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This edition of the Australian Army Journal continues our concerted focus on current and recent operations. The Australian Army is operating in diverse theatres across the full spectrum of operations. The efforts of men and women in these complex contingencies continue to enhance the reputation of the Army.

The Chief of the Army reflected on the esteem in which we are held by the nation in his remarks commemorating the Army’s Birthday in March. We republish these remarks in this edition of the Army Journal to encourage reflection on the solemn obligation that service in the Army in a time of war imposes on every one of us.

The Army is one of Australia’s oldest continuous institutions. We have made an enormous contribution to the nation and this is reciprocated by the high level of trust reposed in us by our fellow citizens. Ever since the deployment of INTERFET to East Timor in 1999, the Army has operated at a very high tempo and under constant scrutiny. Our operational performance has been very sound.

As this edition is published, our commitment to security and nation-building in Afghanistan is being expanded. In March, the Government announced that a Special Forces Task Group and supporting elements would return to Afghanistan.

Accordingly, it is timely to publish the observations of an Australian officer, Major Michael Scott, who served in Afghanistan with two US Army Provincial Reconstruction Teams and a Dutch PRT. In coming months the Land Warfare Studies Centre is devoting considerable effort—both in the pages of this Journal and our other publications—to raising awareness of the history and culture of this increasingly critical theatre of operations.

Of course, operational performance is contingent on the quality of our training. In that context the article by Captain Cameron Leckie is essential reading for all ranks and corps. In the complex battlespace of the twenty-first century, every soldier must be capable of surviving and prevailing in close combat. The significant casualties sustained by logistic units in Iraq, especially convoys, exemplifies this grim lesson. The United States Marine Corps insists that ‘every Marine is a rifleman.’
Under the rubric of our 'I'm an Australian soldier' program, we have set this same benchmark for ourselves, through our aspiration that every soldier, regardless of specialty, master close combat. At the very least this demands a high standard of individual weapons skill. As Captain Leckie argues in his article this is easier said than done.

Since its inception the Army Journal has sought your active support. We have been encouraged by the sustained interest of all ranks in the Journal, which is manifested through a steady flow of articles from the field.

Consequently, we now feel it is appropriate to increase the frequency of publication of the Journal. In 2007, we intend to publish three numbers of the AAJ—this Autumn edition, a Winter edition in late August and a Summer edition just before Christmas. This has become possible through the support that the Army has given to the Journal as well as the splendid work of the Land Warfare Studies Centre Staff, particularly our Publications Manager, Mr Scott Hopkins.

We look forward to your continued interest in the Army Journal

The Publisher
We in the Australian Army are acutely aware of our history and traditions. We honour our past and seek to learn from it. We also honour the service of those who wear our uniform today and serve the nation all across the globe.

On this, our 106th birthday, I believe we have much to celebrate. We are one of the nation’s oldest and most revered institutions. We hold a special place in our nation’s consciousness and we are all proud to wear the slouch hat and Rising Sun badge. Above all, we are proud of the way our mates are performing with courage and distinction in the field.

Today is also a day for sombre reflection. That is because right now the Army is at war. In diverse theatres—from East Timor and the Solomon Islands to Afghanistan and Iraq—soldiers of the Australian Army are directly in harm’s way. There is no such thing as a safe operational deployment,

... we are proud of the way our mates are performing with courage and distinction in the field.

* This article is based on the speech made by the Chief of Army on the occasion of the Army Birthday, 1 March 2007.
but in the case of our men and women deployed in the Global War on Terror and in the Middle East, the nature of the threat they face is grave. They confront an implacable and ruthless enemy.

That is why I cannot view today as an occasion for unrestrained festivities in the manner of an individual’s birthday celebration. Nevertheless, there are some similarities between the birthday of a person and an institution. For each, it is a time to reflect on where they have come from and what they have achieved. It is also an opportunity to look forward with hope and confidence.

When applied to the Australian Army, such contemplation of the past should fill every soldier with great pride. Our Army has a wonderful heritage. We are the custodians of our most cherished national narrative—the ANZAC legend, from which has sprung the mythology of the Digger. The Digger legend is now inextricably linked to how Australians think of themselves: irreverent, good humoured, suspicious of authority and pomposity, and always willing to help a mate.

Most national myths are somewhat larger than life. Yet their ability to inspire passion depends on their containing more than a grain of truth. The Digger legend certainly passes that test. Never has there been a more rational, more sceptical, more questioning generation than those of us living in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The conventional wisdom is that we are cynical and that very little—if anything—is sacred and capable of inspiring human beings.

Yet the ANZAC and Digger myths have survived this cynicism and transcended scepticism. In a secular and hedonistic age, ANZAC still moves millions of Australians deeply. It reminds us all of sacrifice, mateship and endurance in the face of terrible hardship. The marketing gurus tell us that these things are unfashionable.

They are not. I observe them every day as I visit our soldiers on operations. Furthermore, they are on display throughout our Army at home. The Army holds them on trust for the nation. Every man and woman in this Army is heir to that original myth. That is both a privilege and a burden. Our fellow Australians look to us as men and women apart—people who represent the very best qualities of being an Australian.
None of us should ever permit routine and habit to dull the pride and sense of privilege that accompanies wearing this uniform. Additionally, through our fidelity to the core values of the Army—Courage, Initiative, Teamwork—we must demonstrate that we are worthy of such public esteem. Every one of us is a role model. Ours is not merely a job or even a career. It is a way of life.

We can draw great inspiration from those who have gone before us. We do, indeed, march in the footsteps of giants. Consider the battle honours of our Army, which are too numerous to mention in full. Names like Gallipoli, Fromelles, Hamel, Kokoda, Tobruk, El Alamein and Long Tan have become part of the vocabulary of every Australian. They represent feats of arms worthy of warriors from any people at any time. Every one of them was in a decent cause.

In more recent times, the efforts of our young men and women in Cambodia, Namibia, Somalia, Rwanda, Bougainville, East Timor and the Solomon Islands, as well as Afghanistan and Iraq, have demonstrated eloquently that the values of the ANZACS are in the very safest of hands. Many of you in the uniform of the Australian Army today have carved your own initials on the wall of history through service in these theatres.

Yes, we have much to look back on with justifiable pride. Yet we need to temper our celebration in the knowledge that our mates are facing mortal danger all around the globe. Every one of us owes it to our ancestors and to our mates currently on operations to live up to the Army values today and in the future.

Today I ask that we spare a thought for the sacrifices that our families and friends are also making. The great Army family is not merely comprised of those in uniform. Those on operations leave behind children, spouses, and parents who also know what sacrifice means. We must never forget them.

Enjoy the events today, but reflect on where we have come from and look to our future with great enthusiasm. However, do not forget the great onus that being at war places on every last one of us. I am proud to be Chief of the Australian Army today. My best wishes to every man and woman in Army. Thank you for your service. Good soldiering!
It is now my privilege, as an act of commemoration, to read the Battle Honours on the Army Banner:

- South Africa
- World War One
- World War Two
- Korea
- Malaya / Borneo
- South Vietnam
- Peacekeeping

THE ODE:

They shall not grow old as we that are left grow old
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn;
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.
Lest we forget.
IDEAS AND ISSUES

THE END OF STRATEGY?

NOT SO FAST*

CRAIG STOCKINGS

ABSTRACT

Has contemporary strategic thought really not produced a significant idea, concept or thinker in the last half-century? The author argues that van Creveld’s proposition is distinctly unfair to the contributions of a number of other modern military writers. This article refutes van Creveld’s argument through a survey of post–Second World War strategic thought. It explores the continuing evolution of military theory through the contributions of five principal contemporary military strategists: John Boyd (1927–97), Michael Howard (1922–), Edward Luttwak (1942–), Colin S Gray (1943–) and, of course, van Creveld himself (1946–).

* This article has been peer reviewed.
INTRODUCTION

The Israeli historian, teacher and military theorist, Martin van Creveld, contends provocatively that the quality of contemporary Western strategic thought has declined significantly since the Second World War. In his eyes, largely as a consequence of an unwillingness or inability to perceive and react to what he labels the ‘transformational’ nature of modern war, there has been in recent decades a conspicuous lack of innovative thinking about warfare and warfighting. Van Creveld concludes that:

ninety per cent of so-called strategic writing since 1945 … was not about strategy at all. It was about how to incorporate or integrate various kinds of new weapons and weapon systems … there was nothing in the 1991 [Gulf War] campaign that Patton could not have done in a very similar fashion back in 1944.¹

In one sense he is correct in both this general observation and his explanation for it. It is indeed impossible to identify a modern day strategist of the fame, insight and influence of a Sun Tzu, a Jomini or a Clausewitz. Nor is it easy to select a current military theorist with levels of originality or conviction comparable to the pre–1939 efforts of JFC Fuller or Basil Liddell Hart. On another level, however, van Creveld’s suggestion that the evolution of Western strategic thought has somehow plateaued or stagnated since 1945 goes too far. In making this proposition, not only does he overstate the trend but he is being distinctly unfair to the contributions of a number of other modern military writers—including himself. Strategic theory may not have progressed since the Second World War in the giant leaps of ages past, but this does not necessarily signify its decay.

The purpose of this article is to refute van Creveld’s argument through a survey of post–Second World War strategic thought. It explores the continuing evolution of military theory through the contributions of five principal contemporary military strategists: John Boyd (1927–97), Michael Howard (1922–), Edward Luttwak (1942–), Colin S Gray (1943–) and, of course, van Creveld himself (1946–). These individuals, chosen for the importance and likely enduring nature of their ideas, represent a varied cross-section of thought.² Each has extended the traditional modes of strategic thought beyond their well-established—often Clausewitzian—foundations. It is true that many of the basic tenets of conventional Western military strategy have been challenged since 1945. In many cases, old ideas have been found wanting—especially
when uncritically applied to conflicts whose nature would have been alien to the strategists of ages past. At the very least, however, the five individuals explored in this article, through their novel approaches to old paradigms or their recognition of new ones, prove that the progression of strategic thought, while perhaps temporarily subdued, has not ceased. Nor is it likely to cease until the end of warfare or the end of us all—that is, whichever comes first.

STRATEGY

To properly assess the contributions of the strategic thinkers discussed in this article, a working definition of what is meant by ‘strategy’ is required. At its heart, and in any context, strategy describes a relationship between actions and objectives. The word expresses nothing more or less than the plan, means or method whereby singular events are linked and/or coordinated to achieve overall goals. Any activity involving some form of competition will inevitably contain an element of strategy. Strategy is the plan, for example, by which chess pieces are moved to checkmate an opponent. It is the linkage, in another sense, whereby the actions of individual players on a football team are coordinated to outscore an opposing team. When dealing with issues of armed conflict, when the competition in question is war, strategy becomes the plan by which military operations achieve national political goals. Colin Gray describes it as the theory and practice of the use of organised force for political outcomes and a ‘bridge that relates military power to political purpose.’ Gray’s ‘bridge’ is an important analogy as it not only describes the link between ends and means but also the reciprocal influence, through strategy, that operations and objectives constantly exert on each other.

The conception of military strategy as the plan for linking and translating battlefield events into victory in war has a distinguished pedigree. A number of notable ‘strategists’, some of whom are discussed in detail in this article, have embraced this definition. The nineteenth-century Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz saw strategy as ‘the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war’ while the twentieth-century British military thinker, BH Liddell Hart, described it as the application of military means to fulfil the ends of policy. In the twenty-first century, the US Army War College defines military strategy as the ‘skilful formulation, coordination, and application of ends
(objectives), ways (courses of action) and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interest. Clearly military strategy remains the link between operations and objectives—the means by which war actions achieve war aims.

At this stage it is important to note that a working conception of military strategy is often undermined by the colloquial misuse of the term. Military strategy does not, for example, describe tactics. If strategy is the art of linking battles to win the war, then tactics are the techniques and methods used to achieve success in those battles. Too often the issue is confused when terms like ‘operational strategy’ are substituted for ‘tactics’. Equally, military strategy is not ‘grand strategy’. The latter term is regularly and incorrectly used to describe the set of plans and policies designed to achieve the ‘national interest’ or national objectives—most of which will have nothing to do with the use of military force. Military strategy may be a subset of grand strategy, but the terms are not interchangeable.

JOHN BOYD

Of the Cold War and post–Cold War theorists who have shaped the development of modern strategic thought, principal among them was the US fighter pilot, Colonel John Boyd. While he never actually published a book on strategy, Boyd derived a set of ideas that have been collated and disseminated widely as a series of several hundred ‘slides’ entitled: Discourse on Winning & Losing. The impact of Boyd’s concept of war and warfighting has been widespread—particularly in the US where he was credited, according to popular anecdote, with developing the essential elements of the Coalition military strategy in the Gulf War of 1991. Indeed, the Commandant of the US Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak, wrote a eulogy to Boyd in 1997 describing how ‘the Iraqi army collapsed morally and intellectually under the onslaught of American and Coalition forces. John Boyd was an architect of that victory as surely as if he’d commanded a fighter wing or a manoeuvre division in the desert.’

For Boyd, the strategic game is one of interaction and isolation. His key strategic idea, therefore, was the concept of the Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action (OODA) Loop. According to this theory, Observation is the collection of data concerning the environment or ‘battlespace’. Orientation is the synthesis or analysis of that data to form an accurate mental picture of that
environment. Decision is the determination of a course of action based on that mental picture. Action is the physical execution of a decision. According to Boyd, the OODA Loop is the process by which any entity reacts to any given situation—be it an individual fighter pilot involved in aerial combat or an entire nation at war.

The process of cycling through the OODA Loop is continuous. The simple key to victory, therefore, is to move through this process faster and more accurately than the adversary. In order to win, a force must operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than an adversary and 'OODA more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as a basis to keep or gain initiative.' In doing so, decisions are made more rapidly and the enemy is forced to become reactive rather than proactive. The heart of Boyd's theory suggests that it is speed of decision-making that allows a friendly force to 'get inside' an adversary's OODA Loop, rendering the opponent psychologically and intellectually dysfunctional. Without a brain, the body or physical form of an enemy's military establishment is irrelevant and doomed to paralysis and defeat. The opponent is folded 'back inside himself so that he can neither appreciate nor keep up with what's going on ... thereby collaps[ing] his ability to carry on.' Under Boyd's paradigm it is the singular function of all strategy to bring about situations where an enemy can be 'out-OODAed'.

Boyd explained his theory by situating it in history. He described how, for example, by exploiting superior leadership, intelligence, communications, and mobility, as well as by playing upon an adversary's fears and doubts via propaganda

Figure 1: The command and control process: The OODA loop.
and terror, the Mongols operated inside adversary observation-orientation-decision-action loops. Similarly, the ‘amorphous, lethal and unpredictable activity’, which characterised the German strategy of Blitzkrieg in the Second World War, and guerrilla warfare throughout the ages, ‘make them appear awesome and unstoppable which altogether produce uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, … and ultimately collapse.’

Two central aspects of Boyd’s OODA Loop stand as important influences on modern strategic thought. The first is that all large military organisations contain these decision-action cycles at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. Second, in order to achieve an efficient OODA Loop process, capable of cycling at a faster rate than the enemy, modern militaries need to embrace a decentralised approach to command. Echoing the line of thought upon which the famously successful nineteenth-century Prussian General, Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) (1800–91) modelled his General Staff, Boyd advocated a type of ‘directive control’ whereby subordinates are made aware of their superior’s intent and objective but remain free to decide how best to achieve it. This approach, in contrast to detailed, prescriptive and process-driven orders, allows subordinate commanders to exercise initiative and take tactical and strategic opportunities as they are presented, rather than wasting time by constantly seeking higher approval. Such a command organisation greatly increases organisational flexibility and adapts/reacts to situations far quicker than traditional structures. For Boyd, for example,

the secret of the German command and control system … lies in what is unstated or not communicated with one another – in order to exploit lower level initiative yet realise higher level intent, thereby diminishing friction and reduce time, hence gain both quickness and security … the Germans were able to quickly get into their adversaries OODA loop.

Importantly, Boyd noted that the necessary foundation of this command model was mutual trust. Superior headquarters are required to have faith in their subordinate’s abilities and judgment while junior commanders need to feel confident that their seniors are setting the right objectives to begin with.

As well as describing a model whereby an efficient OODA Loop could be created and sustained within a friendly force, Boyd also suggested a number of ways to disrupt the decision-making cycle of the enemy. To this end he divided war itself up into three distinct elements. First, ‘moral warfare’, which concentrates on breaking
down the adversary’s will to win by promoting doubt and internal fragmentation. Victory comes from playing upon moral factors that drain resolve, produce panic, and bring about collapse. 

Boyd’s second element, ‘mental warfare’, is where the key to success is distorting the enemy’s perception of reality (the observation and orientation phases) through deceit or direct attack against communications/information capabilities. Particularly useful in the mental battle are surprise and shock, which can be represented as an overload beyond an adversary’s immediate ability to respond or adapt. The last of Boyd’s three elements of war, ‘physical warfare’, is where the destruction of the enemy’s physical presence and means of war-making undermines the OODA Loop (action phase). The idea behind the physical battle is to ‘diminish [the] adversary’s capacity for independent action … or deny him the opportunity to survive on his own terms, or to make it impossible for him to survive at all.’ It is perhaps fitting to allow Boyd himself to describe the cumulative effects of military action based on his theoretical model. Such strategies:

operate inside adversary’s OODA loops, or get inside his mind-time-space to create a tangle of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts … [they] enmesh an adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion… beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure.

Michael Howard

While Boyd focused on operational warfighting methodologies, other contemporary theorists, like the British military historian Sir Michael Howard, were concentrating on wider strategic issues. Howard’s primary contribution to the evolution of modern strategic thought is through an expansion of the study of military history beyond chronicles of battles to include the wider sociological implications of war. His early account of the Franco–Prussian War (1870–71), for example, demonstrated how the conflict was in many ways a reflection of late nineteenth-century French and German societies. Howard saw the study of this conflict as ‘transcending the specialist field of the military historian, or even the historian of nineteenth century Europe.’ With Clausewitzian insight, Howard showed the fundamental importance of politico-military relationships during the war: it was entirely due to Bismarck’s statesmanship that Moltke’s victories were not to remain
Ideas and Issues

Craig Stockings

as ‘sterile as Napoleon’s, but were to lead, as military victories must if they are to be anything other than spectacular butcheries, to a more lasting peace.’18 As a warning to present-day strategists, Howard stressed the danger of civil-military friction under the conditions of industrial war by predicting that had the Franco–Prussian War ‘been prolonged for a few more weeks it is difficult to see how either Bismarck or Moltke could have remained in posts which each felt the other was making untenable.’19

Howard’s later writings provide some important insights into the nature of modern military strategy. His basic thesis is that contemporary Western strategic thinking is flawed in its bias towards the operational aspects of war. While such a focus may well have been appropriate in the Napoleonic era, Howard contends that the experience of the past century demonstrates this approach to be inadequate and even dangerous.20 In its place he advocates a type of ‘inclusive strategy’, paying due consideration, in addition to the operational art, to the importance in war of logistic, social and technological influences. Howard contends that modern war is conducted in four dimensions: the operational, the logistical, the social and the technological. No successful strategy can be formulated that does not take account of them all.21

Blaming Clausewitz for the artificial division of strategy into logistic and operational elements—and the subordination of the former to the latter (perhaps understandably in the context of his Napoleonic Wars)—Howard concludes that no campaign can be understood or interpreted unless its logistical problems are studied as thoroughly as the course of operations.22 Indeed, the omission of logistical considerations by most historians and strategists has ‘warped their judgements and made their conclusions in many cases misleading.’23 In support of this position he suggests, for example, that

Moltke’s successes were not due to any brilliant generalship… the German victories, as was universally recognised, had been won by superior organisation, superior military education, and, in the initial stages of the war at least, superior manpower; and it was these qualities which would bring victory in future wars … The military revolution which ensued in Europe had repercussions in spheres far transcending the military.24

Similarly, despite the fact that many of the Southern Generals during the US Civil War ‘handled their forces with a flexibility and imaginativeness worthy of a Napoleon or a Frederick; nevertheless they lost’—they lost to the inevitable consequence of the North’s capacity to mobilise superior industrial strength and

[Howard’s] thesis is that contemporary Western strategic thinking is flawed in its bias towards the operational aspects of war.

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manpower into armies, the size of which rendered the operational skills of their adversaries almost irrelevant. 25 To Howard, this conflict was a clear case where the logistical dimension of strategy proved more significant than the operational. 26 So too, according to Howard, the logistical and technological capacity of the Allies in the Second World War ‘rendered the operational skills, in which the Germans excelled until the very end, as ineffective as those of Jackson and Lee.’ 27

Apart from advocating an increased emphasis on logistical considerations in the formulation of modern strategy, Howard also points to Western neglect of the social aspects of war. This means that, among other issues, the management of, or compliance with, public opinion has become an essential element. 28 For him, in modern war it is society that provides the commitment and determination that enables the application of logistic advantage. Pointing again to history, Howard suggests that ‘the Franco–Prussian War in particular was won, like the American Civil War, by a superior logistical capability based on firm popular commitment.’ 29 This requirement for social dedication, as a pillar of modern strategy, applies equally to the effectiveness and credibility of strategies of deterrence and coercion—without it, their real and implied threats are not only empty but, more importantly, can be perceived as being empty. Howard also applies his ideas on the forgotten social aspect of strategy to the problem of insurgency warfare faced by many Western militaries in the post-1945 period. He believes that it was the inadequacy of the socio-political analyses of the societies with which these militaries were dealing that lay at the root of many notable failures, despite overwhelming operational and logistical advantage. 30

Accustomed to operationally-focused strategies, Western theorists have mistakenly sought operational solutions to what were essentially conflicts on the social plane. 31 Of all Howard’s contributions, it is perhaps this last insight which will resonate most loudly in the twenty-first century. The social sources, ramifications, and implications of the ‘Global War on Terror’, and ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, are ringing endorsements of Howard’s criticism of operationally-oriented military solutions to socially and politically-oriented strategic problems.

EDWARD LUTTWAK

Along with Howard, the Romanian-born economist, historian and scholar of international relations, Edward Nicolae Luttwak, is one of the most outstanding present-day strategists. He has a reputation for the unorthodox, earned initially through his controversial interpretations of the role of foreign power intervention in regional conflict in Coup d’etat: A Practical Handbook (1968), and of ancient
Roman frontier strategies in *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD* (1976). Luttwak’s most important contributions to modern strategic theory, however, are contained in *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (1987), in which his stated purpose was to ‘define the inner meaning of strategy’ and ‘to uncover the universal logic that conditions all forms of war as well as the adversarial dealings of nations even in peace.’

Luttwak’s central thesis concerns the inherent paradox of warfare and strategy. He does not reflect the counter-Enlightenment tradition represented by nineteenth-century Prussian officer, Heinrich von Berehorst (1733–1814)—and others before and since—who posit that the inherent unpredictability of strategy renders it impervious to productive analysis. Rather, Luttwak contends that strategy must be understood as a unique field of human endeavour in which paradoxical logic is not only required but rewarded. He writes: ‘it is only in the realm of strategy, which encompasses the conduct and consequences of human relations in the context of actual or possible armed conflict, that we have learned to accept paradoxical propositions as valid.’

The basic idea of deterrence, or maintaining peace by preparing for war, is an example of this general principle. Luttwak goes further than this, however. He suggests that strategy does not merely entail this or that paradoxical proposition; instead he believes that the entire realm of strategy is pervaded by a paradoxical logic, which induces ‘the coming together and reversal of opposites … to reward paradoxical conduct while defeating straightforward logical action.’ To illustrate the point fully, he asks readers to:

> consider an ordinary tactical choice, the sort frequently made in war. To move towards its objective, an advancing force can choose between two roads, one good and one bad, the first broad, direct and well-paved, the second narrow, circuitous and unpaved. Only in the paradoxical realm of strategy would the choice arise at all, because it is only in war that a bad road can be good precisely because it is bad and may therefore be less strongly defended or even left unguarded by the enemy… instead of A moving towards its opposite B, A actually becomes B and B becomes A.
Along with investigating the intrinsic paradoxical nature of war, Luttwak provides some valuable insights into more specific aspects of modern strategy. With a focus on conventional operations, he describes two general approaches: attrition and ‘relational manoeuvre’. He notes the former is war waged by industrial methods, where the enemy is treated as nothing more than an array of targets and the aim is to win by their cumulative destruction achieved with superior firepower and material strength.\(^3\) Luttwak warns against such strategies because there can be no victory in this style of war without an overall material superiority, and there can be no cheap victory as might be achieved with clever moves with few casualties and few resources expended.\(^3\) Having said this, under strategies of attrition, provided for whatever reason the enemy is forced to fight symmetrically (as opposed to adopting guerrilla, terrorist or other asymmetric methods), victory is assured by material superiority.

Luttwak’s alternatives to attrition-based approaches are those involving relational manoeuvre. He regards such strategies as an encapsulation and exploitation of war’s paradoxical nature as they rely, inherently, on the surprise achieved by paradoxical decision-making. Luttwak contends that ‘to obtain the advantage of an enemy who cannot react because he is surprised and unready… all sorts of paradoxical choices may be justified.’\(^3\) Under such strategies, instead of seeking out the enemy’s concentrations of strength to better find targets in bulk, the starting point of relational manoeuvre is the avoidance of the enemy’s strengths, followed by the application of some particular superiority against presumed enemy weakness, be they physical, psychological, technical or organisational.\(^4\)

The aim is not to destroy the enemy’s physical substance as an end in itself, but rather to incapacitate by some form of systematic disruption.\(^5\) Such characteristics mark Luttwak’s relational manoeuvre, therefore, as a direct extension of Liddell Hart’s indirect approach and a close cousin to contemporary airpower theories of strategic paralysis.

One of Luttwak’s key strengths is that, unlike Liddell Hart, he did more than present relational manoeuvre as a universal strategy of choice—he also acknowledged its weaknesses. First and foremost, Luttwak accepted that all paradox-based decision making, all efforts at surprise and deception aimed at avoiding enemy strengths, will inevitably ‘have their costs, regardless of the medium and nature of combat.’\(^6\) Such a price will in most cases involve a decrease in physical strength. Following the ‘line of least expectation’ must entail forgoing the most
attractive (and most obvious) military option. Whether traversing a longer path or more difficult terrain, sacrificing force elements to a deceptive effort, or any number of other paradoxical choices seeking to surprise the enemy, some measure of combat power must be sacrificed that otherwise would have been available. Taking this point further, Luttwak warns that the 'paradoxical path of “least resistance” must stop short of self-defeating extreme.'

The second enduring characteristic of war that Luttwak suggests will always work against strategies of relational manoeuvre, or any military method designed to match strength against weakness, is Clausewitzian 'friction.' This is problematic because while the entire purpose of striving to achieve surprise is to diminish the risk of exposure to the enemy’s strength, this very act increases the danger of failure in implementing whatever is intended because friction grows exponentially ‘with any deviation from the simplicities of the direct approach and the frontal attack.’

Luttwak is almost unique among strategists in that he brings balance to the argument between direct and indirect strategies: 'the direct approach and frontal attack are therefore easily condemned by advocates of paradoxical circumvention who focus on the single engagement, seeing very clearly the resulting lessening of combat risk, while being only dimly aware of the resulting increase in organisational risk’—he understands the true nature of friction in war and reminds modern war fighters of its continuing relevance.

Colin S. Gray

A fourth author and theorist whose work clearly signifies the progression of strategic thought in the contemporary era is Colin S Gray, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England. Gray served for five years in the Reagan Administration on the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, and has advised both the US and the British Governments on defence and security-related issues. His ‘official’ work includes studies of nuclear strategy, arms-control policy, maritime strategy, space strategy, and the use of special forces. Gray is the author of a host of books and articles on ‘the theory and practice of the use, and threat of use, of organised force for political purposes in the twentieth century’—that is, on military strategy. Some of his most recent contributions include Modern Strategy (1999), Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History (2002), The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order (2004), and Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (2005).

[Colin S. Gray] appreciates the complexities of historical processes and avoids an undue emphasis on ‘theory’ in his analyses.
Two of Gray’s latter books, *Modern Strategy* and *Another Bloody Century*, have made particularly important contributions to the evolution of contemporary military thought. He appreciates the complexities of historical processes and avoids an undue emphasis on ‘theory’ in his analyses. The key to his success is an interpretive, analytical and multi-disciplinary approach to the study of strategy. Gray argues that the past provides valuable insight for the strategic theorist, while reminding historians that the perspectives of other branches of scholarship are instructive. He uses such techniques in *Modern Strategy* and *Another Bloody Century* to offer suggestions on applying military force in an increasingly complex world. Aligning himself with Luttwak, for example, Gray refutes the idea that technology itself is any sort of ‘revolution’ or that it alone can or should dominate strategic thinking. Such technological infatuation, he believes, is expensive, susceptible to asymmetric attack and subversive of other elements of strategy that should be managed in harmony. He consistently questions what he considers to be a dangerous trend towards technological determinism in the West. In his latest work, Gray assesses the likely nature of future warfare, considering the role of weapons of mass destruction, space mounted-weaponry and cyber-warfare—all of which are seen as different forms of existing systems, not paradigm-busters. 47

One of Gray’s most important contributions to the study of strategy comes from his understanding of the nuances of social-strategic culture and institutional practice. He contends that no person or institution operates ‘beyond culture’—not even the theorists and practitioners of war. 48 In *Modern Strategy*, he goes to great lengths to explain the importance of strategic culture, defined as ‘a context out there that surrounds, and gives meaning to, strategic behaviour … ’, and describes US defence decision-makers, for example, as being pre-disposed to isolationism and abstract technical solutions to strategic problems. 49 Importantly, in a warning for Western militaries and increasingly relevant in a range of contemporary conflicts, he concludes that a sound strategic culture with inferior weapons can defeat a weak strategic culture with an abundance of technology and economic power.

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… Gray refutes the idea that technology itself is any sort of ‘revolution’ or that it alone can or should dominate strategic thinking.

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… a sound strategic culture with inferior weapons can defeat a weak strategic culture with an abundance of technology and economic power.
Another of Gray’s key contributions, and a theme that runs through a number of his works, is the idea that the foundations of strategy are essentially unchanging. In this he shows himself as essentially Clausewitzian, yet he extends and interprets the Prussian theorist for the twenty-first century. The ‘grammar’ of war may change, with advances in technology, mobility, weapons and so forth, but its ‘logic’ does not. Gray believes that many of the fundamental considerations and problems of strategy—the military/political balance, time, space, and human dimensions, etc—are enduring. Whilst he does not argue that war is unchanging, he demonstrates that little of real importance changes. He believes that ‘there is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of history because nothing vital to the nature and function of war and strategy changes.’ Such advice is a poignant reminder to those prone to overstating the revolutionary nature of the twenty-first century battlefield. Very few strategic problems, and very few of their solutions, are in fact ‘new’. Like Boyd, Gray pays particular attention to one of the truly ageless dimensions of strategy, unique for being immovable and unimprovable: time. Military theorists must acknowledge it and practitioners must utilise it. Time is a strategic dimension too little understood and consequently too little valued by many contemporary combatants.

In a further extension of Clausewitzian strategic thought, Gray agrees that warfare is best understood in a political context; he adds that this outlook, especially in the modern era, needs to be tempered by the light of cultural and social pressures. He urges modern military planners to consider strategy as not exclusively about force of arms, but rather about achieving the national political objective by winning a clash of wills. In this clash, and depending on the nature of the struggle, politicians and populations are often as important as military strength—and may even be more so. Militaries that continue to skew their force structure toward ‘conventional’ capabilities at the expense of all others are, therefore, on shaky ground. Military strategy must be situated in a balanced manner within the full range of national capabilities: diplomatic, economic, cultural, psychological and information-based. Gray also considers the issue of whether wars can be controlled at all; in some cases, he believes, they should not be, so that issues can be settled through conflict alone. In any case, war and warfare do not always change in an evolutionary, linear fashion, and attempts to regulate war are therefore inevitably problematic.

In his most recent work, Gray discusses the nature of future war by first warning about the perils of prediction, particularly those claiming that the nature of war has ‘changed’ in the twenty-first century. For Gray, there is no guarantee that state-based
industrial warfare has disappeared from the strategic landscape. War is an inescapable human condition, albeit one capable of taking on a highly variable range of forms. According to Gray, although irregular warfare may dominate for some years, developments yet unforeseen—such as a renewed and robust Sino-Russian partnership—may emerge to oppose the United States in a conventional military manner. He reflects that:

... the Cold War is barely fifteen years gone, yet it is already orthodox among both liberals and many conservatives to claim that major war between states is obsolescent or obsolete. If history is any guide, this popular view is almost certainly fallacious.  

At the same time, he concedes that most conflict in the immediate future will continue to be at the sub-state level and seeks to demonstrate, particularly in *Modern Strategy*, that the strategic principles of conventional war are valid and applicable to small- and sub-state conflicts. In doing so, he makes three important albeit contentious points: such conflicts are generally not resolved decisively at the irregular level—conventional forces are required at some point; special forces have a role to play but lack a strategic context—that is, current political and military leaders have no appreciation of their strategic value; and that small wars, non-traditional and asymmetric threats must be taken seriously and co-equally with symmetrical regular conflicts. Gray therefore recommends that states should not completely forgo military and strategic preparations for the consequences of Great Power confrontation.

**MARTIN VAN CREVELD**

To return finally to Martin van Creveld, whose critique of contemporary strategic thinking inspired this article and who has authored a number of books about war and strategy, the most notable of which include *Supplying War* (1977), *Command in War* (1985), the influential *The Transformation of War* (1991) and *The Sword and the Olive* (1998). Although often accused of bias in his commentary on contemporary political issues, his influence on modern strategic theory is without question. Ironically, like Clausewitz, whose present-day relevance he goes to some lengths to discredit, van Creveld leans towards the philosophical: he analyses the nature of war as much as what is required to successfully prosecute it.
The strength of van Creveld’s contribution is his bold and innovative approach to modern strategic issues. He contends that, at a basic level, much of Western contemporary strategic thought is fundamentally flawed, being ‘rooted in a Clausewitzian world picture that is either obsolete or wrong’. The underlying reason for this monumental miscalculation is unwillingness or inability on the part of modern and particularly Western strategists to accept that the very nature of war has been transformed from the industrial paradigm of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries. For van Creveld, the large-scale conventional war—warfare as understood by today’s principle military powers—may indeed be in ‘its last gasp’. This does not mean that warfare itself is in the decline but rather that it has evolved from what it once was. Accordingly, ‘we are entering an era … of warfare between ethnic and religious groups [where] even as familiar forms of warfare are sinking into the dustpan of the past, radically new ones are raising their heads ready to take their place.’ Van Creveld concludes that, as a direct consequence of the transformation of war, modern military force is largely a myth and this is why our ideas about war have stagnated.

Van Creveld goes to considerable lengths to outline the nature of the threat posed to Western societies from their adversaries in this emerging transformational paradigm of war. He believes that, in an era of nuclear deterrence and globalisation, if people cannot prosecute war between states then they will search, and find, other organisations to fight for. Such organisations are likely to be non-state, ideologically motivated and asymmetrically oriented in terms of how they approach the idea of conflict. The problem here is not so much the innate danger of the new threat but the refusal of Western strategists to re-orient themselves to meet it. Van Creveld underlines this claim by suggesting, for example, that ‘brought face to face with terrorism, the largest and mightiest empires the world has ever known have suddenly begun falling into each other’s arms.’ Further still, the rise of low-intensity conflict may, unless it can be quickly contained, end up destroying the concept of the nation-state entirely. The refusal to accept the modern reality of conflict means that the most powerful modern armed forces are largely irrelevant to modern war—indeed, the relevance declines in ‘inverse proportion to their modernity.’ Unless twenty-first century militaries are willing to adjust both
thought and action to the rapidly changing new realities, they are likely to reach the point where they will no longer be capable of effectively employing armed force at all. 62

If the weakness of modern Western strategic thought is an inability to accept the transformation of war, then, according to van Creveld, one of the primary causes of this problem is a continuing over-infatuation with Clausewitz’s legacy. Van Creveld’s baseline purpose in writing *The Transformation of War* was to provide a new, non-Clausewitzian framework for thinking about warfare and strategy. 63 Van Creveld’s notion is that while Clausewitz’s model may have described war in the Napoleonic era, it does not represent an accurate picture of modern-day conflict. Clausewitz’s ‘original sin’—and one that plagues strategic thinkers still—is the assumption that ‘war consists of the members of one group killing those of another “in order to” [achieve] this objective or that.’ 64 He rejects this framework completely by commenting that:

… war does not begin where some people take the lives of others but at the point where they themselves are prepared to risk their own… in other words, a voluntary coping with danger – it is [therefore] the continuation not of politics but of sport. 65

Van Creveld criticises Clausewitzian frames of reference for their lack of due regard of the *reasons* people fight and the power of ideas such as ‘legitimacy’ in modern conflict. For him, unless it considers the things that people fight for, including their motives, no strategic doctrine is or will be effective. 66 Van Creveld is especially critical because Clausewitz’s ‘justice’ had nothing to do with strategy and, as a consequence, recommends that ‘in any attempt to rethink strategy, we must start by asking ourselves not how to get the other side to submit to our will but what constitutes a good policy and a just war.’ 67 It is appropriate for van Creveld himself to describe the long-term consequences for modern strategists and military professionals who continue to retain what he would call an inappropriate Clausewitzian strategic outlook:

[i]t is becoming clearer everyday that this line of reasoning will no longer do. If only we are prepared to look we can see a revolution taking place under our very noses. Just as no Roman citizen was left unaffected by the barbarian invasions, so in vast parts of the world no man, woman or child alive today will be spared the consequences of the newly emerging forms of war… such communities as refuse to look facts in the face and fight for their existence will, in all probability, cease to exist. 68
CONCLUSION

For however long that there is competition in human affairs, there will be strategy. It is the link between actions and objectives—the plan, means or method by which the former achieves the latter. Strategy and strategy-making are therefore perpetually self-renewing. While the competition in question is war, then there will always be those who devote time and intellectual energy into devising theories that explain its nature and offer insight into what is required for its successful prosecution.

While certainly not the central theme of this article, it is worth spending a moment reflecting on what all of the above means to present-day Australian strategic circumstances. There is no doubt that, if presented with Australian strategic dilemmas, each of the strategists discussed would have valuable individual insights and critiques. The more important point, however, is what their contributions, taken in total, represent. As this article has demonstrated, strategy-making is not dead. Innovation and original thinking mark true advancement in contemporary strategic affairs. Why then is the strategic debate in this country so shallow? Arguments over various items of kit, bouncing back and forth between well-established defence policy-makers and analysts—most of whom have past or current ties with the Department of Defence—does not constitute a healthy strategic debate. Postulating various remedies for recruiting shortfalls or retention haemorrhages are not solutions of strategy. Quarrels concerning the utility of an Abrams tank, a Joint Strike Fighter, or a new class of destroyer are not the building blocks of strategy.

These issues are related and important but not the essence of strategy-making. Strategy is about how to use force to achieve policy ends—and we do not discuss this topic nearly enough. If the five theorists discussed were presented with the range of Australian strategic problems they would without doubt each come up with a range of unique perspectives and solutions. The problem is that, in the main, they would have to thrash it out among themselves—there would be few people in this country prepared, qualified or inclined to engage them.
Contrary to van Creveld’s original—and deliberately provocative—contention, the importance and influence of his own ideas, and those of the other strategists discussed, shows that Western strategic thought is not in hiatus or decline. Rather, it progresses and adapts, albeit perhaps at a more measured pace than in some eras past, in response to the often unfamiliar and uncomfortable challenges of modern-day conflict. Most importantly, the strategists discussed have incrementally added to the foundations of strategic thought laid down by the great names of the past, and in some cases are still doing so. In their own way each has questioned the status quo of prevailing thought. Through questioning comes innovation and through innovation comes improvement. While none of the authors discussed may turn out to be Clausewitz’s heir, each is a worthy successor.

ENDNOTES

2 In an article of greater length, many other worthy theorists might have been included. The US airpower advocate and architect of strategic paralysis theory, John Warden III, is one such example.
9 Boyd, ‘Strategic Game’, p. 44.
10 Boyd, ‘Patterns of Conflict’, p. 28.
12 Ibid, p. 79.
13 Ibid, p. 28.
16 Ibid, p. 131.
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18 Ibid, p. 454.
19 Ibid, p. 432.
21 Ibid, p. 978.
22 Ibid, p. 976.
23 Ibid.
24 Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, p. 455.
26 Ibid, p. 977.
27 Ibid, p. 980.
28 Ibid, p. 977.
31 Ibid.
33 Ibid, p. 2.
34 Ibid.
36 Ibid, p. 113.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, p. 4.
40 Ibid, p. 115.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid, p. 5.
44 Ibid, p. 8
48 Gray, Modern Strategy, p. 129
49 Ibid, p. 130.
50 Gray, Another Bloody Century, p. 13.
52 Gray, Another Bloody Century, p. 13.
The End of Strategy?

55 Such themes have been since picked up by and expanded upon by a number of authors including, most recently, the retired British General Sir Rupert Smith in his book: The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Allen Lane, London, 2005.
56 van Creveld, The Transformation of War, p. ix.
57 Ibid, pp. ix–x.
59 van Creveld, The Transformation of War, p. 192.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid, p. 32.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid, p. 191.
65 Ibid.
68 van Creveld, The Transformation of War, p. 223.

The Author

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IDEAS AND ISSUES

REACH AND PRECISION

NOT THE REAL REVOLUTION FOR AIR POWER, AT LEAST NOT YET

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JASON THOMAS

ABSTRACT

A need for a cultural shift in the application of Australian air power is gaining wide acceptance. Reach and precision were seen as the key enablers for the application of future air power—an attempt to re-focus on more than the air-to-air approach that has guided air power theory for numerous decades. Without actually recognising it, these concepts are starting to parallel land manoeuvre theory. The drive for reach and precision at the strategic level will offer great benefit to the application of tactical air power. Only by combining this with synchronised land manoeuvre, and a greater tailoring of air power capabilities, will we actually achieve the effects desired by the new air power theorists.

Sometimes we feel we are so busy stamping ants, we let the elephants come thundering over us. ¹

Office in United States Air Force, Directorate of Doctrine, 1974
INTRODUCTION

We seem to be living in an age where military changes are occurring at an unprecedented rate. Whether this is a product of a greater level of access to the thoughts of others or the continuing rise of technology itself as a major societal driver is unclear. We have had jargon and fad terms—‘waves’, ‘RMAs’, ‘nets’, and ‘effects’—thrown at us with startling frequency over the last decade. The enemy has also changed; they are now ‘asymmetric’ and continuously seeking ‘weapons of mass destruction’ to achieve their ends. This paper considers the promise of air power and discusses how it can be best utilised against an enemy that is, for all Western militaries, non-traditional in nature.

Determining what really has changed in the military realm will be the task of historians in 20 years time. Attacks similar to those that occurred in the United States on 11 September 2001 were written about in novels well before becoming a reality, as has US engagement in the Arab oil region. Yet now these fictional events have become realities that affect the conduct of the Western way of war. Further, in the United States at least, the inter-service doctrine arguments continue and are probably serving to cloud the fundamental changes that are needed in the application of both land and air power. The current war in Iraq may be forcing convergence or, at the very least, stalling divergence; however, that war will end and, as history has shown, peace is not a unifying force for fiscally constrained Services.

The astute observer, studying the Israel/Palestine conflict or the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, would not be surprised at the events unfolding in Iraq. Richard Simpkin, noted military theorist, provided the simplest analogy, even if his focus is primarily with regard to conventional warfare. While espousing the eventual transition of NATO-based conventional forces to a way of war where ‘special type’ forces have a potentially decisive effect, Simpkin states that, in the future, ‘my defensive use of gallant special forces in the cause of freedom is “your” subversionary activism in violation of international law and “his” government sponsored terrorism’. This means that perspective and context are critical, non-material factors in warfighting. Simpkin's analogy defines the adversary at the heart of the Army's Complex Warfighting paradigm.
This is not to infer that jihadists are at the level of skill or training of high-end special forces, but the minimum-mass tactics that they adopt do bear some correlation. This ‘new’ enemy aims to achieve strategic ripples from minor tactical action. Thus, we are now faced with a belligerent of lesser total combat power than a NATO/US/UN opponent—willing to wage war in complex terrain with a high level of non-combatants. Even if the enemy fails to achieve success at the outset, they will still fight and continue to do so for a long time, regardless of the real or perceived progress made in defeating them. This contradicts one of air power theory’s more grandiose claims: ‘We are moving on into a time, where if we know where the target is and we have basic characteristics of the target, we will be able to destroy that target anywhere on the planet.’

Air Power

Two of the cornerstones of air power in the Australian context are ‘reach’ and ‘precision’—enabled by high technology. As such technology develops, offering new hope of success on the battlefield, can we fully use and control it? Or is high-technology air power merely the increasingly precise and aware application of high explosive? How can the grand theories of ‘strategic strike’ apply to an enemy that is difficult for an infantryman to detect on the ground, an enemy that understands the importance of remaining below the ‘detection threshold’ of their conventional, nation-state opponent?

Already the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has recognised that cultural change is needed. The current Chief of the Defence Force, quoted from when he served as Chief of the Air Force (CAF), said: ‘air superiority will not necessarily be won by air combat.’ Reach and precision are the tools of the new air power proponents, and have given older platforms (such as the B-52) a new lease of life. Control of the air is the primary driver for the RAAF and other roles become ancillary, albeit important. Thus, the RAAF contributes ‘reach and precision’, whatever the warfighting context. Whilst that is promising, is it enough and where should it be deployed? More importantly, in the counterinsurgency fight, is this new-found utility increasing the role of air power, or has it pushed it to the edge of conflict?
Ideas and Issues

Lieutenant Colonel Jason Thomas

Australian forces have been defeated even with total air superiority—as in the Vietnam War. They have also conducted operations where the risk of direct military confrontation was low—as in East Timor. Let us assume that air combat assets are now able to turn their efforts to land-focused operations. Let us also assume that maritime surface and sub-surface issues are also relatively settled. How then do we effectively apply air power in a complex warfighting environment?

The default thinking for air-power planners would be to shift to a working of Warden’s rings—‘a methodology for successfully attacking and paralyzing a conventional enemy system in depth’—and a strategic strike targeting-cycle. Here, reach and precision could theoretically achieve the effect required at the strategic level.

Even against the nation-state, this has been contentious (the claims of air power advocates about Kosovo notwithstanding). Numerous exceptions exist, with the Vietnam War being the most notable—and often cited failure—of air power’s war-winning ability. Whether, in the case of Vietnam, this was due to misapplication is irrelevant; the outcome is what matters.

Figure 1: Warden’s Rings

Fielded forces

Population

Infrastructure

Production facilities

Leadership
COERCION AND DETERRENCE

It is arguable that all forms of warfare—and air power in particular—work by coercive force. Future war, with a pervasive and subtly controlled media, will only promote coercive force into greater prominence; constituencies on all sides can be influenced quickly. Despite the argument regarding the decline of the importance of the nation-state in the conduct of conflict, coercion is still likely to remain the ultimate effect of the application of air power. We should not ignore the other side of the coercion coin—deterrence. However, in the Australian military context, we can only deter those threats that are considered slight in terms of national or regional threat. Coercion theory is the stuff of conflict; deterrence the stuff of avoidance.

Richard Pape contends that military coercion attempts to achieve political goals ‘on the cheap’. He wrote this in the context of the application of air power to coercion theory. His contention of fighting ‘on the cheap’ accords with land-based manoeuvre theory such as that espoused by Robert Leonhard, Richard Simpkin and others. New theorists aside, no rational military planner would seek to achieve victory other than by the most inexpensive means possible in terms of life and resources. In an analysis of the will of various high commands during modern war, Pape states that the ‘will’ of the commander is not fundamentally affected (it shifts yet remains unchallenged) until either the capability of his land forces to defend the homeland or the sovereign territory itself is under severe threat: ‘When coercion does work, it is by denying the opponent the ability to achieve his goals on the battlefield’.

So, in the context of past battles, coercion could not be fully leveraged until a direct and persistent threat was placed against the core of a nation (i.e. invasion or destruction). ‘Manoeuvre Theory’ would ascribe this to a case of directly threatening the centre of gravity. We must take the same approach with a low-signature enemy. Coercion attempts to change an adversary’s behaviour by manipulating cost and benefits. The most oft-cited example of the application of air power is the war in Kosovo. Regardless of the effectiveness that will finally be ascribed by history to air power, Slobodan Milosevic was placed in a position (probably when Russia withdrew its support) where the cost of maintaining military power in Kosovo was outweighed by the loss of...
his political power base in Serbia.18 In simple terms, coercion is more likely to succeed ‘when the coercer can increase the level of costs it imposes, while denying the adversary opportunity to neutralise those costs or counter escalate’.19

Air power, with its reach and precision, has been deemed a natural choice for coercive efforts. However, the predominating view in planning such operations is to treat the enemy as a system (i.e. Warden’s rings) and this tends to underestimate an enemy’s ability to adapt—to change the system.20 If the enemy can adapt, then a coercion strategy must be used to place them on the horns of a dilemma. We must lock-in their decision cycle, not just think faster than them. This will not be achieved by simply dropping an ever-increasing amount of high explosive on the enemy, regardless of reach and precision. Such a move will, at best, only force an adversary to change posture. One uniformly conceded point with respect to Kosovo is that the campaign did not stop the Serbian Army from committing its ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the Albanian Kosovars. This only ceased following the withdrawal of the Serbian Army; air power prevented the Serbian Army from practising conventional, but not unconventional, operations.

STRIKE

Yet, who and where are the targets within a dispersed state or non-state adversary in a strategic air campaign? A sustained strike campaign in its traditional form is already somewhat contentious. Reach and precision are of little use if you only have two targets. Yes, the training camp was taken out, but what then? Thus, in the case of the new enemy, we should assume, not in a dismissive manner, that if a strike is possible, it will be carried out. However, it is not a sustained effect.21 The ‘shock and awe’ will, at best, stun rather than break the jihadists and their ilk. They can be shocked, but they will recover because they have time and a homeland (their ideology) that can neither be threatened by high explosive nor physical occupation.

The four broad targets of strike—will, national wealth, human loss, and military power22—become less tangible against the non-state actor. Pape has also identified that those coercion campaigns which use air strike focused on...
‘denial’ as opposed to ‘punishment’ appeared to be the most successful. Both Gulf Wars proved that, in the right terrain, conventional forces are vulnerable to strategic- or operational-level ‘deny/disrupt’ operations. Guerrilla campaigns, unfortunately, are far less susceptible. The guerrilla (in core concept) is not heavily reliant on air power in any form and is able to lower his detection threshold by ‘disappearing’ amongst the people. Indeed, do reach and precision even matter? The concept of a traditional air-denial operation is lost against the non-state actor.

Without going into a deep analysis of the relative merits of strategic strike, we have a troubled doctrine against an enemy with a low strategic detection threshold. Yet air power hurts an enemy when detected in a way that no land system can. How do we develop a synergy to maximise air power’s potential? Royal Australian Air Force doctrine accepts that we fight in a joint domain, thus there exist two other forms of offensive support to the land battle: interdiction and close air support. The requirements driving the improvement in the performance of conventional strategic strike platforms and weapons will offer benefits at the tactical and operational level, both in effect and effectiveness. It is here that precision and reach may come to the fore—with some important qualifications.

INTERDICATION

As far as air interdiction is concerned, there are a number of factors that contribute to success. Mutually supported ground and air operations are recurring enablers of that success. Generally, the force with the initiative is able to lever interdiction, but exceptions do exist (as in the early stages of the Korean War, where UN forces were able to conduct interdiction operations whilst on the defensive).

For the future enemy in complex terrain, simultaneous air/ground operations will be essential for successful interdiction. The contentious model of using proxy forces—such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Kosovo—is neither a validated nor an ADF doctrinally accepted concept. However, any interdiction operation against a low-signature enemy requires synchronisation. Moreover, the strategic driver of

... the strategic driver of reach and precision, synchronisation, becomes essential for successful interdiction.
reach and precision, synchronisation, becomes essential for successful interdiction. Intelligence capability will also be a primary enabler and again it is likely in future war that human or signals intelligence (HUMINT/SIGINT), as opposed to image or electronic intelligence (IMINT/ELINT)-type capabilities, will be a key factor. It is also likely that, in the future, interdiction will require a far greater level of responsiveness. Reach and precision will not be enough. We are seeing this trend emerging already with the so-called ‘Time Sensitive Targeting’ process.

In order to coerce, we must somehow place air power in a position where it can achieve maximum effect. Air power is, despite increasing technological improvements, still essentially a blunt instrument. It destroys mainly large and static targets. But blunt instruments can force an enemy into a dilemma. Leonhard refers to one classic land warfare dilemma:

The introduction of the chariot led to revolutionary tactical changes…[W]arfare previously had been conducted by men on foot.[This] for the most part demanded that the troops be packed into dense comparatively unwieldy blocks …[and] the introduction of the arrow-shooting chariot put such formations on the horns of a dilemma, compelling them to carry out two contradictory movements at once. If infantry stayed together they would come under long distance fire to which they had no counter, and for which, moreover, they represented an ideal target. If, on the other hand, they took the opposite course and dispersed, they would be easily overrun.

Classic interdiction, despite the advances in technology, may actually become more difficult. Synchronisation of effect will therefore need to be coupled with reach and precision. To deny the adversary the ability to adapt, we must present multiple dilemmas—and not just in the military realm. Coercion theory also demands that we offer up dilemmas. Yet, do air power planners just modify Warden’s rings or take another approach to achieve maximum effect, and how do we accomplish this in the complex warfighting realm?

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Air power is … a blunt instrument … [that]
destroys mainly large and static targets.

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The answer [to complex warfighting] lies in an often-neglected application of air power—close air support.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

The answer lies in an often-neglected application of air power—close air support. It is apparent from reviews of literature, in particular those concerning the Korean War, that close air support has been a role which has suffered in peace but has been brought to a high level of skill by Western air forces in times of war.

For the modern ground commander, close air support is not a case of ‘if’ but rather ‘when’, and it is not in the classic model of 30 minutes prior to H-hour. Responsiveness is required both throughout the depth of an Area of Operations (AO)—easier with reach and precision—and temporally, which is not as easy, as persistence of air assets remains a problem unless you own large or numerous combat aircraft.30 Pervasive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), not necessarily airborne, appears also to be an as yet unfactored close air support requirement.31 Here the greatest gaps lie, but so too do the best opportunities present themselves.32 Indeed, pervasive and cued ISR facilitates all aspects of air power.

The First Gulf War provided the classic conventional dilemma. If Iraqi forces moved, air power would detect and destroy them; if they remained static, they risked being literally out-maneuved by conventional and special land forces33—the unsolvable dilemma.34 This example blurs the lines between what is classic close air support and battlefield air interdiction; however, we need to present this dilemma to the adversary in the complex warfighting domain. The vital need for close co-ordination of close air support with land manoeuvre forces is the tactical clue we need to apply at the operational and strategic level.35

Integrated close air support has the potential to provide immediate tactical effect that helps mitigate the strategic ‘ripple’. Minimum-mass tactics have one inherent weakness: they are extremely vulnerable when compromised or disrupted. A sustained air presence offers a greater possibility for protecting ground forces, both in offensive and defensive manoeuvre. Ground forces work at a level far more likely to achieve detection. Any attempt by the guerrilla to raise their level of effect by massing to counter our own minimum-mass tactics further increases their detection threshold and allows the easier application of air power. Any attempt
by the guerrilla to lower their threshold reduces their ability to apply effect at a meaningful level or, at the very least, slows their tempo. This allows time in a long conflict to cue the necessary and vital non-military solutions needed to win.

Pape also contends that, in any combat operation, hitting the combatant hurts more than most air power theorists centred on Giulio Douhet will concede.36 Defence forces do just that—defend a nation or even just the idea of a nation. Even a rag-tag militia will protect its popular base or face being disenfranchised by its people. Military power is part of any national power model and, in wartime, combatants remain legitimate targets until disabled. While they remain effective, you can hit them and hit them hard. Without spilling into the morally bankrupt analogy of ‘bleeding an army white’, the degradation of any military power (regular or irregular) will profoundly affect the enemy, albeit for a short period of time.

Whilst more mobile and harder to detect than other targets for air power, military targets can be shaped by direct military action (land- or air-based) into a change of posture and this can raise the detection threshold for a further response. Synchronisation of land/air action offers the promise of throwing the enemy into a decision cycle that they can neither contain nor control. Tactical defeat leads to operational effect, which will enable strategic ends.

What is probably holding air power back in the close air support domain is neither technology nor over time training, but rather a mindset:

The lower the intensity of a conflict, the more the outcome depends on ground forces. Winning ‘the hearts and mind of the people’ is best achieved face to face. Therefore, in counter-insurgency/guerrilla wars or against an enemy who lacks a fully mechanised conventional force, air will normally support ground manoeuvre.37

Despite the quality of the remainder of Jack B. Eggington’s work, in this instance he could not have made a more dangerous statement. This is the conventional view of war. To coerce the jihadist, we must offer up the same dilemma that we impose on the conventional enemy, regardless of the level of war.
CONCLUSION

Reach and precision will matter, but enduring, rapid and pervasive effect will be just as important, not only with respect to applying conventional air power but also employing ISR assets. Synchronised ground and air reconnaissance will lower the detection threshold and rapid response must occur when required; on-time and on-target is not enough, it must be on-occurrence.

Mass will not be as critical as causality. To provide a dilemma to the jihadist, we must not allow them sanctuary or respite. Such operations require endurance and continued presence. Coercion through rapid response and enduring containment will push systems to the limit.

There seems to be a lack of understanding in the extant RAAF doctrine that, now and into the future, tactical effect will echo into the halls of strategy. What should be said is:

In all forms of conflict, at all levels of war, the outcome depends on a synchronised joint force. Coercing your adversary and ‘shaping hearts and minds’ is best achieved face to face with the promise and presentation of potent threat. Therefore, in future wars, at all times air and land power must be mutually supporting. 38

It is unlikely to remove the requirement for the airman and the soldier to take great risks when operating in or above complex terrain and this will not stop the new enemy from initially taking up arms. However, it is likely to ensure that the military component of a solution to any conflict is executed with maximum effect and with minimal loss of life on both sides. So reach and precision are not enough.

Mass will not be as critical as causality.

Endurance, speed of response and the operational art are the new challenges for air power. These challenges are only partially solved by the promise of high technology. Most have to be met in the minds of those that plan and execute air warfare. Are you ready for the challenges that await?
IDEAS AND ISSUES

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JASON THOMAS

ENDNOTES

1 RJ Hamilton, *Green and Blue in the Wild Blue: An Examination of the Evolution of Army and Air Force Airpower Thinking and Doctrine since the Vietnam War*, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, AL, June 1993, p. xxv.


9 Goodman, p. 22.


11 I do not assume away these issues in terms of their real difficulty, but they are worthy of a separate paper.


16 Ibid, p. 314.

17 Ibid, p. 4.


REACH AND PRECISION

20 Ibid, p 130.
27 My intention is not to demean the importance of air transport, the rise of the utility helicopter and so forth, but these elements, although essential, remain at best supporting ones in the application of power, land, sea or air.
33 JB Eggington, Extract from ‘Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction: A matter of mutual support at the Operational Level of War’, School of Advanced Air Power Studies, Air University, AL, May 1993, p. 29.
34 Ibid, p. 8.
35 For a very good account of the see-saw battle between CAS/BAI/Strike doctrine, see: Hamilton, *Green and Blue in the Wild Blue: An Examination of the Evolution of Army and Air Force Airpower Thinking and Doctrine since the Vietnam War*.
36 Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, Ayer Co Publishers, 1984, p 174. Douhet wrote in the context of doing away with the horrors of trench warfare, but this polarity has remained in much air power conceptual work.
37 Eggington, p. 22.
38 Author’s modification of existing doctrine; such words would greatly strengthen both AAP 1000 – *The Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power* and LWD 1 – *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*. 

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THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas completed a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering and graduated to the RAAC in 1987. He then served as a troop leader in 2 Cavalry Regiment. On promotion he was posted to RMCS Shrivenham, UK, to study in a Masters of Vehicle Technology, a Masters of Science in AFV design. In 1993, he was appointed as the second-in-command of Support Squadron at the School of Armour. In 1996, he was posted to 1 Armoured Regiment as the Operations Captain. In 1997, he was appointed OC of C Squadron 1 Armoured Regiment. In 1999, he attended Australian Command & Staff College.

In 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas was appointed BM Headquarters 1 Brigade. In mid-2001, he was posted to UNMISET as the S3 HQ Sector West, during which major transitions to the force in the AO occurred. After service in AHQ as the SO1 Science and Technology and SO1 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, in 2006 he assumed command of the School of Armour; he is currently overseeing the conversion training for M1A1AIM, FBCB2 and the M113AS4.
ABSTRACT

This article, based on personal observations and experiences during this time, highlights the complex nature of reconstruction and development operations in Afghanistan (particularly in the southern province of Uruzgan), examines the approaches of the two Provincial Reconstruction Teams and proposes a way ahead for future PRTs and the Australian RTF.

_It is better to let them do it themselves imperfectly than to do it yourself perfectly. It is their country, their way, and our time is short._

T.E. Lawrence, 1917

MAJOR MICHAEL SCOTT

OPERATIONS

REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN ONE MUD-BRICK AT A TIME

LESSONS FROM AN AUSSIE ENGINEER

AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL    ~    VOLUME IV, NUMBER 1    ~    PAGE 47
For seven months in 2006, the author deployed to Afghanistan, embedded with the US Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) from late March until the end of July, then from August to mid-October with the Dutch PRT. Both teams were located in Tarin Kowt, the capital of Uruzgan Province. For both the US and Dutch PRTs, the author was the sole engineer responsible for the development and delivery of Reconstruction and Development (R&D) projects in the troubled Southern province. As a lead element of the first Australian Reconstruction Task Force (RTF), who deployed in mid-September, the author was responsible for reconnoitring and conducting preliminary construction planning.

THE COMPLEX NATURE OF SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan has been in conflict for a number of centuries. The Taliban are the most recent in a long line of conquerors, warlords, preachers, saints and philosophers who have swept through the Afghan corridor, destroying older civilisations and religions and introducing new ones. Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Greeks conquered Afghanistan in 329 BC, followed by the Arabs in 654 AD, Genghis Khan and his Mongol hordes in 1219, the British (with two unsuccessful wars) between 1839 and 1919 and, most recently, during the Cold War when the Soviet Union unsuccessfully invaded between 1979 and 1989. Between invasions, internal fighting for power and control between the major ethnic groups and tribal clans has continually taken place. In fact, the only noted period of stability that Afghanistan has seen was between 1933 and 1973 during the rule of King Zahir Shah, who was removed in a bloodless coup by his brother-in-law. Therefore, the majority of Afghans have rarely experienced peace.

THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN

Afghanistan was in a state of virtual disintegration just before the Taliban emerged in 1994, the country being divided into fiefdoms where warlords fought, switched sides then fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed. The Taliban’s declared aims were to restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan. A talib is an Islamic student who seeks knowledge, compared to a mullah who gives knowledge. By choosing their name, the Taliban distanced themselves from the party politics of the mujahideen and signalled that they were ‘cleansing society’ rather than...
trying to grab power. Initially, the Taliban gained considerable support and swept into power when important and wealthy Pashtun tribal leaders around Kandahar hungered for a unifying cause. This arose from what was a wave of popular revulsion over Kandahar’s criminal warlords.

However, the bulk of Taliban forces came from Pakistan and were educated in extreme Islamic madrassas, where they were not taught the history of their native country, their tribal or clan lineages or traditional rural skills—only militant interpretations of the Quran and how to fight. The Taliban won over the unruly Pashtun south because the exhausted, war-weary population perceived them as saviours and peacemakers. The Taliban hinted that their militia would become a vehicle for the return to Afghanistan of the exiled King Zahir Shah. The initial ‘justified’ support, combined with a well-run Information Operations campaign, which endeavoured to keep Afghans supporting their cause, has ensured that support for the Taliban, while nowhere near as strong as in the mid-1990s, still lingers.

Additionally, there is much speculation as to whether the mysterious Mullah Mohammed Omar, founder of the modern extremist Taliban movement, was born in Kandahar or the Uruzgan Province. What is known, though, is that he was born into a poor, landless peasant family of the Ghilzai branch of the Pashtuns and spent several years during the Soviet invasion in Tarin Kowt, a place described by the Pakistani journalist and author Ahmed Rashid as ‘one of the most backward and inaccessible regions of the country where the Soviet troops rarely penetrated.’ A number of the founding members of the modern Taliban movement—as distinct from the traditional talibs who were as commonplace in the Southern Pashtun villages for many hundred years as ‘frocked Catholic Priests were in the Irish countryside, and who played a similar role’—also originate from Uruzgan. It appears that this link has resulted in continued, though little-publicised, ‘hometown’ support for the Taliban in Uruzgan. Villagers, whether coerced or willing, often provide sanctuary or logistic nodes for the insurgency, as well as a spy network. Spying does not just involve reporting Coalition troop movements, but also identifying villagers who are cooperating with Coalition or Afghan security forces. Earning the trust of a local Afghan takes a long time and often involves covert meetings—away from prying eyes.
Reconstruction and development activities, whether by military and/or civilian organisations, cannot be successfully conducted in southern Afghanistan until the numerous issues and hindrances affecting both the area and these activities are acknowledged, identified and then incorporated into all R&D projects. NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission is to:

Conduct military operations in the assigned area of operations to assist the Government of Afghanistan in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment with full engagement of Afghan National Security Forces, in order to extend government authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan’s reconstruction and contributing to regional stability.¹⁰

The ISAF mission will not be achieved until the obstacles currently in the path of the rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan are removed. Southern Afghanistan is still a hotbed of Taliban and Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) activity. When the Taliban were removed from government in late 2001 by the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, Taliban and insurgent activity decreased. However, the number of insurgents, often coming across the border from Pakistan, has been increasing to a level where they now have greater freedom of movement in large portions of the south than ISAF forces. At the end of 2006 (as winter commenced) Afghan and Coalition Forces had only tentative control in one or two of the six districts in Uruzgan. There are almost daily attacks on ISAF forces and civilians by the Taliban in Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan or Zabul Provinces—often resulting in serious injuries or death.

The southern region of Afghanistan has seen far less development and modernisation, in terms of education, technology, civic administration, governance and religious tolerance, than the remainder of the country. Unlike the northern and western cities, such as Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, the south is purely a rural area with an agricultural-based economy. Operations in Uruzgan can be compared to undertaking patrols during biblical times. Except for the district centres and large towns, vehicles and modern machinery are rarely seen—transportation by donkey is a common sight, crops are tended and harvested by hand and water is mostly hand-drawn from ground wells.
ETHNICITIES

Afghanistan is home to diverse communities that share common experiences through interaction with the dominant states, empires, invading armies, and trade and cultural movements that traversed the land during their thousands of years of history. The different ethnic groups in modern Afghanistan (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmans, Persian-speaking Hazaras, Balochis, etc) straddle the boundaries of the state. Southern Afghanistan is predominantly occupied by Pashtun tribes, with a large Hazara population in the north of Uruzgan. The Hazaras seem to experience less infighting than the Pashtun tribes and appear to be more loyal to the government. Atrocities by all ethnic groups that occurred after the Taliban began to seek control of the country had no precedent in Afghan history and may have irreparably damaged the fabric of the country’s national and religious soul. Distrust and disdain between these ethnic groups presents a barrier to R&D activities and is particularly noticeable in the north of Uruzgan where the ethnic groups have segregated themselves, each vying separately for support and funding.

It was the Pashtuns, approximately 40 per cent of the population, who formed the modern state of Afghanistan and who experienced the greatest infighting. The Pashtun tribes are divided into two highly competitive sections: the Ghilzai and the Durrani. Ahmad Shah Durrani was elected by the Durrans as the first King of Afghanistan in 1747 after a nine-day Loya Jirga, or meeting of tribal chiefs. He attempted to unify the Pashtun tribes with a series of major conquests throughout the region. The power of the Durrani rule was dissipated over the years due to bitter internal clan feuds. One or another of the Durrani clan ruled Afghanistan for over 200 years until 1973, when King Zahir Shar was deposed. It should be noted that the current President, Hamid Karzai, is also a Durrani Populzai, the tribe of Ahmad Shah Durrani himself. The bitter rivalry between the Ghilzai and Durrani Pashtuns intensified in the power struggle occasioned by the Soviet invasion and the subsequent emergence of the Taliban. This rivalry, as well as the infighting amongst the individual Pashtun tribes, is a major cause of tensions and hostilities in the whole of Afghanistan.

What was evident, on attending numerous Provincial Government meetings, was that these tribal differences resulted in decisions...
being made on a tribal basis, displaying obvious favouritism in provincial affairs, including the distribution of aid. In Australia, this bias would normally be treated as corruption; however, in Afghanistan it is the way of life. To paraphrase British General David Richards, the then-Commander ISAF, minor levels of corruption are to be accepted in Afghanistan, but it is only when the local population feels that an act is corrupt that coalition forces should treat it as corrupt.14 Working in such an environment is a challenge, both legally and morally.

FOREIGN ORGANISATIONS

The Uruzgan Governor, Mullah Abdul Hakim Monib, is still on the UN Sanctions List, pursuant to UN Resolution 1267 (1999). This is despite his renunciation of the Taliban and his appointment as the Governor of Uruzgan Province by the President on 18 March 2006.15 Several attempts have been made at the United Nations Sanctions Committee to remove Governor Monib’s name, but he still remains listed, resulting in restrictions being imposed on ISAF forces regarding their dealings with him. The United Nations have ordered their own organisations out of Uruzgan due to the security situation—the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and UN Operations departed in April 2006. Engaging the Government in R&D operations under such restrictions, and without UN specialist support, seriously affects the likelihood of successful work in Afghanistan.

In addition to the lack of UN organisations in Uruzgan, there is also a lack of non-government organisations (NGOs) and foreign contractors in Uruzgan, with a very limited number in the rest of southern Afghanistan. The only donor representatives present in Uruzgan are those embedded in the PRT—USAID and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main reason for this lack of aid organisations and large contractors is the poor security situation. Even local contractors (competent or not) cannot be persuaded to work in Chora or Cahar Cineh Districts. Undertaking any reconstruction and development activity, especially construction tasks, is impossible in Afghanistan without the support of these absent organisations and companies.

EDUCATION

Compounding the above issues is the fact that there are extremely poor levels of education in Afghanistan, especially Uruzgan. A 2006 estimate by the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) presents the literacy rate for the total population as 24 per cent, with males being 31 per cent and females 15.8 per cent.16 This figure has significantly decreased from the 1999...
estimate, given in the CIA World Factbook, of 36 per cent, with a break-down of 51 per cent for males and 15 per cent for females. Two possible reasons for this decline are the continuing breakdown of an education system that relied heavily on female teachers and the flight of educated Afghans during and after the reign of the Taliban. MRRD gave the overall literacy rate for Uruzgan as 4.4 per cent—the average of the four southern provinces being assisted by ISAF forces is 7.8 per cent. Southern Afghanistan is one of the most poorly educated regions in the world, proving to be a big obstacle to the recovery of the country.

Uruzgan is home to very few government primary and secondary schools. The district centres each have single-sex schools that occupy damaged and decaying buildings; however, the majority of provincial ‘schools’ meet under the shade of a tree and are taught by well-meaning but unqualified elders with no resources. The two main hindrances to education in Uruzgan are the Taliban’s continuing efforts to stop non-religious education and the lack of qualified teachers. During the author’s deployment, the Taliban destroyed two schools (both of which the author inspected and contracted locals to repair) and distributed numerous ‘night letters’ instructing students not to attend, teachers not to teach and builders not to construct or repair the schools. Defiance usually resulted in death. This real danger to the teachers is not worth their salary—only US$40 per month. The Taliban threats and the fact that translators for ISAF forces and other organisations can earn between US$600 and US$1200 per month have ensured that there is no incentive for qualified teachers to re-commence their teaching roles in the south. The Provincial Government is doing its best, recently completing eight new schools in the province. They do not, however, have the funding to increase teacher and other government worker salaries, resulting in poor standards in these schools.

The problems above do not take into account levels of higher education, whether tertiary or technical-trade training. Kandahar University, founded in 1990, was closed by the Taliban and only resumed teaching in 2004. In Uruzgan, the US PRT began funding a local contractor in early 2006 to establish a ‘trade school’ to introduce carpentry and block-laying to boys fourteen to seventeen years old. The quality and level of teaching was quite poor by world standards—acknowledged by the head ‘teacher’ who boasted one-year of carpentry training in Pakistan twelve years earlier. Despite relatively high-standard education institutions functioning successfully in the north, such as the Kabul University and the American University of Afghanistan, the rural areas in the south lack any form of higher education and training. Due to the conflicts
over the past thirty-odd years, an entire generation (or more) lacks education and trade qualifications, the few exceptions being those who fled to Pakistan or were qualified before the Soviet invasion. They now fill most medical, legal, engineering and government positions. Without sufficient numbers of qualified locals, the transition from ISAF to Afghan-led reconstruction and development efforts is a very long way off.

GOVERNANCE AND INFRASTRUCTURE

A flow-on from these inadequacies is the general lack of governance and administration skills by both provincial and district officials. Most officials are illiterate. They do not know how to undertake basic governance and civil administration functions, such as writing a forward-looking Provincial Development Plan and budgeting. This lack of skill and the overall disconnection between all levels of government, where the few policies formulated at national level are not passed down to the next level of government, results in frustration and wasted time as the local efforts always linger behind those of the PRT. Doing everything for them would be easy but will not steer them towards a successful independence from ISAF.

Civil infrastructure in the rural south of Afghanistan is very limited, even by other developing-country standards. The existing infrastructure is in a very poor condition, a combination of the ongoing conflict, poor initial standards of construction and non-maintenance. The only sealed road in Uruzgan is the road south to Kandahar—and that is to a poor standard with the middle forty-kilometre section yet to be completed. Only one bridge crosses the Teri Rud (Teri River), allowing access to the north of Tarin Kowt, and is thus a dangerous choke-point. Although each district has a medical centre, the only official hospital is located in Tarin Kowt. It is clean and tidy but has insufficient equipment and facilities and a shortage of qualified medical staff. Uruzgan has no reticulated potable water supply, no sewage-treatment infrastructure and no solid-waste disposal facility, contributing to the reduced state of health. There is no publicly available source of electricity in the province; private diesel and micro-hydro generators only provide minimal lighting. Government buildings are run-down or incomplete and lack any form of communication because of very limited landline telecommunications. A mobile telecommunications network was established in Tarin Kowt in September 2006, reducing the population’s reliance on satellite telephones. All in all, amenities and infrastructure taken for granted elsewhere are non-existent. Reconstruction work is more often first-time construction work.
STATUS OF WOMEN

The status of women in Afghan society declined dramatically with the rise of the Taliban, who ordered women to disappear. Eight thousand female undergraduates at Kabul University lost their places and a similar number of female school teachers lost their jobs, with school closures affecting more than 70,000 female students. Thousands of female civil servants in bloated government ministries, contributing meagre but steady salaries to their extended families, were banned from their offices.

Unlike the rest of Afghanistan, Pashtun women in the south have always been treated as a lower class than Pashtun men. Ahmed Rashid summarises the issue in his book *Taliban*:

The Taliban leaders were all from the poorest, most conservative and least literate southern Pashtun provinces of Afghanistan. In Mullah Omar’s village [in Uruzgan and/or Kandahar] women had always gone around fully veiled and no girl had ever gone to school because there were none … The rest of Afghanistan was not evenly remotely like the South … Outside the Pashtun belt, all other ethnic groups vigorously encouraged female education. Afghanistan’s strength was its ethnic diversity and women had as many roles as there were tribes and nationalities.

In general, the status of women throughout Afghanistan has not recovered and women do not play a large role in public life. They are rarely seen at all in the south; the author did not speak to a local female during his seven-month deployment. Therefore, the size of the available workforce is only at 50 per cent of what it could be if women were fully integrated. Again, this impacts on the type, scale and effectiveness of reconstruction and development activities, particularly in the areas of health and education.

NARCOTICS

The final issue confronting the reconstruction of a viable Afghanistan is opium cultivation. The economy in southern Afghanistan, prior to the Soviet invasion, was heavily reliant on the agriculture industry, much as it is today, despite only 12 per cent of the country being arable land. Orchards were plentiful with a large and well-developed export industry distributing Afghan fruit around the world. The orchards and complex irrigation systems, especially in Kandahar, were destroyed by the Soviet forces, although they did not advance very far into Uruzgan. When the refugees returned to their devastated orchards, they grew opium poppies for a livelihood, creating a major source of income for the Taliban.
the single largest producer of opium in the world and Uruzgan is the third-largest province in production terms. In spring, the ‘green zone’ areas near the few water ways in the province were a beautiful sea of pink as every available field bloomed with poppies.

The British have been given the unenviable task of eliminating the huge opium problem. The solution is not as simple as a total slash-and-burn operation. The farmers must be given a viable option; currently the danger of losing their opium crops is not great enough a risk to get them to change. Lately, skirmishes have occurred between crop minders and Coalition forces who were wrongly thought to be seeking to eliminate the poppies. To find an equal financial option is proving almost impossible. Until then, a blind-eye is being turned on the poppy fields as attention focuses on the larger issue of removing the Taliban and the insurgents. Unfortunately, workers required for R&D activities will continue to be lured away to work in the lucrative poppy industry, especially around harvest time.

To summarise the problems in Afghanistan: a wise old Afghan Mujahed once told Ahmed Rashid the mystical story of how God made Afghanistan:

When Allah had made the rest of the world, He saw that there was a lot of rubbish left over, bits and pieces and things that did not fit anywhere else. He collected them all together and threw them down on the earth. That was Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{23}

\section*{Approaches to Reconstruction and Development}

This section will highlight some of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach to reconstruction and development activities in Uruzgan by the American and Dutch PRTs. The two countries approached their missions completely differently—a combination of differing personalities, national doctrine, past experiences and strategic goals as well as dissimilar guidance from the separate Coalition headquarters for which they worked. The US-led Operation \textit{Enduring Freedom} placed a much greater emphasis on destroying the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups than the ISAF who, while still placing great emphasis on improving the security situation by neutralising the insurgent threat, put a greater emphasis on rebuilding war-torn Afghanistan and helping their people.
US PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

The author was the Engineer Officer for two consecutive US PRTs based in Tarin Kowt and provided the continuity for their projects when they rotated at the start of May. The two US PRTs had a similar structure, although the second PRT was more junior, had less experience and relied heavily on US Navy and Air Force staff. The group of seventy had twelve headquarters staff, a Civil Affairs team of eight, a Force Protection (FORCEPRO) platoon and logistics staff. Lacking in both teams, however, was a civil/construction engineer—a necessity in a situation where 75 per cent of PRT activities in Afghanistan are construction related. The second US PRT did have a US Navy Construction Battalion (Seabee) engineer officer who was a qualified computer hardware engineer—an unneeded qualification in Uruzgan where the only computers the locals own are those donated by the Dutch in August.

Having a dedicated FORCEPRO platoon allowed great mission flexibility in planning, deploying and then modifying missions once ‘outside-of-the-wire’. The PRT was able to deploy at will, independent from the remainder of the US Task Force (primarily special forces), and with whatever force composition required. Force protection would be increased from five or six High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMVWs, or ‘Humvees’) for a visit to a site in Tarin Kowt and its immediate surrounds to up to ten vehicles for a mission to another district. On a few occasions, usually arising from issues in the weekly Governor’s or Security Meetings, missions were modified to extend and visit additional sites where problems needing immediate addressing had arisen—something taken for granted in Australia. Without this flexibility, high-priority projects would have been delayed, incurring an increase in the project cost.

The Civil Affairs Team (CAT; similar to Australian Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams, but with less emphasis on cooperation) planned all aspects of reconstruction and development activities and scheduled missions as required. Project inception (including liaison with Government officials, users and potential contractors and requesting budget approval), project administration, monitoring and close-out of projects were all the responsibility of the CAT. In effect, they were the backbone of the PRT. The members of the CAT were all National Guardsmen, who performed a twelve-month
tour and who came from a wide variety of backgrounds: a university professor, business development manager for an executive jet company, two policemen and a recalled ex-regular officer, to name a few. Unfortunately, none had engineering or project management experience, resulting in poorly run projects that suffered numerous, but avoidable, problems. The worst example was the Provincial Administration Building in Tarin Kowt, which was opened by the US Ambassador in January 2006, completed at a cost of nearly US$250,000. In September, on inspection of the building after local officials reported cracks forming in a wall, it was found that, as the result of lack of supervision by a qualified engineer, the roof was unfinished and building defects in structural members had been hidden by cement-rendering. Rectifying the defects was another major issue as the contract documentation was extremely poorly written and almost impossible to enforce. The problem of deploying CAT or CIMIC Teams without engineers is not limited to the US; the Dutch and Australians in Iraq did the same. The addition of an engineer to the US PRT ensured that tendering and contract management were properly completed, suitable contractors were selected and projects were completed within budget and to the required standard.

On observation, it appeared that the dominant assumption of the US forces at all levels was that elimination of the Taliban and insurgents would resolve the Afghanistan issue. As such, US PRT projects were only ‘gift’ projects rather than part of a long-term development plan for the province. Their sole purpose was to win hearts and minds by giving things such as school books, medical supplies or school buildings to the local population. Government officials, in particular two very proactive and intelligent Soviet-trained engineer ministers, were consulted on individual projects and activities to ensure they met the requirements but they were, however, quite random, disjointed and occasionally ineffective in meeting the expectations of the locals. Originally, roads were built without bridges, schools were built without teachers and farm machinery was provided without a maintenance plan, issues that subsequent PRTs had to address. Projects in the six different districts of the province were uncoordinated and the Provincial Government was not consulted about long-term planning as this was not part of the US strategy.
A NEW APPROACH

The Dutch PRT, heavily governed by ISAF directives, brought to Uruzgan a different approach to reconstruction and development. The fears of the United States—that ISAF forces would not involve themselves in kinetic actions but simply bring a ‘touchy-feely’ approach—were proved unjustified as ISAF forces, in all southern provinces, combined kinetic and non-kinetic activities, attempting to overcome the increasing insurgent problem. The biggest issue that the Dutch PRT faced, aside from the security situation, was a lack of dedicated force protection.

The bulk of the Dutch PRT, including their commander and his headquarters staff, came from the 42nd Tank Battalion, with the staff having successfully worked together for several years, ensuring that both operational planning and logistic administration were executed efficiently and effectively. Once again the CIMIC component was the backbone of the organisation—the face of all R&D activities and planners and schedulers for the PRT missions. The CIMIC group comprised a Major-led headquarters section and included development, medical and agriculture specialists (effectively civilians in uniform) and three CIMIC field teams, led by a Tank Battalion Major and Warrant Officer plus a CIMIC-qualified officer and senior non-commissioned officer. Again there was no dedicated, qualified engineer, the role being filled by the author, then later on a part-time basis by the RTF. Inclusion of specialists, particularly in engineering and health, maximises the outcomes of all meetings and streamlines R&D efforts.

The efficiency and effectiveness of these specialists was counteracted, unfortunately, by a lack of dedicated force protection for the PRT—an issue raised by the PRT commander prior to deployment. Initially, having eleven platoons in the Task Force Uruzgan Battle Group appeared sufficient to provide a platoon to the PRT when required, which was virtually every day. The large amount of proactive patrolling required to keep abreast of insurgent activity, as well as participation in Brigade (Regional Command – South) kinetic operations, quickly resulted in the PRT having to compete for force protection. As a result of insufficient force protection, over half the PRT missions were cancelled, sometimes with only a few hours notice, including missions to: inspect ongoing construction works, attend shuras (a consultative meeting of elders),

Inclusion of specialists
… streamlines R&D efforts.

By not prioritising
[force] protection for the PRT, their effectiveness
was reduced …
assess buildings, and conduct meetings with proactive local women’s groups. Many of these meetings had taken weeks of planning and could not be re-scheduled, causing delays in the overall plan. Construction works were not inspected for up to three weeks, meaning neither progress nor quality could be enforced. By not prioritising protection for the PRT, their effectiveness was reduced and Task Force Uruzgan could not back their kinetic activities up with non-kinetic ones to win the hearts and minds of the local population, the key to defeating an insurgency.

There are two aspects to the Dutch approach that appear superior to that of the Americans. Firstly, the Dutch PRT completed a ‘Conflict Analysis’ to determine all obvious and underlying factors contributing to the security situation. Whereas the US mentality was that the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other insurgents were the only source of conflict, the Dutch determined that, as well as the insurgents, there were other factors that ensured conflict would continue even if the insurgency is defeated. Once all sources had been determined, they were then factored into the overall campaign plan. The biggest cause of conflict after the insurgency, although intertwined with the Taliban, was the intense rivalry between the Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtuns—an issue never raised (at PRT-level at least) by the Americans. In the Chora District particularly, the Ghilzai Pashtuns were supporting the Taliban instead of the Durrani tribes. One reason for this was that the Durrani Pashtuns lived in the district capital, effectively receiving all the aid and US support, while the Ghilzai Pashtuns, on the other side of a mountain in Kala Kala, received none. Essentially the Ghilzai saw the Durrani tribes being favoured by the Americans while they received no support—they were not being won over and their support, therefore, was not with the Coalition Forces. Once this issue had been identified, both tribes were then given special attention by the Dutch PRT, with results yet to be seen.

The second major difference with the Dutch PRT methodology was their plan to assist the Provincial Government in developing a long-term and integrated strategy for reconstruction and development in the province. This would usually be undertaken by UNAMA, who were absent from Uruzgan due to the Governor being...
on their sanction list. This plan, written by the author and endorsed by the Dutch and Australian political advisors and the US Department of State Representative, had the aims of providing an update on the Government of Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development activities and strategies and providing a plan of attack for furthering both the Provincial Government’s strategies and the PRT’s activities.²⁴

At national level, and ratified internationally at the London Conference in February 2006, the plan for reconstruction and development, called the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), is the Government of Afghanistan’s five-year operation-level poverty reduction strategy within the overall development framework for Afghanistan. The ANDS will support Afghanistan’s efforts to meet the UN Millennium Development Goals by 2020. Unfortunately, the Uruzgan Provincial Development Council (PDC) is in its infancy, only being formed after prompting by the US and Dutch PRTs between July and October 2006. None of its members have any experience in formulating long-term strategies in any of the areas of government or budgeting for their plans. Guidance is lacking from the national Government and it will take several years to introduce the ANDS as the planning and budgetary tool for reconstruction and development in Afghanistan at all levels.

To jump start the process, the Dutch PRT are deliberately taking only a supporting role in the Provincial Development Council, minimising the ‘foreign-face’ and attributing PDC activities to the Government of Afghanistan. Through a six-step plan, over a period of nine to twelve months, the Dutch will assist with the functioning of the Council (by mentoring, workshops, etc), help with the formulation of the Provincial Development Plan and help integrate the PRT’s reconstruction and development activities. The ultimate goal, to be achieved within the two years which the Dutch and Australians have committed to ISAF, is that the Uruzgan PDC will have a well-established plan, integrated into the ANDS and National Budget, and that they will be able to implement and continue to evolve this plan with time.²⁵

THE WAY AHEAD

After working closely with the US and Dutch PRTs, the following recommendations should be implemented by future PRT/RTF-type organisations in medium-to-high threat environments for the delivery of reconstruction and development:

- Ensure the PRT has dedicated force protection to maximise reconnaissance and monitoring missions and maintain flexibility in a highly fluid environment.
- The PRT must contain full-time specialists who are qualified and well-experienced in reconstruction and development activities—primarily engineering, health, education and agriculture (as applicable to the area of operations).
At a minimum, a CIMIC Team of four should consist of a qualified technical engineer, a medical specialist (doctor or administrator) and two others with relevant specialisations, for example logistics, transport or communications.

Complete a Conflict Analysis from the outset to determine all factors contributing to the security situation. Account for all factors in the campaign plan and continually update this analysis.

Base the PRT on an existing unit headquarters (for example, an Engineer Regiment or an Infantry/Armoured Battalion) and supplement this with reconstruction and development and CIMIC specialists.

Ensure that all projects aim to achieve a long-term development plan for the area of operations, developed in consultation with local government and representative bodies. This will ensure that local people have a voice, helping to win their hearts and minds, and reconstruction and development will continue after military forces have been withdrawn.

From the author's perspective, the single biggest activity that the Australian RTF can undertake in Uruzgan in the next two years is the establishment of a fully functioning and relevant Trade Training Centre that will continue once Australian tradesmen have departed. The trade school will address a large number of the problems found in Uruzgan: poor levels of education and training, shortages of capable contractors, the re-integration of women into the work force and, ultimately, improvement in infrastructure and civil services. The trade school could not only be Australia’s legacy in Uruzgan but in the whole of Afghanistan where it appears that every province, and PRT supporting the province, use different construction standards and produce tradesmen and trained workers of varying skill levels and abilities. If Australia were to develop Training Management Plans (TMPs) for three- and four-month courses in disciplines such as carpentry, plumbing, electrical, small motors maintenance, first aid and food preparation, the TMPs could be passed up through the Provincial Government for implementation on a national level. This would ensure consistent levels of training, producing qualified workers employable anywhere in Afghanistan. Qualified Australian ‘Train-the-Trainers’ would be required to implement the TMPs until local tradesmen were skilled enough to take over. This initiative is what that the locals want and they have offered to add local trades such as carpet and basket weaving to the syllabus. This would ensure that Australia gives an enduring legacy to Afghanistan and its reconstruction.
CONCLUSION

Bringing reconstruction and development to Uruzgan is a very challenging, but achievable, mission for Task Force Uruzgan. The Province is currently ‘behind the eight-ball’ as there is still a major conflict occurring, poor governance at all levels, no NGOs or International Organisations present and a severe shortage of educated and skilled workers.

Uruzgan must develop and follow a long-term and integrated plan for reconstruction and development to ensure that no funding or effort is wasted. In order to assist in this, both in Uruzgan and in future deployments, PRT-type organisations must conduct a Conflict Analysis to determine all the factors that need to be addressed in the campaign plan. The Taliban and insurgents are not the only ‘enemies’.

Rebuilding Uruzgan cannot be done alone with a troop of Australian engineers—regardless of how hard they work to live up to their reputation of always getting the job done despite the adversities they face. The three big areas for reconstruction and development in Uruzgan are infrastructure, education and health. As such, the organisation must be structured to undertake all of these activities. The only way that ISAF, and similar assistance forces in the future, will succeed in Afghanistan is if non-kinetic activities are carried out, addressing these needs, as well as kinetic actions. This is the only way to win hearts and minds.

ENDNOTES

1 T. E. Lawrence, Twenty Seven Articles, Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917, pp. 126-133.
3 Ibid, p. 9.
4 Rashid, p. 21.
6 Ibid, p. 32.
7 Ibid, p. 283.
8 Ibid, pp. 23–24.
The Author

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OPERATION RAMP – THE LEBANON EVACUATION

OVERVIEW OF A MASS NEO AND SOME LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

COLONEL ANDREW CONDON

ABSTRACT

Operation RAMP was a mass Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) from Lebanon carried out by the ADF during the war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. This article provides an overview of the conduct of this successful interagency operation and examines Whole of Government preparations for future interagency operations.

INTRODUCTION

The Australian Defence Force (ADF), as part of a whole-of-government operation, conducted a successful mass Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) of Australian Nationals (ASN) and Approved Foreign Nationals (AFN) from Lebanon during the 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah forces in July and August 2006.
The mass NEO, codenamed Operation RAMP, was the ADF’s support to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) for the evacuation of Australians from Lebanon after the outbreak of hostilities. The operation makes an interesting NEO case study in itself, given the scale (5300 ASN and 1350 AFN evacuated), complexity, and length of the evacuation chain (over 10 000 km). However, the dominant ‘interagency’ nature of the operation also provides a solid context for discussing preparations for inevitable future interagency operations.

This article outlines the events that led up to the outbreak of war between Israel and Hezbollah forces and examines the implementation and successful conduct of Operation RAMP. It then discusses a number of issues to be taken into consideration in the planning for any future out-of-region mass NEO, and concludes by using Operation RAMP as a vehicle to discuss ADF and whole-of-government preparations for future expeditionary interagency operations.

THE ROAD TO WAR

- 12 July 2006: Hezbollah guerrillas capture two Israeli soldiers and kill up to eight on the Lebanese border. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert calls it an “act of war” by Lebanon. 2500 Australians in Lebanon are registered with the Australian Embassy in Beirut.
- 12–16 July 2006: Israel conducts an air and ground offensive into Lebanon. Hezbollah fighters based in southern Lebanon launch Katyusha rockets into Israel. Casualties on both sides. Significant international media coverage.
- 17–19 July 2006: The international community begins to step up its evacuation of foreigners from Beirut as thousands of Lebanese flee their homes. Now 12 000 of an estimated 25 000 Australians in Lebanon are registered with the Australian Embassy in Beirut.
- The international community faces a staggering number of evacuees with estimated numbers of foreign nationals in Lebanon including:
  - Canadians: 40 000
  - Filipinos: 30 000
  - Australians: 25 000
  - Americans: 25 000
  - British: 22 000 (inc. 10 000 with dual nationality)
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- French: 20,000
- Other nationals: numbers unknown

**OPERATION RAMP**

At 4:15pm on 18 July 2006, Headquarters 17 Brigade was advised verbally of a potential NEO for Lebanon. On 19 July, Headquarters (HQ) Joint Operations Command issued a Warning Order for the establishment of Joint Task Force (JTF) 629 to deploy on Operation RAMP. On 19 July, the JTF 629 Advance Party deployed and the main body concentrated in Sydney. Within the following thirty-six hours, the Joint Task Force main body deployed. The JTF consisted of a headquarters with a support element, a Liaison Officer (LO) group, two Evacuation Handling Centres (EHCs), and a C-130 Detachment.

In addition to the JTF, two Defence Supplementation Staffs (DSS) were deployed. The first DSS deployed with the JTF Advance Party and the second deployed with the remainder of the Joint Task Force. In all, 120 ADF personnel deployed to Lebanon, Cyprus and Turkey. Defence personnel also reinforced the DFAT Crisis Centre in Canberra and were central to the Canberra-based whole-of-government evacuation planning.

Immediately upon arrival in the Area of Operations, the JTF commenced Non-combatant Evacuation Operations continuously for ninety-six hours. The JTF operated Evacuation Handling Centres in both Turkey and Cyprus, and extracted evacuees from Beirut Port on a daily basis for a further six days. On the second day of the operation, the JTF established a RAAF C-130 air-bridge from Cyprus to Turkey as part of the onward movement of Australian evacuees. The JTF also mounted a short-notice sea evacuation on day three to extract Australians from Tyre Port in southern Lebanon.

By D+6, over 4800 Australians had been evacuated from Lebanon and Operation RAMP had become the ADF’s largest Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). This mass NEO involved seventeen Australian chartered ship movements, over 470 bus movements, and twenty-two Australian charted aircraft and C-130 movements. By the end of the 34-day war, over 5300 Australians and 1350 Approved Foreign
Nationals had been evacuated. The JTF also facilitated the medical evacuation to Australia of an Australian Army United Nations Military Observer who was serving at a UN observation post in Southern Lebanon during the first week of the war. She had been seriously injured in an armoured personnel carrier traveling at high speed that was attempting to avoid a bomb crater in the road.

By day thirteen, the last Australian chartered ship departed and the JTF had commenced drawing down and was postured in ‘Over Watch’ to support any further evacuations. With only small numbers of Australian evacuees continuing to depart Lebanon, on 17 August 2006 (D+28), the JTF completed its drawdown, bringing JTF 629 to a close. By the following week, all ADF personnel had departed the Area of Operations.

THE EVACUATION CHAIN – 3 TO 6 DAYS AND 10,000KM

Once Australian evacuees had registered with the Australian Embassy in Beirut for evacuation, the evacuees were advised of the time and place Australian Evacuation Assembly Areas (EAA) would open. Once at the EAA, the evacuees were checked for valid passports and visas and put into family groupings before being moved by bus to the Australian Evacuation Handling Centre (EHC) established in Beirut. At the EHC, further processing and briefings were conducted. Once the shipping had arrived, the evacuees were moved again by bus to the Evacuation Point (EP) at Beirut Port. At the EP, the Lebanese immigration officials stamped passports prior to the evacuees boarding ships.

The Australian-chartered ships had ADF personnel aboard, as well as Australian Federal Police (AFP) personnel on board most ships from Cyprus. These personnel escorted the evacuees on their sea journey. The chartered ships varied in size from that of a Sydney Harbour ferry to a cruise liner. The charted ships varied in size from that of a Sydney Harbour ferry to a cruise liner. The ships took up to twelve hours to travel to either Cyprus or Turkey from Lebanon. Most evacuees suffered from sea sickness and there were many severe cases leading to dehydration. At the ports of arrival, the evacuees cleared local immigration and were processed through an Australian EHC. After being married up with their luggage, they were then moved by bus to accommodation where they were generally held for between twenty-four to seventy-two hours before being moved by bus to an airport to meet an Australian chartered aircraft. In some cases, this bus trip took up to ten hours for those flying out of Turkey. Given the limitations on getting chartered flights into Cyprus—due to the peak Mediterranean holiday
season being in full swing—a C-130 air-bridge was established to transport some evacuees from Cyprus to Turkey, which had a higher capacity air hub. The evacuees then faced up to another twenty-four hours of flying before finally reaching destinations in Australia.

KEY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF OPERATION RAMP

There were a number of contributing factors to the successful outcome of Operation RAMP and this article discusses four of them: Rapid Mounting and Deployment, Interagency Operations, Liaison Officers, and Public Affairs. The cooperation and support of the Governments of Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus, Lebanon and Israel to the evacuation operations need to be also acknowledged as a key contributing factor to the success of the evacuation operations.

RAPID MOUNTING AND DEPLOYMENT

The JTF was formed, mounted and commenced force preparation within twenty-four hours of notification. Vital to the success of the rapid mounting was the use of standing high-readiness headquarters for the JTF HQ and standing high-readiness Force Elements to form two Evacuation Handling Centres. The Army EHC was provided by 4 Field Regiment and the RAAF EHC was provided by 386 Expeditionary Combat Support Squadron. Fortunately during the initial planning there was no attempt to form an ad hoc JTF Headquarters in order to create a Joint HQ with tri-service staffing. The important point is a Task Force does not require a joint HQ to be a Joint Task Force. An existing HQ will always be able to mount, deploy and establish full operational capability in a shorter period of time than an ad hoc Headquarters consisting of tri-Service personnel who have no existing equipment, procedures and collective training. Thus, future short-notice JTFs should continue to be based on a standing HQ with integral communications and administrative support, with a task-organised JTF structure based on existing capabilities at a state of high readiness.

INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

There will always be room for improvement in all interagency operations. However, the whole-of-government preparations and investments in developing contingency plans that have basic doctrinal interagency team structures for crisis response situations were critical to the successful conduct of this NEO.
This interagency offshore operation was led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and included the mobilisation of personnel from DFAT, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA), Centrelink, the AFP and the ADF. The cooperation between the agencies and the integration of their personnel into the Emergency Response Teams (ERTs), one each in Lebanon, Turkey and Cyprus, was very effective. Where interagency issues required resolution, the very positive approach by the personnel in the ERTs assured those issues were addressed very quickly. This was also the case in the DFAT Canberra Crisis Centre where ADF personnel were also employed and provided the detailed logistic planning for the interagency evacuation operations.

LIAISON OFFICERS (LOs)

The ADF Joint Task Force was very modest in size compared with the JTFs from the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and France. These nations had significant military capabilities in the region. The UK JTF Headquarters, which was deployed from the United Kingdom, was only marginally smaller than the entire ADF Joint Task Force.

The ADF Joint Task Force was able to utilise international military capabilities in the region through the effective employment of Liaison Officers. There had been some preliminary strategic-level liaison and negotiation prior to the departure of the JTF from Australia. However, as the situation on the ground was changing rapidly, the local liaison function was critical. The support generated and maintained from international military capabilities in the region through the network of LOs was particularly crucial to the early successes in this NEO.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA)

The PA function for a high-profile media activity such as Operation RAMP can be demanding and time-consuming at the tactical level. Channel Seven and Channel Nine had deployed television crews and presenters, and there was a plethora of international and freelance TV crews covering the crisis. The JTF PA effect had...
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instant strategic impact, giving the focus of media coverage in Australia a more positive sentiment. The media reported on the difficulties and complexities of the crisis but also reported on the action being taken by the ADF and the success of these efforts.

Interestingly, the PA effect was also found to be a force multiplier in terms of the second- and third-order effects impacting on the morale of JTF personnel. There was a positive impact on morale from the high profile recognition (in TV, radio, print and web-based media) of the tactical-level effort of deployed personnel. Also generated was a greater sense of ‘connectedness’ for families of JTF members, who could see what their loved ones were achieving. This then fed back to JTF personnel, contributing further to the morale of the deployed force.

PREPARING FOR FUTURE INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

THE NATURE OF FUTURE INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

Over recent years the ADF has been involved in a number of successful inter-agency operations in addition to Operation RAMP. One of the more notable of these was Operation ANODE to Solomon Islands in 2003. This was led by DFAT, with the AFP re-introducing law and order, AusAID and other departments strengthening economic, governance and institutional capacity, and the ADF providing security and logistic support.

The reality is that many future ADF expeditionary operations will be part of a whole-of-government effort in the form of an interagency operation. The requirement to deploy elements of Defence in support of Australian interests is likely to be in assisting other nation-states, particularly those in the arc to Australia’s north.

Department of Defence involvement will often be required for states that are unable to deal with natural disasters or other events that lead to a breakdown in local security and law and order. However, if the ADF alone is used to tackle security issues, then often only the symptoms will be addressed, rather than the underlying causes. Apart from natural disasters, the sources of instability are likely to be such issues as unemployment and poor economic conditions, land rights and local
political infighting, corruption and financial instability, or other governance-related concerns. Addressing such issues is not the ADF’s core business and it will take a whole-of-government approach to establish an interagency Task Force to deal with such matters.

STRIVING FOR PROFESSIONAL EXCELLENCE IN INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

Professionals of any discipline will always seek continuous improvement in their effectiveness and efficiency, and those professionals who will be involved in interagency operations are no exception. While lessons from previous crises have been addressed, and further whole-of-government enhancements are being implemented in light of the Operation RAMP after-action review process, further discussion and debate is encouraged as part of the striving for professional excellence in interagency operations.

There will be an argument that the ADF should remain primarily focused on a capability to conduct close combat in a joint environment in Defence of Australia, not on short-notice interagency offshore deployments. The conventional wisdom has always been for the ADF to maintain its major focus on combat capability for high intensity conflict— and that there will be on-occurrence subsequent adjustments for all other less demanding requirements—is the best risk management approach. However, with interagency-type deployments becoming far more likely, investing in preparations for future such operations is warranted.

WHAT DOES GOOD WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT PREPARATION FOR INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS LOOK LIKE?

There is a body of work required to develop and validate the specific outcomes required of whole-of-government preparations for best practice interagency operations. Rather than attempt to discuss and define the whole-of-government deliverables in preparation for future interagency operations, the remainder of this article will focus on proposing what the mechanism may look like in order to achieve a high level of effectiveness.

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There is a body of work required to develop and validate best practice for interagency operations.
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DEFINE OBJECTIVES

A clear set of whole-of-government preparation objectives need to be defined and validated, along with a corresponding set of metrics in order to be able to assess achievement, or progress toward achievement, of best practice interagency preparations.

ASSIGN WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY

Assigning responsibility for achieving the whole-of-government preparations for potential future interagency operations must be formalised. This would include providing the responsible organisation with both the authority and the resources to undertake assigned tasks.

DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN INTERAGENCY DOCTRINE

While already there has been significant whole-of-government investment in policy and plans for interagency operations for a range of crisis situations, the development and maintenance of procedural-level interagency doctrine is required if best practice is to be achieved.

INTERAGENCY INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

Professional development in the field of interagency operations for personnel across a range of government departments in the form of a short course (one or two weeks) would be a useful start to a training regime. Such a short course, perhaps run by the ADF Warfare Centre (ADFWC), would cover interagency doctrine including terminology, organisational structures, capabilities, and planning processes. A number of historical case studies, in order to provide some operational context, would be useful, prior to a series of scenario-based Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTs) and desktop war games.

INTERAGENCY COLLECTIVE TRAINING

A commitment to a collective training regime is a very strong indication of the level of professionalism of any organisation in any discipline. Military personnel are well schooled and take for granted a number of aspects of conducting operations to which most personnel in other departments will have had very limited exposure.
This is particularly the case for command and control aspects of conducting operations and the operation of a Command Post (CP). Thus, collective training activities such as Command Post Exercises (CPX) are a useful method for collective training. A CPX is a good platform for developing, refining and practicing interagency staff procedures. Desktop scenario-based planning exercises (PLANX) are also useful for refining and practicing interagency doctrinal planning processes.

A Field Training Exercise (FTX) in the form of a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) is then the ultimate commitment to a collective training outcome. Not only does a full-scale FTX provide the opportunity to allow an organisation to enhance its collective competency, but it is also a good platform to expose each government department to other departmental cultures and methods.

Differences in cultures and expectations of deployed personnel are best addressed in a training environment. Departmental cultural expectations may appear at first glance to be minor issues. However, if not identified and managed to provide a common level of expectation, the interagency leadership of a deployed interagency Task Force will have significant morale issues to deal with in order to maximise the effectiveness of the deployed organisation. Such issues will include expectations about living conditions and conditions of service entitlements. Expectations of sharing non-core business duties such as watchkeeping and phone picquets, and other general duties within a camp environment, are all best sorted out and agreed in a training environment, and not in the first days of managing an actual crisis. Managing expectations of limitations on recreation activities when rostered ‘off duty’, such as alcohol consumption, curfews and fraternisation may appear superfluous or unnecessary, but if left unaddressed can have significant impacts.

... the ADF is in a good position to take the lead in promoting the enhancement of preparations for future expeditionary interagency operations ...
CONCLUSION

Operation RAMP was a mass NEO conducted during the thirty-four day war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. In broad terms this was a permissive NEO but not without risk from the threat of collateral damage and incidental threats. The situation was made all the more complex by its scale in terms of the number of evacuees involved. It was also conducted out of region, producing an evacuation chain that stretched for 10000 km.

There appears little doubt the ADF will more often than not be part of future expeditionary interagency Task Forces. Much of what was achieved by this NEO is credited to the whole-of-government preparations for what was a significant interagency operation. However, in striving for excellence in interagency operations, the ADF is in a good position to take the lead in promoting the enhancement of preparations for future expeditionary interagency operations to a higher level of professionalism.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Colonel Andrew Condon is a General Service Officer of the Australian Regular Army who graduated from the Royal Military College–Duntroon in 1985. He has commanded at Troop, Company and Battalion levels within Land Command. Colonel Condon is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and has previously had operational service in Iraq in 2004 on HQ CJTF7. He is currently posted as the Commander of the Force Support Group of 17 Brigade. In July 2006, Colonel Condon deployed on Operation RAMP as the Commander of Joint Task Force 629.
JOINT INFORMATION OPERATIONS

THE ROAD AHEAD

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CHRIS WATSON

ABSTRACT

This article discusses Joint Information Operations in the light of the January 2006 release into the public domain of the United States Department of Defense’ (US DoD) Information Operations Roadmap dated 30 October 2003.1 It considers how Information Operations (IO) has and is evolving in the West with particular reference to US IO policy based on the disclosure of this previously ‘SECRET NOFORN’ (No Foreigners) classified document.

A ROAD WELL TRAVELLED

By 2006, Information Operations could no longer be considered a new concept. During the 1990s, Western nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and coalitions executed IO with mixed success in countries as diverse as the former Yugoslavia, Iraq and East Timor. By the mid-1990s, the United States had established the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center in San Antonio, Texas—affectionately known as the ‘Juicy 2C’, it had formerly
been called the Joint Electronic Warfare Center. In 1999, the author was witness to its transformation into the Joint Information Operations Center. Almost simultaneously (and quite coincidentally), the United Kingdom stood up its Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations in the Ministry of Defence.

Australia led the international Information Operations community in the quality of its comprehensive IO doctrine (Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.13 Information Operations) published earlier in 2002. That year also saw NATO in protracted discussions regarding their original IO policy document. Militaries expect to see policy precede doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures to follow on from doctrine. Yet, the evolution of Joint Information Operations in the West since the 1990s shows that, in the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, there was no disciplined, logical development. For many ‘IO warriors’, the vast majority of whom are American, the most significant was US Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, published in October 1998. Well conceived, but overly simplistic—particularly in relation to command relationships and the control of IO—this document subsequently hampered the effective development of Joint Information Operations in the United States. It provided inadequate direction for IO staffs and described Information Operations principles in insufficient detail. Fortunately, the innovative character and independent spirit of the Australian Defence Force (ADF)’s Information Operations doctrine writers ensured they avoided making the same mistakes when it came to releasing its Australian Defence Doctrine publications.

Among Western-style democracies, the United States, United Kingdom and Australia are the most advanced national proponents of integrating Information Operations into operations. With the assistance of the United States and United Kingdom, NATO too has shown itself able to employ effectively rudimentary Information Operations in several peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations well in advance of written doctrine.2 Surprisingly, as the only nations that supplied forces resulting in a regime change in
Iraq, the United States, United Kingdom and Australia are still unable to agree about a definition and the basic principles of Information Operations. Disparate organisations, such as NATO with twenty-six countries and the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team in our own region, have reached agreement about policy, doctrines, and standard operating procedures for Information Operations. The US military, however, subject as it is to a competitive inter-Service environment and influenced by the interagency politics of central government, has found agreement on what Information Operations actually is very difficult to achieve. As a result, even the founding members of the US-led ‘Coalition of the Willing’ failed to harness the full potential of Information Operations in Iraq. Constraints within each nation, although less so in the United Kingdom, also hamper unilateral planning and the execution of Joint Information Operations.

There is, however, high-level agreement of IO’s potential. After Kosovo, Admiral Ellis, USN (then the Commander-in-Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe, and Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe) stated that, ‘properly executed, IO could have halved the length of the campaign.’ General Cosgrove, when he was the Commander of the International Force East Timor, noted ‘when this is over it will be asked what is different between this operation and others. One of those things will be that we conducted IO.’ This senior recognition of Information Operations and its potential benefits has been reflected by substantial investment, especially in staff requirement terms, in the United States and, to a lesser but still notable degree in the United Kingdom. The Australian doctrinal definition of Information Operations by 2002 was ‘the coordination of information effects to influence the decision-making and actions of a target audience, and to protect and enhance our decision-making and actions in support of national interests.’ Yet, the ADO (Australian Defence Organisation) has preferred to invest the bare minimum in Information Operations whilst still anticipating, and admittedly on occasion gaining, high-yield results. The keywords in Australia’s definition are: ‘coordination’, ‘effects’, ‘influence’, ‘target’, ‘protect’ and ‘national’. The *raison d’être* for Information Operations is to better coordinate our efforts so as to influence a target audience or protect our own decision-making processes for the benefit of Australia. Simply put, the ADF definition exemplifies a commonsense approach in defining Information Operations, and was similar, in terms of affecting the decision-making process, to that of Canada, the United Kingdom and NATO. The approach did not, however, reflect the 1998 US joint definition which placed a focus on information and information systems rather than on people.
Operations

Lieutenant Commander Chris Watson

The United States and the development of IO

Understanding the US position on Information Operations is important for the ADO. The influence of US concepts and doctrine in coalitions is often all-pervasive and it is essential to analyse their approach to any warfare discipline if we are to work successfully together and continue to provide sought-after 'niche' capabilities. During the First Gulf War of 1991, the US military recognised the advantages of harmonising and coordinating those elements of warfare which were able to affect information gathered from both friendly and hostile sources. Although a new concept emerged, described as 'Command and Control Warfare' (C2W), it was simply about undertaking warfare in a more efficient, coordinated and focused manner. If alive today, Sun Tzu would no doubt recognise the principles involved and suspect plagiarism. Yet C2W was quickly overtaken by newer buzz phrases and concepts, including Information Warfare, Information Superiority and Information Operations, although the principles remain sound.

Essentially, C2W sought ‘to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions.’ It was used to best effect during the First Gulf War in 1991 when, during the ‘left hook’ manoeuvre, all the elements of C2W (Military Deception, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Operations Security, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Physical Destruction) were employed in an integrated manner to devastating effect, bypassing Iraq’s defensive positions. The United States had recognised that powerful synergies were to be gained by coordinating joint assets more effectively, yet all too soon one of the weaknesses of the US military system became apparent. ‘Rice bowl’ issues between different military and Service communities hampered the development of C2W and, until recently, had a similar effect on the development of Information Operations. The Army’s PSYOP group was protective of its direct access to the force commander and vested interests within the EW community and other agencies were not prepared to accept a loss of control and influence in their own areas of specialisation. In addition, the newly-formed Joint C2W staffs in the combatant commands were perceived—wrongly in some Headquarters (HQ), perhaps rightly in others—to be trying to control every aspect of operations. As
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C2W training and knowledge was limited and still evolving, it is understandable that consistent success in the employment of C2W was never going to be achieved as efficiently or quickly as it might have been. Despite these problems, the benefits of the concept were recognised and the evolution continued as Information Warfare emerged, essentially as C2W conducted in a crisis environment.

However, by the late 1990s peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations were being conducted with less emphasis on physical destruction and more on influencing ‘hearts and minds’. This led to the recognition that, in peacetime, there was also the requirement to provide commanders with a broader information advantage and C2W and Information Warfare transformed into Information Operations. In the United States, C2W had been the responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but subsequent reorganisations saw the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) (the former US Atlantic Command), US Space Command, and then US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) being given the lead responsibility for Information Operations. To a degree, this reflected the confusion that had for several years hampered the practice and development of Information Operations in the United States. Among the many stakeholders in Joint Information Operations, none was able to persuade the rest where the boundaries of Information Operations should be drawn, nor how Information Operations ought to fit into the command and control chain. Some stakeholders were content to misinterpret or reinterpret the Joint Information Operations Doctrine. This has not been an issue for either the United Kingdom or Australia, which have fewer ‘rice bowls’ to protect in their smaller and more compact defence forces.

As noted earlier, the Joint Information Operations Center replaced the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (which had earlier replaced the Joint Electronic Warfare Center). Although the principles of C2W remain valid, in the United States there were no longer Joint Centers for either C2W or EW.6 This was unfortunate because both C2W and Joint EW had a strong military focus, whereas Information...
Operations has had, until recently, a much broader vision, supporting areas well beyond traditional military boundaries. The US DoD had somewhat briefly come to view C2W as a subset of Information Warfare employed in operations that specifically attack or defend the Command and Control target set. Now, however, with the arrival of the Roadmap and the supporting 2006 reiteration of Joint Publication 3-13, both C2W and Information Warfare have been removed from the US Information Operations lexicon. Is this perhaps an accurate indication of the speed of concept development to trashcan in modern warfare doctrine development?

Information Operations has often lacked discipline, focus and rigour in both planning and execution in national, bilateral and coalition operations. Transforming a concept into reality in any field will raise unanticipated issues. There are still many problems and inconsistencies facing Information Operations that have yet to be addressed effectively. From a basic lack of coordination in areas such as Information Operations staff complements in the US Combatant Commands, and also incidentally in the ADF, through an absence of commonality of definitions, to measuring the effectiveness of Information Operations tasks designed to achieve targeted effects, Information Operations has yet to achieve maturity.

Maybe this is because Information Operations seemed to become so all-encompassing. From the five capabilities envisaged by C2W, Information Operations grew to employ a dozen or more, depending on which national doctrine one examines. To the original five C2W pillars, the United States added in 1998: Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, Computer Network Operations (CNO), counter propaganda, and several others. In Australia there are 14 ‘information elements’ or tools available to the Information Operations planner. This is not to say that Information Operations uses the entire range of assets or effect-providers all of the time. For example, in peacetime it makes good sense to protect Defence Information Infrastructure 24/7/365, but an Information Operations plan is not necessarily required to achieve that protection. However, if hostile intelligence services are known to be trying to
gain certain access or information in the Defence Information Infrastructure, it makes sense to develop a defensive Information Operations plan. Such a plan would coordinate relevant elements such as information security, physical security, communications security, Computer Network Defence, Operations Security, network management, counterintelligence and, perhaps, Public Affairs in order to deter the threat.

A ROADMAP FOR IO

In 2001, the US Quadrennial Defense Review Report identified IO as one of six critical operational goals that would focus transformation efforts within the US DoD. The Defense Planning Guidance for the financial years 2004–2009 supported the concept of Information Operations as a core capability of future forces.

Thanks to the US Freedom of Information Act, it is now possible to analyse the declassified sections of the 2003 Information Operations Roadmap (‘the Roadmap’) and view how the United States intends to develop Information Operations and rectify some of the issues that have dogged its progress as a ‘silver bullet’. This document comes closest to articulating exactly what the United States wants to achieve with Information Operations; its main objective being that IO will become a core competency in the US military so as to enable the United States to dominate the information spectrum. This means IO will be on a par with air, ground, maritime and special operations.

The US Joint Staff realised in the mid-1990s that well-planned Information Operations can provide an effective lead for whole-of-government and multinational interagency planning. To integrate IO effectively into a National Effects Based Approach (NEBA), and to achieve this either independently or within a small coalition of coordinated NEBAs, is a worthy aim. A National Effects Based Approach campaign would employ all appropriate national elements of power to avoid the development, or subsequent escalation, of a crisis or conflict. It would have the potential to provide governments with disproportionate benefits in economic terms, as well as protecting its citizens and minimising risks to its armed
forces. The Roadmap recognised the value of this holistic approach. Due to the three-year gap between authorship and release, many of the fifty-plus recommendations contained in the Roadmap may by now have been executed. It lists the purpose of Information Operations as follows:

- To alter decisions and behaviour in order to support our own objectives by influencing the will of selected target audiences;
- To degrade (potential or actual) adversary capabilities by exploiting information and information systems;
- To achieve and maintain our own Information Superiority by protecting our own decision makers and systems;
- To prevent adversary IO from having an effect on our own will and capabilities by anticipating and neutralising the effects of adversary IO.9

The first two are offensive or, in more politically correct terms, ‘proactive’ in nature. Surprisingly, readers of the ADO’s recent Information Superiority Concept10 will find no mention of developing any proactive capabilities to affect an adversary’s access to information.11 The US DoD sees Information Operations very much as a military discipline, despite there being no reference to the military in those purposes described in the Roadmap. This is perhaps a tacit recognition that, in the Information Age, there is effectively no gap between information effects at either end of the food chain (i.e., what a President or Prime Minister says and what a soldier does as a result). Everything between the two is part of a supporting process enabling the military to accurately execute the politician’s demands. Each level of command—strategic, operational and tactical—is blurred at the edges with regard to information effects. Political sensitivities have caused Information Operations conducted at the strategic level to be called by different names: in the United States it is ‘Strategic Communications’; in the United Kingdom, the ‘Information Campaign’ or ‘Information Strategy’; and in Australia, ‘Shaping and Influencing’. In conceptual transformation terms, it provides the information component of a National Effects Based Approach.

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Each level of command—strategic, operational and tactical—is blurred at the edges with regard to information effects.

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…tactical actions will continue to have disproportionate strategic effects, especially if they are recorded by the media.
During the 2003 Iraq War, the image of US service personnel placing the Stars and Stripes over the head of a statue of Saddam Hussein was transmitted instantaneously around the world. Indeed, the action of one individual in a tactical environment can have immediate strategic implications. Moreover, tactical actions will continue to have disproportionate strategic effects, especially if they are recorded by the media. A government’s inability to control access to ‘open source’ information, together with the volume and speed of transmission, means that military IO planners at one level must consider the impact of effects on all other levels (including secondary and tertiary, and intended and unintended effects). This is no simple task. With experience, it is clear that Information Operations are most effective if firstly integrated with, and then employed in support of, whole-of-government activities. Information Operations may include, and Strategic Communications will include, effects intended to influence government decision-makers and their policies at the strategic level. Yet, military personnel are more comfortable when IO is targeted to exert influence at the operational and tactical military levels. The public servants in the major government departments responsible for coordinating Strategic Communications must ensure that their efforts are synchronised with those effects being designed by military IO planners at the lower echelons, and vice versa. Mindsets within government departments will require adjustment, and solutions devised to best determine how to integrate Information Operations into those National Effects Based Approach or National Effects Based Approaches that incorporate multinational and multiagency planning. The Roadmap indicates the willingness of the US DoD to embrace such whole-of-government planning.

Then–US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld personally approved the Roadmap and directed the Services, Combatant Commanders and US DoD agencies to support fully its implementation. By issuing the Roadmap five years after the Joint Information Operations doctrine, and before the publication of any Joint Information Operations tactics, techniques and procedures, the United States is seeking to redefine (or more clearly define) IO by clarifying who has authority for Information Operations and by placing clear boundaries on its execution. At the same time, the US DoD wants to delegate maximum possible authority to its regional Combatant Commanders to plan and execute Information...

Mindsets within government departments will require adjustment ...

... the United States is seeking to redefine (or more clearly define) IO ...

Operations and include it comprehensively into the contingency planning of all Joint HQ. As such, Information Operations are to be integrated into new operational concepts and included in training and exercises.

In order to achieve its objectives, the Roadmap recognised that there were force development issues that would require: the support of all four-star Combatant Commanders; a streamlined organisational system; well-defined C2 relationships; and a trained and educated Information Operations career force, with joint programs to develop dedicated Information Operations capabilities. The Roadmap identified three areas requiring immediate action: fighting the net, improving PSYOP, and improving network and electro-magnetic attack capability.  

**FIGHTING THE NET**

The United States is in the process of building an information-centric force. The US military, more often than not, now views a network as the operational centre of gravity. The Roadmap recognises the vulnerability in networks and recommends remedial actions such as layered defence in depth to preserve network security, maintain decision superiority, and preserve warfighting capability. One of the Roadmap recommendations is for the US DoD to implement a strategy for defending its networks, including:

- robust network defence infrastructures; networks that slow down and channel attackers;
- vertical and horizontal situational awareness and configuration management for effective C2 of defensive operations;
- a Computer Network Defence concept of operations allowing varied defensive postures; and
- the ability to maintain critical network functionality whilst reconstitution operations are ongoing.

**IMPROVING PSYOP**

The Roadmap recognised that PSYOP needed to be improved—that themes and messages employed in a PSYOP campaign must be consistent with the broader national security objectives and with national-level themes and messages. This reflected the themes adopted by their closest allies several years before. In other words, PSYOP professionals had to learn how best to support public diplomacy efforts.
best to support public diplomacy efforts. One example of this might be using PSYOP to support statements made by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her visits to an operational theatre.

The Roadmap stressed that PSYOP must refocus on adversary decision-making processes well in advance so as to support aggressive behaviour modification in time of conflict. Of course, PSYOP products need to be based on an in-depth knowledge of their audience’s decision-making processes, must be of high quality, and be capable of rapid dissemination in the area of operations.

In the United States, PSYOP is restricted from targeting American domestic audiences, US military personnel, and US news agencies and outlets. However, information intended for foreign audiences is increasingly likely to reach US domestic audiences, as do public diplomatic statements. The Roadmap noted that it is essential for policy differences between different government departments and agencies to be resolved where they affect themes and messages. This may be easier said than done.

The Roadmap likely directs that Combatant Commanders be given new rules of engagement for some specialist elements of PSYOP and, by now, they will certainly have approval authority for those PSYOP products that do not contain substantial political or strategic content or implications. In the past, US PSYOP products often had to be approved at an unrealistically high political level. This has fortunately not been the case in Australia. Whilst the media and media reactions will always have a large part to play in the success of retaining national support for operations, Western politicians cannot demand their media support the party line, nor can military planners expect them to do so. The media will always be there as a part of our strategic environment and be looking to fill an information vacuum. A classic example of how not to coordinate PSYOP and Public Affairs activities occurred in 2005 when US PSYOP personnel allegedly burnt Muslim corpses in Afghanistan and were permitted to speak freely to media representatives who were, rather surprisingly, in the same location at the same time.¹⁴

The US, UK and Australian militaries have differing relationships with their respective Public Affairs staffs. However, as their credibility depends on accuracy and consistency, all seek to never deceive the media. Information Operations and Public Affairs staffs must coordinate in order to both disseminate specific themes and

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The key for IO is choosing to release information to the media on one’s own terms …
messages to our adversaries and to defend our own commanders. This is not an immoral or underhanded approach—but merely commonsense—and reflects the activities of Western politicians towards their constituent base. The key for IO is choosing to release information to the media on one’s own terms, for example as regards the timing and quantity of material released. In a National Effects Based Approach, politicians, diplomats and senior officers must be informed of the essential elements of the plan, namely to stay ‘on message’ and ‘on time’. General Colin Powell, in the lead-up to the First Gulf War in 1991, was convinced that Saddam Hussein was unintentionally receiving mixed and confusing messages from the White House. A Strategic Communications Plan should help avoid such damage and support targeted effects.

**IMPROVING NETWORK AND ELECTRO-MAGNETIC ATTACK CAPABILITY**

When the Roadmap was published in 2003, it noted that, when implemented, its recommendations would effectively jump-start a rapid improvement in Computer Network Attack (CNA) capability. It foresaw a robust offensive suite, to include a full range of electronic and CNA capabilities, with increased reliability through improved C2, assurance testing and refined tactics and procedures. To prevail in an information-centric environment, the United States requires its forces to dominate the electro-magnetic spectrum with attack capabilities. Reading between the lines of the declassified SECRET NOFORN Information Operations Roadmap is not easy and several paragraphs relating to CNA have been deleted in their entirety. However, one can see that USSTRATCOM in Omaha, Nebraska—traditionally the HQ for intercontinental ballistic missile targeting—has been given command of CNA forces. The Roadmap requires the United States to develop a common understanding of the ‘CNA Battlefield’. CNA can be executed at the tactical, operational or strategic level and, as noted earlier, the separation between the three can be blurred for information effect. Sometimes, tactical means of access (for example by special forces or a human intelligence asset attacking a

To prevail in an information-centric environment, the United States requires its forces to dominate the electro-magnetic spectrum with attack capabilities.

The US DoD sought a decision on what constituted a ‘use of force’ when undertaking or responding to CNA.
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computer server directly) might enable strategic targeting and vice versa. It appears that Combatant Commanders such as United States Pacific Command have been delegated authority to employ ‘all CNA weapons except those that entail high risk of knowledge transfer to enemies’. The Roadmap definitely recommended that the Combatant Commanders be delegated specific CNA targets.

The Roadmap also recommended a legal review for the use of CNA. The US DoD sought a decision on what constituted a ‘use of force’ when undertaking or responding to CNA. A legal review is required to determine what level of data or operating system constitutes an attack, to clarify which actions may be taken in self defence and whether an action is an attack or an intelligence collection operation to exploit a network rather than degrade or destroy it. Such a review would also determine the legality of using a third party’s network as an unwitting host to deliver an attack and what level of certainty about the origin of an attack may be required before the United States can respond in kind. In the Roadmap, the US DoD also required a legal regime to respond separately to domestic and foreign sources of CNA and exploit powers available in the US Patriot Act 2001 and Homeland Security Act 2002.

The Roadmap anticipates that USSTRATCOM will recommend three category groups to determine how the use of CNA weapons will be authorised. It is noteworthy that the administration has clearly accepted CNA to be a weapon, rather than a tool, asset, or equipment. The CNA Weapon Categories envisaged by the Roadmap in 2003 were:

Category I. Capabilities allocated to Combatant Commanders.
Category II. Capabilities pre-allocated to an Operations Plan.
Category III. Capabilities requiring Secretary of Defense/President approval.

Perhaps those with the least controversial effects, such as an untraceable attack on a known computer hacker, will be in the first category, and its execution approved by the Regional Combatant Commander. The ramifications of an attack being detected and more importantly traced back to the US Government may, combined with the importance of the target and associated collateral effects, mean that a CNA capability is allocated to the third category. As for the deployment of any weapon, it is essential to have a high degree of confidence in its success and intended effect. The Roadmap contains the requirement for an integrated test range to increase confidence in CNA and better assure predictable outcomes. This facility will comprise an integrated network

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... it is essential to have a high degree of confidence in its success and intended effect.
to support exercises, testing and the development of CNA, EW and other Information Operations capabilities. This network will clearly need to be capable of accurately simulating a potential adversary’s network—a type of wargaming trainer for cyber warfare.

The Unified Command Plan in 2002 stated that USSTRATCOM’s role in Information Operations should include supporting the Combatant Commanders for planning and USSTRATCOM was specifically assigned responsibility for integrating and coordinating Information Operations that cross geographic areas of responsibility or cross Information Operations core capabilities. In theory therefore, military CNA/EW/PSYOP and so forth, which target a terrorist group operating globally, would be coordinated by USSTRATCOM. Meanwhile, there are over fifty recommendations in the Roadmap, one of which is ‘to empower STRATCOM to undertake critical precursor activities for successful Information Operations planning and execution’. Therefore USSTRATCOM has a key role to play if Information Operations in the United States is to reach its maximum potential. Clearly the Roadmap gave the Nebraska HQ the authority to be proactive in peacetime and conduct forward planning for Information Operations.

A FORK IN THE ROAD OR A U-TURN?

The Roadmap considers there to be three broad Information Operations functions, five integrated IO core capabilities and supporting capabilities. The functions are:

1. to deter, discourage, dissuade and direct an adversary in order to disrupt his unity of command and purpose;
2. to protect US plans and misdirect those of an adversary, allowing the United States to mass its effects to maximum advantage while the adversary expends resources to little effect; and
3. to control adversary communications and networks and protect US systems, thereby crippling an adversary’s ability to direct an organised defence whilst preserving US command and control.

All of these depend on early preparation of the Information Operations battlespace through intelligence, surveillance and forward planning, including considerable research in human factors analysis. The new ‘core capabilities’ of Information Operations are identical to the old pillars of C2W except that CNO have replaced Physical Destruction. As the US published this Roadmap seven and a half years after its C2W Joint Doctrine, it is

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The new ‘core capabilities’ of Information Operations are identical to the old pillars of C2W …
very much a case of plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. 23 Like any core military competency, Information Operations cannot be successfully executed without diverse supporting and related capabilities. From a C2 perspective, there is the recognition in the Roadmap that supporting capabilities serve core competencies aside from Information Operations. Public Affairs and Civil Military Operations are seen as complementary to help keep Information Operations ‘on message’, and the Roadmap redefines Information Operations as

the integrated employment of the core capabilities of EW, CNO, PSYOP, Military Deception and Operations Security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own. 24

So by 2003, we observed the United States freely admitting (although not intended for public or foreign consumption) that following two Gulf Wars, the Balkans conflict and various other operations during the 1990s, the Services, Combatant Commands and agencies had no common understanding of Information Operations. They did not uniformly equip and train for Information Operations or adequately develop IO requirement generation. As a result, Information Operations were not fully integrated into plans and orders.

The Roadmap states three reasons why Information Operations have been narrowed to five core capabilities. All the capabilities are operational in a direct and immediate sense—they achieve critical operational effects or prevent the adversary from doing so. The Roadmap also noted that the capabilities are inter-dependent and need increasingly to be integrated in order to achieve the desired effect. Of course, this will depend upon the operation, the Commander’s intent and the area of operations. (For example, in the Solomon Islands, it is unlikely that there would have been a requirement for CNO or military deception). Finally, these capabilities define those which the Services are expected to organise, train, equip and provide to the Combatant Commanders.

The previously broad conceptualisation of Information Operations is considered by the United States to dilute its ability to focus on decision-making processes. However, Australia and the United Kingdom may be as unlikely to follow this narrow Roadmap perspective as they were to follow the original US Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. They can still be expected to continue to use all tools
available to them to conduct Information Operations and, at the strategic level, to support their Shaping and Influencing/Information Campaigns. Whether five Information Operations capabilities or a dozen are to be employed, accurate Information Operations planning and execution will require a breadth and depth of specialist support and expertise. For example, access to a legal officer with a grasp of a commander’s awareness of the limits on rules of engagement and knowledge of international law is essential for any Information Operations planning effort.

HIGHWAY OR INTERSTATE

One of the weaknesses recognised by the United States has led to the recommendation to establish an Information Operations career force with two categories: IO planners and IO capability specialists. In fact the US Air Force had already anticipated this requirement and 7 per cent of all officers between major and colonel were in the US Air Force Information Operations stream by 2001. Some deeply ingrained cultural norms will have to change as isolated communities of personnel such as PSYOP specialists come to consider themselves primarily as Information Operations personnel. This is not something that the United Kingdom and Australia seem prepared to do or indeed recognise the need for. Their preference is to train general staff officers on short Information Operations courses and then employ them in IO-specific staff positions whilst they consolidate and employ their knowledge. This solution only works providing there is adequate quality of training and provision of sufficient IO-trained staff and designated HQ Information Operations staff positions. Without these essentials, it is unrealistic to expect the ADF to be effective in planning and executing Information Operations in peace or war at any level of command. 25

Without these essentials, it is unrealistic to expect the ADF to be effective in planning and executing Information Operations in peace or war at any level of command.
Another Roadmap recommendation concerned intelligence support to Information Operations. Although small, the United Kingdom has led the Western world in this field with a substantial number of intelligence staff dedicated to supporting Information Operations in such fields as human factors analysis, infrastructure analysis, target systems analysis and system of systems analysis. The United States has now also recognised that commanders need incisive and detailed intelligence support to allow them to make an educated choice between the use of conventional kinetic weapons and non-kinetic options that Information Operations may provide. To date, Australia has been reluctant to follow the UK example, and within the ADO’s smaller intelligence community there remain significant changes to be made if Information Operations planners are to be provided optimal rather than *ad hoc* intelligence support.

Information Operations have now been tested in conflict, peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations, and in national, bilateral and coalition environments. Information Operations is a proven (if still fledgling) military discipline, and one that is now recognised by the United States as a ‘core war-fighting capability’. However, before publication of the Roadmap, Information Operations were in danger of being overwhelmed by newer concepts developed within the US-driven construct of ‘Transformation’. Since the United States identified the need to transform its forces, transformation has become a growth industry. Network-centric warfare, Information Superiority, Effects-based Operations (EBO), National Effects Based Approach and other concepts and terms sounded a cacophony, distracting Western militaries from the logical goal of first realising the heady potential of a concept already at least a decade old, yet one still waiting to be effectively implemented. Indeed, one might therefore question why a German Bundeswehr-led NATO team is responsible for Information Operations experimentation before IO has been fully realised in its present form.  

… within the ADO’s smaller intelligence community there remain significant changes to be made if Information Operations planners are to be provided optimal rather than *ad hoc* intelligence support.
Information Operations are indeed closest in nature to EBO. The United Kingdom’s view of EBO is that future military operations will need to place increased emphasis on establishing influence over the mind of an adversary whilst keeping casualties and collateral damage to a minimum. Effects Based Operations offer the possibility of achieving this aim through a combination of both physical and psychological effects.27

The broad utility of EBO grows from the fact that they are focused on actions and their links to behaviour, on stimulus and response, rather than on targets and damage infliction. Some may consider the introduction of a new concept of EBO as a nugatory step before Information Operations have been properly exploited.28 Information Operations planners have always tried to achieve specifically targeted effects to support an objective in order to match an endstate. Might the new core capability of the United States and this newer EBO concept be synonymous? If so, then Strategic Communications/Shaping and Influencing are actually the information component of a National Effects Based Approach.

Edward Smith suggests that EBO can be described as operations in the cognitive domain because this is where human beings react to stimuli, come to an understanding of a situation, and decide on a response. To create an effect, an action first must be seen by an observer who will interpret and understand it against the backdrop of their prior experience, mental models, culture, and institutional ties, and then translate this perception into a ‘sense’ of the situation. Finally, this sense will be balanced against the options perceived to be available to produce a set of decisions and the reactions that constitute a response or ‘behaviour’. This cycle of actions and reactions will be repeated many times and at multiple levels during the course of a crisis, a war, or even a peacetime interaction.29 I suggest that most Information Operations planners would think Edward Smith’s description as also accurately describing their primary function.

Effects-based Operations can be described as operations in the cognitive domain...
OLD ROAD OR NEW ROAD

It seems that Information Operations are in real danger of being hijacked by the overarching concept of ‘Transformation’. The US military is proud of its tradition of experimentation and the USJFCOM is leading the process of Transformation. The Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) is now one of NATO’s two strategic commands. It was established in June 2003 as a result of the 2002 NATO Prague Summit. This new NATO command emphasises the close and deepening influence of the relationship with USJFCOM.

Within the US military, Transformation effectively requires changing the form and structure of its military forces together with the very nature of its military culture and doctrine. The USJFCOM–ACT relationship is growing in influence, perhaps disproportionately to the needs of the warfighter. It is considered by USJFCOM to be ‘a vibrant and powerful linkage, which is output-oriented and forms the foundation for common understanding and synchronisation of transformation across the Alliance’. It is questionable how this USJFCOM–ACT relationship, with two such unequal partners, will affect the continuing development and use of IO. Should it be discarded or only bypassed, to be visited only by military historians? If IO is to be the core capability Donald Rumsfeld intended it to be when signing the Roadmap in 2003, should it not receive the required framework with which to properly support the US military machine? It may yet be subsumed into an EBO construct in similar manner to C2W’s demise from Information Operations. It is worth considering, however, that Information Operations already provides the multi-purpose wrench in the military’s toolbox when planning for a National Effects Based Approach with the other elements of national power. When such strategic planning occurs in the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, it tends to be both military led and military inspired.

In the Summer 2005–06 edition of the *Australian Army Journal*, the editor noted that ‘the reality of our times is not a choice between the black and white of conventional
and unconventional warfare … but a grey world of merging conventional and unconventional alternatives.\textsuperscript{31} Those nations that practice and invest in both Shaping and Influencing and IO in peacetime will have an advantage in times of crisis and the early stages of conflict, while those who ignore the Information Operations threat or miss opportunities to execute it and fail to be proactive may discover they did so at their peril. In peacetime, Shaping and Influencing and Information Operations are potent but underutilised tools available to government. Employing both to avert the recent eruption of violence in the Solomon Islands is but one example of a missed opportunity.

Clearly, the US military, some years after the release of the Roadmap, ought by now to be well along the path of implementing its recommendations and indeed 2006 saw the issue of the second edition of Joint Publication 3-13. The unresolved issue now is not so much how to integrate Information Operations into military operations, but rather how to persuade politicians and public servants to coordinate the efforts of their respective departments into a National Effects Based Approach so as to provide whole-of-government forward planning with the direction, legitimacy and promise of success a nation is entitled to expect.

ENDNOTES

1 On 26 January 2006 the 74-page Information Operations Roadmap was posted to the Internet <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB177/info_ops_-roadmap.pdf>. It was released under the US Freedom of Information Act following a request by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

2 NATO conducts a two week C2W/IO course for its officers at the NATO school, Oberammergau, Bavaria, which is of a similar standard to the Australian Defence Warfare Centre's Information Operations Staff Officers Course.


6 On 1 April 2006 a new Joint Electronic Warfare Center was established as a formation within the Joint Information Operations Center, which itself has doubled in size in the last five years, now numbering some 300 personnel.


9 Ibid, p. 11.


11 In ADF doctrine, IO seeks to enable decision superiority and promote freedom of action for ADF decision-making processes.


13 *Information Operations Roadmap* p. 6


16 In ADO terminology, a Strategic Shaping and Influencing Plan, agreed by the Director Joint Operations and Plans and signed by the Chief of the Defence Force.

17 *Information Operations Roadmap* p. 54–56

18 Ibid, p. 56

19 Ibid, p. 57.

20 Ibid, p. 29.

21 Ibid, Recommendation No. 10, p. 70.

22 Ibid, p. 20.

23 French: ‘The more things change, the more they stay the same.’


25 In an earlier paper prepared for VCDF and COSC submission in 2004 (classified), the author identified 25 positions to be the minimum requirement to provide adequate support to offensive and defensive Joint IO/Joint Effects planning and execution to all levels of command in the ADO. In contrast the United States has several thousand personnel dedicated to IO.
26 The Multinational IO Experiment is conducted within the framework of a Multi National Exercise series forged jointly by USJFCOM and the NATO Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia, previously the HQ of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. In 2005 the author represented the ADF as the IO officer in an IO cell construct within a Standing Joint Force HQ for Multinational IO Experiment 2.


28 Shaping and Influencing and IO are effects based in nature. This is especially relevant in situations where target audiences can be influenced by the information they rely upon to make decisions and where rules of engagement or force capabilities limit the full range of kinetic military options.


THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Commander Chris Watson transferred to the RAN from the Royal Navy. A Principal Warfare Officer and ex–Cold War diplomat in the USSR and Poland, he has been XO of HMS IRON DUKE, First Lieutenant of the amphibious helicopter carrier HMS OCEAN and COMGIBMED’s J2 during the First Gulf War. He has contributed to IO policy, planning and operations for the US, UK, NATO, WEU and the ADF ranging in diversity from the Global War on Terror, West Africa, the Balkans, Iraq, East Timor, the Solomon Islands and the NATO IO Working Group in Brussels. A graduate in Political Theory and Institutions, he was awarded a Meritorious Service Medal for his work in IO with USEUCOM. He is now serving on exchange with the Royal Malaysian Navy as part of the Malaysia–Australia Joint Defence Program.
LEARNING FROM THE THREE LIONS

TRAINING AND TACTICAL LESSONS FROM THE BRITISH ARMY’S INFANTRY BATTLE SCHOOL

MAJOR JUSTIN ELWIN

ABSTRACT

This article discusses a number of training and tactical lessons from the British Army’s Infantry Battle School. Key amongst these is the use of ‘immersion’ training ideologies to improve the effectiveness of infantry platoon commanders on operations and in the urban environment.

THE PLATOON COMMANDER’S BATTLE COURSE

The Platoon Commander’s Battle Course is an intensely demanding fourteen-week course, ten weeks of which are devoted to tactical training. The British training regime is based on a progressive sequence which moves from the ‘explain’ and ‘demonstrate’ phases to ‘imitate’ and ‘act’. Theoretical instruction is consolidated using the TEWT (tactical exercise without troops) as a means
to further develop tactical acumen and bridge the gap between theory and field training. Demonstrations and syndicate modelling form a fundamental part of the first three weeks of the course. Platoon commanders embark on their first exercise in week four when, rather than assuming the role of platoon commander, they are mentored by a captain acting as the platoon commander. This method ensures that students are both mentored and led. The fifth week of the course includes a test exercise when the students are assessed both on their ability as a platoon commander and on their basic fieldcraft.

The course tempo intensifies in week six as the students are required to complete an arduous twenty-one kilometre march over the Brecon Beacons; demonstrate their tactical prowess on an assessed TEWT; produce a written exercise for their platoon; give a formal theory lesson on an aspect of military history or a current British military operation; and finally demonstrate their competence in calling in fire and directing the fire of a support company weapon detachment. The course’s ten-week tactical training phase is broadly outlined in Figure 1 below which also illustrates the progression of this phase through its modules.

These six weeks of training in barracks and in the local training area are merely a prelude to the mission rehearsal exercise which will take the aspiring platoon commander out of his comfort zone and test him over a demanding three-week period.

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Figure 1: Broad course outline

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... ‘immersion’ training ideologies ... improve the effectiveness of infantry platoon commanders on operations and in the urban environment.
LEARNING FROM THE THREE LIONS

MISSION REHEARSAL EXERCISE (‘IMMERSION’)

The mission rehearsal exercise closely replicates the scenario an infantry platoon commander might face if deployed on a short notice intervention operation. The scenario builds from day one of the course and is based on the deteriorating political situation within a fictitious African nation. The country slides into chaos with a failing internal security situation, border disputes with its neighbours, and squabbles over natural resources. Tensions continue to escalate until a mock United Nations Security Council Resolution is passed allowing armed intervention. A barrage of media coverage, intelligence summaries and operations orders prepare course members for a possible deployment. Mission-essential equipment and medical checks closely mirror those typical in a high readiness unit.

The readiness notice for course members—acting as the members of a rifle company—draws down rapidly and, within a six-week period, they find themselves assembled at an air point of disembarkation in Malawi being issued specific-to-mission equipment and receiving intelligence and operational briefings. Crucial liaison with the armed forces of the host nation takes place and these soldiers provide security during the deployment north to an area from which in-theatre training and forward reconnaissance can be undertaken.

The mission rehearsal exercise is initiated with a cross-border incursion by the belligerent country. The rifle company conducts a broad cross-section of tactical tasks in order to bring about a ‘lasting and peaceful solution’. The culmination is a three-day intense live firing exercise in which the company pursues the opposing force towards a ‘blocking position’ established by the host nation’s armed forces. The opposing force adopts a defensive stance, establishing a hasty security zone and main defensive zone. The student company conducts an advance to contact and a series of hasty attacks against the security zone over a time period of five hours. Once the security zone is breached the company conducts a deliberate attack to destroy a trench system and finally assaults a village.

The course’s young officers, preoccupied with multiple tasking and competing priorities, are placed under further stress dealing with the local inhabitants of the training area in Malawi. While friendly, these locals are extremely inquisitive and must be kept out of harm’s way in a firm but courteous manner. Maintaining this friendship is crucial to the success of the operation. The locals are not controlled...
by the exercise staff but are free to act in a way consistent with non-combatants in any war-affected country. The intrusion of other non-combatants including non-government organisations add to the realism of the training activity. Liaison must be sustained and friendly relations maintained with the host nation at all times. Language and cultural differences must be acknowledged and overcome.

The mission rehearsal exercise uses three key pillars to develop the student: mentoring, immersion and ‘brilliance at the basics’. The relationship between these three pillars and the course endstate is fundamental and defining and is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 2. While mentoring is a well-accepted training technique in Australia, immersion training is at the cutting edge of training theory. To transport a company of young officers to Africa, immerse them in a tactical situation with the competing interests of a deteriorating political situation, armed conflict, non-government organisations, host nation’s armed forces and local non-combatants’ interests and security, as well as inflicting on them the severe climatic differences between Britain and Africa, is compelling to say the least. This form of training is pitched at a level of intensity not found in most field exercises. Further, the young officer cannot ‘hide’ from his responsibilities; a colour sergeant is there to continually mentor, cajole and harass him to achieve a level of ‘brilliance’ in his basic infantry skills. Thus, the three pillars of the exercise form a symbiotic circle, as illustrated in Figure 2.

The benefits of the mission rehearsal exercise as a training medium are intuitively obvious. The real difference between this approach and others lies in the immediate and tangible benefits realised on operations. Anecdotal evidence ranging from two star level down to the platoon commanders themselves testifies to the success of this training on operations. Platoon commanders who have undergone this type of training are far more competent and confident in their own ability. They make better, more reasoned decisions under situational and time constraints. For young infantry officers who have completed this exercise, the ‘three block war’ seems to hold far fewer cognitive challenges. In addition, like the ‘strategic corporal’, the infantry platoon commander who completes this exercise is fully aware that ‘his judgement, decision-making and action can all have strategic and political consequences that can affect the outcome of a given mission and the reputation of his country’.

While mentoring is a well-accepted training technique in Australia, immersion training is at the cutting edge of training theory.
URBAN OPERATIONS TACTICS AND TRAINING

Urban operations training is the other stand-out feature of training at the British Infantry Battle School. This training is based on current doctrine, conducted in excellent facilities and features the rapid integration of operational lessons into training. Urban operations training emphasises individual and small team skills as the cornerstone of success in the urban environment. Whether in attack or defence, the individual and small team must be adept at basic urban tactics. Fire team, section, platoon and company entry drills; two-man room clearances; an ability to defend or harden positions against the enemy and to act within the section, platoon and company design for battle—these are integral components of urban operations training. Three days in week four and four days in week five of the platoon commander’s course are dedicated to this training. Many hours are spent in theory lessons, in ‘rock’ drills, and in cutaway buildings watching demonstrations and practical exercises. The end result is an infantry platoon commander who is fully conversant with his role both as an individual and as a leader.

Figure 2: The three training pillars
The use of the combined arms teams with armour in an urban environment is a well-established practice. Like the US Marine Corps in Iraq, the British experiences in Iraq and on exercises at training facilities such as Copehill Down and Imber Village emphasise that 'there is no opposition that could not be overcome by well-trained and well-equipped combined arms teams'. While most military professionals are quite comfortable with this concept, many become unsure when confronted with the next tactical decision—at what level of command the grouping occurs. During exercises on the platoon commander's course, grouping involved the allocation of an individual tank to an armoured or mechanised infantry section. While this notion of splitting tank troops and squadrons is quite alien to many, the reality is that the very nature of urban terrain makes it difficult to concentrate a tank force. Grouping at such a low level allows the attacker to overcome the imbalance in the relationship between suppression and manoeuvre often experienced by the infantry sub-unit. A structural or materiel solution to redress this imbalance may not be necessary; the solution could well lie in the use of the strengths of the combined arms team, including its integral firepower and protection, to re-balance the force. While this is not the panacea for every eventuality in the urban environment, it is an option well worth considering.

The Warrior armoured vehicle has proven its worth both in training and operations. It has performed extremely well on operations in Iraq and is very effective in urban terrain. The author's discussions with members of the 1st Battalion, The Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment, have engendered the very strong impression that few other vehicles in the world could have performed as well during the uprisings in Iraq in August 2004. The proliferation of hand-held anti-armour weapons and the simple yet effective tactic of targeting one vehicle with multi-weapon systems from several firing points simultaneously made this a complex scenario. The situation was exacerbated by the complexity of the terrain and the level of 'clutter' found in the towns and villages of the province. Through all of this the Warrior armoured vehicle performed superbly. The general opinion within this particular infantry battalion was that only a vehicle with the Warrior's level of protection, firepower and mobility could be effective against this type of attack in urban terrain. This lesson is being incorporated directly into training as students are presented with the advantages and limitations of the employment of 'Saxon' (mechanised infantry), 'Snatch' land rovers or land rovers (light infantry) in this terrain against an organised asymmetric threat.

Urban operations training emphasises individual and small team skills as the cornerstone of success in the urban environment.
LEARNING FROM THE THREE LIONS

CONCLUSION

The training conducted by the British Army’s Infantry Battle School is highly effective. The Platoon Commander’s Battle Course is a demanding and intense learning journey for its participants. They are truly fortunate to receive benchmark training through mission rehearsal exercises and urban operations instruction. The mission rehearsal exercise, in particular, is extremely impressive and forms a logical extension of the course material and current British strategic thought. British infantry officers must be able to deploy at short notice, acclimatise and adapt quickly to a new environment, and then aggressively and competently apply military judgement to combat a given threat. The course slowly builds towards this crescendo and places the students under a significant amount of perceived and real stress. The urban operations training is well developed and effective, recognising that current doctrine informed by lessons identified on operations is the way forward. Young officers are also made acutely aware that it is through adherence to the basics that they will achieve success in this most complex environment. They are exposed to armour within the combined arms team and given the opportunity to experiment with ideas and concepts for its effective employment. Training at the Infantry Battle School is unquestionably world class and is providing the British Army with young officers ready to deploy on operations now. This is a model the Australian Army would do well to examine and, with some consideration for local conditions and operational requirements, indeed choose to emulate.

ENDNOTES

1 This phrase captures the Australian—and now British—ethos of competency in the low-level skills as the key to mission success.
2 This is the author’s own model based on the key ideas of the mission rehearsal exercise.
3 The three block war is a well-accepted US Marine Corps concept. The British believe that they are very much involved in a three block war in Iraq.
6 Ibid.
7 Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen and Captain Ian Langford have written some excellent articles on the basis of infantry close combat. Both have discussed materiel and structural changes to the way infantry platoons and companies fight the close battle. This author is suggesting that increased firepower for light infantry platoons will always be welcomed but it comes at a cost, i.e. additional weight for the soldier. Infantry grouped in combined arms teams utilising the effects discussed by Captain Langford comprises a simple solution for any capability gap for the infantry in close combat.

8 In August 2004, the Madhi Army or Militia, as it sometimes called, instigated uprisings in the Maysan Province of Iraq. The British Army hierarchy considers this to be some of the most intense fighting seen by British forces since the Falklands War. It was far more intense than the fighting which took place in the Battle for Basra in June 2003.

THE AUTHOR

Major Justin Elwin graduated from the Royal Military College of Australia in 1995. He has seen regimental service in the 5/7th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, including a tour of duty in East Timor. He has also served in training appointments at the Royal Military College of Australia and at the British Army Infantry Battle School including a short tour of duty in Iraq. Major Elwin is currently serving as a company commander in the 5/7th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment.
SEND THE RESERVE TO WAR WITH SIX WEEKS TRAINING

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

CAPTAIN DAVE FISHER AND MAJOR MURRAY STEWART

ABSTRACT

The authors argue that, based on British Army experience, Australian Army Reserve units and personnel can more easily be deployed than current policy recognises. By comparing competencies between the Australian Active Army Reserve and the British Territorial Army, and considering pre-deployment training requirements, the authors highlight that Australia could easily deploy reservists overseas under existing legal frameworks. All that is needed, they argue, based on first-hand experience, is to change of the ADF’s way of thinking.

Why not compulsorily deploy Active Army Reserve (ARes) sub-units to high intensity operational theatres after six weeks training? Why do we insist on rare voluntary mobilisations by ad hoc units with large lead times to the most benign locations? Why do we presume that the only deployable standard for the ARes is them having the same competencies as an equivalent rank Regular soldier? Time and effort is currently being spent trying to work out the
competency gap between the ARA and ARes and raising a High Readiness Reserve, and little effort is spent seeing if the ARes Active Reserve Squadrons and Companies are ready now to deploy for the task at hand. The British Army compulsorily deploy their equivalent of the ARes, the Territorial Army (TA), to high-intensity operational theatres after six weeks training without various levels of Reserve readiness. If they can do it, why cannot we? It seems the answer is simply one of mindset.

In January 2004, members of C Squadron, (Kent and Sharpshooters Yeomanry), The Royal Yeomanry, (C (KSY) Squadron, RY) a British TA Royal Armoured Corps Squadron equipped with Landrover 110s, received notification of compulsory mobilisation to Iraq as part of Operation TELIC 4. After completing six weeks lead-up training, comprising of only thirty-two days actual field training, they helped augment the Regular Army A and D Squadron of the Queens Royal Lancers (QRL) and deployed to Iraq. On completion of six and a half months service they returned to the United Kingdom, went on post-tour leave then recommenced their civilian jobs.

This tour serves as a case study of the compulsory mobilisation of a British TA Squadron for operations in Iraq and can be used to consider the likely successes and limitations of deploying an ARes armoured corps Squadron on a similar operation. This study uses A Squadron, 1/15 Royal New South Wales Lancers as a comparison.

The validity of comparing the ARes and the British TA will be considered at the Squadron (Company) level. A comparison between the training level, role and equipment of C Squadron TA and A Squadron ARes will be made. Then the experience of the compulsory mobilisation of a reserve sub-unit, the integration and performance of reservists on operations and post-tour experiences will be discussed to see how C Squadron did perform and how the ARes may perform. The Australian legislation will also be considered to see what it would take to compulsorily mobilise the ARes. This article looks at Operation TELIC 4, between April and October 2004; the post-invasion rear-area security tasks conducted are similar to the likely tasks of deployed ARes sub-units. Some reference will also be made to Operation TELIC 1, the invasion of Iraq in January 2003.
The successful compulsory mobilisation of ARes sub-units is highly possible based on the British experience. Legislation currently exists to allow this. Thus, all it would take to instantly increase the deployable capability of the Army is a change of mindset about the abilities of the ARes and a use of the existing legislation.

**IS IT VALID TO COMPARE THE BRITISH TERRITORIAL ARMY WITH THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY RESERVE?**

Before considering the case study, it is first pertinent to discuss if it is valid to use a TA Squadron experience as an indicator of how an ARes Squadron may perform. As both authors have served with the British TA (in C Squadron, Royal Yeomanry) and ARes units such as 2/14 Light Horse (Queensland Mounted Infantry), 4/19 Prince of Wales Light Horse and 1/15 Royal New South Wales Lancers, most of the observations and comparisons outlined below draw on first-hand experience. Thus, the focus will be on the armoured experience. TA infantry Companies also deployed on Operation TELIC 4, but that is mostly outside the author’s experience and knowledge.

Despite there being some misconceptions that the British TA is far superior to the ARes, in the authors’ opinions and in obtainable policy the two organisations are identical in most aspects of conditions of service, dedication, training level, integration with the Regular Army and preparedness for war, with most variation favouring the ARes. In a similar training structure to the ARes, TA units parade one night a week, about one weekend a month and participate in one or two periods of continuous training of one to two weeks a year. As with the ARes the ability of TA soldiers to participate in training activities varies greatly with some who do much more and others who rarely parade.

It can be argued that the skills, training and requirements of the ARes are higher than the TA. For example, the TA equivalent of Army Individual Readiness Notice (AIRN) is voluntary. That is, if the soldier is AIRN compliant they get a bonus, referred to as a bounty, of around one thousand pounds, tax-free. Additionally, action against a non-compliant soldier is slower than in the ARes; this results in non-compliant TA members remaining in the system for much longer periods, eroding the capability of the force.

The ARes certainly has a higher level of formal training than the TA in all ranks. At the time of Operation TELEC 4, the minimum amount of formal training from civilian to deployable soldier in the TA C Squadron was twenty three and a half days.
In the ARes A Squadron, the minimum amount of formal training from civilian to deployable soldier is fifty two days. That is, almost two times the amount! Similarly, for a TA 2nd Lieutenant, the minimum number of days from civilian to deployable officer was sixty three, whereas for an ARes 2nd Lieutenant it is one hundred and seventy three and a half days. The ARes 2LT has almost three times more formal training than his TA counterpart. So why do the British feel that their TA soldiers and officers are capable of deployment to the most high-intensity operational theatres with this level of training and yet we seem to doubt the ability of our ARes to do the same? Perhaps it is because of the perception of some other abilities the TA has that the ARes do not. Let us consider some in turn.

A common misconception is that the TA has a lot of operational experience. Neither the TA nor the ARes have a lot. More than half of the TA C Squadron prior to Operation TELIC 1 had not seen operational service. Of those who had been previously mobilised, their service was dated, with operations in such places as Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s. These deployments were as individuals on a voluntary basis. A handful of older and ex-regular soldiers had experience in Northern Ireland, the Falklands and the First Gulf War. Only three members of A Squadron ARes have participated in operational activities. Obviously, you obtain operational experience by deploying, so it would be unfair to hold this against the ARes. It was forty-seven years between the last compulsory mobilisation of the TA—to the Suez Crisis of 1956—and the next one, the invasion of Iraq in Operation TELIC 1 in 2003. Are we recruiting two more ARA infantry battalions to meet a similar level of current and projected need as the British experienced at the time of Operation TELIC 4—which resulted in compulsory mobilisation?

At the Squadron and Regimental level there is minimal difference in Regular Army cadre staffs. Similarly, most exercises C Squadron TA and A Sqn ARes have undertaken in the last six years have been by themselves or with other TA sub-units, rather than with the Regular Army.
The British TA is essentially the same as the ARes in conditions of service, operational readiness, integration with the Regular Army and level of operational experience. There are more C Squadron TA soldiers who have operational experience, but the A Squadron ARes has had far more formal training at every rank.

ROLE AND EQUIPMENT OF C SQUADRON THE ROYAL YEOMANRY VERSUS A SQUADRON 1ST/15TH RNSWL

C Squadron TA, at the time of Operation TELIC 4, had a ‘war role’ of providing individual tank crew reserves. This was generally only at the gunner and loader soldier level. The tank skills were gained by sending individual soldiers on Regular Army courses. There was little opportunity for continuation training as there were no turret trainers or any other tank training equipment in TA depots. The success of the tank training was, therefore, very limited. Just prior to deployment on Operation TELIC 4, only 50 per cent of the soldiers in C Squadron had actually attained a tank qualification. There were only three soldiers in C Squadron trained as tank crew commanders, and no tank crew officers. Officers and senior non-commissioned officers (SNCOs) were expected to fill non-tank crew roles such as duty staff in Headquarters in ‘wartime’.

Thus any comparison between competencies of the TA and the British Regular Army would have revealed glaring deficiencies in tank crew competencies and training levels, C Squadron’s supposed ‘war’ role. C Squadron TA soldiers would not be eligible for service in the High Readiness Reserve. It could have been concluded that C Squadron was, therefore, not deployable without a tremendous amount of lead-up training. Such a conclusion would be wrong when considering the task required on the ground for Operation TELIC 4 and what they subsequently achieved. Thankfully, the British Army is mature enough not to draw such a conclusion.

C Squadron TA had a ‘training role’ of Light Reconnaissance. Using their standard, un-armoured Landrover 110, they trained collectively doing both mounted and dismounted tasks such as route reconnaissance, road blocks, search, convoy escort, observation posts, key point defence and so on. It was in their Light Reconnaissance ‘training’ role with their Landrover 110s that most of the TA soldiers in C Squadron went to war.

This Light Reconnaissance role is very similar to that of Light Cavalry …
This Light Reconnaissance role is very similar to that of Light Cavalry, a role to which A Squadron, along with many of the other ARes regiments, is transitioning. The ARes Light Cavalry regiments are also being equipped with Landrover variants. The Light Cavalry role is also similar to that of A Squadron soldiers, as M113-equipped cavalry, were expected to attain competence in. These skills encompass performing tasks in both vehicles and on foot across the spectrum of offensive, defensive, security and reconnaissance operations, such as convoy escort, route reconnaissance, area search, specific-area search, ambush, attack, defence, withdrawal, and cordon and search. It also includes protecting key points, conducting road blocks, and vehicle checkpoints. As Cavalry Scouts, they are also trained in specialist dismounted skills such as dismounted patrolling, close target reconnaissance, insertion and extraction skills, urban operations, sector search, location and reporting on minefields, including the use of mine detectors. Light Cavalry Troops and their Scouts are also required to be trained and equipped with a wide variety of specialist weapons, such as 84mm and 66mm Direct Fire Support Weapons (DFSW), .50-calibre Heavy Machine Gun, 40mm Grenade Launcher Attachment, MAG 58 General Support Machine Gun, Minimi SAW, 9mm pistol and the full suite of Night Fighting Equipment (Ninox, Night Aiming Device, Individual Weapon Sight).

This is in stark contrast with C Squadron TA, who were not equipped with nor were they trained in any DFSW, grenade launchers, Minimi or Heavy Machine Guns. The only exceptions were a couple of General Purpose Machine Guns held in the depot as training weapons. This was not enough to equip the Squadron vehicles or train collectively. Similarly, C Squadron TA night vision equipment was limited to Combat Weapon Sight, a 1960s–70s vintage sight that fits on a rifle, and again, not enough to go around.

Therefore, with the exception of a very limited tank crew capability, C Squadron, TA Light Reconnaissance and A Squadron ARes Light Cavalry are almost identical in role and primary equipment. In specialist weapons and night vision equipment, A Squadron ARes is far better equipped and trained than C Squadron TA. Let us now examine how A Squadron might perform and C Squadron did perform when sent to war.
COMPULSORY MOBILISATION: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

There is a significant disparity in the soldier’s and their civilian employer’s mind between ‘voluntary’ deployments and compulsory mobilisation. This article advocates compulsory mobilisation on the British model rather than the voluntary approach for the ADF’s Operations RESOLUTE and Operation ACOLYTE. It is unfair to say that the ARes may have difficulty manning operations when the Australian experience to date has been voluntary deployment of small ad hoc units made up of soldiers drawn from across formations. The message is very different in the minds of reservists and their employers between ‘Can I go?’ and ‘I have to go!’

The British process for compulsory mobilisation of the TA varied between Operation TELIC 1 (the invasion of Iraq in 2003) and Operation TELIC 4 (between April and October 2004) for a number of reasons, especially changed requirements and lessons learnt. These lessons should be well noted by the ADF. During Operation TELIC 1, the requirement was to deploy a force of 45–46 000 men to Iraq as quickly as possible. Approximately 8000 TA and Reservists were eventually compulsorily mobilised, including the Royal Air Force Reserve and Royal Naval Reserve.²

A number of important lessons were learnt from this experience. Prior to 2003, the British Army had always considered its ex-regular ‘reservists’ (similar to Australia’s Standby Reserve, with no training obligation) to be the first choice for mobilisation, followed by the TA. This was largely due to the proportion of ‘reservists’ being far greater than serving TA soldiers. What very quickly became apparent was that it was necessary to mobilise about eight British ‘reservists’ to actually get one soldier into theatre, whilst with the TA the ratio was far lower at 1.25 mobilised to every one soldier in theatre.³

Having considered the lessons learnt from 2003, the British Army rapidly adjusted its process to one of ‘Intelligent Mobilisation’, where a TA Regiment would be asked for a certain number of soldiers or complete sub-units. The Regiment would provide the numbers by first checking which soldiers (and at times their employers) would support the deployment. Those men were then compulsorily mobilised to protect their jobs under law. The expectation, however, was always that this was a compulsory mobilisation unless there were very compelling reasons not to go. The numbers requested were also high, 50 per cent of posted strength in C Squadron’s case. There were higher percentages in other...
sub-units. Intelligent Mobilisation served to reduce the number of appeals that were made by soldiers, and sometimes by employers against the wishes of the soldiers. Appeals were made through the governmental and legal systems.

In January 2004, C Squadron was required to provide four officers and thirty-one men from a posted strength of sixty-eight to support the Regular Army A and D Squadron of the Queens Royal Lancers (QRL) for their tour of Iraq during Operation TELIC 4. Another Royal Yeomanry Squadron provided a further twenty-two officers and soldiers, bringing the total TA Royal Yeomanry personnel deployed to Iraq with the QRL to fifty-seven. Note this was a compulsory mobilisation. Relying on volunteers and accepting that none were available was not an option.

The QRL are usually equipped with Challenger tanks but typically deployed to Iraq as infantry mounted in Landrovers. Fourteen tanks were held in-theatre by the QRL as a reserve. The British have often sent tank crews as infantry to places such as Northern Ireland. This is another example of the British pragmatically applying troops to the task at hand rather than being blinded by Corps or perceived differences in competencies.

MOBILISATION FOR OPERATION TELIC 4: FROM SUIT TO SOLDIER

Mobilisation and pre-tour training for C Squadron TA was conducted over a mere six weeks and consisted of three phases. The first phase involved reporting to Reserve Training and Mobilisation Centre (RTMC) in Nottinghamshire for two days. RTMC’s role is to administratively, physically, mentally and materially prepare TA soldiers for mobilisation. Administration activities included pay adjustments to transfer the TA members into the Regular Army. A Reservist Hardship Allowance can be awarded to an individual to match their military salary with that of their civilian package. No similar allowance exists for the ARes. Physical activities included the conduct of medicals, which only three TA soldiers failed. These soldiers were replaced by three other members one month after the unit deployed to Iraq. Mentally, each soldier had the opportunity to discuss their concerns with counsellors and psychologists about mobilisation and/or issues at home, such as paying bills and family. Finally, soldiers were issued with desert camouflage uniforms, other personal equipment and personal weapons for the duration of the deployment at RTMC.
The second phase, which was common to both the TA and Regular soldiers being sent to Iraq, was a ten-day Operational Training Advisory Group (OPTAG) package. This package consisted of testing of all the basic soldier’s skills, including: Combat Fitness Test, Basic Fitness Test (like a BFA), NBC, first aid, armoured fighting vehicle recognition, weapon handling and marksmanship. It also covered Iraq-specific subjects based on the latest intelligence, such as law of armed conflict and rules of engagement, being taken hostage, mine incident drills, patrolling, the use of interpreters and some introductory Arabic lessons. They also practiced urban and rural patrolling, arrest operations, observation posts, vehicle check points and convoy escorts. Most of the scenarios were based on actual incidents and the instructors had recently returned from tours of duty in Iraq. To add to the challenges, the weather dropped to sub-zero and snow fell. During the training de-brief it was found the TA soldiers scored on par or higher (on average) in every area except physical fitness than the Regular soldiers. In this area, the lack of anaerobic physical fitness and the greater average age of the TA soldier were apparent. At the end of the ten days, the TA soldiers were sent to A and D Squadrons QRL, who had already done their OPTAG training and were under command of their respective Battle Groups for further pre-tour training.

The third phase was conducted over twenty days with the Battle Group commanders exercising their companies/squadrons in the type of operations considered likely to be encountered in Iraq. This included company-sized riot control, cordon and search, vehicle patrolling, foot patrolling and defensive operations. Individual, section and platoon/troop exercises also continued and commanders were able to practice live-fire section and platoon/troop attacks. Weapons training with the Battle Group consisted of training on the baton rounds (25mm riot control weapon), 5.56mm Minimi, GPMG (7.62mm) and Underslung Grenade Launcher connected to the SA80. This was 'from scratch' for the TA. Remember, A Squadron ARes soldiers are already qualified on most of these weapons. The rest of the six weeks was administration, including travel and leave.

Thus, in terms of actual training, a TA soldier received two days of induction, ten days of OPTAG and twenty days of Battle Group training over the course of six weeks, from normal peace-time soldiering to war. Thirty-two days to prepare a Reservist for war. It should again be noted that, with the exception of the first two days, the training conducted by the TA was identical in length and content to that which the Regular Army did in preparation for Iraq.
COMBAT READINESS OF THE TA

Many opponents would suggest that the ARes (or the TA) would not be appropriately combat ready for a mobilisation to such a volatile location. So, how combat ready were the TA? It is a difficult question to answer; however, the C Squadron personnel met and often exceeded the expectations of Regular members. It is believed that this is due to a number of factors.

Based on comparisons between one of the author’s troop of Regular soldiers in the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in 1994 and both A Squadron ARes and C Squadron TA, the TA and ARes soldier is, on average, eight years older than his Regular counterpart. The Regular soldier is fitter, much faster at some specific trade skills and is used to a regimented life; however, the TA soldier is generally better educated, has experienced a more varied life and approaches problems drawing on that experience and maturity. This sort of life experience cannot be measured by competencies or trying to determine relative levels of training. An additional advantage the TA soldiers had was their familiarity with Landrovers, unlike their Regular QRL counterparts who were tank crew converted to Landrovers, although this demonstrates again the British troops approach to task pragmatism.

The subsequent performance of C Squadron TA proved that the TA soldier who was fit for role (AIRN compliant) and had two years service came up to speed very quickly and integrated easily into the Regular QRL. It also demonstrated that the thirty-two days lead-up training the TA received was as adequate for them as it was for the Regular soldiers. It is believed factors such as Intelligent Mobilisation and the minimum two years of service allowed C Squadron to be ready in time. Significantly, a number of young Regular Army soldiers straight out of their corps schools deployed to Iraq with less soldiering experience than their TA colleagues. This is also missed in competency comparisons. This would be the case with the Australian Army as well. Why then can the British TA deploy and not the ARes?
TA TASKS IN IRAQ: INTEGRATION AND PERFORMANCE

Of the twelve troops in A and D Squadron, QRL, ten were bought up to strength with TA soldiers and two troops were entirely TA, commanded by TA Lieutenants. Complete TA infantry companies also deployed on TELIC 4. The TA SNCOs and officers, who were not in the TA Troops, were employed in HQ positions such as Battle Captain, Operations Officer and Intelligence Officer. They were also employed on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) tasks such as being the staff officer of border enforcement. The tank-qualified TA soldiers rotated through the fourteen tanks that formed part of the armoured reserve. The remainder undertook Security Sector Reform (SSR) tasks in Landrovers. In the case of the QRL, it was usually the standard Landrover 110 with roof removed to allow for two soldiers to stand up in the back, providing top cover with 7.62mm GPMG or 5.56mm Minimi. This was achieved by resting the weapon bipod on the cabin roof rather than at an actual weapon mount. Their operations were conducted with a totally unarmoured, unstabilised weapon positioned in an unarmoured vehicle.

A Squadron QRL, under command of 1 Princess of Wales Royal Regiment Battle Group in Maysan Province, concentrated on equipping, training and recruiting the police, whilst D Squadron QRL under command 1st Mechanised Brigade in the Um Qsar Port and Basra area concentrated on port security reform and customs and immigration training. This included securing the border, recruiting and training a force of 6000 border police and customs officials, and collecting taxes on imported goods. This also included supervising the ports, airports, land crossing points, river crossing points, immigration and passport issue.

Both Squadrons were still required to perform normal foot and vehicle patrolling through the towns and perimeter security of their respective bases. The types of urban operations the TA soldiers conducted were: patrols, liaison visits, convoy escorts, vehicle check points, road blocks, mobile HQs, re-supply, crowd control at recruiting events and general vehicle movement while undertaking other activities such as driving to training locations. It also included movement into and out of contact and pursuing fleeing enemy in urban, semi-urban, industrial and rural areas, including the coast and along river banks.
There was some initial concern by the Regular majors commanding A and D Squadron QRL about the skills, knowledge and attributes of the TA junior officers and soldiers. It was only after the pre-tour training and the first few weeks in Iraq that one OC said he was completely comfortable allowing the TA troops to go out by themselves. Even in the British Army the Regulars had what proved to be unfounded concerns as to the abilities of the Reservist. Concerns such as these are inevitably alleviated when ignorance is replaced by contact, trust, familiarity and facts.

Other tasks enabled the TA personnel to take advantage of both their civilian and military expertise. A TA lieutenant, who in civilian life was a Personal Assistant to a Member of Parliament in Westminster, mentored the Iraqi judiciary. A warrant officer whose civilian job was Auditor for the Royal Bank of Scotland become, by the conclusion of the tour, the pay-master for the entire Department of Border Enforcement. Similarly, a corporal who was a civilian fireman directed the training of the Um Qsar Port Fire Station for a four-week period, and a trooper who was normally a civilian IT specialist wrote software programs for the Customs Service computers as they were being installed. It also serves as another example of the wide range of skills and life experience TA (and ARes) can draw upon that is also hidden in competency comparisons. However, it must be noted, these jobs were mostly temporary and local solutions to problems. These soldiers were not deployed to Iraq for this purpose (in accordance with British policy); it was a case of local commanders employing an asset on hand to help achieve their goal. The British experience is that Reservists would rather deploy in their Army role, regardless of their civilian skills and experience.

The TA soldiers commented favourably on the advantages of deploying on operations with most of their TA Squadron. This was especially so with the fully TA troops, but even those soldiers who rounded out the regular troops were never sent by themselves. Naturally, deploying with their mates had a good effect on morale during the tour and offered post-tour mutual support. This is in contrast to the earlier, voluntary tours individual C Squadron soldiers had undertaken with Regular Army Regiments to Bosnia and Kosovo. This is also...
in contrast to the voluntary deployment the ARes has done, such as Operation ACOLYTE and Operation RESOLUTE, which were also comprised of individual volunteers formed into *ad hoc* groups.

By the end of the tour, integration had been accomplished. Most TA soldiers performed the same jobs and tasks in Iraq as Regular soldiers.

**CONTACTS AND CASUALTIES**

Many of the TA soldiers were involved in contacts both major and minor. These experiences are used to illustrate how intense the operational situation the British TA experienced and therefore how our ARes may perform in a similar situation: not in the most benign locations, but very high levels of operational intensity.

The worst area for the deployment was in the north of the British Area of Operations, in the town of Al Amara. There the ‘outstation’ CIMIC house was attacked with alarming regularity. The TA, along with the rest of A Squadron QRL, rotated through CIMIC house for periods of one or two weeks. They were involved in contacts in Landrovers, during foot patrols, on perimeter security and, on one occasion, giving emergency first aid to civilian contractors after two mortars had exploded in their office. At one point in August, CIMIC house, defended at that stage by Y Company Prince of Wales Royal Regiment with C Squadron TA personnel attached, was attacked continuously for twenty-four days by Sadr Militia. During that period, 595 mortar rounds, fifty-seven RPG rounds and seven 107mm rockets were fired at CIMIC house and the Company had eighty-six small-arms engagements. At another time, in the vicinity of Al Amara, seventy-six contacts were recorded in a twenty-four hour period, and a base was mortared forty-four separate times.

Qualified TA soldiers were also rotated onto tanks during the Sadr Militia’s uprising in August as they tried to de-stabilise Al Amara and Basra. Patrols in Landrovers frequently came under fire. In most cases, there were no hits. Incidents mainly consisted of the enemy driving past TA soldiers in the street or bases and firing an AK-47 from the window of their vehicle. Alternatively, TA soldiers might have a grenade thrown at them, be fired on by an AK-47, or endure RPG rounds by an enemy on foot who then withdrew into the urban environment. One of the authors had a burst of AK-47 fired at him as he guided a Dutch patrol of four Landrovers on a familiarisation tour of Basra. His vehicle, leading the convoy, was stopped at traffic lights. A person stepped up to the...
side of the road, raised their weapon and fired at the Landrover. At the moment he fired, a truck drove between them so the enemy's rounds hit the back of the truck. The quick-thinking crew simply ran the lights and broke contact.\textsuperscript{10}

Other incidents included a contact approximately 200m outside the perimeter fence with an enemy mortar crew who were setting up. They were found by a dismounted clearing patrol at 22:30hrs. Despite the level of fire there were no casualties on either side. The enemy withdrew into the urban environment, leaving the mortar base-plate behind. Several TA soldiers also experienced improvised explosive devices detonating near their vehicles, again with little result.

Not all contacts were initiated by the enemy. One of the authors was engaged in an SSR patrol on the Iraq–Iran border with the TA Squadron Sergeant Major, a Royal Navy officer, some Royal Marine commandos and two Iraqi border personnel. They surrounded a group of illegal immigrants and took five prisoners. One of the prisoners then indicated where the actual people smugglers were. Acting on this intelligence, the patrol then advanced up the road to a small berm. On the other side, about eighty metres away were three people in two vehicles, the suspected people smugglers. The patrol formed a skirmish line, with a fire support base commanded by the TA Squadron Sergeant Major off to one side. Advancing to arrest the people smugglers, the suspects decided to shoot it out. Between the skirmish line and fire support, thirty-five rounds were fired at the suspect's vehicle. It took several hits but there were no casualties on either side. The patrol arrested two people, but at least one evaded capture. The next night a further fifty-seven people were arrested at the same spot after an observation post and Quick Reaction Force were emplaced.\textsuperscript{11}

In total, despite the level and intensity of contacts, the QRL—TA and otherwise—did not suffer any battle casualties on Operation TELIC 4. It must be stated, however, that the authors attribute this not only to good training but also to remarkably good luck and the incompetence of the enemy. During Operation TELIC 4, major uprisings and contacts involving casualties and fatalities of TA and Regular soldiers occurred in other units. For example, a TA lieutenant's Landrover took two RPG hits (both failed to detonate) and twenty-five AK-47 rounds during an ambush. His driver was shot in the foot but recovered. They managed to fight and drive through the ambush.\textsuperscript{12} In another incident, two Landrovers were destroyed by RPG hits, yet the crews survived. The Warrior vehicles in the Quick Reaction Force then went through two ambushes on the way to assist the Landrover crews and the lead Warrior took seven...
RPG hits. This resulted in five British wounded and one dead, as well as a Warrior driver being awarded the Victoria Cross. Another dismounted section patrol was contacted by fifty enemy in a hasty ambush. A British soldier was killed when he was shot through the throat. His section commander decided to attack the enemy position. In the ensuing firefight there were twenty enemy killed and another British soldier slightly wounded.

Thus, despite being less well-equipped and with less formal training than A Squadron, ARs, the TA soldiers of C Squadron with only thirty-two days mobilisation training performed admirably in circumstances of far more intense levels of enemy contact and casualties than most recent Australian operational deployments. Their success was highlighted when one of the fully TA troops was named best troop of the tour, having competed for the title against the other eleven Regular and TA troops of the QRL. The TA Troop Leader, Lieutenant Howles, was awarded a Commander in Chief’s Commendation for leadership and performance.

POST-TOUR RETURN TO WORK, TRAINING AND RETENTION

After returning to the United Kingdom, all TA personnel were ‘demobbed’ and sent on post-tour leave. Once their leave time expired, soldiers reported back to their civilian employers, who were required by law to keep their jobs open for them. This aspect of return was largely successful, although there were a few cases of small businesses re-structuring during the nine-month absence, resulting in the soldier being made redundant.

After the post-tour leave, C Squadron started a new training year in January 2005. The mobilisation and subsequent return to civilian work and family life after many months away did have an initial effect on retention. Six of the thirty-five soldiers deployed to Iraq discharged. Most of these were planning to leave before the tour, so the Army received good service from them. The experience of compulsory mobilisation and an operational tour, therefore, had no noticeable effect on retention.
During weeknight and weekend training, the Squadron hierarchy was required to show a greater level of leadership, initiative and man-management to keep retention high. Soldiers were attending parade nights, but it was to see their mates from the tour rather than to continue to train. This practice had to stop, so training had to be planned with more care to ensure it was varied and exciting. As a positive outcome of the tour, the soldier’s operational experience became a valuable training resource.

THE AUSTRALIAN LEGAL SETTING

Having viewed the British experience, does Australia have the legal ability to do the same? When considering this question, the distinction needs to be made between a Reservist asking their employer ‘Can I go?’ on the volunteer model and saying ‘I have to go!’ of the compulsory mobilisation model. With Intelligent Mobilisation, the British seem to have struck a good balance.

Section 50D, 51A, AA, AB, B, C and CA of The Defence Act 1903 gives the Governor General the power to issue a proclamation that has been recommended to him by the Executive Council and call out the ARes for a wide variety of tasks for either a limited duration or indefinitely. Originally, this was a blunt instrument to be used in times of a national defence emergency. However, an amendment was made to the Act in 2001 and entitled Schedule 1 of the Defence Legislation Amendment (Enhancement of the Reserves and Modernisation) Act 2001: Calling out the Reserves. The intent of this amendment can be found in the Second Reading speech of the Bill by Minister Scott, then Minister Assisting the Minister for the Defence and with responsibility for Reserves. He states:

The legislation will enable the call-out of reservists for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, civil aid and disaster relief, as well as for warlike service and defence preparation. These historic changes will greatly enhance the contribution made by the reserves and will permit the Defence Force to operate in all circumstances as an integrated total force. We will have a more useable and effective reserve, making an important contribution to the generation, delivery and sustainment of defence capability. The government does not intend to lightly or frequently call out the reserves. Call-out will be used only when it is necessary.

… the Governor General the power to issue a proclamation … and call out the ARes for a wide variety of tasks for either a limited duration or indefinitely.
The Act now allows for ARes units, sub-units and or individuals to be called out where necessary for war, war-like operations, peacekeeping or peace enforcement as required. Therefore, the legislative ability currently exists to apply the concept of Intelligent Mobilisation. The British found it necessary to use their equivalent legislation for Operation TELIC 1 and Operation TELIC 4.

Where it comes to job protection of the mobilised ARes, Australia is already well served by the provisions under the Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act 2001. Ordinarily reserve service, protected and unprotected Continuous Full Time Service, is protected under this act on the same lines as anti-discrimination legislation, but the provisions for protected Continuous Full Time Service are most relevant. If an ARes member is required for Continuous Full Time Service then they can get employment, partnership and education protection if 'A service chief requested the member to give the undertaking on the basis that the service would be protected.' Indeed, our legislation is very strong in this regard and whilst employers retain the right to have any concerns or objections considered, they have no legislated right of appeal. Employers and soldiers will always have a right of appeal to Defence, to the Service Chief, the Commonwealth Ombudsman and their local MP. The Act provides no specific avenue for appeal but before the Service Chiefs deems a period of CFTS to be 'Protected' they are mandated to consider a number of criterion including, Section 12 (2)(d): 'the effect that rendering the service might have on the member’s employment and education (including the effect that it might have on third parties such as employers).’ Applying Intelligent Mobilisation would keep those appeals to a minimum.

Within current legislative frameworks, the Australian Government can compulsorily mobilise a sub-unit or unit of ARes for operations in a place like Iraq and protect their employment by applying the British model on Intelligent Mobilisation. The Reservist can tell their employer ‘I have to go.’
CONCLUSION

Based on the experiences of the British TA soldiers in C Squadron, RY, the following summations can be made. Using the British Army’s Intelligent Mobilisation model, ARes Light Cavalry Squadrons could be compulsorily mobilised and deployed alongside their Regular counterparts on operations similar to those in Iraq after six weeks extra training. It could be presumed that other ARes sub-units could do the same. Reserve soldiers integrate well with Regular soldiers. Their performance is at least on par with their Regular counterparts if Intelligent Mobilisation is used. Additionally, they bring a different skill-set from their civilian life to the mix, benefiting the operation. Complete Reserve sub-units can be a very successful deployed element rather than using Reservists as individual replacements in Regular units. Indeed, deploying with their mates has a positive effect on morale, both on tour and back home, for the deployed reservists. The job protection legislation as adopted by the British on the whole worked well and Australia has even stronger legislation. Unexpectedly, the impact of compulsory mobilisation on subsequent retention remains good if due attention is paid to post-tour training and administration. The ARes A Squadron 1/15 RNSWL is better equipped and has more formal training than the TA C Squadron RY and yet C Squadron RY was able to perform very well in Iraq after thirty-two days lead up training. The argument that the ARes A Squadron is under-trained and under-equipped and needs six to twelve months lead-up training to achieve the same level of competency before deployment does not stand up to this comparison. The argument that ARes deployments should be to the most benign locations does also not bear close scrutiny, nor does the idea that, as the ARes courses are shorter than some Regular courses, there exists a capability gap that must be bridged before deployment can be considered. It is not about the Regular Army being better trained than the Ares; the question is can the ARes do the job at hand. The legislation exists to be used and was written with that intent in mind. All that is required is the will.

An Australian officer encountered by one of the authors in Iraq was amazed that the TA deployed after the standard six weeks training. He said ‘Australia would never do that.’ The question has to be asked, ‘Why is this case?’ A change of mindset to consider compulsory mobilisation of the ARes on operations is an inexpensive capability increase.
SEND THE RESERVE TO WAR WITH SIX WEEKS TRAINING

ENDNOTES

1. The table below details the difference in formal training time between the TA soldiers of C Squadron at the time of TELIC 4 and the current requirement for ARes soldiers of A Squadron as Light Cavalry. It is acknowledged that some courses will be completed at different times and at different ranks than shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C Squadron British Territorial Army at the time of Op TELIC 4</th>
<th>Total days</th>
<th>A Squadron Australian Army Reservist Light Cavalry</th>
<th>Total Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1 RTB Kapooka,</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruit Course</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Advanced Soldier Course</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank loader / gunner course</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Cavalry Scout Grade 1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployable Soldier</td>
<td>TA Trooper Op TELIC 4</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>ARes Trooper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TA Trooper Op TELIC 4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Not all C Sqn soldiers were tank qualified. Therefore minimum formal training to deploy to Op TELIC was 23.5 days</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. C Sqn also included a self imposed minimum two years TA service which is not shown</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>3 weekends in unit</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1 RTB Kapooka,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruit Course</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Advanced Soldier Course</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Lance Corporal                                              | 35.5       | ARes LCPL                                         | 48         |
|                                                            | Tank Course | 16       | Patrol Commanders Course                         | 16         |
| Corporal                                                    | TA CPL      | 16       | ARes CPL                                         | 16         |
|                                                            | Instructors / Trade course | 16       | Subject 1 Sergeant                               | 28         |
|                                                            | Subject 2 Sergeant                   | 16       |
| Sergeant                                                    | TA SGT      | 16       | ARes SGT                                         | 42         |
|                                                            | Range management and weapons course  | 16       | Subject 1 Warrant Officer                        | 28         |
|                                                            | Subject 2 Warrant Officer               | 16       |
| Staff Sergeant. Promotion to WO2 follows with no further courses | Squadron Quartermaster course | 16       | Subject 2 Warrant Officer                        | 21         |
| Warrant Officer 2                                           | TA WO2      | 36       | ARes WO2                                         | 49         |
| Total days formal training civilian to Warrant Officer       | 143        |                                                   | 207        |
| Officer                                                     |            |                                                   |            |
| Civilian / Officer Cadet                                    | 6 weeks in unit training               | 42       | University Regiment                               | 97.5       |
|                                                            | RMA Sandhurst                               | 21       | RMC Duntroon graduate as a 2LT, not deployable    | 28         |
| Second Lieutenant                                          | TA 2LT      | 63       | ARes 2LT                                         | 125.5      |
|                                                            | No Regimental Officer Basic Course        | 48       |                                                   |            |
|                                                            | Regimental Officer Basic Course 3 modules | 48       |                                                   |            |
Deployable Officer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>TA Position</th>
<th>ARes</th>
<th>Formal Training</th>
<th>Module/Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant TA LT</td>
<td>TA LT</td>
<td>ARes LT</td>
<td>Junior Officer Training Exam</td>
<td>Staff Officer Grade 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain TA CAPT</td>
<td>TA CAPT</td>
<td>ARes CAPT</td>
<td>Staff college</td>
<td>Staff Officer Grade 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The OC of C Squadron was not mobilised. The highest rank was Captain.

Major TA MAJ | ARes MAJ | Total days formal training civilian to Major | 81 | 242.5

2 Lecture notes from the UK Staff College Junior Staff Course TA 2005.
3 Ibid. Some soldiers and/or their employers appealed against mobilisation and sometimes won, causing the discrepancy between mobilised and in theatre.
4 Most of the information is from CAPT Fisher’s recollections supported by a series of emails sent by CAPT Fisher to MAJ Stewart and the Royal Yeomanry diary of Operation TELIC 4.
5 Verbal training debrief by the Regular Army OPTAG team and the Individual Training Directive (ITD) records.
6 The average age of a 2nd Cavalry trooper was 22, A Squadron ARes Troopers average age is 30.
7 The average education of a 2nd Cavalry Trooper was Year 10 or Year 12. None had further education, could speak another language or had a trade qualification. There are three A Squadron ARes Troopers with degrees, one studying for a PhD. There are also two machinists and an electrician. Troopers in A Squadron can speak Arabic, Vietnamese, Polish, Mandarin and Hokkien.
8 Private photograph of the Coy 2IC and HQ staff in the CIMIC house Ops room during August 2004 at the height of the attacks. In the photograph, a whiteboard displays the running tally of incidents. The CIMIC house battle is also described in Dusty Warriors Modern War, Richard Holmes, Harper Press, London, 2006. pp. 266–83.
9 Email sent by CAPT Fisher to MAJ Stewart 16 August 2003.
10 Email sent by CAPT Fisher to MAJ Stewart 2 August 2003.
11 Email sent by CAPT Fisher to MAJ Stewart, based on CAPT Fisher’s contact report 11 May 2004.
12 Email sent by CAPT Fisher to MAJ Stewart 16 April 2004.
14 Job protection legislation is part of UK Reserve Forces Act 1996.
15 The Defence Act 1903.
Send The Reserve To War With Six Weeks Training

16 Schedule 1 of the Defence Legislation Amendment (Enhancement of the Reserves and Modernisation) Act 2001 – Calling out the Reserves.
19 The Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act 2001 Section 12 (1).
20 Ibid, Section 12 (2)(d).

THE AUTHORS

Major Dave Fisher joined the Australian Army Reserve in 1991. After graduating from University of Queensland Regt in 1997 he was posted as a Troop Leader to 2/14 Light Horse (Queensland Mounted Infantry) when it was an integrated Regular/Reserve unit. He went to England in December 1998 and started parading with C (Kent and Sharpshooters Yeomanry) Squadron, Royal Yeomanry. In 2001, he transferred as a Captain to the Territorial Army and was deployed with the Squadron to Iraq on Operation TELIC 4 in January 2004. He is now OC B Sqn Royal Yeomanry.

Major Murray Stewart joined the ARA in 1989. After graduating from ADFA and RMC he was posted to 2nd Cavalry Regiment. He also served in 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (Queensland Mounted Infantry) and 4th/19th Prince of Wales’s Light Horse. He discharged from the ARA and joined the Australian Army Reserve in 1999 and went to live in England for four years. Whilst there he paraded with C (Kent and Sharpshooters Yeomanry) Squadron, Royal Yeomanry. He returned to Australia in 2002 and served as OC A Squadron 1st/15th Royal New South Wales Lancers in 2005-06. He is now serving as a Reservist at Special Operations Headquarters.
EDUCATION, TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

SKILL AT ARMS TRAINING IN NON-COMBAT UNITS

CAPTAIN C. M. LECKIE

ABSTRACT

As unconventional forces shift their efforts to attacking ‘softer’ targets—such as supply convoys, logistics bases and headquarters—to avoid the lethal firepower of combat units, soldiers that have traditionally not needed ‘skill at arms’ come under fire. The author argues that non-arms corps troops require a higher level of marksmanship training to cope with an increasing likelihood of engaging in close combat.

INTRODUCTION

One of the stranger actions of the Second World War occurred on 6 February 1944 in the jungles of Arakan, Burma, when the Headquarters (HQ) and Signallers of a Japanese Regiment attacked the HQ of 7 Indian Division and nearly captured its commander, Major General Messervy. Thus started the battle of the Admin Box, where a collection of HQ and logistics units from XV Corps, reinforced by infantry and tanks, held off the best part of a Japanese division for two weeks.
There are a number of similarities between the battle of the Admin Box and situations in which the Australian Army could find itself today. The Admin Box was an open plain surrounded by jungle covered hills—under current terminology this would be classed as complex terrain. Most logistic areas and headquarters are now deployed in complex terrain, albeit in an urban environment. Yet, much like the jungle, which provided the Japanese with sufficient cover to infiltrate through a divisional defensive position, the urban environment provides an enemy with many opportunities to close with and attack such a position.

One of the critical vulnerabilities of any military force is the HQ and logistic support element. Both require large areas to deploy in and have limited capacity for self-defence. This has not changed since the Napoleonic era when large standing armies became the norm. What has altered is the complexity of the logistic and communication requirements of an army, which make these assets a prime target for the enemy. The defence of the modern ‘rear area’ is therefore as crucial, if not more so, to operational success as it was at the time of the battle of Admin Box.

Although the Allied superiority in firepower, air support and poor Japanese decision-making led to the Japanese failure to capture the Admin Box, its successful defence required clerks, signallers, cooks and drivers to defend substantial portions of the perimeter. This is no different to the circumstances armies face today, where a HQ or logistics node is responsible for its own defence with the assistance of a Force Protection Company Group.

As described in Land Warfare Doctrine 1, the ‘preparation for conflict must anticipate and incorporate the full array of credible threat capabilities’. Thus, to ensure that the non-combat arms soldiers of today are as capable of defending their position as were the defenders of the Admin Box, it is essential that our training prepares them for such a situation.

This paper argues that the current marksmanship training regime for soldiers in non-combat arms units does not adequately prepare them for combat. It will examine current doctrine and policies, the operational setting, specific deficiencies in training, and propose a program...
for improving shooting to a point where soldiers are prepared for combat. Whilst much of what is discussed in this paper is relevant to all weapon systems, only the by-day training for the F88 Austeyr will be discussed. In addition, the term ‘soldier’ in this paper refers to a soldier from a non-combat arms unit, as does the term ‘unit.’ This includes soldiers from all the corps except Infantry, Artillery, Armour, Engineers and Aviation—the Arms Corps. The aim of the paper is to evaluate the Army’s current marksmanship training in preparing non-combat arms soldiers for operations and to propose an improved marksmanship training model.

**MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS**

The F88 Austeyr is the standard individual weapon (IW) of the Australian Defence Force, including the Australian Army. All members of the Army are trained on the F88 Austeyr weapon as part of their initial training. F88 training consists of three stages: Weapon Qualification; All Corps Marksmanship Proficiency; and Advanced Marksmanship Proficiency. Weapon qualification requires soldiers to pass the F88 Weapon Training Test (WTT) and a qualification shoot. Passing this stage is a prerequisite for progression to marksmanship proficiency training.

All Corps Marksmanship Proficiency consists of grouping and application of fire practices. Successful completion of this stage means that soldiers can engage stationary targets up to 300m and engage moving targets up to 100m using both supported and unsupported, using deliberate and rapid techniques from all conventional firing positions, with a hit probability rate of 70 per cent. Live Fire (LF) 6 is the stage two qualifying shoot. It is important to note that the minimum engagement distance for these shoots is 100m. Stage two is the standard that recruits are expected to achieve prior to completion of their recruitment course and is the minimum standard required for operational service. This is also the maximum standard achieved by the majority of soldiers of non-combat arms units throughout their Army career. Advanced Marksmanship Proficiency is the final stage and consists of advanced skills such as firing in bursts, instinctive firing and individual and team battle shooting. Generally only soldiers of arms corps participate in this advanced level of training.
The Army Individual Readiness Notice (AIRN) dictates that all members of the Army are to be assessed on their individual weapons proficiency every six months. This consists of passing the F88 WTT and LF1 Grouping Practice. The AIRN requirement ensures that all soldiers are able to handle and fire their weapons safely, but does not prepare soldiers for operational shooting.

OTHER DOCTRINE AND POLICY

TRAINING THE BATTLE SHOT

The Manual of Land Warfare Volume Two, Part Nine, Pamphlet One (MLW 2-9-1) entitled ‘Training the Battle Shot’ (now obsolescent but yet to be replaced by LWP-G7-4-1) describes the Army’s methodology for skill at arms training. This doctrine describes the training stages, frequency and type of shooting to be conducted. Under this doctrine, Weapon User Category (WUC) C units (soldiers who use small arms primarily for self-protection—which equates to non-combat arms corps units) of Readiness Category one and two units (from zero to 90 days Notice To Move (NTM)), were annually required to complete shoots up to and including individual battle shooting. Readiness Category one units (zero to 28 days NTM) were also required to participate in team battle shooting (up to a maximum of section strength). This progression resulted in soldiers being trained up to a point where they had fired under realistic battle conditions.

Shooting is a skill that degrades relatively quickly without practice. As a result, MLW 2-9-1 dictated the requirement for continuation shooting in addition to qualification shooting. This allocated ammunition to WUC C units so that each soldier could fire a zeroing and elementary application of fire shoot twice annually in addition to the annual qualification shoots. Whilst this doctrine has now been declared obsolete, the reason for continuation shooting remains—and will continue to remain—sound. It is unknown what the doctrinal policy on continuation shooting will be in the yet-to-be-released LWP-G7-4-1 Combat Shooting.

Likewise, the 1st Division (1 Div) has issued a Division Firepower Policy (DFP). This document justifies both the ammunition requirements for 1 Div and prescribes the shooting standards that 1 Div units are to achieve according to their Readiness Category and WUC. The DFP only uses two WUC, which delineates between those personnel who are expected to use the weapon in combat (WUC A) as opposed to those expected only to use their weapon in self-defence (WUC B—equivalent to WUC C under MLW 2-9-1). The minimum shooting standards for non-combat
units (WUCB) include personnel passing the AIRN requirement (LF1) biannually and completing the Basic marksmanship proficiency practices annually on the WTSS. Live firing is limited to the LF2 (Zeroing practice) and LF6 (Application of Fire practice) annually.\textsuperscript{12}

In the Logistic Support Force (LSF), where a large proportion of non-combat arms units reside, the shooting policy for the self protection of small arms users are the same as that required under the DFP.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Comparison}

Whilst the shooting requirements, in terms of rounds fired, between MLW 2-9-1 and the Division Firepower Policy does not vary significantly for self protection small-arms users, the type and frequency of shooting does.\textsuperscript{14} MLW 2-9-1 contained a progression, which resulted in soldiers participating in individual, and for high-readiness units, team battle shooting. MLW 2-9-1 also ensured the requirement for continuation shooting was specifically stated, with ammunition allocated for two other shooting periods during the year. Thus, according to this now obsolete doctrine, a soldier could, in a well-organised shooting program, expect to fire his weapon with live ammunition at intervals of no greater than four months. The DFP on the other hand, does not authorise any battle shooting for the self protection of small-arms users and, realistically, there is no continuation shooting (apart from grouping practices). Due to the requirement to complete WTSS shoots prior to live firing, a soldier will generally only participate in a shooting period once per year.

As can be seen, under current formation policies, the types and frequency of shoots have been significantly reduced, whilst the environment in which a non-combat arms soldier is expected to operate has increased in complexity. An understanding of current and future operational environments will be discussed in the next section.

\textbf{Operational Setting}

MLW 2-9-1 describes the operational setting in which a soldier will use his individual weapon. For non-combat arms units (which include Combat Signals Regiments, Joint Support Unit, Combat Service Support Battalions, Force Support Battalions, Health Support Battalions and unit echelons), this will most likely mean a defensive or patrolling role.
In a defensive position, the operational setting is based on an enemy attack over open terrain providing fields of fire out to the maximum effective range of the weapon. This envisages soldiers firing single aimed shots at this range (300m for the F88), with the requirement for short bursts at multiple moving targets as the enemy assault approaches the defensive position. During patrolling, it is likely that the firer will engage, or be engaged by, ‘a fleeting, probably moving, target or multiple targets with quick, aimed single shots, automatic fire or instinctive fire from the waist’. The generic environments described are based on a conventional warfare scenario and do not necessarily reflect the modern battlefield. For example, there is no mention of the urban environment or enemy mixing with civilians.

MODERN ENVIRONMENT

Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, describes the modern battlespace. One of the key changes is the replacement of the linear battlefield concept with ‘non-linearity’, where military operations are conducted throughout the battlespace and require greater force protection due to increased threats. As stated in LWD 1, ‘Forces operating in support areas will often face as much risk as those actively conducting combat operations’. Urbanisation on a global scale also increases the likelihood that operations will be conducted in an urban environment.

The Chief of Army’s Directive 01/06, ‘Developing the Australian Soldier of the 21st Century’, further describes the complex environment which soldiers are expected to operate in and the behaviours that underpin success in complex warfighting. Some of the key behaviours (with the italicised portions denoting the author’s reference to shooting) are:

- Every soldier is an expert in close combat. (Every soldier can operate their IW safely, accurately and fast in a complex environment where engagements may take place from zero metres outwards where the enemy may be difficult to distinguish from the civilian population).
- Every soldier is a leader. (Every soldier should be able to direct the fire of a group/section of soldiers using fire control orders in a combat environment).
- Every soldier is physically tough. (Every soldier should be able to participate in close combat wearing full equipment (helmet, body armour, webbing etc) in extremes of climate, despite being fatigued and still be capable of operating their IW safely, accurately and fast).
- Every soldier is mentally prepared. (Every soldier is confident of their ability to operate their IW safely, accurately and fast in a complex environment where enemy threats are unexpected in their nature, timing and direction).
Skill At Arms Training In Non-combat Units

Combat experience. Recent Military operations, both by Australian and other forces, have shown that the majority of non-combat units will deploy to an urban area and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. These units are also responsible for their own protection, especially during the early and most vulnerable stages of an operation, when the tasks for combat forces outweigh the resources available. 20

An example of the situation in which a non-combat arms unit could find itself was demonstrated by the US Army’s 507th Maintenance Company on 23 March 2003 at An Nasiriyah in Iraq. In an action lasting 90 minutes, eleven soldiers were killed, seven captured and nine wounded out of a total of thirty three. 21 This logistic unit, without any protection, less its own individual weapons and vehicle mounted machine guns, found itself engaged by enemy forces in an urban environment and had difficulty identifying the enemy, some of whom had been waving at them only minutes before contact was initiated. Furthermore, a large number of the soldiers’ weapons malfunctioned during this action. Australian forces could find themselves in similar situations in the future. Given the Australian public’s rightful objection to military casualties, an incident such as this could have political consequences far greater than the casualties caused. Thus, unless we train and prepare our non-combat arms soldiers for similar situations, these units will become not only a critical vulnerability but a soft target as well.

Shooting standards. A review of post operations reports from Vietnam, Somalia and East Timor 22 all indicate that contacts will continue to take place at close range against a fleeting target. Below are two quotes regarding marksmanship from Vietnam and Somalia respectively:

Marksmanship is still a problem and efforts will continue to be made to improve shooting to the stage where soldiers can engage small fleeting targets (the head and shoulders of the enemy) and be confident of hitting them. 23

Due to the closeness of buildings and dense low vegetation, all contacts took place at ranges of less than 100 metres. Most contacts were in villages and towns, at night, at ranges of less than forty metres. There are a number of similarities to close contacts that may be experienced in northern Australia and the ADMI. Battle shooting training should emphasise the necessary techniques for these situations. 24
The above comments are from infantry units. If infantry units have difficulty in effectively engaging the enemy on combat operations, it is natural to expect that shooting standards from soldiers in non-combat arms corps units will be lower.

**Threats.** Given the environment in which non-combat arms until are likely to be deployed, the likely threats to them will include:

- vehicle ambush (including IED);
- drive by shootings;
- civil unrest;
- conventional attack;
- Indirect attack (Mortar, rockets etc); and
- sniper fire.

**SUMMARY**

After examining the likely operational environment in which soldiers are expected to use their individual weapons, certain characteristics (with regards to shooting skills) emerge; namely that:

- contacts will be initiated with little, if any, warning;
- contacts will take place at short range. It is probable that most contacts will take place at the 0–100m range. (It should be noted that experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that some contacts will take place at over 300m. However, it is more important to be able to react to threats at short range than those at long range);
- the enemy will be a fleeting target, often at short range, and possibly merging into a civilian population; and
- the soldier will have to be wearing helmet, body armour and webbing. (They will also generally be fatigued and have an elevated heart rate due to the stress of the situation.)

**DEFICIENCIES IN SKILL AT ARMS TRAINING IN NON-ARMS CORPS UNITS**

There is a significant gap between the Australian Army’s doctrine and policies when compared to the operational environment in which a soldier is expected to use his weapon. Whilst our current training may skill soldiers to operate a weapon safely and minimise the number of negligent discharges, it does not adequately prepare them to use their weapon in combat. This is a core requirement of the Chief of Army’s ‘Soldier of 21st century’ vision that every soldier should be an expert in close combat. The major discrepancies are described below.
Skill At Arms Training In Non-combat Units

Frequency of Shooting

MLW 2-9-1 states that soldiers who have achieved the required operational standard should fire their personal weapon on a monthly basis. This compares with current policies which, when implemented, realistically mean that shooting (with the exception of grouping) is conducted annually. In addition, dry shooting is rarely, if ever, conducted in units. Because shooting is a skill that degrades quickly, when skill at arms training is conducted, most of the available time is spent maintaining those skills (i.e. training to pass LF6); hence there is no time available to improve so as to progress to more advanced skills.

Types of Shooting

Under current policies, soldiers are not required to practise individual or team battle shooting. The highest standard, which most soldiers achieve, is LF6—a far more challenging shoot than the previous LF9 (Elementary Application of Fire Qualification Shoot). Despite this, the LF6 does not replicate battle conditions and is not an adequate preparation for combat. Specific deficiencies include:

- **Dress.** Shoots are conducted in patrol order. Additional equipment, which will be carried on operations, includes a Kevlar helmet and ballistic vest. Shooting wearing this equipment is quite different to shooting in webbing.
- **Stress.** Soldiers only practise shooting on a mound in relative comfort and without having to deal with the effects of fatigue or arousal due to physical exertion. This also applies to soldiers’ weapon handling skills.
- **Range.** Shooting is only conducted at known ranges (100m, 200m and 300m). Shooting is not practised at ranges of less than 100m (the most likely range at which a soldier will use his weapon in combat) or at unknown ranges. Instinctive or close quarter battle is not practised.
- **Unconventional firing positions.** Soldiers are not practised in using unconventional firing positions (such as firing from a vehicle).
- **Rules of Engagement (ROE).** Soldiers are not practised in applying ROE.

Unit Training

Skill at arms training conducted in most units is not of a high standard. Weaknesses include:

- A limited review (if any) of marksmanship principles prior to either shooting (WTSS or Live) or dry firing:
• Limited use of Small Arms Coaches. There are generally few Small Arms Coaches in Units and in many cases they are not used appropriately or at all. Often the approach to rectify shooting weaknesses is for the firer to fire practice after practice until they qualify. This is wasteful in time and ammunition. It is also detrimental to the firer’s confidence with the weapon and fails to rectify any weaknesses;
• The minimal use of WTSS facilities which have excellent diagnostic tools for firers.
• Limited (if any) concurrent training conducted during range practices. As most non-combat units have little time available for weapon or fieldcraft training, much of this time at the range is therefore wasted.
• The lack of appointment of unit master coaches. This means that there is no one appointed to coordinate shooting training within the unit and raise standards. This does not alleviate command responsibility, but shooting is only one of the myriad of responsibilities of a commander and, due to time pressures, is generally well down the priority list.

MINIMUM STANDARDS

The Australian Army’s doctrine and policies only state the minimum requirements for shooting—with the exception of ammunition. Under the mission command concept, units can use both their initiative and facilities such as the WTSS to improve soldier skills and achieve higher standards. In most units, however, only the minimum standards will be attained. There are a number of reasons for this, most of which relate to time and corporate governance requirements which mean that commanders at all levels are focused on issues other than skill at arms training. There is also no immediate impact on a commander for failing to meet shooting requirements. Unlike financial, equipment management, equity, occupational health and safety (OH&S) or security issues, a commander will not be sacked because his unit’s shooting standards fail to meet the prescribed requirements.

IMPROVING SKILL AT ARMS STANDARDS

As can be seen by an examination of the doctrine, training and policies of the Australian Army when compared against probable operational scenarios, there is a disconnect for all units and non-combat arms units in particular. The doctrine is based on a perfect world, which is impossible for units to implement due to time...
and resource constraints. There is a requirement to align our shooting doctrine, policy and training with the likely operational environment to give our soldiers the best chance of success (and survival) on the modern battlefield. The next section of this paper will present a program for improving a soldier’s marksmanship skills to a level required for combat operations.

SHOOTING PROGRAM

Weapon handling. The current weapon training tests are safety orientated. There are good reasons for this. For personnel in units other than Land Command, this level of training is sufficient to maintain a soldier’s ability to safely operate the F88. However, for those soldiers posted to a high readiness unit, the WTT does not adequately replicate the conditions of the battlefield. An additional test is required to assess a soldier’s ability to handle their weapon safely under physical pressures (such as fatigue and a heightened heart rate) and time constraints. It is envisaged that this test should be completed in addition to the standard AIRN WTT.

By way of an example, advanced WTT would be conducted after some form of battle physical training (PT)—possibly the Combat Support Fitness Assessment (CSFA)—when the soldier is physically fatigued and has a heightened heart rate, whilst dressed in equipment that is likely to be worn on operations (such as a helmet, ballistic vest and webbing). The activity could be overlaid onto an activity such as the Run Dodge Jump (RDJ) component of the CSFA and incorporate (throughout the course) changing weapon states, immediate action and stoppage drills. Moreover, every soldier would have to complete the course within a specified timeframe.

Marksmanship. As has been identified, both the frequency and type of shooting conducted by units is insufficient. Table 1 contains a shooting program for non-combat arms units with respect to Readiness Category One or Two.

Live versus WTSS. The WTSS is an excellent facility for developing shooting skills, but as described in Command it will never replace the need for live fire. The proposed shooting program allocates ammunition to those shoots which soldiers are most likely to face on operations, whilst the remainder are practised on the WTSS.

Frequency. This shooting program will see soldiers shoot every four months, with one of those periods containing the lead up to and conduct of live firing. Whilst it would be ideal for soldiers to...
fire monthly, this would require an increase in WTSS facilities. Despite this, soldiers should dry fire their weapons each month, which should be incorporated into Unit Non Technical Inspection (NTI) programs. This would not place a great burden on units, as it only requires an additional five to ten minutes for a soldier to dry fire 10 shots from each shooting position after completing a NTI.

**Type.** All regular soldiers are required to qualify in LF6 prior to marching out of the Army Recruitment Training Centre (ARTC). Whilst at ARTC, soldiers conduct all of the shots from LF1 to LF6. The program noted here does not include these shoots. The majority of soldiers will pass LF6 after one or two attempts and can then progress to more advanced shoots. Those who fail the LF6 after two attempts on the WTSS should be directed to a remedial shooting program, which would include the intervening shoots. After qualifying on LF6, soldiers would then participate in the instinctive shooting practice or close quarter battle practice. The instinctive or un-aimed shoot practices soldiers in engaging targets at close range without taking an aimed shot. The close quarter battle shoot practices snap shooting at distances from 25m to 100m whilst changing positions. These two shoots replicate the types of shooting that a soldier will likely be exposed to in combat. This is the reason why live ammunition is allocated to the close quarter battle shoot.

In addition, each soldier should be exposed to some form of live-fire battle shooting each year, such as a sneaker practice, section defence practice, or fire

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... the resource implications of adopting this [proposed] program are minimal ...

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Table 1: Proposed self-protection small-arms users shooting program

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Shoot</th>
<th>WTSS</th>
<th>Live</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>LF1—Grouping Practice</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Each soldier is given two opportunities to pass LF6 on each visit to the WTSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LF2—Zeroing Practice</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>LF6—Application of Fire Practice</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Instinctive Shooting Practice</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Close Quarter Battle Practice</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Introductory battle shooting</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Units choose. Could include Section Defence Range, Sneaker range</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and movement practice. The reason these shoots have not been stipulated is that units should have the freedom to choose which shoot is most relevant to them. This would also allow units to change the types of shoot each year so that the majority of soldiers, over a posting, would be exposed to different forms of battle shooting. This shooting program is an increase of only three WTSS shoots per year per soldier and one live shoot per year per soldier. Therefore, the resource implications of adopting this program are minimal and, indeed, if viewed from the operational preparedness level of our soldiers, the program is a vast improvement on the current standards.

**Dress.** All shooting should be conducted in the dress that soldiers are likely to wear on operations. The standard dress should therefore be patrol order with helmet and body armour.

**Remedial training.** Soldiers who fail the LF1 or LF6 after two attempts on the WTSS should be directed into a remedial training program. This would be coordinated by the Unit Master Coach and include the intermediate shoots between LF1 and LF6 and individual coaching to raise marksmanship standards.

**Reporting.** Currently there is very little reporting on shooting standards apart from AIRN statistics and Army Capability Management System Post Activity Reports. Marksmanship standards, just like equipment availability and personnel readiness, are an important part of operational preparedness. Units should be required to report annually on the percentage of soldiers who have met the requirements of this shooting program and also the actions being taken to remedy deficiencies.

**SUMMARY**

This section has detailed a program which is designed to raise the marksmanship standards of soldiers and better prepare them for the type of shooting they would be expected to undertake on operations. It aligns shooting training with likely operational scenarios and will improve a soldier’s confidence in weapon handling and shooting skills by exposing them to more advanced training with a minimal increase in resources.

Some people will argue that not firing the intermediate practices between LF2 and LF6 (Introductory application of fire practices) will result in many soldiers failing LF6. I would argue that the majority of soldiers would indeed pass, because under such a program they would fire this practice more regularly than at present and, in addition, would conduct dry shooting training on
a monthly basis. Their marksmanship skills would therefore be maintained at a higher level year round. A further argument is that even if soldiers do fail LF6, this will not prevent them from being deployed on operations. As soldiers deployed on operations will be expected to shoot in combat conditions, they need to shoot in similar conditions during their training.

CONCLUSION

The Australian Army has gained significant operational experience since the INTERFET deployment in 1999. What has not been gained, particularly for our non-combat arms soldiers is combat experience. This has resulted in the marksmanship standards expected of these soldiers reducing to a level less than that required for combat. Whilst it is easy to adapt a military force trained in conventional warfare to other tasks such as peacekeeping, the reverse is not true. This paper has examined the Australian Army’s current marksmanship training doctrine and policies against likely operational scenarios. It has shown that our marksmanship training for non-combat arms units fails to meet the Chief of Army’s aim of every soldier becoming an expert in close combat. This requires a higher level of marksmanship training than that being currently achieved. As a result, a shooting program has been proposed which would, if adopted, better prepare Australian soldiers for operations. Given that large elements of the Army are expected to deploy on combat operations at short notice, it is imperative that marksmanship skills be improved. Whilst the benefits of improving marksmanship skills are not immediately apparent, our success, or lack thereof, will be measured when Australian soldiers are engaged in combat.

ENDNOTES

2 Allen, Burma: The Longest War 1941–45, p.177.
5 The term ‘non-combat arms unit’ does not mean that the unit will not be involved in combat, but rather that its primary battlefield role is to provide support, in one form or another, to the combat forces.
7 Australian Army LWP-G 7-4-125: Vol.3, chapter 9, paragraph 9–11.
Skill At Arms Training In Non-combat Units

8 Ibid.
9 Department of Defence, Defence Instruction (Army) 80-1, Army Individual Readiness Notice, Army Headquarters, Canberra, ACT, 2005, p. 3, paragraph 10f.
11 Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Army), DJFHQ Standing Orders—Part 1, chapter 5, 'Shooting in the 1st Division', Enoggra, QLD.
14 It should, however, be noted that the majority of shooting under the DFP is conducted on the WTSS with only zeroing and qualification shots being fired live. All shoots were fired live under MLW 2-9-1.
15 Australian Army, 1993, Manual of Land Warfare 2-9-1: Training the Battle Shot, chapter 1, paragraphs 1-5 to 1-10.
16 Ibid, paragraph 1-14.
18 Ibid, p. 44.
20 The 1st Joint Support Unit, during both INTERFET and Operation ANODE, was responsible for providing its own Force Protection during the initial stages of the operation prior to security being established. During INTERFET, soldiers from DJFHQ, 1 JSU and co-located units were responsible for perimeter security during the hours of darkness.
22 Australian Army, 6th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, Operation Citadel Post Operational Report, appendix 1 to annex D, 2001, paragraph 36.
26 Under the DFP, a self-protection small-arms user is authorised to fire LF2 to LF6 once a year using the WTSS and LF2 and LF6 once a year live fire. In order not to waste live ammunition, lead-up shooting is conducted at the WTSS to give the firer the best possible chance of qualifying with live ammunition. This WTSS and live fire will generally occur within a week or two of each other. Therefore the soldier realistically fires their weapon (in a block of time) once annually.

27 LF6 includes shorter exposures, smaller targets (figure 12 targets represent the upper body and head of a human), moving targets and both supported and unsupported shooting positions.


THE AUTHOR

Captain Cameron Leckie enlisted into the Australian Army in 1995 as an officer cadet at the Australian Defence Force Academy where he graduated with a Bachelor of Science. Allocated to the Royal Australian Corps of Signals on graduation from the Royal Military College Duntroon, he was posted to the 1st Joint Support Unit. Other postings have included the 4th Field Regiment, 110th Signals Squadron and a second posting to the 1st Joint Support Unit. His operational service includes East Timor (1999-2000), Operation Anode (2003) and Operation Sumatra Assist (2005). His current appointment is as the Operations Officer of the 136th Signals Squadron.
THE MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS–IRAQ PARTNERSHIP

INTERACTION AND INTEGRATION WITH THE IRAQI ARMY*

LIEUTENANT COLONEL N. H. FLOYD

PURPOSE

This paper outlines selected tactics, techniques and procedures developed and adopted by the Multi-National Corps–Iraq to facilitate interaction with their Iraqi Army (predominantly Iraqi Ground Forces Command) counterparts.

BACKGROUND

Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) was established on 15 May 2005 as the operational fighting headquarters for the Iraqi Army. In a command directive dated 4 August 2005, the Commanding General of the Iraqi Joint Forces (IJF) provided his implementing direction to the Commander of Iraqi Ground Forces. IGFC serves

* This article is based on a memorandum drafted on 7 January 2006 by then-Major Floyd for the US Army's Multi-National Corps–Iraq based at Camp Victory.
the dual functions of operational-level corps headquarters and that of the land component command of the IJF. The mature end-state IGFC will not only direct the combat operations of assigned Iraqi Ground Forces (IGF) units, but will also take responsibility for:

- developing a robust training plan to enable units to maintain their operational capability and combat effectiveness
- identifying training requirements for units in anticipation of forthcoming operations and advising Joint Headquarters (JHQ) where support is required
- collecting and advising on lessons learned in accordance with direction from JHQ

These functions did not exist in this form or level in the former Iraqi Army and, as such, IGFC has met institutional resistance to its raison d’être. This is notwithstanding its key enduring roles as a buffer to politicisation of the IGF, and in delivering effective operational interpretation of strategic direction from JHQ, the Ministry of Defence and the Iraqi Government. Other concepts recently introduced include:

- familiarity and proficiency with C4 (command, control, communications and computers)
- revised application of the Common Staff System (previously inherent, but differently employed to accommodate an autocratic and punitive system of directive control)
- adoption of the military decision-making process (MDMP) as a planning method

These factors impact on Multi-National Corps–Iraq’s effective partnership with IGFC—a liaison that is fundamental not only to the success of the IGFC as a headquarters, but to the entire command and control construct adopted for the Iraqi Army, and thus ultimately key to the transition to the counterinsurgency fight. While the IGFC military transition teams (MiTT) provide technical and individual training, the role of the MNC-I partner provides additional mentorship, contextual understanding and experiential advice to its IGFC counterparts.

**THE BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT**

The concept of an IGFC is entirely new to the senior Iraqi Army leadership in a variety of personal, professional and functional aspects. The key issues for the partnership include:

- dedication of senior and Action Officer partners
- whole of cell support
- maintenance of dual battle rhythm
- accommodation of and accounting for cultural differences (interpreting, translation, time allocation, work rates)
THE MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS–IRAQ PARTNERSHIP

- meeting structure, layouts, attendance and conduct
- IA-partner parallel situational awareness (JHQ-Transition Team, MNSTC-I [Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq], MSC/IA Division, MiTT)
- Iraqi input to policy and operational decision-making
- personal and institutional constraints and limitations
- personal support and credibility

PARTNERSHIP CONSIDERATIONS

DEDICATION OF SENIOR AND ACTION OFFICER PARTNERS

Effective partnership requires the establishment of rapport not only at the senior representational level, but also at the Action Officer level. Partners at all levels also need to mirror this relationship-building within the relevant MiTT appointments.

At the 06 level and above, partnership manifests primarily through personal professional example, relationship development and rapport, and the provision of timely and accurate functional advice. The senior partner should be drawn from an appointment with sufficient executive power to be credible and minimise later recourse. This partnership dynamic is supported in parallel at the Action Officer level, but here the role is further augmented through the provision of decision-making process advice and support and, when necessary, executive assistance in staff procedures that prove unfamiliar and complex. Both partnership levels are best delivered through a consistent and dedicated partnering individual, preferably someone with demonstrated inter-cultural skills and interest.

WHOLE OF CELL SUPPORT

Even when combined, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) cell staff, coalition partners and MiTTs cannot provide all the staff support required by their corresponding Iraqi Army partner headquarters. At the MSC and MNC-I level, this is particularly germane when complex decision-making requires staff effort drawn from the full range of divisional and corps-level staff actions and subject matter expertise. It must be remembered that, regardless of their previous experience, senior IA officers served in an Army environment that was far less complex and that was more austere; as such, many staff functions were either conducted differently or perhaps not at all. MNC-I functional staff must be prepared to contribute across all staff responsibilities where necessary. This requirement will increase as Iraqi Army divisions and the Iraqi Ground Forces Command itself begin to assume battlespace and tactical control as well as administrative control of subordinate brigades and divisions respectively.

Recommendation: All MNC-I staff must be prepared to provide operational-level staff support and advice where and when necessary.
MAINTENANCE OF DUAL BATTLE RHYTHM

For MNC-I and MSC partners, maintenance and deconfliction of a dual battle rhythm will present ongoing time management challenges. Partnership responsibilities demand attendance at and participation in all appropriate conferences and meetings at the Iraqi partner headquarters, in addition to meeting the requirements of the Coalition headquarters battle rhythm. Meeting planners and coordinators must reflect this duality in all programming. Without such programming allowances, partners unavoidably lose situational awareness either of the Coalition or the Iraqi operating picture, or both.

**Recommendation:** Coalition battle rhythm must allow for the battle rhythm of the partner Iraqi headquarters.

ACCOMMODATION OF AND ALLOWANCES FOR CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (INTERPRETING, TRANSLATION, TIME ALLOCATION, WORK RATES)

Beyond the superficial cultural niceties of greetings and politeness, there are numerous inter-cultural challenges facing coalition partners which may include:

- **Interpreting.** Rule number one is that there are rarely sufficient interpreters to meet the operational requirement. In addition to this limitation is the care necessary in the appropriate utilisation of this scarce resource. Individual interpreters have different levels of education and experience, both civil and military, and, as such, may have difficulty with jargon, abbreviations or complex concepts, the vocabulary for which they may not have used in either one or both languages.

- **Time.** Time taken to explain concepts to ensure the interpreter understands what they are trying to convey is never wasted. Depending on skill and experience, interpreters have individual limits on information packets that they can digest before mental translation and relaying in the target language. Unless the interpreter is at the professional superlative level where they can interpret simultaneously, a failure to control conversation to allow interpretation to occur will result in unavoidable information loss, which can have dire consequences.

- **Work rates.** While a coalition partner’s deployment is long, it will never equate to the magnitude of the task ahead of the Iraqi counterpart. For Iraqi Army personnel, leave is vital as a mechanism to maintain and convey financial and personal support to their families, while weekends allow both rest and the opportunity for religious observance. Similarly, Middle Eastern culture does not demand the same frantic approach to work found in most Western cultures. A greater sense of fatalism stemming from a history of autocracy—whether theocratic, tribal or dictatorial—also influences the Iraqi approach to tasks, often preceded by the epithet ‘Insh’ allah’ [If God wills it]. Accept these as cultural norms and work within them.
Recommendation: Remember the three 'P's: Pause, Patience, and Practical vocabulary. While you as a partner may be running a sprint or, at best, a middle distance race, your Iraqi counterpart is only just beginning a marathon.

MEETING STRUCTURE, LAYOUTS, ATTENDANCE AND CONDUCT

Within the Iraqi culture, meetings traditionally serve a different purpose to that typical of most Western cultures. While clear outcomes and decisions are the result sought from a Coalition meeting, this is culturally odd for many Iraqis (though less so within the military). Meetings are intended more to facilitate information transfer and achieve minor staffing resolutions, with weighty decisions more comfortably arrived at in intimate command group meetings. In practical terms:

- **Meeting layouts.** The layout of the meeting should cater for both partners: consideration should be given to interpreter placement, bilingual agendas and supporting slides (half the bullets with information in both languages presented simultaneously). Where available, interpretation headsets should be provided for those speaking the non-predominant language of the meeting.

- **Meeting preparation.** Partners should be prepared for limited Iraqi input to meetings if translated read-ahead guidance and topics have not been provided to both MiTTs and Iraqi counterparts. The onus is on the partner to ensure such preparation occurs; counterpart meetings are long enough (always factor double time to allow for worst-case interpretation rates) without the need to conduct them twice. Consider conducting pre-meetings with key Iraqi counterparts.

- **Meeting conduct.** Loss of face is as important in Arab culture as it is in most Asian cultures. Nothing is gained and much is risked if an Iraqi counterpart is needlessly put on the spot for a snap, under-informed decision. Iraqis come from a military heritage where the wrong answer was dealt with summarily and, at times, terminally. As such, Iraqi counterparts will, at times, not answer a topic directly if it is unfamiliar, but choose to provide all manner of ancillary and nebulous peripheral data that seeks to demonstrate that, while they may not know the answer to the question at hand, they do know something. This is best dealt with firmly but gently to bring the conversation stream back on track. However, there is little point pressing the topic if it is clear the Iraqi partner cannot provide the input sought.

Recommendation. Prepare for all meetings with due consideration for time taken, membership, topics covered and decisions sought. Cater for both partners in supporting documentation, allocation of seating and interpreter support. Prepare the way for decisions through pre-meetings.
Iraqi Army—Partner Parallel Situational Awareness
(JHQ-TT, MNSTC-I, MSC/IA Division, MITT)

More frustrating than losing situational awareness of your counterpart’s operating picture is the need to redress dysfunction between your own headquarters and your superior/subordinate Coalition partner headquarters. Both partners must strive to achieve ‘lockstep’ when dealing with counterpart headquarters above and below, to ensure that mutually agreed positions are clear and articulated. Additionally, Coalition partners need also to ensure that a unilateral Coalition operating picture is shared between higher and lower headquarters, so as to avoid unintentional or calculated circumventing by Iraqi partners with their corresponding commands. Judicious (as opposed to relentless) accompanying of partners on representative missions to superior and subordinate headquarters not only increases situational awareness, but also builds rapport and, where mutual objectives exist (as they always should), enhances the credibility of both. Moreover, early advice to superior/subordinate Coalition partner headquarters of bilateral positions on issues will assist in preparing the way for dealing with them on the day. Finally, important FRAGOs (fragmentary orders) relating to Iraqi Army operations and training need to be issued bilingually, with carbon copies to Iraqi Ground Forces Command.

Iraqi Input to Policy/Operational Decision-Making

While sometimes tiresome, obtaining Iraqi involvement in joint planning teams and planning activities provides significant advantages not only in gaining Iraqi buy-in and ownership of a problem, but also through facilitating the transfer of responsibility for decision-making in the future. More importantly—and unsurprisingly—Iraqis know a great deal about the geographic and human environment of their country. Views that have been dismissed by Coalition planners as expressions of Iraqi self-interest or bias have, on several previous occasions, been proven otherwise. Though generally relatively unsophisticated as an intelligence source, Iraqi assessments are certainly worth considering during the planning process, and should not be discounted out of hand. If nothing else, an alternative, local perspective provides another lens through which to view a situation.

An Iraqi solution that works is ten times more valuable than a perfect Coalition solution, and may well turn out to be a better solution in the long term.

Recommendation: Early and considered involvement by Iraqis in decision-making, while sometimes tiresome, pays considerable dividends. Listen and learn—in one way or another.
PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

Iraqi Army officers are drawn from an extremely diverse range of backgrounds which include former regime battle-hardened commanders and staff officers; former National Guard officers with varied civilian careers; those who left the Army decades ago; and rapidly promoted favourites. Senior-level military professional education is not prevalent, and Staff College-qualified officers are, unsurprisingly, highly sought after. The previous workplace of former regime officers was also radically different to the current environment, both in institutional mechanisms and the professional relationships between superiors and subordinates. Many officers are professional and often dedicated—given the risk to themselves and their families—but many still require firm guidance and ‘handling’ to inculcate appropriate ‘New Iraqi Army’ values and practices.

While the Army is undoubtedly one of the more eclectic institutions in Iraq, sectarian and tribal loyalties do and will continue to influence decisions and behaviour in an irrational manner. This is no different to Western cultures, although perhaps more clear-cut and binding, with trust and reliance in a perilous society often being based on filial and theological kinship. Personal education standards are similarly diverse, which again should not be surprising given the predominantly agrarian nature of provincial Iraqi society.

Recommendation: Harbour no preconceptions of the ability, capacity or attitude of Iraqi officers, but don't be astounded when one or some fail to meet expectations. It is the Coalition's job to develop them, personally and professionally.

PERSONAL SUPPORT AND CREDIBILITY

Early and sustained development of personal professional-level rapport with Iraqi counterparts requires no little effort, but is no less rewarding when achieved. The Coalition partner’s trust, mutual respect and cultural regard must be demonstrated from the outset and, while not everyone can be Lawrence of Arabia, an understanding of and empathy with Arab and Iraqi culture and language is an investment with undoubted return. Iraqis know far more about American culture than Americans know of Iraqi culture—Hollywood, Fox and CNN have done their job well; as can be imagined, those aspects do not necessarily reflect the honour, respect and professionalism that Americans uphold. Start from a pretext of genuinely demonstrating that Coalition members are not all Mafiosi, licentious drug-crazed gamblers or violent, uncultured thugs, and rapport will soon develop. Reinforcing counterpart credibility and providing personal support is also important in obtaining mutual trust. This does not equate to ghost-writing all of an Iraqi counterpart’s staff work efforts, but rather ensuring the requisite information, tools and systemic techniques are available and accessible. Personal
interest in and time devoted to a counterpart's responsibilities not only increase situational awareness of the Iraqi headquarters, but also build your credibility as someone who is truly interested in the security and stable future of Iraq.

**Recommendation:** Institute early and sustained development of personal-level professional rapport with Iraqi counterparts, accounting for and deconstructing cultural differences.

**THE WAY AHEAD**

Never forget that, as a partner, you are ultimately training and preparing your replacement. It is the partner's job to ensure an Iraqi counterpart knows what is required, and when and how to perform and execute a given role. The lessons described above are more or less applicable across most of Iraq's broad ethnic mix. The most important lesson, however, is to remain committed and never expect Iraqis to act like Westerners: they are not, just as you are not Iraqi.

**THE AUTHOR**

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In 2002, Lieutenant Colonel Floyd attended the ADF School of Languages, and subsequently attended the Australian Command and Staff Course at Weston Creek, Canberra in 2003. He was posted in 2004 as Staff Officer Grade Two, International Engagement – Army at Army Headquarters. Prior to his promotion in May 2006, Lieutenant Colonel Floyd deployed as part of Operation **Catalyst** as a Coalition Plans Officer within Headquarters Multi-National Corps – Iraq from Aug 2005 until Feb 2006.

Lieutenant Colonel Floyd has undergraduate and post-graduate degrees in History, and an interest across the humanities and the sciences - including his qualification as a French linguist. He also holds a Masters in Defence Studies Management from the University of Canberra. He is currently serving in Army Headquarters as Deputy Director Strategy – Army.
THE ‘MOUT’ING CHALLENGE
AND THE NEW ZEALAND ARMY’S NEED TO PREPARE

BRYAN DORN

ABSTRACT
Operations in urban environments are a persistent feature of military affairs. As Western technology has outstripped our adversaries, they have adapted to use this most complex terrain, limiting the utility of Western firepower and destructive force. This article examines several aspects of this dilemma from the perspective of New Zealand’s Army and suggests avenues of further development.

INTRODUCTION
The future of warfare is likely to become increasingly complex. Adversaries will employ irregular methods of attack, exploiting complex terrain such as mountains, forests, littoral environments, or urban areas. Such fighting has been an accepted feature of warfare. Whether in the Pacific jungles during the Second World War or insurgents in the alleyways of Baghdad, forces have sought to undermine their opponents’ technological superiority and greater firepower. The exploitation of complex terrain will continue to be a characteristic of tomorrow’s warfighting. Military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) will become a common...
experience for Western military forces in the future. This paper introduces a number of important points or recommendations to improve the New Zealand Army’s ability to conduct combat roles in such an environment.

**STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF URBAN AREAS**

The US Army’s ‘thunder run’ into Baghdad did not herald some new development in war; urban warfare has been a frequent occurrence throughout history and the use of massed armoured and mechanised forces in sweeping reconnaissance-in-force drives through cities dates back at least to Vietnam.¹ The restricted nature of urban warfare can make for exceptionally bloody battles that consume whole armies—as happened at Stalingrad, Monte Cassino, or Berlin. The inherent dangers of urban combat have not prevented conventional armed forces from continually being drawn into urban struggles. Metropolitan centres are important strategic objectives, representing economic, social and political power. While crucial during conventional warfare, built-up areas will become even more attractive during non-conventional hostilities.

Securing these population centres will be crucial to the achievement of operational and strategic objectives. At the same time, the differences between the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war become blurred. The compressed nature of urban areas means that small-unit actions can have significant implications for larger engagements. Moreover, the intensity of urban operations and the potential for non-combatant casualties—and hence possible political backlash—make tactical-level operations even more important for determining strategic victory.

**INCREASED RATE OF GLOBAL URBANISATION**

The rate of urbanisation is expected to increase and much of it will occur in the developing world. For example, by 2015 the world population is expected to be more than seven billion, with 95 per cent of the increase occurring in poor or developing countries.² Half the world’s population will be urbanised. The increase in urbanisation will not be restricted to the Middle East, South Asia, or South America; it will also be prevalent throughout the Pacific Rim. In 1970, the Asia-Pacific region had only eight cities in excess of five million inhabitants; today there are more than thirty.³
The ‘MOUT’ing Challenge

Developing nations often lack the political or social facilities to ensure order. With pollution, corruption and urban decay accompanying urbanisation, cities will attract criminals, terrorists and insurgents that base their ‘centre of gravity’ among the disgruntled urban populace. Urban areas are becoming the ‘citadels of the dispossessed and irreconcilable’. Although the potential for such situations to escalate into large-scale inter-state war is low, it is likely that armed forces will in future be engaged in city areas against insurgents. Furthermore, the proliferation of sophisticated communications systems allows combatants to remain connected through cyber-traffic whilst also employing discrete communication networks.

Physical Challenges of Urban Terrain

Urban environments offer unique military advantages to the defender. The complexity of such environments derives from the sheer number of elements within a confined space. The physical characteristics of urban areas require a different way of thinking about terrain, including comprehension of its multi-dimensional nature, its general forms and functions, and its size and scope. The total size of the surfaces and spaces of a built-up area is usually many times that of a similar-sized piece of natural terrain because of the complex blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior and subterranean forms superimposed on the natural landscape.

Like other terrain, cities consist of airspace and surface areas. Additionally, there are man-made ‘super-surface’ areas (the roofs of buildings or towers) and ‘sub-surface’ areas (below ground level). Intra-surface areas, such as floors within buildings, provide another avenue of attack and are prone to intense combat. Reconnaissance and surveillance is limited in such environments, and they also provide a prime location for the emplacement of snipers, automatic weapons, light and medium anti-tank weapons, and man-portable air defence systems. Firing from within buildings also allows for top-down attacks onto the sensitive points of armoured vehicles or low-flying aircraft. Hence, built environs present more daunting challenges than their natural counterparts.

Urban environments provide the ultimate equaliser for insurgent forces that would be soundly and rapidly defeated in open terrain. The proliferation of heavy-calibre machineguns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) provides insurgents with
significant lethality, particularly within the confines of urban terrain. For example, in 1992, Russian T-72 tanks were destroyed in Tajikistan by rebels using swarmed RPGs. The first round breached the reactive armour, while the second and third rounds hit the exposed area of the tank. With the tank’s crew now blind, the rebel gunners re-positioned themselves to disable the tank. Other tactics included attacking the T-72 from its vulnerable rear and flank. The destruction of the Russian 131st Maykop Brigade during the 1994 attack on Grozny again demonstrated how urban terrain could channel conventional forces into a prepared ambush.

The greater demand for combatants to conduct small-unit engagements at close range places a premium on new weapons capable of breaching walls, clearing rooms and destroying buildings. Minimising civilian casualties will require weapons that deliver force with precision and surgical effort while minimising secondary fragmentation damage. The New Zealand Army will need greater proficiency in close quarters battle to further assist overmatch against the threat force. The numerous avenues of attack mean that a platoon will generally be the minimum-sized unit when conducting mounted or dismounted operations. Given the high density of urban areas and potential for rapid escalation, section commanders will require access to important assets without referring up the chain of command. This includes advanced infantry weapons that can provide a precision and stand-off capability with overmatch, as well as enhanced body armour and access to unattended sensors for enhanced situational awareness.

**THE IMPORTANCE OF PRECISE FIREPOWER**

The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq did not culminate in the much-feared Grozny-like battle for Baghdad. The ‘thunder runs’ into Baghdad were a *coup de main* that minimised the risk of large-scale urban warfare. Major General Buford Blount, Commander 3rd Infantry Division, made the decision to unleash the ‘thunder run’ with poor satellite photos, no human intelligence reports and little understanding of Iraqi defences. The Iraqi Army offered at times stiff resistance; however, they lacked any long-term or coordinated exploitation of urban environments, such as the use of mines, snipers or barricades.

The 2003 Iraq War illustrated the importance of armour in urban areas—when supported by infantry—to provide precise and high-value suppressive and destructive firepower. The supporting infantry-fighting vehicles, with their short barrel length, high barrel elevation and ability to manoeuvre, allowed for a large
engagement envelope. For example, the Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle, similar to the New Zealand Defence Force’s recently acquired Light Armoured Vehicle III, was a valuable asset when isolating an objective in an urban environment. Stryker vehicles were used to drop off squads and then patrol the perimeter to isolate the objective and identify suspects fleeing the scene.

In a Special Defence Department briefing, Colonel Robert Brown, the commander of the US 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in the Multinational Force – Northwest in Iraq, outlined the effectiveness of the Stryker in providing protection and mobility in urban areas. A December 2004 US Centre for Army Lessons Learned report argued that its slat armour was only effective against 50 per cent of RPG attacks and that the additional armour restricted manoeuvrability. However, the report also noted that a soldier’s body armour and minimal exposure outside the vehicle were successful in preventing injuries. Major Nicholas Mullen, 1st Brigade’s rear detachment commander, argued that ‘there were physically very few places that we couldn’t go within that urban terrain’.

THE ROLE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

Casualty phobia has increased as technology has made war seem more clinical and bloodless, with increased accuracy in both information and weapons. This effect has combined with the pervasive products of globalisation as the media has unprecedented access and audience in modern conflict. The decision to use lethal force is now a strategic as well as tactical one because of the consequences on public opinion. The conundrum for tomorrow’s military is obvious: tolerance for casualties is low while the probability of urban combat is high.

When confronted with an irregular enemy, Coalition forces find innocent and opponent indistinguishable. While able to achieve a significant victory during the conventional stages of the Iraq War, they were ill-prepared for the subsequent deterioration of law and order. Maintaining civil order is an important aspect of the contemporary battlefield—and will be in future. The development of non-lethal weapons (NLW) could offer armed forces an effective means of achieving their objectives of modern war whilst minimising civilian casualties and reducing the amount of political ammunition for the urban opponent. Although such weapons are still in the development phase, their potential has already been aptly demonstrated.
For example, in March 1995, the US Marines, armed with non-lethal weapons, safeguarded the withdrawal of 2500 UN peacekeepers from Somalia. The lack of time available meant that the non-lethal systems selected used organic weapons systems within the Marine rifle company’s table of equipment. Due to training time limitations and increased combat load upon the Marine, the decision was made to acquire non-lethal munitions that could be fired from the M203 and the standard 12-gauge shotgun. Despite the efforts undertaken to prepare for the use of non-lethal weapons, these were not actually employed. Advanced efforts in the areas of diplomatic initiative and public awareness, complemented by the availability of heavy forces, meant there was little need for the use of non-lethal weapons. Important lessons extracted from the withdrawal from Somalia were the need to have compatibility between non-lethal munitions and existing weapons and training systems. Furthermore, clear and unambiguous rules of engagement were crucial. Lloyd Feldman, Assistant Director for the Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation, stated: ‘The future of our military commitments is going to emphasize stability and reconstruction … This venue is not a free-fire zone and killing field. You need some way of differentiating the good, the bad, and the ugly.’

Although non-lethal weapons clearly have significant strategic value when operating in the future battlefield, there are numerous issues that must be taken into consideration. For example, future military leaders must comprehend the effectiveness and limitations of NLWs as well as the situations in which they are appropriate. The use of non-lethal weapons can also be expanded to be used against enemy radio or television broadcasts. It is also crucial to extend the range of non-lethal weapons out to 100 metres, out of the range of rock-throwers or rioters armed with Molotov cocktails. The decision to use non-lethal options must be made at the lowest possible level. For example, operations that intend to use non-lethal weapons must comprehend the fluidity of the future battlespace and its inherently unpredictable ability to transition instantly from humanitarian operations to warfighting. The commander’s ability to make sense of the chaos of battle will ultimately determine the success or failure of non-lethal weapons.

**THE VULNERABILITY OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

The current insurgency in Iraq has also illustrated how small units can exploit urban terrain to conduct co-ordinated attacks against enemy forces and supply convoys. Logistic support in urban areas is dangerous, resulting in vital equipment not being replaced or repaired. The strain upon ‘just in time’ logistics will become even greater
considering the potential high rate of ammunition consumption by dispersed groups. It will be difficult to guarantee adequate protection for supply lines in urban areas if scarce infantry are already engaged in offensive operations. Combat service support elements will need to provide their own protection, whether during offensive, defensive or stability urban operations.

The Russians in Afghanistan and Chechnya found it essential to provide armour on the cabs of support trucks. Mogadishu, Northern Ireland, and Baghdad have reinforced the notion that in urban environments there is no ‘rear area’. Since support units will be required to defend themselves as well as come to the aid of other forces, every soldier will need to be trained and equipped to act as an infantryman.

THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER

Heliborne forces are an obvious tactical option for urban penetration; however, they are vulnerable to small-arms fire. The vulnerability of US Task Force Ranger helicopters to small-arms fire was a bloody and important lesson from Somalia. The task force was unaware that Aidid brought in fundamental Islamic soldiers from Sudan, experienced in downing Russian helicopters in Afghanistan, to train his men in RPG firing techniques.\(^\text{14}\) Task Force Ranger failed to learn the significant lessons of the 10 Mountain Division Quick Reaction Force, which just eight days prior had lost a helicopter to enemy RPG fire. Conducting operations in daylight allowed the guerrillas to observe Task Force Ranger’s tactics and to target the helicopters. ‘Given the low altitudes and the relatively low air speed of TF Ranger’s helicopters, the helicopters were much more vulnerable than TF Ranger’s plans assumed.’\(^\text{15}\)

Despite the evident lessons of Somalia and Chechnya about the vulnerability of helicopters in urban areas, they still have a role. For example, attack helicopters were successful in defending US forces from being overrun in Somalia on 3–4 October 1993, while the AC-130 gunship has provided lethal and precise firepower on numerous occasions in Iraq. During the first battle of Nasiriyah on 5 April 2004, the Italian marines were exposed to lethal fire from the rooftops of buildings, which could have been destroyed from the air.\(^\text{16}\) The amount of training and preparedness of crews is crucial to their ability to operate in an urban environment.

The physical characteristics of urban areas can significantly undermine situational awareness. By obstructing line of sight, high buildings can neutralise key sensors. The short sight distances in urban settings demand a mixture of small air- and ground-based sensors to detect and track targets. Unattended ground sensors could cue other miniature uninhabited aerial vehicles and airborne sensors, significantly increasing
the ability to decipher the confused urban environment. The use of uninhabited aerial and ground vehicles can present a viable means of bridging gaps in line-of-sight transmissions. Future sensors are expected to reveal up to 30 to 40 per cent of the battlespace. However, difficulty in assessing the resulting intelligence may lead to confusion—information is not knowledge. Unattended sensors will be crucial in both warfighting and humanitarian missions to compensate for lower friendly troop densities.

THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

Although technology plays an important role in urban areas, human intelligence is of even greater importance. It is difficult to obtain, requiring close contacts with reliable sources. During 1993, Task Force Ranger in Somalia faced challenges in acquiring both signals and human intelligence. Mark Bowden, in his book *Black Hawk Down*, described Somali society as a complex and confusing web of family and kin relations. Obtaining accurate intelligence in such an environment presented tremendous challenges. Readily identifiable, non-members of the clan were immediately suspect and given little access to the community. Also, clan members were unwilling to provide information about other clan members to United Nations forces.

This problem cannot be solved by using technology alone. Somalia highlighted the vital importance of understanding cultural factors when mounting operations in a complex environment. Major General Zinni, a US Marine Corps officer and former commander of Central Command, observed that the principal failure of US intelligence was the inability to 'penetrate the faction leaders and … understand the culture, the clan association affiliation, [and] the power of the faction leaders'. A lack of trained interpreters, as occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq, can also mean that valuable human intelligence is lost.

HUMAN CHALLENGES OF URBAN TERRAIN

The human environment of urban areas presents another complication to future warfighting. Ralph Peters, in his publication *The Human Terrain of Urban Operations*, provided a three-level description of social sub-systems, including hierarchical, multicultural and tribal or clan-based cities. Difficulty in determining the social composition of urban areas can have a significant impact on military operations, whether that is during warfighting or Stability and Support Operations. For example, Moscow’s failure to recognise the tribal nature of Chechen society meant an opportunity to exploit internal frictions was lost.
Contemporary opponents are also prepared to place the welfare of civilians at risk to strike a political victory against conventional forces. During Coalition operations in the Iraqi city of Samarra in October 2004, insurgents indiscriminately fired rockets and mortars, killing civilians. International news agencies assumed this was a result of crossfire between US and insurgent forces. Fast and effective information operations were imperative to discredit such allegations.21

The difficulty in differentiating between friend and foe makes the urban terrain attractive for current and future adversaries. It is therefore imperative that work be undertaken to develop ‘identification, friend or foe’ devices. The negative political repercussions that civilian casualties can cause will be exploited by the urban opponent. As Alice Hills stated: ‘[T]he presence of civilians encourages the media, non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations to pay overly critical attention to what the military do’.22

The urban population also provides a source of sanctuary for insurgents, who can escape through a maze of underground networks. Local popular support also provides a source of personnel, ammunition and intelligence. Retaliatory military strikes by the counterinsurgency forces may cause civilian casualties, further increasing popular support for insurgents and thereby strengthening their ‘centre of gravity’. Innocent civilians may also fall victim to insurgents seeking to deter support for opposing forces or undermine the strategic and political unity of intervening parties. Insurgent forces commonly manipulate the local population and incite opposition against external intervention.

Continued urbanisation will increase the military, economic and political value of urban areas. Modern military forces must be able to conduct operations in urban areas to maintain their strategic relevance. To ignore urban operations or place them in the ‘too hard’ basket fails to recognise that, regardless of intentions, armies have been repeatedly drawn into urban fighting. The gravitational pull of urban areas will only increase as they escalate in political and military importance for the future enemy.

Moscow’s failure to recognise the tribal nature of Chechen society meant an opportunity to exploit internal frictions was lost.

The gravitational pull of urban areas will only increase…
THE NEW ZEALAND ARMY PREPARATIONS FOR URBAN OPERATIONS

The New Zealand Army must continue to be prepared to operate in urban environments. Although New Zealand has not been involved in conventional urban warfighting operations since the Second World War, peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor and Solomon Islands have illustrated the continuing demand for core skills and suitable equipment to operate within such environments.23

Key lessons from our overseas deployments include the importance of aerial surveillance and force and route protection to avoid confusion and fratricide. The New Zealand Army’s experience in Basra in southern Iraq indicated the potential to become involved in the full spectrum of operations. This again highlighted the Army’s weakness in force protection, training requirements to deal with improvised explosive devices, and maintaining public order. The fact that the New Zealand Engineer Group was deployed without its own organic protection meant scarce resources had to be diverted to this crucial task. As a result, engineer output was reduced by approximately 50 per cent. The frequent spikes in violence meant the New Zealand Engineer Group was required to operate alongside British armoured vehicles if protection was required.

In likely offshore scenarios, primarily focused in the developing world and not involving any threat to core state survival, heavy New Zealand casualties will be politically untenable. It is important, therefore, that the Army’s equipment has an increased ability to operate in urban areas. As indicated above, the Stryker, similar to the LAV III, has performed admirably with US forces in Iraq. The American performance has also illustrated important lessons in terms of improving survivability, including armour upgrades and new weapon acquisitions designed for breaching and stability operations.

The Army’s upcoming Future Land Operating Concept (FLOC), which provides the strategic planning for the development of a Network Enabled Army by 2010, places particular emphasis upon the continued requirement to operate in urban areas against lethal opponents. The FLOC also mentions that interagency coordination will become a great demand in the future to ensure success in the other ‘two blocks’—humanitarian and law enforcement operations—in the ‘three-block war’ construct. The New Zealand Army’s soldier modernisation program has also learnt valuable lessons from previous deployments and those of other nations to equip our
future soldiers for the ‘three-block’ war. This includes the development of light body armour, non-lethal weapons, precision weapons with overmatch, and the ability to access information from air- and ground-based sensors. The New Zealand Army has also undertaken efforts towards formulating its tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for operating in an urban environment and is seeking to acquire a purpose built urban training facility. Although work remains to ensure future capability is suitable for urban operations, the New Zealand Army is undertaking a deliberate development of its capacity to undertake operations in an urban environment.

ENDNOTES

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22 Hills, p. 200.

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THE CHALLENGE OF
GENERATION Y

ABSTRACT

The author examines the claims about the importance of the emerging generation as they enter the workforce, Generation Y. The Australian Army, he states, need not adapt itself to the ‘unique’ characteristics of Generation Y—they are like any other group of young people, not the ‘generational shift’ that popular opinion presents. He finds more assertion and hyperbole than evidence and fact in many of the claims by and about Generation Y.

INTRODUCTION

The movement of what has been dubbed Generation Y (Gen Y) into and through the ranks of the Army is becoming a subject of much debate. The current focus on recruiting and retention within Army and the wider Australian Defence Force (ADF) has increased the perceived importance of this debate as the military tries to demonstrate relevance to this generation of potential recruits. It would appear there is much angst and hand-wringing in relation to attracting and retaining Gen Y, but there seems little real examination of the precepts behind the hype. So what is Gen Y and are they different? This paper examines the
'conventional wisdom' currently underpinning the various arguments and debates about this particular demographic and tries to determine the challenges this poses for ADF recruiting and retention.

**WHO IS GEN Y?**

In the broadest sense Gen Y is described as those people born from about 1975 to the early 1990s. In the Army, this is anyone old enough to have enlisted from 1993 to the present day. In 2007, Gen Y personnel had at most thirteen years service. Their rank could be anything up to and including Majors for officers or Warrant Officer Class Two for other ranks.

**HOW IS GEN Y CHARACTERISED?**

Gen Y is routinely described as technologically adept, extremely adaptable, demanding and opinionated. Many observers claim they have a better start-point, with the advantage of beginning where other generations have left off in areas such as gender equity, racial and ethnic tolerance, and the seemingly all-important mastery of technology. In her 2006 book *The World According to Y*, Rebecca Huntley describes them as 'optimistic, idealistic, empowered, ambitious, confident, committed and passionate. They are assured about their own futures and, in many cases the future of the world.' Ryan Heath claims they are ‘the most educated, skilled generation yet.’ Captain Erin Maulday, writing in the *Australian Army Journal* says, ‘Gen Yers grew up in an era of uncertainty and complexity, constantly changing technology and mobility. They have adapted to it quickly, capably and are technologically savvy.’

It is from these and many other opinions a picture is formed of Gen Y being confident and assured. They stride the national stage and are preparing to stride onto the international stage, determined to suck the marrow from the moment and make a lasting contribution to the world around them.
IS THIS TRUE?

The most obvious problem with such general descriptions of this demographic is purely mathematical. Australian Bureau of Statistics figures indicate that about 263,000 people are born in Australia every year. This means that in the period attributed to Gen Y—1975 to 1992—almost 4.5 million people were born. In any broad group within a population, the spread of intelligence and mental acuity, physical prowess, ability to interact socially, and a myriad of other indicators will be about the same as for any other group. In any tested area the individuals will demonstrate ability or competence ranging from the absolute bottom of the scale to the top. The numbers at either end of the spectrum will be about the same and the greater bulk of the population will trend towards the middle, or the median. Thus, in Gen Y, like any other demographic cohort, there are as many ‘numpties’ as ‘geniuses’.

The ‘popular wisdom’ surrounding Gen Y makes no allowance for this statistical truth. Gen Y is viewed as a single entity, as a completely uniform mass of individuals exhibiting identical characteristics and behavioural patterns. Even a cursory glance around a suburban shopping centre, music concert or major sporting event will show the ridiculousness of such a proposition. Individuals are exactly that, individual. There are indicators that allow individuals to be grouped by interest, ethnicity, gender, or religion—to name a few—but to claim that all individuals born from 1975 to 1992 are exactly the same by any measure used brings into question the validity of the data collected and the analysis conducted. Gen Y members range from sixteen to thirty-two years old. Without being a psychiatrist or sociologist, it is easy to accept there are massive differences in the attitudes and expectations of sixteen and thirty-two year olds and in their reactions to stimuli from the world around them. Will a sixteen-year-old apprentice boilermaker from Strachan in Tasmania have the same ‘technological savvy’ as a twenty-eight year old pastry chef from Potts Point in Sydney? Consider the following quote: ‘Compared with older employees, they are said to be more collaborative or accustomed to working in teams, better educated, less hierarchical, more entrepreneurial, more likely to move from one job to another, more technologically skilled, less conscious of formalised rules and regulations and more likely to choose a career that offers a balanced lifestyle.’ If true, such a statement certainly points to some problems for the ADF in recruiting and retaining Gen Y. The main problem here is that the quote is actually speaking of Gen X, the age demographic before Gen Y.
Is it possible that much of the research used to prop up arguments about the nature of Gen Y could as easily be used to describe other generations as well? The answer is no. This research describes part of every generational demographic very accurately but fails to describe the whole. Opinions and arguments about the nature of Gen Y and the integration of that demographic into the workforce fall routinely into the trap of the positive focus, or the ‘best foot forward’. Are there no drug addicts in Gen Y? Are there no criminals? Are there no individuals who fail completely to cope with the modern world and simply opt out? The aforementioned glance at the crowd in the shopping centre has as much chance of describing the demographic as a whole than any of the pseudo-scientific twaddle that has shaped the debate thus far. David Schmidtchen, writing eloquently on this subject in the *Australian Army Journal*, quotes a study conducted by the Centre for Creative Leadership that compared generations born from 1926 to 1982. The study looked for differences in attitude, aspiration and behaviour. They found very few. Their recommendation was that business leaders consider the ‘facts’ of generational differences ‘very carefully, and without relying on stereotypes.’

The ‘facts’ in dealing with generational demographics are quite simply not facts at all. They are at best impressions and at worst an overly optimistic self-description. Despite claims to the contrary, there is very little actual research to support the contention that Gen Y is significantly different. It all depends on the author. A Baby Boomer (or any older demographic) will probably have a negative view of Gen Y based on their own values and life experiences. A member of Gen Y (like any other demographic) will be loath to mention a negative characteristic in relation to their own peer group. So what is, and where lies, the truth?
The use of the term ‘technology’ usually denotes the integration of computers into the everyday. In a broader, contemporary sense, it also encompasses mobile phones, IPods, DVDs and CD-ROMs, modern cars and washing machines. For the military, it is computer-assisted or -controlled weaponry, modern communications equipment, remote sensors and the entire suite of equipment and skills that are loosely grouped under the heading ‘network-centric warfare’. The common thread when describing technology is ‘newness’. Technology is made up of things that are new or constantly changing. Captain Maulday states: ‘Gen Yers have grown up with technology.’ I ask, ‘Has no one else?’ He goes on to say, ‘This [technology] has resulted in a world which is faster and more connected, and in which Gen Y is leading the way.’ One can be forgiven for noting that Gen Y did not invent communication, computers or even the Internet—further, Gen Y are not the only people to use these things on a minute-to-minute basis.

Gen Y is allegedly ‘technologically savvy’. It is often assumed that this mastery of technology is something that Gen Y is somehow born with. They leap from the womb with an IPod stuck in one ear and a Blue Tooth communications device in the other. The obvious corollary is that Gen Y must somehow be better at learning to deal with new things than any generation before them, yet no evidence is presented by any author to support this view.

Examining the life experience of a man now in his mid- to late-seventies reveals some interesting parallels. This man has started his life in the era of the horse and cart. He has seen the introduction of the automobile from its inception to widespread use and coped with its rapid technological advancement. He has moved from travelling by tram, to trains, to aeroplanes and now witnesses almost routine travel into space. His leisure time has included the introduction of radio and television, video recorders and DVDs. He has recorded his experiences on 8mm movie cameras, video tapes and now on disc, and he has used an increasingly technologically advanced range of still cameras. The home he now lives in bears little resemblance to the house in which he was born. He has probably had a hip replaced, and diseases that killed or maimed thousands in his childhood are rarely seen and swiftly and successfully treated when diagnosed. He began his life communicating over distance using surface mail and telegrams. Now he uses email, surfs the ‘net from his home and keeps in touch with the grandchildren on a mobile phone. In the seventy-odd years of his life, the technological changes have been far more widespread …
Insights

Warrant Officer Class Two Kent Davies

widespread and had a far greater impact on him—and the world around him—than anything experienced by a member of Gen Y. Yet he has never been claimed as 'technologically savvy' Why not?

CONSUMERISM

Gen Y is often described as being the ultimate consumers. This dovetails nicely into the view that they are enamoured of 'technology'—they want only the best and the latest. This is difficult to reconcile with the broadly accepted view of the early 1980s when conspicuous consumption was almost a religion. Using slightly different wording, the term 'keeping up with the Jones's' is exactly the same thing from a different generation. The only real difference in 2007 is that the time it takes for the current 'latest thing' to become passé is growing shorter. One need only look at the rapid development of the mobile phone as an example. Every year newer, better and slimmer models are introduced so the 'churn' is far greater than in previous years. This is as true for telephones as it is for desktop computers and household white and brown goods. The pressure from advertisers and popular culture to continually update has certainly increased. As manufacturers of goods have become more adept at marketing, they have also become better at targeting age groups and demographics. David Schmidtchen says: 'Much of the heat and noise about generational differences is fed by marketers who have an interest in putting themselves forward as experts on the attitudes and behaviour of a particular generational group or groups.' This pressure is nothing new; it has always been there. It has simply increased and is expressed in such things as product placement in movies and popular television shows. It is lazy thinking to see this as a unique influence on Gen Y because it does not take into account the fact that retiring Baby Boomers are being just as heavily targeted—they have the highest disposable retirement income in history. Manufacturers, service providers and advertisers have all recognised this and the marketplace reflects their wants and desires just as much as it does for Gen Y.

The primary difference between the Baby Boomers and Gen Y, in relation to consumption, is credit. The Baby Boomers did not grow up with accessible consumer credit. That came about with Gen X in the 1980s. The notion of saving to purchase is often seen as alien to Gen Y, but again this is lazy thinking; it is simply a characteristic of youth. Anecdotes of young people making purchases on credit at exorbitant interest rates, under barely legal terms, are certainly nothing new. It is far easier in the new millennium
for a consumer of any age group to get into financial difficulties due to the ready availability of credit. What would the impact of such availability of credit have been on the youth of the 1950s? It is not difficult to imagine that there would have been very little difference because the basic nature of youth has certainly not changed.

**EDUCATION**

Without wanting to start a debate about the relative merits of the current versus previous education systems, issue must be taken with the notion that Gen Y is the most educated generation so far. In fact, current debates within the military about literacy and numeracy standards, and proposals for remedial action, highlight that the education system is not producing a complete and useable product. Both primary and secondary schools now have a scope and range within their curriculum that was unheard of in recent history. What is lacking is depth. Young school leavers have little more than introductory knowledge in a wide variety of subjects but no detailed knowledge about any particular area. Their education is superficial and in practice quite useless. The problem here is in the definition of education or, more to the point, the relative importance of subject matter. A student who has learned to use the Internet to find printed material and images, mastered the ‘cut and paste’ function, and produces a ‘project’ that delights his or her teacher, is no more demonstrating education or learning than a dog learning to shake hands—and this completely ignores the crucial, unexamined role of plagiarism. The claim that Gen Y is more educated than previous generations is seemingly accepted without proof.

**ADAPTABLEITY**

Dealing with the rapid pace of change in the modern world and adapting to the challenges it poses are often held up as strengths of Gen Y. This view ignores the obvious fact that members of Gen Y are not the only ones living in this world. Everyone alive today faces the same rate of change and must deal with its challenges. Indeed, it could be argued that the Baby Boomers and Gen X are far better at...
adapting to change than Gen Y because they are now in positions of authority and responsibility that increase the pressure they face. Gen Y are only beginning to enter middle management positions and have yet to be tested in this area.

It is very simple to take a snapshot of a time period, compare it to the present, and then draw conclusions. If the year 1890 was examined and compared to 1935, looking at technological advancement, youth culture, adaptability to change and the entire spectrum of characteristics often claimed for Gen Y, the background scenery would be the only real difference. Being able to adapt to change presupposes that the change is sudden and happening now. It is not. The rate of change may have indeed increased, but anyone living now has adapted to change all their lives and has coped reasonably well. There is simply no data to suggest that Gen Y will be able to cope any better than those who have gone before them.

Everyone alive today faces the same rate of change …

POPULAR CULTURE

The notion that Gen Ys are less tolerant of institutions, that they are free thinkers, problem solvers, results focussed and not process driven are yet more examples of slothful science. This description could just as well be used for the hippies of the 1960s as for Gen Y. Producers of television, movies, video clips, popular music, fashion magazines and other youth-oriented products strive to support notions held dear by the youth of every generation. These notions include such things as the incompetence of management (which is full of old people); that old people don't understand what it is like to be young; and that if parents, old people, politicians, or anyone in authority, would just get out of the way things would be much better. Every generation of young people holds these things to be true. Producers of popular culture (themselves of previous generations) cater to this mindset because it makes money. Perhaps it is the very volume of youth-oriented products that grabs the attention of sociologists and researchers, but they again miss the salient point. It is youth oriented. The march of time takes care of this mindset. It has in every previous generation and it will for Gen Y.

[Makers of] youth-oriented products strive to support notions held dear by the youth of every generation.
If anything, the primary effect of popular culture on Gen Y is an extension of adolescence beyond that experienced by their predecessors. The pressure to 'grow up' is not as intense as it was in earlier times. This extended childhood leads researchers to the notion that Gen Y is peripatetic in both the workforce and in society. This, again, is false. These are also characteristics of youth. A short attention span, lack of desire to strive when presented with difficulties, the failure to make choices when confronted with too many options—these are not indicative of keeping options open or being prepared to adapt to changing circumstances. These are indicative of what it is to be young and without purpose or direction.

THE CHALLENGE?

Is there a challenge posed by Gen Y to the ADF in terms of recruiting and retention? In short, no. However, there is a challenge the ADF must face in relation to the recruiting and retention of young, motivated, committed people. To quote Captain Maulday again, in relation to recruitment; ‘… the consequences of getting it wrong and not attracting the right calibre of Gen Y soldiers and officers are far more serious than previously believed.’ If we remove the reference to Gen Y from the statement, we discover that it remains absolutely correct. Gen Y is not really any different than previous generations of young people. They lack direction and focus, and are very short-term in their goals and aspirations. Time, age and responsibility will address many of their particular issues, as it has for generations before them. The challenge is no different now than it has ever been.

CONCLUSION

This article has questioned a selection of the ‘evidence’ in relation to Gen Y. It has found that there is little substance to many of the claims made about or for Gen Y with regard to their being somehow different or unique. They are young people, no more and no less. They evince the same characteristics as their parents and grandparents at a similar age. If the ADF is to focus more heavily on recruiting and retention, it need not attempt to focus on Gen Y and somehow, as Gen Y champions
seem to insist, change itself to suit them. The ADF will be far more successful in demonstrating that it provides focus and direction, long term employment, advancement based on merit, reward for effort and most importantly a sense of belonging. For those parents allowing their teenagers to consider an ADF career, it offers challenges, reasonable discipline and the protection of boundaries for acceptable behaviour. If the ADF does not currently provide these things any appeal to Gen Y or in fact any demographic is certain to fail.

**ENDNOTES**

7. Ibid.

**THE AUTHOR**

Warrant Officer Class Two Kent Davies enlisted in 1988. After basic training he was allocated to the RAA and posted to 16th Air Defence Regiment in Woodside. In 1996, he corps transferred to the RACT. He has been posted to Army Logistics Training Centre in Puckapunyal, 1st Combat Service Support Battalion, 4th Combat Service Support Battalion, Land Warfare Centre, and is currently posted to Motorised Combat Wing at the School of Artillery, Puckapunyal. Warrant Officer Davies has served with MINURSO in West Sahara in 1992 and UNTAET in East Timor in 2002.
TO LEAD, TO EXCEL

TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY*

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHRIS FIELD

ABSTRACT

This article is based on the author's oration on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Australian Defence Force Academy. He examines the history of the Academy and compares it to the early years of the Royal Military College Duntroon. He then suggests ways to enhance ADFAs reputation and utility to the wider community.

To Lead, To Excel: this motto guards the entrance to the Australian Defence Force Academy* (ADFA) which, in 2006, marked twenty years since the first graduates were commissioned into the Australian Navy, Army, and Air Force. At the moment of this twentieth anniversary, it is appropriate to ask two questions: firstly, do Academy graduates live by their motto—To Lead, To Excel—and, secondly, is the Defence Academy relevant in twenty-first century Australia?

* This article is based on the author's presentation made to the 20 Year Anniversary Dinner for the Class of 1986, the Inaugural Graduating Class from the Australian Defence Force Academy, on Saturday 9 December 2006 at the Canberra Race Course.
TO LEAD, TO EXCEL

If asked whether Academy graduates live by their motto, the short answer is yes; the longer, more important answer is that we have yet to see the full impact that Academy graduates will have on the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Australian society. To place the 2006 version of the Academy in context, it is useful to compare the history of Australia’s senior military institution, the Royal Military College, Duntroon (RMC), with the two decade-old Academy.

RMC was established in 1911, with the first graduates serving in the First World War. However, as Staff Corps Officers, these graduates were excluded from command and, following the end of the Great War, were prevented from retaining any temporary rank earned during that conflict: ‘It was reportedly common knowledge with the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) that a ban had been imposed on graduates being promoted beyond the rank of major, this restriction having been promulgated in confidential instructions issued in 1917.’3 Further, ‘there was still an uncertainty in many minds whether [the First World War] had actually shown Duntroon to be an essential national institution … [especially given that] Australia’s citizen soldiery had emerged pre-eminent from the war.’4

In 1931, at the twentieth anniversary of the first intake, RMC was located in Sydney as ‘Duntroon Wing, Victoria Barracks’ and consisted of thirty-one Cadets representing only three cadet classes; there was not a cadet intake for 1931.5 Even on the occasion of the RMC’s twenty-eighth anniversary, on the eve of the Second World War, the senior RMC graduate remained a Lieutenant Colonel. In 1939, twenty-four graduates had been promoted to lieutenant-colonel, although only ten of these were substantive in the rank on the outbreak of the war. By 1945, however, graduates were commanding corps and divisions and had been filling these posts for some years; three were temporary lieutenant-generals, seventeen were major-generals, and some fifty had reached brigadier. For the RAAF, in August 1939, the highest ranking RMC graduate was wing commander,
By May 1945, RAAF RMC graduates accounted for nine group captains and five air commodores. Clearly, by 1939, the efficacy of RMC could still be questioned by the Australian military, government, and people.

By the end of the Second World War, and for the remainder of the twentieth century, these doubts were swept away as RMC graduates, both Army—including the New Zealand Army—and, for a time, Air Force officers, rose to dominate their Services in both peace and war. This dominance remains to this day: Duntroon graduates were appointed as Army’s Chief of the General Staff, without a break, from 1950 to 1997. Four Duntroon graduates were appointed, in succession, as Chief of the Air Staff from 1954 to 1969.

The Defence Academy has, like RMC, had a troubled birth. In 2006, the senior Academy graduates served at the Colonel (Equivalent) level. The nascency of Academy graduates means that the Defence Academy lacks a strong voice in Defence decision-making circles and so seems to be continuously under attack with regards to legitimacy, cost-benefit, and the appropriateness of an institution that purely trains military officers at the tertiary level.

Yet, just as 1939 heralded the changing of the guard in Australia’s military leadership between the militia officer and the professional officer, 2006 heralded another changing of the guard. Academy graduates are slowly making their mark. For example, to date, five Battle Groups (and their equivalent) in Iraq and Timor Leste have been commanded by Academy graduates.

These are small steps, but the tide of contribution from Academy graduates will now swell and gain momentum as more are appointed to command Battle Groups, and above, in a busy and operationally focussed Defence Force that is to be involved in regional and wider international operations for the foreseeable future. If a wider view is taken of Academy graduates in Australian society, it is significant that an increasing number of graduates are making their mark leading and excelling in the non-military world in Australia and overseas.

From these graduates has developed the Academy Graduates Association (AGA)—a unique institution in Australian military circles, having the bulk of current members under the age of forty. It is the only association for ADF officers
that is based on youth, vigorously independent thought and an optimistic vision for the future. The AGA includes strong links with the civil community, including some of Australia’s most impressive private enterprise and academic institutions.  

The AGA, with a dynamic and vibrant vision for graduates both in and out of Defence and a membership of almost 1700 graduates (and rising), is arguably the most relevant Defence Association in our nation. It is almost the only Defence Association that has broken the nexus between military associations concentrating on past glories, medals, and badges, vice supporting the intellectual and professional future for the ADF and Australia. An exception may be the Australia Defence Association (ADA), which was founded in Perth in 1975 by a retired Air Force Chief, a leading trade unionist and the director of a business peak body. The ADA has long been Australia’s only truly independent, non-partisan and community-based public interest guardian organisation and ‘think-tank’ on defence and wider national security issues.

Of note, the AGA also offers graduates a job search program, which is an anathema to the stoic ADF view of a job for life; importantly, this reflects the generational view held by the majority of Academy graduates that leaving the ADF is a fact of life and should not be considered disloyalty to our Services. This is a view that must be harnessed in the ADF and reflects the US Marine Corps view of ‘once a Marine, always a Marine.’ The AGA is capturing this essentially pragmatic characteristic of the Australian military officer that has, for too long, been either officially ignored, or at the very least not effectively utilised.

In summary, do Defence Academy graduates live by their motto ‘To Lead, To Excel’? Yes, and we will see the natural progression of this thesis when the first Academy graduates:

- Assume senior roles in business throughout Australia and overseas—already this is occurring;
- command ADFA;
- simultaneously command the Navy, Army, and Air Force; and
- assume key roles in support of or within governments throughout Australia.

… an increasing number of [ADFA] graduates are making their mark leading and excelling in the non-military world …

… leaving the ADF is a fact of life and should not be considered disloyalty to our Services.
IS THE DEFENCE ACADEMY RELEVANT IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AUSTRALIA?

In a twenty-year history, the Academy has been externally reviewed on a number of occasions. This is appropriate in a vibrant democracy where the military is expected to be transparent and accountable while providing capability to Australia’s defence through the use of taxpayer’s dollars. The Defence Academy of 2006 did not, in terms of the Corps of Officer Cadets structure, look much like the Defence Academy of 1986. This change has occurred partly as a result of external reviews. Serving Defence personnel, with a traditionalists’ view of cadet life, may consider that a Defence Academy where cadets live in single-Service accommodation areas—as opposed to integrated tri-Service—is a poor use of an institution that seeks to provide future leaders for the ADF. This is especially the case for a Defence Academy that is tasked with graduating officers who are intuitively required to understand joint warfighting. However, traditional and nostalgic notions of cadet life maintained by many serving Defence personnel are not what the twenty-first century ADF requires.

What the ADF needs are officer graduates, as leaders in the ADF, who are connected throughout Australia’s tri-Service structure in order to reduce the friction caused when our three Services operate together. Tradition and nostalgia, such as the model for the Academy in 1986, should not burden current Academy leaders who are tasked with training and developing professional joint warfighting officers for Australia.

The need for outstanding proponents in joint warfighting remains an essential element of ADF capability requirements. It also needs to be emphasised that joint warfighting, in the current strategic environment facing our nation, is not enough. So, the first change I would recommend for the Defence Academy is that members of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australian Federal Police (AFP), Australian Customs Service and other key government agencies attend the Defence Academy. The opportunity for all government agencies to attend the Academy would be designed to ensure that Australia moves from intuitively conducting joint warfighting, to intuitively conduct joint-interagency warfighting. Such interagency relations will continue to build on Australia’s outstanding ability...
to develop whole-of-government initiatives in advance of domestic events and in response to regional crises. Examples of Australia’s recent and successful whole-of-government operations include: the 2006 ADF-led, AFP-supported assistance to the Government of Timor Leste; the 2006 Victorian Police-led, ADF-supported Melbourne Commonwealth Games; the 2003 to present day DFAT-led, ADF- and AFP-supported Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands; and, the 2002 AFP-led, ADF-supported assistance to the Bali Bombing investigations.

The second change is linking the Defence Academy more effectively to the Australian community. This could be achieved through offering scholarships to people from top-fifty Australian companies. They could wear a uniform from one of the ADF’s three Services and comply with the Defence Academy military and academic requirements. These two ideas are roughly based on École Polytechnique, one of the most prestigious schools in France. The École Polytechnique was founded in 1794, originally to train military engineers. Although still affiliated with the Defense Ministry, its role has gradually changed over the years: present-day ‘Polytechniciens’ become researchers, top-ranking civil servants, highly qualified engineers and company directors.

Defence Academy scholarships to the future leaders of Australian business and other government agencies would achieve two significant outcomes for Australia and the ADF. Firstly, the Defence Academy would become more competitive in the development of Australia’s collective future leadership, as future business and government agency leaders vied for excellence with future military leaders. Secondly, cohorts of business and government agency leaders would graduate from the Defence Academy with a sound knowledge of ADF culture, capabilities and requirements, and could act as champions of the ADF in their businesses and departments in Australia and throughout the world. This type of intimate understanding of the ADF is essential if the Defence Academy, and indeed the ADF, are to effectively continue to deliver Defence capability.

The third change suggested is reviewing the Defence Academy’s academic program. If people from other government agencies [Members from] key government agencies [should] attend the Defence Academy.

Defence Academy scholarships to the future leaders of Australian business and other government agencies would achieve … significant outcomes …
and top-fifty companies were to attend the Defence Academy, the academic program at the Defence Academy would probably need to be modified in order to reflect the needs of business, but this should not be too onerous as the Defence Academy already offers a Master of Business program. More importantly, the three or four year academic program probably needs to change.

In this time of high operational tempo, the ADF needs more officers leading our Defence personnel, and we need them now. The Defence Academy program, based on a Bachelors degree of three years, followed by an Honours year, results in a return of service obligation of five years, for a total ADF service requirement of nine or ten years. If the Defence Academy's academic program, in response to the high operational tempo of the ADF, was compressed into a ‘Bond University’, intensive semester program style, then the ADF may receive graduates after three years or four years instead of four or five.

This style of academic program would be more demanding on Defence Academy cadets, and would produce officers faster while retaining the objective of providing a tertiary education to ADF officers. In addition, the officer return of service could be reduced from five to four years, thereby making the commitment to the Defence Academy, at the age of seventeen or eighteen, seem less daunting and therefore more achievable for young Australians.

Is the Defence Academy relevant in twenty-first century Australia? Relevant yes, at this stage, but the ADF leadership needs to maintain a vision that will ensure the first two decades of the Academy are followed by another two that consolidate the reputation and achievements of ADFA in Australian society.

CONCLUSION

This discussion has sought to answer two questions: do Defence Academy graduates live by their motto, ‘To Lead, To Excel’, and is the Defence Academy relevant in twenty-first century Australia? The answer to both is yes, but with important caveats. Defence Academy graduates are required to lead, and they do so in military, government and business roles. The Defence Academy has withstood and adapted to external reviews and is producing leaders who have strategic impact on our nation. The leadership and excellence of Defence Force graduates needs to be maintained, especially as the ADF continues to achieve a high operational tempo in a complex and demanding world.
ENDNOTES

1 ADFA Purpose: To serve Australia by providing the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with tertiary graduates who have the foundational attributes, intellect and skills required of an officer. Academy Mission: Best Leaders for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). (http://www.defence.gov.au/adfa/)

2 The Australian Defence Force Academy, located in Canberra, commenced its activities in January 1986 and is now the centre for tertiary education for the armed services. (http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/featurearticlesbyCatalogue/)


5 RMC returned to Canberra in 1937. Ibid, p.115.


7 RMC began to graduate officers to the RAAF from 1921, the year the RAAF was established, and soon became the major source of Air Force officers; Coulthard-Clark, p.108 and 111.


9 Academy graduates achieving COL (E) rank as at 09 December 2006: CAPT Adam Grunzel (1986), RAN; COL Michael Batiste (1986), Army; COL Roger Noble (1986), Army; and, GPCAPT Mike Kitcher (1986), RAAF.

10 Command of Five Battle Groups (Equivalent):
   - Mike Kitcher (F/A-18, Task Group), OP FALCONER, Iraq, 2003 (ADFA 1986);
   - Roger Noble (Al Multhana Task Group), OP CATALYST, Iraq, 2005 (ADFA 1986);
   - Mick Mumford (Battle Group Faithful), OP ASTUTE, Timor Leste, 2006 (ADFA 1987);
   - Scott Goddard (Timor Leste Battle Group-1 / ANZAC Battle Group), OP ASTUTE, Timor Leste, 2006–07 (ADFA 1987);

11 Australian Defence Force Academy Graduates Association Sponsors, as at 26 November 2006 (http://www.adfagrad.org/): Frontier Group; Australian Graduate School of Management; Lend Lease; KPMG; Echo Bar; Sigma Bravo Pty Limited.


14 <http://www.southern.net/wm/about/polytechnique.html>.

15 Defence Academy Return of Service Obligation (ROSO) calculations: three year degree plus one year professional military training (four year total) results in a five year ROSO, for a total of a nine year commitment to the ADF. Or three year degree plus one year Honours, plus one year professional military training (five year total) results in a six year ROSO, for a total of a 10 year commitment to the ADF, as the first ROSO year is served concurrently with the Honours year.

**THE AUTHOR**

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Field is the 12th graduate of the Australian Defence Force Academy. He is presently the Staff Officer Grade 1 – Operations (G3) at Headquarters 1st Division.
THE FORGOTTEN FIRST
THE 1ST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION IN THE GREAT WAR AND ITS LEGACY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT STEVENSON

ABSTRACT
As the last veterans of Australia’s involvement in the First World War pass away, this article outlines the history and evolution of Australia’s first and finest Army formation, the 1st Division. From the generals to the privates, from Australia, Egypt, Gallipoli and France, the long-term impact of these soldiers and leaders on both Australian military and civil institutions has been profound. Indeed, their actions and sacrifices are imprinted on the national psyche, although, as the author argues, the mythology that has grown around them does not do full justice to the legacy of this organisation.

INTRODUCTION
In October 2005, the last Australian veteran of the Great War passed away. Although the last living links with the ‘war to end all wars’ has now been severed, their experience continues to cast a giant shadow over contemporary society and popular culture. The ‘A’ in Anzac has become a veritable industry, with every year seeing another publication or television special on Gallipoli, John
Simpson Kirkpatrick and his dewy-eyed donkey or one of the seemingly endless bloody and futile battles that raged along the Western Front. While popular culture has embraced the Great War as a defining event in Australia’s story, much of the history of this war is narrow, distorted or mythologised. One of the more popular of the contemporary genres of war writing are the collections of letters, diaries and reminiscences of individual diggers during what Bill Gammage evocatively called *The Broken Years.* The public’s fascination with the particular horror of this war shows no sign of slackening, but too much of our understanding of the war is based on the very narrow experiences of individuals, which has only been further distorted by our fascination with the last men standing. Just as the physical confines of the trenches limited their view of the war around them, so too is our understanding often blinkered by the obsession with social history—the ‘hell and whores’ school of military historiography.

Australia, with a population of just over five million people, despatched a force of 330,000 men and women to the First World War. Despite the digger’s well-known but exaggerated individualism, these volunteers were not self-actualising Edwardian ‘Rambos’; rather, they fought within structured organisations that in many ways defined and shaped their experience of the war. The vast majority served in one of the seven Australian divisions. The 1st Australian Division was formed in 1914 as the major component of Australia’s commitment to imperial defence and the war in Europe—the Australian Imperial Force (AIF). It was the 1st Division that led the way on Gallipoli and was joined by the 2nd Division in September 1915. Following the withdrawal of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) from Gallipoli, the AIF expanded to a force of five infantry divisions, which eventually served side-by-side on the Western Front as an integral part of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). In the Middle East, the best part of another two light horse divisions served in the Desert Mounted Corps. Surprisingly, only one of these divisions, and the most junior, produced a history in the immediate post-war era, leading one veteran to opine that the ‘Most remarkable feature of the dearth of AIF unit histories is that of the divisions; the 5th has been the only one heard of so far.’ This situation remained…

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unchanged for eighty years, until the next century when one more was added to this very short list. In 2002, Al Palazzo’s wide-ranging history of the 3rd Division was published, but this division did not see action in France until 1917, halfway through the war. The lack of divisional histories is a serious deficiency in our understanding of the Great War and it has meant that Australia’s greatest fighting formation has all but been forgotten.

This article provides a brief history of the 1st Australian Division in the Great War. The choice of the 1st Division is obvious: it was the first. The first division raised by Australia in the Great War—in fact the first division that Australia had ever raised—and it was the only division that served throughout the war from beginning to end. The article sets out to provide an overview of this most famous but historically neglected formation. It begins by describing the 1914-era division, how it was structured and why it was the division that was the actual ‘currency’ of armies. The article then provides a brief history from the 1st Division’s mobilisation in 1914 to its disbanding in 1919, and concludes by describing the legacy left for the nation and the modern Army.

THE AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

The division in 1914 was an organisation of fighting ‘arms’ and their supporting ‘services’ and it was the largest formation in Western armies with a fixed organisation. The higher organisations of corps and army had flexible organisations that included a number of divisions supplemented with specialist corps and army troops. Subordinate to the division, the brigades and other divisional direct command units also had fixed structures but, unlike the division, they were organised by function and their personnel belonged almost exclusively to one type of military specialisation. There were infantry brigades, cavalry regiments and artillery batteries, but each of these had a specific task and little capacity to operate on their own. Indeed, they could only achieve their full potential when they co-operated together as part of a combined-arms team. The division, in contrast, had the mix of combat and service organisations which allowed it, and only it, to form and support combined-arms teams. In 1914 it was the infantry division that was the mainstay of armies, as Cyril Falls noted when he described them as the real ‘unit’ of the First World War.

The Australian (and British) infantry division in 1914 consisted of more than 18 000 men organised into twenty or so units, ranging in strength from 400 up to 1000 men each. It was commanded by a major general, supported by a surprisingly lean headquarters of just sixty-seven all ranks. Its main weapons were some 18 000
rifles, twenty-six machineguns and thirty-six modern quick-firing field artillery pieces. The bulk of its manpower and combat power was held in its three infantry brigades, which contained twelve battalions. The infantry did most of the fighting (and dying), and although they were supported by the other arms, in 1914 this amounted to just three artillery regiments (titled brigades), a single light horse regiment and three companies of field engineers. Later, the divisional artillery would be re-organised, expanded and supplemented with trench mortars, and battalions of pioneers and machineguns to boost the division’s combat power. However, in 1914 the divisional teeth-to-tail ratio was weighted heavily in favour of the teeth.

The divisional administrative tail was as lean as the division’s headquarters. It consisted of: the divisional medical services with three field ambulances, supply and transportation consisting of a divisional ammunition column and a divisional train, and the veterinary services. A mobile veterinary section, a sanitary section and a salvage company were added later. These organisations fed, clothed, bathed, ministered (physically and spiritually) and laundered all of the division’s two legged and four-legged members. They organised the repair or replacement of equipment, and controlled the movement of this array of people, machines and animals. This was no small task, as the division had nearly 5500 animals (nearly all horses but later included donkeys, mules and pigeons), more than 600 horse-drawn vehicles, 310 bicycles and a mere eight motor cars and nine motorcycles. By 1918, many of the horses were gone but the day of the internal combustion engine had not quite yet dawned.

None of the division’s organisation existed before the war and mobilisation only began after His Majesty’s government advised its dominions and colonies that, as a result of Germany’s invasion of neutral Belgium, the British Empire was at war. On 15 August 1914, the 1st Australian Division was officially raised as the main component of the AIF. It was born because of Australia’s sentimental loyalty to Britain and the Empire, an ideological desire to stand against Prussian militarism, and a practical recognition that Australia was part of a global trading system that would suffer if Germany triumphed in Europe. Considering the lack of pre-war planning, the division was mobilised in the remarkably short time of six weeks but drew its forces from the length and breadth of Australia. Each state’s quota embarked from its home port and their contracted transports made their way individually to rendezvous off the port of Albany on the southern Western Australian coastline. Once this armada had assembled it was escorted by Australian, British and Japanese warships, and sailed west across the Indian Ocean bound for the Suez Canal and eventually Britain.
Problems with accommodation and training facilities on Salisbury Plain in England led to the convoy being diverted to Egypt, where the division was to complete its training before moving to France. There, in the shadows of the great pyramids, the 1st Division was fully assembled. At Mena Camp, it celebrated its first Christmas away from home; for many it was the first of five spent on foreign shores and for many others it was their last. Fate intervened, with the entry of Turkey into the war on the side of Germany and its Triple Alliance partners. Britain took the opportunity of forming the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), two divisions composed of the 1st Australian Division and a composite New Zealand and Australian Division. With few troops to spare, this corps was earmarked as part of a larger Anglo-French invasion force bound for Gallipoli.

INTO BATTLE

It was the 3rd Infantry Brigade (AIF), of the 1st Division, that was the first force to land on that fateful shore. The 3rd Brigade, drawn from the fringe or outer Australian states and led by a British Army regular, actually launched the Anzac legend when they seized the initial foothold during the Gaba Tepe landings. Soon after, the Victorian 2nd Infantry Brigade earned the sobriquet the ‘white Ghurkhas’ for their gallant but failed attack at Krithia on the southern tip of the peninsula. In August, as part of a great new offensive to break the stalemate, the New South Wales–raised 1st Infantry Brigade spearheaded the bloody feint that seized Lone Pine and led to the award of seven Victoria Crosses (VCs). Despite selfless gallantry and stoic courage in the face of appalling conditions, the Gallipoli campaign was a failure and, the reality is that, as Robin Prior has succinctly observed:

Gallipoli had no influence on the course of the war as a whole. More depressing still, even if the expedition had succeeded in its aims, it is doubtful if the war would have been shortened by a single day.7

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The misguided and overly optimistic hopes of the ‘Easterners’ could not make up for a flawed strategy and poor planning. It was the ‘Westerners’ who were correct; it was only on the Western Front where the war was to be decided and it was there that the 1st Division could best help win the war. With no prospect of success, the ANZAC was spirited away in the most successful part of the entire operation, planned chiefly by the 1st Division’s old chief of staff, Cyril Brudenell White.
Back in Egypt, the division provided the nucleus of an expanded AIF and the old ‘1st Divvy’ spread its hard-won experience throughout the new formations. Its influence permeated the entire force from top to bottom and provided the majority of the new brigade and battalion commanders.

In March 1916, the 1st Division again led the way, this time to the main theatre of the war. The 1st Division fought for nearly three years in northern France and Belgium Flanders, and it was involved in many of the most famous battles of the Western Front. After the division landed at the port of Marseilles, the sun-burned diggers were entrained through the French countryside north of Paris and deposited in the Armieriers sector of the British line. This part of the line was regarded as a ‘nursery’ sector, usually quiet and where new formations could be introduced to the front. Here the Gallipoli veterans and the newer volunteers were introduced to the reality of the Western Front and they were issued with their steel helmets, Lewis machine-guns and factory-produced grenades. Much of their worn-out heavy equipment was exchanged for newer items from the immense British logistics depots along the northern Channel coastline while officers and non-commissioned officers attended British schools of instruction.

As they adjusted to the new and deadly war, to the south the diggers could hear the tremendous barrage that marked the beginning of the great Somme offensive. On 1 July, the BEF flung itself at the German defences on the northern side of the river in support of their French allies who were fighting desperately to the south at Verdun. Seen as too raw to join the opening thrust, the 1st Division remained in the north acclimatising and it was the 5th Division that was committed first to the offensive when it launched a hastily conceived and poorly executed diversion at Frommelles. Soon after, however, it was the 1st Division’s turn as it entrained for the south to take part in the second phase of the month-old offensive. Now, instead of a major breakthrough, the British aimed a series of minor attacks to nibble away at the German second-line defences. On 23 July, the 1st Division, operating as part of General Hubert Gough’s Reserve Army, seized Pozieres in what was seen as a significant achievement. According to the division’s last commander, Lieutenant General Sir William Glasgow, this result was second only to Gallipoli in importance: ‘If the landing at Anzac is the first page of the story of how Australia won their place as a full-blown nation, the second page is the story of the capture of Pozieres’. Two more tours on the Somme followed, with fruitless fighting around Mouquet Farm before the division was withdrawn north to the then-quiet sector of Ypres in Flanders. Later in the year they returned
for the final phase of the Somme campaign as the offensive petered out in the mud and rain of a bitter French winter, and the division suffered a number of minor disasters at Gueudecourt.

The New Year of 1917 found the division garrisoning the line in the worst European winter in forty years. The diggers found these conditions very difficult to bear and not for the first time there were discipline problems and increased incidents of absence without leave. On a more positive note, this quieter period gave many their first opportunity for leave both in Britain (or 'Blighty') and in Paris. This year also saw a gradual maturing of the British Army on the Western Front as new techniques and tactics were developed by trial and error or fine-tuned from the experience gained from the 1916 Somme fighting. These improvements were most evident in the artillery, but they also embraced a range of new weapons systems that were being employed in support of combined-arms teams at the divisional level, such as gas, machine-guns, tanks and trench mortars. This growing sophistication of the BEF as a new fighting system began inauspiciously for the 1st Division with the attacks at Bullecourt and the defence of Lagnicourt, but later in the year the division played a central role in a number of the successful attacks in Flanders during Third Ypres. Again the division played a significant part at Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodseinde in a series of overwhelming but limited attacks to which the Germans had no effective answer. Unfortunately, the ground was ill-suited to a late-season campaign and when the weather broke the final attacks floundered in a sea of mud. Eventually, utterly exhausted, the division was withdrawn for a major period of rest and training; none too soon as disciplinary problems resurfaced towards the end of the year just as they had at the beginning.

In March 1918 the Germans struck the Allies hard, attempting to drive a wedge between the British and French and win the war before the arrival of the American armies tipped the balance. Along the Somme the Germans drove a deep fissure in the British line aimed at the great city of Amiens. The newly formed Australian Corps, rushed south from Messines, helped stem the offensive just as the German thrust began to slow in the face of stiffening British resistance. As a new threat emerged to the north at Hazebrouck, the 1st Division about-turned and was pushed into the line as part of the British XV Corps. Holding an extended sector throughout April, the division was able to engage in the type of low-level tactics at which the Australian soldier had come to excel. This form of aggressive minor tactics, colloquially known as 'peaceful penetration', involved minor patrols, raids and small unit offensive
action, usually initiated by junior commanders. Although there were many brilliant examples, the attack of Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Wilder-Neligan’s 10th Battalion on the village of Merris in July was so outstanding that the British Inspector General labelled it ‘the best show ever done by a battalion in France’.9

The skill with which these operations were conducted, and the devastating effect they had on the German formations facing them, demonstrated just how far the 1st Division (and the AIF and BEF) had come in four years. No longer was it a raw conglomeration of units—with four years of hard experience and tough training—by 1918 the division was a highly professional combined-arms team that had few equals on the Western Front. It was no longer totally dependant on the rifles and bayonets of its dwindling riflemen; now they were armed with an array of weapons, from Lewis light machine-guns to rifle grenades and light mortars. They were also fighting within a new doctrinal framework that placed the platoon at the centre of minor tactics. Supporting the infantry were the divisional artillery, trench mortars and machine-guns firing sophisticated barrages that combined smoke, chemical and high explosive, as well as unprecedented quantities of medium and heavy guns from the corps artillery, tanks and close air support. Historian Jonathan Bailey described this as the birth of modern war and, according to Williamson Murray it was the Revolution in Military Affairs of the last century. By 1918, the diggers of the 1st Division had fought through this revolution and mastered the new style of warfare.10

When the crisis abated, the 1st Division was recalled to reunite with the other four Australian divisions just in time to take part in the final 100-days campaign. Despite the claims of post-war German apologists, this campaign saw the final and conclusive defeat of the German Army on the Western Front. Throughout the months of August and September the division achieved further honours at Liéons, Chuignes, and finished the war poised on the Hindenburg Outpost Line. The end came none too soon as, during its final attacks of the war, the 1st Division suffered the single largest mutiny in the history of the AIF; fortunately, the Armistice intervened.

At the eleventh hour on 11 November 1918, the guns finally fell silent. With the war all but over, the veterans of the 1st Division stood in proud silence. It was the 1st Division that had served from 1914 to 1919; it was only the First that had fought from the
Anzac landings to the Amiens counterattack; and it was the *First* that had suffered casualties higher than any other Australian division, with 15,000 fatalities and nearly 35,000 wounded. It officially disappeared as a separate entity on 23 March 1919, although members of the division continued to serve until the AIF was disbanded two years later on 31 March 1921.

**THE LEGACY**

In all more than 80,000 men passed through the ranks of the 1st Division, nearly a quarter of those who served overseas in the AIF. Today, few Australians could name any of the men who made the 1st Division a household name in Australia during the Great War, but it was this division that formed the nursery of the AIF—its commanders, junior and senior, came to dominate the Army during and after the war.

Few today have heard of William Throsby Bridges, ‘the first great soldier Australia possessed’, the creator of the 1st Division and the first dominion officer to command a division in battle. Few outside military and academic circles know much about Cyril Brudenell White, Bridges’ brilliant chief of staff and hero of the withdrawal from Gallipoli, who finished the war as the Chief of Staff of the British Fifth Army. Most Australians, even those in the military, would be surprised to learn that Australia’s senior division was commanded by a British Army regular, Harold Walker, for most of the war. Walker took over when Bridges was killed by a sniper on Gallipoli. If Australians recall Thomas Blamey, it is more likely for his controversial World War II career rather than his brilliance as a staff officer and Walker’s chief of operations in France. Thomas Glasgow is more likely to be remembered as Australia’s first High Commissioner to Canada rather than for his achievements as the last commander of the 1st Divvy. These men ‘earned their spurs’ on Gallipoli with the 1st Division and, by the final campaigns, those that survived dominated the senior command and staff appointments across the AIF. By 1918, all but one of the five Australian divisions in France was commanded by an ex-1st Division officer. Even the Desert Mounted Corps in the Middle East was commanded by an ex-1st Division commander—Harry Chauvel, the first Australian to command a corps. The same held true at the lower levels.

In August 1918 there were 15 AIF infantry brigade commanders serving on the Western Front. Nine of these (60 per cent) began their service with the 1st Division. Of the five divisional Commanders Royal Artillery in 1918, four (80 per cent) had begun their AIF service with the 1st Division. At the regimental level, the division
had produced a host of outstanding combat commanders; of the fifty-seven AIF infantry battalion commanders on the Western Front, more than one third began their service with the 1st Division.12

As the longest-serving Australian division, it is not surprising that the 1st Division was also the most highly decorated in the AIF. While the recent purchase of Captain Alfred Shout’s Victoria Cross for A$1 million dollars—and its generous donation to the Australian War Memorial—attracted the public’s attention, members of the 1st Division won seven of the nine VCs awarded to Australians on Gallipoli. Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Harold ‘Pompey’ Elliott’s 7th Battalion (AIF) contributed four of this total for its actions at Lone Pine, making it the only AIF battalion to win four VCs during the Great War. Members of the 1st Division won a total of twenty VCs during the war and another was awarded to a 1st Division veteran for his actions fighting the Bolsheviks in Russia. The division’s units also received the most battle and campaign honours, with the 7th and 8th Battalions, both of the 2nd Brigade, receiving more honours (twenty-six each) than any other AIF battalion. At the end of the war these honours were handed on to the Citizens’ Military Forces (CMF), who became the chief custodians of the 1st Division’s military legacy.13

The very success of the 1st Division and its sibling AIF formations led to a complete re-organisation of the post–First World War Australian Army. On 12 March 1921, after a review of the Army’s order of battle, Army Headquarters issued a direction to reorganise the CMF along the lines of the AIF. For the first time the CMF was to have a divisional structure with four infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions and three mixed brigades that could be amalgamated to form the fifth infantry division. CMF formations and units were numbered, or sometimes re-numbered, to correspond with the AIF system. Thus, on 31 March 1921, within a week of the old 1st Divy disappearing from the AIF’s order of battle, a new CMF 1st Division was officially created. As the 65 000 1st Division veterans slowly returned home, many helped to flesh out Australia’s first peace-time division.14

Drawn from across society in a way that few other institutions were or are, the 1st Division has a reasonable claim to be Australia’s first truly national institution. Drawn from every town and city—and from across the wide bush blocks of the six states and territories of the new Commonwealth—it was a true reflection of the society from which it came, aside from the absence of women. These men were to shape how Australians saw themselves for the next century.
When their duty was done, the survivors returned to Australia or other parts of the Empire to pick up the pieces of their lives as best they could. Some were destroyed by the terrible experience, shattered in mind or body. The vast, silent majority quietly got on with their lives with the same stoicism with which they faced the murderous barrages and the often deadly boredom of frontline service. With little external support, they sought to reconcile the experience of the ‘broken years’, knowing that only other veterans could fully appreciate what they had witnessed, endured and achieved. Yet, despite the well-worn stereotype of the burnt-out, shell-shocked digger, many veterans actually grew if not blossomed because of their military service.

Some veterans, despite all the horrors of the war, actually took to soldiering and were willing to serve on. These stalwarts volunteered for hazardous service in Iraq with Dunsterforce, while others took a stand against the Bolsheviks in Russia. Others returned to resume full-time or part-time careers in the permanent and part-time forces. It was 1st Division veterans who shaped the Australian Army for the next fifty years. Their influence principally began with Brudenell White who, according to Prime Minister Robert Menzies, was ‘a remarkable man: a great scholar, and a real thinker, and a man of sensitive understanding’. During the inter-war years, successive ministers for the Army were 1st Division men and, with several exceptions, the division also produced a full generation of Australia’s Chiefs of the General Staff. It would also influence the other two services. Air-Vice Marshal William Bostock, chief of staff to the Allied Air Forces commander in the South-West Pacific during World War II, and Walter Brooksbank, founder of the ‘Coastwatcher’ organisation, both began their service with the 1st Division on Gallipoli. Outside of Australia, some chose careers in the British and Indian Armies and Ross McCay became the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army. These men were to have a profound and direct impact on the military forces of the British Empire in peace and war.

Upon the outbreak of the Second World War, a significant number of ex-1st Division soldiers enlisted again in both the 2nd AIF and the CMF. Some, like Thomas Blamey, Leslie Morshead and Vernon Sturdee, would command the Army at the very highest levels. Others again held regimental commands, including John Mitchell, unique in that he commanded the same unit in both wars. A hardy few would serve in the ranks, including Arthur Carson and Harold Murray, who have the distinction of having been decorated for bravery while serving in the Australian infantry in both World Wars. Some would lose their lives in this second great war, others would see their sons and daughters march off to war, never to return. Many more, too old now for frontline service, would join the Volunteer Defence
Corps to defend hearth and home. In the dark, early days of the war, this organisation was entirely led by ex-1st Division officers. Still, the 1st Division cast a much broader shadow than just its military one.

The men of the 1st Division left their mark in diverse spheres across almost every facet of Australian business, cultural, professional and political life. The ranks of the division produced a governor general (Baron Casey of Berwick, Victoria and the City of Westminster); a chairman of the Australian Broadcasting Commission (Sir Richard Boyer); a chancellor of the University of Melbourne (Sir Arthur Dean); the founder of GJ Coles Pty Ltd; a butcher’s apprentice who became a neurosurgeon (Sir Albert Coates); a rugby union international (William Watson, DSO DCM MC and Bar); the philanthropist who created Legacy (Sir John Gellibrand); and Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey, Australia’s only native-born field marshal. They were indeed an eclectic group but they made history before, during and after the Great War; they left the country a better place because of their service.

CONCLUSION

During 1942, in the grimmest days of World War II, the Australian official historian, Charles Bean, wrote in his final volume of the history of the AIF:

Twenty-three years ago the arms were handed in. The rifles were locked in the rack. The horses were sold. The guns were sheeted and parked in storage for other gunners. The familiar faded-green uniform disappeared from the streets.

But the Australian Imperial Force is not dead. That famous army of generous men marches still down the long lane of its country’s history, with bands playing and rifles slung, with packs on shoulders, white dust on boots, and bayonet scabbards and entrenching tools flapping on countless thighs—as the French country folk and the fellaheen of Egypt knew it.

What these men did nothing can alter now. The good and the bad, the greatness and smallness of their story will stand. Whatever of glory it contains nothing now can lessen. It rises, as it will always rise, above the mists of ages, a monument to great-hearted men; and, for their nation, a possession for ever.16

It is now more than ninety years since the 1st Australian Division was formed at dozens of different camps across Australia and shipped overseas to fight in the Great War. These original Anzacs stormed ashore at Gallipoli ninety-two years ago in what
was at that time the largest amphibious operation ever undertaken. Following their withdrawal, they moved to France and last year marked the ninetieth anniversary of the epic capture of Pozieres—a place 'more densely sown with Australian sacrifice than any other place on earth.' This year will see a spate of commemorations marking the Third Battle of Ypres, and next year will mark the 100 days campaign, which saw the defeat of the German Army and the Armistice that led to peace. On each of these occasions it will be worth remembering that only one Australian division was present at all of these momentous events.

The role, place and importance of the 1st Division in Australian history has been neglected and all but forgotten. Today, its history has been drowned in a flood of popular works that paint the war as merely a bloody backdrop to the digger’s story. There also exists a national fixation with personal reminiscences, which leaves little room for the collective experience. They tell a ripping yarn, but one that is often without context. The 80,000 men who passed through the ranks of the 1st Division were shaped by the part they played in a vast and complex military organisation—an organisation that was arguably the most complex the young nation had ever created.

On the anniversary of the Gallipoli landings, each year since 1916, Australians have stopped to recognise the achievements of the 1st Division and the thousands of Australian and New Zealanders that followed them. Since then, their legacy is commemorated in hundreds of towns across Australia, on the stony Gallipoli peninsula, and in the green uplands of the Somme. Today, in a dozen foreign lands, Australian soldiers are still striving to uphold the Anzac legend, and many are serving in units that belong to old 1st Divy’s successors.

The men who fought with the 1st Australian Division, those ‘great-hearted men’ who died and those that survived, belong to Australia’s premier division. The legacy they left has become a central pillar of the Australian national identity. It continues to shape how Australians see themselves and their place in the world, nearly 100 years after the 1st Division served in the Great War. These men deserve to be remembered—the heroes and the villains—but they should not be eulogised, either as mythological heroes who could do no wrong or naive adventures fighting someone else’s war. Rather, they were ordinary Australians who, under terrible conditions, became masters of a new style of warfare. Collectively, they left an example that is still worthy of commemoration and emulation.
ENDNOTES


2 The last survivor of the Anzac landings was Albert Matthews, who died in 1997 aged 101. The last Australian Gallipoli veteran was Alec Campbell, who passed away in 2002. The last Australian World War I soldier, Peter Casserly, passed away three years in June 2005, although at the time of his death two other World War I soldiers were still alive, neither had served overseas during the war. Australia’s last World War I veteran, Evan Allan, a member of the Royal Australian Navy, died in October 2005 aged 106. Stuart Rintoul, ‘Last of our Great War fighters fades away’, *The Australian*, 19 October 2005, pp. 1 and 4; and Tony Stephens, *The Last Anzacs—Gallipoli 1915*, Allen and Kemsley, Sydney, 1996.


5 Unlike contemporary doctrine, which divides the units into combat, combat support and service support, British Edwardian doctrine only divided units into arms and services. The arms were cavalry, artillery, engineers, infantry, cyclists and the flying corps. The services were medical, ordnance and veterinary. General Staff War Office, *Field Service Regulations Part I, Operations (1909)*, HMSO, London, 1909, reprinted with amendments 1914, p. 14.


THE FORGOTTEN FIRST

12 AIF, Staff Regimental and Graduation List of Officers, August 1914, pp. 13–24 and August 1918, pp. 10–21 and 75–136.

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IRAQ: THE WRONG WAR WRONGLY FOUGHT?
A REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE ON IRAQ

DR ALBERT PALAZZO


In the aftermath of President George W. Bush’s now evidently premature ‘mission accomplished’ speech from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS *Abraham Lincoln* on 1 May 2003, journalists, historians and military professionals released a deluge of literature on the American conduct of the Iraq War. These books—such as Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales Jr., *The Iraq War: A Military History* (Harvard University Press, 2003); Ray L. Smith and Bing West, *The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division* (Bantam Books, 2003); Karl Zinsmeister, *Boots on the Ground: A Month with the 82nd Airborne in the Battle*
for Iraq (St. Martin’s Press, 2003); Oliver Poole, Black Knights: On the Bloody Road to Baghdad (HarperCollins, 2003); Paul McGeough, In Baghdad: A Reporter’s War (Allen and Unwin, 2003); and Tommy Franks, American Soldier (HarperCollins, 2004)—highlighted the prowess of American force of arms and the ease with which the United States had seemingly solved the Saddam Hussein problem.

Unfortunately, even before this initial surge of congratulatory works had moved to the remainder shelves, the conflict transformed into an insurgency and Iraq began its slide towards chaos. Still, some authors had been astute enough to include a final chapter on the war’s emerging phase, while others had appended postscripts that added a sense of future uncertainty. The rapidly changing situation in Iraq illustrates the pitfalls of an author’s rush to publish and the need for time to pass before crafting a narrative. The writing of history is not an art of immediate observation and those that win this ‘race to write’ run the risk of being ‘the first to be forgotten’.

In 2006, a new wave of more mature and deliberate reflection began to arrive in stores—books that told a far different story than those earlier volumes. The story they described was no longer one of a triumphantly waged conventional war, but one of a bogged-down superpower caught in a nasty and growing insurgency. These authors did not fault the skill, bravery or resolve of the average US soldier. Instead, their primary targets were the civilian and military commanders. The three books reviewed here—George Packer, The Assassin’s Gate; Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco; and Bob Woodward, State of Denial—were all published in 2006 and present a considerably more critical account of the war to date, offer a far harsher assessment of American strategic thinking and warfighting competency, and conclude on a far grimmer note. In addition, these books possess a greater sense of detached observation than was possible to attain by those writing earlier. Three years, it seems, is a long time in the writing of history.

There is considerable similarity between The Assassin’s Gate, Fiasco, and State of Denial. Each in their own distinctive style takes America’s senior civilian advisors and military commanders to task. George W. Bush, Richard B. Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, George Tenet, General Tommy R. Franks, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, L. Paul Bremer and minor participants all come under harsh scrutiny. The
Iraq: the Wrong War Wrongly Fought?

The authors draw attention to a series of key decisions and policy issues that shaped the course of the war. Throughout, they raise important questions on the processes of US decision-making, accountability, and depth of geopolitical understanding.

Bush initiated the conflict with great promise and conviction and expressed his objectives in terms of a noble crusade. The United States would, by force of arms, liberate Iraq from the dictator Saddam Hussein, eliminate Iraq’s stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, open a new front in the ‘War on Terror’, and establish a democratic beachhead in the Arab Middle East. The goals were far-reaching, comprehensive, and aimed at nothing less than the re-making of one of the world’s most dangerous regions. If successful, Bush’s program would shift the Middle East’s balance of power in a direction more favourable to US interests. That the outcome of the invasion was the disintegration of the pre-existing Iraqi state (at least to date) and the ensnaring of the American military in a protracted insurgency conflict does not discount the worthiness of the objectives stated above. The destruction of the Iraqi nation-state was a reasonable cost for the war and the improvement in American national security that these lofty goals promised. It does, however, highlight the vast gulf between the Bush vision and both his and the US Administration’s appreciation of the steps needed to achieve the desired outcome.

The overarching theme addressed in these three books is how the war’s direction was allowed to deviate so far from the clearly defined strategic objectives. There is a suggestion that Bush foresaw the war as a crusade, and like all crusades, it had an ideological underpinning that made the questioning of its purpose and management extremely difficult, if not impossible. In the long lead-up to the invasion, detailed and critical examination of intent—and the precise and thorough assessment of facts—gave way to the wishful authority of a neoconservative agenda. Bush’s vision for a reformed Middle East was not balanced by considered and provocative debate, well-reasoned assessment and argument, or imaginative contingency planning at the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or Central Command. Nor was much effort made to understand the culture and values of Iraqi society, and how this might shape the local people’s reaction to the planned invasion.

[There was a] vast gulf between the Bush vision and both his and the US Administration’s appreciation of the steps needed …

… the principles of war and realpolitik took second place to an idealistic agenda.
This was a conflict in which the principles of war and *realpolitik* took second place to an idealistic agenda. There was only minor consideration of the reality of the situation in the coming conflict, a flaw that continues to haunt US efforts. In a sense, the rationale for the war was overtaken by the desire for the war.

Time and time again, Packer, Ricks and Woodward point to the absence of the most fundamental requirement for the prosecution of a war—a strategy for victory. From the perspective of the operational art, Franks crafted a plan that saw the comprehensive defeat of the Iraqi Army in a conventional war campaign, the American race to Baghdad, and the toppling of Saddam’s Baathist regime. Given the disparity between American and Iraqi military might, the outcome of the war was never in doubt.

However, little or no consideration was given in Washington or Tampa, the home of Central Command, to the maintenance of security following the defeat of Iraq’s conventional military forces. This was a clear oversight, given that, from the outset, regime change was one of the war’s primary objectives. The result was that, as looting and rioting erupted across Baghdad and then the countryside, and as the first signs of a nascent insurgency appeared, US soldiers stood by, unsure of what to do and without orders or direction. The United States surrendered the initiative to the insurgents because it had no plan, other than the spontaneous emergence of democracy, for the post-Saddam Hussein era. The United States had gone to war without a contingency for anything other than success, and left its fighting troops with no options if the war faltered.

Packer articulates the most convincing explanation for this omission to consider a strategy for the post-conflict—or to use military parlance, ‘Phase Four’—environment, although elements of his argument resonate through the other books. Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld had little patience for peace making and peacekeeping missions, which they considered an inappropriate use of military forces and one that had been associated with a legacy of failure of the Clinton Administration. Instead, they focused on warfighting alone and neglected post-conflict nation-building. Moreover, there seemed to be an urgency to take on Saddam Hussein, as if it was unfinished business dressed up as a response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Bush was no student of Clausewitz and, together with Rumsfeld, who led a Defense Department that had become enamoured with technology-driven

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The United States had gone to war without a contingency for anything other than success …

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[Bush and Cheney] chose … to wage war in isolation from politics.

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transformation, they discarded the time-honoured maxim on the political nature of war. They chose instead to wage war in isolation from politics. In Iraq, this translated into a Central Command war plan that focused on the operational art at the expense of the strategic, and the bifurcation of the conflict’s direction into separate civilian and military spheres.

These books raise more questions than they answer; a consequence of their proximity to events and lack of access to the full scope of materials. In this sense, none can be considered definitive studies, but rather they act as pathfinders that sketch out the critical issues to be revisited at a later date. One question they raise is the part played by Bush in the design and conduct of the conflict. None of the authors have a precise fix on the President’s place in orchestrating the war. Even Woodward, who ascribes to Bush the most active role, still leaves the reader unsure of who exactly was in charge. The source of key decisions remains unclear, and at times it appears as if multiple power centres in Washington usurped the prerogatives of the Commander-in-Chief. Whether this was with or without Bush’s acquiescence (or even whether or not it is true) remains unclear. What is readily evident, however, is that Bush is not cast from the same mould as Britain’s great leader of the Second World War, Winston Churchill, or even Margaret Thatcher.

Another subject addressed by the authors is the US Administration’s reluctance to admit or assign blame for mistakes. While these books convincingly argue that the Bush White House is not a place where error is readily confronted, it is harder to explain the rationale or benefit derived from such a policy. It also remains uncertain whether it was a result of deliberate denial, self-delusion, political opportunism, or of messengers unwilling to deliver negative news to a commander who did not want to hear of failure.

Comparison with past administrations is unavoidable. Periodically during Harry S. Truman’s time in the White House there would appear on his desk a plaque inscribed with the phrase ‘the buck stops here’. This was Truman’s way of saying that he took responsibility for his Administration’s decisions. By contrast, such a metaphor would find no place in the Bush Administration, an observation made even more damning by the President’s limited admission of culpability in January 2007, when he announced his new strategy for Iraq. Instead of a plaque of Missourian directness, the symbol for the allocation of responsibility in the current White House would be a perpetually revolving merry-go-round. As long as it keeps moving, everyone can escape blame and mistakes can be disguised behind swirling motion and the illusion of progress.
At this point it is also hard to distinguish between what the war’s planners did not know and what they did know but chose to ignore when it did not fit their concept of the war. Understanding the distinction between the two is critical in determining the degree of culpability that individuals such as Bush, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Franks must share.

The prime example of responsibility avoidance highlighted in these books is the actions of Bush’s proconsul in Iraq, Paul Bremer. It is with amazement that one reads of his imperious dismissal of the Iraqi Army and the purge of key government ministries, in consequence leaving no one in authority or with the skill to provide for the basic security and services of an entire nation, and throwing out onto the street several hundred thousand armed and angry men. Admittedly, the insurgency had already begun when Bremer implemented his purge, but the effect was to pour fuel on a fire and, as a result, the opposition to the American occupation exploded. This was one of the conflict’s turning points, but the authors do not offer an adequate explanation for Bremer’s actions. Whether he had authority from Washington or acted on his own remains unanswered.

Which book to choose when faced with over 1500 pages of potential reading? The two stand-outs for this reviewer were Packer’s *The Assassins’ Gate* and Ricks’ *Fiasco*. Both are excellent, and although the authors arrive at comparable conclusions, they are dissimilar enough that one may find value in reading both.

*Assassins’ Gate* is the more literary of the two. At times, Packer reaches the level of a well-written travelogue except that the route journeys through a nightmare. Packer undertook numerous trips to Iraq, over a lengthy period of time, and skilfully captures a nation’s descent into chaos. Throughout *Assassins’ Gate* it remains obvious that Packer has a deep respect for the region and people, and alone among these authors he is able to view the conflict, one might say, from an Iraqi perspective. In a war in which the basic military tenet of knowing your enemy has been systematically violated, Packer shows that it is possible to bridge cultural divides and come to understand the values and organisational structure of your adversary’s society. The result is a harrowing tale of American incompetence and Iraqi despair.

*Fiasco* is a painful book to read. Readers will react with shock as each page reveals yet another failure, mistake, or foolhardy decision committed by America’s civilian and military leaders. It is a primer on how not to run a war and should be mandatory reading for military professionals, defence bureaucrats, and any national leader …
mandatory reading for military professionals, defence bureaucrats, and any national leader considering military adventurism. This reviewer expects that it will stand for a long time on military professional reading lists.

Ricks spends more time than the other authors at the coal-face of the conflict, observing the war from the level of those who did the fighting. It is a sympathetic story, presented in a series of vignettes that does nothing to dishonour the troops. Yet one cannot help but become angry when reading *Fiasco*. The consequence of the hubris of leaders in Washington and the Middle East is now measured in an escalating death-toll of Americans and Iraqis.

For this reviewer, Woodward's *State of Denial* is the weakest of the three books. Woodward has become a consummate Beltway insider and his viewpoint does not stray too far from the corridors of power in Washington. For him, the real war was waged in Washington, leaving Iraq a distant distraction and not the main story.

Woodward’s prose also contains numerous annoying idiosyncrasies to which dedicated followers may have become immune. It is never quite clear when he is quoting from an interview transcript or inventing a conversation from hearsay. Quote marks are used without discrimination. More annoyingly, an aspect of Woodward's personality is a need to convince the reader of the breadth of his access. Bush and senior government officials, it must be admitted, gave generous amounts of their time. Yet Woodward crosses the line between a detached interviewer and an actor, becoming part of the story.

Woodward also cannot resist widespread name-dropping of tangential officials and personalities without follow-up or explanation. Judith Miller, the *New York Times*’ Weapons of Mass Destruction advocate, and Valerie Plame, the outed CIA operative, receive only passing comment, without connection to the wider narrative, while a page is spent on Bush’s Chief of Staff’s bout with influenza to no apparent purpose. The book reaches its climax at its half-way point when Woodward declares that ‘Bush was in denial about Iraq’. This is a less than surprising assertion given the book’s title, yet Woodward continues to plough on for another 200 plus pages subjecting his reader to irrelevant anecdotes and retelling now redundant conversations and interviews.

For Woodward loyalists their choice has probably been made, especially if they have already invested in his first two volumes on the Bush Presidency: *Plan of Attack* and *Bush at War*. This is unfortunate. *State of Denial* is not a trivial book, but readers would be better served by selecting the accounts of either Packer or Ricks.
That the differences in the conclusions of all three authors are more of degree than of substance is itself a cause for concern. Is the dire situation in Iraq and the cause of the insurgency’s growing strength so obvious that varied conclusions are not possible? Has the story of America’s war in Iraq already been definitively written, so soon after the conflict’s commencement? Instinctively, the answer must be no. These books are themselves still only interim assessments of the United States and its policies in and about Iraq. More time must pass and the full gamut of records made available before balanced and definitive conclusions are to be made. However, in the short term, each book makes important contributions to the public debate on Iraq, and points out the egregious errors by the United States in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War and in the overlapping periods of combat and nation-building. Each in its own way contains lessons that should receive considered attention.

More significantly, each presents startling and painful insights into how not to wage a war. In the final analysis, perhaps this is the Bush Administration’s most salutary legacy in its ‘War against Terror’. Whether victory or defeat is America’s future in Iraq is yet to be written, but in either outcome this war is likely to only be a small part of a broader fight against a terrorist agenda that has all the hallmarks of long-term conflict. If the lessons of US mistakes in Iraq are learned in this round, and institutionalised throughout US defence and military organisations, there will be greater opportunity for the United States to achieve its objectives in the next round.

THE AUTHOR

Dr. Albert Palazzo is a Senior Research Fellow at the Australian Army’s Land Warfare Studies Centre in Canberra. His PhD is from The Ohio State University and his BA and MA are from New York University. He has written widely on warfare in the modern age and on the Australian Army in particular. His many publications include: Seeking Victory on The Western Front: The British Army & Chemical Warfare in World War I; The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation, 1901–2001; Defenders of Australia: The Third Australian Division; Battle of Crete; The Royal Australian Corps of Transport; and Australian Military Operations in Vietnam. His next project is a history of the Australian Army in the current war in Iraq.
In Retrospect this issue we reflect on the early period of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War. In the extract, Captain Clark reflects on his experience as an adviser with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) during 1963–64. His conclusions are relevant to soldiers today, especially those involved in training indigenous troops, particularly in Iraq.

As military professionals we must not allow the specious and tendentious debate about similarities between the Vietnam and Iraq Wars to distract us from the very real lessons that can be drawn from articles such as Captain Clark’s. Indeed, the Australian Army learnt vital lessons about insurgency during the Vietnam War.

Our troops in Vietnam were engaged on all ‘three blocks’ of the ‘three block war’, long before that term became popular. Raising and training indigenous forces was a central aspect of the broader strategy for defeating the insurgency against the South Vietnamese Government. It directly supported conventional and unconventional military operations against Viet Cong and main-force North Vietnamese units alike.

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... the Australian Army learnt vital lessons about insurgency during the Vietnam War.
RETROSPECT

Such missions present complex challenges. As the author observes, only soldiers possessing the highest levels of physical and mental fitness and exemplary individual skills should be deployed to train foreign troops. Moreover, it is essential to the effectiveness of such training teams that their members have a thorough grasp of the cultural context in which they are operating. Their very survival—let alone effectiveness—will often depend on the relationship of mutual trust that they are able to develop with the force in which they are embedded.

While our US allies have customarily regarded training indigenous forces—Foreign Internal Defense (FID), as they classify it—as primarily a special forces mission, Australia continues to deploy all-arms training teams within our region and to Iraq. Our traditional emphasis on individual soldier skills well prepares our people for this role.

Furthermore, our soldiers have earned a reputation for their ability to adapt to different cultural conditions and to win the trust and respect of the populations among which they are deployed. Such trust and respect directly supports our centre of gravity in what is now widely termed ‘war amongst the people’ in the phrase coined by General Sir Rupert Smith.

The extraordinary legacy of the original Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) has only been enhanced in recent years. The efforts of our training teams in Iraq are worthy of their AATV forebears. This has likewise been the case in East Timor, where a military adviser to the F-FDTL (FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste, the East Timor Defence Force), Major Mick Stone, performed superbly during the crisis there last year. His mastery of local language and customs, which he achieved through his own private study and practice, enabled him to defuse a number of very tense situations without resort to force.

The advent of the Strategic Soldier-era will impose an enormous liability on the Army to produce more soldiers and officers with this delicate combination of toughness, soldier skills, cultural sensitivity and linguistic ability. While Army recognises this challenge through our concept development—notably the ‘Soldier of the 21st Century’—meeting it will be no mean feat.

Captain Clark’s article provides an insight into the earliest days of a legendary Australian Army unit, ‘the Team’. However, the true value of his reflections lies in the enduring requirement for soldiers of all arms to provide training to allied armies across linguistic and cultural divides.
Some Reflections on the War in Vietnam*

Captain R. Clark, Royal Australian Engineers

These reflections are based on a limited experience in Vietnam and in many cases may be old stuff to more experienced soldiers. In order to succeed in this type of war all soldiers must be:

(a) Physically fit. This in my opinion is the most vital part of training as the terrain and climate are severe enough without the Viet-Cong (VC) opposition. The present standard of physical fitness in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) is low; as a result exhausted soldiers quickly fall prey to the VC.

(b) Able to shoot well. Soldiers must be able to hit the target with a quick reaction shot. Well-aimed shots over distances exceeding 100 metres will seldom be needed.

(c) Well led. The junior leaders must be capable of leading small units for varying lengths of time. At present an operation below company level is rare; the normal operation is of battalion size.

* This article first appeared in the Australian Army Journal, No. 192, May 1965.
In this war the holding of large numbers of troops in reserve has been proved useless as such reserves cannot be brought into action quickly enough to be effective. Therefore reserves should be held at the lowest level where they can be brought immediately into action. Reserves above the regimental level will seldom, if ever, be employed.

Limited vision makes operations similar to moving by night. Thus the great emphasis in training should be on night operations. Limited visibility also greatly restricts the range and type of weapons which can be employed.

The infantry battalion, with air supply every seven days, can operate for up to 30 days without the use of vehicles. Battalion headquarters is usually kept small and normally works efficiently with members carrying all they need on their backs.

It is unsound to despatch ARVN units into unknown areas and expect immediate results because the VC knows the area in the finest detail. Therefore, when ARVN troops move into an area they should spend days—weeks if necessary—learning the area of operations in detail, as this will help overcome the VC’s big advantage. The VC’s knowledge of the country is comparable to one’s own knowledge of one’s own home town. If we were to fight an enemy at home the advantage, naturally, would lie with us.

It is wrong to believe that because the VC is believed to have a battalion capability in a particular area that we too must operate as a battalion. The VC needs time to organize its workers into a battalion and this involves loss of security. It is unlikely therefore that at the most more than platoon groups (normally section and less) would be encountered in an area with a VC battalion capability. This of course would be untrue when hard-core battalions are operating in an area.

Battalions must set up Intelligence networks from within their own resources. This can often be achieved by using soldiers enlisted from the area in which operations are being conducted. The conversion and use of VC prisoners is also most effective.

The following technique for searching a village appeared to produce the best results: on moving into a village where the possibility of booby traps was high, the senior members of each household were ordered to stand before their houses. The battalion commander then explained that the discovery of any booby traps in a house would result in a new senior member of the household.
This produced the desired effect, and in five cases the head of the house had pointed out traps left behind by VC which might have led to loss of life. The battalion commander explained that this procedure had been adopted after routine kindness had led to casualties among his troops. The fear of reprisals was well understood by the villagers and brought results.

The staff, in laying down precise times for a unit to arrive at a certain feature, leaves the battalion commander no scope for flexibility or initiative. As a result, during its moves, the battalion fixes terrain features as objectives without worrying about the VC in between. Battalion and company commanders must be allowed a higher degree of flexibility in this type of warfare.

One method employed to obtain advance warning of ambushes was to have a converted VC (dressed as a VC) move ahead of the ARVN column. This has resulted in the VC calling out to the convert scout or, at worst, firing, which of course provides the required warning.

The placing of flank protection on the ground in some areas is impossible. Heliborne reserve forces are used to overcome this, and fire support of guns is also effective.

The VC tend to move according to the seasons. During the wet the VC will live on the high ground, as food and water are plentiful. In the dry season food and water shortages force the VC to move down to the streams. This in turn dictates the areas of operations.

The unorganized destruction of crops and villages has achieved little; in fact it has gained VC sympathy. If crops are to be destroyed they must be completely destroyed to a plan laid down by higher headquarters. Food is so abundant in most areas along the Laos border that partial destruction achieves nothing.

The standard of navigation throughout the ARVN is poor and the constant use of smoke and aircraft—twice daily or when called for—to pinpoint positions is obviously of great value to the VC as a means of keeping ARVN movement under surveillance. A map is never seen below platoon level, so the emphasis on navigation must be placed on those who need it. It is time-wasting to train and teach navigation to private soldiers. Concentrated effort should be applied to officers and NCOs.
RETROSPECT

The ARVN army, for some unknown reason, has adopted the steel helmet for patrolling. This is a useless piece of equipment, of value only as a means of carrying spare water. It is suggested that spare water-bottles be issued and helmets be left in outposts as mortar fire is seldom encountered by patrols. The climate and terrain make water vital to the soldier; to keep fighting fit he must carry two water-bottles. In addition, section water-bottles would be an advantage. At present units camp on streams regardless of the tactical situation.

All arms and services must be able to protect themselves; this involves service troops providing patrols to clear areas round their depots. Great emphasis is placed on the training of all the arms and services in self-protection. The footwear at present in use in the ARVN is most unsuitable for patrolling in the wet season. After about eighteen days on patrol in wet conditions the soldiers suffer from a type of trench foot and many have had to have toes amputated. It is most important in this country that boots have drain holes to let water escape. Australian boots on user trial lacked such holes. In addition junior leaders must be taught to watch and treat any foot problems in their units.

The ARVN places little importance on the loss of ammunition, either in training or on operations. Ammunition is left lying on training centre ranges; on operations clips are hooked all over web equipment, which results in vines knocking the clips onto the ground.

It is a constant battle to persuade battalions to pass back Intelligence information. This of course means that maps are seldom up to date even though each unit has its own Intelligence section which could revise them.

At present the ARVN lacks good leadership, due to the selection of potential leaders on a system similar to that of the French. A man must first of all be politically loyal; second, he must have an education far above the level required in a junior officer. Little account is taken of his ability to lead a platoon in battle. National conscription should allow officers to be selected from soldiers who have proved themselves in combat, and the system of sending civilians direct to Officer training should be limited to a few special cases only.
Some Reflections on the War in Vietnam

Few ARVN units are able to operate by night, and the laying of night ambushes is only half-heartedly carried out. Until the ARVN can operate at night as efficiently as the VC there is small hope of winning the war. Training should emphasize night operations. Training centres do in fact carry out limited night training, but presentation is poor as instructors regard it only as an added burden.

The policy of handing out sweets and other gifts upon moving into an area should cease. This creates the wrong impression on the locals; before long they expect continually to receive without giving anything in return. Gifts should be given only to those deserving of reward and senior officers should bear this in mind when visiting an area in which a battalion adviser has probably spent months creating a policy.

In keeping with all other so-called experts on this war, one has to come up with a solution on how to win it. The solution must be simple as it has to be implemented by simple soldiers at the battalion level. Here is mine: when a battalion moves into an area and gets to know it well, patrols of down to three men should constantly operate to harass the VC. This will cause the VC to concentrate for safety: in so doing they will give away security. The battalion can then bring the concentrated VC to battle and destroy them.

The Author (As at May 1965)

The author graduated from OCS in 1954. He served with the School of Military Engineering, with 11 NS Training Battalion, 23 Construction Squadron, 7 Independent Squadron and 7 and 11 Field Squadrons. He was with the Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam in 1963–64. At the time of writing, he was posted as Operations Instructor at the School of Military Engineering, Liverpool.
All professional soldiers should read this book. *Cobra II* is an excellent, well-researched and professionally written account of the planning and conduct of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It concludes during the early stages of the post-invasion security effort and examines the missed early opportunities and failures that have arguably contributed to the subsequent rise of the insurgency. It achieves the authors’ aim of shedding light on ‘one of the most covered but least understood episodes in recent history’. Perhaps the greatest appeal of the book is the manner in which it links strategic-level issues and decisions through to the real world tactical situations faced by soldiers on the ground. The book, therefore, has something for a wide professional audience. Senior commanders, operational planners, specialists and unit-level soldiers and officers will all take something from this contemporary, easy to read work.

Books by journalists, especially those dealing with contemporary conflicts, are often heavy on emotion and personal opinion but light on genuine research and analysis. This is not such a work. The research is based on detailed interviews and statements from the actual participants. Where possible, it includes the Iraqi side of the story, although access to information and Iraqi personal accounts is limited. Coalition input is also fairly meagre.

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One of the authors operated as an embedded journalist and saw some of the events covered first-hand and in real-time. The book is written dispassionately and in the style of a professional, well-referenced, narrative history. One is left largely free to make independent judgements and linkages. Nor do the authors shrink from pointing out weaknesses or errors—usually based on expert comment and sensible analysis. There is no incessant beating of any particular political drums.

*Cobra II* gives a first class account of what the authors call the ‘accordion’ nature of campaign planning. The authors’ method draws out the real world tensions, arguments and pressures that exist between the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The book cleverly describes how critical strategic issues and imperatives, especially a desire to limit the size of forces deployed, and to avoid perceived post-war Balkans-style nation building ‘errors’, eventually limited and constrained Coalition forces in the early stages of the post-invasion security operation.

It captures the difficulty facing military commanders in dealing with complexity, uncertainty and shifting intent. This description and picture has the ring of truth and fits with my personal recollection of the environment I observed at first hand in Headquarters CENTCOM during late 2001. While highlighting the critical role of operational commanders, the work indirectly reveals the important role played by key plans staff at the rank of lieutenant colonel and major. For officers in similar jobs today, it is worth reading to reaffirm just how critical this role, and the provision of accurate advice and sharp staff work, remains today. It is a must-read for Staff College students.

A central theme of the book relates to whether the design of the campaign plan for the decisive combat operations contributed to eventual failures and missed opportunities during the subsequent security phase of the operation. Were enough forces deployed? Were realistic and comprehensive preparations for managing post-Saddam Iraq effective? The book raises a number of the critical issues facing modern western forces involved in what General Sir Rupert Smith has recently characterised as ‘war amongst the people’. What is the decisive phase? Should we not begin with the end? What is the utility and limitations of the so-called revolution in military affairs in the battle against urban based, irregular forces? *Cobra II* provides an excellent, thought-provoking case study in which these critical questions remain a central thread throughout.

When the book turns to Iraq and the execution of the plan, it draws out a whole series of operational and tactical lessons of genuine value to all soldiers. Old lessons are strongly re-affirmed, including the importance of an unrelenting focus on the enemy, the need for synchronised, combined-arms cooperation, and the constant need to be ready for the chaos and violence of battle. There are a series of valuable
mini-case studies and discussions such as a close up account of the ill-fated 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment ‘deep attack’ against the Republican Guard located near Kabarla. For those with an interest in offensive support coordination there is an excellent description of the Marine ‘Kill Box’ system and a comparison with conventional US Army fire coordination doctrine.

There is plenty for the manoeuvre soldiers who will be firmly reminded about primacy of close combat, the importance of mission command and the value of protection and firepower. Anyone with doubts about what the Hardened and Networked Army is all about should read the account of the Marine fight for the bridges at Nasariyah or the 2nd BCT assault into central Baghdad. These were not largely fights against conventional forces but rather clashes with committed, well equipped, irregular forces. The authors are determined to remind us that the first American killed was shot by a man in civilian clothes riding in the back of an ordinary truck. Cobra II provides an excellent insight into what combat was like during the 2003 advance, but perhaps more importantly it gives us a warning of the future battles, adversaries and tactics we will face.

Perhaps the final and unintended value of the book is that it starkly reveals the access, power and reach of the modern media. These journalists were granted significant access to multiple levels of command, top to bottom. Their work reflects this comprehensive access. It should make us all think hard about the place and role of media in modern conflict. I urge readers to carefully examine the acknowledgements at the close of the book. It leads to a possible conclusion that those who offered the best access got the best coverage of their points of view. It is certainly something to think about in this time of instant communication and a pervasive press presence.

In summary, this is an outstanding, contemporary professional read. I agree with the authors’ claim that it covers hubris, heroism, high-technology wizardry, cultural ignorance, foreign policy strategy, generalship and fighting. It is daunting in size—603 pages in all—but do not be put off, it is worth the effort.

Reviewed by Dr Albert Palazzo, Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre

Dr Louise Richardson is Executive Dean of the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study and a lecturer in government and law at Harvard. Born in Ireland of Catholic parents, Richardson grew up in a culture in which terrorism was part of the Republic’s background environment. She approaches her topic neither as a hawk nor as a pacifist, but as a rationalist with a deep—almost visceral—appreciation of terror.

In *What Terrorists Want*, Richardson combines a sweeping historical overview with policy prescriptions on how states can defeat terrorist organisations. Richardson’s tone is authoritative and covers terrorism in its entire context, commencing with the Roman-era Zealots of Palestine and working forward to the present US conflict with al-Qaeda. She retains her objectivity throughout. For example, readers may reject her characterisation of the African National Congress as a terrorist organisation, but, despite the noble nature of its cause, its members, in fact, employed terrorist tactics in their struggle against the Boer government of South Africa.

Richardson divides her book into two parts. The work’s first half focuses on the nature of terror and terrorists. In this section she defines terrorism, describes its causes, outlines how someone decides to embrace terrorism, and explains why they choose to become suicide bombers. In the face of the tactic of the suicide bomber she insists that terrorists are sane. Far from being irrational, terrorist organisations and their adherents are goal-driven and are no different to the members of other groups agitating for
an ambitious degree of change. They have both short- and long-term objectives around which they shape their policies. In the near timeframe terrorists desire what Richardson calls the three ‘Rs’ - Revenge, Renown and Reaction. In the longer term, the supporters of terrorism seek major political change.

In the book’s second half Richardson turns to the evolution of US policy since 11 September 2001. Her criticism is comprehensive and her conclusions damning. Her most significant observations are that:

- by declaring a War on Terrorism the United States gave the terrorists the legitimacy they sought;
- by refusing to treat prisoners in accordance with the Geneva Convention the United States lost the moral high-ground;
- by refusing to work within international organisations, for example the United Nations and NATO, and to build a broad partnership with allies, the United States failed to access the considerable experience of other countries; and
- by treating the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as conventional military operations, the United States alienated the indigenous populations and thereby provided terrorist organisations with an endless pool of potential new recruits.

Richardson’s opinion on the litany of US mistakes is that the Bush Administration did not want to learn from the mistakes of others: it wanted to learn from its own.

The most controversial assertion contained in What Terrorists Want is that a war against terrorism cannot be won. The reader will need to pause at this point in the book in order to not miss Richardson’s deeper message. She is not playing at semantics in arguing that the waging of a war against terrorism is an attempt to defeat a concept, or in the case of the current War on Terror, an emotion. Her argument is quite pragmatic here. By not declaring war on those specifically responsible for the attacks of 11 September, the United States set itself too high a criterion for victory. To succeed, the United States has to prevent any act of terrorism anywhere in the world while also eliminating every individual terrorist. This is not a manageable task, even for a superpower. Moreover, by employing the rhetoric of ‘war’, the United States has emphasised the military sphere in its response to 11 September 2001 and hence overlooked the possibility of political solutions. A more achievable objective for the United States would have been to contain rather than eliminate the threat and to nullify the terrorist’s message.

Although Richardson describes the tactics so far employed by the United States as misguided and counter-productive, her motivation is not to savage the Bush Presidency. She hints that the United States is now coming out of a necessary
learning phase and that sounder ideas will hopefully be forthcoming. To advance the emergence of new policies Richardson proposes six strategic principles for the waging of counterterrorism. They are:

- have a defensible and achievable goal;
- live by your principles;
- know your enemy;
- separate the terrorists from their communities;
- engage others in countering terrorists with you; and
- have patience and keep your perspective.

None of these points are novel—they form the foundation of basic counter-insurgency doctrine—but they have been widely ignored by the United States. In failing to implement these principles at an early stage in its efforts against terrorism the Bush Administration has compounded the challenge it faces.

Richardson’s final objective in *What Terrorists Want* is to instil a degree of perspective and objectivity in policy makers and the public they represent. The recourse to terrorism is not new, nor is it a reaction to the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower. Instead, it is the traditional response of the powerless. Moreover, despite operational successes that achieve the short-term goals of ‘Revenge, Renown and Reaction’, the historical record shows that terrorist groups rarely succeed in the long-term. Judging by the past, the defeat of those practising terror is highly likely, if not inevitable. Despite the overall negative analysis of US policy so far, Richardson therefore remains an optimist.

This is a valuable book that is dispassionately written by an expert in the field. While it will serve her students well as a textbook, Richardson’s judgements and recommendations will also make important and compelling reading for policy makers. It is to be hoped that *What Terrorists Want* receives the attention it deserves.

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NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

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