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EDITORIAL

Customarily the release of the Autumn edition of the Australian Army Journal affords an appropriate opportunity to reflect on the significance of ANZAC Day, which falls on the eve of our publication date. This year is no exception. In recent years ANZAC Day has undergone both transformation and renewal. For a period in the 1960s and '70s its relevance and longevity appeared doubtful. That period witnessed enormous social change and a radical alteration of the relationship between the individual and the state.

Much of the impetus for such change was provided by the unpopular war in Vietnam. Anti-war sentiment easily conflated with anti-military sentiment. From the withdrawal from Vietnam until the deployment of INTERFET to East Timor in 1999, the Australian Army grappled with the legacy of the social revolution unleashed during the Vietnam era. For much of this period the Army did not enjoy the public esteem that it does today.

There is debate among scholars and social commentators as to the precise nature of the phenomena that led to a resurgence of interest in ANZAC Day. As the numbers of veterans dwindled and fewer Australians had experience of war or military service of any kind, public remembrance of war and sacrifice came to occupy a central place in our national life.

Much of this was attributable to interest in the exploits of ancestors and family members, but it also seemed to represent a search for deeper meaning in an age of materialism and moral relativity.

The result has been the elevation of the ANZAC story to the status of Australia's foundation myth. Arguably, in this process ANZAC Day has come to eclipse Australia Day in the public imagination as the true national birthday. This is controversial, especially in some academic quarters.

The revival of interest in ANZAC Day has coincided with renewed public respect for the Australian Army. Ironically this has not been an unalloyed good. In some ways the ANZAC myth reinforces public complacency. At the core of the myth is the view that Australians are natural soldiers. This is a dangerous fallacy, which
undermines serious discussion about the need for highly trained professional armies and the costs of raising and sustaining them.

Linked to this myth is a view that while our soldiers are invincible they only ever fight ‘other people’s wars’. The paradox of portraying our soldiers simultaneously as victims and supermen is lost on most popular historians and commentators. Moreover, this second myth also inhibits mature discussion about Australia’s engagement in the great ideological struggles of the twentieth century and the role of military power in statecraft.

However, the public image of the contemporary army as the custodian of ANZAC bestows many benefits on us. In particular, ANZAC is a celebration of the mass volunteer Army, it is accessible to a wide cross-section of the population and prevents the Army being seen as an aloof, remote martial caste. In a liberal democracy this is essential to the health of the Army and the democratic system.

The values celebrated through ANZAC are central to our identity as Australian soldiers. They are the source of the contemporary army values of Courage, Teamwork and Initiative. Whether in barracks or on operations or on active service, every Australian soldier is obliged to live according to those values. It is an onerous burden.

This ANZAC Day we pause to reflect on the sacrifice of all those who have died in the service of Australia. Such reflection is a poignant reminder of the unique nature of the military profession. The soldier enters a contract of unlimited liability with the nation. He—or she—may be required to die in the performance of their duty.

This sets us apart from our fellow citizens and explains in large measure their enormous respect for the Army and the wider Australian Defence Force. Conversely, when any soldier fails to live up to those values there will be a public backlash. The recent controversy involving the conduct of some Army cadets at the Australian Defence Force Academy is a case in point.

This episode raises some disturbing issues. As many of these are the subject of inquiries with the potential to lead to prosecutions, we cannot traverse these in any detail. As we reflect on the sacrifice of those who have served in Australia’s wars it is timely to also reflect on the extent to which each of us is worthy of the legacy they have bequeathed.

While this incident has generated a number of inquiries it may be timely to consider another one conducted by the Army itself. The United States Army is currently asking itself serious and probing questions about the nature of the profession of arms in the twenty-first century. That study on the nature of the profession of arms has been convened by the Chief of Staff of the United States Army and will report directly to him. Don Snyder, a retired US Army Officer, told a conference at Oxford University, partly sponsored by the Land Warfare Studies Centre, that after
a decade at war the US Army was returning to first principles. Its most fundamental question is ‘What is the overarching moral narrative to justify the existence of the United States Army?’

Perhaps it is time that we asked ourselves the same questions. The recent scandal at ADFA and the controversy over prosecutions of soldiers for wrongful killing in Afghanistan have revealed a chasm between the Army and social norms. To some extent this is healthy. The nature of military service and the unlimited liability contract mentioned above demand this. Yet do we really understand the full implications of being a unique profession?

‘He died doing the job he loved.’ How often have we heard this remark at the funeral of one our soldiers in recent years? But does this adequately encapsulate the nature of military service? While some argue that we are living in a post-heroic era, where noble claims of patriotism and sacrifice are obsolete, we respectfully disagree.

The profession of arms is an ancient and honourable one. It demands unique sacrifices, offers unique rewards and inculcates distinctive values. We need to be better at understanding this and articulating in public. But of course our claims will be hollow if we are undermined by indefensible conduct that violates basic standards of human decency. This too is worthy of reflection this ANZAC Day.

Since the last edition of this Journal was published, Corporal Richard Atkinson and Sapper Jamie Larcombe were killed on active service in Afghanistan. We extend our profound regrets and respectful sympathy to their families and loved ones.
AFGHANISTAN

DEFEATING THE TALIBAN’S SHADOW GOVERNMENT
WINNING THE POPULATION THROUGH SYNCHRONISED GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY EFFORTS

LIEUTENANT DANIEL R GREEN

ABSTRACT
One of the enduring challenges of the war in Afghanistan has been the synchronised delivery of sustained population protection with robust good governance, development, and reconstruction efforts. Beginning in 2009, the United States began to send additional resources to Afghanistan in order to adopt a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. Significant efforts were made to better organise US and NATO military forces to implement this strategy and the US Embassy also sought to better partner with the Afghan Government. This strategy was implemented in Marjah, Helmand Province in spring 2010 with generally positive results and may provide a future model for civil-military operations.¹
ne of the enduring challenges of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has been the synchronised delivery of sustained population protection with robust good governance, development and reconstruction efforts. All too often, security forces have focused on either short-term clearing operations or intelligence-driven raids for specific targets or stressed the number of insurgents killed versus adopting a population security posture. Additionally, good governance, development and reconstruction efforts too frequently emphasised short-term programs, were insufficiently resourced, or were not coordinated with military efforts. Added to this challenge was the sometimes painful adjustment of bureaucratic structures geared towards solving problems of another era to the unique demands of counterinsurgency warfare today. As great as these obstacles were for the US to overcome in order to adopt a comprehensive approach to these insurgencies, the additional challenge of inadequate partnering with host governments exacerbated them. In many respects, this was simply an outgrowth of having no government to partner with or one that was capable of having an enduring presence at the local level. However, if the political conditions are right for success, a synchronised effort along security, governance and development lines of operation in partnership with the host nation can have significant and often quite dramatic results for the local population. Case studies of the successful pacification campaigns in Ramadi in 2006 and Fallujah in 2007 demonstrate how a tightly coordinated program along these lines of effort can defeat an armed insurgency and reduce the appeal of the insurgent’s shadow government. Beginning in late 2009, this integrated approach started to be organised in Afghanistan and through its application in the beginning of spring 2010, principally in Operation MOSHTARAK in Marjah, Helmand Province, encouraging and positive results were seen in the field and may provide a model for the country at large.

RESOURCING THE SOLUTION

The purpose in deploying static units it to establish a grid of troops so that the population and the counterinsurgent political teams are reasonably well protected, and so that the troops can participate in civic action at the lowest level …

David Galula 4

Following the success of the surge in Iraq coupled with the Anbar Awakening movement, security conditions there began to improve to such an extent that additional US military resources started to become available for service in Afghanistan. Reflecting this newfound success, the Bush Administration initiated the beginning of a sizable increase of US forces to Afghanistan culminating in the early 2009 deployment of 17,000 additional troops by President Obama. These troop numbers were
increased even further by 30,000 in late 2009 following the Obama Administration's Afghanistan policy review and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander General Stanley McChrystal’s strategic assessment. These additional US contributions were supplemented further by an additional increase of 10,000 troops from NATO contributing countries. These substantial increases in combat power were matched by a concomitant pledge to increase the size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) (from 134,000 ANA in 2010 to 171,000 in 2011 and from 94,000 ANP in 2010 to 134,000 in 2011) and a dedicated effort to increase these forces for the long term to allow Afghanistan to secure itself. While these additional resources were the beginning of a solution to Afghanistan’s security problems, it was General McChrystal’s strong emphasis on positioning all military resources in a population protection posture that allowed these added forces the opportunity to confront the insurgency in a newfound way.

As security forces increased in Afghanistan, a complementary effort was also undertaken to increase reconstruction and development assistance by US Government civilian agencies. Besides an absolute increase in development assistance to Afghanistan, the US Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also initiated a civilian personnel uplift and sought to adapt some of their organisational structures to the unique needs of the conflict in the countryside. To these ends, they brought in additional staff at the embassy to include three new ambassadors, to increase the embassy’s organisational muscle and to support a more robust effort in the field. Additionally, they increased the number of personnel in the provinces to around four hundred and placed them at provincial reconstruction teams, military task forces, and in the districts. Furthermore, reflecting the localised aspect of the insurgency, the State Department created a specialised team focused on governance and reconstruction at the district level called District Support Teams, which have three-man elements comprised of representatives from the Department of State, USAID and the United States Department of Agriculture. These teams are embedded with military units and provide tactical expertise, resources and mentoring to district Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GilRoA) officials as well as non-kinetic enablers to co-located military units. The sum total of these efforts was that our civilian interagency partners were not only better positioned to assist military operations in good governance and reconstruction but were now able to assume a leading position in these initiatives over a greater area of the country in an enduring manner.
CREATING A COMMON OPERATING PICTURE

In conventional warfare, the staff of a large military unit is composed roughly of two main branches—‘intelligence/operation’ and ‘logistics’. In counterinsurgency warfare, there is a desperate need for a third branch—the ‘political’ one—which would have the same weight as the others.

David Galula⁶

A week after his initial meeting with Wilson, when his assignment had been confirmed and he had finished his processing, Vann went to the embassy for a political briefing on the province. The political section could not find its sparse file on Hau Nghia, and he left.

Neil Sheehan⁷

A perennial challenge of operating in Afghanistan has been not only understanding the human terrain but having the wisdom to appreciate the sources of conflict the Taliban exploit to separate the people from their government. All too often, military intelligence efforts were focused on finding the enemy to kill or capture, identifying threats to coalition troops, or on recruiting human sources for intelligence. Information gathered on leading indigenous personalities, tribal structures and settlement patterns, as well as reconstruction and development projects was either not captured or, if it was, retained at a local level and lost once a unit rotated out of theatre. While subsequent military training has adapted to this challenge, emphasising the need to understand the local population, and some programs such as the Human Terrain System have provided tactical enablers to military units to study the population, the general effort of collecting non-intelligence information was undeveloped.

To begin the process of centralising human terrain information and operationalising it so that it was useful to military units as well as civilian agencies, General McChrystal initiated the Rich Contextual Understanding project in Washington, DC. This initiative used subject matter experts on Afghanistan and Pakistan to not only provide advice on the region, but to produce research products on specific subjects for the military enriched by academic, archival and field research. These efforts were supplemented by the military’s adoption of a USAID program called…
The Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework. This tool has a series of questions and training programs that military units can use to help them understand why communities were siding with the insurgency as well as identifying local sources of conflict within those villages that insurgents used against the government. It also helped military units identify traditional leaders and representative organisations to work with such as shuras and jirgas. To collect and analyse this information, the newly formed ISAF Joint Command, led by Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, created the Information Dominance Centre (IDC) in November 2009.8 The mandate of the IDC was to centralise as much information as possible on the human terrain and to undertake the kinds of assessments needed to support stability operations. Additionally, the IDC endeavoured to make this information available to relevant civilian agencies to facilitate information sharing and to create a common operating picture. Beginning in February 2010, under the leadership of Major General Michael T Flynn, the Chief Intelligence Officer for ISAF, the military began to create Stability Operations Information Centres at the Regional Commands to facilitate and incentivise the collection of this kind of information in support of the IDC.

As innovative as many of these efforts may appear to be, they have been in the mainstream of military thinking of how to gather the kinds of information needed to confront the insurgency. However, a major innovation was the partnership developed between the military, specifically the ISAF Joint Command, and its civilian counterparts, such as the US Embassy, on understanding the human terrain. The US Embassy, through its office of Interagency Provincial Affairs, sent two detailed surveys out to its members in the field to assess the status and requirements of local government, the leadership abilities and corruption of officials, and the freedom of movement for GIRoA officials to conduct their work. They also polled their members on the presence of programs administered by GIRoA, the United States and other governments, and non-governmental organisations at the district level to establish a common understanding of enabling capabilities to influence and sustain district government. All of these data were included in the assessments of districts and provinces by the IDC as they undertook a regular review of these areas to measure progress. In many respects, these evaluations created a forcing mechanism for the military and civilian agencies to work together on understanding and evaluating how stability operations were going as General McChrystal’s strategy was being implemented. Additionally, through the embassy’s efforts to gather this information from the field, it helped them to focus on improving their own management structures in order to create a more viable organisational counterpart to the military and...
to develop as an institution tying the ministries more closely to the field. The totality of these various efforts by the military and civilian agencies to improve situational awareness was that it better empowered decision-makers to evaluate progress simultaneously along both kinetic and non-kinetic lines. To this end, the ISAF Joint Command created a one-page matrix for both military and civilian agencies to use on each district focused on capturing kinetic and non-kinetic information as part of a shape, clear, hold and build strategy. The synchronisation and centralisation of this information was a substantial improvement in the ability of the coalition to undertake counterinsurgency operations through a better understanding of the people and their needs.

**ORGANISING FOR VICTORY**

*If the forces have to be adapted to their new missions, it is just as important that the minds of the leaders and men—and this includes the civilian as well as the military—be adapted to the special demands of counterinsurgency warfare. Reflexes and decisions that would be considered appropriate for the soldier in conventional warfare and for the civil servant in normal times are not necessarily the right ones in counterinsurgency situations.*

David Galula

While coalition forces have struggled to adapt to the unique challenges of counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, civilian interagency partners have experienced no less dramatic adjustments with far fewer resources. Reflecting the need for greater coordination between civilian and military operations, US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and ISAF Command McChrystal agreed to and signed the United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan on 10 August 2009. Reflecting this campaign plan and a renewed focus on conducting operations in the field, the US Embassy in Kabul made several changes to its organisational structure to make itself more central to conducting counterinsurgency operations. To improve the ability of its interagency field staff to reach back to the embassy and on to the central government, the US Embassy created the office of Interagency Provincial Affairs in July 2009. The Interagency Provincial Affairs office was not only focused on supporting the field and its operations but participated directly in embassy decision-making bodies with ISAF
and US Forces-Afghanistan representatives and liaised directly with GIRoA through its ministerial advisors and political section. To improve overall coordination of civil-military efforts at the embassy, a series of working groups, such as the Governance and Sub-National Governance Working Groups, were created with military and civilian representatives to shape governance and development policy decisions, to evaluate competing proposals, and to decide on courses of action.

To complement US Embassy efforts to operationalise ministerial programs, the ISAF Joint Command created a Ministerial Outreach program to the key ministries focused on providing services and positive government to the Afghan population such as the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and the Civil Service Commission among other bodies. This group was partnered with USAID and Department of State advisors to bolster the central ministries of Afghanistan as well as to help them operationalise the roll-out of their programs and services to local communities. To help tie the central ministries to the field and to improve civil-military cooperation at the operational level, the State Department created Senior Civilian Representative positions at each of the Regional Commands, as well as each provincial reconstruction team, to both coordinate and lead all non-Department of Defense US Government civilian elements in their respective areas of responsibility but to also act as a single point of contact for military leaders to assist in the general unity of effort. Ambassador Eikenberry and Lieutenant General Rodriguez also agreed to have liaisons between their respective organisations to improve civil-military cooperation in Kabul as well as supporting greater participation in each of the overall planning efforts of their respective organisations.

BRINGING AFGHAN SOVEREIGNTY TO THE COUNTRYSIDE

Social injustice, bullying by military or police, and corruption must be seen as grave weaknesses in the defense of a country, errors that can lead to its downfall and eventually, as our friends are eliminated, to the downfall of the United States.

Edward Geary Lansdale\textsuperscript{10}

I believe that government starts at the bottom and moves upward, for government exists for the welfare of the masses of the nation.

Former Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay\textsuperscript{11}

The military successes of the Taliban have been due in large part to a lack of security forces in the Afghan countryside. But the armed element of the insurgency was simply, as author Bernard Fall described it, ‘a tactical appendage of a far vaster political contest
and that, no matter how expertly it is fought by competent and dedicated professionals, it cannot possibly make up for the absence of a political rationale.\textsuperscript{12} The goal of GIRoA and the coalition was to create this counter political rationale for the people. Community support for the Taliban was due not only to coercion by the movement but was also the natural outgrowth of the lack of a viable, positive and enduring government program that secured the loyalty of the people to their government. Because the Afghan Government was so undeveloped in Kabul and many coalition efforts were focused on building central government capacity from the start of the war, local government capabilities were largely non-existent, embryonic or imperfectly mentored. The Taliban took advantage of these weaknesses and stepped into the governance vacuum with their own political program. Additionally, the adoption of a warlord strategy in many parts of the country alienated the population due to their often corrupt and abusive behaviour, and because this was not acted upon by GIRoA or the coalition in a sustained manner, some portions of the population either sided with the Taliban or tolerated their presence.

Beginning in 2007, GIRoA created a directorate focused exclusively on empowering sub-national governance to address these abuses and to build local government capacity. The Independent Directorate of Local Governance, which answers directly to President Karzai’s office, originally evaluated provincial and district officials, removed those who were corrupt, abusive or incompetent, and nominated replacement candidates for these positions. It also focused on incentivising good behaviour through performance funds and training programs. As part of the general effort to expand and improve GIRoA’s presence in the countryside, President Karzai signed a directive in February 2010 giving the Independent Directorate of Local Governance the authority to coordinate the central government’s ministries to provide sustained services through a fully-manned district government. To support this effort, international donors provided additional funding as well as redirected their social service programs to support GIRoA’s efforts. The mechanism through which this was to occur was the District Delivery Program. The program consisted of three funding streams: the first funded the salaries of new and current civil servants as well as the operating costs of their directorates; the second was the coordinated delivery of services through the alignment of existing coalition programs in such things as health and education to empower Afghan civil servants with initiatives focused on the population’s needs; and the third was a mixture of GIRoA and coalition funding, principally through the Commander’s Emergency Relief Program, to build the physical structures to house
government officials and facilitate their work. All of these efforts at the local level were led and coordinated by an Afghan District Chief in partnership with a local representative assembly such as a jirga or shura. Through these combined efforts of enduring local security, the delivery and sustainment of Afghan-led government programs, and good governance focused on community participation, GIRoA sought to create a positive alternative to the Taliban’s shadow government as well as to prevent their armed wing from returning to intimidate or control the population. Additionally, by establishing the government’s sovereignty in the countryside, thus winning the struggle with the insurgents over the political right to lead the population, Afghans saw that their future was with the government and not with whatever the insurgents could offer. The end goal of these efforts is to create a legitimate, capable and effective government that the people of Afghanistan will support that will deny the insurgents support for a shadow government while simultaneously freezing out the armed insurgency’s ability to intimidate the population.

**THE MARJAH CASE STUDY**

*This is first a political war, second a psychological war, and third a military war.*

Lieutenant General Lewis Walt

The area of Marjah in the Helmand Province district of Nad Ali has long been a safe haven for the Taliban insurgency. Its eighty square mile network of villages, canals and farmland served as a crucial base of operations for Taliban forces in the region and a key fundraising area for the insurgency due to its substantial poppy crops. Long neglected by GIRoA and coalition forces, the local population had grown accustomed to Taliban rule and, in many cases, welcomed it due to the abusive and violent behaviour of the previous Provincial Police Chief and the lack of a sustained GIRoA and coalition forces presence. As one local elder put it, ‘[W]e want this [Moshtarak] operation in our area—but do not leave, as you have in other areas, and let the Taliban come back. We want a sound government here. We want the government to pay attention to Marjah.’ Unlike many previous operations in Afghanistan over the last several years, the planned clearing of Marjah also included a sustained security presence as well as a GIRoA-led effort to bring local governance to the population. Following months of planning, NATO forces, GIRoA, and the US and UK embassies had prepared...
a ‘government in waiting’ to immediately make local government a real and vital institution in the community. All that was required was an enduring security presence so that ‘counterinsurgent political teams [were] reasonably well protected, and so that the troops [could] participate in civic action at the lowest level’.

On 13 February 2010, 15,000 coalition forces personnel, including the US Marines, British forces and the ANA, launched Operation MOSHTARAK to take back Marjah from the Taliban. Led by Task Force Helmand and Task Force Leatherneck, NATO forces began a systematic clearing and holding operation against Taliban fighters in the area. As military operations proceeded, diplomats and development specialists in partnership with the Afghan government initiated governance and reconstruction programs to quickly follow clearing operations. On 12 February the Helmand Civil Service Institute opened and began to train civil servants to work at the Nad Ali District Centre. These government workers would be working for Haji Zahir, the newly appointed District Chief who had pledged to provide positive administration for the local population and who had rejected the abusive behaviour of previous officials in the area. On 14 February the Helmand District Development Plan Budget Workshop convened a meeting with Provincial Directors to develop line-item operational budgets for Nad Ali and to determine the capital investments required to deliver packages of services to the area. To assist these GIRoA officials, District Support Teams, supported and manned by US and UK officials, were prepared to move into the Marjah area to continue mentoring these local officials and to provide quick impact projects through USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives. The actions of these teams and local government officials were informed by extensive polling of the population prior to military operations to ‘understand what local residents wanted; how they viewed local security; what they thought of Americans, the Taliban and the foreign jihadists fighting for local control; and what might give them confidence in the central government in Kabul’.

What the coalition forces discovered was that ‘those living in the area still harbor some friendly feelings for the Americans, remember how years ago they built dams in the region, and strongly favor an effort to oust the Taliban’. These results were incorporated into coalition planning and were encouraging to commanders in that the population seemed ready to rid itself of the Taliban and to welcome an Afghan Government presence. While great emphasis was placed on minimising civilian casualties, some isolated incidents did take place but Afghan Interior Minister Atmar emphasised the overall benefits of the operation: ‘We may have lost nine people, but
we managed to liberate thousands of others\textsuperscript{22} and ‘It’s not just a military operation. It is an integrated civilian, military, and development operation.’\textsuperscript{23}

As security conditions improved, the District Chief visited the Marjah area and began to convene shuras with local elders in order to keep them abreast of the latest security initiatives as well as to make sure they understood that the government was going to be staying in Marjah and that it would address the community’s development needs. On 17 February Helmand Province Governor Mangal visited Marjah for the first time to reinforce this message. While GIRoA officials conducted the necessary political work to encourage the population to support the government’s programs, American and British development specialists moved quickly to work with locals and to identify projects that would have an immediate impact. By 21 February they had ‘already … identified 33 potential quick-impact projects to help the local population—including fixing schools and drilling wells—and have received authorisation to spend almost $1 million in military funds on such activities.’\textsuperscript{24} While crucial political and development work was being undertaken, a ‘400 man brigade of specially trained Afghan police accompanied by 80 US Marines established a base in Marjah to continue local security.’\textsuperscript{25} Twelve days after the start of the operation, an Afghan flag was symbolically hoisted over the Marjah area and by 27 February local commanders indicated that Marjah had ‘been cleared.’\textsuperscript{26} Even though clearing operations were largely done by late February and Afghan forces had begun to patrol the area, it is expected that the Taliban will test the new security and governance arrangements. In a cautionary note, US Department of State advisor John Kael Weston stated: ‘Marja will be a test for everyone. It’s a test of the US Government’s ability to help build local government in Afghanistan. It’s a test of the Karzai Government’s [willingness] to be responsive to what its population needs. And it’s a test of whether the Afghan people will take responsibility for their future.’\textsuperscript{27}

**CONCLUSION**

The strategy for the war in Afghanistan has gone through a number of phases reflecting, in part, a shifting of goals for the war and learning on our part but also an adversary that adjusted its behaviour to maximise the few resources it had to seize the opportunities it could. Though the war had long suffered from too few resources, it was the poverty of thinking about the conflict that was the greatest obstacle to victory. Afghanistan lends itself to a certain level of romanticism where advocates of different approaches see the people as either implacable xenophobes hostile to outside powers or a tribal people desiring government by warlord. Other variations of this view include ‘they only understand force’ to ‘these people are religious fanatics’ or, as a colonial British Officer once stated it, ‘they are priest-ridden.’ The strength with which people adhere to these views is often inversely proportional to their direct
and first-hand experience with the Afghan population. Military approaches to the war often suffered from similar shallow thinking where some proponents offered a simplistic solution of pin-point airstrikes, regardless of collateral damage and its potential for blowback, to robust clearing operations without providing a sustained security presence for the population. Other strategists supported a ‘by, with and through’ warlord strategy that purchased security at the expense of justice, galvanising the population to tolerate the Taliban’s presence or, at worst, to embrace it. What was significant about the comprehensive counterinsurgency approach adopted by General McChrystal, Lieutenant General Rodriguez, and Ambassador Eikenberry was that it was informed by each man’s direct, first-hand experience with the Afghan population and seeing the war as it was and not as they would like it to be. It was only through these shared experiences that incomplete, faddish or nonsensical approaches were set aside or subsumed into a holistic approach for success in Afghanistan. The coordinated and synchronised delivery of sustained local security for the population attuned to the needs of the people with robust, Afghan-led good governance, reconstruction and development efforts tied to the central government in the Marjah campaign is the intellectual and operational high-water mark of thinking in the Afghan War. As we continue to implement this strategy in the next few years and security conditions improve to the point that Afghans are better able to govern their country, Afghanistan will no longer be considered the graveyard of empires but will be a frontier of freedom and a bulwark against Islamic Radicalism and its false promise of a better future.

ENDNOTES


2 Ibid.


5 Though this increase has generally been beneficial, its overall effects have not been as great as anticipated due to a number of challenges with the uplift.

6 Ibid., p. 64.


Defeating the Taliban’s Shadow Government

11 Former Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay, Ramon Magsaysay Award Foundation website <http://www.rmaf.org.ph/>.
17 Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, p. 78
18 US Department of State field reporting, 13 February 2010.
19 Ibid., 14 February 2010.
21 Ibid.
22 CNN Interview, 15 February 2010.
23 Ibid.
27 Chandrasekaran, ‘As Marja Assault Progresses, Coalition Considers Challenges in Rebuilding Area’.

The Author

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AFGHANISTAN

THE COIN ENVIRONMENT

THE INTEGRATION AND EXECUTION OF LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL EFFECTS AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL – PLATOON TEAM LESSONS FROM MRTF-2 IN AFGHANISTAN

CAPTAIN MATT PROUD

ABSTRACT

This article examines the key role that junior commanders and their soldiers must play in the execution of force concepts necessitated by the emergence of modern counterinsurgency warfare. Now more than ever, platoon teams and sections have the moral, legal and strategic imperative to analyse and apply force concepts at a rate and magnitude equal to, if not in excess of, their higher command. This article discusses approaches to this increased pressure by drawing on experiences from platoon teams operating as part of Combat Team A (CT-A), Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force 2 (MRTF-2), in Afghanistan from June 2009 to February 2010.
Afghanistan

CAPTAIN MATT PROUD

INTRODUCTION

- **Lesson 1:** Junior commanders now have an operational responsibility far in excess of that for which they traditionally train.

It is important to recognise initially that the operational scenario experienced during the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force 2’s (MRTF-2) tour is likely to be markedly different to that experienced by more recent rotations. Force construct and mission profile have evolved in response to the challenges and successes that previous forces, including MRTF-2, have experienced while operating in Afghanistan. As such, the purpose of this article is not to discuss the merits of MRTF-2’s particular tactical actions and environment, but rather use it as a medium to aid in explaining the shift of operational responsibility and approaches experienced by junior commanders and their soldiers.

The first imperative of this article is to accurately describe the disconnect between accepted understandings of lethal and non-lethal effects, and the reality of applied force concepts in a tactical counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Lethal and non-lethal force is often interpreted in terms of the kinetic effect that a soldier can impart onto an adversary. To the average soldier graduating from Initial Employment Training, the distinction between lethal and non-lethal is normally in the type of weapon system used to impart force, rather than the distinction between the kinetic and non-kinetic means of creating it.

So far as can be identified, nowhere in Army doctrine does it provide a clear definition of ‘Force’, despite it being used in various contexts. For the purposes of this article ‘Force’ is defined as:

The physical or non-physical means of exerting influence over a person, group or situation, which is contrary to the natural or intended state of that entity.

The integration of lethal and non-lethal concepts is often considered to be the domain of higher level tactical and operational planners. Indeed, Platoon Commanders are often not expected, trusted or trained to implement their own non-lethal targeting concepts while conducting tactical training within Australia. It is evident, however, based on recent operational experience, that it is the most junior of commanders that possess the actual agility and available assets to be able to accurately and sufficiently devise, integrate and execute these effects at the tactical level.

SETTING THE SCENE

As part of Operation PELATEL MANA in the Mirabad Valley between 1–29 January 2010, 2 and 3 Platoon, CT-A were tasked with occupying platoon houses within the
green zone for a period of approximately three weeks. One of these houses was pre-existing, while the other had to be established from scratch. The platoons were given areas of operation of approximately five by three kilometres to dominate, each with a local population base of about 4000 people. The primary focus of this portion of the operation was to deny the enemy freedom of action within the area, disrupt enemy caches, conduct reconnaissance for engineer works, and to catalogue and earn goodwill with the local population.

For a number of reasons, patrol strength during this time was normally limited to section team size (nine to fifteen people). Of note is that these patrols were largely un-partnered; often conducted solely by Australian forces with limited interpreter support. The patrol program was aimed at saturating the area and saw patrols on the ground for a combined period of six to twelve hours every day, by day and night. Due to the COIN nature of the conflict, the patrol program was very much intelligence driven and would often be amended at extremely short notice due to the information obtained by innovative and talented junior commanders and soldiers.

During this period junior leaders were forced to develop a rapid understanding of non-lethal effects as a means of positively influencing the local population. This proved initially difficult as the locals were extremely weary of International Security Assistance Forces due to Taliban intimidation and their infrequent contact with foreigners. Both 2 and 3 Platoon had to balance this non-lethal approach with the need to maintain the poise and mentality to be able to effectively employ lethal effects as the situation arose.

**STAGES OF COIN AND APPROACHES**

- **Lesson 2:** Junior commanders must understand the four stages of the Australian COIN approach and their place in it.
- **Lesson 3:** Each neighbouring cultural and geographical area can exist in separate stages of COIN independently of one another.
- **Lesson 4:** Each stage of the COIN battle requires different levels of kinetic posture.

In order to explain the junior command approaches used during MRTF-2’s tour, the Australian approach to COIN as detailed in LWD 3.0.1 *Counterinsurgency* must be understood. In conjunction with many of our coalition partners, Australia’s four-stage approach is: shape, clear, hold and build. The ‘shaping’ phase is primarily a strategic
action which tactical forces need to understand in terms of presenting a united narrative and maximising effect.

The ‘clear’ stage is far more relevant to the scope of this article and involves clearing the area of operations of insurgents. It is primarily kinetic in nature. This stage is important because without security established, the population is not in a position to be decisively and positively influenced. What is not understood well by junior commanders is that the main effort for this stage of COIN, as it is with all other stages, is still the population. Far too often, and as a result of a focus on kinetic training, junior commanders are not attuned to the fact that an adversary can sometimes be cleared without kinetic force, and therefore with less risk to the population.

The next stage of COIN is ‘hold’. This is possibly the hardest to define as it can encompass elements of both the clear and build stages concurrently. It involves the maintenance of security by continuing to clear insurgent threat as it eventuates, and by winning the population through building efforts. The focus for this stage begins to shift from kinetic to non-kinetic action, and towards influencing and understanding the population.

The final stage is ‘build’ and includes the establishment of basic services, but more importantly, the establishment/re-establishment of local law and order. Primacy in this phase begins to shift to supporting indigenous forces that have normally been trained and mentored through the hold phase. The build phase is the indigenous forces’ chance to affirm their ability and build support from the local people prior to the withdrawal of occupying forces.

It is important to understand that the stages of COIN are fluid and an area can rapidly transition from one to the other. This transition can often occur independently from other neighbouring areas where one can be in the clear phase while the other is transiting through the hold phase. The implication of this is that tactics and approaches need to be tailored for each area and/or ethnic group based on a thorough appreciation of local factors by tactical commanders.

Each stage of the COIN battle requires different levels of kinetic posture, and commanders must be able to adjust this rapidly as their efforts start to take effect. Arguably, the more successful a commander is in progressing their region through the stages of COIN, the less kinetic their approach must become. This is not to say that they should not be prepared for the area to decline rapidly back along the COIN spectrum, but they should be aiming to work themselves out of a job as quickly as possible.
DEFINING A TACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

- **Lesson 5:** When defining boundaries in a COIN environment the first consideration should always be to the population, followed then by capability and terrain.
- **Lesson 6:** Cultural and political information is best gathered through a non-lethal approach. This information is mission critical.

Nowhere is the considered and accurate allocation of tactical boundaries more important than in the COIN environment. Traditionally, tactical boundaries are assigned from an appreciation of functional capabilities of our own forces, or due to geographical convenience of an area. Indeed, during most military appreciation processes the battlespace is normally defined geographically as a precursor to the area than being dissected and analysed for stakeholder influence.

While own force capability and geography are important considerations, in a COIN environment boundaries formed from these considerations alone will often not correspond to the tactical and cultural reality of the forces on the ground. It is suggested that in the COIN environment, the first consideration should be to the main effort (the population). Once this is achieved, areas of operation and tactical areas of responsibility should then be allocated with further consideration to other influences such as capability and geography. This should occur at all levels of command.

During Operation PELATEL MANA there were a number of platoon team, combat team and even coalition boundaries within a valley area of approximately 10 to 15 kilometres. It was soon established by the sections and platoons operating within this area that these boundaries did not correspond to the cultural and political boundaries as understood by the local population, despite best guesses during the planning process.

In one example, a key leader from a particular village resided approximately 80 metres over a combat team boundary from the platoon that was tasked with that village’s security. This created a deconfliction dilemma for junior commanders as they tried to build rapport and act on short notice information and intelligence, while at the same time contending for battlespace with an adjacent combat team. This issue would have been further compounded had the adjacent organisation been from a coalition country and without compatible communications systems.

This example highlights the importance of integrated and thorough intelligence planning pre H-hour in order to better define these cultural boundaries. Indeed this
is not always possible, especially when the area of operations is relatively unknown to the force. In this situation, the need for flexibility, a bias for cultural understanding, and rapid and effective population mapping by ground forces post H-hour, is necessary to be able to rapidly realign control measures to support the mission.

All of these intelligence needs are best gathered through effective use of non-lethal force rather than lethal. Without the junior commander having a thorough understanding of their importance as a sensor and without employing effective non-lethal force and tactics to the population, the information junior commanders require will likely not be forthcoming. The likelihood of extracting cultural information from a population under duress is relatively low. Even less likely is that the information obtained will be accurate or given in full. In this regard it is important to remember that it is not only the enemy that can scare and intimidate the population, but us as well.

INTEGRATION OF STAKEHOLDERS

- **Lesson 7:** Junior commanders must learn to coordinate kinetic and non-kinetic effects from all sources and agencies to be successful.
- **Lesson 8:** A balance must be reached between the amount of non-kinetic force used, and maintaining an appropriate kinetic posture to ensure security.

Tactical level ground forces are only one of the many very important sensors. Junior commanders must understand the need to coordinate kinetic and non-kinetic effects from all sources and agencies to ensure maximum effect is achieved.

This concept is again one which would traditionally be expected to occur at higher headquarters. However, in a complex COIN environment where patrols have regular contact with and are often supported by other nation’s armed forces, government agencies, non-governmental organisations, contractors and indigenous forces, it is the patrol commander on the ground that will often discover he has the opportunity and requirement to incorporate these assets into his force concepts in order to best support the mission.

During Operation PELATEL MANA, platoon houses were often bolstered by a number of battlegroup and theatre assets including: Explosive Ordinance Disposal, Light Electronic Warfare teams, Human Intelligence teams, Psychological Operations detachments, interpreters and
Engineering Reconnaissance teams. Support to operations included coalition air and vehicles, as well as Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams from various nations, with their associated Afghan Security Forces. In similar operations, additions might also include media and a number of governments and non-governmental agencies.

These assets were normally allocated to the platoon house commander under a Tactical Control arrangement. This junior commander was then responsible for using and coordinating them on a daily basis to achieve higher commander’s intent, while tailoring their efforts to support the geographical and cultural nuances of his particular tactical area of responsibility. In addition to this, the commander was constantly receiving intelligence feeds from both up and down the chain of command, with most originating from the population itself.

In this scenario the junior commanders entrusted with these assets were expected to devise and then execute their own kinetic and non-kinetic force concepts based on their appreciation of the battlespace and understanding of the COIN approach.

Without a sound understanding of COIN warfare, the battlespace and the capabilities of the assets themselves, the concepts would be ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. The commander needs to reach a balance between the amount of non-kinetic focus needed to best support the mission, while still maintaining an appropriate kinetic posture in order to ensure security. This is a difficult task for relatively untrained and inexperienced junior commanders without the luxury of a specialised planning staff.

UNDERSTANDING NON-KINETIC FORCE

- **Lesson 9:** In a COIN environment where the population is the main effort, do not always expect a tangible result for your successes.
- **Lesson 10:** Non-kinetic action is tiresome and requires weeks, months and normally years of persistent effort. This does not fit in well with our training and operational cycle.

It is fair to say that soldiers train hard at and have a good understanding of the lethal force concept; to do otherwise could have disastrous results in combat. Lethal force is but one aspect of kinetic force and relates to that which has the potential to kill. Forced entry for search purposes and detention of suspects are other examples of kinetic force that are not traditionally lethal in nature but may produce unexpected consequences.

Non-kinetic force is a relatively new concept that has little attention in doctrine; particularly that doctrine relating to the employment of ground forces such as
Infantry, Armour and Engineers. It is understood that it was December 2008 before LWD 3.3.7 Employment of Infantry doctrine was amended to include mention of non-lethal and non-kinetic force:

LWD 3.3.7. Paragraph 1.10: Influence. The battle for the hearts and minds of domestic and international audiences is a decisive element of warfare. Infantry, working among the people, is uniquely placed to influence perceptions through respect for the people, adherence to the laws of armed conflict and the sparing use of force (lethal and nonlethal, kinetic and non-kinetic) with the greatest possible discrimination. Australian infantry soldiers have an enviable reputation for winning the hearts of indigenous populations.

Currently, Army has in draft form LWP-G 3-8-3 Non-lethal Capabilities, which should shed more light on the subject once it becomes available. Given the current lack of writing on the topic it is not surprising that many inexperienced junior commanders have almost no understanding of methods available to impart non-kinetic force in support of a COIN campaign.

In the military, our training is normally geared toward achieving a tangible objective, or by gaining a tangible result such as ‘taking that hill’ or ‘refuelling that many aircraft’. Naturally, it is reasonable for a junior commander on operations to expect a tangible outcome from their missions as this is the way we have trained. Unfortunately, in a COIN environment where the people are the objective, and our effort is broken down into multiple lines of operation, this is rarely the case. Many of these lines of operation are intangible in nature, and those that do have a tangible aspect often take far longer than the six to eight months of an operational rotation to achieve.

Commanders must understand that COIN warfare occurs in regions that have experienced, almost exclusively, long term periods of instability and violence. Kinetic action is swift and violent and aimed at a gaining a tangible resolution to an adverse situation over a finite period of time. Non-kinetic action is tiresome and requires weeks, months and normally years of persistent effort in order to be effective. Patience is not something that most naturally possess, at least not in the quantities required to achieve success in COIN. The rotation of forces in and out of country, while a necessary burden, does not lend itself well to continuity in the COIN environment.

As we know COIN is broadly about shaping perceptions and winning over population. Perception is never positively influenced by violence; however, violence must be used as a means to protect that which you seek to influence. Therefore, how do you balance the approach and what actions can a junior commander take?
NON-kinetic effects on patrol

- Lesson 11: Junior commanders need to understand how to exploit ‘surfaces and gaps’ both for kinetic and non-kinetic action.
- Lesson 12: Quick Impact Projects are a highly effective non-kinetic approach.

Quick Impact Projects: It is important to stress the need for junior leaders and soldiers to develop their understanding of ‘surfaces and gaps’ as it applies to the non-kinetic piece. Certainly in Afghanistan it was found that the average local farmer did not care about the big ticket items as much as the decision-makers in Tarin Kot did. To them the fixing of a foot bridge between their home and their corn field held far more importance than who was going to be elected in the upcoming election.

This is because these communities are survivalist in nature with a very strong sense of family and community. Unless an issue has direct benefits to their community, a local population may not see the point in worrying about it. What these people do value is tangible deliverables that have an immediate effect on their everyday life. Such projects are termed Quick Impact Projects.

These Quick Impact Projects are ‘gaps’ to the junior commander as they gain good faith and trust, require little work, need almost no resources and can be achieved in a short period of time. The larger projects such as a medical clinic are ‘surfaces’; these traditionally require many resources, numerous hours discussing plans with local government and stakeholders, and huge amounts of time and effort to complete. Many never eventuate, because by the time the plans are finalised the tactical situation has changed and priorities have moved on. The end result is often distrust for coalition forces.

Junior commanders need to embrace these gaps by exploiting them as they become evident. An example of an effective Quick Impact Project from Operation PELATEL MANA was the assistance given by a patrol to a local family in forging a path in the side of a mountain. This path would lead from their home to their grazing pasture and would allow the family to take feed to their flock by wheelbarrow, thereby making everyday life easier.

While this was certainly not an arduous task, the junior commander was able to recognise and exploit this opportunity by returning 30 minutes later with some picks and shovels and simply assisting the family to dig. The entire path was finished inside three hours, but the goodwill that was earned lasted indefinitely. This family
was later able to provide some valuable information that assisted in the arrest of two suspected insurgent bomb makers/weapon couriers. The lesson is that if the patrols focus had only been on the ‘big ticket’ items, which at the time was the construction of a large foot bridge over the Tiri River, then opportunities such as this path would have been overlooked.

To illustrate further the effect that exploiting these gaps can have, it was discovered through analysis that over the period of the three-week operation, the rate of small arms and improvised explosive device attack in the area decreased dramatically. It is the author’s opinion that this was as a direct result of the non-kinetic efforts taken by junior commanders who understood the importance of the non-kinetic approach.

- **Lesson 13:** People need to be engaged and local leaders need to be allowed to be leaders.
- **Lesson 14:** Local leaders can set the foundation for lucrative, effortless and permissive search.
- **Lesson 15:** Within the rules of Operation Secrecy always be honest and put energy behind your promises.

**Key Leadership Engagement:** Quick Impact Projects on their own are not enough to change the battlespace and influence the population. Another important aspect which is common in training is Key Leadership Engagement. The trouble with Key Leadership Engagement in a COIN environment, particularly Afghanistan, is that key leaders often have their own unique agendas that may not reflect the ‘good of the people’. This is not to say that these leaders should not be engaged, but what is gained from them should be considered with some degree of scepticism.

The second consideration with Key Leadership Engagement in the COIN environment is that key leaders are only a small percentage of the population. Ground forces need to engage with all people in order to best gauge atmospherics and give the best chance for diverse information collection. The difficulty remains in balancing this with the need to allow the local leaders to be leaders. Undermining the hierarchal system will automatically destroy any good faith gained and potentially cause new issues of its own.

The third consideration is that leaders exist in a variety of circles. In Afghanistan the village leader and religious leader are normally one and the same. When this is
not the case the junior commander needs to invest energy into discovering the local political and power system. For example, a leader within the Mirabad area was a local doctor. He was openly subservient to the village chief but behind closed doors he held substantial influence.

The doctor’s power was that far reaching that he had written permission from Taliban upper echelons in Pakistan to administer polio immunisation injections to infants, despite this being largely against accepted Taliban beliefs. Such was his importance with the people of the area that even the Taliban had to concede to some of his requests, rather than risk alienating themselves from the main effort.

Local leaders can also help with setting the conditions for permissive search and clearance of the area. We found throughout the tour that many people who were not insurgents either knew of buried insurgent caches, or had buried themselves during the Soviet occupation. What was universally true was that these people did not want to be found with these goods as they risked being arrested and handed over to local law enforcement whom at the time, they did not trust.

What junior leaders were able to achieve in the Mirabad Valley was the explanation to local leaders that there would be an amnesty period; locals would be encouraged to bring any contraband items to the platoon houses, or alternatively when forces turned up to search their property the locals should instantly direct them to the location of any contraband items.

The effect of this approach was that local leaders were able to influence their own people, many items were recovered without any effort on our part, and many people who were likely not insurgents were not detained unnecessarily. The local population saw us as a fair and considered force rather than occupiers who would imprison innocent family members. The good will gained from this approach again helped to endear us to the people, and as a result the provision of information of tactical value increased. The approach was also beneficial in increasing our legitimacy to detain anyone who was found with prohibited and undeclared items. It provided less chance of local backlash as all had been warned.

The final consideration is the truthful, timely and frank explanation of purpose and mission. Communities operate much like a schoolyard; once a rumour starts it is hard to stop. This can be debilitating if it is not the truth.
Lesson 16: Dominate the terrain. Be seen or be known.

Presence: Another method to exert non-kinetic influence is simply by providing a presence. Insurgents operate at all times of day and night; therefore so must we. Despite it being often dangerous and uncomfortable, it is necessary for patrols to operate regardless of weather, season and terrain. During Operation PELATEL MANA normally three patrols of two to four-hour durations were planned each day. At least one of these was at night to demonstrate that we dominated the terrain. This concept is not foreign to any junior commander, but what was difficult to grasp was why we were doing so when there was no evidence of recent insurgent activity at night.

The answer to the above question was that, ‘just because it’s not happening doesn’t mean it won’t’, and ‘perhaps that’s because we are preventing their activity by continuing to dominate the night’. Regardless, the importance of ‘saturation’ is obvious, despite how uncomfortable it can be in the middle of an Afghani winter.

In addition to maximising time on the ground, patrols should be as small as tactically possible. This affords those not on patrol more rest, gives the commander more flexibility in event of an incident, can increase net effort over time, and most importantly demonstrates to the people confidence in the patrol’s ability and in the security it has created to operate in those smaller numbers. This confidence, whether it is real or just a portrayal, is infectious and the population will follow suit.

The final consideration is that in order for presence to be effective, the population needs to know about it. During those periods where there is no activity, such as night-time in winter, there are non-kinetic methods available to display presence. The method of choice during Operation PELATEL MANA was leaflet drops. By night patrols would stop by all mosques on their patrol route and leave behind information pamphlets explaining aspects of coalition of Afghan force involvement in their area. This let the population know when they got up in the morning that Australians were out making them safe.

ADVERSE EFFECTS OF LETHAL AND KINETIC FORCE

Lesson 17: Soldiers must ask the ‘right’ question, ‘Do I need to shoot?’ not ‘Can I shoot?’

Lesson 18: Applying the ‘right’ question is not a ‘softening’ of approach but rather a refining of it.

The ‘Right’ Question: At this point it is pertinent to restate the importance of lethal and kinetic force throughout all stages of the COIN battle. While this article is aimed more at the non-kinetic piece, without appropriate kinetic poise, posture and potential,
a force cannot maintain the security necessary to influence the main effort within the COIN environment. All soldiers should be trained and ready to impart up to and including lethal force on an adversary, but they should be able to do so after giving strong consideration to alternatives and the consequences. After all, Key Leadership Engagement that comes under fire will suffer more from a lack of coalition response than it will from an excessive one.

With that in mind it is important to understand ‘the question’. When confronted with a violent, uncertain or threatening situation, a soldier must make a choice as to what response they should deliver. Often at a tactical level a soldier will ask the question, ‘Can I shoot?’ Invariably the answer will be ‘yes’, given current rules of engagement in our present COIN environments. The generally accepted line being that if you feel your life is in danger you may defend it.

In the COIN environment this is the wrong question to ask. Rather, soldiers should be asking the question, ‘Do I need to shoot?’ It is imperative that junior commanders enforce this mentality on their soldiers, as the one who asks the wrong question can undermine an entire operation in an instant.

While conducting operations in the Miribad Valley it was identified that a common enemy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) was developing: bolt action rifles were being used to snipe at Australian platoon houses and other static positions from concealed and complex terrain. The fire from these rifles was reliably inaccurate and would range from distances as close as 100 to 200 metres, but more often than not it was from well beyond 600 metres. This action became a subset of the classic insurgent ‘shoot and scoot’ TTP and the primary insurgent culprit was quickly nicknamed ‘the Jackal’. This tactic was preferred by the insurgents because they were more than aware of their inability to compete with us kinetically, and it allowed them to avoid becoming decisively engaged.

Due to the nature of the enemy’s TTP and the complex terrain of the Mirabad valley, it was often extremely difficult to apply accurate fire. Whereby in the conventional battlefield it would be tactically sound to suppress the likely firing points and attempt to manoeuvre. In Afghanistan, it paid to consider the residual effects of engaging the enemy back.

In this situation junior commanders need to make an appropriate risk analysis. A comparative analysis is needed to identify a balance of risk for what their action (or inaction) may cause to coalition forces, the enemy, the physical and human environment, and the likely effect on both the immediate and COIN mission. As an example:
An insurgent engages a platoon house over a distance of 800 metres. The fire is ineffective, the piquet positions are unable to locate the exact firing point of the enemy and all platoon members are safely behind cover. The commander asks himself ‘do we need to shoot?’ Because the enemy fire is not effective, and due to the inability of the platoon to respond rapidly through complex terrain in order to clear a suspected area, it is decided that returning fire is not likely to achieve anything except potential collateral damage. Instead the commander chooses to use an unmanned aerial vehicle to fly over the suspect area to try and get eyes on the enemy as he concurrently launches a patrol to clear the area and reinforce local security, without the use of fire support.

Had the commander asked the wrong question in this scenario, he may have given the order for the piquets to suppress the area while he conducted a quick attack. As was experienced in Mirabad, it is very unlikely that a shooter would be found amongst the complex terrain without local assistance. This aggressive and highly kinetic manoeuvre while addressing the short term risk to the platoon house could potentially undermine the larger COIN mission.

By asking the wrong question, and by not measuring a kinetic response to the situation, a friendly force might assist the insurgents in achieving their mission of undermining coalition security without the enemy even having to inflict a casualty. By not conducting an appropriate risk analysis, by committing to substantial kinetic action and by doing so without killing or capturing any insurgents, the reacting force has reinforced to the population that security does not exist and that they are not in full control. The net loss is a heightened sense of local fear.

Ultimately this is not a debate about whether force protection measures should be reduced to protect Afghanis at the expense of our own soldiers, but rather a call for increased awareness by junior commanders to find a way to add flexibility into their plan, to consider the use of all available assets, and to consider the protection of locals as well as their own soldiers. When asking the right question a soldier is still left with a lethal option should he require it, but the approach is more attuned to the consequences. Being able to apply ‘the right question’ to each step of our operations, and at all levels, is not a ‘softening’ of approach but rather a refining of it.

Lesson 19: Place yourself in the shoes of those you mean to influence.

Due to the nature of the enemy’s TTP and the complex terrain of the Mirabad valley, it was often extremely difficult to apply accurate fire.
Search and detention: Non-permissive searches and detention are also examples of kinetic force. While it may produce tangible short term results, unnecessary and fruitless searches in particular can leave a lasting negative effect that may need to be considered. Commanders would often do well to envisage themselves in the shoes of those they mean to influence. Few of us would warm to the thought of a foreign military breaking down our door, tearing our home apart and physically intimidating our children.

However, at times, particularly during the ‘clear’ stage of COIN, non-permissive search and detention are necessary. If there is a need for this to occur, the general rules of search applicable to that theatre should apply, but in addition tactical commanders should take every effort to explain to the affected families and communities the reasons why it was conducted. They should also limit the amount of damage they do to buildings and limit the degree of physical force they project and impart. The principle of proportionality does not just apply to lethal force.

Lesson 20: Soldiers are emotional beings. People may be injured and killed. Commanders must empathise with soldiers while being attuned to the danger emotions can have to the mission.

Taking Casualties: Despite preparation and training, soldiers are still emotional beings. Fear is a natural and powerful emotion in war and one which can rapidly lead to a thirst for revenge should one of the team be wounded or killed. The desire for revenge cannot be underestimated, nor can the damage this emotion can create to any good work done during the COIN battle.

Junior Commanders must be attuned to the emotional effect taking casualties can have on soldiers, and be able to remind them that despite gut feeling, adjusting their approach is not the answer. While TTPs may need to be amended to ensure a similar incident does not occur, the force concepts behind those TTP should remain constant.

Following a suicide bombing incident in August 2009, it was found that there was a period where soldiers ceased to interact with the population due to fear of a repeat incident. In the week or so following the incident soldiers started to view all locals as the enemy and as such succeeded in alienating themselves from the population. Additionally, the need for revenge led them to become far more aggressive toward the people. It was not for some time that the attitude adjusted, the correct COIN approach was readopted, and the people re-engaged.

The principle of proportionality does not just apply to lethal force.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this article has discussed the modern realisation that tactical forces and junior commanders have a moral, legal and strategic responsibility within the COIN environment, far in excess of that for which they traditionally train. The article has discussed the Australian approach to COIN and how force concepts and tactical approaches must vary to conform to all aspects of the battlespace.

The COIN battle is a complicated and time intensive pursuit. It requires persistent application of force in order to understand, and subsequently win the support of the local population. The article does not advocate a ‘soft’ stance by coalition forces, nor does it describe the need to treat all people without suspicion. It does, however, preach the need to consider the methods and durations that a commander applies force in order to best support the mission.

Operation PELATEL MANA was used to give substance and background to the concepts discussed and to the lessons learned. Importantly, the approaches taken during different stages of the COIN spectrum were discussed in the context of their independent cultural and geographical boundaries. The importance of accurately allocating these tactical boundaries was stressed in terms of thorough pre and post H-hour assessment and information gathering.

The article discussed the importance of integrating lethal and non-lethal effects from all sources and agencies to ensure maximum effect is achieved. This responsibility is increasingly falling to the junior commander who is necessarily entrusted with the tactical command of a variety of complimentary kinetic and non-kinetic assets.

While the examples cited are drawn from operations that were largely un-partnered in nature, the concepts illustrated are just as important for those commanders currently executing mentoring operations. By understanding COIN, non-kinetic surfaces and gaps, and by exploiting them through the use of both kinetic and non-kinetic methods and approaches, it is hoped that future junior commanders can learn from and build on the lessons learned by MRTF-2 in the Mirabad Valley.

THE AUTHOR

Captain Matt Proud enlisted into the Army in January 2003. In 2004 he attended the Australian Defence Force Academy and was awarded a Bachelor of Arts (Management and Geography) in 2006. Upon graduation from the Royal Military College – Duntroon in 2007 he was posted to the 1st Battalion the Royal Australian Regiment and was deployed to Afghanistan with Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force – 2. He is currently the Second in Command of the South Queensland Wing of the Warrant Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Academy and is studying a Masters of Business.
ORGANISATIONAL IMPROVEMENT

GETTING THE BALANCE RIGHT

THE AUSTRALIAN COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AND THE PART-TIME OPTION

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SEAN L’ESTRANGE

ABSTRACT

This article identifies the opportunity, if not the necessity, for the Australian Defence College to offer a larger pool of mid-ranking Army officers a mission-focused part-time ACSC program. To do this the article will assesses one of the current part-time ACSC options, the Army Reserve ACSC course (ACSC(R)), against its ability to build and develop the skills required of a mid-ranking ‘mission-focused’ officer. This analysis is Army focused; however, the concepts are applicable to a tri-service approach. This article will dispute the notion that all officers who complete ACSC should receive an education in itself. It will argue that, to increase Army’s pool of highly competent professionals beyond what is already achieved through the full-time ACSC(J) course, the Australian Defence College should open its doors to a separate group of mid-ranking officers (Regular and Reserve).
The key requirement for meeting the wide and essentially unpredictable range of contingencies that could arise is a substantial pool of highly competent professionals—especially at the mid-levels of the Defence Force.

– Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force

INTRODUCTION

In 2009 the Australian Department of Defence released ‘The Strategic Reform Program (SRP) 2009 – Delivering Force 2030’. This reform aims to ‘comprehensively and fundamentally improve the supporting “backbone” of Defence, making the organisation more efficient and effective, and creating significant savings to reinvest in building a stronger Defence Force’. Linked to SRP goals, there is an opportunity to improve and strengthen the professional cohort of mid-ranking Army officers (major–lieutenant colonel equivalent) in the Australian Defence Force (ADF). By recognising, for example, that only a small proportion (8%) of mid-ranking Army officers can be selected, or are available, to attend and subsequently graduate from the Joint Australian Command and Staff College (ACSC(J)) each year, this leaves a pool of mid-ranking officers untrained in the higher order staff and command skill sets. Further, Army currently fills fifty to sixty Passed Staff Course (psc) major positions from non-qualified psc majors. Opportunities can therefore be developed from the existing part-time ACSC course to increase the vocational education for mid-ranking officers throughout the Army, address the shortfall in psc mid-ranking officers, and in so doing build a more skilled defence force.

A 2005 Defence inquiry into the Australian Defence Force Learning Culture judged that the ADF is not a best-practice learning organisation at this stage, and that there is considerable room for improvement in investment in staff training and engagement. Further analysis by Dr Nick Jans identified that ‘perhaps no better example of this exist[ed] than the situation at the Australian Defence College (ADC) at Weston Creek where, in an institution with the potential—if not the imperative—to be at the heart of ADF intellectual capability, the major courses [continued to be] run in accordance with an old-fashioned management/leadership paradigm focused too much on what is often essentially “training” rather than “education”’. Jans went on to argue that the Directing Staff were ‘essentially generalists, chosen on the basis of
Getting the Balance Right

their operational experience and leadership’ and that while there are ‘obvious advantages in having staff with such qualities, this practice constrains their ability and opportunity to develop learning programs in which course members can be guided to make connections between professional activities and related disciplines such as law, politics, psychology, sociology, civil-military relations, and the like’; and that ‘all of this limits the ADF’s capacity to make intellectual capital a genuine element of capability’. Since 2005 the ADC enhanced its ACSC(J) program, including the introduction of the University of New South Wales as a key education provider (in 2006), in order to address the above concerns. However, Jans’ earlier analysis did not take into account the educational and professional pedigree of the mid-ranking Army officers who have either worked in civilian professions and/or acquired degrees and post graduate degrees from civilian-led universities. These officers could already demonstrate success with regards to the above mentioned ‘connections’. While the Joint Australian Command and Staff College (ACSC(J)) works hard to provide its officers with an education, the so called ‘old-fashioned management/leadership paradigm which focused too much on what is often essentially “training” rather than “education” is arguably a better fit for a separate group of mid-ranking Army officer’s development requirements. For carefully selected officers an abridged part-time program may prove to be a highly appropriate Staff Course option. An existing part-time ACSC program, delivered to mid-ranking Army Reserve (ARES) officers (ACSC(R)), aims to satisfy what CDF (Air Chief Marshal Houston) seeks through the SRP in building a ‘Reserve force that is more mission focused’. Mission focus transcends the Army and, in the context of vocational Staff Course training, needs to remain at the forefront of all mid-ranking officers’ military education. What is therefore required is an alternative, mission-focused part-time staff training option for the mid-ranking officer (Regular and Reserve) who may not be eligible to attend the twelve-month full-time ACSC(J) course.

This article identifies the opportunity, if not the necessity, for the Australian Defence College to offer a larger pool of mid-ranking Army officers a mission-focused part-time ACSC program. To do this the paper will assesses one of the current part-time ACSC options, the Army Reserve ACSC course (ACSC(R)), against its ability to build and develop the skills required of a mid-ranking ‘mission-focused’ officer. This analysis is Army focused; however, the concepts are applicable to a tri-service approach. This article will dispute the notion that all officers who complete ACSC should receive an education in itself. It will argue that to increase Army’s pool of highly competent
professionals, beyond what is already achieved through the full-time ACSC(J) course, the ADC should open its doors to a separate group of mid-ranking officers. These officers would be drawn from across both the Regular and Reserve force spectrum and they would be offered a part-time ACSC alternative to ACSC(J). This alternative would not aim to replicate the ACSC(J) course but instead focus on professionally developing higher-order vocational military command and staff skills with an ‘increased emphasis on active skills development rather than passive knowledge acquisition’ while simultaneously providing scope to draw on the officer’s existential connections between their formal education and professional activities.

**PART-TIME ACSC AND THE SKILLS REQUIRED OF THE MID RANKING OFFICER – LOOKING AT THE ACSC(R) EXAMPLE**

If the mid-ranking Regular or Reserve officer is not selected, or available, to complete the twelve-month full-time ACSC(J) course and a part-time option is desired, this means the time available for an officer to build higher order command and staff competencies, and to maintain proficiency in the application of these competencies, must be balanced against his/her full-time occupational commitments. With regards to the ACSC(R) example, in preparing for operations, the mid-ranking ARES officer must be trained to acquire the same competencies for the job to be performed as their Regular counterpart. The end-state must be for the mid-ranking psc officer to possess the ‘knowledge skills and attitudes required for success on operations’. The current ACSC(R) course is a key enabler in preparing the mid-ranking ARES psc officer for the types of roles and responsibilities they are expected to perform. With regards to operations these roles and responsibilities vary from Task Force command through to staff officer positions on a Task Force headquarters. Common to all roles is the requirement for officers to operate in either a tri-service and/or multi-agency headquarters.

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Common to all roles is the requirement for officers to perform the duties of a Grade One staff officer in a headquarters to include application of the Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP), analysis of information, prioritisation of work, directing and monitoring subordinates, written and oral communications, planning and conduct of training, and provision of general and corps specific advice to superiors;
c. Maintain currency of policy and doctrine in order to advise, plan, implement and assess training, optimising the use of technology and resources; and
d. Maintain expert knowledge of his/her parent corps doctrine and be able to provide advice to commanders and other staff officers on the effect of corps related matters.

It is anticipated that, for the future employment of all mid-ranking psc officers, the above listed roles and employment functions will remain an important subset. The imperative is that the mid-ranking psc officer is prepared so that they are competent, proficient and available to fill key psc positions including those mission-focused roles and responsibilities that are much needed for operations.

LOOKING AT THE CURRENT PART-TIME ACSC(R) PROGRAM – DOES IT MEET ‘MISSION FOCUS’?

The current part-time ACSC(R) course is broken down into three modularised blocks and delivered over twelve months. Course members complete the program via distance learning packages and by attending three residential training blocks of between one to two weeks’ duration. The combined total of training days allocated to complete the ACSC(R) course equates to eighty-one days. All three modules are designed for graduates to be able to effectively fulfil command and staff appointments at the lieutenant colonel level in single service, joint and integrated units and headquarters. A brief synopsis of the part-time ACSC(R) program is provided below:

- Foundation Studies: The aim is to introduce course members to the essential elements of Critical Thinking, Communication and Strategic Studies.
- Land Operations: The aim is to exercise and consolidate course members’ ability to contribute to the planning and synchronisation of land operations.
- Command Leadership and Training: The aim is to examine a range of issues relating to the exercise of command and leadership and the delivery of training.

The learning outcomes achieved through the above ACSC(R) learning modules more-or-less mirror the ‘Foundation Studies’ and the ‘Land’ (Army single service) competencies delivered on the full-time ACSC(J) course. The litmus test for assessing the mission focus success of a part-time ACSC program can be found in the willingness for One and Two Star commanders across Army to seek out and employ part-time ACSC course graduates into key command and staff roles. With regard...
to the ACSC(R) course there is little evidence of a resounding increase in demand, beyond the 2nd Division, for ACSC(R) graduates to serve in operational headquarters. At this stage, mission focus is being achieved for the ACSC(R) program; however, it is being achieved on a narrow front.

THE NEED FOR A BROADER BASE OF COURSE MEMBERS TO COMPLETE A PART-TIME ACSC OPTION

The current operational tempo requires the Army to have mid-ranking psc officers serving on a number of headquarters in the Pacific and in the Middle East. The Army must also fill staff officer positions on a number of domestic based headquarters such as Forces Command, 1st Division, 2nd Division, and on the subordinate headquarters of Brigade formations. In addition, the Army must maintain the capacity to surge, in order to staff Joint/Combined Task Force Headquarters (J/CTF), for short lead-time domestic and overseas operations. So what should the alternative part-time ACSC program look like?

An opportunity exists to address both the shortage of psc majors and, more broadly, the lack of Army-wide demand for current part-time ACSC(R) graduates. This opportunity can be exploited through further development of the existing part-time ACSC option(s) so that a new part-time course reflects what the One and Two Star commanders seek (Regular and Reserve), and in so doing builds a larger pool of talent of mid-ranking officers. A starting point is to relinquish the Reserve ‘brand’ for the part-time course and to broaden the base of part-time course members by extending an alternative ACSC opportunity to the wider Army (Regular and Reserve). This will provide for more mid-ranking staff and command trained officers. We must therefore look to develop a suitable adjunct to the full-time ACSC(J) course that is able to achieve the best vocational outcomes, with the least amount of time and resources, thereby achieving SRP outcomes.

THE SCHEYVILLE-ESQ ACSC MODEL

During the 1960s and 1970s the National Service Officer Training Unit at Scheyville graduated junior Army officers and deployed many of these graduates as Rifle Platoon Commanders to the highly dangerous and complex warfighting environment of Vietnam. The Scheyville program lasted twenty-one weeks, which compares...
with the then forty-four-week Officer Cadet School – Portsea program, or the four-year Royal Military College – Duntroon program. While it is understood that the Scheyville program was designed for junior officers, the analogy can be made that a high tempo mission-focused vocational military skills regime can be just as relevant to many of the experienced mid-ranking officers of today. What is required in order to achieve mission focus for a broader base of mid-ranking officers is an alternate Scheyville-esq part-time ACSC model.

Carnes and Holloway in their article ‘Practice Makes Perfect – Army Simulation Wing and Mission Specific Training’ recognised ‘that the application of simulation is a key enabler in enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency in the conduct of training, and supports the adaptation required to maximise performance on operations’.17 Using this approach in the conduct of the alternate Scheyville-esq ACSC model will maximise the ‘bang for the buck’ required, particularly when time and other resources are scarce. The Scheyville-esq ACSC model will need a balance of highly effective distance learning packages along with mission-focused residential based simulation activities. All learning packages must make maximum use of the latest technologies, particularly those relating to eLearning and simulation.

**GETTING THE BALANCE RIGHT – WHAT SHOULD THE PART-TIME COURSE ACHIEVE AND WHO SHOULD BE SELECTED?**

The goal of a part-time ACSC course must be to elevate the standard of a mid-ranking officers’ performance. The part-time psc graduate, when working in demanding staff appointments, will be able to produce higher quality work, and greater volumes of this work, than a non-psc mid-ranking officer would otherwise be expected to achieve over the same period of time. The ACSC approach to learning is outlined below. This approach would be maintained in the conduct of a part-time course:

Course members are expected to assimilate knowledge then utilise critical thinking skills to create innovative solutions to complex problems. Graduates of ACSC will have the ability to analyse and evaluate opinion, to weigh and assess evidence dispassionately, to
build a case for decision making from many sources and to tolerate and accommodate diverse viewpoints. The capacity to effectively communicate resultant arguments and conclusions is also fostered. Graduates will embrace uncertainty and display flexibility in their approach to novel and unresolved situations. Graduates will have developed robust leadership, command, critical thinking and communication skills in order to better meet the challenges of our profession.18

Group Captain Prencel, the Director of Studies for Air Force (DOS-A) at ACSC in 2010, noted that the existing ACSC(J) course 'could be reduced by half if either the electives and/or single service elements were removed, or all modules were significantly remodelled'.19 The intent is not to replicate the ACSC(J) course, but instead to raise a new, and shorter, Scheyville-esq part-time option. The total full-time equivalent (FTE) course length of the part-time course could therefore be reduced to a Scheyville-esq length of four to five months (twenty-one weeks). The part-time ACSC course would need to be divided into modules to be taught and assessed through the latest distance and residential based learning methods. As a result of creating a significantly shorter ACSC option, the Australian Defence College would need to focus the course member’s learning on vocational education and skills development.

The skill set or outcomes to be developed into the part-time ACSC course, which will enhance the career performance of the mid-ranking officer, can be drawn from the existing ACSC(J) and ACSC(R) course programs. Throughout the conduct of the part-time course, the learning programs would guide course members to make connections between their professional military activities and their personal experience of related disciplines such as law, politics, psychology, sociology and civil-military relations. By way of an example or template, the part-time course would be modularised, with key learning outcomes drawn from the following headings, and allocated the appropriate amount of time. The full-time equivalent provided below totals twenty-one weeks.20

a. Critical thinking (28 days FTE),
b. Communication, written and verbal (35 days FTE),
c. Operational planning (42 days FTE),
d. Command, Leadership and Management (28 days FTE), and
e. The application of information communication technologies as used on domestic and overseas operational headquarters (14 days FTE).
The part-time ACSC course could be completed by a course member, like a post graduate study program, over a period of eighteen to twenty-four months. Selection for this course should be competitive but open to mid-level officer applicants who wish to seek out professional development opportunities. The benefit to the individual and to the Army should be ‘win-win’; the Army would be better placed to address its shortfall in psc mid-ranking officers while the applicant would be able to achieve a psc qualification they might not have otherwise been able to achieve, and in so doing improve their chances for future promotion consideration.

CONCLUSION

The implied task from SRP goals is to make the Australian Command and Staff College more ‘efficient and effective’ and in so doing create significant savings to ‘reinvest in building a stronger Defence Force’. This reinvestment can be demonstrated through the development of an alternative part-time staff course option which would provide an increased pool of psc mid-ranking officers without the resource burden of attempting to replicate the existing full-time ACSC(J) course. To get the investment balance right, the Australian Defence College needs a part-time ACSC option which is vocationally focused while simultaneously providing scope to draw on the officer’s existential connections between their formal education and professional activities. The part-time nature of the alternate staff course will enable the participating member to continue to fulfil their employment obligations thereby enabling greater efficiencies. The overall return on investment in a part-time ACSC course will be recognised through the graduation of mid-ranking psc officers who will be able to produce higher quality work, and greater volumes of this work, than a non-psc mid-ranking officer would otherwise be expected to achieve over the same period of time.

ENDNOTES

3 Directorate of Officer Career Management – Army (DOCM-A). Draft figures: 60–70 (plus ten from overseas nations) officers are selected from a pool of 650–700 majors (i.e. all first to sixth year majors) per year. At the first cut, this pool is reduced to approximately 170–180 (approximately three times as many of the Staff College placements).
4 Directorate of Officer Career Management – Army (DOCM-A). Draft figures: DOCM-A manage approximately 200 psc majors per year of which 60 will be at Staff College, 60–70 will be promoted to lieutenant colonel, leaving 70–80 to fill
128 psc major positions. This leaves a delta of approximately 50–60 positions having to be filled by non-psc majors. This delta can be even larger when some long time psc majors seek out less demanding appointments and deselect themselves from psc positions.


7 Ibid.


12 ACSC(R) Joining Instruction 2010. Course Duration: The ACSC course may be completed within a single twelve-month period; however, this may be extended over twenty-four months. Completion of ACSC(R) comprises approximately thirty-six days of residential course work (one 4-day and two 16-day periods) and forty-five days of distance education.

13 ACSC(R) Distance Learning Website <http://olive.adfa.edu.au>, 2010

14 In 2006, when violence and civil unrest escalated in Timor Leste, and the ADF was called to intervene, a number of ACSC(J) course members (approximately 40–50) were temporarily withdrawn from the course to fill staff officer positions during the planning phase for the intervention.

15 In addition to the ARES ACSC(R) course, the Australian Command and Staff College also runs the Royal Australian Navy Staff Acquaint Course (RANSAC).

16 The current RANSAC course does have course members from both the Regular and Reserve. The ARES ACSC(R) course has course members from the Reserve only.


20 This time frame has been provided as an example only. Detailed development of an Education Management Package is required.


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Organisational Improvement

Matching Supply and Demand in ADF Specialist Health Support: A Proposal

Major Michael C Reade

Abstract

The Australian Defence Force has a need for procedural medical specialists in garrison healthcare, on major exercises and on operations. Employing such specialists in the full-time component of the ADF has proved largely impossible, leading to reliance on civilian contractors. However, the ADF Reserves include many procedural medical specialists who could potentially perform this work. Underemployment of the Reserves is a costly lost opportunity. This article proposes a method of better matching resource to requirement that would reduce reliance on expensive civilian contractors, increase ADF capacity, reduce wasteful expenditure on the Reserves, and provide a more viable option for procedural specialists wanting a military career.
PREFACE

This article concentrates on the provision of specialist procedural medical support to the Australian Defence Force (ADF). These functions are largely performed by either civilian contractors or Reserve personnel. Other essential aspects of garrison and deployed medical care, such as primary care, rehabilitation, public health and occupational medicine, are principally performed by full-time ADF personnel. Reserve procedural specialists—specifically general surgeons with knowledge of trauma surgery and orthopaedic surgeons (both with Fellowships of the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons), anaesthetists (Fellows of the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists) and intensive care physicians (Fellows of the College of Intensive Care Medicine)—have been essential to many recent ADF deployments. These specialties also receive the bulk of contracted private medical billing in garrison healthcare. In concentrating on procedural specialties, the intent is not to devalue the contribution of other Reserve medical specialists, general practitioners, career non-specialist doctors and doctors-in-training, nor to ignore the work of nursing and allied health practitioners. The proposal made in this review might apply equally to each of these groups.

SITUATION

The ADF needs the services of procedural medical specialists in three main areas. First, in garrison healthcare, where soldiers require procedures as a result of injuries or illness, whether or not acquired in the course of their ADF service. Garrison procedural specialist medical care is currently largely provided by private practitioners in private hospitals. Second, on major operations, as both ‘real world’ support in the event of major trauma in a location remote from civilian medical infrastructure, and as ‘exercise’ support for the operational, logistic and medical aspects of the exercise. Third, on operational deployments overseas.

At present, the ADF relies heavily on civilian contractors in each of these three areas. Contracting has provided a clinically effective—though expensive—solution. However, a large number of procedural specialists in the ADF Reserve are substantially underemployed. Many are particularly frustrated by the lack of opportunity for overseas deployments, and indeed, some have resorted to working as civilians (for salaries much greater than those on offer in the Reserve) for the organisations that are contracted to the ADF.
FACTORS EXPLAINING THE CURRENT SITUATION

The ADF has only one full-time procedural specialist: a naval orthopaedic surgeon, who also works in civilian practice in order to maintain a diverse skill-set. While the ADF has occasionally been able to attract other surgeons, anaesthetists and intensivists into its full-time component, the scope of clinical practice in garrison healthcare is insufficient to maintain the required range of clinical skills. Even if there was a sufficient quantity of work available, these doctors must work primarily in civilian hospitals in order to maintain proficiency. Historically, ADF full-time conditions of service have been substantially worse than those for equivalent civilian practitioners. Paid less than half their colleagues’ wages for the same work, there have also been the added disadvantages of uncertain future posting locations and the possibility of deployment at short notice. It was not surprising that specialists employed in such positions did not remain in the full-time component of the ADF for very long.

In contrast, the ADF has some success in recruiting full-time general duties medical officers. Full-time medical officers recruited through the undergraduate sponsorship scheme are able to integrate part of their postgraduate training into their military service while at the same time providing primary care under remote supervision. Most are encouraged to train in general practice as many ADF postings are accredited by the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners. Training in procedural specialties is more difficult. Full-time training in civilian hospitals takes at least seven to eight years from graduation. As it is impossible to work full-time in a civilian hospital while also working in the ADF, this is not a realistic source of procedural specialists. Moreover, even if a full-time doctor was committed to this career path, qualification after ten to twelve years of part-time training would be long after the return of service obligation was passed, presenting the same problems of retention as those described above.

From time to time, better conditions of service are entertained as a means of attracting a limited number of procedural specialists into the ADF’s full-time component. Even if two or three doctors in each specialty could be appointed, this is unlikely to guarantee the ability to provide year-round staff to a deployed surgical team, or to respond to emergencies at very short notice.
These factors combine to ensure that the ADF’s ability to perform surgical operations under general anaesthesia in the garrison, exercise and operational environments will continue to rely exclusively or nearly exclusively on Reserve or contracted civilian medical procedural specialists.  

**NATURE OF THE PROBLEM**

Reliance on the Reserves for procedural specialist medical personnel is not necessarily a problem, at least in terms of the skills required. In each of the three environments they are employed (garrison, exercises and operations), familiarity with the military environment confers many advantages, including an appreciation of the occupational health implications of treatment options, a willingness to work in suboptimal conditions and with portable equipment, and an understanding of military command structures and the role of healthcare in the overall operational plan. For this reason, civilian contractors often prefer to employ doctors with previous military service. The essential military skills are nonetheless relatively limited, and outside command roles procedural specialists appear to function well after one to two years of non-continuous Reserve service along with three to four 2-week courses. In terms of knowledge acquisition, there would appear to be no great advantage to having such doctors in the full-time component. The bulk of the ongoing training liability for procedural specialists is their continuing medical education. In Australian state public health services this requires up to four weeks of leave per year, in addition to a large financial allowance. For Reservists, this cost is borne by state departments of health and by the doctors themselves rather than the ADF. By relying on Reservists, the ADF also avoids the cost of superannuation, leave, medical indemnity insurance and practice overheads.

There is a large pool of Reserve procedural specialists who could potentially work in each of the three environments. The ADF’s operational focus in the last eight years has been an effective recruiting tool, with most entrants during this time joining with the intention—that is rapidly downgraded to hope—of working on an overseas deployment. There is an understanding that providing support on major exercises is a necessary prelude to such deployments, as is the acquisition of military skills, not only on the Specialist Service Officer courses but also the All Corps Officer Training Continuum and Logistics Officer series of courses. As the dates of these courses and exercises are usually known six months to a year in advance, organising time away from public hospital practice is rarely a problem.

...civilian contractors often prefer to employ doctors with previous military service.
Even doctors engaged in private practice no longer have a significant financial disincentive, as the Employer Support Payment Scheme covers at least part of a doctor’s practice costs while away.

In summary, there is a large pool of highly experienced procedural medical specialists who have completed the necessary military training and are willing to work for up to a few months at a time, for less than they are paid in their civilian employment, in support of the ADF. Why does the ADF rely on civilian contractors rather than utilise this resource?

As currently administered, the procedural specialists in the Reserves are rightly perceived as an unreliable source of manpower by some in the full-time component. Commanders of the specialist medical elements of the Army Health Support Battalions receive regular requests for surgical and even general-duties medical officer support to major and minor exercises in Australia. These requests are typically less than two months in advance of the task. Virtually no doctor in public hospital practice is able to reorganise their roster with such little notice without calling in substantial favours from colleagues, all of whom then have to reorganise other aspects of their work (such as private practice, academic and administrative work) to accommodate the request. Most doctors in private practice have appointment bookings at least two months in advance. At the same time, doctors perceive the ADF as unreliable. A doctor who volunteers to support a particular exercise and rearranges his or her schedule to accommodate this can often find the task cancelled by the ADF at short notice, leaving them with no income during this period and having expended considerable goodwill from patients and colleagues. Task requests are therefore routinely not filled.

In contrast to inability to support routine tasks, procedural medical specialists (along with others) have often made extraordinary efforts to respond to emergencies. Humanitarian aid deployments to Pakistan and Banda Aceh were easily staffed at extremely short notice. A number of factors are responsible—the relative ease of asking a colleague to contribute to such a high profile mission by covering gaps in a civilian roster, the understanding of patients who need to be rebooked, and the knowledge that such events do not occur frequently and that they warrant calling in the once-in-five-year favour. Paramount, of course, is the attraction of the task itself, which is also why there is seldom a difficulty finding volunteers for more prolonged operational deployments, given sufficient notice. This unfortunately leads to criticism that Reserve medical specialists only want to work with the ADF in high-profile desirable activities, a seemingly unprofessional approach.

Virtually no doctor in public hospital practice is able to reorganise their roster with such little notice…
For specialist medical support in Australia, the ADF provides the equivalent of private health insurance to its 55,000 full-time members, allowing quicker access to specialist opinions and procedures and a quicker return to work. This is very costly: $261 million was spent on purchased health services in the 2008/09 financial year. The referral habits of ADF primary-care doctors is no different to other Australian general practitioners, who choose procedural medical specialists on the basis of familiarity, past positive experience and an understanding of their particular areas of expertise. Not surprisingly, ADF members are often referred to specialists who are in the Reserve. However, very few provide such services on their Reserve time.

The current system of employment of Reserve procedural specialists and use of contracted civilian providers has therefore led to the following problems:
1. Inability to reliably provide uniformed surgical support to major exercises and operations, with consequent expensive reliance on civilian contractors.
2. Reservists working as civilians with contractors in support of field exercises and overseas operations, and as private practitioners in garrison healthcare in Australia, at considerably greater cost to the ADF than if they were working on Reserve time.
3. The Reserves being perceived as an unreliable and (from a military if not clinical perspective) unprofessional source of health support.
4. Frustration amongst Reservists that the ADF does not allow them to do what they joined to do, while at the same time making demands in training time which come at a financial cost.
5. Wasteful ADF expenditure in using the Reserve service of procedural medical specialists in tasks such as first aid training for medics or attendance at administration courses.
6. A sense amongst Reservists that the ADF has little appreciation of the realities of public hospital or private practice, when, for example, it makes requests for support with only two months’ notice or when it cancels tasks at short notice.

THE SOLUTION

Each of these problems would be addressed by adopting a roster of doctors in each procedural specialty that would guarantee to employ the rostered practitioner for the duration of the nominated period (say, six weeks) with an overlap of one week at each end, as shown in figure 1. The total commitment would be ten doctors and sixty paid weeks in each specialty.

Not surprisingly, ADF members are often referred to specialists who are in the Reserve. However, very few provide such services on their Reserve time.
The essence of this scheme would be to guarantee work during the rostered period. Clearly, it will not be possible to know a year or more in advance what this work would be, but it is difficult to imagine that the ADF would be unable to find some form of productive task during each period. The primary focus—as for the rest of the ADF—should be support to operations. If the rostered doctor was considered 'first in line' for any operational deployment during the rostered period, signing on to the roster would become highly attractive to many. However, even doctors understand that deployments cannot be manufactured to satisfy their wish to serve overseas. In the absence of an operational need, the rostered doctor could be used in support of major exercises, in the development of policy and equipment relevant to their specialty, and perhaps most importantly from the perspective of the ADF, in the provision of garrison healthcare for ADF members as an alternative to using contracted private medical practitioners. ADF surgical inpatient facilities at St Vincent's Hospital in Sydney, and possibly elsewhere around Australia, would clearly benefit from the continuous presence of ADF specialist medical staff. Co-location with a large civilian medical facility would still allow such staff to be removed for operations or exercises at short notice, with little impact on patient care.

ADF Reserve medical specialists serve in all three services. While the single-service training requirements vary dramatically in time and content, procedural specialists employed exclusively in clinical roles do not draw heavily on their single-service experience. Recent deployments to Afghanistan, in which Royal Australian Navy doctors have worked successfully in teams from both Army and the Royal Australian Air Force, attest to this. Therefore, to begin with, it is proposed that this roster scheme be tri-service and administered by Joint Health Command.

In summary: Ten doctors each rostered for six-week periods
One week overlap at the start and end of each block, to allow for travel, clinical handover, familiarisation, etc.
Sixty weeks in total

Figure 1. Year-long roster for one specialty position
In addition to requests for surgical teams on exercises, general-duties medical officers are also frequently sought from the Reserves when the full-time component cannot provide sufficient support. Specialists on the proposed rosters could also be used in these roles. While this would underutilise their clinical skills, this would be offset by the value to their general military training and also their ability to provide higher level specialist instruction to the full-time component. However, a similar roster scheme for Reserve general practitioners or non-specialist doctors able to perform general medical duties under remote supervision would equally fill this need. Units that are unable to identify the need for a medical officer more than two months in advance would then have the guarantee of a Reservist to fill the position if a full-time member was not available.

The system proposed would have many attractions for individual Reservists. Rather than having to rearrange civilian commitments, Reserve service could be integrated into a job plan in the same manner as occurs with hospital appointments. Few Reservists would find it difficult to commit to a six-week period given sufficient notice. Reserve service would change from an ad-hoc series of events that is justifiably considered by many as a 'hobby', to a core clinical commitment. However, not all Reservists would need to be on the roster every year. Eligibility for entry onto the roster would be a career goal and milestone, giving purpose to the completion of the various initial entry and professional courses required by the ADF. The skills required by rostered doctors would have to be actively managed, but the certainty of employment would make the acquisition of extra clinical skills a valid continuing medical education activity. Such training could be actively managed by the chairs of the relevant clinical consultative groups.

The ADF would derive numerous benefits from such a system. There would be more certainty that a specialist team could deploy at short notice, or on a continuous rotating basis, than is currently the case, or would be the case even if a small number of full-time specialists could be recruited. The financial cost of medical procedures performed in Australia could be substantially reduced in comparison to the current reliance on private practitioners. A large pool of ‘highly deployable’ Reserve specialists would emerge, reducing the over-dependence on key personalities that has characterised deployments in the last ten years. While they would usually concentrate their Reserve service to a limited number of ADF health facilities, these doctors would be drawn from all around
the country. This would allow the ADF to more effectively use the largest pools
of medical expertise (in Sydney and Melbourne) to provide support to the largest
concentrations of ADF members in northern Australia.

COST ESTIMATE

Procedural medical specialists are paid at Medical Level 4. Most procedural
specialists are majors, earning $452.05 per day. In addition, the Employer Support
payment for Reserve procedural specialists is $5600 per week. Therefore:

a. Each specialist would receive $18,986 (tax-free if on Army Reserve Training
   salary; taxed if on continuous full-time service) + $33,600 Employer Support
   Payment taxed for a six-week commitment

b. The total cost to Defence (including employer support payment) over one year
   would be $525,860 in each specialty.

This total cost figure appears quite large. However, in comparison with the $654
million currently spent by the ADF on garrison health services the figure is relatively
small.\textsuperscript{10} Reduction in expenditure on contracted health professionals was identified
as a goal in the recent Australian National Audit office report on the provision of
healthcare to the ADF.\textsuperscript{11} In the 2008/09 financial year, the ADF spent $24.7 million
on the Employer Support Payment scheme,\textsuperscript{12} so even as a proportion of the figure
currently spent on Reservists, the proposed expenditure is not unrealistic.

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

There are a number of alternatives to
the system proposed:

a. Continue with the current situation.
This will mean continuing to support
deployments in Timor Leste and the
Solomon Islands with contracted
civilian surgical teams, being unable
to reliably provide surgical teams to
support major exercises in Australia,
and being uncertain of the ability to
continuously staff even a limited
surgical facility in an operational
area thought too unsafe for civilian contractors. It will also mean continued
reliance on civilian private practitioners for garrison healthcare. This approach
calls into question the very need for the ADF to maintain any ability to provide
surgical support in the field or at sea.

Reduction in expenditure on contracted health professionals
was identified as a goal in the recent Australian National Audit
office report on the provision of healthcare to the ADF.
b. Develop a cohort of full-time specialist procedural medical officers. This would probably be a more expensive approach to developing the same capability, would not make use of existing resources, and would perpetuate a culture of having a ‘chosen few’ repeatedly selected for desirable tasks. The system would be more vulnerable to the possible appointment of doctors unsuited to their role, to the possibility of high staff turnover, and to the concentration of expertise amongst a select few.

c. Establish a roster in which Reserve medical specialists would agree to be ‘on call’ for short notice employment on exercises or deployments. This would not facilitate garrison healthcare (as described above) and would be markedly less attractive to most Reservists, as many civilian hospitals would require such a period to be free of clinical commitments. As the ADF would in essence be asking Reservists to take six weeks without pay, such a system would be unlikely to succeed.

**COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT**

Development of the proposed course of action will require:

a. Formal costing in comparison to current expenditure, much of which is not in the public domain;

b. Definition of the skills required for appointment to the roster in each specialty, and establishment of a clinical governance and administrative structure to support the work of the clinicians appointed; and

c. A call for expressions of interest amongst relevant specialist groups in order to confirm the viability of the scheme using current resources.

**CONCLUSION**

In recent years the ADF has successfully relied on a disaster management approach to staffing its deployed surgical facilities, at the same time as increasing its dependence on contracted specialist medical support. This has ignored the large, expanding and capable pool of Reserve specialist medical officers. Adoption of the system proposed could better align resources with need, increasing operational capability and reducing cost.

**ENDNOTES**


MATCHING SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN ADF SPECIALIST HEALTH SUPPORT: A PROPOSAL

4 'Defence's Management of Health Services to Australian Defence Force Personnel in Australia.'
5 Ibid.
6 D Stedman, 'Financial support: helping Reserve service by health professionals', *ADF Health*, No. 8, 2007, pp. 22–23
7 'Defence's Management of Health Services to Australian Defence Force Personnel in Australia.'
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.

THE AUTHOR

Major Michael Reade is an Associate Professor of anaesthetics and intensive care medicine at the Austin Hospital and the University of Melbourne. He joined Sydney University Regiment in 1989, completed the First Appointment Course and was commissioned as a general service officer. After medical qualification, he served as RMO of UNSWR and SUR, on exchange with 144 Parachute Medical Squadron in London and the 2nd Armoured Division in Texas and California, and as a specialist medical officer with 1HSB and 3HSB. He is currently the OC of the Specialist Advisory Group of 3HSB – Victoria Company. He deployed with the British Army to Bosnia in 2000 and Kosovo in 2001, and with 1HSB to East Timor in 2003 and the Solomon Islands in 2004. In 2009 he was the clinical director of the NATO Role 2(E) Hospital, Tarin Kot, Afghanistan. He has first class Honours degrees in medicine and medical science from the University of Sydney, the British Army-sponsored diploma in disaster medicine, a Masters in Public Health from the University of Pittsburgh, and Doctorate from the University of Oxford, as well as specialist clinical fellowships in anaesthetics and intensive care medicine.
The Australian Overwatch Battlegroup (West)-3 provided operational overwatch to two Iraqi provinces in 2007. A small but important part of the battlegroup staff was a CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) team that supported the Commander with civil-military liaison and the planning of consent winning activities. The superficial ‘hearts and minds’ commentary that accompanies the public face of CIMIC projects often belies the true extent, nature and contribution of CIMIC. In essence, every CIMIC activity was a calculated attempt to achieve integrated effects in support of the mission. This article describes the CIMIC activity conducted to support battlegroup manoeuvre and identifies considerations for future tactical land commanders.

_CIMIC could often provide us with access and influence into areas that were initially wary, bordering on hostile…_

COL Justin Ellwood
CO OBG(W)-3
INTRODUCTION

The Australian Overwatch Battlegroup (West)–3 (OBG(W)–3) provided operational overwatch to the Iraqi provinces of Dhi Qar and Al Muthanna from June to December 2007. A small but important part of the battlegroup staff was a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) team that supported the Commanding Officer (CO) with civil-military liaison and the planning of consent-winning activities. The popular face of this CIMIC activity is characterised by Public Affairs photos of the CO cutting a ribbon at a school refurbishment opening ceremony and the associated 'hearts and minds' commentary. However, this simplistic view belies the true nature and extent of CIMIC activities and their contribution to the achievement of the OBG(W)–3 mission. In essence, every CIMIC activity was a calculated attempt to achieve an integrated effect in support of the OBG(W)–3 mission. This article describes the extent of CIMIC activity conducted to support OBG(W)–3 manoeuvre and identifies some considerations for future tactical land commanders.

ENVIRONMENT

Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar were the first and second Iraqi provinces respectively to transition from coalition security responsibility to Iraqi primacy. Australia had been operating in Al Muthanna since the deployment of the Australian Al Muthanna Task Group–1 (AMTG–1) in 2005 and in Dhi Qar since 2006. These provinces represented a substantial area of operations in terms of both geography and population. The main geographic features were the Euphrates River, which ran through both provinces, and Highway 8, the main supply route for coalition forces running from Kuwait to Baghdad. Coalition forces were based at Tallil airbase located south of the city of An Nasiriyah, adjacent to Highway 8. Both provinces had functioning, if developing, democratic governments and institutions. The Iraqi Security Forces were generally effective and increasingly capable.

THE THREAT

There were a number of threat elements active in the area of operations during the deployment period. Predominant among these threats were the Shia extremists, primarily the Jaish Al Mahdi militia. Also present, both permanent and transiting, were a number of Sunni extremists. These groups would variously target coalition forces, the Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi government officials and infrastructure. There was a significant improvised explosive device (IED) threat with regular IED strikes against coalition vehicles, mainly along the main supply route. Tallil was also
intermittently targeted by indirect rocket fire. There was extensive criminal activity throughout the area of operations which was sometimes difficult to distinguish from counter-coalition force action. Patrolling OBG(W)–3 elements also encountered unexploded explosive objects, remnants of major combat operations in 1991 and 2003, and ran the frequent risk of road traffic accidents.

**MISSION**

OBG(W)–3’s mission was to provide operational overwatch, within defined boundaries, in order to support the transition to full Iraqi control. This comprised three main tasks:

- monitor, mentor and train the Iraqi Security Forces (specifically police and elements of the 10th Iraqi Army Division);
- be prepared to support the Iraqi Security Forces if requested by the Provincial government; and
- be prepared to assist coalition forces *in extremis* (i.e. in grave or exceptional circumstances).

The main effort was force protection which overlaid all tasks and was afforded priority consideration.

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*Table 1. Key provincial statistics*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBG(W)–3 area of operations</th>
<th>Al Muthanna</th>
<th>Dhi Qar</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area</strong></td>
<td>51,740 km²</td>
<td>12,900 km²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>436,825</td>
<td>1,181,725</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>97% Shia, strongly tribal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provincial Capital</strong></td>
<td>As Samawah pop 132,000</td>
<td>An Nasiriyah pop 587,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provincial Iraqi Control</strong></td>
<td>13 July 2006</td>
<td>21 September 2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remarks</strong></td>
<td>rural, desert with urban centres</td>
<td>more urbanised with six major cities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comparison:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tasmanian pop. 500,000; area 68,000 km². East Timor pop. 1,134,000; area 14,874 km².</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Given the nature of OBG(W)–3’s mission and tasks, the utility of CIMIC may not be immediately apparent. However, an outline of the critical requirements for CIMIC to achieve its key enabling role affords some clarity to this role. These critical requirements included:

- achieving situational awareness and situational understanding throughout the area of operations (including ‘ground truth’, information sources, route reconnaissance, understanding of tribal or political power structures and cultural awareness);
- establishing communication links with key Iraqi leaders (government, security, tribal and religious); and
- liaising with the numerous civilian and military actors operating in or transiting through the area of operations.

In addition, many of OBG(W)–3’s key restrictions originated from clauses in the Memorandums of Understanding agreed between coalition forces and the provincial leadership which outlined the transition to Iraqi security primacy for both provinces. The Memorandums of Understanding stipulated that the Provincial government approve, on a case-by-case basis, the movement of coalition forces beyond the immediate proximity of the coalition base at Tallil and the main supply route. At the time, neither the Governor of Dhi Qar nor the Governor of Al Muthanna displayed a positive disposition towards Australian forces, and both would frequently deny requests for those forces to enter major population centres. The reasons for denial varied, but often included political expediency and the desire to minimise the presence of coalition forces and the associated disruption to the civilian population. Fundamentally, CIMIC consent-winning activities provided an acceptable reason (codified in the Memorandums of Understanding) for OBG force elements to be moving throughout the area of operations and engaging key leaders and their communities.

**OBG(W)–3 STRUCTURE**

OBG(W)–3 consisted of around 515 personnel based on the 5th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment. The battlegroup was organised into two manoeuvre combat teams with a reinforced platoon as a reserve. A combat team was allocated to operate in each province, although on major tasks the battlegroup deployed as a whole.

OBG(W)–3’s operational manning limited the battlegroup to two dedicated CIMIC officers. During all rotations for AMTG/OBG, these officers were sourced from the G9 branch at Headquarters 1st Division, which provided a pool of officers who had completed the CIMIC Tactical Operator Course and, crucially, had experience in CIMIC planning. This small element had proved its effectiveness in previous
rotations and, soon after deployment, the CO augmented the CIMIC team with the addition of a captain re-tasked from within the battlegroup and a major (on a part-time basis). The CO recognised that an increase in CIMIC manpower would realise a disproportionate increase in the battlegroup's effects throughout the area of operations.

The S9 (CIMIC), a major, was primarily engaged in planning, liaison and supporting CO-level key leadership engagement. Each captain was allocated to support the officer commanding a combat team and was primarily engaged in consent-winning activities in project facilitation and liaison. It is important to note that the CIMIC effects were delivered by the whole battlegroup, not just the CIMIC staff.

Each captain was allocated to support the officer commanding a combat team and was primarily engaged in consent winning activities in project facilitation and liaison.

PLANNING AND INTEGRATING TACTICAL EFFECTS

The CIMIC staff, along with others including intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance; psychological operations; human intelligence; Public Affairs; a Military Transition team; and the ‘Divisional Training Centre’, augmented the battlegroup and provided supporting effects to the overall mission. The effort required to integrate and synchronise the activities of these elements to generate effects in support of the mission was complex and time-consuming. The battery commander who led the Joint Offensive Support Coordination Centre was tasked with this integration role and he developed a planning and synchronisation process that involved the daily meeting of the Joint Effects Working Group. This forum, directed by the Battlegroup Commander, developed the plan that fed the weekly fragmentation order and conducted deliberate planning for specific operations. No CIMIC activity was conducted unless reviewed by the Joint Effects Working Group, integrated with the other effectors and approved by the CO. Every CIMIC activity provided a targeted opportunity to achieve a number of complementary effects. For example, a visit to a project site might offer improved situational awareness and situational understanding through route reconnaissance, interaction with the local population, associated key leadership engagement, psychological operations product distribution, information operations message distribution, and the provision of material for information operations products. For a battlegroup engaged in an overwatch mission, CIMIC provided a key lever for the CO to shape and understand the battlespace.
CIMIC PRIMARY EFFECTS

‘Hearts and minds’ is a common cliché used to describe CIMIC activity, although it is usually a poor descriptor. CIMIC has also been defined as:

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.2

‘Hearts and minds’ implies a level of ideological control of the population. It requires a concerted effort to influence a target population across an area of operations. OBG(W) did not possess the mission, mandate or resources to conduct a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. In the overwatch mission context, ‘hearts and minds’ was the purview of the Iraqi government and its institutions. What the CO OBG(W)–3 required from the CIMIC staff was an enhanced ability to influence, engage and leverage. In other words, CIMIC provided the CO with an improved capability to achieve ‘tactical consent’ from individuals and groups in the areas specifically important to the OBG(W)–3 mission.

Some of the key effects to which CIMIC contributed included:

- **Influence.** ‘Influence’ primarily concerned achieving consent from target individuals and groups (normally the key leadership). At a minimum, this activity sought to ensure that key leaders understood the reasons for the presence of OBG(W)–3 force elements and tolerated them. Efforts were also devoted to shaping target individuals and groups to view contact with OBG(W)–3 favourably in order to elicit cooperation.

- **Engage.** Engagement was achieved through building relationships with members of the key leadership. CIMIC supported this engagement by providing an incentive for key leaders to meet with OBG(W)–3. This incentive was generated by the prospect of projects and the associated commercial, political and community benefits.

- **Leverage.** Leverage referred to activity aimed at harnessing the resources of another organisation in support of the OBG mission. There were many actors with capability and resources not available to the OBG. The CIMIC team spent time analysing these and planning efforts to take advantage of them. For example, one organisation (a provincial reconstruction team) had water pumps and generators to distribute. The OBG was able to utilise this distribution to achieve an effect in support of its mission.
Practical experience demonstrated that these effects often possessed certain characteristics:

- **Persistent.** The effect of a CIMIC project can extend far beyond the activity itself. While the project may or may not be labelled an Australian project, it will be informally recognised as such by the local community. The community and key leaders also know that Australian forces will probably return to visit the site. Shaping is achieved through the potential for further project work in the area on the clear proviso that the security situation is satisfactory. This provides an incentive to control or report insurgent activity in the vicinity where possible.

- **Remote.** A CIMIC project can create an effect without the necessity for a physical Australian presence. Several projects with a targeted effect were completed in remote corners of the area of operations with a single visit by OBG force elements. These were effected using local contractors and were monitored via various means including unmanned aerial vehicles and reports from key Iraqi leaders. This is an aspect of what Brigadier Roger Noble describes as ‘soft manoeuvre’.  

- **Low velocity.** CIMIC projects can take a long time (an important consideration in the context of a six-month rotation). However, the effect can be immediate as the mere possibility of a project can shape the behaviour of individuals and groups. This effect can then continue through initial engagement to discuss the project’s possibility, the ongoing scoping work, the issue of a contract, the actual work itself, visits to the site to monitor work in progress and a completion ceremony. All of these offer the opportunity to achieve complementary effects through engagement, visits, information operations and collaboration with other actors.

- **Possibility of unintended consequences.** Given the complexity of the human terrain and the interaction between political, tribal, commercial, individual and threat elements, it was difficult to predict the second and third order effects for any particular activity. Some activities did not achieve their intended effect. Likewise, OBG(W) was also vulnerable to the negative influence of unintended consequences from the other actors conducting projects in the area of operations. Unintended effects were mitigated, where possible, through consultation with coalition partners, subject matter experts and local officials as part of a careful planning process before any commitment was made.

It is important to note that the actual effect intended for an activity might be quite different from that communicated in the Public Affairs product. For example, there is a crucial difference between CIMIC and humanitarian assistance. CIMIC resources are not spent where they are most needed by a population.
(as is the case with humanitarian assistance). They are spent where they will have the most effect in support of the military mission. CIMIC activities are sometimes criticised by those who do not appreciate this difference and do not understand the context of the mission. A project deemed a failure by uninformed external commentators may have actually achieved the effect desired by the CO. Thus, it is important to be wary of critical judgments of the success or otherwise of a consent-winning activity if the mission context, the intended effect and the follow-on activity are not clearly understood.

The key operational outcomes to which these effects contribute are:

- consent of the targeted segments of the local population,
- influence within key Iraqi leadership,
- improved freedom of manoeuvre,
- enhanced situational awareness, and
- enhanced force protection.

**KEY CIMIC ACTIVITIES**

Key CIMIC activities that worked to achieve these effects included:

- **Consent-winning activities.** These activities primarily consisted of facilitating small-scale civilian infrastructure projects. These projects, each endorsed by the CO, typically ranged in cost from US$20,000 to US$100,000 and included basic school refurbishments, road repair and water reticulation. All these projects were approved, scoped and certified by Iraqi officials. They were designed by Iraqi engineers and built by Iraqi contractors to Iraqi standards. OBG CIMIC staff facilitated contract tender, funding and payment, and ensured that the projects were conducted within the funding regulations. Utilising Iraqi contractors injected money into the local economy and supported business development. Having Iraqi officials responsible for standards increased local ownership and reinforced the legitimacy of the local government. OBG(W)–3 had access to several streams of funding for this type of activity. The first of these was via the Australian government funds managed by Joint Operations Command. The second was the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program provided by the US government via the Multinational Force–Iraq. Both had stringent guidelines for spending and accounting, but were different in scope, process and guidelines. OBG(W)–3 facilitated over eighty projects throughout the area of operations during the deployment. Sometimes the consent-winning activity was conducted by other agencies and OBG benefited through a leverage effect.

- **Support to key leadership engagement.** CIMIC staff supported the CO and officers commanding combat teams in preparing for and conducting key leadership engagement.
• **Liaison.** The CIMIC team played an important part in managing the friendly forces civil-military liaison for the battlegroup. There were numerous coalition actors operating in the area of operations including various organisations and forces from the United States, Romania and the United Kingdom. Most were conducting some type of civil affairs activity that had to be de-conflicted and coordinated with OBG(W)–3 operations. The key civil actors present were the provincial reconstruction teams from the United States and Italy, a number of private security contractors, and organisations such as the United Nations Development Program and AusAid, which visited occasionally. All of these organisations sought linked but not identical goals. Coordination was achieved through a series of meetings, councils and a liaison officer network. Some were led by other actors with OBG(W) representatives as participants, while others were led by OBG(W). There was also a constant stream of individuals and organisations keen to meet with the CO. The CIMIC team acted as the first point of contact for many of these (particularly local Iraqis and civil agencies) freeing the CO for other activities.

CO OBG(W)–3 developed a theme that focused on consent winning activities to benefit children.

**THE CHILDREN-CENTRIC CONSENT WINNING ACTIVITY THEME**

CO OBG(W)–3 developed a theme that focused on consent-winning activities to benefit children. Typically these were school refurbishments and work on orphanages and community playgrounds. The rationale for these included:

• to allow OBG(W)–3 to concentrate the majority of its limited CIMIC resources on a single sector;
• these types of projects were generally relatively simple, low risk and within the capability of the OBG(W) CIMIC team;
• these projects benefited communities rather than individuals, therefore it was difficult to oppose or attack them;
• there was generally a school (or unfulfilled need) in an area where OBG(W) wished to have an effect or an area that was the responsibility of a key leader;
• these activities provided a simple theme (investing in the future) for OBG(W) staff to disseminate that was readily understood by local nationals;
• this theme (spread by word of mouth) helped shape the local leadership in their requests for assistance and allowed OBG(W) to rebuff other requests; and
• these types of projects have particular religious and social significance because of the importance that Islam places on caring for children (particularly orphans).
The children-centric theme proved to be successful for this mission and in this environment, although it is not a universal template. In this case, the context featured a functioning provincial government, developed (if degraded) infrastructure and a population generally supportive of education. However, the lesson is clear: having a theme appropriate to the mission enabled focused allocation of scarce resources in a way that can be articulated by commanders and understood by the community. This helped de-conflict activities with other civilian actors, support information operations messaging and develop local consent.

**EXAMPLE OF CIMIC SUPPORT TO BATTLEGROUP MANOEUVRE**

CIMIC was a key enabler for the conduct of Operation HOOPER. The mission for this operation was to gain enduring situational awareness in the six northern cities of Dhi Qar and featured a battlegroup-level patrol conducted over a number of days with multiple key leadership engagements in each location. Prior to this engagement, the local government leadership was wary of the idea of coalition forces visiting major population centres. The region had seen very few coalition force elements since the initial invasion, and the local population was cautious and, at times, hostile towards coalition forces. Only months before, an OBG(W)–2 patrol that had moved through this region had been engaged on multiple occasions by threat forces.

The CIMIC contribution to this operation featured:

- support to a preliminary series of shaping key leadership engagements with tribal, municipal and Iraqi Police leaders conducted at the Tallil base over the course of a week;
- rapid CIMIC follow-up to scope and commence projects discussed during key leadership engagement (nine projects, worth a substantial amount, were scoped, funded and commenced within the two weeks prior to the manoeuvre phase of the operation); and
- visits to each of the project sites, including into highly concentrated population centres.

The temporal and geographic concentration of CIMIC effort in support of Operation HOOPER realised the following benefits:

- pressure on local leadership to assert control over local militia elements;
- tangible reinforcement of the information operations message that OBG(W)–3 was a force for good;
enhanced status of Australian forces by rapid follow-through on promises (contrasting with other agencies that had not done so in the past). This type of speed was generally valued by Arab leaders with their cultural tendency to plan in the short term;

- assistance in creating the conditions for entry by OBG(W)–3 force elements to visit the project sites and conduct further key leadership engagement;
- empowerment of leaders involved in the key leadership engagement by allowing them to take credit for the reconstruction activity (no Australian or coalition signage was placed in the vicinity of the projects); and
- CIMIC projects allowed ongoing communication with key leaders as progress was monitored and issues resolved. The project completion also provided a reason to return to the area, re-engage with the leaders and build further situational awareness.

The operation proved a success, with situational awareness significantly boosted through the development of multiple networks and relationships. In addition, targeted populations were positively influenced by successful projects that were inextricably linked to the presence of coalition forces.

CONCLUSION

OBG(W)–3 conducted a successful mission to provide operational overwatch during its deployment to Iraq. A key contributor to this success was the integration of specialist attachments into the battlegroup. In particular, the inclusion of specialist CIMIC officers and the availability of enabling resources allowed the battlegroup to enhance its ability to achieve tactical consent within the local leadership and population in areas important to the mission. It also allowed a robust civil-military liaison network to de-conflict and coordinate the activities of the numerous civil and military actors operating in the OBG(W)–3 area of operations. CIMIC assisted in the achievement of key effects including influence, engagement and leverage. These effects were often characterised by being low velocity, remote, persistent and subject to unintended consequences. Each CIMIC activity was a calculated attempt to achieve a military effect. They were planned by the battlegroup staff, integrated with other ‘effectors’ and ‘collectors’ and approved by the CO. Ultimately, CIMIC provided the CO with a valuable and effective lever that improved situational awareness and situational understanding, freedom of manoeuvre, force protection and consent, to shape this non-permissive battlespace.
ENDNOTES


3 Colonel Roger Noble, Presentation to the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law Civil-Military Cooperation Course, March 2008.

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Armstrong is an Army Reserve officer who is seconded to the Queensland Reconstruction Authority following his full-time attendance at Australian Command and Staff College. A Military Police officer, his previous posting was as the G9 at Headquarters 1st Division. Prior to deploying with OBG(W)–3 in 2007, he was the S9 for Headquarters 7th Brigade. In 2009, Lieutenant Colonel Armstrong was the lead instructor for the Joint CIMIC Staff Planners’ Course and instructed at the NATO CIMIC Centre of Excellence. Lieutenant Colonel Armstrong has completed Masters degrees in International Security Studies, Arts (Strategy and Management), Business Administration and Human Resource Management.
ABSTRACT

The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team, an element of 20 EOD SQN, is among the Australian Defence Force’s most effective weapons in the fight against the improvised explosive device (IED), the tool of the modern insurgent. The crucial communications element of the EOD team is currently managed by a Regimental Signaller, a non-specialist operator with all-corps training. Replacing the Regimental Signaller with a specialist Communications Systems Operator (COMSYSOP), however, would significantly increase the team’s capability. This article argues that an embedded COMSYSOP would not simply enhance command and control capabilities and reduce re-tasking time, but would also provide valuable expertise in advanced force protection electronic countermeasures (FPECM) and specialist electro-magnetic spectrum (EMS) knowledge. The article describes the role of an EOD COMSYSOP and proposes operational control and technical control structures, outlining also the required changes to the EOD COMSYSOP training continuum. Issues of manning neutrality, structure within the EOD squadron and selection of the right COMSYSOP for the task will also be discussed. The article concludes with a balanced appraisal of the benefits of the embedded COMSYSOP against the backdrop of current manning and resource constraints.
Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces.

David Kilcullen

INTRODUCTION

The employment of IED by insurgent groups poses a constant threat to counterinsurgency operations. Insurgents have become far more sophisticated in their employment of the IED, which has evolved from a favoured tool of harassment to a key force multiplier, all too often used with devastating effect. One of the critical assets used to counter the burgeoning IED threat is the EOD team within the 20 EOD SQN construct. Managing the team’s communications element is the responsibility of its Regimental Signaller, an essential component of the team. Yet, as this article will argue, the capabilities of the EOD team would be significantly enhanced were the Regimental Signaller to be replaced by a COMSYSOP from the Royal Australian Corps of Signals (RA Sigs). The primary role of an embedded COMSYSOP would be to assist the EOD team and the Task Force Commander by facilitating critical communication flow at the tactical level and to provide additional expertise not resident in the Regimental Signaller. Thus EOD teams could be re-tasked rapidly, reducing the deployed force elements’ time on incident.

ROLES OF THE EOD COMSYSOP

The COMSYSOP trade is highly versatile and is often regarded as the backbone of RA Sigs. While the Regimental Signaller shares some key roles across the Australian Army, the COMSYSOP affords a niche capability to the commander by providing an array of capabilities and expertise that surpasses that of the Regimental Signaller. Within the EOD team, the COMSYSOP could provide and maintain tactical voice communications and battle management systems (BMS), employ FPECM and supply battlespace spectrum management (BSM) advice, maintenance, management and operation. Each of these additional capabilities will be discussed in turn.

In an enhanced EOD team, the provision, maintenance and operation of tactical HF, VHF, UHF and satellite communications voice and data services would be the primary responsibility of the COMSYSOP. These services are currently managed by a qualified explosive ordnance reconnaissance (EOR) team member, or an attached Technical Assist who is a field engineer sapper or corporal understudying the EOR team member. While these operators are equipped to ensure the provision of a basic service, the COMSYSOP can maintain a higher command link with both the coordinating headquarters and supported Australian and coalition force elements. Adding a COMSYSOP would involve minimal change in the provision of tactical
voice communications to the team; however, it would considerably enhance BMS connectivity. In addition, the COMSYSOP could also manage the team’s cryptographic responsibilities and provide direct liaison with the Joint Terminal Air Controller net to request restriction of airspace while the EOD team is on task.

The ability to operate, maintain and manage BMS—which provides a common operating picture of the battlespace—is a skill that is currently not organic to the EOD team. The recent RA Sigs force structure review concluded that ‘Regimental Signallers, in their current guise, are unlikely to be capable of operating future signals capabilities without significant additional training.’

Put simply, BMS operation is beyond the ability of an all-corps communicator, and certainly well beyond that of a member of the EOD team who is undertaking this role as a secondary task. However, the efficient employment of BMS by a COMSYSOP could prove to be a significant force multiplier. Introducing a BMS capability will allow the task force assets’ operational tempo to be closely monitored by the networked commander at all levels. BMS allow the EOD manager enhanced visibility of the battlespace and all those EOD tasks conducted within. In addition, BMS provide the EOD manager with an enhanced ability to directly re-task assets, ensuring EOD team members are utilised with the maximum economy of effort. With the addition of BMS, the team will be able to update task completion times which, in turn, will assist networked commanders to plan future tasks. For example, if an EOD team plots the estimated completion time of a clearance task, a combat services support team commander can then schedule a convoy based around that timeline, supplementing the tactical information flow to all commanders.

The addition of the COMSYSOP would also add expertise in the management of FPECM and BSM. Given the complexity and risk inherent in counter-insurgency operations, the protection of assets remains a key consideration. Arguably, EOD teams are highly vulnerable to radio-controlled IED and thus every effort should be made to protect them. The COMSYSOP would conduct routine FPECM procedures such as equipment issue, management and security, and pre-use checks as well as providing advice on FPECM for use in pre-deployment orders. The COMSYSOP’s BSM capacity would also enhance its effectiveness against enemy spectrum use and reduce the threat of spectrum confliction of communication through FPECM and EOD equipment. During an EOD task, the COMSYSOP would ensure that the FPECM equipment is employed to deliver
maximum effectiveness. The COMSYSOP would achieve this by utilising spectrum analysis equipment on site to determine the emitter’s frequency and deploying the relevant FPECM equipment in an ‘ECM haze’. Concurrently, the COMSYSOP would update the EOD manager over a dedicated net on the progression of the task and mark the incident on the theatre’s BMS while maintaining command and control awareness and higher command link capability over combat net radio equipment. Additional tasks could include employment of BSM to avoid spectrum fratricide—this is particularly important with partnered coalition patrols—and the conduct of de-confliction with other force elements in the area of operations. On completion of these tasks, the COMSYSOP would conduct site analysis, bagging evidence and photographing the site for the relevant exploitation cell. While not on task, the operator could be charged with providing comment on active and passive emitters utilised in radio-controlled IEDs to the theatre J63X and collecting other information relevant to the role. The COMSYSOP could also maintain the team’s communication, cryptographic and FPECM equipment and conduct training, while developing intelligence tools in conjunction with the battlegroup S2 cell.

As the role develops, additional tasks may include the provision of direction-finding equipment and management and maintenance of spectrum-mapping equipment to assist the EOD team in locating radio-controlled IED.

The higher level of communications support provided by the COMSYSOP will increase the effectiveness and protection of EOD teams well beyond current levels of operation. The increased knowledge of FPECM and BSM within the team will ensure that EOD operators have the ability to apply a new knowledge base and skill-sets in the conduct of their tasks. Employment of BMS and the advances in tactical communication will ensure that the EOD team has the correct command and control balance to ensure timeliness of relevant tactical information and coordination. Given the complexity of the modern battlespace, there is an enormous range of factors that can affect an EOD team’s task time, including the complexity and number of the team’s devices, nature of the threat, soak times (delay in reaction so as to avoid setting a pattern) and the time of movement to the incident. With the addition of an embedded COMSYSOP, the team’s reaction time will be effectively reduced because the EOD manager’s ability to coordinate assets will be enhanced and the manager will now have the freedom to employ an extra qualified EOD on task and utilise additional skill-sets embedded in the team.
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Management and Coordination of the COMSYSOP

Management of the COMSYSOP and his/her role within the EOD team are issues that require particular focus. As suggested previously, the COMSYSOP will replace the Regimental Signaller, requiring a shift in both RA Sigs and Royal Australian Engineers operating procedures. In addition, the level of command designated to each element must be considered. The attachment of a COMSYSOP will also affect reporting into the intelligence cycle, empowering the FPECM officer and providing a range of enhancements and adjustments to tactics, techniques and procedures with the introduction of BMS and the provision of BSM capability.

Recent advances in search techniques and the use of FPECM and related equipment have reduced the threat of casualties from IED detonation. However, insurgent forces gain their centre of gravity from freedom of movement and the EOD team’s inability to effectively counter this. Once an EOD operation begins, a security cordon is established around the site, and any observing insurgent force can detect, locate and fix its opposing force elements into position. For this reason, a reduction in the EOD team’s reaction and re-tasking time is paramount. By enhancing communication and command and control capabilities, the EOD manager acquires the ability to conduct concurrent EOD clearance operations. The introduction of the COMSYSOP adds a BMS capability to assist in the reduction of re-tasking time by allowing complete visual of the EOD manager’s assets and tasks, and allowing the

Figure 1. Capabilities provided
team’s members to be employed more effectively to assist with the EOD task without the burden of providing and monitoring communications and FPECM. In short, the COMSYSOP’s ability to closely monitor the EOD team and its tasks will reduce time on task and reaction times for EOD and force protection assets.

Intelligence and operations are complementary, and this has become one of the driving factors in counterinsurgency operations. The intelligence cycle assists and, at times, drives operations. The weapons intelligence team assists in developing force protection measures such as FPECM and enhanced tactics, techniques and procedures. Additional protection of force elements by FPECM relies on accurate, timely and multi-tiered reporting on the insurgent’s employment of passive and active systems utilising EMS. The addition of the COMSYSOP provides another collector with the ability to feed raw data into the intelligence cycle. In this environment everyone is a collector, and having a communication asset deployed at the tactical level with advanced knowledge of FPECM increases the ability of the FPECM officer to task intelligence requirements to the appropriate EOD COMSYSOP team. Intelligence requirements can be managed by the FPECM officer and tasked to the COMSYSOP on behalf of organisations such as the S2/J2 Cell, Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell, Combined IED Task Force, weapons intelligence team and spectrum managers as part of their liaison duties.

Management of the COMSYSOP within the EOD team may, however, prove complex. Difficulties may arise if operational control of RA Sigs members occurs outside their technical control authority. The use of the COMSYSOP will need to be managed on two levels. Operational control will fall within the EOD chain of command, allowing the COMSYSOP’s operational integration into the team and ensuring that he/she gains intimate knowledge of the team’s tactics, techniques and procedures. This arrangement will allow the coordination and optimisation of the COMSYSOP’s services. Technical control will rest with the RA Sigs hierarchical structure within the EOD squadron. Having the two branches of command will allow the COMSYSOP to maintain situational awareness of EOD team operations and also ensure management of complex signals issues within the traditional chain of command.

**TRAINING THE OPERATOR**

A soldier’s training continuum and trade progression ensure that he/she gains the required skills to perform efficiently. Among the Australian Army’s greatest assets
are its training emphasis, continuum and establishments. Currently there is no particular emphasis in the RA Sigs training continuum below the combat team or nodal level, with the exception of the special operations signals community. This lack of emphasis is detrimental to the operating environment of the COMSYSOP described in this proposal. However, its effect can be reduced by enforcing a set of standard prerequisites and general increase in the skills of the COMSYSOP.

The COMSYSOP possesses a range of skill-sets organic to RA Sigs that cannot be matched by the all-corps trained communicators. COMSYSOPs will, ideally, have completed the Advanced Operator Course and have twelve months’ experience in trade within a combined arms communications environment. This will ensure that the operator has sufficient trade skills and qualities to provide tactical voice/data and BMS services to the EOD team. Completion of the Electromagnetic Spectrum Engineer and Planning Course will also ensure that the COMSYSOP possesses an understanding of spectrum management and can assist in BSM tasks.

The FPECM training requirement will require a rethinking of the training prerequisites for RA Sigs members. Currently, RA Sigs operators are trained on FPECM equipment only when there is a requirement for a signaller to complete the FPECM operator’s course, usually when attending pre-deployment training or completing the promotion training continuum beginning with Subject 2 for Sergeant. Changing the prerequisites and allowing the COMSYSOP to undertake the FPECM manager’s course will create a knowledge base beyond that of an FPECM operator and enhance employability within the EOD team.

The employability of the COMSYSOP may also be significantly enhanced with possession of a range of all-corps qualifications. The Junior Leadership Course, Battle Group Intelligence Course, Tactical Site Exploitation/Tactical Site Analysis (TSE/TSA) qualifications and Explosive Ordinance Technical Assist are all examples of these qualifications. The TSE/TSA qualification will assist in reporting and chain of evidence requirements and allow the COMSYSOP to contribute directly to the intelligence cycle, particularly in the absence of a weapons intelligence team on site. A qualified COMSYSOP will also enhance the FPECM officer’s contribution in the intelligence preparation and monitoring of the battlespace (IPMB). The TSE/TSA qualification can be gained by an all-corps signaller either by attending a three-day TSE/TSA course or by completing the Battle Group Intelligence Course. These courses will also provide a base knowledge of the intelligence cycle, battlegroup intelligence duties and the compilation and maintenance of IPMB. Completion of
the Junior Leadership Course will assist the COMSYSOP to operate more comfortably in a combined arms environment. Finally, ‘... completion of the EOTA [Explosive Ordnance Technical Assist] course would provide the COMSYSOP a generic knowledge base in EO clearance techniques, tools and procedures utilised by the EOD team, and therefore allow a better integration into the EOD team.’ While this appears to be a heavy training liability, time in training could be mitigated by posting the COMSYSOP to the Engineer Regiment within the standard posting cycle. By shifting the responsibility for the training requirement to the gaining engineer squadron, particular emphasis can be applied to managing the training continuum and focusing on relevant, developing threats and tactics, techniques and procedures to manage these.

Equipping the COMSYSOP with the knowledge to assist the EOD team and removing traditional barriers posed by training prerequisites will ensure the successful integration of the COMSYSOP into the EOD team. The COMSYSOP must have an advanced understanding of his/her trade, experience of operating within the all-corps environment, knowledge of FPECM and an awareness of EOD team procedures in order to make the most effective contribution to the team and its performance.

MANNING, STRUCTURE AND SELECTION

A practical example of the employment of the COMSYSOP can be applied to the structure and personnel selection for 20 EOD SQN. RA Sigs certainly has the ability to provide a suitable number of COMSYSOPs to supply a functioning arm to 20 EOD SQN. However, the careful selection of individuals to fill this position is essential in order to achieve the best results for 20 EOD SQN, RA Sigs and the Army as a whole.

With the current critical manpower shortage that afflicts the COMSYSOP trade, any proposal that may draw manpower away from units must be viewed as manning neutral in order to gain support. For the COMSYSOP structure within 20 EOD SQN to be operationally functional, a total of nine suitable operators must be posted into these positions with an additional nine following the second phase of manning. Initially, positions for the first phase of manning could be provided by Forces Command and Chief Information Officer Group signal squadrons and regiments. The second phase, comprising nine additional operators, could occur following 20
EOD SQN’s second unit establishment review, scheduled for 2013. The generation of a new role for the COMSYSOP that focuses on the operator’s individual qualities, trade skills and the fact that the COMSYSOP trade will now have a non-SOCOMD position operating at the tactical level, will assist the corps in recruiting and retention, thus contributing to its manning-neutral status.

EOD teams are divided between three operational formations: 20 EOD SQN, Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) and the Regional Explosive Ordinance Services (REOS). Given the way that EOD teams are employed in support of SOCOMD and REOS operations, the addition of a COMSYSOP offers no real enhancement to their capability. However, 20 EOD SQN clearly has a requirement for the additional capability provided by the COMSYSOP. Given the manning restrictions placed on RA Sigs, the first phase of manning would seek to...

...20 EOD SQN will be able to raise, train and sustain the COMSYSOP capability within the unit as long as no more than four teams are deployed from the squadron at any one time.

Figure 2. Training continuum
support 20 EOD SQN at section level which comprises two EOD teams. The second phase would place a COMSYSOP within every team (see Figure 3). This would ensure that, from the date of the first phase, 20 EOD SQN will be able to raise, train and sustain the COMSYSOP capability within the unit as long as no more than four teams are deployed from the squadron at any one time. Should the squadron’s operational demands exceed four teams, support could be provided to up to four sections by the COMSYSOP; however, this would severely hamper the COMSYSOP’s ability to provide team-level support and would restrict his/her role to mentoring, maintenance and management of the communication infrastructure of the team.

The provision of communications support to small team operations requires an individual who is competent in his/her role and who can draw on a broad range of experience. While the training of the COMSYSOP will bridge a substantial capability gap, it will be crucial to select an operator who can assimilate into an EOD team, manage the substantial multi-tiered workload, and who, above all, is technically competent. Selection for this role is the responsibility of the COMSYSOP’s career manager and chain of command at his/her losing regiment or squadron, with due emphasis on trade experience.

CONCLUSION

The simple replacement of the Regimental Signaller in the EOD team with a specialist COMSYSOP is sufficient to significantly enhance the effectiveness of the EOD team and add to its operational capability. The addition of the COMSYSOP’s expertise in

Figure 3. RA Sigs ORBAT within 20 EOD SQN
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FPECM, BSM and BMS operability and the consequent effect on re-tasking time are all effective force multipliers for the EOD team. While this article has been written from the perspective of a COMSYSOP and merely presents the base line of an idea to serve as a talking point, it demonstrates that such a proposal is readily achievable within the current training continuum and manning constraints. The Army possesses both the opportunity and the ability to achieve this goal and now needs only the impetus.

ENDNOTES

1 As is usual in such operations, BSM advice would be tailored to the COMSYSOP knowledge base and would rely in turn on advice provided by the coordinating force elements specifically tasked with frequency management.


3 The networking, management and maintenance of BMS are usually RA Sigs responsibilities.

4 Interview with Major Ashley Nurick and Warrant Officer Class 2 D Higgins, 13 October 2010.


7 David Kilcullen, Counter Insurgency, Scribe, Melbourne, 2010, p. 31.

8 The COMSYSOP will not erode the role of the weapons intelligence team and other assets used to exploit information from IEDs. The role of the COMSYSOP is purely to provide exploitation, assessment and comment within the Tactical Site Exploitation/Tactical Site Analysis (TSE/TSA) parameters bounded by his/her skill as a communicator. The COMSYSOP will also further reinforce the FPECM officer’s reporting and knowledge of active and passive emitters used in conjunction with IEDs.


10 Operational control is ‘The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned . . .; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign separate tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistical control.’ See Operations Series ADFP 3.8.1. – Peace Operations Planning and Procedures, Department of Defence, Canberra, 14 December 2009.
11 Technical control is ‘The specialised or professional guidance and direction exercised by an authority in technical matters.’ See Logistics Series ADDP 4.2 – Support to Operations, Department of Defence, Canberra, 17 October 2003.

12 Interview with Major Ashley Nurick and Warrant Officer Class 2 D Higgins, 13 October 2010.

THE AUTHOR

Signalman Russell Larner joined the GRES in January 2004 and, after postings as a clerk with the 4th Combat Engineer Regiment and 4th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (Commando), he joined the ARA in January 2006 as an Operator Specialist Communications. After completing initial employment training at the Defence Force School of Signals, he was posted to the 1st Combat Signals Regiment (1 CSR). As a member of 1 CSR he deployed with the Force Communications Element in September 2008 in support of Headquarters Joint Task Force 631 and Timor Leste Battle Group V. He is currently posted to 138 Signals Squadron in Melbourne.
Doctrine Training Tactics

Australia’s Amphibious Ambition

Captain Dean Clark

Abstract

This article discusses the effect of the acquisition of the Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment (ADAS) System, acquired under JP 2048. It is argued that the project is largely ignoring the need to control river systems and shallow water areas that dominate our region’s geography. The article also discusses the training implications associated with the raising and sustaining of a world class amphibious force.

A small but highly trained [amphibious] force striking ‘out of the blue’ at a vital spot can produce a strategic effect out of all proportion to its slight numbers.

Basil Liddell Hart
As an island nation in a region characterised by enormously complex riverine systems and archipelagos, Australia has long faced the challenges of littoral manoeuvre within an amphibious area of operations. The Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) amphibious ambition is currently achieving a degree of realisation through the Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment (ADAS) system. Acquired under Joint Project (JP) 2048, ADAS will potentially provide the capability to deploy an Amphibious Ready Group of approximately 2200 personnel—a significant enhancement in ADF capability. Yet, for all the complexity of this system, it appears that a number of fundamental truths have been ignored—not least the fact that the acquisition of large amphibious ships alone will not provide Australia an amphibious capability comparable with that of its coalition allies, Britain and the United States. If these ships are to be considered more than simply transport vessels, Australia must also invest in enabling platforms and training for ship-to-objective manoeuvre and distributed manoeuvre. The ADAS system may also create a capability gap by failing to consider the replacement of Army-operated watercraft or the development of a capable riverine force. As a result, ADAS may deliver its promised Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs) before the ADF is ready to employ this capability to its full potential within any credible threat environment. JP 2048 as a whole appears to be increasingly focused on blue water capability, ignoring the need to control the river systems and shallow water areas that dominate the region’s geography. If the ADF is to engage in littoral manoeuvre, it must be equipped and trained to conduct tactical surface manoeuvre and apply force within shallow coastal areas and river systems. While the ADAS system focuses on the transit to theatre, it is only part of the amphibious puzzle; the real challenges lie in the successful prosecution of littoral manoeuvre within the amphibious operations area.

Australia’s ability to project and sustain amphibious forces within its region will be substantially enhanced with the introduction of new amphibious ships, supporting sealift ships and landing craft. The Defence White Paper 2009 argues that this capability will provide a significant capacity for maritime manoeuvre of land forces in the littoral environment. However, JP 2048 largely ignores the requirement for ADF forces to conduct surface manoeuvre once in theatre. The LHDs and strategic sealift ships that will transit forces to theatre cannot enable all facets of littoral manoeuvre without supplementation from a variety of surface manoeuvre assets. This is a point of particular concern given
that Australia’s primary operating environment is characterised by archipelagic, riverine and estuarine systems subject to large tidal variations and severe weather. Indeed Australia’s Amphibious Concept defines littoral manoeuvre as ‘the use of the littoral as an operational manoeuvre space from which a sea-based joint amphibious force can threaten, or apply and sustain, force ashore’. Current NATO doctrine also reinforces the need to control this environment:

The salient requirement of an amphibious assault is the necessity for swift, uninterrupted build-up of sufficient combat power ashore from an initial zero capability to full coordinated striking power as the attack progresses toward ATF [Amphibious Task Force] objectives. To achieve success, an ATF should have sea control in and over its area of operations (specifically the amphibious objective area), as well as a favourable air situation, and—in the case of an amphibious assault—a substantial superiority over opposing forces ashore.

For the ADF to control amphibious areas of operation for extended periods, it must acquire a surface means of projecting and sustaining force across the spectrum of the amphibious area. Operating effectively within this environment requires amphibious vehicles, supplementary watercraft and a riverine capability, not just ship-to-shore connectors.

The watercraft procured within JP 2048 and specifically designed for the ADF’s primary operating environment are not suitable for prolonged tactical manoeuvre, force protection or riverine operations. While the Landing Craft Medium (LCM) 1E is a very capable ship-to-shore connector and will provide enhanced capability during ship-to-shore operations (including the ability to transport an Abrams battle tank), it is not capable of prolonged riverine or distributed operations. Currently, this capability is partially filled (somewhat poorly) by use of both the LCM8 watercraft and LARC V amphibious vehicle. To date the ADF has not identified a replacement for the ageing amphibian or the Army’s independent watercraft fleets, despite the fact that these are due to be decommissioned in 2017. This capability cannot be provided by the new LCM1E as it does not possess the crew habitability or the survivability required for distributed manoeuvre. It is also unsuited to prolonged independent riverine operations and its size precludes it from a number of tactical applications.

Given that current operational watercraft fleets are less than ideal for use within the region’s restricted waterways, the ADAS system’s failure to procure a watercraft capable of riverine and tactical inshore operations will further degrade this essential capability. Additionally, the LCM1E is integral to the LHD and is likely to be withdrawn once the initial amphibious operation is complete and the LHDs return to Australia or are required elsewhere to conduct other operations. Clearly the acquisition of the ADAS system must be complemented by a force that is capable
of operating within the riverine environment and manoeuvring in coastal areas. Failure to adequately address these key pieces of the amphibious puzzle may see the ADF unable to conduct anything other than an unopposed linear beach landing and helicopter insertion and deny it the ability to conduct surface manoeuvre within the littoral and river systems. This is a critical weakness in the ADAS system.

In the Australasian region, waterways often serve as primary lines of communication and will potentially constitute key terrain. Riverine operations seek to project power ashore by exploiting the riverine manoeuvre space and are complementary to the principles of manoeuvre. These operations should be conducted by a riverine force task-organised to operate within river systems and capable of adapting to the unique characteristics of this environment. If the ADF fails to acquire a riverine capability, its ability to conduct extended manoeuvre within a significant portion of its primary operating environment will be severely curtailed. The recent experiences of coalition partners in Iraq highlight the importance of dominating river systems. The Royal Marines patrolled Iraq’s vast river systems during Operation TELIC, denying the enemy mobility and resupply. The fifty craft and 185 personnel of 539 Assault Squadron, Royal Marines, conducted extensive patrols and were involved in the initial assault on the Al Faw Peninsula and clearing operations on the Khawr Abd Allah, Khawr az Zubayr, Shatt al Basra and the Shatt al Arab waterways. The squadron saw continuous operations for thirty-one days across distances of over ninety nautical miles during which it conducted three opposed landings and fired in excess of 10,000 rounds. The British experience highlights the need for a capable riverine force to conduct operations across large river systems and coastal areas. This is particularly pertinent to Australia’s immediate region which is dominated by archipelagos, large river systems and limited port and road infrastructure. To place this in perspective, Australia’s closest neighbour, Papua New Guinea, has 10,940 kilometres of navigable rivers and only 686 kilometres of sealed roads. While special forces operate small, fast, armed craft such as the eleven-metre rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIB), it is unlikely that these units will be tasked to conduct extended riverine patrols. However, a conventional riverine force would be capable of enduring manoeuvre in the coastal regions and river systems that dominate Australia’s primary operating environment. Failure to acquire such a force will severely limit the Commander Amphibious Task Group’s options and ability to project force within the area of operations.

Clearly the acquisition of the ADAS system must be complemented by a force that is capable of operating within the riverine environment and manoeuvring in coastal areas.
The failure of the ADAS system to procure a craft capable of tactical manoeuvre within river systems and shallow waters will significantly reduce the ADF’s ability to conduct surface manoeuvre within the region. To a large extent, the flexibility and effectiveness offered by a riverine force is dependent on the surface craft employed. The Royal Marines use a mixture of Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP) and Offshore Raiding Craft (ORC) to control river systems, deliver combat power and conduct tactical resupply deep into the area of operations from a seabase positioned offshore. For these craft, survivability is an essential attribute. Survivable, deployable surface craft that minimise their signature and reduce their ability to be detected and engaged by advanced weapons are vital for riverine operations. Survivability can be achieved through a mix of stealth, speed, manoeuvrability, deployability and armour. The LCM1E and large ocean-going landing craft acquired within the ADAS system will be designed as transport vessels rather than manoeuvre assets capable of providing tactical support to the land force through the use of fire and manoeuvre.

It is also likely that the LCM1E will be commanded and crewed by Royal Australian Navy (RAN) rather than Army personnel, which will significantly affect the support available to the Land Force Commander. It is unlikely that RAN assets will be allocated to the Land Force Commander to support his scheme of manoeuvre or to conduct the prolonged independent operations required for distributed manoeuvre. Unlike the LCM8, the LCM1E has no crew accommodation, limiting its ability to project from the LHD for extended periods. The LCM1E is likely to return to its parent ship once the land force has conducted its lodgement. Despite this, the small number of LCM1E landing craft procured within the ADAS system will be capable of achieving the initial requirement of the insertion, which is ‘… to project two company groups by surface assault in multiple waves, up to two discrete SPODs [sea point of disembarkation] or beach landing sites.’ It is unlikely, however, that this assault could be prosecuted within any credible threat environment without supplementation from smaller, faster craft.

Operational flexibility and tactical impact could be maximised by the conduct of simultaneous surface and air assaults from the LHDs utilising small, fast craft coupled with amphibians and LCM1Es. These smaller vessels provide the means to rapidly project force to multiple locations, enabling distributed manoeuvre and simultaneous action. The operational pause and channelling effect of a single beach
landing site would be reduced by the use of amphibians and alternative surface options. Amphibians are able to cross unprepared beaches and move directly to the objective during inclement weather and large swells. Currently, the only means of projecting surface forces from the LHDs is via LCM1Es and special forces craft. The LCM1E is constrained by tidal variations, surf zones and, when laden, is capable of only twelve knots. The ADAS system is yet to be complemented with tactical manoeuvre capabilities that provide force protection, riverine, estuarine and archipelagic surface manoeuvre support to the Land Force Commander’s scheme of manoeuvre. While the LHDs will provide the capability to project force throughout Australia’s primary operating environment and possibly beyond, once in theatre, littoral manoeuvre will be prosecuted by various types of watercraft, amphibians and helicopters, not ship-to-shore connectors. Operations within the region may necessitate the use of watercraft capable of riverine operations and independent coastal tasks over a prolonged period. The LCH replacements will possess the ability to transit blue water and conduct independent coastal operations; however, the size and draught of these large vessels will preclude them from many tactical applications and all but the deepest rivers.

ADAS will herald another loss in capability with the decommissioning of the LARC V amphibious vehicle without an identified replacement. An amphibious vehicle provides significant flexibility to an amphibious operation as it is not constrained by the lack of local infrastructure, tidal variations or available beach exits. It also provides the commander with the option to insert or withdraw forces deep into the area of operations when environmental or tactical conditions preclude the use of helicopters. Amphibians are capable of delivering large quantities of aid and supplies without the need for landing craft, additional wheeled transport, ports or prepared beaches. Helicopters can provide all that an amphibian can; however, helicopters are often constrained by weather conditions and the availability of landing sites and air hours, making them unreliable for disaster relief operations and tactical resupply. The demise of the LARC V will also affect the JP 2059 (bulk liquid distribution) project, which relies heavily on the LARC V for the deployment and recovery of a large floating fuel dracene (the Towed Flexible Barge Discharge System). Without the LARC V, this component of JP 2059 will require significant revision. The use of amphibious vehicles in a non-combatant evacuation or disaster relief operation provides the flexibility to move straight to the objective without a change in transport mode or the need for prepared landing sites. Amphibians are
particularly useful in flood-damaged areas where roads and landing points may be inundated with water, mud or debris. The unique attributes of amphibious vehicles provide a niche capability that allows surface manoeuvre in a variety of operations and conditions.

The littoral manoeuvre concepts of ship-to-objective manoeuvre, distributed manoeuvre and sea-basing as defined in current Australian doctrine require the conduct of extensive training before they can become feasible options for the projection and sustainment of land forces from an amphibious task group. Indeed, acquiring equipment and training operators to negotiate the inherent difficulties of the littoral environment is key to the development of amphibious skills and capabilities commensurate with those of Australia’s coalition partners. A recent comment by the Chief of Army highlighted this need: ‘… amphibious-related individual and collective training requirements exceed baseline infantry skills, as the landing force requires exposure to the maritime environment of surface and air assault’. If the ADF is to possess a capable amphibious force with the ability to conduct successful littoral manoeuvre, Australian forces must be equipped and trained to fight within coastal and riverine areas. The ADF’s planners are constantly challenged to adapt land-centric organisations, procedures and equipment to their maritime equivalents so as to create or maintain critical balances between land compatibility and maritime constraints.

Interestingly, the Chief of Army suggested that Australia provide one online battle-group at the same certification as the ADF’s coalition partners, confirming that the Royal Marines and US Marine Corps have been identified as models for Australia to emulate. This aspiration is indeed ambitious given the ADF’s lack of a dedicated amphibious force or training establishment to teach the required amphibious skill-sets. If Australia is to emulate these capable, well-trained and well-resourced amphibious forces, it must be prepared to enhance amphibious training across the Army. The Royal Marines and the US Marine Corps are specifically trained and equipped to fight in the amphibious environment. To train a battalion to perform these tasks on a rotational basis would be problematic at best as operating effectively within the littoral environment requires specific skill-sets that would be difficult to gain within a twelve-month rotation. The landing force must be trained and equipped to dominate the amphibious objective and exploit the riverine system in order to dislocate objectives or bypass opposition.

The landing force must be trained and equipped to dominate the amphibious objective and exploit the riverine system in order to dislocate objectives or bypass opposition.
In the quest for an organisation to benchmark the ADF’s future capability, British amphibious forces offer an example of a flexible, well-equipped force with a similar culture and method of operation to that of the ADF. The 3rd Commando Brigade is a core component of Britain’s Joint Rapid Reaction Force. Working in unison with the Royal Navy’s amphibious ships, the brigade represents a highly mobile, self-sustained and versatile organisation with a strategic power projection capability that is unique within the British armed forces. A recent Army Headquarters discussion paper concluded that the British model reflects a scale and structure that Australia could realise and offers an appropriate design that Australia would be wise to mirror. Royal Marine soldiers and officers understand the intricacies of operating in the maritime environment and the command structures that are unique to amphibious operations. The Royal Marines possess dedicated reconnaissance elements that are trained in shallow water diving and the operation of small, fast reconnaissance and riverine patrol boats which are fitted with armour and multiple weapon systems. Once in theatre, the Royal Marine Amphibious Task Group’s main effort is the execution of land force manoeuvre within the amphibious operations area, rather than the manoeuvring of major Naval fleet units. Conversely, current ADF amphibious operations seem to focus on Naval skill-sets, largely ignoring the requirement to integrate land force and maritime component manoeuvre. If the ADF is to develop an amphibious capability comparable to that of its closest coalition partners, a paradigm shift in training and culture is required.

Three options are currently being considered for the construct of the amphibious land force—and each of these options carries its own risks. Option one involves the tasking of a battlegroup as the amphibious specialist battalion, similar to an airborne battlegroup. This option would promote a high level of capability; however, it would also introduce force rotation issues. The viability of this option has been questioned given the ADF’s current focus on operations in Afghanistan—a view that appears somewhat short-sighted. To argue that none of the ADF’s ten battlegroups should become amphibious entry professionals because of current operational commitments involves flawed logic and may result in a failure to utilise new capability to its full potential. Like motorised and mechanised infantry, there is no reason amphibious infantrymen cannot be employed in Afghanistan.
Option two involves tasking a brigade as the amphibious brigade similar to the US Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit and Britain’s Royal Marines. This option has the potential to dilute amphibious skills across three battalions which would presumably rotate through amphibious battlegroup responsibilities. Option three goes one step further and envisages all of Australia’s ten battlegroups rotating through the amphibious role. This model allows the cultivation of very broad amphibious skills, but does not permit the development of expertise such as that of the ADF’s coalition partners. For a small army such as Australia’s to seek to develop skills comparable to the Royal Marines and US Marine Corps without focusing its limited resources on one battlegroup is ambitious indeed. Thus this option will most likely dilute expertise to such an extent that the ADF will not only fail to develop skill-sets comparable to those of its coalition partners, but may fall short of developing sufficient expertise to successfully prosecute amphibious operations at all.

Littoral manoeuvre must remain focused on projection and sustainment of land forces from major fleet units into the land area of operations. This is a capability that must be built through training and the acquisition of capable platforms. Currently, amphibious operations are not focused sufficiently on the land force, with the Amphibious Task Group preoccupied instead with the manoeuvre of RAN major fleet units rather than holistic land, sea and air manoeuvre in support of land force operations. This focus would be assured with the appointment of a Commander Australian Amphibious Task Group from the Army rather than the RAN.

A paradigm shift in training and operations is also required if the ADF is to develop an amphibious capability commensurate with that of its coalition partners. The projection and sustainment of an effective land force requires personnel and equipment capable of negotiating the challenges of the littoral for a longer period than the initial lodgement. These are the enablers that will determine the way an operation is executed and whether distributed manoeuvre, ship-to-objective manoeuvre and sea-basing are viable. These enablers require resource allocation and robust conceptual development to ensure littoral manoeuvre is not constrained by a lack of suitable platforms or knowledge. Smaller, faster landing craft coupled with amphibians provide the means to rapidly project force, extract foreign nationals, distribute aid or deploy medical teams. This capability is vital for both warfighting and disaster relief.

To train, look and fight like Marines, the Army needs to significantly enhance its amphibious training and—just as importantly—acquire platforms with similar capabilities to those of its coalition partners.
Conceptually, amphibious operations require a flexible, specifically trained and balanced force with the ability to project swiftly from LHDs and continue to operate within the littoral and river systems once the ships have departed. While the acquisition of the ADAS system will provide a means of projecting and supporting forces within and beyond Australia’s primary operating environment, it is littoral manoeuvre within the amphibious operating environment that requires a paradigm shift, as the Chief of Army noted recently, ‘Our Army amphibious capability does not necessarily need to be called Marines but it needs to train, look and fight like Marines.’¹⁷ To train, look and fight like Marines, the Army needs to significantly enhance its amphibious training and—just as importantly—acquire platforms with similar capabilities to those of its coalition partners.

The ADAS system provides the means to transit to theatre; however, it does not provide the means to conduct all aspects of littoral manoeuvre. Once the Amphibious Task Group has arrived in theatre, the focus must shift from the maritime component to land force manoeuvre. In order to conduct extended tactical land force manoeuvre within the littoral a range of surface vessels must be available to the Commander Land Forces, not just the Maritime Commander. If the ADF is to build an amphibious capability comparable to that of Britain and the United States, it must be prepared to resource additional training and acquire equipment that can operate tactically within the littoral. Without a capable amphibious and small, fast and armed watercraft, the ADF may lack the ability to conduct anything other than a linear beach landing in a single location. Training and equipping a capable amphibious force is much more than purchasing a few large ships and landing craft. To become a truly capable amphibious force and realise its amphibious ambitions, Australia must be able to dominate the coastal area and river systems through the use of capable platforms and well-trained personnel. The ADAS system must become a platform capable of supporting littoral manoeuvre within Australia’s primary operating environment and beyond.

ENDNOTES

1 Australia’s Amphibious Concept (version 5.2), Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, 2010.
2 Defence White Paper, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, p. 73
3 Australia’s Amphibious Concept (version 5.2).
4 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
Australia’s Amphibious Ambition

7 For a description of this operation, see ‘539 Assault Squadron Royal Marines’, <http://www.onceamarinealwaysamarine.co.uk/539telic.htm> accessed 5 August 2010.
9 Australia’s Amphibious Concept (version 5.2).
12 Chief of Army’s address to Seapower 2010 Conference, Darling Harbour, 27 January 2010.
16 Chief of Army’s address to Seapower 2010 Conference.
17 ‘The Amphibious Amphitheatre’.

The Author

In 2010, Captain Clark was employed as the Officer Commanding the Amphibious Beach Team. During this time he conducted exercises with the New Zealand, United States, French and United Kingdom amphibious forces. He was also attached to 3rd Royal Marine Commando Brigade for Exercise AURIGA, which was conducted in the United States. Captain Clark is now employed as the Officer Commanding 30 Terminal Squadron.
Chris Forbes-Ewan has twenty-five years’ experience as a Defence nutritionist with the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO). He is based at DSTO-Scottsdale (aka Defence Nutrition and Food Technology). In this response to an article in the Winter 2010 issue of the *Australian Army Journal*, Chris argues that, although it is far from perfect, the Combat Ration One Man does make adequate nutrition available for ADF members.

*A man’s ration is part of his pay. As we do not pay him in counterfeit money, let us ensure that we do not give him poor food.*

Field Marshall Viscount Slim of Burma

Private Robison is to be commended for having the welfare of ADF members at heart. He is correct in noting that CRP do not currently fully satisfy the needs and wants of ADF members. However, his article contains some factual errors. In this article, Private Robison’s claims are compared with results from published DSTO reports and the wider scientific literature.

ENERGY REQUIREMENTS COMPARED TO ENERGY AVAILABILITY

Private Robison states that ‘A 21-year-old infantry male soldier in the field … is expected to expend approximately 4000 calories a day.’ (Note: 4000 calories is approximately 16,700 kJ).

This is probably an overestimation—Morrissey et al. reported that Australian soldiers engaged in typical field exercises in jungle and desert environments have mean energy expenditures of a little over 15,000 kJ per man per day.¹ The references given by Private Robison for his higher estimate include Kaare Rodahl’s ‘Nutritional Requirements in Cold Climates’. It is correct that soldiers in cold climates will need 10–15 per cent greater energy intake to do the same work as compared to warm climates.² However, the vast majority of ADF training and operations are conducted in warm climates, so the general-purpose ADF pack—the Combat Ration One Man (CR1M)—provides about 15,500 kJ.³

Private Robison claims that, ‘if a soldier eats every item in an Australian Army CRP … they will consume approximately 2800 calories.” (Note: 2800 calories is approximately 11,700 kJ). He also states that this is less than the energy provided by rations from several other nations, and that it will lead to negative energy balance (loss of body weight and of body energy reserves) even if soldiers eat all the available food.

As mentioned above, the CR1M provides approximately 15,500 kJ, equal to the average energy expenditure of soldiers studied on two field exercises. Further, it is virtually identical to the average energy provided by the general-purpose ration packs of ten NATO nations involved in a Research Technical Group from 2006 to 2009, in which Australia is also a member.⁴ If soldiers eat all the food available in the CR1M while engaging in typical field exercises or operations, there will be no serious level of negative energy balance.

MACRONUTRIENTS (PROTEIN, FAT AND CARBOHYDRATE)

Based on an extrapolation from civilian nutritional requirements, Private Robison claims that ADF members on typical operations need ‘about 450g carbohydrates, 150g protein and 110g fat’ per day, and that these macronutrient levels are not available in CRP.
It is not appropriate to scale up macronutrient requirements with increasing energy expenditure. In particular, the need for dietary protein does not increase linearly with energy expenditure. The Australian Institute of Sport recommends that protein intake for *endurance* (heavy training) should be in the range 1.2–1.6g per kilogram of body weight per day. Assuming that soldiers on typical operations are expending energy at similar rates to athletes engaged in heavy training, protein availability in CRP should be in the range 1.2–1.6g per kilogram per day.

In a recent study, sixty-one infantry soldiers had a mean body weight of 82kg. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that CRP should provide between 98g and 131g of protein. The CR1M provides about 108g of protein, which is within the recommended range.

The CR1M also provides nearly 600g of carbohydrate and about 116g of fat. These values exceed the minimum requirements suggested by Private Robison for carbohydrate (450g) and fat (110g).

**CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF CRP DISCARDING**

Private Robison correctly points out that ‘The majority of soldiers do not consume all of the contents of a CRP. The importance of this observation cannot be over-emphasised.’ This problem applies not only to ADF CRP, but also to rationing by our NATO allies, and is subject to intensive research in several nations, including Australia.

Under various tasks, research is being conducted on how food consumption can be increased when troops are fed with CRP. Investigation is also proceeding into how the CRP supply chain may be revised to decrease the time between manufacture of CRP food items and their consumption in the field. Speeding up the process of procuring, packing and distributing CRP would result in troops having access to more acceptable food with a higher retention of vitamins. It would also allow a greater variety of foods to be included in CRP—currently many foods are not potential ration pack items because they do not have sufficient shelf-life (e.g. nuts and many dried fruits). Finally, investigation is being conducted on whether ration packs need to be developed for specific operational situations (e.g. short-term/high-intensity, long-term/low-intensity) and/or specific environmental conditions (e.g. heat, cold, altitude). A prototype hot-weather ration pack has already been field-trialled, and was found to lead to greater consumption in a hot climate than the standard CR1M. A prototype pack has also been developed for short-term/high intensity operations.
SUGAR AND ARTIFICIAL SWEETENERS

Private Robison states that the quantity of sugar provided ‘increases the chance of type 2 diabetes, tooth decay and cancer … and slows mental and muscular recovery.’

There is no convincing evidence that sugar consumption causes type 2 diabetes. For example, the American Diabetes Association states that ‘the myth that sugar causes diabetes is commonly accepted by many people. Research has shown that it isn’t true …’. Nor is there convincing evidence for an association with cancer. Private Robison is correct when he states that consumption of sugary foods is the main contributor to tooth decay—but with appropriate dental hygiene in the field, this problem should not affect soldiers’ individual readiness. Also, Private Robison (among others) may be pleased to hear that next year’s build of CR1M will include dental chewing gum.

It is not accurate to claim that sugar ‘slows mental and muscular recovery’. On the contrary, glucose (which constitutes one half of sugar) is the only fuel the brain can use, other than during starvation or semi-starvation. Similarly, repletion of muscle glycogen following exhaustive exercise requires a readily available supply of glucose—sugar performs this role as well as any other food.

It is also stated that ‘another problem with relying on sugar as a fuel source is its quick high, then equally quick low’. This is a condition known as rebound (or reactive) hypoglycaemia. Burke points out that ‘in most cases this is short term and metabolism corrects itself as exercise continues … Nevertheless, the stigma about eating carbohydrate before exercise persists, and many athletes and coaches talk about “rebound hypoglycaemia” with fear, even though eating carbohydrate could provide extra fuel.’

Private Robison claims that artificial sweeteners fool the body into believing that sufficient energy has been consumed, and so lead to reduced food intake. He also lists ‘a number of alleged side-effects associated with consumption of artificial sweeteners including bloating, diarrhoea, nausea, skin irritations, wheezing, coughing, chest pains, heart palpitations, anxiety, anger, moods swings and depression.’ No references are provided for these claims, so it is difficult to comment on their authenticity. However, it may be relevant to point out that ‘… it is the position of the American Dietetic Association that consumers can safely enjoy a range of nutritive and non-nutritive sweeteners …’. It is also of relevance that only one component—chewing gum—of the CR1M contains artificial sweetener, so soldiers will obtain an insignificant amount of these sweeteners even if they consume the entire CRP.
SALT

Another alleged problem with the CR1M is that it does not provide enough salt: ‘… it is estimated that an average soldier will only eat about 1–1.5g worth of salt from their CRP per day’. This claim is not referenced.

The CR1M actually provides approximately 14g of salt.14 This is more than ten times the salt level estimated by Private Robison to be available in the CR1M. Further, most of this salt is in the food itself, rather than in the salt sachet, so unless the soldier is discarding the vast majority of his food he should obtain adequate salt from the CR1M. For example, soldiers from 1 RAR who took part in a study at Tully in 2008 had a measured consumption of about 6g of salt from CR1M each day.15

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Private Robison’s suggested solutions to these perceived problems include extending the range of foods, by adding (for example), ‘salted peanuts, salted cashews, almonds, sunflower seeds and pumpkin seeds’ and ‘mixed nuts’. While this is a good suggestion in theory—and some nuts (e.g. walnuts) may be suitable for inclusion in CRP—because of the current lag time between manufacture and consumption of CRP most of the suggested foods are not suitable ration pack components (they tend to develop rancidity during storage). Another consideration is the relatively high rate of nut allergies in the Australian population; nuts and nut products are not permitted in CRP at present. However, a ‘nut-free’ trail mix is currently undergoing assessment to see if it is suitable for inclusion in the CR1M in future.

Private Robison also recommends the inclusion of dried fruits in CRP. Although dried fruits are already included in the form of fruit grains in the CR1M, Private Robison’s suggestion that a variety of dried fruits should be available is worthwhile. However, many dried fruits undergo browning and loss of flavour during storage, making them inappropriate components of CRP at present.

If the time between manufacture and consumption of CRP can be substantially shortened, Private Robison’s valuable suggestions may be able to be put into effect—a much wider range of nuts, seeds, dried fruits (and of foods generally) could all be considered for inclusion.

Private Robison recommends including beef jerky in the CR1M. He (and many other soldiers) will be pleased to know that a Beef Steak Bar (similar to beef jerky)
has been added to the CR1M. However, because of the time taken for CRP to complete their passage through the supply chain, it will be several years before the Beef Steak Bar will be enjoyed by soldiers in the field.

Private Robison also recommends (appropriately) that a program of nutrition education be conducted and that 'ideally, this training would be delivered during foundation courses at institutions such as the Army Recruit Training Centre and the Royal Military College'.

The most efficient and effective way in which healthy eating by ADF members can be promoted is being investigated by DSTO under an Army-sponsored task. Nutrition education of recruits at ARTC has been recommended previously, while ADF-wide, through-career nutrition education has also been recommended. Finally, DSTO is contributing to revision of the Dietary Guidelines for Australians, which will include recommendations for individuals with higher energy requirements (such as endurance athletes and soldiers) and the development of a Military Guide to Healthy Eating.

**CONCLUSION**

Private Robison has shown an admirable level of concern about the nutritional status and military preparedness of ADF members who are required to subsist on CRP. Many of his suggestions are worthwhile, and some are in the process of being implemented (or at least investigated further). However, his article does not accurately reflect the current nutritional quality of the CR1M, and the situation is perhaps not quite as dire as he paints it.

This does not mean that ADF CRP are without problems. However, as described above, these problems are being addressed by DSTO in conjunction with Army, DMO, FORCOMD and Joint Logistics.

For general information on Defence nutrition research conducted by DSTO-Scottsdale, I recommend the report by Forbes-Ewan (2009), which is available electronically on the Defence Restricted Intranet at: http://dspace-dsto.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/handle/dsto/7391

**ENDNOTES**


More Food for Thought


4 Ibid.


6 C Kullen, C Booth, J Carins and A Fogarty, 'Field evaluation of the prototype HWR,' DSTO Technical Report in publication, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2010.


8 Ibid.

9 Ibid, section 3.3.1.1.

10 Kullen, *et al*, 'Field evaluation of the prototype HWR.'


15 Kullen, *et al*, 'Field evaluation of the prototype HWR.'


THE AUTHOR

Chris Forbes-Ewan has twenty-five years’ experience in Defence nutrition, including extensive research into food acceptability, food intake, energy expenditure and physical performance enhancement. For ten years he was the Australian National Leader of an international defence technical panel under The Technical Cooperation Program. This panel conducted collaborative and cooperative research into performance enhancement for special and conventional operations. From 2006 to 2009 Chris was the Australian member of a NATO Research Technical Group that developed optimal standards for combat ration packs. Chris is continuing his research into aids to military performance and nutritional promotion of health and military fitness.
Reflections

Wool Gathering in the CO’s Office

Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Hoskin

Abstract

‘Wool Gathering in the CO’s Office’ is an article in two parts. Firstly, it proposes a model for the Psychological Contract between Army and its personnel, and postulates that a fundamental role of commanders is to uphold this contract. Secondly, it provides a series of discrete observations about the practice of command at unit level. The author’s aim is to share his experiences in order to assist future COs and provide them with a head start on their own journey of command.

I was privileged to have spent two years commanding 3 CER, and I loved every minute of it. Apart from the enjoyment of being a brigade soldier again, and the pleasure of regimental life, I found the exercise of command to be a deeply intellectually engaging pursuit. The complexity of decision-making was actually pretty simple but, with a wide sphere of influence, responsibility for a large number of people and the need to nurture every aspect of the Regiment for the long term, it was a very thought-provoking time. I have no pretensions to excellence in the role or claims of revolutionary initiatives but I thought it may be of interest to share some of my thoughts.
MISSION COMMAND

The most rewarding leadership experience is seeing subordinates achieve wonderful things on their own initiative; feeling pleasantly surprised by the methods employed, happily watching events unfold knowing that you set the conditions for success, yet with a light touch and in a way that your subordinates largely feel they have done it on their own. We don't always achieve this, despite espousing Mission Command. Why is this? I think it is because of a lack of self-discipline and investment by commanders. All too often, people claim to be Mission Commanders in the belief that staying out of the subordinates' way is a virtue in its own right. This is simplistic and lazy. What tends to happen is that the subordinate gets poor initial guidance (‘I’m busy and it will do him good to work it out for himself, and I can assess him better this way’), then continues manfully until things stray from the Commander’s (belatedly considered) Intent. By then it’s too late for a light touch and the Commander re-injects himself to get things back on track, employing Directive Control and leaving all parties disgruntled. It is all very well to let people learn from their mistakes, but in reality it is wasteful to make a habit of this: while one leader executes his flawed plan, his subordinates are learning bad lessons, getting frustrated and expending scarce resources. Better to let the lesson be learned ‘virtually’ via the back brief process, than reinforce success via execution of a good plan. I think that the respective roles of commander and subordinate commander in good Mission Command can be visualised as follows:

The notable features of this approach are as follows:

- Creation of a sound Command Climate in which people know each other well at a personal level, trust each other and have a confident sense of how each other would react to unforeseen events. This takes time and effort. Examples include social interaction, training to shared doctrine, lessons learned sessions, debriefs and a forgiving approach to well-intentioned mistakes. It is helpful to use Mission Command effectiveness as the base criteria for counselling, whether positive or negative. For example, ‘That was a great initiative and I am glad you got on with it while I was away, this is why I am very happy to employ Mission Command with you,’ or ‘What you just did was outside my intent, as clearly expressed to you in the OGP and further discussed in the Back Brief. I am finding it hard to work with you using Mission Command because you keep doing things like this. I will be forced to employ Directive Control with you until we can re-generate the right Command Climate.’
Early investment by the Commander in direction-setting: taking the time to think through the problem, allocate the right resources, then express his intent well. A written Commander’s Intent document works superbly. This is surprisingly rare. Our culture seems to accept that busy commanders can shoot from the hip—a very false time economy and an abrogation of responsibility.

A good back brief by the subordinate commander. This provides essential clarity, the opportunity to adjust resource allocations, and most importantly a strong sense of confidence. If the subordinate commander’s plan is seriously flawed, then this is the time for the commander to decide whether to allow him to go ahead anyway and learn valuable lessons or, by a process of teasing-out, perhaps allow the same lessons to be learned in discussion with a better plan developed for execution. It is very easy to leave a subordinate alone to get on with it once he has provided a good back brief. A quick series of ‘what-if’ discussions during the back brief would also deeply reinforce the Mission Command environment.

Occasional visits from the Commander. The first visit provides an azimuth check and an opportunity for the higher headquarters to troubleshoot in support of the team. All going well, the second visit should simply be an opportunity to recognise success and the third visit to confirm the end game and provide a Warning Order for the next task.

Self-assessment by the Commander. If issues arise during a subordinate’s execution of a task, then the commander should ask himself where he failed: poor command climate, poorly expressed Intent, insufficient attention to the back brief, failure to allocate appropriate resources, or incorrect choice to employ Mission Command with an ill-suited subordinate. Only after doing so should he then consider what went wrong at the lower level.

Mission Command is not a condition of service. It is an enjoyable and highly effective leadership approach, but it requires hard work and, in particular, an early investment of time by the commander.

**TIME MANAGEMENT**

How to get Rudyard Kipling’s ‘sixty seconds’ worth of distance run’ from every minute? Somehow all that automation and labour-saving equipment have only added to our workload, and most of us are over-stretched all the time. In the case of
ADF units, the demands of operational tempo and corporate governance are nearing extreme levels. Arguably, time management is one of the great challenges of our era. A good leader needs to focus hard on key activities yet spread his influence widely, and to manage diligently yet lead strategically. He needs to be accessible to his people but also remain objective and interconnected with the external environment. The best leaders achieve a balanced existence including cultural interests beyond work, happy family relationships and friendships and time to themselves for rest and reflection. I found time management to be a particularly strong pre-occupation while in command, both personally and as a leadership issue for my people. There are some very good books about this, but the key points are:

1. Be self-disciplined and own your own time
2. Be as systematic as possible
3. Ruthlessly distinguish between ‘urgent’ and ‘important’
4. Jealously guard the time you need for strategic planning and direction-setting
5. Allocate plenty of time to visiting unit activities and mentoring your people
6. Fill the gaps with the remainder

This is very tough to achieve. I am certain that if I did nothing but sit at my desk for two years, I would have been fully occupied responding to emails and administrative paperwork. This would not be a good look for the CO of a Combat Support Unit in a high readiness formation. Email is a killer, but has to be managed somehow. The following time management protocols proved useful:

- No meetings or phone calls before 0900 or after 1600, thereby leaving people alone at the most productive (or family-oriented) times of day.
- Only check emails and do admin three times a day at specified periods, and don’t assume people will have read emails outside these time frames—use the phone if something urgent arises. Switch off distracting email alerts, send cc: emails to a discrete (rarely-checked folder) and get on with real work.
- Base everyone’s time management around MS Outlook, with shared calendars and a strong culture of diary management for your own activities and respecting the plans of others.
- Email discipline: clearly-specified actions and responsibilities, no use of unnecessary or a@#%-covering ‘cc:’, use ‘bcc:’ only for genuine privacy reasons and empty your inbox daily.
- Get written work done early or late in the day and allocate usable chunks of time to getting out and about, conducting battle procedure or planning ahead.

These proved worthy targets; hard to achieve but immensely helpful at wresting back control of time and well worth continual striving.
WOOL GATHERING IN THE CO’S OFFICE

- Programming time for family activities is good leadership (e.g. taking kids to school occasionally, lunch with partner, personal admin—all clearly visible in your shared diary).
- Avoid and disguise after-hours work wherever possible (e.g. don’t send emails on a Sunday, save them as drafts to send on Monday); it’s subtle but this has a strong effect on work/life culture.
- Operational contingencies or urgent personnel welfare issues over-rule all the above. These proved worthy targets; hard to achieve but immensely helpful at wrestling back control of time and well worth continual striving.

CUSTODIAN OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT

The psychological contract between the Army and its people is not written down anywhere, but it is deeply felt and has ten fundamental tenets:

1. The Army will train you well, pay you well, give you lots of benefits, maintain your health and fitness and generally look after you and your family in every possible way. In return we will work you hard, take you away for long periods, force you to move around the country, generally stuff you around and possibly one day order you to go out and kill or be killed in combat.
2. The Army exists to serve the interests of the Australian people as expressed by the elected government of the day. War and the employment of military force are dreadful events, and should be avoided wherever possible. However, due to human nature, there will always be a need for good people to have force available to uphold justice and peaceful security.
3. The decision to employ force is strictly not a military one. In an imperfect world of difficult decisions and strategic uncertainty the process of democracy is the best available. Military leaders will provide frank and fearless advice but the decision to employ force is made by government. Soldiers have to accept this. Our decision to keep serving contains an implicit commitment to do whatever is asked, without any discretion to opt out of a specific operation. Mistakes will inevitably be made, but military force will not knowingly be employed in an ill-considered or ethically unsound manner. No matter what the rights and wrongs of a particular campaign are perceived to be, the soldiers are doing their rightful duty and will be supported regardless.
4. The chain of command exists to accomplish the Army’s missions. This is the enduring first priority. ‘People first’ is over-simplistic: people are the means to an end, albeit the most important means. The chain of command will make hard-headed decisions to get the job done, while also exerting itself to look after people in a selfless manner. Goodwill capital generated by people-centric leadership is a valuable asset, but sometimes tough decisions will draw it down.
5. If you become a casualty in the line of duty, then you have taken a hit on behalf of every Australian, so you and your family will be looked after for as long as it takes.

6. In this day and age, conflict is localised and often occurs far from home. Most of society gets on with its prosperous existence unaffected by war, relying on a small military force to uphold security and bear the brunt of doing so. This fact is recognised and appreciated.

7. The Army is not a cut-throat, competitive organisation where you only advance by undermining others. There is an equitable and transparent system. If you work hard, uphold your values, have faith and let the system do its part, then the right things will happen. Not everyone gets to be a general or serve overseas, but such is life. Grace and realism are the keys to happiness, not success.

8. You do not need to fight for your rights or conditions of service. That is the role of the chain of command and other advocates. Stay out of it, have confidence in those that represent you, and don’t tarnish the Army’s reputation by being seen as self-serving.

9. If you are diligent, competent and behave well you will receive good reports, promotion, the best jobs and maybe even some sort of personal recognition. If you are lazy, incompetent or badly behaved you will be identified as such and required to either improve or go elsewhere. There is no point in looking sideways—the truth always comes out eventually.

10. Army life is fun and adventurous. Our job includes travel, camaraderie, personal challenge, exposure to other cultures and exhilarating experiences. A lot of what we do does not look like work. This is part of the deal. While the chain of command does need to manage risk and corporate responsibilities, the enjoyment and flair must be maintained.

This psychological contract results in Army careers that fit into a very narrow envelope of ethical, practical and spiritual balances. It can be highly rewarding and generates profound commitment. The ten tenets are perhaps idealistic, and we have all experienced breaches of contract (generally by the principal), yet they are very real. A profound and spiritual role of commanders is to uphold this contract on behalf of all their people. It’s not easy, and generally these are the issues you will need to fight for. Expect to spend some time on this and be challenged by hard decisions. Also, your people will need you to provide leadership and understanding—keep the psychological contract in mind when you write your ANZAC Day speech and every other time something difficult happens and you need to speak to the unit.
**DECISION-MAKING**

One striking feature of command is the sheer volume of decisions needing to be made, often with a time imperative. As noted above, few of these are particularly complex. The trick is to siphon off those decisions that need further attention and otherwise power ahead. ‘Best is the enemy of good enough’ in many cases, and most things arrive on the CO’s desk after passing through a chain of well-informed and diligent subject-matter-experts. A few thoughts follow on dealing with the difficult ones:

- The ‘muscle memory’ of 20 years’ service provides great intuition. Make the leap of faith in your own judgment and be confident that the chain of command will back your decisions. Our system has many checks and balances so fear of the occasional mistake shouldn’t slow you down.

- As a CO your Situational Awareness becomes very developed and it often takes very little to trigger your sense of disquiet. Follow your instincts and ask a few probing questions if something doesn’t seem right—often a light tap on the tiller will save real problems later.

- The truth sets you free. Making tough decisions and being candid and direct are all command responsibilities. Such actions continually reinforce your position and the confidence of your team. Integrity is built slowly. Conversely, a part of something important dies forever with every weak decision or mealy-mouthed explanation.

- Statement of Reasons. If an outcome is likely to be controversial or goes against others’ recommendations, then simply providing a rationale with your decision can be very effective. A lot of effort spent on redress action is wasted and could be avoided. If you have the habit of providing a Statement of Reasons with your decisions then people appreciate your effort, respect your candour and generally accept the outcome. Often it is a good mentoring experience for junior leaders too, helping them understand issues they had missed.

- Benign neglect. If an issue is vexed and the way ahead unclear, yet resolution is not urgent, then often the wisest approach is to stay defilade and await further developments. People sometimes push you for decisions that really don’t need to be made.

- ‘Nothing in war is ever as good or as bad as the first reports of excited men would have it.’ You will often be presented with tales of woe and imminent disaster by your OCs and other key staff. Keep your powder dry. Most often the initial prognosis is exaggerated and the crisis never eventuates. The experience gap...
between a CO and his (generally) young majors is sometimes quite poignant. That said, I suspect that formation commanders may occasionally feel the same way about their unit commanders.

- None of us is perfect: you will make mistakes and fail occasionally to show enough strength of character. If you have a shocker then dust yourself off, be honest with yourself and others and get back on the horse.

**PILOT’S ADVICE, CAPTAIN’S ORDERS**

COs are provided with advice from many quarters and it is not always correct or consistent. We need to be robust in maintaining independent judgment. This point is not always well understood. For example, it is easy to be seduced by legal advice in the mistaken belief that it is direction, and therefore definitive and inviolable. This is not the case. Bear in mind that the legal profession spends much of its time second-guessing its own ‘judgments’ through the appeals system, and that legal advice is only based on a narrow field of view compared with the array of competing priorities faced by a commander. Listen to the advice, then make your own decision and instruct the legal adviser to find a way to codify and protect your chosen course of action. The better lawyers get this and will be only too happy to help—you are the decision-maker and they are but one of the ‘consultants’ there to help you.

Other ‘consultants’ out there include health professionals, logisticians, Military Police, Padres, engineers, OH&S advisers, Military Risk Managers, security advisers and the Technical Regulatory Framework. The same principle applies—listen to the advice, make your own judgment then require the specialist to use his expertise in support of your plan.

**TRAINING**

Regardless of the Strategic Reform Program, our training time and resources are precious and good training builds people’s confidence in their leaders. A talk-crawl-walk-run approach is best, yet we often seem to be learning in the field, leaping far ahead of people’s understanding. Far better to educate people, then practice and rehearse them at small scale, and only then attempt the real thing. We have all been trained in a great diversity of skills and are therefore rusty at most of them. Start a
Wool Gathering in the CO’s Office

training activity with classroom revision, followed by some sort of simulation (e.g. a war game or Rehearsal of Concept Drill using a mud model, or computer-based simulation, or simply working through it on a whiteboard), then conduct a small-scale rehearsal at slow tempo with instructors present, then finally do it for real. The results will be far better than business-as-usual, and will make considerably better use of scarce resources.

Retreat to Advance

Take your team away occasionally, somewhere outside mobile phone range and DRN connectivity. This needn’t cost much (or make you undesirably famous for gross breach of the Strategic Reform Program). For example, a handful of unit CSS personnel can support a good retreat activity somewhere in a training area—a bit of imagination will provide good options. Get the sub-unit commanders and their sergeant majors plus your Tight 5 and spend two days outside the box. I suggest three key objectives: firstly, simply get people to know each other; secondly, pick out some key strategic planning tasks and get them knocked over without distractions; and finally, select one area of professional development that will benefit everyone. For example:

1. Inspirational Person: Require everyone to give a short brief on someone that inspires them. This is a good icebreaker and very interesting. More importantly, it allows people to share something personal and immediately breaks down barriers of rank and unfamiliarity. Many late night conversations arise from this.

2. Ten Targets: Each person briefs on the ten things they would like to see happen during their time in the unit. This activity recognises that there are many people in the unit that are just as passionate about it as you and the RSM. It is unifying, and the varying perspectives are fascinating. Everyone walks away with a strong sense of how to help others succeed in their particular lane, and for the CO it is very informative (and humbling) about what makes people tick and how the unit works.

3. Professional Development: Spend a few hours on a key topic, whether military or more general. Try and pick something relevant but more sophisticated than normal Professional Military Education sessions. Examples might include time management, cultural awareness or campaign planning. While you could pay for an external instructor there are alternatives such as harnessing the knowledge within your own team.

This activity recognises that there are many people in the unit that are just as passionate about it as you and the RSM.
4. Guest Speaker: Bring someone in to speak with the group, preferably in a relaxed setting (over dinner with a bottle of red if you can arrange it). Your choice of speaker may be related to your chosen area of professional development, perhaps someone that you think will inspire the group in other ways, or maybe your formation commander. There are lots of Army tribal elders who enjoy doing this and who will cost you only an airfare.

THE BOSS

It is surprising how little a CO sees of his formation commander, much less than an OC sees of his CO for example. COs have a lot of autonomy and formation commanders are extremely busy people. As a general rule, your formation commander will expect you to get on with business and be responsible for your own decisions, and will be grateful to be left in peace most of the time. Some good advice provided by a former Brigade Commander is to batch process—if you haven’t spoken with your boss for a while (say two weeks) then gather up a list of things to catch up on, and arrange a time at his convenience for a telephone chat. You will soon work out what he wants and needs to know about or be consulted on, and how. It is also good for the command climate to keep in occasional contact like this. It is best to avoid badgering him by email (especially unnecessary cc’s), and if you want an issue resolved prepare a short written brief. It will be appreciated if you make a point of always acknowledging directives and provide feedback as appropriate (e.g. ‘we will achieve this by …’, ‘the effect on my unit will be …’, ‘this is unachievable because …’). No commander likes to be seen to change his mind so, if you see a decision looming and believe it will be wrong, get in early before your boss risks losing face.

Command at all levels is sometimes lonely, perhaps more so at formation level than in the regimental environment. Therefore don’t be afraid to provide positive feedback upwards…
BAD THINGS HAPPEN IN GOOD BATTALIONS

I don’t know who said this first, but I often had reason to think of it. When something goes wrong don’t take it personally or feel a need to manage it in-house in order to guard your reputation. Problems are a fact of life and our responses say more about us than the problems themselves. The Quick Assessment is an excellent tool for this. There is considerable strategic sensitivity to any incident that may harm Army’s reputation. Accept this and just call things as you see them. The CO’s comments on Quick Assessment quickly make their way to high places via the Army Incident Management System. Decisive, well-considered and ethical action will be respected.

CLOSING THOUGHTS

Command is a wonderful life experience. Those who get this chance are very lucky. Many of my friends who were at least as deserving did not get the opportunity. I often reflected on this and sought to do well in their honour as well as for the normal reasons. It would be good to bottle the experience and then open the lid occasionally for the rest of my life and have a sniff. I sought to achieve this by maintaining a daily journal and this has become a prized possession. Command is a philosophical journey, with many lessons learned and humbling experiences, as well as all the glamorous bits and the fun. Getting it down on paper is cathartic in the short term and fascinating in review.

As one of my peers said, command is pretty easy because you inherit a mantle of respect and authority, and (nearly) everyone in the unit just wants to help you succeed. It is humbling and confronting to see just how much respect is placed in the institution of a CO. With our feet of clay it is hard to be everything that is expected of us, but that is the role. The concept of love could be defined as ‘caring deeply about someone, being fascinated by what they do, wanting to help them grow, accepting them as worthy despite their faults and wanting to do everything possible for them without demanding reciprocation.’ That is also a good definition of the mindset a CO should have towards his people en masse. I am deeply grateful to have had this opportunity and I will always remember the magnificent people of the regiment I was privileged to command.
ENDNOTES

1 ‘Wool gathering’: an old English expression meaning ‘to indulge in wandering fancies and purposeless thinking’. It originates from the practice of sending children out to collect tufts of wool windblown onto hedgerows, a relaxing past-time that left plenty of time for idle chatter and distracted pensiveness. An example of modern usage would be ‘Plagued by guilt, they took refuge in wine, women and wool gathering’ [Ruthless Trust, Brennan Manning].

2 For example, 3 CER employs a template, filled out hastily by hand or typed. Fields for Title, Individuals Responsible, Purpose, Method, End State, Back Brief Requirements, Commander’s Remarks.

3 For example: Steven Covey, Seven Habits of Highly Effective People, Free Press, 1989.

4 A nautical expression referring to the employment of locally expert pilots to aid navigation: no matter what the pilot says, the ship’s captain always maintains command of the ship and responsibility for safe passage.

THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Hoskin is a Sapper officer, currently in command of the 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment. He has served in a variety of command, staff and training appointments in 3 CER, 3 Bde, 21 Construction Squadron, ADFA and Army Headquarters. He has tertiary qualifications in engineering, business administration and defence studies and is a fluent French linguist. He has served on operations in Timor Leste and Bosnia. His career has included several non-military roles, including as a water engineering consultant to the UNHCR in Niger, as a project engineer building a jetty for Woodside on the North West Shelf of Australia, and as a site engineer on the Jubilee Line Extension Project in London.
**REVIEW ESSAY**


Reviewed by Captain Dayton McCarthy

This lively collection of essays aims to slay, or at the very least provide some context to, ten of the most resilient myths in Australian military history. The authors have a job on their hands as many of these myths form the staple subject matter for the bestselling books in popular Australian military history. In general, the authors succeed in this task. Whether *Zombie Myths* will subsequently spare Australian bookshelves from another ill-based tome is altogether less certain.

First, let us clear the air on what the book is and is not. It is not an attack on the institution of Anzac Day or the commemoration of Australian military history *per se*. In this way, *Zombie Myths* does not open a new front in the History Wars, but does note the link between many of these myths and the need to commemorate past deeds. Stockings *et al* are at pains to stress that these essays are neither ‘myth-busting’ for its own sake nor seek to denigrate or lessen the deeds of the soldiers themselves. Instead, the essays seek to reorient our understanding of past events. In doing so, Stockings argues, these myths ‘twist and distort our perceptions of war’ and ‘distort our reading of the present and expectations for the future’ (p. 3). For this reason, military professionals have much to gain from such a book; while those wedded to the prevailing narrative may find some essays confronting. In this respect, it will be interesting to see how this book is received in the wider community.

Some will also quibble on the final selection of myths in the book. In this reviewer’s mind, some of the ‘myths’ are truly on their last legs, while others are still being actively debated and yet to achieve ‘zombie myth’ status. John Connor’s examination of the so-called Frontier Wars is a case in point. This chapter aims to demonstrate that there *was* Aboriginal armed resistance to European settlement and that it was a ‘war’ despite colonial administrations refusing to use the term (for
a number of valid reasons). While none would dispute some form of warfare took place, others (myself included) would debate the use of the term ‘war’ in describing this conflict. But on this, Connor plays the Clausewitz trump card; if ‘war is an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will’, then how can the frontier conflicts not be considered a war?

Craig Wilcox’s chapter on Breaker Morant is bluntly titled ‘the murderer as martyr’ and leaves the reader in no doubt about its subject. Far from the unorthodox hero and ‘scapegoat of empire’ of lore, Morant is exposed as a serial liar, con-man and thug and the famed Bushveldt Carbineers no more than an irregular policing unit assigned to a relatively pacified region. The actions of Morant and his accomplices are revealed as murder—no more, no less. Furthermore, the conceit that it was a dirty war that required morally ambivalent actions to take the fight to the enemy is revealed as false—at least in relation to Morant’s case. One wonders how those who would commemorate Morant would consider the subject if a latter-day poorly-trained, irregular unit shot civilians or captured soldiers in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Some myths are easily despatched by simply providing context. Elizabeth Greenhalgh’s chapter on the supposed exceptionalism of the Australian Corps and the breaking of the Hindenburg Line in 1918 is one example. By demonstrating what other allied units were doing across the entire front, the contribution of the Australian Corps, while important, is shown to be part of the wider effort that applied the hard-won lessons of combined arms warfare into a cogent operational plan. Similarly, Peter Stanley and David Stevens launch a double-envelopment on the idea that Australia was fighting for its very life with the Japanese poised to invade in 1942. By examining the hard logistical realities facing Japanese operations in the Pacific and the fact that Allied control of the sea undermined any maritime/amphibious strategies, the authors demonstrate that Japan would not be able to supply and hold what land gains they had, let alone invade Australia. I suspect that Stevens, a naval historian, may have downplayed the importance of the land operations denying Japanese access to Port Moresby and Milne Bay, but he is correct in placing the Papuan campaigns in the wider context of the Pacific war.

Craig Stockings tackles perhaps the greatest of the military myths—that the Australian soldier is a ‘natural’ fighter—in the context the 1940–41 Libyan campaign against the Italians. He shows that military effectiveness is first and foremost a function of training and competent leadership. It is also relative to the quality of the enemy faced. So in the Greek Campaign, when the Australians did face an enemy who placed equal—or more—importance on combined arms warfare, training and small unit leadership, the outcome was altogether different. It is a shame that Stockings did not examine this myth in a wider context and over an extended period. One suspects that despite protestations and a far more intellectual veneer, the belief about ‘natural’ Australian soldiering abilities remains not far below the surface.
One of the more enjoyable chapters is Peter Dennis’ thorough demolition of the conspiracy theories surrounding the sinking of the HMAS Sydney in 1941. He exposes the various hucksters and conspiracy peddlers, some of whom concocted entire theories without a shred of evidence. The naval action demonstrated that the enemy ‘always gets a vote’ and that in war, events take a non-logical, non-linear turn which some may have difficulty rationalising. His chapter concludes with excerpts from the 2009 Commission of Inquiry, which finally despatched this particular zombie. To have been a fly on the wall in those hearings would have been fantastic; for those of us who were not, Dennis’ chapter is a great substitute.

The writing style is punchy throughout and all contributors have obviously taken to their brief with gusto and relish. As such, each chapter propels the reader into the next and the book may be completed in a sitting. Moreover, Stockings is to be congratulated for weaving a consistent tone and thematic thread across the disparate chapters. One wonders whether the book will do well enough for a second edition. If so, Stockings might consider the inclusion of some more recent myths, some of which are well on the way to ‘zombie’ status. One comes to mind—‘the ADF punches above its weight.’ I am sure there are many others out there.

Reviewed by David Goyne, Strategic Policy Division, Department of Defence

‘... man is the fundamental instrument in battle’ according to the nineteenth century French infantryman, Charles Ardant du Picq, who added, ‘Nothing can wisely be prescribed in an army—its personnel, organisation, discipline and tactics, things which are connected like the fingers of a hand—without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat.’\(^1\) Despite this realisation, it surprises me how little we know about soldiers in battle. We teach soldiers how to use their weapons and how to operate tactically, but we are still poor at teaching them how to understand their own reactions to combat and how to manage these, at least in so far as they can be managed.

Partly this is because there is little written to guide us. Only a few significant books have been written on this subject. Notable examples are Men Against Fire by S L A Marshall,\(^2\) one of the first; The Anatomy of Courage by Lord Moran,\(^3\) another pioneer work; The Warriors by J Glenn Gray,\(^4\) which is as much about the philosophy of men in war; The Sharp End of War by John Ellis,\(^5\) about the soldier’s experience in the Second World; Firing Line by Richard Holmes;\(^6\) and most recently On Killing by Dave Grossman,\(^7\) which deals with the psychology of killing in war. All of these serve to illuminate at least some aspects of man in battle; none are sufficient alone. This is surely a limited, if not exhaustive, list. If I was to try to catalogue instead books on the German Army in the Second World War, or the SAS, or the merits of different tanks, all the Army journals published this year would not be sufficient room. I don’t decry books on these subjects, but this balance only highlights how poorly the soldier in battle is addressed. Surely logistics is the only other field so poorly covered.

A new book, The Soldier, by a former Australian Army officer, Darren Moore, has joined this short list and is not the least ambitious, covering the soldier’s experience from the Napoleonic wars until today. Its scope is also broad, addressing the
relationship of the soldier and the state, recruitment, preparation for battle, the physical and psychological costs of battle, the relationship of war and sex, killing, media-military relations and the rationale—or lack of it—for war. The central act of soldiers killing is extensively covered with chapters on killing the enemy, friendly fire and military executions. This is a broad canvas and the question is, how does Moore cover it, and how well?

His methodology is to draw on personal experiences from published reminiscences. He uses an impressive range of books, many of which were new to me. This approach depends on the judicious selection of who and what to quote. Here Martin Windrow’s comment in his history of the French Foreign Legion is apposite:

‘… I am all too conscious that junior ranks frequently tell lies about their own lives—on the page, as well as in the pub. … I have allowed a discount not only for lapses of memory, but also for the tendency of story-tellers or their ghost-writers to reshape, embroider, or simply invent in order to give the public of their day the type of material that they expected. Some cross-checking has occasionally been possible, but in the end the sifting process can only be a matter of reasoned guesswork.’

Generally, Moore’s reasoned guesswork seems about right. Any empirical research is limited as a battlefield is not a controlled experiment. Du Picq circulated questionnaires to fellow officers, but was forced to rely as much on Greek and Roman classics on war. S L A Marshall could have used his mass battlefield interviews for an empirical approach, but that did not suit his more intuitive and journalistic nature. The only modern widely based empirical study I am aware of is the Second World War volumes by S A Stouffer and his colleagues based on questionnaires to US soldiers.

An area of caution with Moore’s approach concerns the commonality of the soldier’s experience across time, armies and cultures. At one level the experience of fear, pain and physical stress is ageless; Homer writing of battle on the ringing plains of windy Troy still resonates. On the other hand, I am cautious that the attitudes of, for example, a British soldier of the Napoleonic wars may not match those of a modern Australian or Western soldier. Changing cultures have remoulded expectations and attitudes to war. Similarly, the motivations and attitudes of Japanese kamikazes or modern suicide bombers are alien to mine. Each reader will have to judge for themselves this universal approach of The Soldier.

Moore’s wide scope means that he sometimes stretches himself thin compounded by his coverage of marginal areas, for example, executing comrades is a limited experience and gains undue proportion here. However, I fully endorse his coverage of love and sex. These are central to the soldier’s desires and experience and are too often ignored. In war soldiers crave and seek out a female touch, not necessarily even in a sexual sense, as a link to a softer world beyond his immediate experience.
If you are interested in man in battle this book is well worth your time. It is not the final word on this topic; attempting to comprehensively distil the soldier’s experience must fail in the face of the range of experience of the millions of soldiers there have been. Moore brings an Australian perspective to *The Soldier*, but I was pleased that he did not restrict himself to one national experience—this is rightly far from a chest-beating volume. Moore is pursuing a PhD at the University of New South Wales. I hope he continues to interest himself in and write on this area. We need more thinking on the fundamental instrument of battle.

ENDNOTES

9 Marshall’s free use of statistics led to controversy about his conclusions.
BOOK REVIEW


Reviewed by Gary Sheffield, Professor of War Studies, University of Birmingham, UK

Recently I had the privilege of leading a party of British army officers on a battlefield study to France to examine the 1940 campaign. As we stood overlooking the places where Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps crossed the Meuse and where the French armoured counterstroke fizzled out in a bitter but ultimately irrelevant struggle for the village of Stonne, I was struck that the operations of 1940 were essentially straightforward. The military experiences of the men and women in the party were largely concerned with highly complex operations. Almost all were veterans of the current operations in Afghanistan, and the sheer complexity of modern warfare was a frequent theme of our discussions. From some I detected a feeling bordering on envy for the simplicity of the tasks assigned to the men of 1940. Cross that river; counterattack that lodgement. The stakes at issue were huge, but the tasks were straightforward, if not easy.

The complexity of contemporary war is well reflected in Kassimeris and Buckley’s generally excellent collection of essays. The editors are to be congratulated on commissioning such an eclectic mix of chapters. Some such deal with very traditional topics. Leading experts such as Andrew Lambert, John Buckley and Antulio J Echevarria II demonstrate their expertise in chapters on, respectively, ‘Sea Power’ ‘Land Warfare: Attrition and Manoeuvre’ and ‘Strategic Thought: The Relevance of Clausewitz’. Each of these pieces, and others like them, can be recommended as concise discussions of key topics, each bearing the imprint of the deep knowledge and insights of their authors. Others, such as John Ferris’s article ‘After the RMA: Contemporary Intelligence, Power and War’ and Myriam Dunn Cavelty, ‘Cyberwar’ examine subjects that have established themselves in the mainstream in the last two decades, as a reflection of the emergent complexity of the post-Cold War world.
A representative chapter that deals with a very recent phenomenon is Chris Kinsey’s valuable chapter ‘Turning War into Business: Private Security Companies and Commercial Opportunism’. The re-emergence of mercenaries is perhaps one of the more surprising military developments in recent years, although given the trends of ideologically-driven politics and economic trends since the early 1980s, with an emphasis on shrinking the state and its corollary of privatisation, it is entirely logical. Kinsey argues that it was as recently as the 2003 Iraq War that private security companies demonstrated to governments how useful they could be, while simultaneously flagging the obvious problems. ‘The question,’ Kinsey argues, is no longer should governments be employing them, ‘but what roles governments should allocate them, when operating in the battle-space.’ Working alongside mercenaries, it seems, will become an increasingly common aspect of the military experience in the years to come. Perhaps fighting against them will as well.

But there are other chapters which strike off in very different directions. I suspect that many military professionals will glance at the contents pages and reject some articles as being too esoteric, or at least of less obvious use to busy military operators. In that sense, both Tony Shaw’s ‘Cinema and the Cold War: An International Perspective’ and Jonathan Pieslak’s ‘Music as an Inspiration for Combat among American Soldiers in Iraq’ suffer in comparison to the two pieces that follow: Stephen Badsey on ‘Media War and Media Management’ and Philip M Taylor on ‘From Psychological Warfare to Information Operations and Back Again.’ Yet one of the gems of the book has the apparently unpromising title ‘Forgetful Warriors: Neglected Lessons on Leadership from Plato’s Republic’.

In this chapter George R Lucas, drawing on Socrates’ discourse, makes a simple, elegant but vital point: soldiers can forget themselves, in the sense that a witness to the My Lai massacre, which he was instrumental in halting, said that the US soldiers murdering civilians ‘had forgotten what we had come here to do.’ Similar comments are cited about those involved in the maltreatment of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib. Socrates’ views on the need to ‘practice justice with knowledge in all we do’ directly concern leadership and the maintenance of core values. These insights get to the very heart of successful counterinsurgency. This eleven-page, accessible chapter should be required reading for all officers.

According to the blurb on the dust jacket, The Ashgate Research Companion to Modern Warfare intends ‘to offer scholars and graduate students a comprehensive and authoritative state-of-the art review of current research in a particular area.’ One can quibble about whether it is truly comprehensive—there are a lot of topics missed out—but it is certainly authoritative in the areas that it covers. Unfortunately it is expensive (£75 in the UK), and is yet another example of a book that will miss a large part of its potential audience because of its price. That would be a great shame. One review of the book goes as far as to say that ‘It is an essential tool for both the
student and practitioner of modern warfare across its full spectrum... One copy please on every staff college student's bedside table..."

I agree. Military people at every level will benefit from reading this book, even if some chapters are more marginal than others. It is a challenging book, but we live in challenging times. The relative simplicity of campaigns like France 1940 is unlikely to return any time soon. Kassimeris and Buckley have provided a very useful instrument for getting grips with the multifaceted nature of modern conflict.
BOOK REVIEW


Reviewed by John Moremon, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University, NZ

The late Cam Bennett, whose _Rough Infantry_ is one of a few memoirs of the Salamaua campaign, commented that he ‘found it extremely hard to write about the war in New Guinea’. It was not just that the tropical, jungle-clad, mountainous island was so different from Libya, Greece and Syria. It was also that the six-month advance from Wau to Salamaua in 1943 ‘imposed almost universal hardship on the troops …’

The challenge Phillip Bradley faced was to produce a history of a campaign that veterans found hard to explain and which today is little known. It is nearly five decades since the last decent account in David Dexter’s _The New Guinea Offensives_, published in 1961. Of course, Bradley is a champion of lesser known New Guinea campaigns, with this book following _On Shaggy Ridge_ and _The Battle for Wau_.

Bradley positions the campaign within the wider events of the Second World War, although he stumbles with a claim that the German Army had been ‘decisively defeated at Stalingrad and was in retreat, desperately trying to hold back the Soviet tide’. Certainly Stalingrad was a disaster, but in early 1943 the Germans planned fresh offensives; admittedly, they failed. Within a few pages, there is a worrying sign of ‘plane-spotting’, to which Bradley can be prone, as for no apparent reason he gives the serial number of a Catalina flying boat flown on patrol over the Bismarck Sea. Fortunately, these turn out to be uncharacteristic, as _To Salamaua_ is based on solid research with judicious editing. (Bradley remains infatuated with precise timings and with numbers.)

Bradley appreciates that nowadays few readers will have served in the war and fewer still have travelled to this part of New Guinea. Not only has he walked the ground, he possesses the skill to convey a sense of that ground. Key positions such as Bobdubi Ridge or Old Vickers are described clearly—and battles upon them
portrayed evocatively. There is also a sense of the participants, whether they be Australian, American, New Guinean or Japanese, and from any service. Further, there are strong character sketches of commanders and some ‘ordinary’ men who accomplished extraordinary deeds, such as Corporal Leslie ‘Bull’ Allen MM, stretcher-bearer.

Bradley takes the time to explain units, including a sound explanation of a brigade and battalion at that time, along with weapons and equipment. Early in the book he outlines the Japanese fleet that sailed into the Bismarck Sea in March 1943, and Allied air force units pitched against the fleet. His description of air force training and tactics devised ahead of the Battle of the Bismarck Sea is first-rate (except for seemingly forgetting to explain what is meant by ‘skip-bombing’). Likewise, for the Australian-American advance on Salamaua Bradley shows an eye for compelling stories so that his narrative equals, if not surpasses Dexter’s official account.

If there is a shortcoming, it is that while the narrative is impressive the analysis can be wanting. Bradley discusses tactical and logistical challenges without great depth. For example, he describes the slowly-constructed Bulldog Road but does not assess the project; he explains supply dropping without appreciating evolving air transport methods; and there is not a strong enough sense of the evolution of jungle warfare tactics or differences between Australian and US doctrines.

A great strength is that all maps and illustrations complement the text, however, the quality is variable. Keith Mitchell’s maps are outstanding (as always) and those by Rohan Bola are impressive. Other maps are from the official history; those originally in colour do not reproduce well in black-and-white, as some text appears faint, while those that originally were small sketches have been enlarged so that in some cases there is pixilation. Otherwise this is an exceptionally well presented book, further boosted with photographs by some of Australia’s best wartime cameramen.

With To Salamaua, Bradley has met the challenge of narrating a campaign many veterans could not write about. There remains scope to dig deeper so that we might better understand how the Australian Army conducted its 1943–44 campaigns. Nevertheless, this book is recommended; it will be especially appreciated by the few remaining veterans and their descendents. Soldiers too will learn of challenges and may better appreciate this episode in the Army’s history.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Jason Thomas

How to Win on the Battlefield is a useful introductory text to the basics of tactics. For the general military reader it is a well-researched introductory text written by three eminently qualified authors of military history. The book is well laid out with a chapter allocated to discuss a particular winning ‘tactic’. Each chapter outlines the tactic, provides a concise historical example or two and then concludes with some (unfortunately) concise analysis. The historical examples are deliberately broad in choice and range across all levels of war. The language is simple and concise; the analysis is likewise simple and relatively traditional in its conclusions, but easily understood.

The 25 ‘tactics’ chosen are really a mix of tactics, techniques, basic considerations and principles of war. Without guidance this could mislead a novice. ‘Selection and maintenance of the aim’, ‘envelopment’ and ‘surprise’, all earn stand-alone chapters. While I see merit in this approach, it does come unstuck. For example, the chapter on ‘attrition’ using the historical case study of Verdun, while accurate shows the core weakness of the text. Attrition as defined by manoeuvre theory (which the ADF subscribes to) is the other side of the same coin as ‘manoeuvre’. It is a dialectic that all commanders must understand. Such important by subtle distinctions get lost in the author’s approach. In being so broad, for simplicity’s sake, the text develops a shallowness that can lead to a lack of cohesion in the core theme. What exactly do the authors believe are the real ‘winning’ tactics? The conclusion to the book is self-evident and lacks real consideration of how to achieve victory. Nor even dare discuss what victory actually is in contemporary conflict. Even a novice reader deserves a greater level of discussion and reflection on the nature of conflict.

It would have been better for a student reader if the majority of examples used were recent (last 100 years) small unit engagements. A chapter would have then
been necessary on the principles of large formation tactics and the importance of historical study, but this would have assisted the student in placing the tactics into their context.

While the jacket of the book states the book contains ‘evocative photographs, illustrations… specially commissioned battle plans’, I found them no better (indeed worse) than a 1960s equivalent text. In this age of computer graphics and fly through terrain visualisation, the maps should be better. Indeed an enclosed supporting DVD or link to a YouTube web page (showing video capture using any of the brilliant tactics computer war games available), re-enacting the historical examples, would have brought this text up to the standard of a suitable instructional tool in the twenty-first century.

These are not overly harsh criticisms; the text for the serious military student does not achieve what its lofty title aspires to. This is despite the supporting exhortations of Generals Rose and Lord Guthrie on the back of the jacket.

That does not mean it has no utility. Its key strength is its attempt to get back to basics, a theme that sadly lacks great emphasis in current ADF and Army conceptual and foundation doctrine. Even in the world of ‘complex adaptive behaviours’, brilliance at basics matters. This text provides some good ground work for a young leader learning the art of war. I would rather see an RMC staff cadet writing an essay on a chapter of this text than on the current Defence White Paper.

There are far better texts for exciting in a student a passion for mastering tactics, Caesar’s *In Gaul*, Leonhard’s *The Art of Maneuver*, the mandatory Rommel’s *Infantry Attacks*, and of course Swinton’s concise masterpiece *The Defence of Duffer’s Drift*. The confused selection criteria, necessarily limited analysis and underwhelming graphics means this noble endeavour falls short of its stated aim. Its simplicity and clarity of expression and format does mean that as an adjunct to classic texts it provides a useful engine for discourse and instruction. It is recommended as an introductory or supplementary text or a text for easy revision. It should not be used a sole text for instruction.

Reviewed by Michael Lankowski, Strategic Policy Division, Department of Defence

In The New Global Insecurity, Iranian-born psychologist Fatahali M Moghaddam makes an ambitious attempt to explain contemporary global security challenges through a comprehensive theory that identifies subjective individual experiences and threatened collective identities as the primary drivers of global insecurity. The result is a broad-ranging but shallow and uneven study that makes some useful points about the importance of psychological factors in understanding international security, but fails to convincingly demonstrate how its 'innovative and novel' alternative to more traditional approaches would improve analysis and policy. Moghaddam admits in the first chapter that human security concepts are frequently seen as 'vague and woolly' by traditional security studies scholars. Unfortunately, this book's weaknesses reinforce rather than challenge that critique.

The book's starting premise is that globalisation is fostering a 'profoundly new kind of insecurity' that traditional realist approaches to security focused on states and military power cannot address. Moghaddam presents a 'dual-source theory of security' based on the premise that security perceptions are determined by two sources: individual temperament and early socialisation experiences, and macro-level societal factors that shape adult experiences. His argument about the importance of irrationality or subjective experience in influencing perceptions of security is one the book's strongest and most coherent themes. There are also useful observations in the book's definitions of 'soft and hard security capital', which emphasise the interdependency between traditional national security and its human security-based 'enabling conditions'.

However, Moghaddam's analysis becomes less cogent and focused in Part II as he seeks to describe how psychological factors affect global security in relation to
globalisation and identity politics, economic instability, religion, terrorism and torture. Moghaddam makes a series of broad assessments and judgments about why people feel threatened by factors such as economic hardship or changes in a community’s ethno-religious composition, that tend to be unremarkable if not trite. The narrative meanders from topic to topic, without adequately analysing the relative significance of different material or subjective factors or the security perceptions and dilemmas that they generate. Moghaddam is clearly enthusiastic about discussing security perceptions and identity challenges in the Muslim world, their implications for Western societies and the need for better mutual understanding, but there are few observations in the book that have not been made elsewhere.

Moghaddam has previously written on the motivations and structural drivers of terrorism in books such as *From the Terrorists’ Point of View*, *How Globalization Spurs Terrorism* and *Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences and Interventions*. Disappointingly, he appears to have sacrificed clarity and depth of analysis in trying to apply his approach to a holistic study of global security.

The limits and flaws of the book are particularly apparent in Part III, optimistically titled ‘Towards Solutions’. Moghaddam feebly asserts that more efforts need to be made to develop a ‘long-term global diversity policy plan’. He then devotes a chapter to outline a rather banal concept of ‘Omniculturalism’ as a ‘third way’ between assimilation and multiculturalism to managing diversity and overcoming insecurity within societies. This merely underscores the inadequacy of Moghaddam’s ‘comprehensive theory’ of security as a basis for prescriptive analysis that can inform policy responses.

Overall, *The New Global Insecurity* makes only a limited contribution to the significant body of literature on the broadening of contemporary security studies and the security implications of globalisation. This is not to deny the potential for more useful studies of international security problems using some of the psychology-based concepts advanced by Moghaddam. However, they would achieve much more satisfactory results with the use of a more focused approach.

Reviewed by Brigadier David Webster

Sandra Finger Lee’s book admirably combines Ken McFadyen’s art and the story of his service with the Army in Vietnam as an official war artist; though there is much more to this book than the title suggests. For me, the portrayal of the artist’s life, from the time he was appointed as a Vietnam war artist at the age of 35 through to his untimely death from a heart attack thirty-one years later while fighting a bush fire on his Victorian country property, is as much of interest as what he witnessed and its effect on him as depicted in his art.

To do his job effectively, McFadyen first had to become a soldier—and an infantry soldier in particular. No one gets a free ride in an infantry battalion especially one that is at war. McFadyen would have been tested by his infantry colleagues to ensure that if he did become engaged in combat he would not be a liability. He obviously passed with flying colours.

Embracing this most demanding of military professions enabled him to see and record the events that characterised the conflict through the eyes of those who prosecuted the war at the ‘sharp end’. This can be seen in his portrayal of the fighting, the movement of the soldiers, their major weapons systems (especially the ubiquitous Iroquois helicopter), the environment in which they worked and the exhaustion they felt in a war with little opportunity for proper rest. His vivid use of colour in portraying the evergreen tropical vegetation in which most action took place acts as a footnote to each remembered event he witnessed.

Finger-Lee skilfully tells his story and hints at a close relationship with the artist to establish herself as confidante in coaxing from him at least some of his innermost feelings—something soldiers tend not to do except to other soldiers who have shared similar experiences. The liberal use of quotes from McFadyen gives the impression, at times, that one is reading an autobiographical account of the artist’s experiences.
Vietnam on Canvas

There is mystery too in his paintings. In the cover, for example, the soldiers are all carrying their weapons in their left hands while in other scenes no one is wearing a watch when every soldier did in fact have a watch which was considered a critical item of equipment. There is mystery too surrounding the disappearance of a considerable amount of his work; what happened to the paintings that were removed from his farm by persons unknown? And what do the letters sent to the head of the Australian War Memorial contain? Why did he ask that they not be opened for thirty years?

Like so many others, the Ken McFadyen who left Australia in August 1967 was not the same man who returned following his service. And it is unlikely that the change process ceased on his return in March 1968—it would have continued; and so, as he changed, the interpretation and expression of what he had seen and how he portrayed it would also have changed. Alas, the missing artworks, incomplete paintings and sketches deny us the opportunity to see how this played out.

In explaining the discomfort that so often accompanies armed conflict, I was curious to read that McFadyen at one point felt extreme cold. He refers to an operation in which D Company 7 RAR was led into a Viet Cong stronghold and reflects that ‘you get to know yourself very, very well on a mission like that’. As a young National Service platoon commander with D Company, I participated in the incident to which he refers. The company was inserted into a Landing Zone that was over a foot-deep in water and then commenced an all day approach march in the pouring rain to attack a Viet Cong camp. Guided by two SAS troopers, we attacked the camp very late in the afternoon with two platoons and, after a two-hour battle in which the company suffered two KIA and twenty-two WIA, the camp was secured and the long wait for daylight began. A further twelve hours of being wet, cold and hungry in the total blackness of a rain-sodden forest passed before the light of dawn and the commencement of the drying out process. Our discomfort was exacerbated by the rotor downwash from the DUSTOFF helicopters hovering over us for over three hours as the dead and wounded were lifted out. Although I recall there were some extra personnel with the company on that operation, I was completely unaware until reading this book that Ken McFadyen was one of them.

The chapter on ‘photographer versus artist’ resonates with me especially. A colleague and I spent a number of years compiling a pictorial history of 7 RAR’s two tours of duty in South Vietnam and over that time poured over literally thousands of photos to depict the battalion’s experiences of war. As Finger-Lee says, the photograph captures a moment but the war artist’s snapshot in time, seen through his mind’s eye, is processed in the context of his own experience to create an image unique to the artist. I believe McFadyen’s paintings captured the Vietnam War with a strength and vitality that accurately reflect my memories of that period of the war.
BOOK REVIEW  BRIGADIER DAVID WEBSTER

I found reading Finger Lee’s account of Ken McFadyen’s experience as a member of an infantry battalion and war artist very rewarding. Knowing something of Ken McFadyen’s experience in Vietnam as the longest serving of only two official war artists of the ten-year Australian involvement in the Vietnam War, allows me to see his work in a new light. Perhaps his missing paintings will one day come to light—and it is only eighteen years until the message in his embargoed letters to the AWM can be revealed.
Even for the non-scholars of recent military history, there are names of places that can immediately conjure up visions of the courage, sacrifice, hardship and unbridled terror felt and endured by those operating on the ground. The quagmire of the Somme, the sweltering desert of Tobruk and the bloodied beaches of Normandy are synonymous with all of these characteristics and more. What is less readily identified are the small pockets in every conflict which draw out these same actions, feelings and emotions for the men who operated within them. More often then not, these experiences are relegated at best to a brief mention in a broad media piece or purely the memories of those who lived it. Sebastian Junger, in his raw and thought evoking novel *War*, breaks the mould and in doing so, tells the story of Second Platoon, Battle Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment and their fifteen-month deployment in Afghanistan’s Korengel Valley.

The title of the book is highly appropriate and in many respects is a masterful stroke by Junger. It is sharp, unambiguous and avoids sugar coating the daily grind in the Korengel with purest counterinsurgency or humanitarian connotations and the suite of buzzwords that have accompanied the supposed ‘small war revolution.’ For Junger and the men of Battle Company, little opportunity existed for anything other than fighting for survival—little opportunity existed for anything other than war. The Korengal Valley when viewed on a map by the uninformed, looks like many others in Afghanistan; however, its close proximity to Pakistan and its historical use for all forms of movement quickly identified it as a strategic location for the Coalition, al-Qaeda and the Taliban. As a result, the fighting is at times fierce, a near guaranteed daily quantity and, as fate would play out, a frequent taker of lives in an area less than ten square kilometres in size.

Junger’s credibility in bringing *War* to life is unquestioned. Alongside his photojournalist partner, he spent over five months on the ground with Battle Company.
and followed up with many of the wounded who returned back to the United States. He lived in the same small outposts, walked the same patrols, lived through the same contacts and even survived an improvised explosive device attack on his own vehicle. In many respects Junger became a part of the fabric of the platoon, and in doing so ensures the true essence of this book comes to the fore. His descriptions are vivid, from the choking heat of long summer days through to the unmistakable snap of incoming rounds and the roller coaster of emotions after surviving an intense fire fight.

What is particularly gripping are his descriptions of the emotions of the men before, during and after combat. In many respects Junger’s journey with the men of Second Platoon is one with two objectives. Firstly, to present the true story of the men fighting in this part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and secondly, to try to answer the question of why men like these willingly go into battle together and for one another. Junger’s account of the daily grind not only for the men of Second Platoon but the wider company and battalion comfortably answers the first. In answering the second, Junger takes the time to show that war, battle and the thoughts and feelings of those in this fight are not a revelation. Junger quotes studies and findings from the Second World War, more contemporary conflicts and even delves into the behaviours of our Chimpanzee brothers to show that the things that these young men at times struggle with or laugh off are age-old in both their presence and enduring effects. Ultimately his search for an answer to the question of why these men do what they do is answered by the very tenets we too hold dear: loyalty, tenacity and an overwhelming desire to not let ones’ mates down.

Noting these objectives, the true worth of War, is Junger’s blending of the two. Junger’s writing pedigree is unquestioned, having previously written the hugely successful The Perfect Storm, and as a result his descriptions match the best of contemporary war correspondents. But by going the extra step and presenting what comes after the rounds stop, the AME lifts off and the harsh cold blackness of an Afghan winter’s night envelops not only the body but the minds of those still standing, Junger ensures that the story of the men of Second Platoon is truly told, and in doing so, delivers.
Australian Army Journal

CHAUVEL ESSAY PRIZE
for contribution to the understanding of land warfare

Competition Winner 2010

Lieutenant Colonel Jon Hawkins

‘Assessing Afghanistan against Aden and Oman: A Euphemism for Capitulation or the Seeds of Success?’

Judged by:
MAJGEN I.C. (Ian) Gordon, AO
MAJGEN M. (Maurie) McNarn, AO (Retd)

‘The quill as a force multiplier in urban environments’
TITLES TO NOTE

Listed below are a select group of books recently or soon to be published that either contribute to the discussions initiated in the articles in the *Australian Army Journal* or on subjects that may be of interest in the near future. Some of these books may be reviewed in forthcoming editions of the *Journal*.


  In this book, Senior Lecturer in terrorism and counterterrorism at Edith Cowan University, Dr Anne Aly takes a multidisciplinary approach to terrorism drawing perspectives from psychology, political science, criminology and sociology. Although the book addresses the origins and history of terrorism, it is in its analysis of the evolution of terrorism where Aly’s book is of most interest. Emerging trends in terrorism and the effect of new technologies are a key focus, with chapters on the tactical use of media by extremist groups and links between state, intergovernmental and non-governmental actors offering interesting insights on potential counterterrorist strategy.


  Keith L Shimko’s book is a detailed examination the existence and scope of a revolution in military affairs brought about by information-age technologies in the 1990s. Using detailed examinations of the United States’ operations in DESERT STORM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Shimko explores the relative strengths and inadequacies in overall defence strategy and capability planning that the revolution in military affairs debate led to, how these have affected low-intensity conflicts today, and how they might shape potential high-intensity conflicts of the future.
TITLES TO NOTE

  Jeremy Black challenges conventional war chronologies permitting a reappraisal of the debate over the military revolution of the early-modern period. The seventeenth century has long been seen as a period of ‘crisis’ or transition to the modern world. Exploring this crisis from the perspective of war and military institutions, Black places warfare into a global context, assessing military capability in terms of tasks and challenges faced, and attaching styles of warfare to their social and political context.

  Combining his academic expertise with his experience as a combat US Marine, Gary D Solis explores the complex questions that today’s battlefield presents for the soldier in this age of terrorism. Moving from analyses of international and humanitarian legal doctrine and their application to previous wars and conventional combatants, he then applies this to contemporary battlefield conditions using case studies from all over the world.

  David W Cameron presents a detailed narrative of the bloody and tragic battle for Hill 60, along with the other engagements that went on until the very last days at Anzac—viewed from both sides of the trenches. Using firsthand accounts including letters, diaries and interviews, he examines the planning and execution of the evacuation of the troops from Anzac—the most successful part of the whole Gallipoli fiasco.

  To write this book Sean Rayment, British ex-paratrooper and now defence journalist, accompanied the elite British bomb disposal unit in Helmand Province in Afghanistan throughout 2009. Through interviews with soldiers while they performed their duties, Rayment paints a picture of what they feel about the war, their place in it, and how they deal with the relentless pressure of the job itself.

In this book Fay Anderson and Richard Trembath present a history of Australian war journalism from regional conflicts of the nineteenth century through to major conflicts of the twentieth. In the process, they examine the ethics of embedding journalists, and issues that have continued and contemporary relevance, including the genesis of the Anzac ideal and how technology has changed the nature of conflict reporting.


A medical anthropologist, Dr Patricia Omidian began working in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1997 studying Afghan refugee camps and then conducted research in Afghanistan from 1998 to 2001, finally moving to Kabul and working there from 2002 to 2007. She has done extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan both when it was under the control of the Taliban and then US/NATO forces. In this, an experiential narrative, Omidian provides an insider’s view of the people and circumstances that reaches beyond the news headlines of wars, invasions, coups and droughts. As a critic of militarised anthropology, she presents a different perspective as she illustrates the difficulty for the Afghan people in negotiating between the dictates of their own culture and the intimidation of the Taliban.


This book offers a fascinating insight into the history of organised sport in the British military, drawing on a wide range of untapped sources to explore its development in all services and all ranks. Beginning its organised development in the Victorian army and navy, sport became the focus of criticism in the Edwardian era and then officially adopted in the First World War as a boost to morale and *esprit de corps*.
TITLES TO NOTE


This interactive book uses photographs, animated maps and documents from the period (including the 'Pocket Guide to Australia: Information for Australian Troops Stationed in Australia') and archive video to retrace the war between the Japanese and the Allies in the Pacific during the Second World War. Beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor, US bases on Guam and Wake Island, this app then goes on to detail the battles in the jungle islands of Guadalcanal and Philippines and on the Pacific Ocean. This book is a part of the larger Home Box Office franchise, The Pacific and Band of Brothers.
NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The editors of the *Australian Army Journal* welcome submissions from any source. Two prime criteria for publication are an article’s standard of written English expression and its relevance to the Australian profession of arms. The journal will accept letters, feature articles, review essays, emails and contributions to the *Point Blank* and *Insights* sections. As a general guide on length, letters should not exceed 500 words; articles and review essays should be between 3000 and 6000 words and contributions to the *Insights* section should be no more than 1500 words. The *Insights* section provides authors with the opportunity to write brief, specific essays relating to their own experiences of service. Readers should note that articles written in service essay format are discouraged, since they are not generally suitable for publication.

Each manuscript should be submitted through the *Australian Army Journal* Submission Form at <http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/Australian_Army_Journal.asp>.

PLEASE MAKE SURE YOUR SUBMISSION INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING DETAILS:

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- 100-word article abstract
- 100-word author biography (please see the following biography guidelines)
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THE ARTICLE MUST BE PRESENTED IN THE FOLLOWING FORMAT/STYLE:

- Microsoft Word (.doc) or Rich Text Format (.rtf)
- 1.5 line spacing
- 12-point Times New Roman
- 2.5 cm margin on all sides
- Automatic word processed footnotes
- No ‘opcit’ footnote referencing
- Australian spelling (e.g., –ise not –ize)
NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

GENERAL STYLE

All sources cited as evidence should be fully and accurately referenced in endnotes (not footnotes). Books cited should contain the author’s name, the title, the publisher, the place of publication, the year and the page reference. This issue of the journal contains examples of the appropriate style for referencing.

When using quotations, the punctuation, capitalisation and spelling of the source document should be followed. Single quotation marks should be used, with double quotation marks only for quotations within quotations. Quotations of thirty words or more should be indented as a separate block of text without quotation marks. Quotations should be cited in support of an argument, not as authoritative statements.

Numbers should be spelt out up to ninety-nine, except in the case of percentages, where arabic numerals should be used (and per cent should always be spelt out). All manuscripts should be paginated, and the use of abbreviations, acronyms and jargon kept to a minimum.

BIOGRAPHIES

Authors submitting articles for inclusion in the journal should also attach a current biography. This should be a brief, concise paragraph, whose length should not exceed eight lines. The biography is to include the contributor’s full name and title, a brief summary of current or previous service history (if applicable) and details of educational qualifications. Contributors outside the services should identify the institution they represent. Any other information considered relevant—for example, source documentation for those articles reprinted from another publication—should also be included.