s *Black Hawk Down* (2001), portray, in often harrowing detail, the deadly world of urban battle.

… Mark Huband described Mogadishu in the early 1990s as ‘the land of Blade Runner, the city of Robocop’ …
More recently, fictional portrayals on screen have been supplemented by graphic television footage of street fighting in such cities as Mogadishu, Grozny, Vukovar, Jenin and Nablus. The veteran British journalist Mark Huband described Mogadishu in the early 1990s as ‘the land of Blade Runner, the city of Robocop’—a city wracked by crime, drug dealing and camouflaged battlewagons, night vision and missiles. Like no other combat environment, cities merge pre-modern, modern and post-modern forms of armed conflict. They are a metaphor for our times.

In the 21st century, the frequency and intensity of urban military operations are likely to increase. It is a sobering fact that, at the beginning of the new millennium, half of the world’s population lives in urban areas. Moreover, by 2015 the global population is expected to be 7.2 billion—an increase of 1.1 billion since 2000—and almost all of this demographic growth will be in cities of the developing world. In the Asia-Pacific in 1970, there were only eight cities with populations of over five million. By 2003 there were thirty such cities. Asian mega-cities now include Calcutta, Jakarta and Karachi, each of which has more than ten million inhabitants. Beijing, meanwhile, has fifteen million inhabitants; Shanghai, over twenty million; and Tokyo, thirty million. Increasingly, cities are linked to the kind of demographic pressures that produce insurgency, criminal warlords, terrorism and persistent low-level warfare.

Given these realities, there is a strong likelihood that war in cities will become commonplace in the future, and it is this premise that underlies Alice Hills’ timely and impressive study of urban military operations. Hills (who will be a guest speaker at the Chief of Army’s Conference in September 2005) notes that, of all forms of contemporary warfare, urban operations have changed the least over the past half century. Furthermore, urban operations challenge contemporary theories of war built around the notion of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), with its vision of information systems and long-range precision munitions, robotics and a digitised battlespace. Indeed, the current gap between military theory and military reality was graphically demonstrated by the battle for Fallujah in November 2004. In Fallujah, 6000 American soldiers and marines undertook Operation al-Fajr against Iraqi insurgents and foreign mujahadeen. In the fighting that followed, RMA-style technology was of limited value, and the struggle for Fallujah became a test of basic military skills in combined arms, close combat and infantry training. American forces took the city but suffered fifty-one killed and 425 wounded in
the process—an 8 per cent casualty rate—while about 1200 insurgents were killed. The battle of Fallujah was a far cry from the 1990s with its fashionable military theories of casualty-free warfare by stand-off strike and air power. The battle was a reminder that the confined space of cities with their high-density wires and omnipresent fire from infra-red man-portable missiles and small arms often nullify advanced technology, especially air power.

From Grozny through Mogadishu to Fallujah the most powerful insurgent weapon remains the thirty-year old rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). The RPG is the poor man’s cruise missile and, when combined with the use of machine guns, mortars and low-cost commercial technological devices such as cellular phones and scanners, provides a bargain basement, lethal weapons system for urban insurgents. In her book Hills argues that, if Western militaries wish to succeed in urban warfare, they must develop a more operational–strategic approach to the subject—one that seeks to recognise the human environment of cities and its critical interaction with armies. Urban operations require combined arms warfare and the grouping of armoured infantry at lower tactical levels in order to provide direct-fire support rather than traditional open-terrain manoeuvre. Engineers and logisticians are essential, and armour, flamethrowers and mortars are usually more useful weapons than jet fighters and attack helicopters. In recent urban warfare, both the Israeli Defence Force and the Russian military have tended to avoid the use of helicopter gunships due to their vulnerability to small arms fire. Hills quotes one Israeli Defence Force officer as stating:

A tank is always better, more accurate and far more effective [in urban operations]… Basically a helicopter is good as long as it’s moving. [Use it for] rapid insertion, hunting down groups of gunmen, [and] some light fire support. If they start hovering around the same place for too long, they become targets.

In the immediate future, a new land–air dynamic based on precision firepower and sensor technology for urban operations is unlikely to emerge. On current trends, advanced technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and smart missiles are most likely to enhance fighting on the ground. Fighting in cities remains a form of warfare that is often pre-modern in its physical and psychological intensity.
warfare that is often pre-modern in its physical and psychological intensity. Writing in the immediate aftermath of Operation *Iraqi Freedom* and before the outbreak of the urban insurgency in Iraq, Hills warns:

The West’s experience in the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq is misleading because it detracts from the fact that urban war is probably the single most difficult form of warfare it can encounter. It remains a brutal and exhausting matter involving significant collateral damage (that is to personnel or property not forming part of an authorised target) and casualties, and is the closest the West comes to pre-industrial forms of conflict. The traditional core capability of aggressive close combat—the Hunter-Killer philosophy of ‘What I find, I can kill’—remains essential for successful operations.

Hills believes that the West has yet to realistically assess the conditions under which it might have to fight sustained urban operations against an intelligent and well-organised enemy. The most valuable theme of her study concerns the West’s need to place urban operations in a proper analytical context and to use interdisciplinary research from military history, security studies, development studies and disaster studies to complement doctrine and to shape new operational concepts. A new paradigm is necessary because, when deploying into cities, Western militaries need to place a premium on managing complex transitional operations—that is, operations involving movements from one phase to another in which there are rapid changes in mission, situation, task organisation and command-and-control arrangements.

Australian readers will find Hills’ discussion of urban operations in Somalia in the early 1990s interesting. She compares the relatively heavy-handed use of force by the Americans in Mogadishu with the more subtle methods used by the Australians in Baidoa—methods that emphasised patrolling, disarmament of militia fighters and the role of civil affairs. She notes: ‘the Australians, recognising that Somalia was a heavily armed state, used measured force to restrain local warlords, but they also employed a coherent strategy to deal with the humanitarian and socio-political symptoms of violence’. American military forces generally failed in all of these areas.

The book points out that, in urban warfare, tactical knowledge must be accompanied by attempts to develop strategic coherence. Cities have their own strategic grammar and act ‘as multidimensional magnifying glasses in terms of complexity, 

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*… the West has yet to realistically assess the conditions under which it might have to fight sustained urban operations against an intelligent and well-organised enemy.*
and the speed and scale of [operational] change. Hills points to the importance of the Russian military’s three battles for Grozny in 1994, 1995–96 and in 2000 as an urban warfare laboratory for Western armies. The savagery of the fighting between Russian troops and the Chechen rebels created an almost lunar wasteland. In 2000, the French photojournalist, Eric Bouret, was moved to write: ‘when I entered Grozny, it was as if I was hit by an apocalyptic vision. In 20 years of covering wars I never had the occasion to feel like an astronaut landing on another planet’. In the Russian operations of the mid-1990s, the sheer scale of Grozny swallowed up nearly 50,000 troops, 230 tanks, 454 armoured vehicles and 388 artillery pieces.

In short, in Grozny, ideas of surgical warfare were proven to be a fantasy. Urban war is the realm of elemental firepower, including phosphorus bombs, flechettes, flame-throwers, and cluster bombs and, more recently, thermobaric weapons. The Russians confronted determined Chechen fighters who used snipers and who were armed with RPGs, heavy machine-guns and mortars. Russian troops progressed through the rubble-strewn streets often by blowing up entire buildings using self-propelled guns and anti-aircraft weapons. Armoured forces also proved critical. As Hills observes:

[In urban operations] armour will probably continue to play a significant role in the coming years, especially when special assault teams are used; it can successfully breach concrete and steel structures for infantry when forming part of a combined arms team. Indeed, it was a key technology in Iraq (and Jenin) because it provided protection and survivability against sniper and machine-gun fire.

However, there is an important caveat: armour cannot be deployed as a lone iron fist; it must be encased in the mail glove of strong dismounted infantry support. In 1994, in Grozny, unaccompanied armoured assaults suffered up to 70 per cent losses of vehicles and in later operations the Russians rediscovered the necessity for combined arms teams of armour, infantry and engineers. Recent operations in Jenin and Ramallah also confirm the necessity for armour to be employed in conjunction with other arms, especially infantry, in order to combat nests of well-armed insurgent fighters.

Because urban warfare is often pre-modern in its character, it forces liberal democracies to confront their own value systems. The moral challenge of engaging in a form of war that may lead to the death of non-combatants and the destruction of vital infrastructure is compounded by the West’s lack of a theoretical strategic framework for operating in cities. The best work on urban warfare in the West has ... in urban warfare, tactical knowledge must be accompanied by attempts to develop strategic coherence.
been completed by the US Marine Corps, who in the late 1990s under General Charles C. Krulak began a serious program of preparation for ‘three block’ fighting in cities. However, for all their achievements at the tactical and operational levels of war, the Marines have yet to develop a strategic framework for their theories of armed urban conflict.

Indeed, one of the most important lessons flowing from urban operations—whether these involve the British in Northern Ireland, the Russians in Grozny, the Israelis in Gaza or the Americans in the Sunni Triangle—is that successful tactics or techniques do not necessarily translate to successful strategic policy. This situation is a major military weakness, and Hills speculates that, ‘just as the Cold War placed security studies at the centre of the intellectual and political challenges confronting the West, so urbanisation may result in urban operations shaping many of the critical security issues of the twenty-first century’. If she is right, then much work remains to be done by Western militaries if they are to avoid more Mogadishus and Groznys. A major stumbling block is that intellectually soldiers often view urban warfare as a subject that belongs to military history rather than to contemporary security studies. The vision is of Stalingrad, Berlin and Hue.

As a result, there is no coherent strategic theory of urban war, and the military implications of rapid urbanisation have no place in current strategic studies programs. This is a situation that security analysts and operational planners must urgently address. Urban operations require geopolitical insight and an analysis of disciplines that traditionally have lain outside the field of defence and strategic studies. These disciplines include urban studies, disaster management, law enforcement and policing, architecture, anthropology, sociology and geography. Hills argues that the strategic challenges of urban operations must involve military professionals and security practitioners in developing knowledge of the technical–social factors underpinning urban infrastructure and the human geography of cities.

Military studies of disaster management might, for instance, yield important insights into how cities can be managed in times of crisis. In addition, an understanding of the process of how inter-agency responsibilities...
overlap in urban operations between the military, political leaders and civilian organisations might assist armies to rebalance their tactics, operations and strategy. As Hills puts it, urbanisation represents a ‘critical interactive context for operations’. She suggests that, just as open terrain warfare has given the military art concepts such as tempo, so closed terrain warfare embraces the concept of density. In urban warfare, density is omnipresent in terms of buildings, city blocks, streets and the presence of vehicles. Other factors—such as civilians, continuous noise and vibration—add another layer of complexity. The cumulative density of an urban environment magnifies the character of operations and can create sensory and capability overload among soldiers. Troops face limitations in using precision missiles while back-blast effects from using high-powered munitions—such as shoulder-launched, single-shot, disposable thermobaric weapons in confined spaces—deafen and disorientate their users. ‘Density,’ notes Hills, ‘like the linked notions of tempo and fragmentation, thus represents a way of understanding the dynamics of [urban] operations’.

Ideally, Western armies are better off bypassing cities and avoiding urban warfare. Unfortunately, that solution may not be possible in the future because it is into cities that many enemies may deploy. Cities represent one of the classic realms of asymmetric warfare since their complex environments and teeming human geography negate many military technological advantages. The urban labyrinth confronts modern armies with a deadly array of snipers, suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices including car bombs. Man-portable missile and RPG teams, inflammable shanties, child soldiers, ambush alleys and booby-trapped apartment complexes add to the continuous and multiple levels of stress that the soldier must face in an urban town or city. Rock music from ghetto blasters and automatic fire from Kalashnikov assault rifles coexist while insurgents, bandits, warlords, narcotics dealers and drug runners may form a shadow regime that controls the streets through noncombatant collaborators and an informal criminal economy.

In 1961, the scholar, Bernard Fall, published his famous book on rural insurgency in Indo-China entitled *The Street Without Joy*. Fall’s study took its title from the infamous coastal highway that French soldiers dreaded travelling because of the frequency of Viet Minh ambushes. Ironically in 1967, while on patrol with US Marines along the same highway, Fall himself was killed by a Viet Cong landmine. Over forty years later, Western soldiers are now confronted by the rise of urban insurgency and, with it, the prospect of cities without joy. As the ancient Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, warned in his classic treatise, *The Art of War*, ‘the worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative.’
Yet one cannot always choose the wars one would like to fight. As a result, in the future, Western armies may have no alternative but to prepare for multidimensional operations against enemies that exploit complex urban terrain. In seeking to tame urban labyrinths of the developing world, the West’s liberal value system is unlikely to embrace the use of maximum force. There can be no Jericho solution involving the ‘edge of the sword’ against combatant and noncombatant. Instead, Western soldiers will be called on to practise strategic restraint, tactical judgment and the discriminate use of force under harrowing operational conditions. Hills’ book reminds us of the complexities and menaces of fighting in cities. It is an important contribution to our knowledge of how we can improve our understanding of a neglected field of warfare and should be required reading for all military professionals.

ENDNOTES


THE AUTHOR

Dr Michael Evans is Editor of the Australian Army Journal.
BOOK REVIEW


Reviewed by Captain Lachlan Mead, Headquarters 1 Brigade, Robertson Barracks

In 1975 Paul Fussell opened what might be described as a new front in military studies with the publication of *The Great War and Modern Memory*. The book turned away from approaching World War I as a collection of grand campaigns directed by great generals, or as a clash of economies turning on production statistics. Instead, it focused on how the war was represented, understood and remembered by those who experienced it first-hand. By moving from Whitehall and General Headquarters to the trenches themselves, Fussell, a Professor of English Literature, stepped adroitly between disparate academic realms, presaging academe’s current interest in ‘interdisciplinarity’ and ‘cultural studies’ by quite some years. Many scholars subsequently followed Fussell’s lead, and any serious reading list on the Great War will include works with a Fussellian spirit, such as Modris Eckstein’s *Rites of Spring*, Jay Winter’s *Sites of Memory, Sites of Meaning* or Eric Leed’s *No Man’s Land: Combat and Identity in World War I*. Unsurprisingly, Australian academics have also adopted similar approaches to studying the experience of Australians in the Great War. Notable in this regard has been Bill Gammage’s *The Broken Years*, Peter Cochrane’s *Simpson and the Donkey* and Alistair Thompson’s *Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend*. Graham Seal’s *Inventing Anzac: The Digger and National Mythology* is the most recent addition to this distinguished genealogy.

In this book, Seal argues that the myths and legends associated with the ANZAC tradition constitute the single most important component of Australian identity and traces the processes by which they were established during World War I and taken up, modified and deployed by succeeding generations. Central to Seal’s interpretation of the ANZAC tradition is the idea that it is made up of two apparently antagonistic strands. The first might be loosely described as the ‘popular’ or ‘digger’ tradition of ANZAC. From an analysis of demotic sources such as trench
newspapers and soldiers’ ‘yarns’ and songs, Seal argues that a strong sense of ‘digger’ character and identity emerged between 1914 and 1918 that bound the members of the AIF together. Seal sees ‘diggererness’ as involving a mix of what are, by today’s standards, a number of commendable and not-so-commendable qualities: laconic stoicism, mateship, black humour, egalitarianism, hostility to class, gender and ethnic outsiders (British officers and ‘gyppos’ being favourite targets for abuse), and larrikinism.

The second strand might be described as the ‘high’ or ‘official’ tradition of ANZAC. Seal examines more formal literary and historical sources and sees the development of an alternative, sanitised vision of the Australian soldier as athletic, courageous, patriotic and loyal to the Empire; this vision, of course, served the interests of the state. The ceremonies and practices associated with Anzac Day successfully fuse both these strands of ANZAC, with some elements, such as the Dawn Service, stressing the state-centred official version of ANZAC and others, such as two-up, celebrating the more relaxed and appealing digger tradition. For Seal it is the synergy between the formal and informal aspects of ANZAC that accounts for its enduring success and central role in Australian culture. It might be said that, in making these arguments, Seal traverses ground already fragmentarily covered in different areas by other scholars. Where Seal differs from them, however, is in the ambition and scope of his work. Seal offers an account of ANZAC that has its roots in the nationalism of the 1890s and extends through to the rededication of Anzac Cottage in suburban Perth as a war memorial in 1996. Along the way he integrates a variety of subjects into his narrative, such as the connection between C. E. W. Bean’s writings and the emergence of the ANZAC myth or the folkloric aspects of soldiers’ yarns, often treated in other scholarship, if at all, in isolation only.

Understandably, a sizeable portion of the book is concerned with the emergence of the ANZAC myth during World War I and its consolidation as tradition in the postwar years. However, the material devoted to the reiteration of ANZAC during World War II is much less substantial, and that to its further reiteration during the Vietnam War much less substantial still. One of Seal’s more interesting arguments is that the ANZAC tradition was refashioned over time in order to meet the needs of new generations of Australians. To illustrate this point, he shows how camp songs and ditties frequently carried over from one war to the next remain intact in most cases, or with the words somewhat altered (for example, ‘Bye, Bye Buna’, popular during World War II, became ‘Bye, Bye Pucka’ for the diggers of the 1960s). Unfortunately, the paucity of material on the more recent manifestations of ANZAC, particularly the contemporary resurgence of its popularity among the young flag-draped pilgrims to Gallipoli, prevents Seal from exploring this idea as fully as it deserves to be.
Inventing Anzac is written crisply, and Seal avoids the trap of over-academising his prose. While he uses terms such as *myth*, *tradition* and *legend* in carefully particularised and informed ways, he never resorts to the type of ‘cultural-studies speak’ that renders much contemporary humanities scholarship impenetrable to all but those initiated in the most esoteric rites of modern theory. Furthermore, the author avoids, for the most part, the plodding, dogged meticulousness so necessary for a dissertation, but Mogadon in any writing aiming at a more general readership (a section tediously applying Alessandro Falassi’s theory of the festival to Anzac Day notwithstanding). On the contrary, Seal’s focus on digger folklore, yarns and songs punctuates the book with interesting and amusing detail that carries the reader along. For example, he enters the debate concerning the origin of the term ‘digger’ and recounts anecdotes such as the Australian soldier in Britain who, when asked how often he had leave back home, replied, ‘Once every war—at the end of it’.

With this book, Seal has effectively accomplished a rarity in contemporary scholarly writing: an academic work of cultural history that wears its theory lightly, and is both of interest and accessible to the general public. If the later chapters on the more recent manifestations of ANZAC are a little light on, then Seal has only done a service to other scholars by leaving room for the present-day relationship between Australian military culture and Australian society at large to be considered in greater detail.
BOOK REVIEW

TWO PERSPECTIVES ON A TROUBLED FUTURE


Reviewed by Russell Parkin, Senior Research Fellow at the Land Warfare Studies Centre and co-editor of the AAJ

In his essay *An Agenda for the 21st Century* (1987), the leading Mexican writer Carlos Fuentes wrote that ‘High on the agenda for the 21st century will be the need to restore some kind of tragic consciousness’. After the horrendous wars and other man-made calamities of the 20th century, Fuentes believed that there was a serious requirement to regain a perspective on the tragedies of recent history in order that they might be understood on a human scale. The works reviewed below are attempts by two distinguished scholars to provide readers with differing perspectives on the use of military intervention as a means of curbing the violence and instability that have scarred the early years of the new millennium.

Michael Ignatieff is a Canadian scholar who is currently the Carr Professor of Human Rights Practice at Harvard University. *Empire Lite* is his observation of American military interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Ignatieff believes that these interventions represent the emergence of a US global empire that is both imperial and humanitarian, hence the term ‘empire lite’. This humanitarian empire is defined as ‘… the new face of an old figure: the democratic free world, the Christian West. It is held together by common elements of rhetoric and self-belief… The idea if not the practice of democracy: the idea if not the practice of human rights; the idea if not the practice of equality before the law’. 
Drawing on his personal experience as a journalist in several war zones, Ignatieff puts forward the case for unilateral US military intervention in failed states. He believes that the use of military power for this purpose is the only means by which nations such as Afghanistan can be saved from a continuous cycle of violence and instability. The chapters in the book represent an attempt to spur readers to think about the issues that he raises by putting them on a human scale, just as Fuentes insisted. The narrative permits understanding of both the depth and scale of the problems involved by showing the experience of individuals against the broad sweep of geopolitics. Ignatieff is able to demonstrate convincingly the relationship between the fragile peace created by American military power and the ability of humanitarian agencies to begin rebuilding shattered nations.

Scholars on the left have criticised Ignatieff for his staunch defence of American unilateralism. However, he would counter such assessments by saying, as he does in Empire Lite, ‘for every nationalist struggle that succeeds in giving its people self-determination and dignity, there are more that only deliver their people up to a self-immolating slaughter, terror, enforced partition and failure.’ There is also a hard edge of realism to this perspective. In Ignatieff’s own words, ‘the ostensible motive that sustains these nation-building projects [Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq] may be humanitarian, but the real principle is imperial: the maintenance of order over barbarian threat’.

Gabriel Kolko is the Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus at York University in Toronto. He has written ten books dealing with subjects ranging from World War II and international politics to the Vietnam War. His latest work, Another Century of War?, reprises both the title and some of the major themes of his celebrated 1994 work, A Century of War. The 1994 book dealt with the conflicts of the 20th century in the period after 1914. The final section of this work was entitled The United States, Politics and Warfare in a Complex World, 1946–1991: The Limits of Power. In Another Century of War?, Kolko begins with the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 in a chapter he called ‘The War Comes Home’. Kolko believes that most American foreign-policy initiatives amount to meddling in the affairs of other nations and that this interference has caused more problems in the world than it has solved. American meddling in the world is now even more dangerous than in the past because, as he notes in his preface to Another Century of War?, ‘The world has become far more complex, and much more unstable politically. The Cold War is over, but the dangers and reality of wars are ever present. There are, especially, more civil wars. Weapons of every sort are more destructive and also more widely distributed’.

The central hypothesis of Kolko’s book is that the complex problems of the world require political, economic and social remedies, not military solutions. He points out that US military interventions in the past have rarely brought peace. As a result of
the current series of American military operations, Kolko says, ‘… we now live in an era of growing insecurity that will probably see more trauma like [11 September] …’. He believes that the roots of terrorism lie in America’s cynical foreign policy, especially its handling of the crises in the Middle East and Afghanistan during the 1970s and 1980s. Kolko believes that the unilateral exercise of American military power will only further destabilise the international order. Unlike Ignatieff, he sees little difference between the wars of the present and the wars of the past. Indeed, the question mark in the title *Another Century of War?* signifies the author’s ambivalence towards the prospect of a peaceful future for the world.

Reviewed by Colonel Terry McCullagh, CSC, President, Royal Australian Artillery Association (ACT)

The Fragile Forts is a joint publishing venture between the Australian Army History Unit and Australian Military History Publications and makes a valuable contribution to the rich history of the Sydney Harbour’s fixed defences. The author Peter Oppenheim, an architect by profession, taught at the School of Architecture, University of New South Wales, and spent ten years researching and writing this book. In the process of his research, Oppenheim worked closely with a number of key heritage organisations, including the National Artillery Museum at North Head and the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company.

The author traces the history of Sydney’s fixed defences from the arrival of the first fleet and the early days of British settlement. He describes the development of Sydney’s fortifications from the colony’s fears of foreign invasion in the 19th century through the impact of the Great War of 1914–18 and the War in the South-West Pacific in World War II. The history concludes with the dismantling of the great guns that protected the harbour. The book is meticulously researched, abundantly illustrated with drawings, photographs and maps, and features a comprehensive index. Oppenheim’s descriptions are generous in their detail of ordnance and fort design. The author provides an excellent technical description of the forts and guns of Sydney Harbour. He also describes the complex military, political, social and economic factors that helped to shape the establishment of the harbour defences. In particular, Oppenheim recounts the countless reports and appreciations that were produced, and the numerous commissions and schemes that existed over the years in New South Wales relating to the defences of Port Jackson. The book is therefore an intriguing account of colonial fear and isolation, of technology and independence—an account that is told fluently and stylishly, making for compelling reading.
The Fragile Forts should cater for a broad readership, including military historians, heritage lovers, devotees of the architecture of fixed defences—such as the Martello tower on Fort Denison—and will please those artillery specialists and gunners fascinated by the vast array of ordnance around Sydney Harbour. As a study, the book makes a significant contribution to the history of Australian artillery in particular and Australia’s military history in general. It is a book that is long overdue and one that is thoroughly recommended to interested readers.
Sirs

I was pleased to hear that the Army is to receive a fine battle tank. Being a naval officer, my enthusiasm might come as a surprise to some people. Indeed, many observers did not share my satisfaction. Some critics questioned why the Australian Army needed tanks at all. They argued that we have not used tanks since Vietnam and that Asia is, in any event, not ideal tank terrain. The last point is contradicted by the reality of the Japanese advance in World War II down the Malayan Peninsula. Other critics derided the choice of an American tank model, the Abrams, over the British Challenger and German Leopard.

I believe that many of the tank critics are misinformed or have not thought their arguments through logically. Suggesting that, because something has not been used for a long time, it is not required is akin to tearing the fire detectors out of houses because there have been no fires. Most of the ADF’s future military operations are likely to be undertaken in conjunction with its traditional ally, the United States, whom we have fought alongside since the battle of Hamel in World War I. The Abrams will give Australian ground forces valuable interoperability with the US military. Indeed, having the same tank as the US Army and Marine Corps confers obvious advantages in maintenance, supply and operational lift. The Royal Australian Navy requires tanks simply because future ADF operations will be joint and tri-service in character. The RAN can bombard land positions or restrict enemy manoeuvre by blockade, commerce raiding and by controlling amphibious access. Similarly, the RAAF can deliver high-precision weapons and destroy an array of land targets. But of the three services, only the Army can occupy land through ‘boots on the ground’. Moreover, many operational headquarters are located on land.

It is important for critics of the tank decision to understand that, for a modern Army, tanks represent an essential capability in the all-arms ground force inventory—rather like submarines in the modern navy’s arsenal. The RAN has six submarines; the Army will receive about sixty tanks. These are small numbers and they represent basic capability. And basic capability is what Australia has lost in the vital
area of naval aviation. With the demise of HMAS Melbourne in 1982, the Navy was forced to discard its valuable core skills and capabilities in maritime fixed- and rotary-wing aviation, force projection and in strategic presence. These are capabilities and skills that take years to develop and that are not lightly relearnt. It is for this reason that I am pleased that the Army has been able to retain and to modernise its core armoured warfare requirement.

Lieutenant Tom Lewis, RAN
Canberra

TO THE EDITORS

I am writing in response to the article ‘Chaos and Predictability: A Critique of Effects-based Operations’ (EBO) by Brigadier Justin Kelly and Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen which appeared in the Winter 2004 edition of the AAJ. Their article is a timely reminder of the limitations of EBO, especially in conventional warfare where the fog of war makes an effects approach difficult to calibrate. There are, however, several issues arising from the article that warrant further examination, particularly in the Australian context.

Kelly and Kilcullen point out that the use of any physical force may unleash unintended consequences. Indeed, when physical force is a primary source of the effects, the consequences can be very costly. If EBO are about ‘shock and awe’, as in Iraq in 2003, then Australia can only ever aspire to be a peripheral player in such high-end military operations. However, if the Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, is correct in arguing that the skilful leader subdues his enemies without fighting, then physical force really should be a last resort. With this point in mind, EBO should not be considered only from the viewpoint of conventional warfare. Australian operational experience in recent years points to the need to be prepared to generate effects in operations short of war that involve significant constraints on the application of force.

In contrast to the US armed forces, the Australian military has always been forced to observe restraint and to maximise effectiveness because of its small size and lack of resources. Thus, while Kelly and Kilcullen are correct to point out that EBO has its limitations, for a middle power such as Australia, an understanding of effects still has relevance—particularly should Australia ever again lead a regional multinational coalition as in East Timor. The article’s observation that the development of a cultural–military–economic model for EBO lags behind contemporary developments in information technology is true. However, the current Australian Defence Force (ADF) does recognise the need in many operations to coordinate the efforts of a wide range of government agencies. Recent governmental decisions suggest that efforts to coordinate security concerns have been elevated to the national level under
the direction of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. This process is a result of recent experience in mustering whole-of-government responses to regional crises such as the one in the Solomon Islands.

A clear definition of EBO is important in any debate over their merits. Kelly and Kilcullen employ the ADF definition of effects being the ‘physical, functional or psychological outcomes, events or consequences that result from specific military or non-military actions.’ With its focus on direct and indirect attack and on the psychological as well as the physical dimension of conflict, effects-based thinking has much in common with theories of manoeuvre warfare and the indirect approach. These are concepts that the Australian Army has grappled with both in theory and in practice.

The International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999 saw a prototype of Australian effects-based thinking being applied, with several government agencies working towards the objective of harnessing a spectrum of capabilities in order to maximise national power. Arguably, in the Australian context, EBO are more akin to the INTERFET approach, where the application of manoeuvre operations concepts adapted for the information era demonstrated how military tactics and television images can interact to generate the effects required to achieve the liberation of East Timor.

Australia has been working at further refining such an approach with the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). In the Solomon Islands, Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen commanded military forces that deployed in considerable strength at the outset in order to enable RAMSI to achieve its nation-building objective. Lieutenant Colonel Frewen—working in conjunction with a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade mission head, an Australian Federal Police deputy commissioner, and with representatives from AUSAID—was aware of the need to generate effects from a whole-of-government perspective. In measuring the significance of RAMSI, one should not forget that, at the beginning, the mission’s success was not a foregone conclusion.

Regarding the war on terror, Kelly and Kilcullen are right to highlight the impact of the ripple effect of operations. Again, there are parallels with Australian experience—particularly in counterinsurgency in South-East Asia in the 1950s and 1960s—although the new form of terrorist insurgency is transnational and therefore significantly more difficult to manage in terms of an effects-based approach. For the Australian Army, necessity often has been the mother of invention, as means have been sought to generate disproportionate effects, or ‘punches above weight’, in order to compensate for lack of resources.

On balance, then, perhaps there is a distinctive ‘Australian Way’ in EBO or information-era manoeuvre that recognises from the outset not just a military but a political or whole-of-government approach. Whenever Australia has played a lead role in regional operations, its military commanders have sought to understand the
details of the operational environment and the likely effects of their actions. Armed with that understanding, they have applied primarily non-kinetic and often non-military means to achieve political objectives. To date, the Australian focus on effects tends to be more about effective leadership than about kinetic-based coercion.

Australia’s outstanding operational record in recent years suggests that the ADF’s specific experience is worthy of wider reflection. With a track record of measured, understated but firm, culturally-attuned and successful operations, there may be a particularly ‘Australian way’ of generating effects in operations short of war that should be more closely considered. As the critique by Kelly and Kilcullen makes clear, we should carefully think through the application of concepts such as EBO from an Australian perspective. However, in order to do so, Australian military practitioners must first study and understand their own military history.

Lieutenant Colonel John C. Blaxland
Canberra
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The CEW Bean Prize is awarded annually for the best honours or postgraduate thesis submitted in any Australian university focusing on Australians’ experience of war. The prize was established in 2004 to mark the 10th anniversary of the Australian Army History Unit (AAHU). Its aim is to foster and encourage the study of Australian military history and heritage at the tertiary level.

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AN APPLICATION FORM IS PROVIDED ON THE NEXT PAGE
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NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The editors of the *Australian Army Journal* welcome submissions from any source. Two prime criteria for publication are an article's standard of written English expression and its relevance to the Australian profession of arms. The journal will accept letters, feature articles, review essays, e-mails and contributions to the *Point Blank* and *Insights* sections. As a general guide on length, letters should not exceed 500 words; articles and review essays should be between 3000 and 6000 words, and contributions to the *Insights* section should be no more than 1500 words. The *Insights* section provides authors with the opportunity to write brief, specific essays relating to their own experiences of service. Readers should note that articles written in service essay format are discouraged, since they are not generally suitable for publication.

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All sources cited as evidence should be fully and accurately referenced in endnotes (not footnotes). Books cited should contain the author's name, the title, the publisher, the place of publication, the year and the page reference. This issue of the journal contains examples of the appropriate style for referencing.

When using quotations, the punctuation, capitalisation and spelling of the source document should be followed. Single quotation marks should be used, with double quotation marks only for quotations within quotations. Quotations of thirty words or more should be indented as a separate block of text without quotation marks. Quotations should be cited in support of an argument, not as authoritative statements.
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Numbers should be spelt out up to ninety-nine, except in the case of percentages, where arabic numerals should be used (and *per cent* should always be spelt out). All manuscripts should be paginated, and the use of abbreviations, acronyms and jargon kept to a minimum.

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