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The war in Afghanistan is now the longest to be waged by Australians and continues to demand a great sacrifice from the Australian Defence Force, especially among our land forces. It should also not be forgotten that the Army continues to sustain significant commitments in Timor Leste, the Solomon Islands and a range of smaller operations elsewhere. For more than a decade Army has been working hard; since the East Timor intervention in 1999 it has been on operations without respite, representing for a small force an intense tempo of activity as well as an important and proud addition to its history.

While the waging of the current fight deserves our full attention, an army must also consider its obligations to the future. This is one of the most difficult challenges a military organisation can face as it strives to find the balance between present and future requirements. In recent years the Army has worked hard to manage this balance. It has raised, trained and sustained the forces needed for its current tasks while overseeing the introduction of new capabilities that have eliminated some of the deficiencies revealed by the East Timor intervention. New equipment currently in the pipeline will further enhance the force’s capabilities and allow it to meet the government’s strategic requirements as outlined in the 2009 Defence White Paper.

Continuous modernisation and adaptation are two of the hallmarks of an effective and professional military, whether it finds itself at war or at peace. Although Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan will continue in the near term, it is timely to consider the future of the Army after Afghanistan in the mid-term. There is a need to reset the force for the next challenge. There are two areas in which this process of consideration is most pressing. These are the examination of the changing character of war and its applicability to the future of the Australian way of war, and the development of an amphibious capability suitable for the ADF’s primary operational environment.

It appears increasingly likely that in the mid-term view, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the Israeli experience in Lebanon in 2006 represent a transitional shift in the character of war. While conventional state-on-state conflict remains a danger, the risk of its occurrence is becoming less likely as a result of globalisation, rising wealth and the ongoing threat of nuclear weapons. Instead, we live in an age in which irregular and non-state based combatants have proliferated. Guerrilla war is by no means an innovation, but today’s practitioners have access to highly lethal...
Editorial

weaponry which they combine with an ability to hide among the people. These opponents also exploit the reach afforded by globalised communications to disseminate their narratives. The state no longer has a monopoly on military power and the capacity to exert influence, if it ever did.

The second major requirement facing Army is to relearn how to conduct amphibious operations within its primary operational environment. This is a mission that the Army has not conducted since the end of the Second World War. Whatever skill sets Army once possessed have long atrophied, although the history of these operations is still relevant and instructive. The new Landing Helicopter Docks should not be seen as ‘water taxis’ but as warships designed to project military power in accordance with a government-directed maritime strategy. Amphibious operations are highly specialised, and the Army as well as the RAN and RAAF have much to learn before this capability achieves the needed effectiveness.

In responding to the changing character of future war and in developing its amphibious capability, all members of the Army have a part to play. At its core it is not the kit that enables a capability. Rather it is the knowledge the force possesses, translated into concepts and doctrine, that shapes how an army fights and thus determines the difference between success and failure. The Journal has always played a part in this process through its role in advancing debate on the profession of arms. In this issue the Journal balances the need to develop a force to wage the current fight with the requirement to adapt and anticipate the next fight. In ‘Living in the Twilight Zone: Advising the Afghan National Army at the Corps Level’, Lieutenant Colonel Gavin Keating discusses his experience as an advisor in the current, highlighting both successes and pitfalls. In contributing to the development of the Army’s future capability Major Michael Scott provides an engineer’s perspective in ‘Engineering from the Sea: Establishing how Australian Army Engineers fit into Australia’s Amphibious Capabilities’. The Journal will continue to publish articles that reflect the entire range of the force’s experience but it does call upon the Army’s members to think hard upon these themes and contribute to their debate in future issues.

This edition also represents a transition in the management of the Journal. Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm McGregor, its long-serving publisher, has moved to other duties in Army. Under his mentorship the Journal reached maturity in its contribution to the discussion of the profession of arms, both within Australia and abroad. The staff of the Land Warfare Studies Centre wish Lieutenant Colonel McGregor continued success in his future endeavours.

Sadly, as is the custom in this editorial, it is necessary to acknowledge those who have paid the supreme sacrifice in the service of their nation. We extend our condolences to the families of Captain Bryce Duffy, Corporal Ashley Birt, Lance Corporal Luke Gavin and Private Matthew Lambert who died on active service on Operation SLIPPER, and Craftsman Beau Pridue who died on active service on Operation ASTUTE. Lest we forget.
CURRENT OPERATIONS

LIVING IN THE TWILIGHT ZONE

ADVISING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY AT THE CORPS LEVEL

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GAVIN KEATING

ABSTRACT

Advisers working with the Afghan 205th Corps operate in a 'twilight zone' as they attempt to bridge the cultural and institutional gaps between the Afghans and their ISAF partners. Like the rest of the Afghan National Army, the Corps is grappling with numerous institutional development challenges while simultaneously fighting a difficult counterinsurgency war. Determining what might constitute 'Afghan okay', and how they can assist their Afghan colleagues to arrive at this state, demands considerable adaptability. This article discusses this advisory experience and considers its wider relevance, particularly as the campaign in Afghanistan enters a new phase.

'Cling tight to your sense of humour. You will need it everyday.'

Lawrence of Arabia, The 27 Articles
INTRODUCTION

The Australian Army has a long history of providing advisers to foreign armies. Examples include the personnel who served with Dunsterforce in Persia in 1918, the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam and, more recently, the various Mentoring Task Forces (MTFs) in Uruzgan Province. Since 2010 Australia has also provided individual advisers to the 205th Afghan National Army (ANA) Atal (Hero) Corps. With the recent withdrawal of the Canadians from southern Afghanistan, and the refocus of British efforts on Helmand Province, Australia now provides half of the twenty-person 205th Corps Coalition Advisory Team (205 CAT). Like the MTF, who focus on developing the ANA’s 4th Brigade, 205 CAT is focused on the development of ANA capacity, but at the corps level (equivalent to a Western division). While there are undoubtedly many common ‘adviser’ experiences, operating at this level provides some different perspectives that are worth considering. This is particularly true as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) seeks to drawdown in Afghanistan and transition lead responsibility for security operations to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by 2014. The aim of this article is to discuss the experience of advising the 205th Corps, highlight the associated challenges and consider their relevance to the future.

OVERVIEW OF 205 CAT

205 CAT’s organisation and employment was theoretically governed by the ISAF CONOPs for Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs). The reality was that this higher-level direction provided only a very basic foundation for the conduct of daily tasks on the ground. 205 CAT’s mission was to:

…provide advice, assistance, and training to Headquarters 205th Corps and promote close partnership with Headquarters Regional Command South (RC-S), in order to contribute to a self-sufficient, well led and competent ANA capable of independent operations by 2014.

205 CAT’s name and composition have varied significantly since its original formation, which is believed to have occurred in approximately 2006. By mid-2011 the team had transitioned from a multinational organisation, consisting of Dutch, British, Canadian and Australian personnel, to an Australian/US only organisation (and one lone Canadian lawyer). This twenty-person team, commanded by an Australian colonel, provided advisers to the majority of the key ANA staff on the Corps’ headquarters. In some cases, positions such as the Deputy Commander Civil Affairs and the Religious and Cultural Affairs Chief had to be covered by enthusiastic generalists. 205 CAT was based adjacent to Camp Hero, which houses the Corps’ headquarters and a number of related units and formations, and is located close to
the ISAF Kandahar Airbase. OMLTs are assigned operational control to Commander ISAF and delegated tactical command to the regional commands. In theory, OMLTs operating below the corps/divisional level are supposed to report to their relevant regional commands through the Corps OMLT. In practice the 205th Corps’ brigade level OMLTs, manned by Australian, Canadian and US personnel, reported through the partner force (ISAF taskforce) chain of command. 205 CAT did not exercise any formal authority over any of the other OMLTs operating with 205th Corps units. Liaison with these other organisations was relatively frequent but informal.

It is worth noting that the terms ‘partnering’, ‘advising’ and ‘mentoring’ tend to be used interchangeably by many ISAF personnel, despite the fact that they really describe very different ways of interacting with the ANSF. In simple terms, ‘partnering’ occurs between like organisations, or equivalent personnel, and involves the conduct of combined activities. Thus Commander RC-S and Commander 205th Corps and their respective headquarters are partners. Advisers are embedded into ANSF units and support the development of these organisations. A critical part of their work is facilitating the partnership links. The term ‘mentor’ is often used as a synonym for ‘adviser’. Members of 205 CAT preferred to avoid describing themselves as mentors, which implies a relationship between someone with great insight and a less experienced learner. As many of the Headquarters 205th Corps’ officers had extensive military experience, and certainly knew more about Afghanistan and the ANA than members of 205 CAT, this seemed a sensible approach. ‘Mentoring’ is perhaps better considered as an activity that can be conducted by partners, advisers and their Afghan colleagues, where previous experiences place particular people in a position to impart their knowledge in a relevant way.

OVERVIEW OF 205TH CORPS

The 205th Corps’ area of operations extends across the southern provinces of Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan and Daykundi. The areas immediately surrounding Kandahar City are the primary focus of the ANA’s efforts. The Corps’ primary formations are its four rifle brigades, each comprising four rifle battalions (kandaks), a combat support kandak and a combat services support kandak. Increasingly a number of corps level independent units and sub-units are being added to provide enabling capabilities. ‘Divisional’ manoeuvre, as taught at Western staff colleges, was not a regular feature of the Corps headquarters’ work. A small tactical command
post did deploy into the field in the latter half of 2010 in support of Operation HAMKARI. In essence, however, most of the staff’s attention was focused on force generation and institutional development activities. Operational planning was largely conducted at the brigade and kandak levels, which was appropriate given the small unit nature of the counterinsurgency operations being conducted in the south. There were certainly more than enough ‘raise, train and sustain’ challenges to keep the staff fully employed, but it should be noted that this focus was significantly different to that of the partner headquarters.

The staff of the 205th Corps’ headquarters had diverse backgrounds. They were drawn roughly from three distinct professional sources. Many of the senior officers had served in the military forces of the former Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Many struggled to survive during the Taliban era and were forced to either flee the country or adopt very low public profiles. Soviet influence on their training and exposure to the Red Army remains considerable and permeates many aspects of their institutional culture. Another group, albeit considerably smaller, consisted of ex-Mujahideen fighters. Many lacked formal staff training but this was, to an extent, compensated by their sometimes stronger local knowledge and connections. It was probably more typical to find ex-Mujahideen officers in lower level command and staff appointments. Understandably, the potential for friction between these two particular groups remains considerable. The last distinct group were those officers and senior non-commissioned officers (SNCOs) with no military experience prior to 2001. This group has been influenced greatly by its exposure to ISAF, particularly US, training. By necessity most within this group tend to be more junior in rank, although it should be noted that many of the Corps’ highest-ranking SNCOs originated from this source. Not all within this last cohort have earned their positions based solely on their military expertise—this is also true for all groups.

Despite the ANA’s desire to see itself as a truly national organisation there is no doubt that the ethnic origins and tribal affiliations of its personnel are a significant factor in its organisational politics. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) has formal policies mandating the required ethnic composition of its organisations to ensure they mirror wider Afghan society. This can, however, distort personnel management decisions in less than optimal ways. The accusation of ethnic and tribal favouritism was often one of the first responses employed by officers faced with undesired career management decisions. One wonders how well the Australian Army’s career management system would cope if all of its unpopular posting decisions were
challenged on the basis of state bias. Given the raw ethnic and tribal undercurrents flowing through Afghan national life, this issue was particularly problematic. Different ethnic backgrounds also had an impact in other ways. The official language of the ANA is Dari, but not all Corps headquarters personnel spoke it to the same level of proficiency. Likewise, the regional language in the south is Pashtu, but not all ANA personnel are fluent in this language.

The Corps’ activities were marked, ostensibly, by a highly centralised command and control system with distinct Soviet characteristics. Officially no action is undertaken without a formal written order (cipher) from the MoD. Likewise, subordinate formations will simply not act without written formal orders. The practical realities, in keeping with most aspects of life in Afghanistan, were not as simple. The MoD’s ciphers tended to be vague and open to wide interpretation. As such there were many opportunities for formations at all levels to ignore unwelcome guidance or delay its implementation. The absence of an appropriate cipher was also used to delay action where this was deemed to be advantageous. Likewise, the ‘Tashkiel’ (authorised manning table) was held to be sacrosanct and delays in official amendments were routinely used to explain why certain actions could or could not be taken. None of these things are completely foreign in Western armies but the way they affected the routine work of the headquarters was particularly marked. More importantly, the ability of the staff to randomly (or so it appeared) switch between seemingly slavish adherence to higher direction and ignoring it completely could be somewhat disconcerting.

The level of staff motivation, like all big headquarters, was uneven. Many of the more senior staff (lieutenant colonel and above) had served in some sort of military organisation, and on operations, for up to three decades. It was not uncommon to find officers who had served in 205th Corps, or southern Afghanistan more generally, for several consecutive years. Most served in the south unaccompanied by their families, reflecting the general security situation, the scarcity of married quarters and their family origins. There is a marked feeling that service in Kabul, particularly in the MoD, is both more comfortable and better for career advancement. Finally, many officers served below the rank they held during the Communist era. None of these factors make for a highly dynamic or motivated organisation, but of course there are always exceptions. Overall a posting to southern Afghanistan for an ANA officer seems to be about as attractive as a posting to the Eastern Front for a German officer during the Second World War.
It is all too easy to be critical of the ANA’s general performance, and this was no different for Headquarters 205th Corps. However, as a number of senior ISAF officers have noted, building a new army at the same time as fighting an utterly ruthless insurgency is no easy matter. Understanding the challenges that impede better progress is critical if relevant capacity building is to be supported. The high rate of illiteracy within the ANA was a background, but very significant, difficulty. Like most armies, the two areas that challenged the Corps headquarters most were personnel management and logistics. The potential morale issues noted above were also broadly applicable to the average frontline askars (Pashtu for soldiers). Unlike the staff at the Corps headquarters, however, their service in the south brought with it a much higher likelihood of being killed or wounded when compared to those in the north or west. ANA personnel were not well administered and basic problems such as unreliable pay and leave systems reflected this challenge. Combined with generally poor living conditions these fed the largest personnel difficulty: very high rates of absence without leave (AWOL). National recruiting and training efforts were being undermined by the constant leakage of personnel who deserted. The widespread availability of hashish was an additional problem.

Equally challenging for the Corps staff was overseeing a logistical system that nearly everyone, from the askar in the most remote outpost to the Corps Commander, completely mistrusted. The US designed ‘MOD 14’ system (supply request procedure) was not well understood by many, lacked transparency as requests proceeded up the chain of command and produced, at best, very inconsistent results. For example, even a simple request for the provision of furniture and computers for the Corps’ Tactical Operations Centre produced nothing for in excess of six months. Poor basic staff procedures, complacency, incompetence and corruption all served to make logistics harder than normal. This situation also inevitably affected the maintenance of equipment and vehicles—a constant source of complaints from the brigades. The poor quality of some of the foreign equipment being supplied to the ANA and the lack of indigenous tradesmen and specialists were also significant contributors. A source of many logistical problems was the ANA’s reliance on contractor support for an array of supply and maintenance services. Contract management is a weakness in most armies, and this is particularly true in Afghanistan. The majority of contracts were developed under ISAF auspices and even when these were turned over to the Corps to supervise, the associated details remained unclear. The difficulties encountered during the transition of vehicle maintenance contract arrangements during the first half of 2011 provided an excellent example. At times it was
evident that ISAF contract negotiations were conducted in complete ignorance of the real requirements on the ground. This was also evident in the arrangements made for the development of longer-term infrastructure and facilities. The frustrations expressed by members of the Corps’ staff when faced with these issues were entirely reasonable.

Despite this litany of problems, the Corps was able to support the conduct of simple counterinsurgency operations by its subordinate formations. In the operational arena the headquarters proved adept at managing short-notice and short-term crises. The sense of urgency and commitment to action displayed in these situations were markedly different from the general headquarters’ approach to less urgent, but equally challenging issues. The Corps’ general success in reacting to a variety of short notice contingencies in Kandahar City, for example, was largely driven by the direct involvement of its key commanders and senior staff. While this was positive it also revealed a systemic weakness in the capability of the general staff system, which had little redundancy below the principal staff. Here inexperience, limited training and a military culture that does not generally encourage initiative and mission command, were severe limitations. It remains to be seen whether ISAF’s training influence will alter this situation, but it will probably take generational change to overcome long entrenched habits.

While the Corps was relatively good at ‘crash actions’, its operational and planning capabilities were particularly poor at addressing longer-term campaign and institutional development challenges. This again was shaped by limited staff depth and the more pressing problem of dealing with the ‘wolves closest to the sled’. One example was the Corps’ inability to consider the requirements involved in developing a force generation cycle which would enable and sustain its long-term development. The MoD had actually issued clear directions concerning the introduction of a red-yellow-green cycle (equating roughly to leave/administration, individual and collective training, and commitment to operations) but the conditions in southern Afghanistan were not conducive to its development.

In simple terms, the Corps is fully committed to operations but has insufficient redundancy to free formations, or even kandaks, to rotate through programmed leave and training periods. Furthermore, the management of such a system requires a relatively sophisticated staff capacity. However, some sort of force generation cycle will be critical to the Corps’ institutional health, particularly in the post 2014 period. The current AWOL problems and inability to complete training much beyond the individual level are symptoms of an underlying ailment that cannot be ignored forever.

At times it was evident that ISAF contract negotiations were conducted in complete ignorance of the real requirements on the ground.
ISAF’s drawdown over the next few years will only increase the difficulty of implementing such a system. This is one of those dreaded staff college ‘wicked problems’ that are challenging for even the most sophisticated and well-resourced armies.

THE CHALLENGES OF ADVISING AT THE CORPS LEVEL

There is little doubt that the general situation described above makes for a challenging environment for the adviser at the corps level. Maintaining one’s sense of humour is critical. Added to this is the requirement for large doses of tact, patience, humility and persistence. While it was possible for advisers within 205 CAT to work their way into a multitude of different roles, probably the most important was acting as the intermediary between 205th Corps and RC-S. In essence this critical role was all about facilitating the partnership between the two organisations. ISAF’s rather ad hoc development over the last decade has produced a military organisation of considerable complexity, which is difficult even for an officer trained in NATO standards to understand, let alone explain to his Afghan colleague. The conventional counterinsurgency paradigm is that the different strengths of the ANSF and ISAF are complementary.5 The ANA has better local situational and cultural awareness, better access to human intelligence sources and a better approach to information operations. On the other hand ISAF is able to provide sophisticated enablers, such as joint fires, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance platforms, medical evacuation assets, and, perhaps more importantly, access to material resources. ISAF officers and soldiers are also able to provide their Afghan partners with an example of contemporary command, staff, leadership and management procedures. This model was broadly valid but its underpinning assumptions needed to be constantly reviewed. For example, ANA personnel recruited from northern provinces could not necessarily speak the local language in the south, let alone empathise with villagers from different ethnic backgrounds.

Assisting in the maintenance of relations between Headquarters 205th Corps and Headquarters RC-S required careful management of their competing agendas and demands. Of these, the very different time horizons that drove the two headquarters were the most significant. Put simply, ISAF elements are generally deployed for 6–12 month operational tours and, even with the most enlightened leadership, inevitably focus on a fairly short timeframe. This is driven by their inevitable desire to produce tangible results during their tours. Conversely, the members of the Corps staff realised that their ISAF partners and advisers came and went with, what seemed to them, regular monotony. The constant influx of new enthusiastic colleagues with ‘good ideas’ could be a source of considerable frustration, particularly when the Afghans knew that they would be left to deal with the repercussions long after their partners had redeployed home. It is little wonder that many of the Afghan officers on the Corps staff were not always motivated to approach issues with the same sense of
urgency as their ISAF counterparts. Ironically, it was the realm of long term planning for institutional development, the Corps’ real Achilles heel, which received the least attention from their partners.

A related aspect of this different time appreciation was the incompatible staff cycles that could be generated and maintained by the respective headquarters. Not only was Headquarters RC-S compelled to operate at a higher tempo by both the ISAF chain of command and its own basic nature, its large, well trained and technology enabled staff branches enabled it to do so. The respective staff branches within 205th Corps simply could not keep up the same tempo. For example, the Corps’ planning capability consisted of a G5 branch manned by a lieutenant colonel and a very small number of majors. RC-S maintained large CJ5 and CJ35 branches, which meant that simultaneous ‘partnered’ planning was impractical. The inevitable time frictions involved with collaborative activities, of which the simple act of translating specialist military language was only one difficulty, also made practical partnering between staff branches frustratingly slow. On occasions this led RC-S staff to engage in fairly superficial consultation and subsequently to attempt to camouflage this with various acts of tokenism. This situation was not aided by the practical difficulties of sharing any sort of information between the two organisations caused by security restrictions, incompatible information systems and, most importantly, the lack of suitable translators.

There were numerous other pitfalls that could hinder 205 CAT’s members in ‘building the bridge’ between the Corps and RC-S. It should be noted that RC-S also had partner responsibilities with numerous other ANSF organisations—primarily the Afghan National Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police and the National Directorate of Security. Practically there was only so much time and energy that could be provided to each. This was particularly true given higher-level strategic direction to change the main effort for partnering to the Afghan National Police. Sometimes the strength of the partnerships at brigade and below actually hampered smooth relations between their superior headquarters. On a number of occasions it became apparent that subordinate ANA headquarters were involved in planning partnered operations without informing the Corps staff. A favourite brigade tactic when this inevitably came to light was to confuse the situation by denying they knew anything about ISAF’s intentions, which led to recriminations and friction at the higher levels. The Afghans can be particularly good at ‘staff obscuration’ when it is required. Close partnership at brigade and below, when not coordinated using the Afghan chain of command, could reinforce the tendency of...
some ISAF personnel to view elements of 205th Corps as extensions of their own task forces. This was evident in a number of attempts to pressure the Corps Commander to allocate forces in line with the preferences of certain ISAF officers. Managing the ‘dependencies’ fostered by close partnerships at the lower unit level was also challenging. ANA units proved particularly adept at tapping into their partners’ logistical capabilities, something that the ISAF chain of command recognised was not particularly desirable. However, the abrupt termination of local arrangements, particularly when ISAF units rotated, had the potential to cause major disruptions for the Corps’ staff. As the daily ‘face of ISAF’, 205 CAT’s advisers quickly became acquainted with the ensuing angst.

Perhaps the biggest challenge as an adviser at the corps level was attempting to adhere to Lawrence’s famous saying that ‘it is better to let them do it themselves imperfectly than do it yourself perfectly. It is their country, their way, and our time is short’. In a perfect world this guidance is completely valid, but in practice it is very difficult to honour. Advisers are no more immune than other ISAF personnel from the desire to produce tangible results during their short tours. At times it was difficult to know how to inject one’s own experiences and knowledge in a way that actually aided the Corps’ staff, as opposed to progressing personal agendas. This proved difficult but the default rule for the advisers was to ensure that they did not foster staff practices that would be unlikely to survive ISAF’s eventual withdrawal. A further complicating issue was the culture of learned dependency evident in certain Corps staff sections. It was difficult to foster close working relations with officers when they insisted that their advisers ‘fix’ problems that they should have been addressing through their own systems. This was particularly the case when time was short and the need pressing. There is a fine balance between winning influence and trust, and pandering to the addicted. In this respect it is interesting to ponder if Lawrence would have been as influential with his Arabs if he was not the means by which liberal quantities of stores and equipment were provided to them.

The old adage of ‘teach a man to fish to feed him for a lifetime’ was certainly appropriate guidance for 205 CAT’s personnel. When commenting on this issue, in relation to logistics, a recent US publication actually stated:

Advisers must make obtaining coalition logistical support as painful as possible for the ANA leadership in order for the ANA leadership to develop a reliance and confidence on the ANA logistics system over their dependence on NATO’s logistics system.
The problem with this particular stance is that the ANA’s logistical system is largely based on Western procedures. ‘Teaching a man to fish’ is all very well when you are sure that knowing how to fish is actually what is required, and that your fishing style is applicable to the local conditions. The US produced ANA Mentor Guide correctly notes that ‘it is not the purpose of advisers to make the ANA look like a Western Army’. Despite being obvious, this approach was not always apparent in some of the schemes developed by higher level ISAF organisations, or even Afghanistan’s MOD. It is easy to forget how alluring some features of Western military organisations are to the unwary. One small example was the apparent fascination (bordering on fixation) of the Corps staff with PowerPoint. At a higher level, the push by both ISAF and Afghan personnel to introduce sophisticated capabilities and equipment also reflected a degree of ‘mirror imaging’ and ignorance of what was both possible, and appropriate, at the local level. In trying to properly fulfil their role, the Corps’ advisers had to attempt to navigate the fine line between supporting the ANA’s development through the wholesale adoption of ISAF procedures, their adaptation to local conditions or their rejection in favour of completely home-grown approaches. This was not made easier by the fact that the Afghans were by no means unanimous in their approaches to this issue. In keeping with tradition, today’s adviser practitioners have distilled much collective wisdom into one simple phrase: ‘Afghan okay’. But knowing what constitutes ‘Afghan okay’, or what might constitute it in the future, is certainly not easy.

An additional challenge for ISAF advisers and partners was the possibility of the ANA being infiltrated by the insurgents. Sowing mistrust between the two organisations is a particularly effective and economical means for the insurgents to disrupt friendly operations. Most of the deliberate ‘green on blue’ incidents in recent months seem to be more based on Afghans motivated by personal grievances and acting during moments of apparent insanity. The ready availability of drugs and weapons, years of living under trying conditions and generally high levels of psychological stress all tend to produce a fertile environment for random acts of violence against ISAF personnel. However, the deliberate infiltration of the ANA’s ranks remains an enduring threat and not one that is easy to counter. It should be noted, in this respect, that the Corps’ officers were very protective of their assigned advisers and aware of the threats posed by either discontented soldiers or infiltrators. A related friction point was the different force protection regimes maintained by the ANA and ISAF. The Afghans accept considerably more personal risk, particularly when
moving around the battlefield, than is tolerated by the force protection regulations mandated by most ISAF nations. It is difficult for advisers to serve ‘shona ba shona’ (shoulder-by-shoulder) with their Afghan colleagues when prohibited from travelling with them by national policies.

THE FUTURE

The Inteqal (Dari for ‘Transition’) process, developed and endorsed throughout 2010, seeks to progressively shift the responsibility for security in Afghanistan from ISAF to the ANSF by the end of 2014. It is obvious that this is a key component of ISAF’s drawdown plan. Equally obvious is that one of the keys to this process is that the ‘ANSF must be capable of handling additional security responsibilities with less assistance.’ As the US Secretary of Defence stated in 2007, ‘Arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves.’

A key feature of the recent US-led ‘surge’ in Afghanistan has been the ANSF’s rapid expansion. Since November 2009 its size has increased by about 44 per cent (85,000 personnel). By March 2011 the ANA alone had reached 160,000 and there are plans for continued growth to bring this figure closer to 200,000. It is arguable, however, if the quality of these new troops has matched this rapid increase in quantity.

A number of observations can be made about these trends. As ISAF reduces the size of its forces it will ‘progressively shift from partnering to a mentoring relationship that supports continued ANSF professionalisation.’ The key will be for ISAF to concentrate on assisting the ANA to manage its future posture, as opposed to supporting the Afghans as they deal with shorter-term issues. Advisers will become more important as the assets available to support partnered relationships decrease and ready access to remaining ISAF enabling assets becomes increasingly important. The development of coherent command and control arrangements for linking advisory teams at all levels would be useful. Helping the ANA to negotiate ISAF’s metamorphosis during the transition will be a critical adviser task. As ISAF focuses on improving the quality of the personnel put through the ANA training pipeline there will also be a requirement to not only maintain operational adviser support, but reinforce this with additional training adviser support. In terms of maintaining a valued contribution to ISAF’s efforts in Afghanistan both of these areas provide attractive options for the Australian Army. There is certainly scope to increase the
current commitment to 205 CAT and to investigate the provision of advisers to some of the specialist units that will be fielded within 205th Corps over the next two years. Australia’s mentoring efforts at the tactical level in Uruzgan have been very successful, but advising at the corps level may potentially have broader and longer-term effects.

As the focus shifts to the ‘Army after Afghanistan’ it is also worth reflecting on how Australia’s most recent adviser experiences are relevant to the future. Building indigenous security force capacity is one of the tenets of Adaptive Campaigning and is likely to remain a role for the Army within Australia’s immediate region. For example, the Defence Cooperation Program in Timor Leste has been delivering a dedicated adviser effect for a number of years. As Australia’s contributions to Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands are examined, expanding this type of contribution is certainly worth considering. Structuring and preparing such contributions must be driven by local requirements but would benefit from considering past adviser commitments, including contemporary experience from Iraq and Afghanistan.

In conclusion, service as an adviser to the staff of the 205th Corps was both unique and challenging. The obstacles facing the Corps are numerous but progress is being made, largely because of the dedication of motivated and capable Afghans. An understanding of the challenges faced by the Corps, the difficulties of fostering effective partner relationships and avoiding a multitude of possible adviser pitfalls is important as the campaign in Afghanistan enters a new phase. Advising, at all levels and in both the operational and training realms, is only set to increase in importance. The unique perspectives that come with operating in the twilight zone between the ANA and the mainstream ISAF organisation make advisers well placed to help ensure the ANSF, and particularly the ANA, is well postured for the end of 2014. No article on advising should conclude without a parting shot from Lawrence: ‘It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.’14 It is a thought with universal applicability.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to acknowledge the many adviser ‘insights’ provided by fellow Australian 205 CAT personnel, particularly Colonel John Simeoni, Lieutenant Colonel David McKerral and Lieutenant Colonel Guy Moten.

ENDNOTES

2 Document revised in early 2011.
3 The regions of Arghandab, Dand, Panjwai, Zharay and Maiwand were all critical to the maintenance of Kandahar City's security and the focus of both ANA and ISAF security efforts.


6 Lawrence, *The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence*, article 15.


8 Ibid., p.3-3


13 Ibid., p.49.

14 Lawrence, *The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence*, article 1.

**THE AUTHOR**

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CURRENT OPERATIONS

TEN TIPS FOR TACTICAL COMMANDERS

MAJOR MARK POPOV

ABSTRACT

Many armies today are learning institutions with outstanding lessons learnt processes that have saved soldiers’ lives on the battlefield. However, the body of intangible, experiential knowledge that combat arms leaders hold is difficult to capture and nearly impossible to pass on in formal courses or training scenarios. This article identifies ten critical command and leadership lessons, from time management to battle staff employment to dealing with casualties, garnered throughout operations in Kandahar province in 2009–10. These ten tips, proven in combat, are suitable for officer and NCO tactical leaders, whether in garrison or deployed on operations.

Canada’s Army today is a learning institution, with a more effective lesson learning and application process than ever before. On-the-spot examination and investigation of incidents and engagements, both in Canada and during deployed operations, have identified and rectified shortfalls in tactics, techniques and procedures, drills, equipment use, movement and application of firepower in the contemporary operating environment. Experienced officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from the Army Lessons Learned Centre deploy as part of Canadian task forces, and participate in patrols and operations.
alongside the soldiers whose lessons they are capturing. It is a system that works extremely effectively and has saved soldiers’ lives on the battlefields of Afghanistan, during humanitarian assistance operations in Haiti, and in peace support operations in Sudan.

However, there is a body of intangible, experiential knowledge that is difficult to quantify and more difficult to capture—combat arms leader knowledge, hard-won only through experience, but nearly impossible to pass on in formal courses or training scenarios. After deployments, key leaders are often posted away from their units and not always able to pass on this knowledge informally. In order to try to capture some of the knowledge and experience that my team gained through two years of force generation, training and deployment, I have distilled lessons from our individual and collective experience into the following ten tips. Many times during operations, leaders say to themselves, ‘I wish someone had told me this before I deployed.’ I wish, prior to being privileged enough to command B Squadron, the Royal Canadian Dragoons, an armoured reconnaissance squadron, which later expanded to become a combat team composed of more than 250 soldiers operating in southern Kandahar Province, that someone had offered them to me.

1. TIME MANAGEMENT – READINGS, WRITING AND WRENCHES

There is never enough time, particularly while deployed, to read anything for yourself, or write anything that is not urgent and directly related to your deployment. Often any time you start to read something, circumstances, necessities, requirements or the exigencies of service throw a wrench into your plans, leaving your work half-finished while you attend to more urgent duties. The raft of professional development readings, language lessons, counterinsurgency readings, theatre directives, lessons learnt, post operation reports, orders and information packages that will be pushed to you throughout training for deployment are valuable and should be read. However, do not put them off to be read once in theatre; try to finish reading them all before you arrive. Once in theatre, you will be consumed by other things and they will sit unread on a shelf. Make sure to leave enough time to spend with the soldiers, NCOs and junior officers; if all they see is the combat team commander reading and writing, that is all they will think you do. Sit and eat a meal with the soldiers who are not in your headquarters whenever possible, rather than the command post crew, who see you often enough as it is. Make a conscious effort to do this and the time spent will pay off in spades.
2. DIVISION OF LABOUR – LET YOUR PEOPLE HELP YOU

Our training system focuses on making the student under assessment, whether a candidate undergoing basic officer training or the Combat Team Commander’s Course, conduct nearly every task himself, knowing and attending to every detail. While this ensures that candidates are familiar with all of their subordinates’ tasks and are capable of accomplishing them, it is an untenable methodology for sustained operations. As a tactical commander, you absolutely cannot do everything yourself. You will burn yourself out and do your soldiers a disservice by becoming fuzzy-minded, overly detail-focused and combat ineffective. While you may want to track, manage and coordinate every single detail, you cannot do this while still commanding effectively. You must maintain some separation, some time and space free from demands of the limited mental bank account of attention and thought in your brain that is free to think, consider, plan and command. You must use the skills, knowledge and considerable ability of your people to help you command your organisation. Lean on your battle staff very hard. The Officer Commanding (OC) commands the company, battery, squadron or combat team, but the supporting lieutenants, captains and NCOs need to run it from minute to minute, handle operational details, maintain the command post and manage the myriad parts and lateral interactions required to keep the organisation operating. The Canadian Army’s division of labour in the Combat Arms has evolved over many years and has proven to be effective across the spectrum of operations, from high intensity combat to garrison training. Use this system to help you, to give you the time and space to think and make the right decision at the right time. Delegating and leaning on them is neither a failing of the tactical commander, nor a burden to subordinates—it is the best way to use collective knowledge and skills to help you accomplish the mission.

3. BATTLE PROCEDURE – WHO DOES WHAT?

After receiving a warning order, give your command support team some early planning guidance based on a very general effect to be achieved and the timeline required as soon as possible. As the commander, you have the right to change elements of any plan as your estimate progresses. However, your subordinates would prefer to have partial information sooner to let them start concurrent activity on your behalf, rather than full detail at a time that will leave them scrambling to set conditions for your success. Always try to give as much notice, as early as possible, in as much detail as possible, as far as possible down the chain, often through detailed radio warning
orders—it has always paid dividends. During deployment to southern Kandahar Province, depending on time and distance, the captains in my combat team started looking into planning, linking with the appropriate higher-level staff as required and concurrently with looking at resources, immediately after I passed them very general and very fragmented warning orders. After conducting mission analysis, clarify planning direction based on time, space and effects, then sit down with your command support team, supporting arms/enabler advisers and experts to plan collectively. Whenever possible, bring the sergeant major in to look at sustainment and replenishment, see what is achievable and offer a sober second look. Even in a small combat team, there are so many moving parts that the combat team commander can rarely track vehicles or maintenance states from minute to minute—the command post staff, maintenance NCO, operations warrant officer and captains can and must. Once the estimate is completed, usually done collectively with input from the captains and specialist advisers, a Scheme of Manoeuvre is roughed out and a plan is formed, finish the written order if time permits or radio/overlay order if time is short. For written orders, the captains should assist your orders preparation by writing and verifying groupings and tasks, coordinating instructions and most of command and signals. In Canada’s Armour Corps, the squadron sergeant major’s input forms most of the service support paragraph and critical coordinating instructions such as detainee handling details or actions on breakdown; other arms may differ. When I issued formal orders, one of the captains (normally the battle captain, my squadron operations officer or S3 in US terms), issued the groupings and tasks, most coordinating instructions and the sergeant major issued service support instructions. I cannot stress enough the need to lean on your team throughout battle procedure and plan development so that you have the time and space to think, to ensure all the appropriate lateral coordination gets done and then review your orders properly before issuing them. To support this process, your headquarters must be a self-running organisation with workable and detailed standard operating procedures and a strong battle rhythm that manages key staff time and tasks. If the combat team headquarters is not tight and well managed, where everyone understands ‘who does what, when and where’, it will waste effort and burn out, which will cause the whole sub-unit to suffer.

4. TAKE TIME TO SOLDIER

Remember, you are a soldier first, who also happens to be an officer; young soldiers will deploy without complaint and follow your orders without fail, so you need to demonstrate the same skills, abilities, determination and endurance that they do. This
is a simple principle, often easily said in garrison and training, but difficult to do during operations, given the demands on your time. Take the time to deploy out with the different elements of your organisation, particularly new attachments, to learn as much as you can about them, their personalities, confidences, doubts and motivations. Sit down with soldiers and clean weapons, take your Tactical Movement Group (commonly called the OC’s Tac Group in Canada’s army) out as a fighting element and fulfil some of your own Commander’s Critical Information Requirements or complete other tactical tasks. It will ground you, remind you of the difficulties and dangers of the terrain in which your people operate, and keep you in touch with what they do and how they do it, so your decisions will be made from a position of credibility, knowledge and experience, not from a command post divorced from the battle.

5. LEADER MOVEMENT

In Afghanistan, commanders cannot flit about the battlespace at will. Every move is a deliberate operation that saps combat power from the rest of the team and puts the soldiers in your vehicle crew and OC’s Tac Group at risk.¹ To support you commanding forward, your vehicle crew must be well versed in all command post duties and be ready to conduct local defence, communications troubleshooting, map preparation and other command support duties in austere forward locations, often from the back of your vehicle, in the middle of the night with red flashlights. They must also be capable of independent action, understanding the big picture and the next steps of ongoing operations, keeping the vehicle ready to move at a moment’s notice and using their initiative to resolve uncertain situations when time and rest are at a premium. Try to plan moves well in advance and link them with sustainment runs, existing patrols, route clearance packages, combat logistics patrols, movements by flanking sub-units or any other elements moving in the battlespace whenever possible. Yes, your movement will be hampered, but you have no choice. If you have to move, pull from the rest of the combat team as needed to support your requirement to command forward, but be aware of the effect it will have. Ensure to plan return moves in as much detail as movements out, so as to prevent being stuck in a location with only one vehicle and unable to return to the rest of your sub-unit in a timely manner. While maximising the use of other moving parts in the battlespace is good, having the combat team commander stuck in a forward location with no way to retrieve him is bad—let your team help you make the decision to rely on another element or use your own teams, despite the drain on combat power it entails.

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Every move is a deliberate operation that saps combat power from the rest of the team …
6. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

During deployed operations, the leave plan, which will at times see large numbers of personnel unavailable for operations, will cause such havoc that at times you may have to centrally manage and allot vehicles and crew members. Often in preparation for large scale deliberate operations, the captains and sergeant major had to chess-piece out individual vehicle crewing and patrol make-up. While every attempt is made to give troop and platoon-level leaders and their NCOs maximum latitude, this planning often cannot be pushed to them, as they would spend so much time gathering combat power, coordinating, planning and linking laterally to exchange personnel and vehicles that they would have no time to lead their troops. While planning in such detail, driven from the combat team headquarters, is painful and something never encountered during training, it is a reality that cannot be escaped. In this instance, egos must be set aside to permit the whole sub-unit to function effectively. All leaders must understand that Combat Team readiness takes precedence over platoon-level cohesion. In training, platoons must practice operating with each other and practice operating with sections from different troops and platoons meshed together for tasks.

7. KNOW AND UNDERSTAND ATTACHMENTS AND ENABLERS

In the modern battlespace, everything is a combined arms effort. However, the breadth of attachments and enablers used in practice far exceed those typically covered in training. B Squadron, the Royal Canadian Dragoons, deployed to Afghanistan in Fall 2009 as a squadron of less than one hundred personnel. However, for most of its deployment, it had upwards of two hundred Canadian personnel, mostly comprised of attachments over and above those normally found in a combat team such as engineers, artillery forward observation officer parties and additional infantry. The B Squadron combat team had attached civil-military cooperation teams, construction management organisation teams, police operational mentor liaison teams, medics, a national support element logistics detachment, a number of civilian contracted K-9 patrol dog teams and from time to time, psychological operations and explosive ordinance disposal teams. The combat team also worked closely with whole of government partners in the form of Canadian International Development Agency civilian stabilisation officers and civilian police officers. For all deliberate and most routine operations it also partnered with an Afghan National Police element. Take the time to sit down and learn what your partners, attachments and enablers can offer you...

Take the time to sit down and learn what your partners, attachments and enablers can offer you...
they may have with regards to their employment. Often the perceptions you have may differ from reality on the ground; learning about them as soon as possible will not only offer you the best understanding on how to employ them, it will let the attachments know that you have taken the time to understand them and see them as part of your team, not just resources to be exploited. Finally, attachments may be drawn from the Air Force or Navy; they may not understand very much about combat arms operations whatsoever, so be prepared to educate them and look after them as you would your own.

8. TACTICAL PATIENCE

In operations, things happen that will throw timings and plans out the window at a moment’s notice. Every time you roll out, you may not be back for days, depending on events beyond your control. A defensive measure or radio failure in the wrong place may make a thirty-minute road move from one position to another into a three-day event. Planned H-hours may be pushed off endlessly by enablers, or lack thereof, Special Operations Forces operations or the other frictions of war. As a leader, you must stay patient and always let subordinates work laterally, feed you situation reports and suggestions, and offer a work-around to challenges that arise. Frequently, particularly when you are deployed forward, your command post will have a better grasp of detail than you do, so should be offering you contingency plans which will give you time and space to look at the big picture and add minor steering corrections as needed. Plan ahead and remember that things beyond your control do not mean your plans are ineffective or that you have failed as a leader; stay patient, stay focused and work within, rather than against, the situation.

9. NEVER STOP TRAINING

Keep your own skills sharp and keep pushing your subordinates to do the same. This is part of leadership by example; the combat team commander should never be ‘too busy’ to train on critical skills, particularly in lulls between major operations. While it may seem like mothering or an unnecessary distraction during war, refreshing simple skills like weapons handling, mine detector operation, first aid or communications equipment will prevent skill fade and save lives. In large combat teams, not all attachments may be as familiar or used to handling weapons or equipment; they must also be included in refresher training if they are under your command.

10. CASUALTIES

They will happen. Prepare for it. Be aware of your own reaction. There will be times when things explode, bullets fly, soldiers, comrades and close friends may be hurt or killed and there is nothing you can do about it. Find a way to deal with it and lean on your sergeant major. Keep your team informed as soon as possible about casualties from
other units and your Afghan security partners—you may not know them, but they may be close comrades of your attachments. Take the time to publicly commemorate and respect the fallen, but remember that you can no longer help them. Stay focused—the living still need your attention and efforts. You may also be injured, but must continue to lead, and lead well, despite injury. When all is going bad, you and the sergeant major, of all people, must be calm, collected and continue to lead the organisation.

While geared to the Canadian deployed combat team commander in Afghanistan, these ten tips are also applicable for captains in sub-unit and unit-level positions and in most cases, to platoon or troop-level leadership teams, from any country, deploying to any theatre. Having served alongside and with Australian Army personnel on the Golan Heights, in South Lebanon and Afghanistan, I am confident that they will offer the same value to the officers and NCOs leading Australian soldiers in dangerous and difficult operations. While they do focus on deployed operations and have been proven in combat, they are also valuable for training or domestic deployments. Finally, while they are in my words, the soldiers, NCOs and officers that I was privileged enough to command are the ones who brought them into sharp focus for me, validated them with their sweat, effort and blood; they and their successors are the ones who will benefit most from leaders that apply them in future.

ENDNOTES

1 Canada’s Task Force Kandahar dictates that a minimum of three Canadian armoured vehicles, or two armoured vehicles accompanied by Afghan National Army or Afghan National Police forces are the minimum required for movement outside any secure area. This policy has been validated through a great many improvised explosive device strikes and ambushes.

THE AUTHOR

Major Mark Popov, an Armour officer in the Royal Canadian Dragoons, has served since 1995 in Leopard tank, Cougar armoured car, M113 and Coyote armoured reconnaissance squadrons. He served in Bosnia as a squadron liaison officer, as a UN Military Observer in Syria and Lebanon and in Afghanistan as second-in-command of a reconnaissance squadron. In 2009–10 he commanded a combat team in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. He holds a BA from Royal Roads Military College, an MBA from Norwich University and an MDS from the Canadian Forces College. He is currently the G3 of 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group.
ENGINEERING FROM THE SEA

ESTABLISHING HOW AUSTRALIAN ARMY ENGINEERS FIT INTO AUSTRALIA’S AMPHIBIOUS CONCEPT

MAJOR MICHAEL SCOTT

ABSTRACT

The high demand historically placed on engineers by an amphibious landing force after it has deployed ashore requires that the manner that Australian Army engineers fit into Australia’s Amphibious Concept be established in order for the ADF to successfully execute amphibious operations, prior to any future such commitment. The list of engineering tasks needed to support the full spectrum of operations in the current and future operating environments is quite extensive, thereby an ad hoc engineer group to support the landing force cannot simply be formed, nor is there a one-size-fits-all engineer solution. This article is based on a paper submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Military Studies from the Marine Corps University. A copy of the full paper can be obtained at the Alfred M Gray Marine Corps Research Center USMC Research Library website.

The combat Marine engineer was described as the man who volunteered for nothing, but worked around the clock.

Ralph W Donnelly1
INTRODUCTION

The Australian government stated in its Defence White Paper 2009 that ‘Australia’s defence policy should continue to be founded on the principle of self-reliance in the direct defence of Australia’. This White Paper dictated that Australia’s military strategy is principally a maritime one and assigned the Australian Defence Force (ADF) a primary operational environment covering approximately sixty-six million square kilometres—more than 12 per cent of the Earth’s surface. As a result, the Australian government decided that this expansive strategic geography requires the ADF to assume an expeditionary orientation at the operational level, underpinned by requisite force projection capabilities. Flowing from this requirement was the purchase of two amphibious Canberra class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships, due to enter service between early 2014 and mid-2015, and the early-2011 purchase of a former Royal Navy Bay class Landing Ship Dock (LSD). In order to provide the required expeditionary amphibious capability, the ADF produced Australia’s Amphibious Concept (AAC), which articulates the ADF’s aspirations for future amphibious warfare across the spectrum of amphibious operations.

Engineers have always played, and will continue to play, a significant role in amphibious operations. The 13th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps (USMC), Major General John A Lejeune, wrote that ‘the Marine Corps for many years has carried on certain military activities of an engineering nature. Work which may properly so be designated is performed as a matter of necessity in almost every land campaign’. Engineers have also historically been an integral part of all major amphibious operations that Australia and its major allies, the United States and the United Kingdom, have conducted. Royal Australian Engineers (RAE) have thus played important roles in these amphibious operations, with Sapper Fred Reynolds of the 1st Field Company Engineers recorded as the first soldier to be killed on the Gallipoli Peninsula in 1915. The most recent amphibious operations conducted by the ADF primarily involved engineer forces providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief following large-scale natural disasters in Indonesia in 2004–05 and 2009.

With respect to engineers, neither the AAC nor the more detailed Landing Force Concept of Employment provide more definition than to state that engineers will be part of the battle group, around which the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) will...
base its landing force. Despite this, due to the high demand historically placed on engineers by a landing force after it has deployed ashore, the nature of how Australian Army Engineers fit into the AAC must be established in order for the ADF to successfully execute amphibious operations. This nature can be established through an examination and analysis of the engineer tasks and organisations that have contributed to previous successful amphibious operations from the Second World War to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

**DESCRIPTION OF THE MILITARY PROBLEM**

**AUSTRALIA’S AMPHIBIOUS CONCEPT**

The AAC is the concept for the employment of the ADF’s amphibious capability to its full potential, linking higher-level guidance and operational concepts with ADF operational-level doctrine for amphibious operations. The strategic military priorities established in the Defence White Paper 2009 are reaffirmed in the AAC: deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia, contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and East Timor, contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, and contribute to military contingencies in the rest of the world.

At the same time the ADF saw the need for the AAC, the USMC decided to get back to its amphibious roots after ten years of intense focus on ground operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While closely aligned with the USMC’s *Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century* and *Marine Corps Operating Concept – Third Edition*, as well as the UK’s *Littoral Manoeuvre (Amphibious Task Group) Joint Capability Concept*, the AAC is tailored to secure Australia’s strategic interests with a relatively small-sized force. The AAC directs that ADF forces be prepared to conduct three distinct types of amphibious missions: amphibious operations, military support operations, and sea lift. Amphibious operations are further divided into four types: demonstration, raid, assault, and withdrawal. Military support operations are also further divided: Defence aid to the civil community or Defence Force aid to civil authorities; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; non-combatant evacuation operations; peace operations; civil enforcement duties; and inter-agency, international organisation and non-government organisation liaison and support. Sea lift is the ‘administrative movement of personnel and/or equipment to and within the Joint Force Area of Operations.’

In order to be interoperable with allies, the ADF’s amphibious concept aspires to develop Australian amphibious thinking based on an Australian analysis and conceptual models from US and UK doctrine. As a result, the four core concepts to underpin the Australian approach to amphibious operations reflect US and UK thinking: littoral manoeuvre, ship-to-objective manoeuvre, distributed manoeuvre, and sea basing. Like the US and UK, the core concepts require further development in order for the models to be fully implemented.
For a country with relatively limited military assets, the Australian ATF must be flexible and adaptive to conduct sequential and/or simultaneous different missions. The AAC states that the ‘ATF must be a scalable organisation,’ ‘be a balanced, mobile force … with sufficient endurance to accomplish the mission,’ and deploy ‘without the reliance on host-nation infrastructure.’ To achieve the large mission set, the AAC bases the future ATF around the deployment and sustainment requirements of the following two organisations:

1. **Amphibious Ready Group (ARG).** The ARG will be capable of the full suite of amphibious tasks. Its manoeuvre component will be a medium-weight battle group, of similar size to a USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), of approximately 2200 personnel, with armoured vehicles, helicopters, associated stores and equipment. The engineer element will be squadron-sized.

2. **Amphibious Ready Element (ARE).** The ARE is a sub-element of the ARG and is primarily focused on the conduct of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief or non-combatant evacuation operations missions at very short notice. The manoeuvre component will be an infantry company based Ready Combat Team (RCT) and will include a troop-sized engineer element.

Neither the AAC nor the derived *Landing Force Concept for Employment* defines tasks or an organisation for the engineer elements. The documents do, however, imply that substantial engineering effort will be required to ensure success. The *Landing Force Concept for Employment* states that the ‘ADF is to be prepared to conduct amphibious assault[s] … into uncertain … environments’ and repeatedly highlights that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations will be a core skill set of the landing force. As the list of engineering tasks required to support these operations is quite extensive, an ad hoc engineer group to support the landing force cannot simply be put together without a detailed analysis of what it will likely do, what personnel and equipment it will require, and what training it will need.

**HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF ENGINEERS IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS**

A brief study of amphibious operational history highlights the utility of engineers and the fact that they were crucial for the manoeuvre elements in combat. The study of operational campaigns since 1943 provides examples of likely combat
operations in the ADF’s primary operating environment: the USMC and RAE in New Guinea and the Central Pacific in the Second World War; the Royal Marines as they landed and advanced to their objective in the Falkland Islands (1982); the USMC entry operations into Somalia, with a focus on a low-mid intensity security environment (1992–93); and finally, the 2001 operations of the 15th and 26th MEUs for a planned non-combatant evacuation operation and the executed operations that seized two airfields inside Afghanistan in the early stages of OEF. All tasks noted were conducted within the first thirty days (many within the first seven days) of a landing force deploying ashore, which is well inside the mission duration that has been set for the ARG. 18

SECOND WORLD WAR

The strongest theme that emerged from analysing the official records of operations in New Guinea, including Gape Gloucester, on Saipan and in Borneo can be simply stated: terrain was very restrictive to the movement of the landing forces. 19 The lack of key infrastructure in the region, such as roads and bridges, resulted in engineers providing the required mobility through the expedient construction and maintenance of beach exits, tracks, corduroy roads and bridges. (A lack of infrastructure in the ADF’s primary operating environment is still the case today.) These tasks were made all the more difficult during the extensive monsoon season, with its influence on both rain and surf. The weather was not the only challenge, as engineer tasks frequently had to be completed under enemy fire, often without protection. 20 Other common tasks included obstacle reduction, minefield clearance, booby trap clearance and the destruction of enemy strong points to enhance mobility. General engineering tasks also had to be completed, including water supply, rapid airfield repair and improvement, and camp construction. 21 In addition, the vast majority of amphibious engineers in the Second World War were required to execute infantry tasks; that is, engage in combat, the engineer’s ubiquitous secondary role.

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, 1982

The Royal Engineers (RE) reinforced 59 Independent Commando Squadron (Five-Nine), which included a reconnaissance troop and a troop from 9 Parachute Squadron RE, 22 provided the mobility and survivability support to 3 Commando Brigade (3 CDO BDE RM) when it secured a beachhead at San Carlos in East
Falkland. The squadron then supported the advance east to the final objective, Stanley. While relatively light, with regards to engineering vehicles and specialist equipment, the amphibious engineers played a significant role in the operations to recapture the Falkland Islands. In addition to fighting as infantry, the significant engineer tasks Five-Nine undertook included: improving beach exits and roads; constructing hardstands; reconnoitring, breaching and clearing minefields and obstacles; rendering safe explosive ordnance and booby traps; constructing fighting positions and strong points; and water supply operations. Once the beachhead was secure, additional RE units were brought ashore to undertake the numerous general engineering tasks required to support the larger task force. The Commander of 3 CDO BDE RM wrote in his account of the war: 'In war there are never enough Sappers and the support given to the Commando Brigade by its engineer squadron, which included a troop from 9 Squadron, was superb.

**Somalia, 1992–93**

As part of Operation RESTORE HOPE, the 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (1 CEB) supported the initial insertion of the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) into Somalia with a reinforced combat engineer company. The bulk of effort provided by the company from 1 CEB at the start of the operation was on mobility tasks, including route reconnaissance, route maintenance, route clearance, mine clearance and work to open the port facilities. Survivability was another high priority, including strong point construction and facility hardening, as well as the provision of water and general security tasks. After the initial insertion of the SPMAGTF, additional engineers were flowed into theatre from 1 CEB, as well as from the US Navy Seabees, the Marine Wing Support Squadron and the 7th Engineer Support Battalion. At the eighteen-day mark, approximately 1300 engineers worked for the Marine Forces. An official and important lesson that emerged from Operation RESTORE HOPE: UN ‘chapter VI and VII operations [that is, Security and Stability Operations] in third world countries place high demands on engineer support.

**Afghanistan, 2001**

The seizure in late 2001 of forward operating base Rhino and Kandahar Airport by Task Force 58 (TF 58), consisting of the 15th MEU and the 26th MEU, is the most recent amphibious combat operation studied. Engineer support to this operation was crucial to the rapid build up of forces in Afghanistan and was almost exclusively flown in, initially by helicopter, then by KC-130 aircraft, and finally by C-17 transporters. Each MEU was supported by a reinforced combat engineer platoon, a reinforced support engineer platoon, a Marine Wing Support Squadron detachment, and an enlarged explosive detection dog section. TF 58 was also reinforced with a
chemical biological inspection site team and a Seabee detachment of thirty engineers. The key tasks conducted by TF 58 engineers were: the rapid repair and expansion of the two airfields and helicopter landing zones; the conduct of high risk search tasks; the clearance of mines, booby traps, and explosive ordnance; the construction of fighting positions, strong points, and berms; the construction of hygiene-related camp facilities and the building of detainee compounds. Of particular note is the fact that both the 15th MEU and the 26th MEU were afloat when the events of 11 September 2001 occurred. Thus, neither MEU was task organised for this specific mission but they were prepared for it. 27

Since late 2004, the 1st Combat Engineer Regiment (1 CER) has twice provided short notice amphibious engineer forces for large-scale humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in Indonesia. In response to the devastating 2004 Boxing Day Indian Ocean Tsunami, 1 CER provided the main ADF contingent as part of the Australian government’s response in Banda Aceh. Here, it focused on water supply and debris clearance in order to reduce environmental health threats. In response to the 2009 magnitude 7.5 earthquake off Western Sumatra, 1 CER again provided the main ADF contingent to the Australian government’s response in Padang. On this occasion, it focused on water supply, structural building assessments, rendering safe important buildings, minor repairs to key lines of communication, and construction of semi-permanent medical centres. While both responses were very similar in nature, before deployment no contingency plans existed. This resulted in planning from first principles; that is, with a limited knowledge base for such an operation. 1 CER was very successful in both operations, largely due to the individuals who were available at the time to rapidly plan the tasks and then execute a quickly developed plan, providing modifications to it as required. 28

Whether in the ADF’s primary operating environment or further afield, the range of engineer tasks required for an amphibious operation are vast, although common throughout, and cover the majority of tasks for which RAE sappers train. The review of historical operations showed that combat, support and specialist engineers were required, both individually and collectively, to complete the work and, on occasion, required supplementation. The historical employment of engineers on amphibious operations can help predict how engineers will be used on future expeditionary operations.
CONCEPTS  ~  MAJOR MICHAEL SCOTT

HOW OTHER AMPHIBIOUS FORCES EMPLOY THEIR ENGINEERS

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

USMC engineer roles, tasks, organisation, and principles of employment differ significantly from that of the RAE. Thus, the USMC template cannot simply be transferred to the Australian ARG, even though the manoeuvre element is similar in structure to a USMC MEU. For example, petroleum operators and engineer vehicle mechanics are USMC engineer specialities but not RAE trades; conversely, electricians and explosive ordnance disposal technicians are RAE trades but not USMC engineer specialities. In addition, USMC combat engineer units have neither organic transport/drivers nor protected mobility vehicles to support a mechanised/motorised combat team. Overall, USMC engineers independently support the four elements of a Marine Air Ground Task Force: command element, ground combat element, air combat element, and the logistics combat element. As these four elements will exist in an Australian ARG, while named and organised differently, the task and breakdown of forces provide a good reference point. In addition, in order to expand on capabilities that do not exist in the USMC (but exist within RAE CERs and 6 ESR), a scalable and tailored naval construction force will often be attached. Typical engineer support to a MEU is shown in Figure 1. The engineer elements total approximately 103 to 120 personnel, without including the naval construction force.29

The USMC 2024 Baseline MEB and MEU provides the future force structure of USMC manoeuvre formations, including their engineer elements.30 This baseline, used for future force concept modelling, includes very few changes to the engineer organisations organic to a MEU. The ground combat element is still supported by a reinforced combat engineer platoon and a reinforced engineer platoon is included in the combat logistics battalion. It can thus be deduced that the method by which the USMC employs its engineers will only substantially differ when the concepts of operation for USMC manoeuvre formations change significantly.

ROYAL MARINES, GREAT BRITAIN

The support provided by 24 Commando Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers (24 Cdo Engr Regt, RE) to 3 CDO BDE RM is relatively light. This reflects the fact that 3 CDO BDE RM is a light-medium expeditionary force that does not include significant armoured elements, such as tanks, in its order of battle. Having
previously supported the entire 3 CDO BDE RM with one regular independent commando squadron (Five-Nine), the RE are now upsizing to support the brigade with an engineer regiment. This is in accordance with the Australian model and highlights the fact that amphibious operations require considerable engineer support in order to attain success. The RE provide support to a battalion-size Royal Marine commando battle group with a squadron-size element, totalling approximately 126 to 173 personnel. The typical organisation is shown below in Figure 2.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY

In accordance with Australian doctrine, the appropriate level of engineer support to an Australian battle group is usually provided by a combat engineer squadron, with a combat engineer troop supporting an independent company-sized combat team. This is not always strictly followed, with the size and composition often

Figure 1. Current Generic Engineer Support to a USMC MEU

Figure 2. Royal Engineer Support to a Royal Marine Commando Battle Group
adjusted to cater for specific missions and operational environments. Currently in Afghanistan, a combat engineer squadron, reinforced with additional combat engineers and support engineers, provides the increased support required by the combined arms battle group. This level of support is predicated on the level of threat, type of weapons being used by the opposing forces and the counterinsurgency mission of the battle group. As Australia does not currently possess a dedicated amphibious capability, the engineer support to an amphibious operation is usually ad hoc. Another real world complicating factor exists: force structure is generally based on limits set by a manning cap rather than on an analysis of historically based likely tasks.

As Australia does not currently possess a dedicated amphibious capability, the engineer support to an amphibious operation is usually ad hoc.

THE CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS

Studies in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom have predicted similar future global and regional security environments, which have proved accurate in recent years. Traditionally, inter-state wars involving conflict between armed forces purpose-built for engaging in conventional combat (symmetrical warfare) have been the main focus of defence planning by Australia and its allies. In recent years, intra-state conflict among different political, ethnic or religious groups has come more to the fore in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where conventional military forces have had to work alongside civilian agencies and non-government organisations. Moreover, threats from some non-state global actors, such as al-Qaeda, have meant that armed forces have had to be employed against new types of adaptive adversaries. All of this has resulted in what is termed ‘complex war’ or asymmetrical warfare. While globalisation has seen growing interdependence between states, the Australian government still considers it premature to rule out future conventional wars between states, including the major powers.

The ADF does not currently train for employment in a single environment; instead, it can be deployed from urban environments to jungles, from deserts to mountains. Global factors (including terrorism, pandemic disease, population growth, resource depletion and climate change security implications) as well as specific Asia-Pacific region factors (such as state fragility, poor governance, and economic underdevelopment and inequality) will affect Australia’s security interests, both directly and indirectly. Compounding these threats will be factors such as globalisation, urbanisation, the rise of new military powers, new technologies and
other non-traditional challenges. Traditional societal structures and the ability of states to provide essential services as well as law and order will continue to be stressed by population and urban growth, no more so than in Melanesia and Southeast Asia. The principal physical characteristics of the ADF’s primary operating environment are its littoral nature, vast spaces between areas of human habitation and the presence of complex terrain. The broad range of topographical features tends to combine so that urban areas exist in close proximity to a mixture of agrarian land, coastal planes, mountains, tropical vegetation and coastal waterways. Compounding these environmental challenges are the frequent natural disasters that occur in the Southeast Asian and Pacific regions, most notably the seismic activity along the fault lines of the ‘ring of fire’. History suggests that challenges that lack opponents are more likely than those with an adversary, that is, significant opposition greater than opportunistic criminals.

The global and regional security environment means that the ADF should be prepared to face opponents who use the following capabilities: readily available ‘low tech’ capabilities; increasingly secure and sophisticated networked command and control, and ISR systems; increasingly conventional platforms that enhance lethality, survivability, and deployability; and increasingly available advanced conventional weapons as well as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive devices. States now no longer possess a monopoly on advanced weaponry, as non-state actors, such as terrorist groups and irregular forces, have acquired the means, knowledge and employment capability of increased lethality. The conventional capabilities of many states will also improve, so both state and non-state adversaries will be able to acquire increased lethality. A significant trend, while not new, has been identified in recent conflicts where previous notions of distinct forms of war and conflict—conventional war, irregular challenges, terrorism and criminal activity—have become blurred into what is being described as hybrid challenges. These hybrid challenges can be created by state and non-state groups, and will result in opponents that can merge different approaches and integrate various weapons, tactics and technologies to deny access and freedom of action. A recent example is the 2006 Israel–Lebanon conflict.

There are numerous implications for the conduct of engineer operations arising from the forecast of the security environment in which the ADF will operate in the next twenty to thirty years. Firstly, terrain in the littoral areas will provide significant mobility challenges that engineers will need to overcome. This harks back to
operations in New Guinea and the Pacific during the Second World War, where engineers directly influenced and contributed to the speed at which operations were executed. Secondly, the ADF’s adversaries will use various combinations of conventional and improvised weapons systems to attack a landing force. These may combine conventional minefields and obstacles with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and booby traps in urban terrain, including at airfields and ports that may be used for the ingress of follow-on forces. Finally, the frequency with which natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions and cyclones have occurred in the past six years within Australia’s primary operating environment, will ensure that the ADF’s response to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations is engineer intensive.

CAPABILITIES REQUIRED OF THE AMPHIBIOUS ENGINEER FORCE

What do the future operation environment and historical employment of amphibious engineers indicate? Individualised lethality of modern weapons and the disaggregated battlespace means that, in complex war, land forces will encounter more lethal enemies, with less warning, in close combat and in complex terrain. Therefore, all deployed land force elements, including engineers, will need to be given sufficient levels of protection, mobility and firepower to conduct sustained close combat within the complex battlespace. Importantly, the land force will need to survive first contact with the enemy and react accordingly. Additionally, Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept states ‘the land force will need the capacity to conduct rapid route clearance and gap crossing, maintain essential lines of communication and operate within a contaminated environment’.43

Today and in the future, the combat and support engineers bring to the battlefield both constructive (e.g. building strong points and providing essential services) and destructive (e.g. obstacle breaching and demolitions) capabilities. This unique amalgamation of contrasting capabilities provides skills, knowledge and experience to commanders at the operational and tactical levels with which the commanders can reduce friction, facilitate manoeuvre and increase the morale of friendly forces, or create friction and disorder to break the cohesion of the enemy. The combat engineer earns his title most notably through assault breaching of enemy obstacles and fortifications, or by their contribution of firepower in the form of supplementary
infantry support and self-protection. The capabilities provided can be decisive in maintaining momentum in the attack or responding quickly to an enemy’s counter-attack. These required engineer capabilities are common to all current and future operations, not just amphibious operations. Due to space constraints on the amphibious ships, which restricts the amount of engineer personnel, vehicles and equipment that can be carried, the number and type of tasks that can be undertaken by amphibious engineers is also restricted.

The challenge therefore becomes determining or prioritising the most likely tasks that will be required. Once done, an engineer force can be developed that is capable of covering the majority of these tasks while remaining within the space restrictions. The wide range of military and engineer tasks for which the ADF is required to prepare, across the full spectrum of operations in the current and future operating environments, means that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all engineer solution. Therefore, five likely scenarios are proposed, covering the spectrum of amphibious operations with their multitude of engineer options. The scenarios are as follows:

- **Scenario 1.** Support to an ARE conducting Phase Zero (shaping) operations, minor humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and non-combatant evacuation operations. Engineer tasks will include minor vertical and horizontal construction, including strong points, searches for simple IEDs and water supply.

- **Scenario 2.** An engineer task force conducting a major humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation as a result of a ‘large scale’ natural disaster, such as the Indian Ocean Boxing Day Tsunami. Engineer tasks will focus on water supply and debris clearance in order to reduce environmental health threats as well as essential infrastructure assessments, structural building assessments, rendering safe important buildings, minor repairs to key lines of communication and construction of semi-permanent community health buildings.

- **Scenario 3.** Support to an ARG conducting regional stability operations, such as the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands in 2003 and East Timor in 2006. Engineer tasks will include clearing beach obstacles, countering unsophisticated IEDs, minimal preparation of beach landing sites and small-scale expedient construction tasks.

- **Scenario 4.** Support to an ARDF conducting entry operations for a medium-intensity regional conflict, such as for the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999. Engineer tasks will include clearing beach obstacles, clearing basic IED/mine threat against air operations, countering IED threats on roads, the construction/enhancement of landing zones, preparation of beach landing sites and basic camp construction.

- **Scenario 5.** Support to an ARG conducting entry operations for a major regional conflict involving a Coalition Task Force, in the manners of 3 CDO BDE RM
in the Falkland Islands in 1982 and 15th/26th MEU in seizing APODs in Afghanistan in 2001. Engineer tasks will include clearing beach obstacles, clearing sophisticated IED/mine threats targeting air operations, countering sophisticated IED threats on roads, breaching or clearing a mine threat, the construction of landing zones, preparation of beach landing sites, the construction and maintenance of routes, basic camp construction and the construction of defences.

The likely tasks for amphibious engineers can be distilled from analysing historical records from operations similar to those that the Australian ATF will undertake, described in the five scenarios, or from operations that have occurred in Australia’s primary operating environment. From these tasks a mixture of combat, support and specialist engineers is required for low-intensity missions such as Phase Zero operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and small-scale security operations. The majority of these engineers reside in a CER. The analysis also shows that for large-scale high-intensity operations, where the ATF conducts entry operations for a follow-on force, the variety and number of simultaneous engineer tasks that will be encountered will require a follow-on engineer force. Initially independent, it may then function as part of a coalition engineer capability to facilitate the flow of the ensuing forces. The majority of engineer tasks required to secure the points of entry, however, can be executed within the existing capabilities of a CER by a reinforced combat engineer squadron.

What is not captured in the task analysis, and is often overlooked, is the requirement for the provision of engineer advice and engineer planning. Due to the fact that there are so many different engineer tasks, the vast majority of which require technical knowledge to plan and execute, it is essential that engineers are represented from the outset in all operations planning processes. Therefore, an engineer planner, or at least an engineer liaison officer, must always be included in ATF planning groups as well as in the landing force headquarters. While this function is sometimes filled by the headquarters of the engineer force, the need for the engineer headquarters to monitor and control engineer tasks results in this element often being physically distanced from the supported battle group headquarters. As such, it is recommended that an RAE Officer always be included in the landing force headquarters, either as a permanent liaison officer or as one of the operations cell staff.

The likely tasks for amphibious engineers can be distilled from analysing historical records from operations similar to those that the Australian ATF will undertake …
CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT
ASSUMPTIONS AND RESTRICTIONS

Several assumptions have been made for the provision of engineer capabilities to the scenarios. For the development of engineer options it has been assumed that the light vehicles, protected mobility vehicles and trucks will be replaced with similar vehicles as part of the current ADF land vehicle fleet replacement program. It is also assumed that medical support to the engineer element will either be provided by the supported battle group element or by the main combat service support element, except for Scenario Two where the medical element would be organic. Finally, it is assumed that the follow-on engineer element will be transported by either black-bottom vessels or coalition ships.

A feasible and suitable engineer solution to the outlined problem must be good, fast and cheap as well as be within the restrictions set by the ADF. The Landing Force Concept for Employment and modelling data used by the Joint Amphibious Capability Implementation Team gives the size of engineer force and its equipment for which there is space available on the amphibious ships. The publication Employment of Engineers provides the governing principles and guidelines for the employment of engineers by the Australian Army. Documents for the Modular Engineer Force, which is the RAE’s ongoing Force Modernisation Review, provide the guidance as to how engineers will meet future warfighting challenges and how they will be commanded and controlled. These documents provided the constraints for this analysis, as outlined in Table 1.

SCALABLE OPTIONS

Taking into account the constraints, the five scenarios covering the likely employment of engineers in amphibious operations necessitate five different and scalable organisation options, due to the size of the force being support, type of amphibious mission being supported and the variety of resulting tasks. An overview of each option is as follows:

- **Scenario 1 – Support to an ARE conducting Phase Zero (Shaping) operations, minor humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and non-combatant evacuation operations.** As the ARE is of company-size, it requires a reinforced troop-sized option. The likely security cooperation and minor HA/DR missions, which will dominate the ARE deployments, will most probably involve
Table 1. Constraints on the Employment of Engineers used in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Constraint Details</th>
<th>How Constraint Applies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Load Planner for the ARG used an estimate of 158 engineers, fourteen armoured</td>
<td>The engineer element supporting an ARG can have a strength of up to 158 persons and can have a maximum total lane meterage of 413.7m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vehicles, five light vehicles with four trailers, three medium-weight trucks with</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>five trailers, eight heavy trucks with two heavy trailers, one water purification</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unit, six tracked plant machines and four wheeled plant machines. This provides</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total lane meterage of 413.7m.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Load Planner for the ARE used an estimate of fifteen engineers, two PMVs and</td>
<td>The engineer element supporting an ARE can have a strength of up to fifty persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no additional engineer equipment. As this load calculator had a spare capacity of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>446 persons but only three lane metres, it is also assumed that up to fifty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>engineers can be used.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The secondary role of RAE is to fight as infantry.</td>
<td>For low-intensity operations, such as Phase Zero and non-combatant evacuation operation, engineers can also perform the roles of infantry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The solution must have centralised control with decentralised execution.</td>
<td>The engineer element must have one overall headquarters for planning and coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Early warning and reconnaissance – engineers must have participants in the planning</td>
<td>There must be an engineer in the headquarters as well as part of any reconnaissance team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of operations at the outset and be given the opportunity to conduct reconnaissance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Economy of effort – it is uneconomical either to apply more engineer effort than</td>
<td>Only the minimum number of engineers are included; however, engineer positions cannot be sacrificed for personnel who can provide unskilled labour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>is necessary to complete tasks in the required time or to use engineer effort on</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the unskilled aspects of engineer tasks.</td>
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Engineering from the Sea

light construction. This would require four tradesmen and two plant operators. The military tradesmen would supervise construction works by the combat engineers as well as undertake specialist trade work. Two mechanised sections are included to provide self-protected engineer support to the combat team and can additionally serve as infantry sections for security operations. The light combat engineer section is air mobile, providing mobility capabilities, such as search, as well as the ability to conduct water supply tasks. The troop is reinforced with a two-man explosive ordnance disposal detachment and two explosive detection dog teams, to increase the search and explosive ordnance capabilities of the troop. The troop has organic transport, a storeman and a mechanic. Planning with the ARE headquarters would be provided by an RAE captain, as either a liaison officer or operations staff member, as well as a geospatial technician.

- **Scenario 2 – An Engineer Task Force conducting a major humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operation as a result of a 'large scale' natural disaster.**

  The scale of such a disaster would require a dedicated Engineer Task Force to be deployed. As the engineer group forms the nucleus of the ATF, this option would include a sizeable organic logistics element. A chaplain and a minimum of two interpreters are included due to the nature of the work being undertaken. The option includes two combat engineer troops—one dedicated to water supply tasks and the other to general engineering—as well as medium-weight plant and tradesmen elements. An emergency response detachment has been included to handle potentially hazardous materials, such as asbestos. An RAE captain is included in the Joint Task Force headquarters, as well as a geospatial technician. It is also more than likely that a technically qualified structural assessment team, supplemented from outside a CER, would be required to technically assess building and bridge damage.

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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Constraint Details</th>
<th>How Constraint Applies</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The appropriate levels of engineer support for most types of operations are as follows: combat engineer troop to a manoeuvre sub-unit and combat engineer squadron to a manoeuvre unit.</td>
<td>ARE will be supported by a reinforced troop and the ARG will be supported by a reinforced squadron.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Engineer sections will have eight members. This does not include the sections with protected mobility, which require a dedicated crew commander and a driver.</td>
<td>The light combat engineer elements will have eight-man sections, while the mechanised combat engineer elements will have ten-man sections.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Scenario 3 – Support to an ARG conducting regional stability operations. As the ARG is battalion-size, it requires a reinforced engineer squadron for support. Two combat engineer troops would support the manoeuvre forces: a mechanised troop supporting the two mechanised combat teams and a light troop, with organic transport, supporting the two air mobile combat teams. The substantial general engineering tasks required of this mission, primarily the construction and maintenance of roads and airfields, as well as the construction of camp infrastructure and survivability tasks, demands a light-medium weight support engineering troop. A specialist troop is also included to provide the suite of likely explosive ordnance disposal, explosive detection dog and hazardous material capabilities. The explosive ordnance

As the ARG is battalion-size, it requires a reinforced engineer squadron for support.
disposal team would use a Buffalo-type mine protected clearance vehicle, as is currently being used to counter the IED threat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Planning with the ARG headquarters would be provided by the squadron headquarters. No follow-on engineer element is required, unless the situation escalates and the ARG is reinforced.

- **Scenario 4 – Support to an ARG conducting entry operations for a medium intensity regional conflict.** This option builds on the solution provided for in Scenario 3 by including two assault breacher vehicles and a follow-on engineer force. The latter would comprise a works team and construction squadron element. The ABVs are included with the mechanised troop to recognise the heightened IED and mine threat, providing the ability to conduct rapid route clearance, minefield and obstacle breaching, as well as the reduction of enemy strong points. The works team and construction squadron detachment are required to deploy, by either black-bottom or coalition shipping, to supplement
the support engineer assets with the combat engineer squadron. The tasks of this follow-on force will primarily involve camp construction for the follow on battle groups, the construction and maintenance of roads, the expansion and maintenance of airfield(s), and the establishment of air points and sea points of disembarkation.

- **Scenario 5 – Support to an ARG conducting entry operations for a major regional conflict involving a coalition task force.** This option builds on the solution postulated for in scenario 4. The squadron headquarters becomes mechanised, an armoured vehicle launched bridge is added to the mechanised troop, an additional combat engineer section is added to the light combat engineer troop, the number of explosive ordnance disposal teams is increased, an air crash rescue team is included and the follow-on engineer force is expanded to comprise a Works Team and a complete construction squadron. Mechanising the headquarters provides it with the required protected mobility to conduct engineer reconnaissance tasks in the high-threat environment. The armoured vehicle launched bridge will allow the provision of protected tactical gap crossing capabilities. The additional engineer section is included to balance the support available to the air mobile combat teams, which may be distributed due to the increased air threat. The increased air threat predicates the requirement to augment the emergency response detachment by including an air crash rescue team. The heightened IED threat demands the increase of explosive ordnance disposal capabilities, as has been experienced in Afghanistan. Finally, as the Australian ATF may be providing entry operations for a coalition follow-on force, the follow-on engineer force has been enlarged to cope with the increased demand for engineer works. The follow-on construction squadron would initially operate under command of the ARG, but would in time become part of the coalition engineers. When functioning as part of the coalition engineers, a liaison officer would be required, in addition to a level of command and control appropriate to the coalition.

**REQUIRED MATERIEL**

The vast majority of vehicles and engineer equipment required to provide the recommended engineer support is either currently in service or will come into service as part of ongoing Army vehicle fleet replacement programs. Currently
the Australian Army lacks any form of protected specialist combat engineering equipment, which goes against requirements of both the Defence White Paper 2009 and the AAC. In order for this issue to be remedied, a Buffalo-type mine protected clearance vehicle, the assault breacher vehicle and an armoured vehicle launched bridge need to be included in the ADF’s Defence Capability Plan.

**CONCLUSION**

The Australian government has decreed that Australia’s military strategy is principally a maritime one and that the ADF is to assume an expeditionary orientation at the operational level, underpinned by requisite force projection capabilities. The ADF has responded to this by developing an amphibious capability, with an Amphibious Task Force consisting of two LHDs and an LSD to deliver a medium-weight battalion-size battle group to its area of operations. Underpinning this capability is Australia’s Amphibious Concept, which links higher-level guidance and operational concepts with ADF operational level doctrine for amphibious operations. The concept, and its supporting concepts of employment, states the need for engineers to support amphibious operations, but specifies neither likely tasks nor organisation.

Engineers have historically always played a key enabling, and sometimes leading, role in amphibious operations, more often than not receiving praise for their work. The future operating environment will continue to demand that engineers enable, support and enhance the manoeuvre elements of a Joint Task Force by providing mobility, counter-mobility, survivability and sustainability to these combat arms in likely hybrid threat environments. Because of the wide spectrum of operations that exist both now and into the future, the required enabling tasks are too numerous to be covered by a single engineer organisation.
It is therefore proposed that five engineer contingencies be planned to cover the spectrum of possible operations, ranging from a permanent reinforced troop to support defence cooperation and short-notice security missions, to a reinforced combat engineer squadron that is followed by a construction squadron to support forced entry operations as part of a coalition at the high-intensity end of the operational spectrum. These options, and those in between, carefully balance the limited space for personnel and equipment on the amphibious ships with the array of likely tasks that have been distilled from historical examples for the types of operations that are expected to occur again. If Australia is to have a serious amphibious capability, the Australian Army must genuinely invest time, effort and money to ensure that it is capable of conducting engineering from the sea.

ENDNOTES


3 Australia’s Amphibious Concept, v5.2, Department of Defence, Canberra March 2010, p.4; Defence White Paper 2009, p.51. The primary operational environment extends from the eastern Indian Ocean to the island states of Polynesia and from the equator to the Southern Ocean. That area contains all Australian sovereign, offshore and economic territories, such as Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Christmas Island, Heard and McDonald Islands, Macquarie Island, Norfolk Island, plus waters adjacent to the Australian Antarctic Territory.

4 Major General Julian Thompson, RM (Rtd), ‘Expeditionary Forces and Expeditionary Warfare: Major Themes and Issues’ in Battles Near and Far: A century of overseas deployment, 2004 Chief of Army History Conference, Australian Army History Unit, Canberra, 2005, p. 6. In his keynote address to the 2004 Chief of Army History Conference, Major General Thompson defined Expeditionary Operations as: ‘A military operation that can be initiated at short notice, consisting of forward deployed or rapidly deployable, self-supporting forces tailored to achieve a clearly stated objective in a foreign country’. (Original emphasis shown)


6 Australia’s Amphibious Concept, p.3. Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.2 – Amphibious Operations defines Amphibious Operations as: ‘A military operation launched from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked in ships, landing craft or rotary wing aircraft, with the principal purpose of projecting the landing force ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile’.
ENGINEERING FROM THE SEA

10 Australia’s Amphibious Concept, p. 3. The ADF doctrine is ADDP 3.2 – Amphibious Operations and ADFP 3.2.1 – Amphibious Operations Procedures.
11 Australia’s Amphibious Concept, p. 6.
13 Australia’s Amphibious Concept, p. 7.
14 Ibid., p. 10.
15 Ibid., pp. 8, 13–14.
16 Ibid., p. 14.
18 Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment System, Logistics Concept for Employment, p. 4.
19 Official records of the Marine Corps’ 1st Division in Cape Gloucester, V Amphibious Corps on Saipan, and various RAE units in New Guinea and Borneo are cited below.
20 ‘Special Action Report, Cape Gloucester Operation, Vol II’, Headquarters, First Marine Division, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Cape Gloucester Collection, Box 4, Folder 1, December 1943, p. 10.
22 Major General Julian Thompson, RM (Rtd), No Picnic, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, York, 1992, pp. 5–6 and 18.
24 Thompson, No Picnic, 104.

27. ‘Command Chronology for the Period 27 October 2001 to 26 February 2002’, Task Force 58, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Command Chronology Collection Box 2226, Folder 1, March 2002; ‘Command Chronology for the Period 1 July 2001 to 31 December 2001’, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Command Chronology Collection Box 2205, Folder 4, 2 March 2002; and ‘Command Chronology for the Period 1 July 2001 to 28 February 2002’, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Command Chronology Collection Box 2226, Folders 6 and 7, 31 May 2002.


30. ‘2024 Baseline MEB and MEU’, information brief, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, 7 January 2010.


33. LWD 3-6-1 – Employment of Engineers, Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal, 16 October 2007, p. 2-5.

34. Results of these studies are reported in: *Adaptive Campaigning – Army’s Future Land Operating Concept*, Department of Defence, Canberra, September 2009; *Joint Operations for the 21st Century*, Department of Defence, Canberra, May 2007; *Littoral Manoeuvre (Amphibious Task Group) Joint Capability Concept*; and *The Joint Operating Environment 2010*, Headquarters United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, 18 February 2010.


Adaptive Campaigning, p. 66.


Employment of Engineers, p. 10-5.

An explosive detection dog team consists of a handler and an explosive detection dog.


THE AUTHOR

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PROFESSIONALISM

PRELIMINARY MOVES


MAJOR DAYTON MCCARTHY

ABSTRACT

This article is an amended version of a paper first presented at the 2011 Chief of Army History Conference. The theme of the conference was ‘1911–Preliminary Moves’, therefore the paper examined the professionalisation of the officer corps via the prism of the Royal Military College, Duntroon. The article demonstrates that there were elements of professionalism present in the Australian military prior to RMC’s founding in 1911; in fact these foundations were crucial in the long-term development of the military profession in Australia. This article is not a history of RMC per se but rather a study of the Australian military profession in its formative years. The kind permission of Professor Peter Dennis, organiser of the Chief of Army History Conference, in allowing the paper to be reprinted in the Australian Army Journal is duly acknowledged.
This year marks the centenary of the founding of the Royal Military College, Duntroon (RMC). Among its many achievements, the college has had a fundamental impact on the Australian profession of arms. Although college graduates had served in the First World War, their numbers were few and their wider impact minimal. Before, during and after the First World War, the small cadre of permanent officers existed to support the larger citizen militia or the Australian Imperial Force (AIF). But by the Second World War, graduates had commanded divisions and held staff jobs at the highest levels. By 1946, the college had graduated 690 Australian officers. Moreover, after 1947, the profession of arms in Australia had matured to the extent that Duntroon graduates would serve in the newly created Australian Regular Army (ARA), rather than solely train and administer citizen soldiers.

That Duntroon had an impact is undeniable, but what influence did it have on the professionalisation of the officer corps? To answer this, one must first define professionalism and professionalisation. As such, this article will be divided into four parts. First, it will discuss briefly the development of the professions generally, with special reference to the profession of arms in Australia. From here, the criteria by which one can judge whether an avenue of human endeavour may rightly be called a profession will be stated. Against these criteria, the article will examine the status quo ante of the pre-1911 Australian military forces to see what professional developments had taken place. As it will demonstrate, crucial foundations for the military profession were laid during these decades. Next, the article will discuss the initial intent for Duntroon and examine how this contributed to creating or perhaps cementing the profession of arms in Australia. Lastly, to determine the extent to which RMC professionalised the officer corps, the article will examine briefly the Army in the period up to 1947 against these established criteria.

THE MILITARY PROFESSION

So what is a profession and professionalism? These terms tend to be overused or indeed, misused to describe certain occupations. One definition of a profession is:

- a relatively high status occupation whose members apply abstract knowledge to solve problems in a particular field of endeavour. The definition identifies three elements critical to the idea of a profession: high status, which (is linked to) a notion of legitimacy; applied abstract knowledge (which is) the source of expertise; and a field of endeavour or jurisdiction for problem solving…we can refer to these three simply as expertise, jurisdiction and legitimacy.\(^1\)
Another broader definition is that a profession is an occupation that requires advanced training in a specialised field. The purpose of long and intensive training is to maintain high levels of achievement and conduct according to standards set either by the rules of the organisation or opinion of peers…(a profession also) needs to be able to serve the client to the best of (its) abilities.2

The concepts of expertise and legitimacy are well understood. It is worth clarifying two other preconditions for a profession. The mastery of this body of knowledge or ‘professional theory’ must be distinct and acquired only through education provided by the occupation in question.3 As such, this mastery of theory gives the professional a certain authority over non-professionals (or other professionals from another occupational group) and demonstrates the uniqueness and social worth of this profession vis-a-vis others.4

Moreover, a profession cannot exist without a dual relationship; it must serve a client and that client must deem the profession to have utility.5 A profession must also be deemed as such by the society in which it operates. 'The acceptance by society of a group of experts with specialised knowledge is important in establishing the status and prestige of that group within that community'.6 And as we have seen, enforcing professional standards as the sine qua non of professional competency and demonstrating the continued need for the unique skills of the profession are the two key determinants in maintaining that prestige.

With this basic understanding in place, let us turn to the military profession in particular.7 Morris Janowitz considered the military professional to be unique because he ‘is an expert in war-making and in the organised use of violence’.8 Moreover, the officer corps represented the elite of the profession because entry into it required ‘prolonged training’ which equipped him to ‘render specialised service’.9 A profession, however, was more than a collection of people with a specialised skill. A profession also develops a group identity and a system of self-regulation; this self-regulation includes the evolution of its own ethics, standards of performance and internal administration.10 Professionalism, in the case of the military, also implied that this ‘management of violence’ could no longer be conducted by any other than those who have committed to a career of such service.11

In the military context, the danger has been to conflate the notions of a regular soldier with that of a professional and a standing army with that of a professional military.12 Much of this is due to misunderstanding the nature and purpose of training, which disseminates skills by instruction, and professional knowledge which

This is not to suggest that enlisted personnel cannot demonstrate elements of professionalism.
Professionalism

is the theoretical and practical understanding of a subject. As such, most academics believe that only officers who have devoted themselves to mastering the esoteric body of corporate knowledge over extended periods can rightly be called military professionals. Samuel Huntington argued that while enlisted ranks form part of an army’s organisational bureaucracy, they are not part of its professional bureaucracy. Moreover, they could not be considered professional because they do not bear the professional responsibility which the officer corps must accept; he classed them specialists in the application of violence rather than its management.

This is not to suggest that enlisted personnel cannot demonstrate elements of professionalism. One recent article on the subject offered that enlisted soldiers may not be lacking in professionalism because of anything inadequate or missing within them. Rather, the structure of military service—the way they are treated, trained, educated and developed—prohibits many soldiers from being considered professional.

At any rate, for the purposes of this article, I will only consider the question of military professionalism via the prism of the officer corps and the establishment of RMC.

So, based on what we have discussed, we may deem that the military is a profession and by inference, the officer a military professional. For our purposes in examining the rise of military professionalism in Australia, we may state that the following are a profession’s tenets:

- a profession demonstrates unique expertise within a distinct area that is deemed to solve a societal problem;
- this expertise may only be gained through formal, theoretical education;
- this education can only be obtained through schools controlled by the profession;
- the profession controls entry to those schools and maintains its own administration and ongoing standards for performance and behaviour;
- the profession serves a client (in this case the nation), and is held professionally responsible for its actions and the advice its gives the client;
- the profession’s own standards reinforce this notion of service;
- these demonstrable standards also grant it a degree of autonomy from general societal interference; and
- the profession is considered a ‘calling’—its members identify strongly with it, have a group identity and are highly regarded by society as a whole.

The First Steps – Professional Developments to 1911

What then was the state of the nascent Australian military profession in the decade post-Federation? As this article will argue, the establishment of RMC in 1911 would not represent a ‘Year Zero’, although it was the seminal event in the progression
of the military profession in Australia. Instead there were small stirrings, false starts, bold moves and policy missteps before RMC was eventually established. Nonetheless, many of the foundations of professionalism were present and more importantly, there were officers, both British and Australian, who recognised the need for professionalism to take root in the Australian military.

Albert Palazzo, when describing influences that affect military organisations, noted:

> Each country possesses national characteristics that help shape the organisation of its army according to the requirements of its individual situation...these characteristics tend to be inflexible and exert their influence over considerable lengths of time.\(^{16}\)

The development of the post-Federation Australian military is a case in point. Upon Federation, the new nation inherited six disparate military forces from the former colonies, all of which had their own organisations, traditions and traits. Until the *Defence Act* was proclaimed in 1903, the new Army in fact continued to operate under the six sets of previous colonial legislation.\(^{17}\) Ironically, when one considers the ardent, nationalistic debates concerning the future of Australian defence policy, the new nation also inherited military forces at war as part of an imperial campaign, with some colonial elements serving overseas in South Africa at the time of Federation.

These former colonial forces also brought with them the traditional British mistrust of standing armies and a preference for part-time and volunteer (both paid and unpaid) forces. This was underpinned by faith in the Royal Navy’s supremacy and despite concerns about being committed carte blanche to imperial adventures, most Australians held a general belief in the efficacy of operating within the imperial defence framework. With the so-called Braddon clause in place—which required three quarters of all Commonwealth customs and excise revenue to be remitted back to the states for the first decade—the new Commonwealth Government sought to spend as little on defence as possible while maintaining the control of its overall defence policy.\(^{18}\) The notion of a professional military was almost non-existent.

To provide some context, when the former colonial militaries were inherited by Commonwealth in 1901, there were around 1400 permanents and 26,000 militia and volunteers.\(^{19}\) These permanent soldiers were instructors, administrators, engineers and garrison artillerymen only.\(^{20}\) The *Defence Act* would enshrine the reliance on part-time forces for economy, belief in the efficacy of the citizen soldier and concerns that a larger permanent force may lead to European-style militarism.
Military professionalism in Australia can rightly be traced to the colonial commandants, those British officers employed in the decades immediately before Federation by their respective colonies to improve all aspects of defence therein. Most, if not all, took to this task with zeal and competence. When the last of the British regiments left in 1870, a vacuum was created that was never filled by the hodge-podge of militia and volunteer units. It also removed the only source of professional independent military advice available to colonial governments. Much has been written about the imperial agenda that the commandants brought with them. At the time there were constant laments that suitable Australian officers should command the colonial forces; however, Australian officers with the requisite training, operational experience and organisational capacity did not exist. As Stephen Clarke notes, ‘it was a matter of professionalism…it was not a prejudice against colonial officers per se as a quest for professional officers.’

To be sure, there were imperial agenda at work; some of the commandants looked ahead to a time when their colonial forces might be integrated to a wider imperial army. In many ways, the despatching of colonial contingents for service in South Africa realised this aspiration and was testimony to their success in raising forces to a minimum standard. Whatever controversy they generated in relation to their imperial scheming or otherwise, the colonial commandants—and later the first and only General Officer Commanding, Major General Sir Edward Hutton—transferred the practices of the modern British Army to Australia, mentored a number of up-and-coming Australian-born officers, established schools of instructions and laid the foundations so that one day Australian officers with the requisite knowledge and experience would command at the highest levels.

Hutton, as General Officer Commanding, was directly (and solely) responsible to the Minister for Defence for all matters military. During his tenure from early 1902 through to late November 1904, he worked in a time of extreme ambiguity with no Defence Act or cogent defence policy in place, financial parsimony, and from some politicians and media, a fairly aggressive nationalistic public debate. He was an early advocate of an Australian military college, but he also believed that the citizen soldier should be the foundation of the new nation’s defence. His lasting contribution was unifying the colonial forces into one Commonwealth military and then ambitiously organising it into mobile field forces and static garrison units. Despite his well documented faults, Hutton’s profound
The Australian military continued to benefit from the close association with British forces, especially since there were a number of military reforms taking place at this time pertaining to military education, administration and the higher command. In 1904, after weaknesses were identified in the British staff during the Boer War, an inquiry recommended the establishment of a general staff, specially selected, divided into branches and responsible for providing professional advice. It also recommended the abolition of the position of General Officer Commanding, to be replaced by an Army Council. The Defence Act, when it was finally implemented, reflected these changes and Australia followed suit with the creation of the Military Board in 1905, along with an Inspector-General who would act as an independent auditor. Later, in 1909, the position of Chief of General Staff and first member of the Military Board was created, and then in 1911, positions and responsibilities were codified further for greater accountability. One can see that the establishment of the Military Board represented what was considered best practice at the time, provided greater accountability to the Minister and also a greater degree of professional regulation with the military itself. Moreover the implementation of a general staff system also designed to act in concert with an imperial general staff, focused the limited number of permanent staff officers on what one might today call ‘core tasks’; that is, the planning of operations, collection of intelligence and the training and equipping of forces ready for war.25

The nascent Australian military also profited from exchanges with the United Kingdom to improve their professional knowledge. Some permanent officers were attached overseas on regimental service while others benefited greatly from exchanges to the United Kingdom for specialist training.26 For example, in 1897 the then Lieutenant (later Major General and Chief of General Staff) Walter Coxen of the Queensland permanent artillery was sent to the School of Artillery at Shoeburyness to complete courses in garrison and field artillery. This allowed him to become Chief Instructor at the School of Gunnery in Sydney in 1902.27 In 1904, Hutton argued for an officer to attend the staff college at Camberley, and nominated the then Lieutenant C B B White to attend.28 The Australian military profession surely benefited from White’s attendance, as he was later to become perhaps Australia’s finest staff officer. This said, between 1904 and 1911, only four Australian officers had attended either Camberley or Quetta,
meaning that for a long time, many staff positions had to be filled with ex-British Army or non staff college trained officers.29

There had been other occasional sporadic steps towards creating and maintaining a corpus of professional knowledge, such as the establishment of the Royal United Service Institute in a number of cities, which allowed officers to keep abreast of new ideas and developments. Later, military ideas would also be disseminated by the Commonwealth Military Journal. It was short lived; established in 1911, it ceased publication in 1916, and the military profession would have to wait until the end of the Second World War for similar means to be created.30 Tentative steps toward a more formal military education were taken in response to developments in Britain. The University of Sydney Diploma of Military Science was the first formal military qualification issued in Australia and was offered from 1906 to 1916. Of note, the course was designed primarily for the betterment of militia officers, rather than the professional education of permanent officers. The course offered subjects in military topography, military history, administration and military law, strategy and tactics, and military engineering.31 Figures vary, but it seems at its peak it had around thirty students enrolled, with a larger number of students attending lectures or taking the odd subject as part of other studies. When the course finally fell into abeyance, no more than twenty-five full diplomas had been awarded.32

So in those decades prior to the establishment of RMC, one can already identify some of those prerequisites of professionalism being evident in the embryonic Australian military. With the Defence Act, no matter how flawed the document itself, the Australian military was granted the political legitimacy to exist and thence recognition that it was meeting a key societal need. Moreover, the Defence Act confirmed civil control of the military, enshrining the notion that the military served the government, therefore the nation would be the client of this budding profession. Distinct and unique expertise was slowly developed within the Australian military. This was through the emulation of developments abroad and the garnering of operational experience on colonial service. However, it was the direct and indirect transmission of knowledge via colonial commandants and British-trained officers in Australia and the training and exchanges of selected staff overseas that really began to generate the unique military expertise within Australia required to be acknowledged as a profession.

Yet for all these tentative steps towards a military profession in Australia, there remained a number of obstructions that hindered its full development. The
Australian government decided to rely on part-time soldiers and maintain a very small cadre of professional soldiers. This retarded any meaningful growth of the profession. Moreover, these professional soldiers most likely did not consider themselves fellow members of the one profession. The organisation of the post-Federation permanent forces generally reflected the structures inherited from the colonies, namely administrative and instructional staffs and a limited number of specialists such as gunners and engineers. These were considered separate organisations; each body had its own training requirements, career progression and maintained its own seniority lists. Although permanent soldiers were variously referred to as members of the 'Permanent Forces' or 'Permanent Military Forces', there was no overt group cohesion or collective self-identification with this nominal organisation. Moreover, the issue of prescribed establishments also meant that there were limited opportunities to first join, and then later be promoted in, these organisations. This meant that it was difficult to portray a career in the permanent forces as a particularly lucrative or attractive choice.

Respect and societal standing are preconditions for a profession; in many ways the worth by which a society views a profession can be gauged by the remuneration of its members. For most politicians, the post-Federation permanent forces were most likely viewed as an expensive, but necessary evil to maintain the nation's citizen army. Thus the size of the permanent forces was kept at the absolute minimum to train and administer the militia. Moreover, the personnel costs of this small force were constantly under scrutiny. The proceedings of the Military Board during this time are full of minutes, submissions and discussion on pay and conditions, with the Board often deliberating on the merits of individual pay claims for relatively minor amounts. The Military Board was concerned, quite correctly, that the pay and conditions of the permanent forces, relative to other professions, made it a less than attractive career choice. The citizen army—and therefore the foundation of the nation's defence—relied explicitly on members of the small permanent force to train and administer it. Any of lack of public confidence in a career in the permanent forces therefore had ramifications for the efficiency of the military as a whole.

At any rate, the small Australian permanent military lacked, on the whole, the wider, higher regard normally shown towards professions. Indeed, politicians may have granted the military its legitimacy, via the Defence Act, but they rarely bestowed upon it the praise or respect accorded to other professions. Moreover, as the discharge of the army's unique skill set—that is, the 'management of violence'—would be largely be undertaken by part-time forces, can one rightly claim that a professional jurisdiction was in place? To be sure, permanent officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) would train these part-time forces and permanent officers, and the staffs would plan and execute operations. Nonetheless, part-time officers commanded the units in peacetime and would lead them in wartime. Furthermore, most Australians believed
their citizen soldiers were equal to, or better than, other soldiers. The contention that the organised use of violence required specialist expertise possessed by professionals only, must have seemed specious to most in the decade post-Federation.

It appeared that the permanent forces’ professional jurisdiction, already challenged by the militia, would be diffused further by the introduction of universal military service in 1911. An inspection by Lord Kitchener at the government’s behest in 1909 had endorsed the scheme, with Kitchener himself completing the finer organisational details. His would be a territorially-based scheme of 215 training areas producing a peacetime army of 80,000 soldiers. Twenty-one infantry brigades, twenty-eight light horse regiments, and fifty-six batteries of artillery along with supporting troops would be generated from these training areas. The crux of the scheme would be the junior and field grade permanent officers assigned to administer and train the troops in these training areas. Kitchener stressed that it was a ‘national necessity’ that these area officers were ‘carefully selected…thoroughly grounded in their profession and scientifically educated’ so that they were ‘good leaders, strict disciplinarians and thoroughly competent officers.’

Universal military training, based on a part-time obligation, reaffirmed the primacy of the citizen soldier. This seemed to be a further diffusion of the military professional’s jurisdiction. Instead, the scheme justified the establishment of the Royal Military College to furnish competent young officers with a broad military education to train this citizen army and staff its headquarters. Moreover, as 350 permanent officers would be required, the scheme validated the creation of a staff corps with sufficient employment and career progression for its members. Ironically, it would be this decision to base the nation’s defence on a partially-trained mass army which lead to the creation of RMC. With its own military educational institution, the emerging military profession in Australia would develop slowly, but with growing purpose over the coming decades.

‘KNOWLEDGE PROMOTES STRENGTH’ – THE CONCEPT AND PURPOSE OF RMC

Discussions on the need for an Australian military college had taken place for decades. Over time, the colonial commandants, Hutton, various Australian politicians and officers had advocated such a college. In 1903, provisions had been made
in the *Defence Act*, which gave the Governor-General the power to establish a college; in 1909, the Act was amended to state that such a college would be established. The models, utility and output of various overseas officer institutions were studied. The Chief of General Staff, Major General J C Hoad, thought that the college might provide commissioning training for permanent and citizen officers, as well as act as a staff college.⁴⁰ Previously, as Chief of Intelligence, Colonel W T Bridges had expressed a strong regard for West Point and RMC, Kingston, noting that its graduates benefitted from years of ‘strict discipline and had acquired the elements of a sound military education’, in contrast to the current system whereby Australian officers necessarily must ‘obtain most of their professional knowledge after being commissioned’.⁴¹

However, Kitchener, upon whose professional advice the government relied, made it clear what the college must achieve and for what ultimate purpose its graduates would serve. The college was to produce self-sufficient area officers wholly responsible for training and the administration of the scheme within their own areas, not young subalterns who would benefit from mentoring and on-the-job training provided by normal regimental soldiering. As such, the emphases and curriculum of the college had to reflect this. Indeed, Kitchener famously remarked that these area officers, whom he described as the cornerstone of the universal military training scheme, had to be ‘given a complete military education (and) brought up to realise that their career depends upon their ability to do their duty and on that alone’.⁴²

Kitchener preferred the West Point model as he saw it as successfully combining strict military virtues with an adherence to the wider democratic ideals of that country. But the final vision of RMC would be provided by Bridges after he completed his whistle-stop tour of a number of overseas academies in the first half of 1910. Afterwards, he reaffirmed his belief that the longer West Point course, with its emphasis on character, discipline and formal education, coupled with a rigorous selection process and unhesitating removal of poor-performing cadets, best suited Australia’s requirements.⁴³

It must be stressed that some selection standards for commissioning into the permanent forces were in place prior to RMC’s establishment. In fact, Bridges recommended that the educational examination for RMC be based on the extant initial examination set up in 1909. But the path to a permanent commission had been somewhat disjointed. For example, a candidate’s application was first considered by
a special military board, which would determine whether the candidate could sit the educational examinations. The board was required to ensure that the candidate’s moral character was ‘satisfactory in all respects’ and determine whether he had the wherewithal to ‘exercise command efficiently and secure respect from those around him’. Therefore the board also had to consider a candidate’s general intelligence and bearing, whether he had any prior military service and whether he had been a sporting team captain.44

From here, recommended candidates had to sit the educational examination. For example, a candidate for the Administrative and Instructional Staff was required to pass this examination if he had not previously passed a public or matriculation examination for a civilian university. Candidates for the technical arms of the artillery and the engineers had to meet different educational prerequisites. These examinations took place in various capital cities over the course of a week. At this point, successful candidates were put on a period as probationary officers during which time they had to pass military confirmatory examinations before those first appointments were confirmed. It was assumed that the candidate would have access to the various manuals, participate in and witness the regimental duties to be examined, and be mentored by other staff during this probationary period.45

The confirmatory examinations were tailored to the branch of service, and covered such subjects as regimental duties, drill and field training, tactics and military law. If more applicants than vacancies existed, these examinations were competitive and candidates were ranked in order of merit. It was intended that if an officer failed to pass these examinations, his commission would not be confirmed. Moreover, regulations stated that the District Commander, under whom the candidate served, was to state whether the candidate performed his duties satisfactorily and whether he was likely to become a suitable staff officer.46 The Military Board advised that such suitability would be demonstrated by ‘energy and commonsense’, the power to instruct citizen troops, ‘the faculty of administration’ and a general knowledge of all arms.47

Bridges based admission into RMC on the competitive open entrance examination.48 But RMC represented a marked change from the old system of examinations and probationary appointments. Previously, a candidate was required to demonstrate considerable officer qualities prior to commissioning and would be required to acquire the bulk of his professional knowledge after commissioning. Now RMC would prepare a cadet fully within its four year course, prior to commissioning and assuming his area officer responsibilities.49
Reflecting pragmatism and no doubt his own pro-British inclinations, Bridges sought to secure the best possible staff for the college from overseas. As such, most of the military staff was British and this would remain so for a number of years. Bridges also designed the curriculum to equip future graduates with a thorough grounding across all arms. Generally speaking, the course was more academically focused in the first two years, with cadets undertaking more military studies in the latter two years. The military subjects would progress over the four years with infantry and light horse training providing the foundations for studies in artillery and military engineering later on. In accordance with Kitchener’s original vision of a military college with severe discipline, cadets would have the equivalent rank of private; scrutiny would be constant and living conditions austere.

The military profession in Australia now had its own ab initio institution to educate, train and commission its officers. Bridges had left his stamp on the new college. He had essentially cherry-picked a number of successful elements from various overseas colleges, amalgamated them and tailored them for Australia’s specific purposes. A protégé of Hutton and generally considered an imperialist, Bridges nonetheless selected a college modelled largely on the American institution, West Point. In doing so, he created a college for the distinctly Australian environment that selected on merit, provided a thorough and complete education and scrupulously maintained the quality of its cadets. The college’s motto Doctrina Vim Promovet or ‘knowledge promotes strength’ appropriately represented Bridges’ belief that a broad military and civil education was the best means to prepare officers for their profession. But he also understood that, for all his work, the college would ultimately be judged by the calibre of its graduates. On his departure from Duntroon, Bridges urged the cadets to remember that ‘the degree of utility of the College to the Australian Forces depends on whether you maintain its prestige or not’.

Even so, one must not overstate RMC’s immediate impact. For example, the Military Board was well aware that the army would rely on citizen officers and newly commissioned former NCOs to act as area officers for a number of years before enough RMC graduates were in the system. At that time, it was planned that the current system of commissioning in the permanent military forces would remain until 1 June 1916, whereupon only graduates of RMC would be appointed officers in the Permanent Military Force. It would still be some years before Duntroon’s impact would be truly felt; the senior professional officers who rose to prominence in the First World War had all been commissioned under the old system.
‘A SUCCESS EXCEEDING THE MOST SANGUINE HOPES’ – RMC AND THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

Despite universal military service being the immediate catalyst for the college’s founding, Duntroon cadets would graduate early to serve in the newly raised AIF, not to act as the scheme’s area officers. The exigencies of war threatened to dilute the standards established at RMC. Many of the British officers at the college, employed specifically to establish those professional standards, left for the war. Ironically, Bridges, who was tasked to raise the AIF, might also have threatened such standards when he requested that Duntroon cadets graduate early into that organisation. Nonetheless, the war would prove the worth of the college and cement its reputation early in its existence. During the war, RMC would continue with its traditional course as well as providing staff and facilities for special commissioning schools for militia officers and officer candidates in the AIF. In its first eight years of existence, RMC had graduated 181 permanent officers, of whom forty-two were killed and sixty-five wounded. Although Duntroon graduates had won praise throughout, their numbers were minute within the context of the five divisions of the AIF.

After the war, with RMC established and its reputation secured by the performance of its graduates, societal esteem and recognition—one of the hallmarks of a profession—was often lacking. Much was due to the belief that the success of the citizen soldier in the AIF obviated the need for professionals. In 1921, the Inspector-General of the AMF lamented:

Because…our citizen army did so extraordinarily well during the late war, there is a tendency on the part of the Australian public to discount the value of the professional soldier, and to doubt whether he is necessary at all…people do not realise that the framework of the army…had been gradually built up for years before the war by the efforts of a small body of professional soldiers (and) that all the AIF formations were largely staffed by permanent officers…and that the officers of the Citizen Forces who attained great distinction during the war were in nearly all cases those who had devoted years of hard work and close study to their duties under the direction of such men as Sir Edward Hutton, General Bridges and other professional soldiers.54

War-weary inevitably followed the war and the attractiveness of a professional military career waned accordingly. In the post-war period, issues of pay, cost of living increases, lack of a robust superannuation scheme and forced retirements also plagued the permanent forces.55
Matters would get worse before they got better. The universal military training scheme had continued throughout the First World War, but was scaled back in 1922 and scrapped altogether in 1929. This placed immediate pressure on career opportunities as permanent officers reverted back to their customary role of trainers and administrators in a drastically reduced all-volunteer militia. Promotions slowed to a snail’s pace. The onset of the Great Depression saw more redundancies, with many officers leaving and transferring to other armies or to the public service. The practice of sending new Duntroon graduates overseas to British or Indian units for regimental experience, which commenced after the war, was discontinued in 1931. In 1930, in order to prevent wholesale redundancies, the Military Board devised a scheme of work rationing whereby permanent soldiers and officers took varying periods of leave without pay depending on their salary. This was followed by a reduction in salary under the auspices of the Financial Emergency Act of 1931, which remained in place until certain pay and allowances were restored under the Financial Relief Act in 1934. Between 1931 and 1936, RMC was relocated from Duntroon to Victoria Barracks in Sydney. The military profession was in a parlous state in the 1930s.

Ultimately, it would take the Second World War to restore the profession’s fortunes. I will not elaborate on the famed Staff Corps/Militia feud in the Second World War as it well known and well documented by a number of historians. When the 2nd AIF was raised, there were concerns among permanent officers that only citizen officers would receive commands. Initially this seemed the case. However, senior permanent officers were keen to see Staff Corps officers gain operational and regimental experience and agitated on behalf of their junior counterparts to gain command opportunities. Some 540 Duntroon graduates served during the Second World War. Although small relative to the overall size of the 2nd AIF, the Staff Corps was now cohesive, self-aware and in enough positions of influence to look out for the interests of its members. At the war’s end, General Blamey commented that Duntroon graduates ‘formed a highly educated and practically trained accomplished corps of staff officers [able to] carry out staff work of the greatly increased army and [hold] high places amongst the leaders of the Australian Army.’

With the decision to raise a standing, regular army in 1947, RMC and its graduates could perhaps rightly claim to be part of a fully mature Australian profession of arms. It had taken some thirty-odd years after the college had produced its first graduates, with all the travails of the inter-war period, along with two wars, before the government accepted the need for a standing army. During this time professional officers were constantly required to justify their existence and validate the military profession. The
ideal of the citizen soldier and brilliant amateur, the bête noire of the professional officer since Federation, was not immediately extinguished with the creation of a regular army. The widespread belief in the citizen soldier would continue for another decade, abetted by the first national service scheme and the post-war service of high quality and very experienced Citizen Military Force officers. However by the 1960s, the regular army was dominant, the part-time component existed to augment the full-timers, and fewer politicians felt compelled to take up the citizen soldiers’ cause in parliament. To be sure, the disputes on the utility and existence of the Reservist ‘part-time professional’ continue, but this debate remains outside the scope of this article.

CONCLUSION

Today all officers in the Australian Army, regular and reserve, general service officers and specialists alike, graduate from the Royal Military College. In the last fifty years, there have been other commissioning institutions such as Scheyville and Portsea, each with their own courses and each producing a different type of officer. And RMC itself has evolved over time. But these developments remained consistent with that fundamental tenet of professionalism, namely that entrance to the profession was conditional on specific expertise gained at a professional institution.

For the officer corps in Australia, the creation of the Royal Military College in 1911 was the key development for its long-term professionalisation. However, it was a series of small, incremental steps, made by British and Australian-born officers alike, which allowed the framework for an Australian military profession to take shape. It was these preliminary moves that laid the foundational schema of professional military attributes and supported the ultimate justification for a military college. Elements of professionalism existed, in an incomplete way, prior to 1911. But with its own college, the small permanent Australian officer corps could now rightly be considered part of a profession—the emerging Australian profession of arms.59

ENDNOTES

4 In this regard, the sociologist Andrew Abbott argued that the history of professions is best understood as a continual clash over areas of work or jurisdictions. He believed that
professions tried to claim or create jurisdictions over various forms of work by inventing forms of abstract knowledge to accomplish said work. From here, they sought recognition of this jurisdiction within the wider workplace, in public opinion and before the state itself. Logically, this jurisdiction also leads to a certain level of autonomy granted to the profession. This is because the profession has a monopoly over its specialised knowledge and skills and a monopoly on judging who is competent within the profession. See Andrew Abbott, 'The Army and the Theory of Professions' in Snider and Matthews, *The Future of the Army Profession*, p. 534; and Stephen John Harris, *Canadian Brass: the making of a professional army, 1860–1939*, Toronto University Press, Toronto, 1988, p. 2.


7 Most sources agree that military professionalism as a concept did not emerge until after 1800. This does not suggest that professional traits or characteristics did not exist prior to this. Mercenaries and amateur aristocratic officers alike often demonstrated considerable interest, skill and devotion to their trade; however, their motivations were most likely pecuniary or bound with honour and adventure respectively. It would take some key developments over a number of centuries to usher in the preconditions for true professionalism to take root. The first of these was the growth of the nation-state. The shift from a feudal society meant that the military professional was now loyal to a government, a nation and its people rather than essentially a private employer in the form of a lord. Secondly, only the nation-state could generate the wealth to maintain large, technologically-advanced standing armies; the state became the sole potential employer of the military professional which reinforced his loyalty to the state. With the nation-state and its militaries came arms races. Brian Bond suggested that the rate of military professionalisation in a given country was related to the extent to which that country felt its security threatened by a neighbour. Furthermore, bursts of reformation of the military profession usually only followed a disastrous military defeat. For Britain, it would take the poor performance in Crimea for such reforms to begin; more pertinent to this study were the reforms pertaining to professional education and the higher command after the British Army’s performance in South Africa. Importantly, such developments led to the recognition that would-be officers needed to be specially educated in military schools before commissioning, rather than being trained haphazardly after commissioning. This also meant that the military would, in future, place a greater premium than hitherto on professional zeal, qualifications and length of service as against privilege stemming from birth, influential connection or wealth. See Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A social and political portrait*, The Free Press, New York, 1960, p. 6; and Brian Bond, *The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854–1914*, Eyre Methuen, London, 1972, p. 13.
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8 Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, p. 15.
9 Ibid., p. 5.
10 Ibid., p. 6.
11 Ibid., pp. 178–82. The officer corps must therefore be experts in the management and command of violence to defeat an enemy. Samuel Huntington largely agrees with Janowitz. In his classic work, *The Soldier and the State*, he wrote that ‘the modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man’. The key tenets he believed that the military profession demonstrated were special expertise, responsibility to society as a whole, and group unity and identity. See Samuel P Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 1957, pp. 7–18.

Matthew Moten, ‘Who is a member of the military profession?’ *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 62, July 2011, p. 15.

Kevin M Bond, ‘Are We Professionals?’, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 58, July 2010, p. 67. Bond discusses the two approaches to determining whether a sphere of endeavour may rightly be considered a profession. He referred to the first and most commonly accepted method, as essentialism; that is, identifying the essential features of a profession. This is the method which Huntington, Janowitz et al have used. The second and less accepted method was known as functionalism, which aimed to justify professionalism in terms of function within society. Should enlisted soldiers, or more importantly, SNCOs, be considered military professionals? There is absolutely no doubt that elements of professionalism are demonstrated by soldiers and SNCOs, especially since the training and professional development they receive over the course of a career has increased markedly. That said, by the accepted standards used to define a profession, soldiers and SNCOs do not constitute professionals; perhaps the crucial aspect is that the ultimate professional responsibility for decisions made or actions taken rests with the officer corps. For example, the newly commissioned junior lieutenant holds the ultimate responsibility for the welfare and actions of his platoon; it is he who will be held to account, not the platoon sergeant.
Preliminary Moves


20 For a consolidated table of the various strengths and composition of the colonial military forces upon Federation, see Craig Stockings, *The Making and Breaking of the Post Federation Australian Army, 1910–1909*, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2007, p. 10.


22 Clarke, ‘Marching to the Beat of their own Drum’, p. 21.

23 Ibid., pp. 318–19.

24 This belief was as much a vote of approval in the efficacy of citizen soldiers, as an insight into his belief that military obligation was a duty and right of the Anglo-Saxon communities throughout the world.


29 Bond, *The Victorian Army and the Staff College*, p. 238.


33 For a breakdown of the different establishments for officers in the permanent forces, see A2653, Military Board Proceedings, 1912, ‘Table A to Item 12 for meeting of the Board held on 10 June’, June 1912. By 1912, the establishment of permanent officers...
was spread across six separate areas viz: The Administrative and Instructional Staff (A & I Staff), the Australian Field Artillery (RAFA), the Australian Garrison Artillery (RAGA), Royal Australian Engineers, Australian Army Service Corps, Australian Army Medical Corps. The various colonial artillery units had been grouped together to form the Royal Australian Artillery by Hutton, but following developments in Britain, Australia delinked the field and garrison units into separate entities in 1911.


35 See for example Grey, *The Australian Army*, p. 31; A2653, Military Board Proceedings, Minutes, 10 May 1912 and A2653, Military Board Proceedings, Minutes ‘Proposed Rates of Pay for Establishment of Officers of the Permanent Forces’, 17 June 1910. MP 367/1, Item 558/1/381 is full of letters and minutes discussing pay and conditions (specifically superannuation) for SNCOs.


37 Support for some form of compulsory military training grew on both sides of politics when the 1905 Japanese victory in Russo-Japanese War focused attention on the deficiencies of the all-volunteer army. The raw staff work behind a scheme had been completed by Lieutenant Colonel J G Legge over a number of years. Amendments to the *Defence Act* were passed in 1909 to introduce a universal military service. The scheme would include service in cadet units for youths aged 12 to 18 and then service in the militia for men aged 18 to 26.


39 This figure included staff for RMC, headquarters and staff immediately employed within the universal military training scheme.

40 Wood, *Chiefs of the Australian Army*, p. 129.


44 A2653, Military Board Proceedings, 1905/1907, 'Instructions for the guidance of the President of the 'Special Military Board' appointed to report on the general fitness and personal aptitude for military service of candidates for commissions in the Permanent Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia under Regulations published in paragraphs 12–18 of Part III of the Commonwealth Military Regulations', 4 April 1905.

45 Commonwealth Military Forces of Australia, Regulations and Syllabuses of Examination for Candidates to, and Confirmation of Probationary Appointment in, the Permanent Forces, and Instructions for Boards of Examination, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1909, pp. 5–17. For example, candidates for RAA and RAE had to pass a higher level of mathematics and had a longer probationary period than that of the A and I candidates.


48 Coulthard-Clark, Duntroon, p. 26. There were many debates about concerns that a privileged military caste might arise or that only boys from private schools would have the ability to qualify for RMC. Egalitarianism was one of the original intents for RMC, in that professional officers would not come solely from a leisure or dilettante class as was largely the case in England. So that candidates from non-private schools were not disadvantaged, the educational standard was initially kept low or at least not unduly taxing; Bridges mitigated this by extending the RMC course to four years' duration. Such an examination process was used so that charges of favouritism on selection choices could not be made. Moreover, it identified those candidates who had sufficient education to take advantage of the college's curriculum.

49 Moreover, it was decided that the college would not charge fees, despite Kitchener's initial recommendation. As such, the government met all expenses, granting the college a greater freedom to remove non-performing cadets. Not only did this mean that a cadet was remunerated for his training, he also acquired a return of service obligation for a considerable period post-graduation. Together, this indicated that one of the characteristics of professionalism, namely the inter-relationship between a profession and its client, was strengthened. The cadet was beholden to the government for his livelihood and career, while the government had a growing body of trained and educated military professionals to address a societal need, in this case the management of the universal training scheme.

50 This included the first Director of Military Art, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Gwynn, who would later write the seminal 'small wars' text, Imperial Policing.

51 Clark, Duntroon, p. 53.

52 A2653, Military Board Proceedings, 1911–1912, 'Adjutant-General's recommendation on the inability of area officers to carry out the duties of Adjutants in addition to their area duties'.

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53 A2653, Military Board Proceedings, 1914, Item 74, ‘Appointment of Graduates from the Royal Military College’. However the arcane and tortured seniority system would be simplified with all graduates placed on one seniority list from this time, regardless of what branch of service they entered. See A2653, Military Board Proceedings, 1913, Agenda 46/1913, Minister’s Decisions, 13 November 1913.


55 To some extent, matters of seniority and therefore a degree of certainty pertaining to a permanent officer’s career were clarified when the Military Board approved the creation of the Staff Corps in October 1920. All permanent officers would now be on one seniority list, with their date of graduation from RMC or their date of receiving a substantive commission being the date upon which seniority would be considered. Those holding honorary commissions such as those granted to warrant officers to act as quarter-masters would not be part of the Staff Corps, nor would specialist officers such as in the medical, remount, finance sections. Importantly, brevet rank would not be considered for the purposes of seniority.


57 B1535, 856/2/172, letter from Adjutant-General to Minister, 9 October 1933 and excerpt from Financial Relief Act, 1934.


59 The title of this segment is taken from Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn’s 1946 forward to Colonel Lee’s 1952 history of RMC. ‘Duntroon,’ he wrote, ‘has proved a success exceeding, I frankly admit, the most sanguine hopes of General Bridges and his original staff.’ Lee, Duntroon, p. xii.

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HOW WHOLE IS WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT?

THE REALITY OF AUSTRALIAN RESPONSES TO OFFSHORE CONTINGENCIES

RODGER SHANAHAN

ABSTRACT

Over the past decade, Australia has been called upon to conduct a range of whole of government interventions, as both a lead and contributing country. The experience has taught us a lot about how to prepare for and conduct such missions. It has also taught us much about the political and risk factors that often work against achieving a unified approach to such contingencies. Ten years on, though, it is fair to say that Australia has improved systemically in being able to mount such operations, but more still needs to be done.

‘Whole of government’ is a term that suffers from a lack of clarity but an overabundance of usage. Initially the preserve of domestic public policy initiatives that crossed numerous portfolios, it is now applied to overseas commitments of Australian assets to offshore contingencies as varied as disaster relief, dealing with the aftermath of terrorist attacks, and stabilisation or counterinsurgency operations. Even the definition endorsed by the Army’s Chiefs of Staff
Committee in 2009 comes from a 2004 Public Service Commission document that is very much about domestic interagency cooperation, reflecting the policy-making antecedents of the concept. The notion of whole of government, however, has moved on from that of purely domestic policy consequence to one that is meant to connote a well-coordinated approach using all of the government’s resources to achieve a desired foreign policy outcome offshore in potentially insecure environments.

In reality though, Australia’s ability to conduct truly whole of government missions overseas has not always been in evidence. At times the concept has lived up to its name; the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) intervention that commenced in 2003 was a broad, multi-departmental task force that deployed in an uncertain security environment and continues to provide stability to a near neighbour. The intervention has been praised by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and was the subject of a RAND Corporation report that noted the mission’s signature characteristic as ‘the extent to which the military, police, aid organisations, and foreign affairs organisations cooperated in addressing what they agreed to accomplish and constraining themselves to those areas’. By contrast, Australia’s whole of government commitment to Iraq was undertaken in a reluctant, limited and piecemeal fashion while the national effort in Afghanistan began in similar fashion but has started to develop in a more coherent multiagency fashion.

Such uneven approaches raise the question as to how much we have learnt from our recent experiences and the degree to which Australia has developed a coordinated and effective approach to interagency operations overseas. Creating well-coordinated, whole of government offshore interventions is difficult given the myriad elements required. Some of them are readily quantifiable: interagency planning capacity, availability of assets, well-defined control arrangements and interagency liaison capability to name a few. More subjective elements are less easily quantified but have just as significant an impact: departmental interpretation of the national interest involved, and strategic intent for particular missions; the degree of Australian leadership involved and risk tolerance, for example. There are too many variables at play to believe that any broad-based intervention will work perfectly, but the way in which the key elements for interagency cooperation are developed prior to deployments will to a large degree determine how successful the interventions are. This article argues that while we have advanced systematically in our ability to deliver whole of government responses to offshore contingencies, there remains a range of shortfalls and subjective approaches that limit our ability to truly deliver a whole of government outcome.

Creating well-coordinated, whole of government offshore interventions is difficult given the myriad elements required.
THE FUTURE REALITY OF AUSTRALIAN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

The future is, as we all know, difficult to predict. While security analysts and military practitioners prophesise about the nature of future war, the conduct of military operations often bears little resemblance to that which the pundits predicted would be the case. Concepts such as the Revolution in Military Affairs emphasised the triumph of technology over mass, while the United States’ ‘shock and awe’ view of future battle was based on the orchestrated use of overwhelming force and rapid manoeuvre during the opening phase of a conflict to paralyse opponents’ abilities to mount effective defences. The experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, have shown that such concepts have limited utility in contemporary counterinsurgency operations. ‘Shock and awe’ may be successful in the initial phases of inter-state conflict but in complex socio-political environments its effects dissipate quickly. And while the Revolution in Military Affairs has some applicability in both theatres (the use of unmanned aerial vehicles being a good example), the need for troop ‘surges’ show that sometimes mass is an expensive but necessary component for tactical success on the modern battlefield.

Strategic commentators developed these concepts largely in isolation, and based their work on an assumed environment without regard to the geographic or societal limitations on the employment of military technology. There was no room for interagency cooperation in these concepts, so few if any people delved into the complexities of multiagency operations. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) came closest to realising the nature of future operations with their concept of the ‘Three-Block War’, where peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and warfighting were likely to occur simultaneously and in close proximity to each other. General Charles Krulack’s article identified the complexities of future conflicts facing the military but focused on the requirements that would likely be needed by the junior leaders of the future, hence the term the ‘strategic corporal’. The last decade has seen military operations of the type envisaged by the USMC become the norm and Krulack’s concept of the strategic corporal has proven to be applicable not only to junior military leaders but also to soldiers and officers at all levels, and more importantly increasingly to staff from other government agencies likely to be involved in such operations. The acknowledgement of this new reality was not, however, taken up much outside the USMC at the time.

In the case of Australia neither the Australian Defence Force (ADF) nor other government departments were well prepared for the brave new world of interagency
cooperation on the type of operations foretold in Krulack’s conceptual work. For its part, strategic guidance for the ADF had largely focused on the Defence of Australia with a later focus on peacekeeping operations following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Defence of Australia concept would prove to have two deleterious effects on Army. First, emphasising the need to dominate the air-sea gap to our north meant that the requirement for strategic lift assets and logistic and communications support that land forces required for offshore deployments were allowed to wither or be assumed away. The lack of deployable capability and support functions necessary to sustain them were highlighted during the Somalia deployment in 1991 and again as a result of the precautionary deployment of ADF elements to Kuwait (Operation POLLARD) in 1998. Secondly, and just as importantly it also required little to no interaction with other government departments such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) that would later be critical partners in any whole of government response.

Australia’s subsequent experiences with the Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville from 1998 and Solomon Islands from 2003 had given Australia a sense that it was capable of effective whole of government responses. But these were small-scale interventions in benign environments, operating close to Australia and involving small Pacific islands coalitions in which Australia was far and away the dominant partner. It was not until the complex, large-scale coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that the government became focused on a more holistic approach to offshore contingencies. By 2008, the government was acknowledging that for Defence:

A(nother) strategic imperative is pursuing whole of government approaches in response to the challenges of a complex and uncertain international environment. Many future challenges will not restrict themselves neatly to the responsibilities of individual government departments … Responding to … challenges requires a broader, whole of government approach – not just a military commitment – to address the underlying causes of violence.5

Official direction to Defence to change its approach to what had traditionally been regarded as offshore military operations was set out in the 2009 Australian Defence White Paper, which noted the evolving nature of security operations would require a broader and more integrated response in the future as

… security objectives in intra-state conflict situations are increasingly interdependent with broader political, humanitarian, economic and development goals. These operations require a ‘whole-of-government’ response on the part of military and civilian agencies, extending beyond individual agency operations, and integrating security and other objectives into comprehensive political-military strategies.6
The ADF was initially slow to move towards the type of interagency cooperation envisaged in the White Paper, in part because it had spent much of the previous decade focusing on achieving greater operational interconnectedness internally between each of its Services. This culminated in the establishment of a purpose-built Joint Operations Command at Bungendore that centralised all of the ADF’s operational planning and execution. The move allowed for a single point of contact for ADF operational-level matters, which in theory at least should have proven beneficial to the establishment of whole of government capabilities on operations. When it began to address the issue of interagency cooperation, the ADF was at least able to draw from its experience in two relevant areas: the long and difficult path to bring together essentially independent Services with different operating cultures to achieve a joint operational capability, and the need to develop deployable land elements capable of operating in high threat environments where policy guidance had confined them largely to domestic contingencies or low-threat regional responses.

Difficult as these two issues were to resolve, being limited to the one department meant they were more easily addressed than achieving interagency cooperation. They are nevertheless relevant to whole of government responses because for the ADF strategic interagency cooperation is viewed as a joint responsibility while the tactical level of cooperation is in nearly all instances in high-threat environments a land responsibility. As a consequence, Army has taken the lead in addressing the doctrinal aspects of interagency operations. The Army’s current operating concept encapsulated in Adaptive Campaigning defines its approach as ‘Actions taken by the Land Force as part of the military contribution to a Joint and Whole of Government approach to resolving conflicts’. In late 2009, an Army and Whole of Government Operations concept paper was developed and accepted for further development, reflecting an understanding that Army needed to position itself intellectually for more cooperative interventions in the future.

For their part, other government departments have until recently been similarly focused on working unilaterally overseas, placing a greater focus on the ability to deploy their own assets rather than in addressing interagency interoperability issues. AusAID has developed a Rapid Response Team concept, designed to react to short-notice humanitarian missions and has had some experience in working offshore with the ADF, most recently during the provision of ADF and AusAID medical teams in response to the Pakistan floods. AusAID has also been given responsibility for the development of the Australian Civilian Corps, which has been designed to
broaden the skill sets and number of civilian specialists able to be deployed at short notice, as well as providing a means of transitioning from the short-term response to the long-term development or peace-building phases.

The AFP have also expended a great deal of effort in developing the ability to deploy police officers offshore for a range of tasks. Traditionally an organisation that has focused on national and transnational crime, but with some experience of offshore deployments particularly from their long involvement with the United Nations in Cyprus, the requirement for a deployable capability to ‘contribute to offshore law enforcement initiatives and participate in capacity development programs within the Law and Justice Sector’ became readily apparent. In 2004 the AFP established the International Deployment Group. Its focus has been on capacity building through the training and mentoring of regional police forces and the provision of forensic capabilities. In 2007 an Operational Response Group was added that gave the International Deployment Group the capability for riot response up to and including the use of lethal force.

COORDINATION OF WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACHES

Deployable capabilities are simply the building blocks of a truly integrated whole of government approach and there are many other areas, such as the planning, coordination and control of the agencies’ efforts to achieve specific outcomes that ultimately determines the success or otherwise of a multiagency approach. Most countries are relative newcomers to this area, particularly working within coalitions in hostile security environments, so it is only natural that teething problems have occurred. Although Australia has been focused on our immediate region, our requirement to operate as part of larger coalitions with our main alliance partners has focused attention on the way in which the United States and the United Kingdom have attempted to develop a systematic approach to the coordination of whole of government efforts.

THE UNITED STATES MODEL

The size of the US whole of government contributions to offshore contingencies dwarfs that of most countries. The complexity of the tasks they undertake, the resources both financial and human required to run these projects and the domestic political equities tied up in these interventions demands a tight and well-defined
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Coordination mechanism to run it. It has, however, taken the United States a long time to come to terms with whole of government responses within insecure and complex social environments. The lack of planning, interagency coordination and resourcing during the immediate post-invasion phase of Iraq illustrated the poor channels of communication that existed within the US system. Prior to 2007, the decision on which agency would lead a whole of government crisis response was made on a case-by-case basis by the National Security Council. In response to the disorder that characterised the US intervention in Iraq and the lack of progress in Afghanistan, President George W Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44. This directive made the Department of State the lead agency ‘to coordinate and lead integrated USG efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization activities’. 9

In response to this directive, the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization established the Interagency Management System in 2007. This system consists of three bodies for each whole of government operation: a country reconstruction and stabilisation group that resides in Washington as the senior interagency decision-making body; an integration planning cell that deploys alongside the combatant commander’s planning staff; and an advance civilian team that augments the chief of mission’s staff to coordinate interagency efforts on the ground. 10 Despite these organisational reforms, there are challenges in translating policy-making primacy to implementation primacy on the ground. The State Department’s relatively poor funding compared to Defense provides a clear limit on their ability to dictate terms, as does strong political support for Defense relative to the State Department.

The difficulty faced by the chief of mission in coordinating the national effort in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan is that he/she has no responsibility for forces assigned to combatant commanders. Consequently the combatant commander possesses all the hard power and significant (and wide ranging) financial resources dedicated to the country’s stabilisation effort. For example, in addition to the funding for indigenous military training and capacity building measures, the US Defense Department is often as significant a player as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in funding reconstruction projects. The main vehicle for this, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program has provided over USD 4.6 billion on projects in Afghanistan and Iraq. 11 Other US agencies have similar programs in place, such as the Department of State’s Provincial Reconstruction
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Development Council (PRDC) program and several USAID programs. To give an idea of the relative funding available, in FY 07 Defense's Commander's Emergency Response Program in Iraq spent US$900 million compared to State's PRDC expenditure of US$600 million and the USAID’s US$449 million.

For all the difficulties faced by the United States in its whole of government approach to interventions such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the Haiti earthquake in January 2010 provides a useful case study of how the United States can conduct an effective whole of government crisis response, albeit in a low-threat environment.

While the Interagency Management System was not activated, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance quickly formed an interagency task force known as the Response Management Team that was responsible for the coordination of all US government agencies contributing to the crisis response. USAID organised and dispatched a seventeen-strong Disaster Assistance Response Team that assessed humanitarian needs on the ground and coordinated response activities with the US embassy, Haitian government, non-government organisations and the international community.

The US Department of Defense's rapid response and close cooperation with the ambassador, embassy staff and United Nations mission was aided by the fact that the deputy combatant commander of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)—Lieutenant General Ken Keen—was meeting with the US ambassador in his residence in Port-au-Prince at the time the quake struck. On 14 January, SOUTHCOM established Joint Task Force Haiti, headed by General Keen, to support USAID's efforts to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The USAID interagency task force had clear leadership, and the US combatant commander, through his deputy commander on the ground, worked in support of the ambassador and the USAID coordination team. With this operational level of coordination in place from the outset, the crisis response operation in Haiti exhibited none of the disorder, chaos or confusion that had characterised early interagency efforts in Afghanistan or Iraq. After six months, JTF-Haiti's mission was declared complete, and the last units departed for the United States on 1 June 2010.

UK Whole of Government Responses to Crisis Situations

As a consequence of its colonial experience the United Kingdom had, prior to their engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq, a record of integrated civil-military responses to crisis situations, exemplified by its actions in Malaya and Oman, and the still delicate situation in Northern Ireland. But such experience had not resulted
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Prior to 11 September 2001 the United Kingdom had been examining its ability to respond in a more coordinated fashion to the challenges it was likely to face in responding to crises in fragile states. In 2000 the decision was taken to form the Global Conflict Prevention Pools (GCPP) within the UK government. The GCPP is not a standing body; rather it is a means of coordinating state efforts on reducing conflict in target areas by bringing together funds and staff effort from the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) into an integrated policy-making and action body.

The GCPP is overseen by a committee consisting of the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for International Development (the committee chairperson), the Defence Secretary and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury. It bids for money separate to its contributing agencies, giving it a degree of independence and authority to make decisions regarding the conflict prevention and post-conflict management aspects of UK foreign policy.17

Sitting astride both the tactical and operational level of multiagency interventions is the UK Stabilisation Unit. Originally established as the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit in 2004, it is the UK government’s central whole of government planning and coordination body for the key non-military elements as part of stabilisation operations overseas. Again, this body draws personnel and funds from the MoD, FCO and DFID and reports back to those departments. At its heart is the Civilian Stabilisation Group, a pool of over 800 deployable civilian experts and more than 200 members of the Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre that represent thirty-three government departments.18 The Civilian Stabilisation Group for instance is the main source of individuals for the UK Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), and served as the model for the Australian Civilian Corps.

THE AUSTRALIAN ‘SYSTEM’

Australia has consciously eschewed the concept of a standing body to coordinate interagency offshore deployments. Rather, it has maintained responsibility for strategic decision-making with the National Security Council and formed interdepartmental emergency task forces/working groups when necessary for the period of the commitment to act as the key day-to-day decision-making and strategic whole of government coordinating body, while trusting in the existing arrangements developed by each department to provide capabilities when necessary.
Control of offshore deployments has rarely followed the same pattern. In the Solomon Islands in 2003 a special coordinator from DFAT was appointed as the 'first among equals'; in the 2006 East Timor intervention the military stabilisation force commander was given a former ambassador to East Timor as his senior adviser, while in Afghanistan the DFAT head of the PRT reports tactically to the International Security Assistance Force and nationally through the head of mission in Kabul to Canberra, while the military commander reports tactically to ISAF and nationally to the Australian national command headquarters in the United Arab Emirates. These differing approaches to the way in which whole of government deployments are coordinated are driven as much by the various domestic political and bureaucratic considerations of departments and powerful individuals within these departments as they are the practical considerations regarding the best way to manage interagency interventions.

The absence of a single person with responsibility for coordinating interagency responses on the ground is not necessarily an impediment to the successful prosecution of a mission. It can, however, lead to a dynamic tension between strategic direction from Canberra and perceptions of operational necessities in theatre. There is also a feeling among non-military (and some military) elements that the ADF’s national command structure impedes the speed and unity of messages back to Canberra. Whereas the United States and United Kingdom ‘dual-role’ the senior military commander in-theatre as the national commander and leave national support functions to another officer, the ADF has a dedicated national commander along with a headquarters. In Afghanistan for example, this means that while the ambassador is able to speak directly to Canberra about Afghan and Coalition issues in-theatre, the senior military officer in-country must report through his national commander, who then reports to Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) who then reports to Defence Headquarters. The delay, lack of context and possibility for dilution of the message from within theatre is self-evident. The difficulty in maintaining a cohesive national approach between departments is even more difficult when Australia is part of a coalition and the national political representative (the ambassador) and the national military representatives are located in different countries. It is important in such interventions to be as well attuned to the coalition environment as possible and be able to influence events within as it is to understand the local political and security environment. Divorcing Australia’s
national military commander from the coalition military headquarters makes this

task more difficult than it needs to be.

That having been said, it is not always the case that those on the ground are

best placed to determine the priority for the allocation of national effort. In Iraq

for example, the deployment of the battle group to al-Muthana province gave the

Australian military effort a geographic (if time limited) focus, but one that was not

shared by other departments. A visiting Senate Committee delegation commented

on the fact that they


… observed the potential for Australia to establish a Whole of Government effort in the

south, under the protection of Australian troops, to make a significant impact on the

quality of life of the local population. Any Australian effort would be of a higher profile

than that achieved in Baghdad where AusAID efforts are potentially swallowed up by

the larger donor countries and security overheads.19


While the task group did have some funds to be spent on local projects, these

were normally spent with short-term tactical considerations uppermost. The Senate

Committee’s remarks reveal that little consideration was given to the nature of

Australian aid (much of which was for debt relief),20 the difficulty of the long-term

sustainability of aid projects or the ability

for institutional capacity building after the

inevitable withdrawal of Australian forces. The military saw its presence alone as

justification for national aid delivery whereas aid providers understood the

limited nature of the deployment and

sought to deploy their aid resources in a

manner consistent with a long-term view of assistance to Iraq.


CAPABILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

There are essentially two elements that determine the efficiency and effectiveness of

whole of government commitments: operational capabilities and political considera-

tions. In general terms the former provides a quantifiable measure of the ability of

government departments to deliver options to their ministers that can be considered

as part of a whole of government response, while the latter is normally the final

determinant of what is to be contributed, where it is to be deployed, what tasks it

will undertake and as a consequence how truly whole of government any overseas

crisis response is considered to be.
SYSTEMIC CAPABILITIES

Subjective areas such as the differences in priorities between departments, and even the actual enthusiasm for deployments, are to a large degree driven by personality and self-interest and thus difficult to overcome. However, it is in the practical and quantifiable areas where shortfalls can be identified and advances made. Over the past decade there has been significant improvement in the ability of individual departments in key practical areas to react to overseas contingencies, although shortfalls remain:

A. PLANNING

The military has always seen planning as a core staff function separate from running current operations, and maintains planning branches to conduct detailed appreciations and potential courses of action for a variety of contingencies. While most of these contingencies may never eventuate, a range of likely scenarios has at least been considered and partially addressed. Non-military agencies tend to eschew military notions of detailed future planning for ‘crisis management’ or what may pass for ‘immediate planning’, using staff that are often neither trained nor specialised in planning functions. There are practical reasons for this approach—the lack of a compulsory career-long training culture within the public service, concentration on policy development rather than deployment, the small numbers of personnel that these departments have traditionally deployed to overseas crises and the resultant limited requirement for detailed planning for their deployment, sustainment or protection. That having been said, both the AFP’s International Deployment Group and the nascent Australian Civilian Corps have small planning cells, illustrating that the importance of planning as a dedicated function for deployable elements is being acknowledged in other areas of government.

That is not to say that the ADF is a natural repository of multiagency planning capability or that it is easy to develop. It has taken the ADF the best part of two decades to come to terms with the concept of synchronising the operational effectiveness of the three Services to create a joint operational outcome. Even within a single military it has been a drawn-out process to establish joint doctrine and training and overcome sometimes competing single-Service cultures and agendas in order to establish a functioning and sustainable joint planning and operational
capability. It should come as no surprise then that the ability to synchronise the efforts of different government agencies that come from entirely different and separate operating cultures, answering to different ministers and with their own funding lines, will not be easy to achieve.

The military planning process, as developed as it is, nevertheless relies on a common training standard and language that is often impenetrable for many, and consequently gives the impression that the ADF sees itself as the agency in control of the intervention. The planning functions, timelines, language and requirements may differ too much between departments to achieve a standardised multiagency operational plan but that does not mean that departmental plans need to be done in isolation. It is possible for different organisations to synchronise their efforts effectively through the establishment of close liaison at the planning level. For that reason, both AusAID and the AFP have liaison officers resident in HQJOC, while the ADF has recently placed a liaison officer within AusAID. By passing military planning advice to their home department and providing departmental input into the development of military operational plans, it is possible for effective coordination of effort to occur at the operational level. This will of course be dependent on the seniority and capability of the liaison officers, their ability to meet ADF planning timelines, and the willingness of ADF planning staff to take their requirements into account.

B. ENABLERS

The ADF provides a wide range of enabling capabilities designed to move, house, sustain, communicate with and provide health care to deployed personnel. Many of these capabilities are unique to the ADF or are of such prohibitive cost and/or demand if provided by contractors that the ADF remains the provider of choice. Whole of government responses rely to a marked degree on the ADF for these same support mechanisms, particularly in the early phases of deployment before such operations mature and other government agencies are able to access contracted service providers.

C. PREPAREDNESS.

The military has long realised the unsustainable cost of having all elements on short preparedness timeframes and has staggered its force elements …
are at longer notice for follow-on efforts. There is also the need for reconstitution of the elements that have been deployed, so that the military does not just provide the government with a ‘single-shot’ capability. In the whole of government environment, there is a commensurate need for non-military elements to develop a similar focus on preparedness. This has been recognised and other agencies have created rapid response elements to react at short notice to a range of overseas contingencies.

DFAT regularly sends teams to supplement diplomatic missions during times of crisis. But these are normally individuals who provide consular assistance and the system for deploying them is relatively ad hoc. AusAID has a well-developed humanitarian assistance capability resident in the Rapid Response Team. The team is designed for responses to humanitarian disasters and has exercised and deployed internationally, most recently as part of a joint ADF–AusAID disaster relief effort (Operation PAKISTAN ASSIST) in the aftermath of the devastating Pakistan floods. The capacity to provide individuals with a range of skill sets who will be able to contribute to both short-term contingencies as well as longer-term stabilisation operations will be resident in the Australian Civilian Corps, although the capability is still being developed.

The AFP has developed a comprehensive system of pre-deployment training at its own complex at Majura and the International Deployment Group and Operational Response Group (ORG) have been deployed on several interagency developments, most notably as the lead agency in RAMSI. But there are still significant limitations regarding the circumstances in which they are likely to be deployed. While the ORG is more than capable of reacting to situations involving civil unrest, both Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed the very real limitations to police involvement, particularly where there has been no tradition of community policing on which to build. Despite the positive view of one academic regarding the development of the ORG because ‘it makes good sense to build up the capability the AFP has to go in at the sharp end of activities, more alongside the ADF’; there are degrees of ‘sharp end’ and the utility of the ORG lays in regional fragile state intervention rather than counterinsurgency of the Iraq and Afghanistan variety.

D. DOCTRINE, TRAINING AND LEARNING

**Doctrine.** Of all the systemic difficulties in achieving interagency synchronisation the development of interagency doctrine is perhaps the most difficult. The more agencies whose agreement is required for such a document the more difficult it is to achieve and, while training, preparedness and planning are all necessary but practical means to achieve an operational outcome, doctrine requires a commitment to a written document that may tie agencies to agreed tasks that prove problematic in future interventions. For that reason alone, such documents are notoriously difficult to develop. There is also the issue of who is delegated to write the doctrine and in what institution(s) such doctrine will be taught.
Australia is by no means alone in this. The US Defense Department’s 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report called for the publication of an authoritative national-level strategic guidance document that addresses interagency roles and responsibilities, and resolves seam issues between agencies.24 The former head of the UK Stabilisation Unit noted in a speech in February 2010 that ‘Cross-government agreed stabilisation “doctrine” or best practice principles are required … we need concise, specific guidance on how government comes together to set priorities and achieve coherent and effective delivery.’25

Given the proliferation of government strategic guidance regarding the need for interagency cooperation contained in the 2008 National Security Statement, the 2009 Defence White Paper and the 2003 DFAT White Paper, the lack of Australian whole of government intervention doctrine is disappointing but not unexpected. The Asia-Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (APCMCOE) was given the remit in the 2009 Defence White Paper through research, education and doctrine development to deal with intra-state conflict.26 But such direction falls short of giving APCMCOE responsibility for interagency doctrine development and, given that it was contained in a Defence document it has no powers of compulsion on other government departments to cooperate in such a venture.

In place of a single authoritative guidance document, individual departments have developed bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as a means of articulating interagency cooperation responsibilities. AusAID has signed strategic partnership agreements with Defence (2009) and the AFP (2004) that have formalised understandings between the two agencies regarding roles and responsibilities, secondments and in some cases protocols for cooperation. The ADF and the AFP signed an Interoperability MOU in 2008 that covered issues such as common procurement solutions and established a Joint Steering Committee on Interoperability chaired by the national manager of the AFP’s International Deployment Group and Chief Joint Operations. But these are nearly exclusively working-level documents, and while they undoubtedly alleviate some of the frustrations that occur between the two agencies once deployed, they fall well short of outlining the way in which multilateral agency operations are conducted.

**Training.** A difficulty in providing mission-specific training for multiagency interventions is that in many cases these operations do not begin as whole of government interventions and therefore establishing cooperative relationships, reporting...
chains and de-confliction mechanisms are often done retrospectively. Interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, were solely military conflicts to begin with, with other government departments becoming part of the national effort much later. This can lead to tensions as the military is required to accommodate disparate government elements through the provision of security and logistic enablers that had not been catered for in its original planning. At the same time, other government organisations feel that their contributions get overlooked as the media and public concentrate on the military aspects of the operation to the exclusion of other agencies whose efforts are just as critical to mission success.

There have been improvements in the general area of interagency participation in military exercises, most notably on the large combined Exercise TALISMAN SABRE 2011. It not only included elements from DFAT, AusAID and the AFP, but it also enabled those elements to work with their US counterparts from the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation, and members from the FBI, USAID, Department of State and others.

It is notable that senior elements involved in the original RAMSI intervention found the most useful interagency activity they conducted prior to deployment was a short-notice ‘desk-top’ operational and tactical-level planning day. Responses to likely scenarios were worked through, agency capabilities and limitations confirmed and possible points of friction worked through with the people who were going to exercise responsibility once deployed.

This naturally is the ideal—just in time delivery of training to disparate organisations in order to appraise each other of capabilities, limitations and agreements/directives. Of course the ideal rarely ever exists but this type of operational-level interagency operational planning has been very much the exception rather than the rule. Such are the benefits of this type of training that its formalisation merits a more considered and systematic treatment. Despite the growth of interagency educational institutions such as the Australian National University’s National Security College and the APCMCOE, their training is based more on individual professional education rather than collective staff training. The lack of a mission rehearsal training capability for principal staff officers on interagency deployments is a shortfall in current approaches to whole of government offshore deployments. Even if the various agencies rotate their people at different times, it would be possible to conduct scenario-based training utilising people experienced in, or recently…
Learning. The experience that Australian agencies have gained in whole of government deployments over the last decade should have established a good base of knowledge regarding what aspects have worked or otherwise, and what elements should be addressed in the future. But a system for the collection, assimilation and implementation of whole of government lessons from Australia’s various deployments does not exist in any formal sense. In Afghanistan for example, Australia is for the first time leading a multinational PRT in a hostile security environment. Without a system in place to not only capture the experiences of the key ADF, DFAT, AFP and AusAID members but to also incorporate them into future training, the hard-won lessons learnt will be lost. In the same way there has been no formal debrief and centralisation of the key lessons learnt from the initial and mature RAMSI intervention.

The ADF has an exhaustive process of capturing lessons, while DFAT has recently commenced doing the same for its Afghanistan commitment. But nowhere are these integrated, and as noted above, even if they were there is no institution responsible for their collection, integration, dissemination and review. APCMCOE has identified the need for this type of capability but again, without formal agreement from all involved agencies to centralise interagency operational-level doctrine development and training, no single organisation has the mandate to conduct such a task.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

It goes without saying that whole of government approaches to crises work most effectively when all departments participating in the mission approach the task with the same urgency, enthusiasm and focus as each other. And for all the advances that Australia has made in developing multiagency interoperability over the last ten years, there are subjective impediments to achieving a truly unified whole of government approach that are realistically part of the nature of governance, and will likely feature in future whole of government interventions.

The subjective constraints are most likely to manifest themselves in interventions that were traditionally the preserve of the military—nation-building in hostile security environments. But risk, while probably the most significant, is not the only
issue that inhibits the establishment of a unified approach to whole of government efforts. Rather, the degree to which an effective whole of government approach emerges is influenced by three main factors:

a. the perception and acceptance of risk (both physical and reputational),

b. Australia’s leadership role, and

c. the degree to which the mission is considered to be in Australia’s direct national interest.

In the case of natural disasters where humanitarian need is readily apparent, where there is little to no security risk and Australian national interests are obvious, then unity of purpose is easily established and the whole of government machinery has shown itself capable of responding in a timely and appropriate manner. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2002 Bali bombing brought a range of government and non-government organisations together effectively, while PAKISTAN ASSIST II and the Japanese tsunami were good recent examples of where the ADF, AusAID and state emergency services respectively were able to provide an effective interagency response to a country outside our immediate region, where we were relatively minor participants, but where Australia had significant strategic interests at play.

This unity of purpose is not always the case, however. In particular, where there is disquiet among the electorate and/or within government about a deployment’s relevance to the national interest, where Australia is a junior coalition partner and/or where the physical threat is high, a unified approach is harder to achieve. While the National Security Council may make decisions regarding the commitment of Australian assets to particular contingencies, the means by which risk is determined and the level of risk each element is willing to accept, the timetable for their deployment and the manning of the deployed elements are all the responsibility of individual ministers, secretaries and their departments.

Variations in risk acceptance have an obvious impact on the ability to deliver a completely integrated whole of government mission. In the security field, the development of an effective indigenous police and military capability ideally requires a seamless training and mentoring system to ensure that training can be delivered, understood and implemented with the appropriate reviews made along the way. This is a longstanding concept that has been largely effective. The Participating Police Force has had great success in following this model in RAMSI for several years. But in the more dangerous Iraqi and Afghan theatres, Australia’s whole of government effort at the tactical level has had less impact due to the reluctance to accept risk.
Iraq was a contribution largely motivated by alliance maintenance and hence the government’s appetite for risk was low. As a consequence the Australian military training teams largely conducted basic training for Iraqi forces without committing themselves to the more dangerous mentoring role that was left up to the United States. To a degree symbolism was more important at the political level than substance at the tactical level. This was evident in a speech by the then Prime Minister in 2007 when he noted ‘the fact that the training is occurring in Iraq itself is significant, both practically and symbolically. It ensures our trainers have greater credibility and develop stronger bonds of trust with Iraqi recruits.’

No mention of the unwillingness to mentor those same Iraqis, nor of Australia’s contribution to the training of the Iraqi Police Service that by the Prime Minister’s measure was rather less significant—two Australian police trainers participated in the training of members of the Iraqi Police Service at the Jordan International Police Training Centre between 2004–06. Both the military and the police contributions said much about Australia’s reluctance to accept risk in Iraq. Military forces that trained but did not mentor, and a police force that conducted training outside the country.

Afghanistan has also highlighted the differing approaches to force protection between government departments in a high-threat environment. In contrast to Iraq though, there has been a higher degree of risk acceptance adopted by some departments, particularly since Australia took over leadership of the PRT from the Dutch. DFAT officers have deployed into some of the patrol bases to conduct key leadership engagement while five AusAID officers are also in Uruzgan monitoring the delivery of development aid. In the security sector though, there remains some anomalies. The task force has undertaken the operational mentoring of the Afghan National Army 4th Brigade, with the Special Operations Task Group mentoring the Afghan Provincial Police Response Companies. The AFP meanwhile has taken on the role of training the local Afghan National Police (ANP) within the Tarin Kowt base without undertaking the mentoring role within the province proper. There are practical reasons for this—small numbers of AFP and the largely static checkpoint duties of the ANP (who are mentored by the US military on such tasks) mean that there is no community policing for the AFP to mentor. By the same token, there are other slightly higher risk tasks that could be done, such as mentoring police command and control elements at the police headquarters in Tarin Kowt town if the AFP elements were allowed to deploy outside the main base. The AFP’s tolerance for
risk is shaped by a number of factors, but unlike other agencies it also has a vocal officers’ association to deal with, whose willingness to weigh in on tactical issues is evident in their criticism of the original decision to send additional police trainers to Afghanistan.31

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

The military planning process can become obsessed by the need for an articulated strategic end-state as the starting point for planning, based on the simple assumption that you need to understand where you want to end up before you plan how to get there. But well articulated end states that all agencies should work towards are very much the exception rather than the norm. Given the absence of a systematised planning process other government departments are far less affected by such ambiguity. There is a good reason for governments failing to provide something that represents a fundamental element of effective planning for international deployments—a political opposition. Governments are loath to commit themselves to a publicly stated goal lest it be used against them in parliament and by the press if the intervention does not go as originally envisaged.

There is also the somewhat inconvenient fact that governments may undertake overseas commitments for other than the publicly stated reasons. Iraq’s absence of weapons of mass destruction proved that considerations such as alliance maintenance play a major role in government decisions to commit resources and accept risk in support of the United States’ military deployments. In addition, the dispatch of niche capabilities deployed as part of a broader alliance consideration, with broad generic goals, restricted freedom of action designed to minimise casualties and uncertain measures of effectiveness with which to track progress towards mission accomplishment make it difficult to engender broad national support for government actions. And without a clearly stated national strategic end-state to work towards there is a large grey area that can be exploited by departments that may choose to interpret for their own ends what course of action best meets the government’s intent.

CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that Australia’s systemic ability to undertake multiagency interventions offshore has improved greatly in the past decade. The Army’s ability to deploy formed bodies and individuals, and to conduct training and mentoring of foreign forces has improved markedly through experience since the ADF’s intervention in East Timor in 1999. Similarly, the AFP and AusAID have developed deployable capabilities for offshore contingencies, while the Australian Civilian Corps offers...
the promise of a broader skills base than currently exists for stabilisation operations. Training for such whole of government deployments still remains somewhat problematic. While organisations that provide the largest numbers to operations such as the ADF and AFP have well developed agency training programs, it is at the operational/strategic level that a training shortfall exists—there is a need for a mechanism by which operational-level, interagency capability and planning considerations are taught to those likely to deploy on interagency interventions. In addition, there is also a need for mission-specific interagency staff training that can be delivered to those identified for deployment.

Of course it is difficult to teach these aspects of interagency coordination and cooperation unless there is an agreed doctrine that outlines agencies’ responsibilities and tasks. It suits some departments’ purposes for there to be no doctrine, and in its place some departments have established MOUs with other agencies to articulate bilateral relationships covering specific issues. Until such doctrine is written and more importantly agreed to by all agencies, there will be no source document to which policy-makers or training developers can refer to, leading to a continually fractured approach to whole of government training and capability development.

There are other aspects that work against a more coherent and integrated approach to whole of government interventions, such as risk management and an ADF national command structure that can be convoluted and inflexible compared to the other agencies. Risk is a difficult concept for departments to agree on, and there is no common method for determining risk within the non-military components. Nevertheless, it has assumed an increasingly important profile since non-military elements have become an integral part of complex interventions in hostile security environments and the differences in risk tolerance have the potential to impinge on the development of a unified approach to an issue.

At the management level, there remains in some instances a disconnect between the ADF and the non-military elements involved in whole of government missions because of the physical dislocation of the national military commander from both Australia’s political representative and the coalition headquarters. This dislocation can slow up the military reporting chain relative to the political, make the national military commander less attuned to Australia’s role in the Coalition, and introduce slight variations in the interagency message as it passes through the various military headquarters.
Australia has shown itself quite capable of undertaking successful whole of government interventions offshore, but the most successful have been those within our immediate region. The further afield they are, the larger the coalition we operate within and the higher the physical risk, the more difficult Australia has found it to achieve a unified and coordinated national approach. These political considerations will be a feature of all future interventions. Improvements can be made in the way in which we organise for and approach future interagency interventions offshore. Firstly, responsibility should be given to a single organisation for the development of whole of government offshore intervention doctrine, the development and conduct of operational-level, whole of government training and interagency ‘force preparation’, and the collection and integration of interagency lessons learned. Second, the acceptable risk profile for all contributing agencies to be agreed to as part of National Security Council considerations, rather than be left to individual departments to determine. And finally, in complex offshore deployments the ADF’s national command and national support functions should be separated so that the national military commander works closely with the senior Australian civilian representative and (where applicable) the coalition partners to maximise his situational awareness and the unity of effort of the Australian contribution.

ENDNOTES


3 A situation now referred to as ‘persistent conflict’.


HOW WHOLE IS WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT?

7 Adaptive Campaigning 09 – Army’s Future Land Operating Concept, Department of Defence, Canberra, September 2009, p. vii.


9 Defined as activities ‘to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief’. Field Manual No. 307 Stability Operations, Headquarters, United States Department of the Army, Washington DC, 2008, pp. vi, B-1.


12 The Community Action Program and Community Stabilisation Program were two examples of Iraq-based USAID programs.


16 Ibid.


21 Edwina Thompson, Smart Power, Kokoda paper No. 12, Canberra, April 2010, p. 59.


30 PRTs have an integral military force protection capability.

THE AUTHOR

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Whole of Government

The Reserve Response Force and Public Safety

Lieutenant Colonel Peter Woodward

Abstract

The 2nd Division’s Army Reserve Response Force (RRF) was established after a series of overseas terrorist incidents in 2001–02 and has carved out a niche role in the area of public safety. Since 2006 RRF trained soldiers deployed on no less than three domestic event support operations and three disaster response operations. This article focuses on experiences in NSW, and argues that the RRF Defence Aid to the Civilian Community (DACC) role in public safety for major events and disaster response is likely to continue in the future. It puts forward the reasons why RRF collective training needs to be more challenging and relevant to the DACC role in a multiagency environment with police and other emergency services so as to better prepare commanders, staff and liaison officers, and soldiers for future domestic support operations.

Prime Minister John Howard announced his intent to establish a Reserve Response Force (RRF) in December 2002. Senator Robert Hill gave more detail in May 2003. The RRF was to be:

…trained for short notice response to domestic security incidents including terrorist incidents as well as quick response to other civil emergencies. Reserve Response Forces
The Reserve Response Force (RRF) will be employed primarily as formed units to cordon off an area, provide static protection of a site or to assist other ADF elements. They could also provide limited on-site medical and transport support.

The RRF was formed within six brigades of the Australian Army Reserve’s 2nd Division.1 Government directed Defence to provide an RRF for Defence Aid to the Civilian Community (DACC), where there was no likelihood that force will be required, and Defence Force Aid to the Civilian Authority (DFACA), where force may be required to achieve the task and where soldiers may be armed.2 The RRF is tasked to provide a capability within Australian territory only and is at higher-level readiness than normal Active Reserve soldiers. In addition to their specialist trade training, RRF soldiers receive additional training including low risk search. A myriad of targets can be searched (buildings, open areas, vehicles, aircraft, roads, trains, tunnels, vessels and wharves), provided the risk to search operators is low.3 Subject to the availability of vehicles, the RRF deploys with its own command, control, communications, water, and rations. Unlike civilian emergency services, it does not require external logistical support when deployed. The RRF’s principal resource is a disciplined, fit and resilient labour force, with security and search skills. It can be complemented with, but does not include, specialist engineering, medical or other sophisticated technology or equipment. If such a capability were required it would need to be force assigned.

The government’s motivations to establish the RRF were manifold. In the relatively benign period following the Vietnam War the Army moved elements of its full-time 1st Division from the more populous southern states to northern Australia.4 The Army’s Reserve 2nd Division became the largest operational capability located in the more populous southern states. Following its deployment to East Timor in 1999, Army experienced a heightened operational tempo.5 Army Reserve soldiers were successfully deployed for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, primarily performing search-related functions.6 It appears that government presentiment of attacks on home soil post 11 September 2001 and the first Bali bombing in 2002 served as principal catalysts to project the Army Reserve into a domestic security role.

Since 2001 Australia has remained free from domestic based terrorist attacks;7 however, RRF trained soldiers were employed, not in security incident response but in security incident prevention and disaster response. In three Domestic

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The RRF’s principal resource is a disciplined, fit and resilient labour force, with security and search skills.
Event Support Operations (DESOs) the RRF searched for explosive devices, weapons and other prohibited and dangerous items. In three disaster response operations these same skills were used to search for the remains of deceased persons and provide logistical and other support when the RRF was deployed at short notice to the Victorian bushfires in 2009, and the Queensland and Victorian floods of 2011.

**PUBLIC COMMENTARY ON THE RRF AND DACC**

Public commentary of the RRF is sparse; however, academics across disparate disciplines comment more generally on military involvement in disaster response. The RRF itself has attracted little publicity or debate within Defence publications or in the wider community. Large-scale ADF domestic operations involving the Army Reserve are relatively recent phenomena over the last ten years, concurrent with the rise of emergency management as a separate academic discipline. Several Australian Strategic Policy Institute strategic policy articles emphasise an emerging ADF trend of participation in domestic operations, along with Defence ambivalence towards their involvement. Authors point to views among some Defence members that DESO detracts from its core business of training and preparedness for warfighting. Indeed, that argument is a partial justification for tasking the Army Reserve for DESO. The Army Reserve can surge to meet short duration activities, avoiding disruption to regular units preparing for or deployed on overseas operations. These analysts also point to a lack of preparedness within the ADF for domestic support operations. There are no specific Defence budgets for DACC, nor are there permanent, designated units for DACC other than the RRF. Except for command positions, RRF positions are held by Reserve soldiers in addition to their normal Reserve postings.

Emergency management studies rarely touch on Defence in response efforts despite embracing a whole of government ethos to disaster response efforts. Emergency Management Australia supports an all agency approach to disaster response, reinforcing the desirability of Defence involvement in training in order to provide niche specialist capabilities in response. Emergency management concepts stress the importance of joint or combined training exercises. Emergency Management Australia, the NSW Police Force and Defence internal training publications stress the value of joint training as a means to enhance training outcomes. Emergency management emphasises rapport and trust building between emergency service agencies as an ingredient for effective coordinated response, underpinned by developing long-term relationships and the mutual awareness of roles. Trust can be developed with regular meetings and exercises to practice working together, so that coordination and possible friction can be resolved more
readily during the stressed periods of initial response. Conversely a lack of understanding between agencies may compound emergency response efforts.

Analysis of military responses to major disasters proves insightful; common functions emerge across diverse conditions. In the aftermath to extreme weather conditions—ice storms in Canada,15 hailstorms in Sydney16 and bushfires in Victoria17—military participation was invaluable. Reconnaissance, intelligence gathering in hazardous environments (rapid impact assessments in emergency management terminology), analysis and reporting, improvised search, community liaison and planning are some of the examples of military skills used in emergency response. Major, mega or super events embrace many facets of emergency management. Just as for disaster response, preparatory joint training for major events enhances operational performance.18

Civilian libertarians and lawyers focus on the sensitive constitutional and political precedence of military deployments on the home front.19 They highlight the dangers of blurring police and military functions within Western democracies that might occur when the military supports the police. These authors suggest that the Australian public is uncomfortable with armed soldiers on the streets. The last occasion in which the ADF deployed armed soldiers on the streets within Australia was in response to the bombing outside the Sydney Hilton Hotel, site of a Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting in 1978. The ADF has exercised force within Australia only rarely in very specific instances since then.20 Personnel deployed on DACC operations have no more powers than do civilians, except on Defence land where they have powers to stop, search and arrest trespassers.21 Unlike members of the NSW Police Force or State Emergency Service, ADF members do not have authority to direct traffic or pedestrians. At a vehicle check point (not on Defence land) RRF soldiers have no powers to stop vehicles, searching them only in the presence and with the authority of civilian police.22

Civil libertarians pose the question: what events could precipitate armed deployment of ADF personnel within Australia? One might be a series of terrorist events causing a much higher domestic threat level. This possibility may have served to motivate establishing the RRF, given the specific mention of the cordon role in the Defence Minister’s 2003 press release. Over the last decade circumstances have not warranted the RRF deploying armed personnel or using force. Experience to date of course does not definitively predict future scenarios.
One of the reasons posed for deploying armed soldiers in the disaster response phase overseas is to prevent looting. Emergency management theory purports that media exaggerates the incidence of looting; in fact communities pull together to overcome adversity. Looting may be more likely in very low socio-economic areas, as was experienced after Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, Louisiana, in 2005. The hurricane caused a high loss of life, widespread damage, broken levies and sustained residential flooding. Looting occurred in hardest hit poor communities with high crime rates and drug dependency. One might speculate on the circumstances that may arise after a disaster hit one of Australia's remote or urban socio-economically poor communities and (for whatever reason) emergency response proved ineffectual in delivering aid. In the Australian context, and as an alternative to seeking DFACA, police are able to draw additional personnel from interstate as special constables, as occurred after the Victorian bushfires and the Queensland floods.

**RRF CAPABILITIES**

With the knowledge of RRF deployments, and in the light of overseas experience, potential RRF capabilities could be:

- **Search** – low risk, for explosive devices, weapons, contraband, missing persons.
- **Manpower** for transport, setting up tents, catering labour and other logistical support, augmented by other Defence elements with the RRF providing manpower where appropriate.
- **Rapid impact assessment** – in the response phase to a disaster, the RRF can survey the impact of a disaster and prepare intelligence reports in a timely manner using Army off-road vehicles (armoured vehicles if necessary) and radios. This capability is especially useful for rural and remote areas employing off-road and hazardous driving skills. Moreover there is a tendency in disaster response to focus on the impact to urban centres and towns overlooking farming properties and small rural settlements that could be accessed by military vehicles in the first hours of response. Army training lends itself to this task, but it is not covered within RRF courses.
- **Community engagement** – as occurred in the 2009 Victorian bushfires, the RRF can establish and maintain small outposts ‘24-7’ in affected disaster areas to engage with the local community, gather information and provide a reassuring presence to locals among the destruction.
• Evacuation assistance – early warning via door knocks, accessing remote localities.

• Planning assistance – Army’s Military Appreciation Process discipline and training gives key personnel the ability to assist emergency services in planning complex short notice tasks.

WHERE TO NOW?

Will the RRF continue to be deployed at the current rate and in what kinds of roles? Recent history and emerging emergency management trends provide some clues. Causal factors can be explained under the following headings:

DOMESTIC EVENT SUPPORT

Across the globe nations aggressively compete to win the right to host major and mega events to boost tourism and economies. The NSW government clearly aims to attract events to the ‘Premier State’ while other Australian states and cities compete to attract major events. During the period 1956–2000, the ADF supported four DESO at the rate of one per eleven years. Since 2001, the ADF has supported no less than six events or one every 18 months. Sporting, religious and political events offer both risks and rewards to host nations. A successful event showcases a city as a place to attract tourists and conventions with flow-on benefits such as additional revenue and employment. Conversely, a poorly managed event has an unfavourable impact on reputation, tourism and the economy. Mega-events can precipitate contingencies, generating consequence and response management roles, some of which the RRF may be called upon to perform …
The Reserve Response Force and Public Safety

- Damage to the reputation or embarrassment of those personnel in uniform, whether they are police or Defence.
- A range of potential contingencies, identified and unidentified.

Mega-events present both specified and implied tasks for the supporting military force. Specified tasks are normally identified in the initial request agreement for the establishment of a joint task force, and documented in a Memorandum of Understanding. For the RRF search tasks have predominated, fitting within the DACC ambit, requiring no additional legal powers or use of force, and freeing up stretched police resources. Mega-events are deliberate and well planned with military personnel on location on a high degree of readiness. An implicit expectation exists for the ADF to assist, if during the event, a contingency occurred. A prudent commander would plan ahead in order to identify those possible contingencies, possible new RRF short notice tasks, and conduct relevant preparatory training accordingly. The Military Appreciation Process (MAP), including risk management techniques, helps to identify ‘worst case’ scenarios and possible new tasks. Given that deployed RRF soldiers are physically located close to the event at high readiness levels and with situational awareness, political leaders and the public may well expect a prompt and professional military response to a range of contingencies. New tasks might be categorised as either more of the same or new, ‘be prepared to’ tasks. More of the same might be additional police search tasks. New search tasks might involve preparatory site specific occupational health and safety risk mitigation, for example the search of underground rail tunnels or to conduct magnometer and bag searches of individual event attendees. In a heightened threat environment, event volunteers may stop attending and the RRF may be called upon to perform some key roles.

Natural disaster response

Natural disasters appear to be increasing in their frequency and impact, as does ADF involvement in their response phase. Climate change is forecast to increase the incidence of extreme weather events over time. Flow-on effects may be water shortages, greater health problems including disease contagion, flooding, coastal erosion and storm surge. Extreme weather events such as hailstorms, floods and cyclones may occur in places where they have not previously occurred. Population growth and housing sprawl into bushfire and flood prone areas and fragile coastal developments increases the level of exposure to such events.
The RRF may be required to assist in a major natural disaster response, tasked at short notice to complement civilian combat agencies, particularly in states with a limited full-time Army presence. The degree of warning and preparation time for natural disaster response varies depending on the nature of the emergency. Weather reports forecast approaching cyclones and heavy rain precursors flooding, whereas earthquakes and tsunamis occur without presentiment. Nonetheless the RRF is not the ‘Army’s SES’. State governments compliment full time (police, fire and ambulance) emergency combat agencies with large and well-equipped volunteer organisations. For example, in NSW the Rural Fire Service has 70,000 members across 2100 brigades, while the State Emergency Service has 10,000 volunteers across 226 units. Under DACC local ADF commanders may provide assistance for up to 24 hours without seeking approval from higher authority. Local ADF base commanders in regional areas may consider it necessary to commit personnel and equipment to assist the local community in times of crisis in order to protect Defence’s reputation in the local community. In 2010, Army personnel from Puckapunyal were deployed to assist in flood preparations, subsequently to be replaced by members of Victoria’s 4th Brigade RRF personnel. RRF may be called to backfill Regular personnel in regional areas. One might question the RRF’s ability to significantly contribute capability to the efforts of civilian emergency service combat agencies, given their broad extant capabilities. For example, sand bagging is an unskilled task that RRF soldiers can perform, and for which Defence can receive due recognition for assistance from the local community. However sand bagging could be equally performed using purpose built equipment or by able-bodied members of the local community, whereas the RRF has other, more unique skills to offer in an emergency environment.

URBAN EXPANSION

Since the Second World War Australia’s steady population growth has expanded into bush land and farming areas exposing residents to new threats. Some newly urbanised areas are more vulnerable to natural disaster; for example, the communities north-east of Melbourne surrounded by bush and destroyed by the Victorian bushfires of 2009, or the new suburbs west of Brisbane affected by the 2011 floods.

INFRASTRUCTURE FAILURE

In recent decades our increasing embrace of technology accelerated demands for supporting infrastructure. Computers, communications devices, air conditioners and a growing number of household and office appliances generate heat and consume energy. Information systems and utilities are vulnerable to human or natural disruption and failure. State governments, particularly in the more eastern populous states, were criticised for investing inadequate funds on infrastructure development and maintenance, especially road and rail. Interdependence of systems means a collapse
by one can precipitate multiple systems failures.\textsuperscript{32} Climate change, growing dependence on technology, government neglect of infrastructure funding, and the interdependence on these human systems raises the potential incidence of major disasters.

**TERRORIST ACTION**

Threat of terrorist attack on Australian soil remains extant. A recent example is the 2010 conviction of ‘home grown’ terrorists intending to attack Sydney’s Holsworthy Barracks. RRF personnel deployed on Defence land have additional legal powers under the *Defence Act 1903* to stop, search, seize and detain. If an attack were to occur then the RRF may be tasked to search or provide a preventive presence on Defence land and civilian infrastructure or iconic structures, and may be armed under DFACA arrangements.

**PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS**

Australian society’s expectations about emergency support service levels are increasing. If a major disaster were to occur the public presumes a comprehensive government response. The public expects emergency services to respond quickly when needed without much consideration of the cost or degree of difficulty in doing so. Media will expose any perceived failings with consequent damage to the Service’s public reputation.\textsuperscript{33} Australians perceive Defence as a professional organisation; regardless of the scenarios faced, Australians expect Defence to act professionally and get the job done. However, the public has little understanding of the legal relationships between the states and the Commonwealth.

**GOVERNMENT WILLINGNESS TO DEPLOY THE ADF**

Concurrent with a perceived rise in the domestic terrorist threat post 11 September 2001 was an increasing incidence of ADF involvement in natural disaster response, both domestically\textsuperscript{34} and overseas.\textsuperscript{35} Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005 and its aftermath reinforced political leaders’ desire to be recognised acting decisively and expeditiously after a natural disaster. President George W Bush was heavily criticised for the federal government’s poor response to Katrina and his own actions. Initially he flew over flooded New Orleans in his Air Force One aircraft, rather than landing to inspect personally. He praised Michael Brown, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and a Bush appointee with very limited emergency management experience, only to accept his resignation two weeks later. Post Hurricane Katrina,
Australian political leaders demonstrated little hesitation to commit Defence assets in disaster response in recent years. Witness Prime Minister John Howard’s visit to north Queensland after cyclone Larry in 2006 and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s visit to the victims on the Sunday following the Victorian bushfires of Black Saturday in 2009.

RISK MITIGATION

Over the last ten years Australia’s workplace occupational health and safety legislation was standardised in federal law. The ADF along with other government agencies and private enterprise ramped up their occupational health and safety processes. Training in risk management to identify risks, worst case scenarios, and means to mitigate risks are now commonplace. One consequence of such planning is a greater recognition of dangerous scenarios for event organisers. Identifying new dangers generates more work to mitigate against them, engendering more potential RRF tasks. The RRF was tasked to assist the Victoria Police in a search for deceased persons in the devastated bush fire areas in 2009, several weeks after the event, in order to ensure that all human remains were recovered. Media presence at disasters and mega events can be pervasive; any transgression by personnel in uniform may appear on the Internet and newspapers. Media propensity to publicise any peccadillo, no matter how trivial, with consequent potential reputation damage, influences commanders to adopt a cautionary approach to operational planning.

SOUND TRACK RECORD

Police and other emergency services perceived that the ADF performed to a high standard on domestic operations in recent years, as evidenced by their repeated invitations by government at several levels. ADF DACC attracts favourable public, government and media support, enhancing Defence’s reputations.

The above analysis supports the existence of an ongoing demand for the RRF in the future, particularly in the DACC space.

MULTIAGENCY RRF TRAINING

What types of training should the RRF conduct to be best prepared for future operations? RRF training includes both individual and collective training. After an initial qualification course each brigade RRF exercises annually. This article focuses
on a particularly important skill for the RRF, namely the ability to coordinate effectively in a multiagency environment. DACC and DFACA training, like stabilisation operations, involve coordination with the emergency services, other government and non-government agencies. Specialist niche capabilities need to be deployed effectively in a harmonious and timely manner with other specialist emergency services. Conventional military training focuses on command, control and planning, with less regard for coordination with third parties. A potential for friction exists between army and civilian emergency service commanders; military commanders are trained to take charge, whereas coordination is primarily emphasised among emergency response agencies. For the ADF (including the RRF) to work effectively, emergency services incident commanders and RRF commanders need to be aware of each others’ standing operational procedures and modes of operations. This all takes practice and is best learned in an exercise environment rather than the pressure cooker atmosphere of an emergency response.

Exemplifying the value of practicing coordination among agencies are the regularly held Special Forces exercises with state and territory police. The Munich Olympic Games terrorist incident in 1972 and the 1978 Sydney Hilton Hotel bombing served as a catalyst for the federal government to establish a domestic military counter-terrorist response capability. Special Forces rehearse and refine arrangements for the deployment of personnel in a hostage siege or other counter-terrorist action regularly with civilian police forces in each jurisdiction. Well-practiced training regimes exist with civilian police to practice and build learning around the most effective counter-terrorist response.

When RRF trained soldiers were deployed on three DESO, extensive mission specific training was conducted prior to each event in order to prepare them for the activity. DESO usually offer a lengthy degree of military planning (6–12 months) during which training and preparations can occur. In preparation for planned operations (Commonwealth Games, APEC, World Youth Day) mission specific training and a mission rehearsal exercise took place. Other than in preparing for these DESO, RRF training largely occurs in isolation. Commanders rarely practiced coordination with other agencies, which may not participate and are represented by Army role-players.

The lead agency for emergency management doctrine in Australia, Emergency Management Australia, reinforces the desirability of joint training. It embraces four concepts of emergency management:
The Reserve Response Force and Public Safety

The first three of these tenets support the conduct of joint RRF/emergency service training. The all hazards approach proposes that emergency services should train for a variety of scenarios, not just for one type; for example, a terrorist response. Moreover, hazards include both physical hazards, as discussed earlier, and also technological hazards. In an increasingly technologically complex and interdependent society an extended power failure can threaten life and a volcano spewing ash can disrupt airline flights globally. As the name ‘Reserve Response Force’ indicates, the RRF was intended to be employed in response to an emergency or terrorist incident. If it is to be ready for the response phase it should train in the preparation phase. The all agencies approach involves an active partnership between all levels of government. Under Australia’s federal constitution the states hold primacy for the protection and preservation of lives and property, while the Commonwealth provides guidance and physical assistance to a requesting state or territory when an emergency requires assistance beyond its response capabilities. The all agencies approach emphasises the multidisciplinary and multiagency nature of response management. An oil spill in Sydney Harbour may involve twenty or more agencies working in a coordinated effort. To operate effectively the RRF needs to exercise in a multiagency environment.

RRF AND POLICE JOINT TRAINING IN NSW

Joint training encompasses a broad spectrum of activities from desktop exercises through to field exercises. By way of example, two joint training activities at each end of this range were conducted in NSW in 2009 and 2010. Based on relationships built on Operations DELUGE and TESTAMENT, members of the NSW Police Force developed an understanding of the RRF’s capabilities and a willingness to build joint understanding. The two activities were:

- A desktop activity involving NSW Police Force and the 8th Brigade RRF in December 2009
- Exercise STEEL GUARD, a field exercise involving NSW Police Force, 5th Brigade RRF and civilian stakeholders in October 2010
THE RESERVE RESPONSE FORCE AND PUBLIC SAFETY

DESKTOP EXERCISE

Within the NSW Police Force the Major Events and Incidents Group is responsible for the conduct of planning for scheduled large events and response to short notice major incidents. During recent major events (APEC and World Youth Day) the NSW Police Force was exposed to the RRF through its low risk search capability. The NSW Police Force is also relevant to emergency response through its responsibilities under the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act, 1989. A range of exercise options was considered, as presented in the handbook of the NSW State Emergency Management Committee. It was agreed that a one-day workshop would be conducted to improve the combined understanding of the response capabilities of the RRF and civilian emergency services during operations. The principal challenge identified for developing interoperability between the NSW Police Force and RRF lay not with the soldiers or junior leaders but with RFF commanders. This view was based on the experience during the conduct of support to the NSW Police Force for APEC and World Youth Day. After consultation with a number of parties to achieve a shared understanding of capability, it was agreed to conduct a number of presentations followed by three discussion exercises.

Three scenarios tested a number of scenarios:

- Major planned event – Sydney hosts a G20 heads of government meeting
- Disaster response – earthquake in a NSW town, no warning
- Pandemic outbreak – while responding to the earthquake, a highly contagious, non-lethal pandemic breaks out.

EXERCISE STEEL GUARD

RRF commanders need skills in liaison and coordination with emergency services, and public and private agencies. Rather than Army recreate or role play other stakeholders, a plan emerged to ‘bolt on’ an RRF exercise to an existing police security operation and a major civilian event, namely the 2010 Breakfast on the Bridge event, held on 10 October 2010. Billed as a tourist promotion for Sydney, it involved closing the Sydney Harbour Bridge and laying down real grass for 6000 people to have breakfast on the bridge deck. The NSW Police Force, the Roads and Traffic Authority and the NSW government invited Army’s 5th Brigade RRF to perform a low risk search of the bridge the evening prior. The bridge is an iconic landmark, vital road and rail link, and on the day a potential mass causality target. Subject matter experts from each agency jointly developed components of the plan together, for example search, media, risk/occupational health and safety, logistics and traffic. Working at heights with high perceived risk challenged the RRF operators in what is an inherently repetitive task of searching. While the RRF was deployed on the bridge the NSW Police Force established a command post at the Sydney Police...
Operations Centre. The NSW Police Force and RRF personnel conducted a desktop exercise at the Police Operations Centre, discussing how the RRF and the NSW Police Force would react to a range of ‘what if’ scenarios. Harbour Bridge staff also benefited from the chance to interoperate with the RRF.

LESSONS LEARNT

Key findings from both activities were:

- Up until that time RRF training in NSW was generally conducted in isolation to the emergency services. Opportunities should be considered to train as part of a joint exercise or public event, thereby engendering a greater degree of realism for participants, particularly facilitating interaction with external agencies.

- The RRF can be used as a capability enhancement for the NSW Police Force. By tasking the RRF to conduct low risk search, a task requiring no additional legal powers, police resources are freed to conduct other tasks. In NSW the Public Order and Riot Squad has primary responsibility for low risk search. Riot squad personnel who would be otherwise conducting search can be employed in high visibility policing, crowd control and other duties during major events or disaster response.

- Jargon can be a barrier; presenters need to be cognisant of acronyms and terminology that are not understood by all involved, Army being the principal offender. Ideally a common language and nomenclature would enhance interoperability.

- Simply meeting each other in the workshops was helpful in building trust and enhancing working relationships. As the adage says ‘…when you need a friend it’s too late to make one’.

- Cost savings may be achieved through joint training; for example, reducing the number of role-players and sharing expenses in the preparation of exercises.

- Joint training widens the scope for suitable venues, both Defence and NSW Police Force facilities and areas. Contacts of both organisations can also be exploited and shared.

- RRF commanders practice coordination among the RRF and emergency service agencies while conducting command and control internally.

- Risk management outcomes are enhanced by involving organisation subject matter experts, rather than developing plans in isolation. Without joint training the potential exists for mission failure and/or embarrassment to members in uniform and consequent damage to the reputation of respective organisations.
Emergency services’ understanding of the RRF within the DACC arrangement in NSW is limited. Through a failure to explain the RRF, Army’s motives can be unwittingly misconstrued. Emergency services may think that Army seeks to take over, threatening civilian emergency service roles and jobs. The 1999 Sydney hailstorm response exhibited that friction may arise among emergency combat agencies and with Defence. A deduction is that the ADF needs to make clear its intentions for the RRF’s role in DACC in the future, and joint training is one means.

The RRF is not embedded within the NSW Disaster Response Plan. Its presence during emergencies is problematic, depending on circumstances. Unlike other emergency agencies, standing operational procedures for the RRF to support civilian combat agencies are not in place. Joint exercises are one way to explain the RRF’s capability to emergency services.

When deployed supporting a major event, emergency services and the public may have a higher expectation for RRF response to an incident, given their proximity on hand and high readiness state. Appropriate planning needs to occur to prepare for possible worst case scenarios and subsequent possible RRF tasks.

RRF road transport, including the choice of vehicle raised several issues. While Army all-wheel vehicles excel in hazardous off-road rural conditions, in urban areas limitations arise: poor turning circles, seat belts only in the driver’s cabin, and no roll over protection for personnel in the rear of the vehicles. Emergency service vehicles are fitted with emergency lights and sirens, RRF vehicles are not. While some RRF soldiers will have local knowledge, many will not. Drivers and navigators of military vehicles can struggle to move in convoys in busy city traffic, with motorways, tunnels and unforgiving on/off ramps. Mega-event special event road closures and clearways are not depicted on GPS systems, if available to Army drivers. If RRF personnel were required to move quickly in heavy traffic in an emergency they would require a police escort. Media is usually well represented at major events and disaster sites. Clearly identifiable as Army vehicles, if they are involved in a vehicle accident or take a wrong turn they become targets for unfavourable media coverage, possibly harming the ADF’s reputation. These factors convinced commanders to compliment the Army ‘green fleet’ vehicles with civilian style mini-buses in which to transport personnel during the last two DESO in Sydney.
The ‘nightmare’ desktop scenario was a pandemic outbreak on the site of a country town with stretched emergency services responding to an earthquake. Discussion revolved around use of the RRF to man checkpoints and provide early warning of vehicle and personnel movement in that scenario. The RRF could man roadblocks in a DACC environment providing a police officer was present to provide legal powers and deal with non-compliant civilians. Additional legal powers under DFACA are required to stop, search or detain members of the public without police presence outside Defence land.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Identify tasks suited to the RRF, based on agreed threats, likely scenarios and capabilities.
- Conduct joint training in order to build understanding, practice coordination skills and better understand each others’ capabilities and standard operating procedures.
- Develop training wherever possible to be conducted as part of real events in order to maximise realism, challenge participants and provide opportunities for agency interaction.
- Develop joint training programs, consulting with key stakeholders, recognising the long lead times necessary to suit Army Reserve training schedules.
- Design training that conforms to the best practices for emergency management as prescribed by Emergency Management Australia.
- Build on small steps through an agreed strategy progressing forward.
- Exploit the strengths of each organisation, not their weaknesses.
- Review the RRF operator and commander course in light of the above findings.
- Compliment RRF training with selected Emergency Management Australia courses.
- Appoint a liaison officer from each brigade to their relevant state emergency services.
- Provide liaison officer training.

CONCLUSION

Established but never deployed as the Army Reserve component in an ADF response to domestic terrorist threat, the RRF found an operational niche providing public safety capabilities at major events and disaster response. A variety of casual factors point to a continuing demand for DACC with the RRF well-suited to provide that support to the states. Multiagency training with emergency services enhances RRF’s skills, and engenders understanding of its niche role. Ongoing joint training, liaison and relationship building should occur so that, when called upon in the cauldron of emergency response, the RRF can coordinate effectively with other agencies, and bring credit to the ADF.
ENDNOTES

1 Originally the Army Reserve’s 1st Commando Regiment was included in the RRF construct but was later removed, leaving 2nd Division’s six brigades to each raise/train/sustain an RRF company group.

2 Sections 51A, 51B and 51C of the Defence Act, 1903, allow for the use of the ADF to provide aid to the civilian authorities under certain circumstances.

3 High risk search tasks are undertaken by Royal Australian Engineers. Underwater search and render safe can be performed by Navy Clearance Divers.

4 The Army’s full time 1st Division has three brigades: 1st Brigade – Darwin, 3rd Brigade – Townsville, and 7th Brigade – Brisbane.

5 Afghanistan, Gulf War II, Iraq, East Timor and the Solomon Islands.

6 Operation GOLD, (the ADF support to the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games).

7 Australians were attacked overseas on several occasions during this period, namely the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005, the 2004 Jakarta Australian Embassy bombing and the 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings.

8 2006 Operation ACOLYTE, (Commonwealth Games, Melbourne, VIC); 2007 Operation DELUGE, (APEC, Sydney, NSW); and 2008 Operation TESTAMENT (World Youth Day and the visit of Pope Benedict XVI, Sydney, NSW).

9 Operation VICTORIAN FIRES ASSIST, February 2009; Operation QLD FLOOD ASSIST; Operation VIC FLOOD ASSIST.


12 A journal article covering the topic is WN Carter, ‘Military Forces in the Counter-disaster role’ in Disaster management; a disaster manager’s handbook, ADB, Manilla, 1991.


Whole of Government

Lieutenant Colonel Peter Woodward


19 For example, M Head, ‘Domestic violence and calling out the troops’ in Calling out the troops, Federation Press, Sydney, 2009; and J McCulloch, ‘Calling out the Troops’ in Blue Army, Melbourne University Press, 2001, pp. 53–67.

20 Special Forces were deployed to board and secure the North Korean cargo ship Pong Su off the coast of NSW in 2003. During Operation DELUGE in 2007 the RAAF deployed FA-18 fighter aircraft to intercept a small aircraft flying into an air exclusion zone. The aircraft failed to acknowledge radio messages and the FA-18 fired flares in order to attract the pilot’s attention, upon which the aircraft was directed to land at a local airport.

21 Defence Act, 1903.

22 Unlike the US National Guard which regularly deploys armed on domestic support operations and can be sworn in as state troopers when under direction of their state governor.


27 Australia hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM) meeting in Perth, WA in October 2011. The Australian government supported an unsuccessful national bid to win the hosting rights to the 2022 Football World Cup. Australia may seek to host a meeting of the G20.

28 In 2007 the ABC TV’s comedy program ‘The Chaser’ drew wide media attention when a mock motorcade penetrated an APEC roadblock, embarrassing the NSW Police Force and the state government.

29 By way of example, a series of terrorist incidents occurred leading up to the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, and on the opening night of the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, a bomb exploded in an Atlanta park killing one person and injuring 111 people.
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31 The 1999 Sydney hailstorm was Australia’s most expensive natural disaster at that time in terms of insurance claims, and Reserve personnel assisted in emergency roof repairs in Sydney. Keys, ‘The response to the “mother of all storms”: a combat agency view’.

32 Sydney’s rail system, exemplifies a complex system in which a collapse in one part may lead to widespread failure. A stoppage in the central underground will quickly disrupt the whole system, as most lines travel through it.

33 Witness the media’s criticism of perceived slow Navy response to rescue passengers of a vessel breaking apart at Christmas Island in December 2010.

34 For example, Operation LARRY ASSIST 2006, cyclone, Innisfail, QLD.

35 For example Operation BALI ASSIST 2002, Bali bombings; Operation SUMATRA ASSIST 2004-05, Boxing Day tsunami; Operation PAKISTAN ASSIST, earthquake; Dhanmi, Pakistan; and Operation PAPUA NEW GUINEA ASSIST 2007, floods, Oro, northern province, PNG.

36 For an Australian perspective on Hurricane Katrina see Handmer, ‘American exceptionalism or universal lesson?’


39 A number of animal and human pandemics have attracted media coverage and government response in recent years, including Asian bird flu, horse flu and swine flu.

40 For example, while RRF personnel search the edges of piers and wharves, a water police vessel is deployed in case a soldier falls in to the harbour.

41 Interagency rivalry can occur, as evidenced by the Sydney hail storms response in 1999 when the NSW government replaced the SES with the NSW Fire Services Commissioner as the overall authority for the response effort, amidst radio talk back commentators calling for Army involvement to increase. Keys, ‘The response to the “mother of all storms”: a combat agency view’.

42 During APEC in 2007, a RAAF truck damaged a historical park gate at North Head in Sydney. Owing to its camouflage appearance the tabloid media apportioned blame to Army.
WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT  ~  LIEUTENANT COLONEL PETER WOODWARD

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WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT

OPERATION QUEENSLANDER

TEN IDEAS FOR AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE SUPPORT TO DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

BRIGADIER CHRIS FIELD

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to articulate ten ideas for ADF support to disaster relief operations. These ideas originate from the development of the strategic, operational and tactical plans for Operation QUEENSLANDER in order to ensure that the ADF can continue to fulfil Defence White Paper 2009 requirements. These ideas are: intelligence preparation in disaster relief operations; the effectiveness of the Joint Military Appreciation Process; the utility of design in complex disasters; beyond whole of government – a comprehensive approach to disaster relief; maintaining momentum – establishing the campaign sequel; domestic disasters: templates and tensions; Defence as a supporting agency; whole of government planning, writing and language; the value of military education and training; future operations: workers, thinkers and leaders.

The Defence White Paper, 2009 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, states that Australia’s ‘most basic strategic interest remains the defence of Australia against direct armed attack.’¹ In addition, Defence White Paper 2009 acknowledges the ‘vital role’ for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in ‘supporting domestic security and emergency response efforts’ including disaster...
relief. Among other domestic threats, Defence White Paper 2009 recognises that ‘natural disasters such as cyclones, earthquakes, floods and bushfires can also threaten the security and safety of the Australian people.’

As a result of Queensland’s November 2010–February 2011 flood and cyclone-related events, thirty-seven people lost their lives, and all seventy-three local government areas in Queensland, some 20 per cent of the Australian continent, were disaster activated under Commonwealth–State Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements. As forewarned in Defence White Paper 2009, the security and safety of Australians, this time in Queensland, were threatened by fifty-nine rivers flooding with twelve breaking flood records, 19,000 kilometres of affected state and local roads, and 29 per cent of Queensland’s rail network damaged. Restoration and reconstruction costs were estimated at approximately $5 billion for flooding and more than $800 million for cyclone-related events.

Due to Queensland’s flood and cyclone-related events, and in accordance with commitments articulated in Defence White Paper 2009, the ADF seconded a small team of planners to the Queensland state government in January–February 2011 to assist in reconnecting, rebuilding and improving Queensland, its communities and economy. This team, working to build ‘a stronger, more resilient Queensland and Queenslanders’, authored Queensland’s strategic reconstruction plan: Operation Queenslander, The State Community, Economic and Environmental Recovery and Reconstruction Plan 2011–2013 (The State Plan).

Following the release of the State Plan and the departure of the ADF planning team from the Queensland Reconstruction Authority (the Authority), Operation QUEENSLANDER was broadened to include operational and tactical plans titled: The Community, Economic and Environmental Recovery and Reconstruction Implementation Plan 2011–2013 (The Implementation Plan), and A Guide to Local Community, Economic and Environmental Recovery and Reconstruction Planning (The Local Plan).

The purpose of this article is to articulate ten ideas for ADF support to disaster relief operations. These ideas originate from the development of the strategic, operational and tactical plans for Operation QUEENSLANDER in order to ensure that the ADF can continue to fulfil Defence White Paper 2009 requirements. These ideas are:

1. Intelligence preparation in disaster relief operations
2. The effectiveness of the Joint Military Appreciation Process

Restoration and reconstruction costs were estimated at approximately $5 billion for flooding and more than $800 million for cyclone-related events.
Defence is a national institution with a significant public profile and a high degree of community trust among Australians. Each time the ADF deploys, based on the actions of ADF members, its profile and trust are reassessed by the Australian people. This reassessment is amplified in domestic disaster relief operations, which require ADF members to interact directly with Australian citizens. A key theme of this article is that the ADF’s relationship and standing with the Australian people for all operational deployments remains dynamic, and the ADF must always strive to learn and improve under all circumstances.

IDEA 1: INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION IN DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

Despite the Defence White Paper 2009 emphasising ADF domestic security and emergency response responsibilities, Defence’s primary focus is international. Defence White Paper 2009 states that Australia’s ‘expansive strategic geography requires an expeditionary orientation on the part of the ADF…underpinned by requisite force projection capabilities’. As a result of this ‘expeditionary orientation’, the ADF’s Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is primarily focused on government roles and responsibilities in the context of potential areas for international deployment. For the majority of the ADF, JPME usually only examines the business and operations of state and territory governments in a peripheral manner within the context of Commonwealth–State and Commonwealth–Territory relations.

One consequence of ADF JPME providing peripheral consideration to state and territory government business is that intelligence preparation in disaster relief operations within Australia relies, almost exclusively, on the assets and capabilities of Australia’s six state and two territorial governments. As a result, ADF planners...
for disaster relief operations in Australia need to quickly identify state government capabilities that enable intelligence preparation. For Operation QUEENSLANDER, six Queensland government departments were the core intelligence providers for ADF planners. The ADF planners were blind without the leadership and cooperation of the Queensland Department of Communities, Department of Employment Economic Development and Innovation, Department of Environment and Resource Management, Department of Transport and Main Roads, Department of Public Works, and the Department of the Premier and Cabinet.

Two Queensland government innovations enabled these six Queensland government departments to effectively provide intelligence in disaster relief operations. First, each of the departments led a whole of state sub-committee which within Operation QUEENSLANDER, is responsible for one of six lines of reconstruction: human and social, economic, environment, building recovery, roads and transport, and community liaison and communication. These sub-committees comprised Commonwealth, state, business, peak body, non-government organisations, local government, and community-based membership. As a result, ADF planners quickly sourced vital intelligence used in the writing and development of Operation QUEENSLANDER. If ADF planners missed key information or factors required to reconnect, rebuild and improve Queensland, its communities and economy, members of the whole of state sub-committee quickly provided robust feedback, advice, and direction.

Second, Queensland state government departments, through their regional presence and experience combined with their connections to local government authorities, non-government organisations and communities, are well positioned to collect, quantify, measure and report on natural disaster damage, recovery and reconstruction. All six lines of reconstruction were mutually reinforcing, interdependent, synchronised and tailored, and departments readily adapted existing reporting metrics or developed new metrics to demonstrate the progress of Operation QUEENSLANDER. The Operation QUEENSLANDER Implementation Plan, the state’s operational plan, detailed the tasks and metrics used in reconnecting, rebuilding and improving Queensland, its communities and economy. In turn, the Implementation Plan enabled the Queensland Reconstruction Authority to develop and provide comprehensive monthly board reporting to Commonwealth, state, and local stakeholders.\(^\text{12}\)
**What the ADF should do:** For future intelligence preparation in disaster relief operations in support of state governments, Defence should *sustain* immediate cooperation with appropriate state and territory governments and their departments in order to gain the best possible ongoing intelligence. The Queensland government’s use of six whole of state sub-committees, responsible for six mutually reinforcing, interdependent, synchronised and tailored lines of reconstruction, is an excellent model for consideration in future disaster relief operations. In addition, the ADF’s JPME continuum should *fix* ADF members’ understanding of the business and operations of state and territory governments through a broader Defence to state–territory government education program.

**IDEA 2: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE JOINT MILITARY APPRECIATION PROCESS**

The Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP) was employed by the ADF planning team in authoring Operation QUEENSLANDER. The planning team applied the JMAP to analyse the mission, develop, test, recommend and select courses of action, and then write the State Plan. Notably, while the JMAP was employed, it was the skills, knowledge and attitudes of the ADF planners that enabled them to effectively conduct a JMAP to support ‘domestic security and emergency response efforts’ including disaster relief for Operation QUEENSLANDER.

Most ADF members receive training on a form of the military appreciation process. Following attendance at Australian Command and Staff College as mid-ranking officers, this military appreciation training includes the JMAP. As a result of challenges such as Operation QUEENSLANDER, the ADF will arguably be expected to support future disaster relief operations with skills that include the JMAP. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that *all* ADF members must be ready to apply the JMAP, often at short notice, in the context of a state–territory disaster event.

Arguably, the ADF training continuum does not fully support the notion that all ADF members can be ready to apply the JMAP, in the context of a state–territory disaster event. For example, the introduction of the JMAP to mid-ranking officers seems too late, especially when the small planning team that wrote Operation QUEENSLANDER included an Army captain who had not previously employed the JMAP. Readers of this article may also know situations where, on an exercise
or deployment, the bulk of JMAP analysis and development during planning activities was left to a few individuals—the so called ‘lead-planners’. Other cases may be known where ADF members preferred to attempt solving problems without employing the JMAP, often with less than satisfactory outcomes. Arguably, the late introduction of the JMAP into ADF training, with an emphasis on mid-ranking officers, and few non-commissioned officers, can lead to the JMAP assuming some form of mystic quality within the ADF, where the JMAP is seen to be too formal, or onerous, or complex for employment in problem solving.

Recognising the value of planning in the ADF, since 1991 ADF officers have attended advanced planning courses with three of the four services in the US military. These advanced planning courses are approximately twelve months of intensive study in planning and the operational art. While the advanced planning courses are of significant benefit to the ADF in terms of connections with our major ally, in developing planners and in avoiding the creation of a ‘home-grown’ ADF advanced planning school, in twenty-one years, the US advanced planning courses have only produced thirty-two ADF planners. Therefore, in addition to developing and employing advanced ADF planners, the ADF needs to focus on lifting the overall standard of planning, and employing the JMAP, by all ADF members, both officers and non-commissioned officers.

Ideas to lift the standard of planning in the ADF include introducing the JMAP earlier in JPME, simplifying the JMAP, and rigorously demanding JMAP’s use for problem solving throughout Defence. In addition, the introduction of the JMAP to other government agencies, especially emergency management and police authorities, at federal and state level, may assist in harmonising whole of government disaster relief planning efforts (see Idea 8 for an extension of this point). Finally, if the JMAP is not achieving planning outcomes needed for the ADF, especially in terms of operational design (see Idea 3), then the JMAP should be updated or changed.

What the ADF should do: For the effective employment of the JMAP in disaster relief operations in support of state–territory governments, Defence should fix JMAP training so that all ADF officers and non-commissioned officers are confident in the use of the JMAP, encouraged to use the JMAP for problem solving, and can lead JMAP planning teams. To achieve this requirement, the JMAP must be introduced earlier in the JPME training continuum and must be a core skill of ADF members. The introduction of the JMAP to other government agencies requires consideration.
IDEA 3: THE UTILITY OF DESIGN IN COMPLEX DISASTERS

The ADF planning team moved beyond the JMAP to apply design in developing Operation QUEENSLANDER. The ADF planning team initially deployed to develop a plan in response to flooding in regional Queensland. Through the employment of design methodology, the ADF planning team wrote a plan that enabled the Queensland government to respond to multiple events that occurred across the entire state including river and flash flooding, coastal storm, surges, cyclones and monsoonal rains.

Design is a ‘methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualise and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them’. Queensland’s November 2010–February 2011 flood and cyclone-related events, covering every Queensland local government area and 20 per cent of the Australian continent, were and remain complex and ill-structured problems. During the ADF’s January–February 2011 secondment of a small team of planners to the Queensland state government, the planning team applied critical and creative thinking to solve these problems.

It was the ADF planner’s skills in designing a framework for Operation QUEENSLANDER, the Queensland Reconstruction Framework (QRF), based on the six mutually reinforcing, interdependent, synchronised and tailored lines of reconstruction that allowed the state of Queensland to absorb multiple disasters while developing a State Plan that provided a vision for the future. Months after the ADF planning team left the Authority, and following an April 2011 flooding event in Roma, western Queensland, the QRF is adjusting, absorbing and adapting the design of Operation QUEENSLANDER, not only for Queensland’s reconstruction, but for additional environmental disasters, and political, economic, and social change.

In short, a well designed campaign supported by the QRF has set the platform for the Queensland government’s whole of state response in employing Operation QUEENSLANDER to adapt to unforseen and unfolding complex ill-structured problems.

What the ADF should do: For the employment of design in disaster relief operations in support of state governments, Defence should sustain ADF understanding and employment of this important concept. Like Operation QUEENSLANDER, all ADF operational challenges are plans in motion and therefore need critical and creative thinking to understand, visualise and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them.
IDEA 4: BEYOND WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO DISASTER RELIEF

For a small population such as Australia’s, whole of government operations are vital to ensure resources are effectively and efficiently coordinated to achieve specified missions and tasks. The primary advantage that whole of government operations provide government is unity of effort, whereby duplication of resources, capabilities and functions are avoided, while simultaneously achieving synergies in government services. The ADF strives to work with other government agencies in training and on operations and has effective working relationships with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Federal Police, and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). For domestic counter-terrorist arrangements the ADF has cooperative partnerships with state agencies and police services. 21

In developing Operation QUEENSLANDER, the ADF planners were able to move beyond extant whole of government arrangements, and utilise a whole of state approach to disaster relief. This whole of state approach, which included Commonwealth, state, business, peak body, non-government organisations, local government and community-based participation, is similar to the comprehensive approach. The comprehensive approach is well articulated by the UK Ministry of Defence in a 2006 publication of the same name. 22 For the United Kingdom, experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, made it evident that [whole of government policy] coherence could only be achieved if strategic processes, planning and objectives were harmonised across all [available] instruments and agencies. 23

As noted in Idea 1, in Queensland the whole of state approach was largely facilitated by the establishment of six whole of state sub-committees, which in Operation QUEENSLANDER are responsible for one of six lines of reconstruction. 24 As a result, ADF planners had ready access to a range of specialists and advisors beyond the usual whole of government arrangements. This access enabled agreement to Operation QUEENSLANDER, both within and outside the Queensland government, prior to release. In turn, this meant that after the release of Operation QUEENSLANDER, there was minimal disagreement with the plan’s fundamentals. Most importantly, the six whole of state sub-committees supporting Operation QUEENSLANDER retain an ability to adapt to the progressive reconnecting and
rebuilding of Queensland, while ensuring that processes and plans in Queensland are improved in preparation for future disaster events.

**What the ADF should do:** The ADF should sustain the development of whole of government coordination, at the Commonwealth and state–territory levels, in training and when deployed. Where possible the ADF should improve participation in whole of state, or whole of nation/comprehensive approach planning activities in order to prepare ADF officers for national responses to future challenges, including disaster relief operations.

**IDEA 5: MAINTAINING MOMENTUM – ESTABLISHING THE CAMPAIGN SEQUEL**

Operation QUEENSLANDER directs the conduct of reconstruction activities across three phases:


Phase 3 – transition, is the least developed aspect of Operation QUEENSLANDER, and sees a progressive hand over of reconstruction responsibilities to agencies or organisations including government, local government, community-based or industry led sectors that would normally support the functional area. [Phase 3 - transition] ends when all reconstruction responsibilities are handed over to relevant agencies.25

In late May 2011, some twenty months prior to the December 2012 phase change, the Queensland Reconstruction Authority’s planners, led by a Queensland Police Service officer who is also an Army Reserve officer, began to develop broad courses of action for Operation QUEENSLANDER, Phase 3 – transition.26 By commencing Phase 3 – transition courses of action development early, the planners sought to create an iterative and adaptive planning continuum in order to maintain the momentum of Operation QUEENSLANDER. In short, the planners were seeking to establish ideas for the campaign sequel beyond the life of the Queensland Reconstruction Authority, which is due to end in February 2013.

The planning for Phase 3 – transition, which includes regular input by strategic leadership from all six lines of reconstruction, is designed to set the conditions for
the completion of the final element of the Authority’s mission: reconnect, rebuild and improve Queensland, its communities and economy. To achieve improvements, the Authority has a mandate from the Queensland government to work fast, drive value for money in capital and non-capital projects, and to create a stronger, more resilient Queensland. The improvement of Queensland, its community and economy is not only a requirement of Operation QUEENSLANDER, but it is the implied campaign sequel beyond the life of the Operation QUEENSLANDER campaign, which ends in December 2013.

In particular, planning for Phase 3 - transition, concentrates on ensuring the Authority’s key outputs, including Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements coordination, governance, land use planning, reporting and performance measurement, information management, local government authority engagement, departmental coordination, donation management and strategic planning are integrated into post-Authority business practices. These business practices will, ultimately, involve agencies or organisations including government, local government, community-based or industry-led sectors.

**What the ADF should do:** The ADF should sustain campaign planning as a fundamental skill for ADF officers in their education at Australian Command and Staff College, and beyond. This educational emphasis ensures that ADF officers are predisposed to designing campaigns when faced with complex adaptive long-term operational problems. In addition, campaign planning education should instil restlessness in ADF officers so that they are never satisfied with the plan as written and agreed. In short, ADF campaign planning should comply with Eisenhower’s dictum:

> Plans are worthless, but planning is everything. There is a very great distinction because when you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one thing: the very definition of ‘emergency’ is that it is unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the way you are planning.  

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**IDEA 6: DOMESTIC DISASTERS – TEMPLATES AND TENSIONS**

For Operation QUEENSLANDER, the Authority and ADF planners received advice from past leaders of post-disaster planning and lessons learnt from other disaster events. This advice included lessons from international disaster events such as the 2005 Hurricane Katrina response in the United States, the Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority, which was established following the February 2009 Victorian
Understanding the complexities involved in post-disaster planning from past leaders and lessons from other disaster events are important to ADF planners for three reasons.

First, despite apparent dissimilarities between disasters, consultation with people who responded to other disaster events can identify fundamental ideas and principles for a new disaster event. For example, in early 2011 the senior leadership of the Victorian Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority briefed the Queensland Reconstruction Authority, provided a useful series of lessons, and seconded an experienced employee to support Queensland’s disaster response efforts.

Second, as identified in Idea 3 on the employment of design in disaster relief operations, ADF operational challenges are plans in motion and therefore need critical and creative thinking to understand, visualise and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them. Due to the complex nature of disasters, the response to other domestic disaster events cannot provide a template to design new post-disaster plans. However, lessons from previous disasters can assist in guiding planners as new plans and campaigns are created.

Third, the tension between what was done in previous disasters, and what is to be done in new and evolving disasters is real and must be seen by ADF planners as a legitimate input into the planning process. Planners will be time poor. They will face overwhelming advice from other disaster ‘experts’. Information will arrive in multiple forms from phone conversations, email, letters, rumour, websites, personal representation, the media, formal direction and post-activity reports. ADF planners must be prepared for this overwhelming influx of information. Take all information, including lessons learnt, and fuse it into the design process. Keep an open mind, there will be ideas that can assist in the design of new plans, and there will be ideas to avoid.

**What the ADF should do:** The ADF should *sustain* engagement with holders of post-disaster knowledge, including lessons learnt, so that ADF planners can quickly gather information in the design of post-disaster operations. ADF planners should understand that, at least initially, they will receive inputs and advice from multiple sources right at the time they are most time poor; accept this as a legitimate aspect of designing a response to complex problems, and take all inputs while avoiding templates between different post-disaster operations.
IDEA 7: DEFENCE AS A SUPPORTING AGENCY

Quite often the ADF is a lead agency in domestic and international operations. Regardless of lead agency status, when faced with a crisis, challenge or significant event, domestically or internationally, the ADF quickly establishes a Joint Task Force (JTF). A JTF ensures that command and control is unified and ADF capabilities are unambiguously assigned for a specified task and mission. Recent examples of JTFs in support of domestic events in Australia include: JTF 630, Operation LARRY ASSIST, North Queensland, 2006; JTF 636, Melbourne Commonwealth Games, 2006; JTF 634, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting, Sydney, 2007; JTF 637, Operation QUEENSLAND FLOOD ASSIST; and JTF 664, Operation YASI ASSIST supporting Queensland flood and cyclone events, 2011.

In Queensland in January–February 2011, the magnificent work by JTF 637 and JTF 664 in supporting Queenslanders facing severe flooding and cyclones was the key focus for ADF support to the Queensland government. In a less conspicuous development, Major General Mick Slater was, on 4 January 2011, seconded to the Queensland government and appointed Head – Flood Recovery Task Force. On 19 January 2011, the Queensland Reconstruction Authority was announced, with Major General Slater as the Chair and Mr Graeme Newton as the Chief Executive Officer.

As a result of the Flood Recovery Task Force and Queensland Reconstruction Authority arrangements, a JTF was not established by the ADF to support the development of Operation QUEENSLANDER. Instead, in addition to Major General Slater, the ADF seconded a small team of planners to the Queensland state government in January–February 2011 to assist in reconnecting, rebuilding and improving Queensland, its communities and economy.

Without a JTF to support the development of Operation QUEENSLANDER, Defence became a supporting agency to the Queensland government and government departments. The ADF presence was tiny, with a planning team of three assigned with sole responsibility for writing Operation QUEENSLANDER.28 Yet, this unusual arrangement worked for two reasons.

First, the Queensland government and government departments readily agreed to the presence of an ADF planning team. Initially, this agreement coincided with disaster response work conducted by JTF 637 and 664 which demonstrated ADF competence and capability. It was also as a result of Major General Slater’s ability to quickly develop a sound working relationship with the Queensland government, and
his partnership with Mr Graeme Newton. Finally, Queensland’s senior bureaucratic leadership, who were well organised and leading six lines of reconstruction sub-committees, quickly grasped the value a dedicated group of ADF planners could bring state recovery and reconstruction capabilities.

Second, ADF officers are well trained and this training allows rapid adaptation to changing circumstances. The three ADF planners who wrote Operation QUEENSLANDER deployed at short notice into circumstances of crisis to work for a state government of which they had peripheral knowledge and no experience; only one of the three planners resided in Queensland. These planners, through dint of their selection as ADF officers and subsequent single service and joint training, two for example as Australian Command and Staff College graduates, adapted to a new and complex environment to quickly write the State Plan. Training ADF officers is a serious and demanding process, and high training standards, as demonstrated in the development and writing of Operation QUEENSLANDER, are essential in supporting Australian national interests.

What the ADF should do: The ADF should sustain excellence in training to enable the development of adaptive officers who can design and plan in the most complex and demanding circumstances whether Defence leads or supports an operation.

IDEA 8: WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT PLANNING, WRITING AND LANGUAGE

Operation QUEENSLANDER amplified differences in whole of government planning, writing and language. The JMAP, while not perfect, has no observed equal for Commonwealth or state–territory government planners. Writing styles, including the content and context of government briefing notes, are not uniform between Commonwealth and state governments, or between state government departments. The language of planning and operations in the ADF is vastly different, and foreign, to state government departments.

None of these differences are impossible to overcome or absolute barriers, but uniformity in whole of government planning, writing and language will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of ADF support to disaster relief operations.

The JMAP, despite its focus on an enemy’s centre of gravity, was easily modified by planners. For example, the intent statements in Operation QUEENSLANDER moved from the military ‘purpose, method, and end state’ to a civilianised ‘why, how, and outcome’. Noting the requirement for JMAP modification, challenges such as Operation QUEENSLANDER indicate it is time for the JMAP to move to whole of government planning process: a Joint Inter-agency Appreciation Process.

Time is lost and plans are delayed when government officials are frozen through their inability to write, understand or develop briefing notes due to jurisdictional
nuances, archaic rules and procedures. An ADF officer, with a bias for action, can be stopped dead-cold by a bureaucrat defending the mysteries of a Commonwealth or state government administrative system.

In Operation QUEENSLANDER the ADF planners were guests. They had to modify their actions to comply with an existing culture, work practices, procedures and agendas. The experience was similar to ADF officers working in a United Nations or North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Headquarters. In these situations, ADF officers are rarely in charge, but they are always influential. Operation QUEENSLANDER was the same.

The shock of Queensland’s November 2010–February 2011 flood and cyclone-related events allowed the ADF planners to quickly get inside the central apparatus of government to plan, influence, affect and cajole, and then leave a framework for others to follow.

What the ADF should do: For whole of government planning, writing and language in support of state governments, Defence should fix ADF capabilities including the development of a Joint Inter-agency Appreciation Process and planning language. In addition, the ADF should lead the development of a guide to whole of government writing.

IDEA 9: THE VALUE OF MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

In terms of educating its people, the ADF is a generous employer. In the development of Operation QUEENSLANDER, ADF planners drew upon their ADF education and training to design and plan in a complex, changing and unusual environment while in a crisis situation. One citizen commented to the author, ‘finally, you can use your expensive military education to directly assist Australian people’.

This leads to two important points regarding the value of military education and training.

First, as ADF members we should ensure that we make the most, personally and professionally, of every education and training opportunity. ADF members are developed via a progressive and comprehensive system of Joint Professional Military Education Training. In contrast, people from other Commonwealth and state government agencies tend to experience ad hoc training opportunities, many of which are self-generated. Members of the ADF must never take education and training opportunities for granted.

Second, ADF education and training is not restricted to the classroom, firing range or field training area. The ADF experience in Operation QUEENSLANDER is an excellent example of the ADF seizing an opportunity to enhance its people’s education and training, outside formal education and training processes. As late as May 2011, the Queensland Reconstruction Authority comprised 11 per cent ADF personnel,
both full-time and part-time, including the Authority Chair, engineers, local government advisors, community engagement, administrative support, and planners. All of these personnel participated in work with the Authority for which they had not been specifically trained, and yet they were able to adapt and thrive in unusual and demanding circumstances. Importantly, the ADF personnel became fully integrated with the Authority, with the only distinguishing feature being that they wore an ADF uniform.

Significantly, the education provided to ADF personnel by their experience in the Authority will benefit those personnel and the ADF for many years. Exposure of ADF personnel to whole of state operations, local government authorities, complex urban planning challenges, non-ADF leadership styles and Commonwealth–State interactions are unique experiences, and will ultimately contribute to enhancing the ADF’s future capability to work in complex and demanding multiagency environments.

**What the ADF should do:** The ADF should *sustain* its comprehensive approach to professional military education and training in order to ensure ADF people are ready when called upon. ADF people should take full advantage of every education and training opportunity offered, including non-traditional training opportunities such as service with the Queensland Reconstruction Authority.

**IDEA 10: FUTURE OPERATIONS – WORKERS, THINKERS AND LEADERS.**

The development of Operation QUEENSLANDER in January–February 2011 by a small team of ADF planners confirmed that, for operational and strategic success, planning future operations requires a combination of workers, thinkers and leaders. For a week prior to the arrival of the ADF planning team, the then Flood Recovery Task Force had a number of workers—people working hard to do things, and some leaders—people providing guidance and vision to the workers. What was lacking was a dedicated group of thinkers—people whose sole purpose was to provide a strategic vision and a plan.

While none of these three groups is exclusive—that is workers can also be thinkers and leaders, and vice versa—the arrival of three ADF planners allowed Queensland and the Flood Recovery Task Force/Queensland Reconstruction Authority space to think. Without the ADF planners, Operation QUEENSLANDER would have been delayed due to workers and leaders being consumed with non-planning tasks.

… ADF planners drew upon their ADF education and training to design and plan in a complex, changing and unusual environment while in a crisis situation.
In essence, the ADF planners created a future operations cell for the state of Queensland. While Queensland’s leaders and communities were fully occupied with countering multiple natural disasters, the ADF planners looked to the future and relentlessly designed, wrote, briefed and socialised the State Plan—Queensland’s strategic reconstruction plan. As noted earlier, a key element of success in writing the State Plan was the six departmental-led whole of state sub-committees. In designing future operations for Queensland, a key role for the ADF planners was to work with the six departmental-led whole of state sub-committees to ensure their input, support and approval of Operation QUEENSLANDER.

What the ADF should do: The ADF should sustain a deployable future operations planning capability that provides thinkers who link workers and leaders in strategic and operational design. The temptation for organisations is to work hard on current problems. A dedicated team of people need to be separated from this temptation in order to enable them to plan for complex, evolving and long-term issues and challenges.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article is to articulate ten ideas for ADF support to disaster relief operations. These ideas are derived from the 2011 development of the strategic, operational and tactical plans for Operation QUEENSLANDER. Importantly, the ideas are designed to ensure the ADF can continue to fulfil Defence White Paper 2009 requirements to support disaster relief operations. In doing so, this article has identified three issues for the ADF to fix, one issue to improve and eight issues to sustain.

Three issues for the ADF to fix:
- ADF understanding of the business and operations of state and territory governments through a broader Defence to state–territory government education program;
- Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP) training so that ADF members are confident in the use of the JMAP, encouraged to use the JMAP for problem solving, and can lead JMAP planning teams; and,
- develop a Joint Inter-agency Appreciation Process complemented by whole of government language for planning.

One issue for the ADF to improve:
- ADF participation in whole of nation/comprehensive approach planning activities, in order to prepare ADF officers for national responses to future challenges, including disaster relief operations.
Eight issues for the ADF to sustain:

- post-disaster, immediate cooperation with appropriate state and territory governments and their departments in order to gain the best possible ongoing intelligence;
- ADF understanding and employment of design in seeking to understand, visualise and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them;
- development of whole of government coordination, at Commonwealth and state–territory levels, in training and when deployed;
- campaign planning as a fundamental skill for ADF officers in their education at Australian Command and Staff College and beyond. In addition, campaign planning education should instil a restlessness in ADF officers so that they are never satisfied with the plan as written and agreed;
- engagement with holders of post-disaster knowledge, including lessons learnt, so that ADF planners can quickly gather information in the design of post-disaster operations;
- excellence in training to enable the development of adaptive officers who can design and plan in the most complex and demanding circumstances. This includes circumstances where Defence leads or supports an operation;
- comprehensive professional military education and training in order to ensure ADF people are ready when called upon. ADF people should take full advantage of every education and training opportunity offered, including non-traditional training opportunities; and,
- deployable future operations planning capabilities that provide thinkers who link workers and leaders in strategic and operational design.

At present, the ADF is operationally focused and has significant elements of the force deployed away from Australia. In an era of persistent conflict, high force tempo and demand for ADF capabilities, including planners, is likely to remain. Therefore, all members of the ADF need to ensure that they are personally and professionally ready for a diverse range of challenges. To prepare for a diversity of challenges, this article describes ADF actions employed in the development of Operation QUEENSLANDER, and aims to assist ADF learning, improvement and adaptation.

ENDNOTES

2 Ibid., pp. 11, 62.
3 Ibid., p. 24
4 Operation Queenslander, The State Community, Economic and Environmental Recovery and Reconstruction Plan 2011–2013, Queensland Reconstruction Authority, 23 March


6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., p. 14. The small team of planners was led by Lieutenant Colonel Jim Hammett (Royal Australian Infantry Corps), and included Lieutenant Colonel Sue Graham (Royal Australian Corps of Transport) and Captain Evan Armstrong (Royal Australian Corps of Signals). Other ADF members who made significant contributions to Operation QUEENSLANDER, especially the Implementation and Local Plans include: Lieutenant Commander Jo Beadle, RAN, and Squadron Leader Alan Brown, RAAF. In addition, Queensland Police Service members, who are also Army Reserve Officers, made considerable contributions to Operation QUEENSLANDER, including: Superintendent Mark Plath (Colonel, Army Reserve), and Detective Senior Sergeant Steve Vokes (Lieutenant Colonel, Army Reserve).


10 The author is grateful to a colleague for providing key intellectual components for this paragraph.


13 The JMAP is a logical decision-making process that enables a rigorous analysis of all the relevant factors in a situation and the efficient coordination of all staff functions towards the development of the most appropriate plan of action. Australian

14 Defence White Paper 2009 - Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, p. 11, 62

15 Officers usually attend Australian Command and Staff College as lieutenant commanders (Navy), majors (Army), and squadron leaders (Air Force).

16 The advanced planning courses attended by ADF officers in the United States include: US Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (first attendance 1991–92, and now eighteen graduates); US Army School of Advanced Military Studies (first attendance 2000–01, and now nine graduates); US Army Advanced Operational Arts & Sciences Fellowship (first attendance 2007–08, and only one graduate); Joint Advanced Warfighting School (first attendance 2009–10, and only one Graduate); School of Advanced Air & Space Studies (first attendance 2006–07, and now three graduates). To date, no Australians have attended the US Navy’s Maritime Advanced Warfighting School which is a 13-month course providing officers in the ranks of lieutenant commander and major with planning knowledge, leadership skills, and advanced warfighting for follow-on assignments to operational planner billets. ‘NWC Graduates Maritime Advanced Warfighting School Students’, NNS090910-13, United States Navy, 9 October 2009, <http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=48193> accessed 31 August 2011.

17 Of these thirty-two planners, the author is aware that at least eight, or 25 per cent, have retired from the ADF.

18 Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process (Final Approved Draft), Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington DC, 2010, p. 3-1.


21 For example the ADF ‘could be called on to resolve a domestic terrorism incident in extreme cases where state police and emergency services do not have the capability to deal with that situation. ADF call-out could potentially involve the use of force, and such incidents could include recapturing buildings, freeing hostages, cordoning off areas or reacting to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive incident’. Quote by then Major General Ken Gillespie, ‘Official Committee Hansard, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Reference: Watching Brief On The War On Terrorism’, Monday, 9 December 2002, Canberra, p. 10. <http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/joint/committee/j6085.pdf> accessed 8 September 2011. General Gillespie was later Chief of the Australian Army 2008–11.


23 Ibid., pp. 1-1, 1-2.
Whole of Government

Brigadier Chris Field

24 Six lines of reconstruction: human and social, economic, environment, building recovery, roads and transport, and community liaison and communication.


26 Detective Senior Sergeant Steve Vokes (Lieutenant Colonel, Army Reserve).


28 The ADF planning team members are outlined in footnote 7.


30 The author, for example, is privileged to have been given eight years of professional military education and training by the ADF in twenty-seven years of service: officer cadet, four years; junior officer career and specialist courses, one year; command and staff college and school of advanced warfighting, two years; higher defence college, one year.

31 Quote from a conversation between a citizen and the author, January 2011.


The Author

The then Colonel Chris Field was Chief Operations and Plans, Queensland Reconstruction Authority, January–June 2011.
MILITARY HISTORY

THE BATTLE OF PINIOS GORGE

A STUDY OF A BROKEN ANZAC BRIGADE

CRAIG STOCKINGS

ABSTRACT

The Battle of Pinios Gorge was a key 'rearguard' action fought by Australian and New Zealand troops against a German enemy from 17–18 April 1941 during the ill-fated Greek campaign. The purpose of this investigation of events at Pinios is threefold. First, it provides a detailed forensic account of an important yet little known 'Anzac' battle. Second, it seeks to counter a number of mistaken interpretations, which have grown from the scant body of non-operationally oriented literature that has thus far concerned itself with the engagement. Last, for professional military practitioners it is an important historical case study of a brigade under pressure, and defeated. More lessons are often learnt from analysing failure than studying success.

The Pinios Gorge, otherwise known as the historic 'Vale of Tempe', lies on the eastern coast of Greece. It was the site of an important action fought by Australian and New Zealand troops against a German enemy from 17–18 April 1941. This battle was one of the most operationally significant and intensive 'rearguard' engagements fought by the Anzac Corps throughout the ill-fated Greek campaign. This corps, as part of W Force, the larger British and
Dominion commitment to Greece in early 1941, was progressively deployed in the first week of March that year for the purpose of assisting the Greeks against an increasingly obvious and imminent German invasion, eventually launched on 6 April. The ensuing campaign in Greece lasted just over three weeks and ended with a complete German victory during which W Force retreated some 430 kilometres in ten days. By 20 April, when it was clear that it could do no more than slow the German advance, the Greek government agreed that this expeditionary force should be evacuated. The withdrawal began on the beaches of Attica and the Peloponnese four days later. Over the next five nights around 50,000 Allied troops departed the Greek mainland. The fact that such an unexpectedly large proportion of W Force managed to evacuate, given that senior British officers had earlier predicted that a third of the force would be lucky to escape, was in no small part a consequence of events at Pinios Gorge.

The purpose of this investigation of events at Pinios is threefold. First, it provides a detailed account and forensic analysis of an important yet little known ‘Anzac’ battle in the early stages of the Second World War. Second, in seeks to counter a number of mistaken explanations or interpretations that have grown from the scant body of non-operationally oriented literature that has thus far concerned itself with the battle. Last but not least, for a professional military audience it is an important historical case study of a composite Australian/New Zealand brigade under pressure, and defeated. More lessons are often learnt from analysing failure than studying success.

In terms of operational context, the first six days of the German invasion of Greece did not actually involve any substantial fighting on the part W Force. Rather, the initial German thrust from bases in Bulgaria (in conjunction with simultaneous advances into Yugoslavia) was directed against the Greek defenders of the Metaxas Line—a 155-kilometre long chain of fortifications constructed along the line of the Greco-Bulgarian border and named after the former Greek dictator. The first time Imperial troops actually came to grips with the Germans was in a sharp battle fought at Kleidi Pass between 12–13 April. This engagement was a consequence of early and serious Yugoslavian collapse which exposed northern Greece to invasion on the axis of the ‘Monastir Gap’—a valley running from Monastir in the north to the Greek city of Florina, 13 kilometres south of the Yugoslavian border. German troops streaming down this passage threatened to flank the W Force line to the east, and as a consequence the 19th Australian Brigade, along with flanking Greek formations, was rushed northwards to plug the gap at Kleidi. The subsequent engagement...
The Battle of Pinios Gorge did not go well for the Allies. By the evening of 13 April the forward elements of Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Regiment, followed by vanguard elements of the 9th Panzer Division, had broken the Australian line and were headed south. The defenders managed to escape, bruised and bloodied, in what was best described as less than an orderly withdrawal.¹

After the W Force ‘delaying action’ at Kleidi Pass, what followed was a nervous period of consolidation for W Force as it attempted to hold German probing attacks against a series of defended passes along the Aliakmon Line, while plans were developed to withdraw much further south to a new line at Thermopylae. Pinios Gorge was the easternmost of these ‘passes’, and a crucial one. The chances of W Force successfully withdrawing to the Thermopylae Line were in many ways predicated on holding the western exit of the gorge until the morning of 19 April, after which time threat to the bottleneck at Larissa, a town to its immediate south, would have passed and a critical situation would have been saved. At the same time, the potential of cracking the defenders in this location, and this cutting-off a large proportion of W Force from moving south through Larissa, represented a significant opportunity for the Germans.

In terms of geography the ‘gorge’ in question is formed where the Pinios River, on its way to the sea, cuts through the coastal mountain range, to the south-east of Mount Olympus. The village of Tempe stands at its western end. The Ancient Greeks thought the area, covered in April with hyacinths and cyclamens, inhabited by gods. The gorge was a traditional and historical avenue for an invader moving south along this part of the Greek coast. The ruins of old fortresses thus abounded. In 1941, both a railway and a road used the gorge to cross inland from the coast and connect with Larissa. In order to protect Larissa long enough for W Force to withdraw through the choke point it represented, the 16th Australian Brigade under Brigadier ‘Tubby’ Allen, minus the 2/1st Battalion but with the 21st New Zealand Battalion under its command, was rushed into position to block German movement through the gorge.

Under generally overcast skies and rain, bearing down on Pinios Gorge were leading elements from both the 2nd Panzer Division (following up along the coast from Plantamon) and the vanguard battalion of the 6th Mountain Division, moving southwards over the Olympus foothills towards the village of Gonnos, near the western exit of the gorge. Both German groups received orders during 17 April to get to Larissa before W Force could pass through it.² This task, however, was not at all straightforward. The easternmost of the 2nd Panzer Division’s battle groups at
The Battle of Pinios Gorge once began, with considerable earthworks and blasting, the difficult task of transporting vehicles across the mountain spurs and improved cart tracks towards the eastern entrance of the gorge. The leading German tank company had a very difficult descent at this point. Time after time tracks came off along narrow mule paths and the company did not reach the bottom of the ridge to the north of the gorge until midday. There it carried on along the railway track paralleling the coast. From here the country all the way up to the eastern entrance to Pinios Gorge was reported clear, and early in the afternoon the leading tanks were at the eastern mouth of the gorge. As all the bridges across the Pinios River in this location had been destroyed, the German armoured troops (led by the 1st Battalion, 3rd Armoured Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel K von Decker) proceeded west along railway tracks on the north side of the river. At about halfway along the length of the gorge, von Decker’s leading tanks found their way blocked on the railway line by two blown tunnels. The tank column was momentarily halted. Wheeled vehicles could not yet be brought up and the tank crews, soon accompanied by infantry patrols, were ‘entirely without supplies’. This problem was only partially solved by airdrops and use of small boats off the coast east of Olympus to ferry stores forward.

Meanwhile, slightly to the west, at around midday, 17 April, the vanguard company of the leading battalion of the 6th Mountain Division (the 3rd Battalion, 143rd Regiment) began arriving at Gonnos, after having moved across the southern slopes of Olympus using mountain trails. The Greek inhabitants immediately informed them of British patrols on south bank of Pinios. The German divisional commander, Brigadier Ferdinand Schörner, ordered the rest of the 3rd Battalion to rush at best speed to Gonnos to open the gorge from the west. After a short rest, at 3.00pm the remainder of the 143rd Regiment resumed its exhaustive climb. Behind it, the 141st Regiment began its move into the hills well to the north. Schörner himself arrived at Gonnos at 4.00pm and later described the trek to this village as the most difficult task his men had yet faced. Again, food and supplies were scarce and were either dropped by air to the mountaineers or acquired on the march.

As the leading elements of the 2nd Panzer and the 6th Mountain Divisions closed in on the gorge, during the morning of 17 April, with Brigadier Allen still en route, Lieutenant Colonel F O Chilton (2/2nd Battalion) and N L Macky (21st New Zealand Battalion) prepared their planned blocking position. According to Pliny, when the ancient Greeks had occupied the same position in an attempt to halt Xerxes’ march...
on Athens they decided to abandon Pinios Gorge before battle in favour of making a stand at Thermopylae. Their central reasoning was any blocking position in this area, while effective in the gorge itself, was vulnerable to flanking by an advance from the southern ridges of Mt Olympus. The ancients saw it was possible for an invader to approach Tempe, or begin an encirclement of the western flank, by movement from the coast through various mountain villages to Gonnos—just as the 6th Mountain Division was now doing. For Chilton and Macky, however, withdrawal was not an option. Both men thus began the day with a combined reconnaissance as far west as a roadblock placed by the New Zealanders within the gorge. Macky suggested that pending Brigadier Allen’s arrival the entire force go under his command. Chilton refused. The two men did agree, however, that Macky’s battalion should deploy east of Tempe village on high ground on sharp ridges on the south bank of the gorge (culminating in Mt Ossa) and with a company within the gorge itself, in order to prevent the Germans from driving through it from the north-east. For its part the 2/2nd Battalion would take a position in depth on the western slopes of the same heights at the western exit of the gorge, with the added responsibility of protecting the left flank of the position from any infantry attack across the Pinios River south of Gonnos. Four anti-tank guns were sighted with the New Zealanders, with one covering a position in depth near Tempe village. At this stage a battery of 25-pounders was tasked with establishing observation posts to allow for observed shooting on the roadblock, within the 21st (NZ) Battalion position, and along the Pinios River. Weapon pits were dug and good use made of low stone walls in the area. There was no wire, however, nor any anti-tank mines. Sappers placed naval depth charges at the culverts on the pass, to be blown in case of a hurried withdrawal.6

At 1.00pm, 17 April, Allen arrived and assumed command, immediately informing Chilton that the 2/3rd Battalion (minus some trucks which had lost contact with the unit and mistakenly drove on to Larissa), and eleven carriers from the 2/5th and 2/11th Battalions, were already rushing to reinforce the Pinios position. Allen spent the rest of the afternoon trying to hastily arrange his defences, which were shaped entirely by terrain. The gorge itself was narrow, steep-sided and around 10 kilometres long. The fast flowing river within it was 30–40 metres wide. A railway (currently being followed by von Decker’s tanks) travelled along the north side of the river and a road along the south. At the western edge of the gorge both the railway, after crossing the river, and the road swung south to Larissa. Expecting the Germans to appear at any stage, and disturbed about the
small number of troops he had available to defend such a large, extended front, Allen accepted the deployments he found rather than attempting to change them in any significant way. He ordered a platoon of the arriving 2/3rd Battalion to ‘thicken up’ the centre of the 2/2nd Battalion, and sent a company of the same unit (detailed under Chilton’s command) to the 2/2nd Battalion’s left flank. Nonetheless, a gap of some 2700 metres still existed on this flank that could be covered only by patrols. Two field guns were rushed forward and placed in an anti-tank role. The rest of the 2/3rd Battalion was used to defend astride the road to Larissa some kilometres south of Tempe, to patrol nearby roads lest the Germans attempt a flanking move on Larissa from the north-east, and to form a small reserve. On confirmation of his task Allen replied to his divisional commander, Major General Iven Mackay, that, ‘I can do no more than my best.’

Despite the weaknesses of Allen’s force, Pinios Gorge was naturally a strong defensive position. Any attack, even from west of the barrier of the gorge itself, still needed to cross a significant river. The constricted terrain also offered opportunities for the defenders to delay an advance to their position. Such demolitions had, after all, already halted von Decker’s tanks at the blocked railway tunnel on the north side of the gorge. A proportion of the Germans’ tankmen then tried to cross to the road on the south bank of the gorge but could not easily ford the river. In the afternoon a successful attempt was made to swim a Panzer Mk II across, cheered on by German spectators. Four more tanks crossed in this way, but two others were lost in the river. A separate party of tanks attempted to bypass the tunnel demolitions by moving on the north side of the gorge but they were held up by swampy ground.

Frustrated at the lack of progress, at 4.00pm von Decker ordered the cycle squadron of 112th Reconnaissance Unit (which, with the cavalry squadron of the same unit, had been detached from the 6th Mountain Division’s advance guard and re-attached to the 1st Battalion, 3rd Panzer Regiment), forward of the blocked tunnel. At 5.00pm, just past the tunnel, the squadron was engaged by machine gun fire from the New Zealand roadblock. The German cyclists immediately deployed to attack. With almost no cover, however, and badly exposed, they were forced back to the tunnel. At that point one of the German tanks, which had managed to cross to the south side of the river, arrived and engaged the roadblock, forcing the New Zealanders manning it to retire. A little later Chilton sent one of his platoons to patrol the lower eastern portion of gorge as far as the roadblock position. As it arrived on the scene it was pinned by fire from the roadblock from a small party
of soldiers of the German 8/800th Special Unit, which had now joined the troop of German tanks on the south bank of the river. The Australian platoon was unable to break away until nightfall and lost a number killed and wounded. Chilton’s pleas to Macky to assist them elicited no response from his headquarters, or from the New Zealand platoon which had originally been manning the roadblock. Allied artillery, however, prevented any German attempts to infiltrate much past the blocked tunnel on the north side of the river for the rest of the afternoon. At one point the German cycle company managed to crawl around 800 metres forward, but was called back by von Decker to the railway tunnel as night fell. A German tank column several kilometres long patiently lined up behind the tunnel in the darkness.11

Meanwhile, at Allen’s headquarters attention was focused northwards as reports had been arriving all afternoon on 17 April of Germans in the heights above Gonnos. It was therefore decided to despatch a fighting patrol in a small boat found by the left hand company of the 2/2nd Battalion across the river to see if there were indeed any Germans in Gonnos and in the foothills between this village and Tempe, north of the river. This patrol returned 2.00am, after eight hours of investigations, to report that Germans were not only in Gonnos, but also in the nearby villages of Rapsani and Ambelakia, and the ground in between. More enemy troops were moving towards Elea, further to the west. Three Australians left to guard the punt had in fact been attacked but had fought off a German patrol. During the night the centre and left hand companies of Chilton’s battalion patrolled the south bank of the river to their fronts and exchanged fire with Germans on the other side thought to be conducting reconnaissance. Harassing Allied artillery fire was laid to the north-east of the New Zealanders and on German parties showing lights in the vicinity of Gonnos. This fire was surprisingly effective. In one bombardment von Decker’s tank battalion and patrols from the 8/800th Regiment lost more than twenty killed and wounded. The rest of Allen’s men spent the night trying to improve their defences, building sangers and digging slit trenches.12

For their part the German mountaineers closing up to the north of the river also spent the night preparing for the new day. During its move to Gonnos the 143rd Mountain Regiment was given warning order at 7.50pm for an attack over the Pinios River early the next morning. This was clarified further at 9.30pm when the German 18th Corps headquarters ordered cooperation between the 6th Mountain and the 2nd Panzer Divisions in clearing the Pinios Gorge as fast as possible in order to make an early push on Larissa. At 10.30pm Schörner issued his own orders. His division’s part in the
coming attack would be mounted by two battalions of the 143rd Mountain Regiment. It was to begin with feint attack (by fire only) supported by artillery mounted against the defending troops in the Tempe area by the 1st Battalion at 7.00am from an assemble area south-east of Gonnos. Then, at 7.30am, the 3rd Battalion of the same regiment would make a genuine attack through the western flank of the 2/2nd Battalion, before exploiting along the road to Larissa. After the 3rd Battalion had gained its objective, the 1st Battalion was to cross river and push to Larissa east of the main road. The combined two-battalion objective was the destruction of defending forces on south bank of the Pinios thereby opening up the gorge and the Larissa Road. Meanwhile, the 2nd Company (1st Battalion), the division’s original advance guard, with engineers attached, was placed under Schörner direct command and directed to cross the Pinios further to the west. Covered by the 3rd Battalion’s attack, this company was to proceed with a special task of advancing over the western slopes of the Erimin mountains towards the Larissa Road with the purpose of getting behind the defender’s lines and blocking the road short of Larissa against withdrawal by Allen’s force. The coming attack by the mountaineers would be the first time they faced ‘English’ troops, rather than Greeks. For its part, von Decker’s tank battalion, along with the two squadrons of the 112th Reconnaissance Unit and the detachment of 8/800th Special Unit in the vicinity of the tunnel were ordered to push on westwards through the gorge at first light.13

The new day dawned at Pinios clear and fine. The attacking units of the 6th Mountain Division, the 1st and 3rd Battalions (143rd Mountain Regiment), had only arrived complete in the Gonnos area during the night. Most German soldiers thus had only a few hours rest before moving up to their assembly areas at first light. Company and platoon orders were given at daybreak and the infantrymen moved to their assembly areas. At 6.30am Allied artillery began to fall on Gonnos and within the German 1st Battalion’s assembly area. At 7.00am the forward posts of Chilton’s 2/2nd Battalion spotted German infantrymen of this battalion, moving down the slopes from Gonnos towards the Pinios River. The volume of Allied shelling increased, and as the German troops approached the river they received heavy fire from D Company, 2/2nd Battalion, in the hills slightly to the east, and from the composite carrier platoon (of 2/5th and 2/11st Battalion carriers) operating from the southern bank of the river. After a prolonged machine gun duel, by 10.00am the German feint attack had moved forward to around 500 metres north of the river but had halted. Reconnaissance found the river to their front impassable to the German infantrymen, most of whom could not swim, and there was no immediate means to make a crossing. Unaware this attack was only a feint, Chilton later claimed ‘success’ at preventing the river crossing at this point.14 The aim of distracting the Australians from the advance of the 3rd Battalion to their west had, however, already largely been achieved.15
Meanwhile, the main (3rd Battalion) German attack from Gonnos had begun. The battalion was two kilometres north-west of the Chilton’s position by 6.50am. Patrols were despatched. One went to the village Parapotamos, to the forward–left flank of the 2/2 Battalion, after crossing the river in a boat they had found. Soon after, an Australian patrol sent to investigate the village came under sharp fire. A carrier patrol sent into the same area made contact with the German detachment in this village, and after taking casualties from mortar fire, established itself (dismounted) on this flank. Meanwhile, the bulk of the German 3rd Battalion assembled for its river crossing and attack. The Germans began to trickle across the Pinios from 7.45am with the aid of a captured boat and from midday by a ferry of two boats. By 10.30am the Australian defenders in the vicinity of Parapotamos village were broken and retreated to high ground towards the south. At 11.00am Schörner personally ordered the artillery in support of the 3rd Battalion to take on a direct-fire assault gun role against the nearest Australian company positions (D Company, 2/2nd Battalion and C Company, 2/3rd Battalion) holding positions south of Parapotamos. Under such fire, Chilton’s left-hand positions were gradually becoming encircled from the west. By 11.30am the Australians on this flank were all but surrounded on three sides. The 2/2nd Battalion’s own carrier platoon sent forward to clear the river immediately to front of D Company, engaged the left flank of the German battalion at the river but could not stop it. Just before midday D Company, 2/2nd Battalion sent another patrol to Parapotamos and found it still strongly held by the by Germans. 16

By midday the feint attack by the German 1st Battalion was ordered to transform itself into a full-blown assault. The unit was ordered to cross the river by all available means to the south-west of Tempe to open a direct path out of the gorge for the 2nd Panzer Division group. German infantry companies advanced line abreast, by platoon, with short intervals in between. By 1.00pm this crossing was well underway and despite considerable defensive shell, mortar and withering machine gun fire on the river and its northern bank, and 30 metres of fast flowing river, the first company was across and formed a beachhead. Over the next 90 minutes the remainder of the battalion crossed, savaged by Australian mortars and by A and C Companies, 2/2nd Battalion, on the high ground south of the river. The obstacle had been crossed, but at significant cost, with German bodies and broken rafts drifting downstream. Nonetheless, the 1st Battalion, now on the southern bank, quickly reorganised and prepared to attack. By this time the rest of the 143rd Regiment (less the 1st Battalion)
had been ordered to follow the 3rd Battalion across the Pinios at Parapotamos and continue its attack along towards Larissa.\textsuperscript{17}

As the German 1st Battalion began pushing across the Pinios, to Chilton's surprise troops from the 21st (NZ) Battalion began flowing through his headquarters location in unformed groups, some without equipment—clearly things had not been going well for Mackey in the gorge to the east. Efforts to convince the fleeing New Zealanders to stay, even by Lieutenant Colonel G B Parkinson in command of the 4th (NZ) Field Regiment, generally failed. Only one New Zealand platoon managed to regroup and report to Chilton for further tasking. It was despatched to reinforce the centre of the battalion's position. As they passed through the 2/2nd Battalion Macky's soldiers reported that German tanks and infantry had driven them off their positions and that they had received orders to withdraw 'independently'. To this point Macky had not informed Chilton or Allen he had even been under attack, let alone that he intended to retire. Contact had abruptly ceased just before midday with no explanation or permission for closing his radio down. Macky's last words were: 'Tanks are through the village [Tempe] and we are withdrawing to the hills.'\textsuperscript{18}

Chilton's C Company on his right flank immediately south-east of Tempe village soon confirmed the New Zealander's flight. Chilton warned the company to alert the anti-tank gun covering the southern exit of the gorge at Tempe but it had already departed without firing a shot.\textsuperscript{19}

The pressure on the 21st (NZ) Battalion had in fact begun, as it had on the 2/2nd Battalion to its west, at dawn. In this case, however, it was not from Schörner's mountaineers but the leading elements of the 2nd Panzer Division group continuing their push through the Pinios Gorge from the east. At first light the cycle squadron of 112th Reconnaissance Unit renewed its attack westward along the northern bank of the gorge. At first the cyclists met less resistance than the day before and they made significant progress before being halted by heavy enfilade fire from New Zealand machine guns, mortars and artillery from hills on the south bank of Pinios. German mortars and guns answered with a light bombardment, although the former were interrupted by Allied artillery fire. Although this German squadron, duelling with the main 21st (NZ) Battalion from across the gorge, posed little immediate threat to Macky's battalion, throughout the morning he worried hard about the sounds of battle in the vicinity of the 2/2nd Battalion to his left flank. Macky was soon convinced that a serious German attack was threatening his left rear. He called a morning conference and told his subordinates that, if overwhelmed, they were to disperse. This order was contrary

\textbf{By midday the feint attack by the German 1st Battalion was ordered to transform itself into a full-blown assault.}
to earlier instructions given to the unit to stay in place for as long as possible and to fall back and form a second line if required. With perilous communications Macky’s orders left individual company commanders to decide exactly when to retreat.\textsuperscript{20}

The most dangerous effect of the advance of the 112th Reconnaissance Unit’s cycle squadron was not its fire, but the fact that during the morning it occupied the full attention of the 21st (NZ) Battalion and its artillery. The New Zealanders were fixated on the German cyclists across the gorge and were not, therefore, looking east in the area of their original platoon roadblock. The problem was that after those manning the roadblock had been forced to retire the previous day, high ridges meant that Macky had no way of knowing what was happening in this area. No patrols were sent to observe it. No observation positions were deployed to cover it. As a consequence the Germans were able to send further detachments of infantry from the 8/800th Special Unit, and small groups from the 7th Battalion, 304th Regiment, across the river to the south bank to clear the roadblock unobserved. This task was complete by midday, freeing up the advance of the detachment of six German tanks that had managed to ford the river the previous day. The tanks rolled at 12.15pm on the south bank of the gorge and were soon engaging the right flank of 21st (NZ) Battalion. A desperate engagement followed. German tanks duelled with the anti-tank guns within the New Zealand position. German armour and infantry behind it then engaged Macky’s exposed positions on the forward slopes of the southern bank of the gorge. The eastern-most NZ companies were soon pushed back, isolating the anti-tank gun positions that subsequently fell. As the three surviving German tanks moved slowly along the road below the battalion, indirect artillery fire halted their further progress for around two hours. However, with German tanks just below them and German infantry still firing from the other side of the gorge, the New Zealanders began to fall back. Coordination was lost with the many gullies and ravines making it difficult to collect the scattered fragments of the battalion. Though some positions continued to hold on higher up the ridge, the unit lost its cohesion. These were the parties withdrawing through the 2/2nd Battalion, declaring German armour was moving up the gorge behind them. Most of the New Zealand battalion, however, was withdrawing in packets south and south-east up the slopes of Mount Ossa to their rear.\textsuperscript{21}

In the meantime, with New Zealand defensive fire slackening, the leading elements of 2nd Panzer Division continued pushing through the gorge. More of von Decker’s tanks were emerging and about to break out into open ground west of
Tempe. At this point the Germans were cautious, however, and took time clearing the gorge. Tanks and infantry moving along the south bank did not occupy Tempe until 3.00pm. The cyclists of the 112th Reconnaissance Unit, still scrambling along the north bank and engaging the retiring New Zealanders where possible, did not ford the river and reach the village until 3.30pm. Nonetheless, with the New Zealanders now effectively out of the fight, the 2/2nd Battalion faced not only frontal attack from German mountain troops but now German armour approaching from its right flank.22

Just after 3.00pm, with Tempe secured, preparations for a concerted German attack were begun against Chilton’s battalion. A little further to the south, Allen’s headquarters was bombed for 30 minutes by around thirty-five German aircraft. Next, German tanks from Tempe drove towards Chilton’s eastern (C Company) position, while their supporting infantry spread over the ridges previously occupied by the New Zealanders.23 What followed for the 2/2nd Battalion was a chaotic and desperate sort of struggle by companies and platoons. Chilton lost communications with his left forward company (D Company) after ordering it to mount a counterattack against German troops seeking to flank his position to the west. At around 4.00pm a badly worded order from Headquarters 2/3rd Battalion to its company (C Company), situated close to Chilton’s left forward company, led to a premature withdrawal of both. When firing ceased on that flank Chilton incorrectly assumed both companies had been overrun. With the premature withdrawal of these companies Chilton’s left flank was now wide open. The forward anti-tank guns supporting his battalion now began receiving small arms fire, as did Chilton’s headquarters.24

By 5.00pm the situation for the 2/2nd Battalion had deteriorated even further. Allen managed to contact Chilton with instructions to hold his position until 3.00am, but hoped to be able move this time forward. Freyberg also spoke briefly to Chilton from Allen’s headquarters wanting to know the whereabouts of the New Zealand battalion and if he could speak to Macky. Chilton reported this as impossible. The line went dead soon after this and no more communications were made between Allen’s headquarters and the 2/2nd Battalion. At 5.30pm a liaison officer was despatched by Allen to Chilton with new orders to thin out and break contact as soon as it was dark. The liaison officer returned to Allen at 7.00pm, however, with the news that he could not get through to Chilton’s headquarters.25
Meanwhile, the Germans of the 1st Battalion, 143rd Regiment, began advancing from their newly won bridgehead and began attacking the hills to the south-east. In the face of stubborn resistance the unit made slow progress. It was not until 6.30pm that the attackers broke into the remaining 2/2nd Battalion positions after intensive hand-to-hand fighting. The small village of Evangelismos fell, and the attackers were now reinforced by the 2nd Battalion of the same regiment that had been rushed across the river. Still further west the 3rd Battalion pushed further around Chilton’s exposed left flank. Schörner, thinking of exploitation, ordered whole of his division forward across Pinios during the evening to continue the pursuit.²⁶

As the mountaineers attacked the Australians in the late afternoon they were joined by the first of von Decker’s light tanks, which had by now passed through Tempe. As they had proceeded west through the Pinios Gorge, each German tank had dragged a trailer carrying a section of infantrymen (mostly from the 7th Battalion, 304th Infantry Regiment), while more infantry followed on behind. Chilton’s C Company on the right soon reported tanks had broken into its position and that it was taking fire from infantry on the high ground in the old New Zealand position. The German tanks in this area drew up stationary for around 30 minutes firing machine guns and cannon. The C Company infantry pits replied with small arms, but without effect. The company was forced to withdraw shortly after 5.30pm. The departure of C Company now meant A Company, in the centre, which had been engaging Germans crossing river since 3.00pm, was now faced attack from its right rear. At 5.55pm two tanks began to press its right flank. Soon after another ten pressed forward against it, supported by infantry. This company, by now out of contact with Chilton, was also forced to withdraw. Thus at around 6.00pm, after further delay imposed predominantly by Allied artillery fire, the 2nd Panzer Division tank/infantry force at last broke free of the mouth of the gorge and moved into open ground to the west. Around twenty-six German tanks in total subsequently deployed south of the river astride the road to Larissa. By 6.30pm this force, in conjunction with the mountaineers, had broken the remaining 2/2nd Battalion company positions and forced the survivors to withdraw. Chilton’s headquarters was by now receiving fire from its front, from the direction of Tempe, and from the old left flank D Company positions now occupied by the Germans (which included an assault gun). The 2/2nd Battalion was by now all but finished.²⁷

The Germans moving from the east out of the gorge were, however, still cautious of their losses and moved forward slowly, delayed at every point by Allied artillery
batteries that were leapfrogging to the rear firing, often over open sights as they went. By 6.45pm their creeping advance converged with the mountaineers south of Evangelismos, where Chilton’s headquarters and its last remaining company position (B Company) stood. The only remaining anti-tank gun in this area, sited 60 metres from Chilton’s headquarters, had departed once again without orders. Tanks were approaching from the north and infantry from the north-west. Germans were also seen to the left-rear in foothills across the flat. B Company was finally ordered to withdraw. Five minutes later, with his headquarters group of around seventy men engaged by German infantry and tanks from 40–200 metres away, Chilton gave the final order to extract all his remaining troops. From this point until darkness fell, small parties of Australians clambered into the nearby hills east and west of the road to Larissa chased by streams of bullets and mortar bombs from the German tanks and infantrymen below. Many parties reformed in nearby hills that night, and by the end of the next day the main group of survivors consisted of twelve officers and 140 ranks from the 2/2nd Battalion as well as seven officers and 120 ranks from the 21st (NZ) Battalion. Chilton was not with them. Eventually this group reached the coast 6 kilometres south of Koritza and waited two days for a Royal Navy pick-up that never came. From this point the large group split into small parties owing to the difficulty of obtaining food, and the idea that small groups had a better chance of escape. Most went south and sought boats. By 25 April the largest party had reached Skiatos Island and from there sailed to Chios Island. The single largest single group of 122 men from Pinios eventually reached Crete on 5 May.28

As German tanks broke out of the Pinios Gorge, Allen was ready to implement a hasty plan to delay further German advances. His orders were still to deny Larissa to the Germans until 3.00am, 19 April as the roads through the town were reserved until 1.00am for the withdrawal of the 6th (NZ) Brigade. With few alternatives Allen now planned to accomplish this mission as a fighting withdrawal. He had lost the 21st (NZ) Battalion, and most of the 2/2nd Battalion had been cut off and dispersed. In response he first redeployed his headquarters and what guns could be gathered to a road-rail junction south of Makrikhori, mindful that there were several points along the route back to Larissa where further blocking forces could be placed. Allen was at this point still confident that the Germans could be held until nightfall, when the job would be much easier. He had already ordered Lieutenant Colonel DJ Lamb, commanding the 2/3rd Battalion, to prepare a rearguard line around 10 kilometres south-west of Tempe at a set of crossroads. In addition to preparing his own

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Around twenty-six German tanks in total subsequently deployed south of the river astride the road to Larissa.
companies, Lamb was to ‘forcibly hold all guns particularly anti-tank guns—that tried to get through from the forward lines, and also to grab all other troops he saw and make use of them.’\(^{29}\) This included the two companies that had mistakenly withdrawn from the left flank of the 2/2nd Battalion and any straggling New Zealanders. By 6.00pm a force of around three infantry companies, the surviving carriers, and a recently arrived squadron of NZ cavalrymen were set on Lamb’s first fallback line. Allen’s artillery, including detachments that had pulled out of the forward positions without orders, was re-deployed by Lamb behind this screen. Closing on this blocking force was the leading tank company of von Decker’s 1st Battalion, 3rd Panzer Regiment, now supported by elements of the 2nd Battalion, 304th Infantry Regiment. Slightly to the west but on the same axis, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 141st Regiment, had taken over from the units of the 143rd Regiment as the vanguard of the 6th Mountain Division.\(^{30}\)

At around 6.30am Allen’s hastily deployed rearguard position was attacked by five German tanks moving astride the road. A hail of ineffective small arms greeted them from his infantry force before two New Zealand 25-pounders were moved up into the line to engage the tanks over open sights. In the ensuing duel two tanks and one gun were lost before the artillerymen, without ammunition, withdrew with their wounded. The remaining German tanks formed up and continued forward. At that moment a squadron of German aircraft appeared and strafed Allen’s infantrymen and carriers who fired back with their small arms and Bren guns. The tanks pressed forward in the half-light of dusk and broke into the defending infantry positions. At one point 15–20 Australians reputedly surrounded a German tank and rather ineffectively persisted in pouring small arms fire into it. Two Australian soldiers were crushed in their pits by German tank tracks. Nor did the Boys rifles of the New Zealand cavalymen slow the Germans before they too were forced to retire. With heavy German mortar fire now falling, at 9.00pm the helpless and disheartened infantrymen began to stagger backwards, or into the hills on each side of the road, and the line was broken. An officer Australian attached to Allen’s headquarters described how ‘suddenly, everybody seemed to become panic stricken and the one object appeared to be to get away.’\(^{31}\) Both D Company (2/2nd Battalion) and C Company (2/3rd Battalion) had thus withdrawn for the second time without orders. The carriers and artillery followed them. Only B Company, 2/3rd Battalion, held in position until ordered to move. At this point Lieutenant Colonel Lamb took control and reformed the withdrawing parties of infantrymen 1200 metres further south, again astride the road to Larissa in the darkness. They were soon joined by

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The single largest single group of 122 men from Pinios eventually reached Crete on 5 May.
Allen’s headquarters, artillery detachments and the remaining carriers. The men lay once again in the darkness, close enough to touch each other. What was left of Allen’s transport was placed only a few hundred yards to the rear. 32

Within minutes of Lamb’s hastily arranged second rearguard line, the leading German tanks arrived. The Australians again opened fire. The leading German tank commander, standing waist-high in the turret, was riddled with bullets. This tank and others to its rear, by now confounded by the darkness, fired tracer and shells randomly. This fire was met by an equally ineffective hail of small arms, but nonetheless the German armoured column stopped. In the darkness the risk of supporting units firing on each other, a dangerous lack of fuel, and exhausted ammunition supplies encouraged the German tankmen to halt in what Allen later called ‘a scene of colourful confusion’, a ‘world of Very lights, tracer bullets and blazing vehicles’. 33

There were sufficient burning Australian trucks to read a road map without aid. German tank crews once again resupplied themselves on food and water left in abandoned Allied vehicles. Inexplicably, however, German infantrymen did not follow up the truncated armoured push with immediate patrols or pressure Allen’s thin line in any other way. Flares subsequently rose to the flanks as German infantry explored the hills but no more attacks developed. Allen subsequently ordered Lamb to withdraw the force further back to a point where the road crossed a swampy area, considered to be difficult terrain for tanks, immediately north of Larissa. The New Zealand armoured cars covered this withdrawal. Allen’s headquarters pulled out at 9.30pm with ‘night and rumour…spreading disorder’. 34 It was fortunate for Allen’s men that the Germans had halted. The ford through this swamp was, in fact, found to be blocked by a bogged New Zealand 25-pounder and crammed with transport waiting to withdraw Allen’s remaining infantrymen. Allen noted the ‘confusion of vehicles was such that the further withdrawal of the force was almost impossible’. 35 The final movement from this ford area was sorted out and cleared by 4.00am. 36

Despite the fact that the German pursuit had ended for the night, the withdrawal of Allen’s force from its second rearguard line through the ford area to a position just north of Larissa did not precede according to plan. Unknown to Allen, the German 2nd Company (1st Battalion, 143rd Regiment) had followed its orders and moved around his left flank during the day and set up an ambush to cut his withdrawal route at a road-rail level crossing around five kilometres north of Larissa. It had been an epic day’s march for this company, which had begun with a swim across the Pinios that morning, unnoticed

In the ensuing duel two tanks and one gun were lost before the artillerymen, without ammunition, withdrew with their wounded.
by the Australians. At around 8.00pm the company had made it to its objective at
the main road north of Larissa and set up its ambush. All telephone lines in use at
crossroads were cut, and a roadblock made with two captured trucks. The company
went into all round defence in a natural redoubt. To this point, from the morning
of 17 April, this particular company had marched close to 150 kilometres across
mountains and difficult terrain with a total of two and a half hour’s sleep. 37

Almost immediately after its ambush had been set, a ten-vehicle Allied ammuni-
tion convoy appeared and was captured by the German company. Then, at 10.30pm,
the leading vehicles of Allen’s long column from Pinios Gorge approached. The
Germans again initiated their ambush, riddling the leading lorry with bullets and
calling for surrender. A carrier travelling with the convoy tried to force the German
roadblock at high speed. It was engaged with machine guns and anti-tank rifle, and
was destroyed. Allen’s convoy now stopped in confusion, the road thoroughly
choked. A number of Allied troops took cover off to the side of the road and opened
fire on the German company position. At 11.30pm two more carriers came forward,
weapons blazing, and again tried to crash
through the block. They were met with a
wall of German fire, but nonetheless
pushed to close range with dismounted
troops following. By around 1.00am,
however, this attack had petered out.
Around thirty Australians surrendered
and the rest dispersed to the south-east.
Others escaped towards Larissa by
skirting the roadblock on foot.

Meanwhile, Lamb, noting the fire to this front and therefore assuming Larissa to
have fallen to the Germans, decided to divert the bulk of Allen’s column east along
what he mistakenly thought was a road to the port of Volos. This was, however, a
dead end road to a village by the coast south of Mt Ossa. Allen’s force was by now
breaking up in the darkness; a large part of it was lost. 38 Two days later, as most of
W Force was settling into its new defensive line at Thermopylae, small parties of
survivors from Allen’s force had begun to appear with news as to the fate of their
units. By nightfall, 20 April, 250 men from the 2/2nd Battalion and 500 from the
2/3rd Australian Battalion had reformed at Thermopylae under Allen’s command
once more.

It was noteworthy that, apart from the physical challenge of reaching its ambush
position, the German company ambush had attained some significant results. It
had, in effect, managed to block Allen’s withdrawal through Larissa. Its success led
to later legend that Larissa had been in German hands during the night of 18 April.
This was never the case. Units of the 6th (NZ) Brigade were in fact passing through

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It had been an epic day’s march
for this company, which had
begun with a swim across the
Pinios that morning …
the town until 4.00am the next morning. Other rumours were that the confusion was a consequence of German agents in Larissa misdirecting traffic, or Greek fifth column activity. There is no evidence for such conclusions. Allied disorder was a consequence of a very successful German company-level ambush. This was achieved at a cost of two Germans killed, and two others wounded.39

Field Marshal Wilhelm List, in command of the German 12th Army and in overall charge of the German invasion on Greece, was later quite vocal in praise for the troops of the 6th Mountain division and 2nd Panzer Division that fought at Pinios Gorge. He remarked repeatedly about the ‘excellent cooperation’ between these formations, and the critical role they played in the ‘break out’ into the plains of Thessaly.40 ‘The Pz troops’ swift advance’, he noted ‘was made possible only by the mountain troops splendid marching.’41 It was ‘the very model’ of combined action and an ‘unprecedented feature’ of the campaign.42 Certainly, the mountaineers that fought in this action had undertaken a monumental encircling march to the west, then climbed 1200 metres on the southern slopes of Olympus, before reaching the north bank of Pinios and attacking the 2/2nd Battalion, thus helping open the gorge for elements of the 2nd Panzer Division. It was quite a feat. Brigadier Allen may well have complained that his force’s ‘reserves, mentally and physically, were overdrawn’, but his men could not have been more tired than Schörner’s mountaineers.43 It was also true, however, that List’s tribute’s masked the essential truth that Allen did hold on for sufficient time to protect Larissa—if only by the skin of his teeth.44

What then can this narrative reveal about some of the traditional and enduring themes of Pinios? First, the idea that Allen’s men were pushed from their positions by vastly superior German numbers is a premise that underpins many English-language accounts of the engagement, especially those written in Australia. In this regard they echo the contemporary press, which claimed the defenders participated in distinctly ‘unequal combat’ in that they ‘held up two divisions, which outnumbered them by a least ten to one.’45 This perception was also present in the minds of W Force soldiers not at Pinios and yet to meet a German attack. A soldier from the 2/6th Battalion, for example, noted with bitterness in his diary after the battle that ‘no doubt the Hun is well-equipped in everything as well as numbers.’46 Such contentions are, of course, nonsense. Allen’s brigade group faced attack by elements of two German divisions, but it certainly did not fight them as divisions. In fact, the 21st (NZ) Battalion was assaulted, in the morning of 18 April, by 6–9 German tanks, around two companies of German troops from 112th Reconnaissance Unit firing from across the gorge, small detachments of
infantrymen from 8/800th Special Unit, and small patrols from the 7th Battalion, 304th Regiment that had managed to cross to the south bank. This force increased as the afternoon approached, but by this stage the 21st (NZ) Battalion was in the process of leaving the field. When account is taken of the anti-tank support available to them, the force that routed Macky’s unit was roughly equivalent to it.47

Similarly, on the western flank, Chilton’s 2/2nd Battalion was attacked on its left flank during the morning of 18 April by a single battalion (the 3rd Battalion 143rd Regiment), less a company despatched to perform the Larissa ambush. This attack was covered by a feint by the 1st Battalion, 143rd Regiment. Even conceding that in the afternoon Chilton’s men were under fire from some elements of the 2nd Panzer Division emerging from the gorge, and faced an attack by the 1st Battalion when it eventually moved against Evangelismos, the actual numbers of troops engaging each other on the ground on this flank did not give much of a numerical advantage to the Germans. In both instances, had the defenders held for longer, the Germans would have been free to concentrate an ever-increasing force against them—but it did not pan out that way. The Battle of Pinios Gorge, as it eventuated as opposed to how it might have developed, was fought between roughly equivalent ground forces. The story was the same in terms of artillery. The German attack was only effectively supported by the 1st Battalion, 118th Mountain Artillery Regiment, which was low on ammunition and could deliver only 400 rounds all day on 18 April. The 1st Battalion, 95th Mountain artillery Regiment only arrived on the scene at 3.00pm, too late to be effective as German forces were already advancing on the south side of the Pinios. Against this the full 4th (NZ) Field Regiment supported Allen’s men.48

In terms of traditional perceptions regarding the critical impact of German armour at Pinios, it is true that the attackers had tanks to support their assaults within the gorge, but here the terrain, ‘which contradicted all principles and experience’, acted against their being decisive.49 Due to demolitions, German tanks from 3rd Panzer Regiment had to be taken down to the deep and swift river one by one with the help of engineers. A number were lost in the torrent and others were bogged. The nine vehicles (at best) that pressed their morning attack on the 21st (NZ) Battalion faced five anti-tank guns sighted within the New Zealand position, as well as field guns prepared to fire in an anti-tank role if required. This was no German wave of steel. More tanks were deployed only after the 21st (NZ) Battalion had been removed from the east of Tempe. Nor does the scale of destruction often purported to have been wrought upon the attackers by Allen’s men in spite of the outcome of the battle hold up to analysis. The Germans lost in the vicinity of
The Germans lost in the vicinity of 140 casualties. The defenders lost many more …
of 21 NZ Bn and A Tk guns with them.’ 53 Allen himself was later at pains to praise Chilton’s battalion in that it held on until late afternoon, ‘in spite of the complete withdrawal of the 21 N.Z. Bn’. 54 Captain R R Vial, of the 6th Australian Division’s intelligence section, concluded after questioning some 21st (NZ) Battalion soldiers, intercepted while withdrawing at Allen’s headquarters, that they had ‘broken before they were attacked by the enemy under the impression they were cut off’. 55 In summary, according to common Australian interpretation, the New Zealanders broke too early and without good cause, thus threatening the whole Allied position at Pinios. 56

Unsurprisingly, such conclusions have not been so readily accepted or palatable to many New Zealand historians. When drafting New Zealand’s official history of the war, its authors went to great pains to try to explain what happened at Pinios. After all, it was clear that there ought to have been sufficient Allied force in place to delay the Germans for longer than it did. German armour, in particular, was in a very difficult position in the gorge, yet it broke out and into flat ground west of Tempe, making continued defence impossible. The key aspect then was preventing German tanks leaving the gorge, which brings focus once more back to Macky’s battalion. His unit, and its attached anti-tank guns, should have posed a significant obstacle to the small leading German infantry and tank detachments on a restricted and narrow front in the gorge. Only these types of mobile forces could ever really have threatened the W Force evacuation timetable by getting to Larissa before it was clear of withdrawing troops. These authors, however, and those that have followed the tradition they set, generally conclude that it was Allen’s faulty dispositions that invited the German breakthrough rather than 21st (NZ) Battalion’s premature retreat. In particular, they argue, as it was deployed on hills on the south bank of Pinios, not in the gorge, Macky’s unit seemed sighted to meet a frontal attack from across the river. Sitting along high ridges the New Zealanders were thus useless once tanks were in Tempe. Furthermore, Allen placed too little importance on the key tunnel demolition and roadblock in the gorge. Of his seven anti-tank guns, not one covered this obstacle. Only two, in fact, covered the gorge entrance and the rest were positioned too far back to prevent tanks debauching from the gorge. Perhaps a full infantry company with anti-tank weapons might have been placed, covering this obstacle to great effect. Allen also prepared no force for counterattacks, while two full companies (of the 2/3rd Battalion) were held in
reserve some seven kilometres distant. This did not seem, according to one New Zealand author, that ‘the best use was made of the troops available’.57 While there is certainly something to such complaints about Allen’s dispositions at Pinios, such arguments must inevitably be seen as an attempt to shift focus from Macky’s failings, or else explain the poor performance of the 21st (NZ) Battalion in this action.

While it is absolutely true that failing to adequately cover the roadblock was a mistake, it was as much Macky’s error as it was Allen’s. In fact, Macky himself later described this as his ‘major mistake at Pinios’.58 Had an effective block been maintained, German tanks would have had much more difficulty ever emerging from the gorge. ‘This,’ admitted Macky, ‘we could and should have done…’59 As it was it should not be forgotten that it was Macky who chose to man the roadblock with only a platoon, and Macky that chose not to replace that platoon when it was forced off the roadblock by the Germans. His battalion had been given clear responsibility by Allen to cover the roadblock and prevent German tanks moving out of the gorge. This he failed to accomplish. The fact the Germans were able to quickly clear the roadblock without harassment was decisive as it opened the way for more tanks to pour through the gorge. These were the vehicles that later swamped Chilton’s headquarters. Macky had also chosen, with his mission in mind, to deploy his companies on the ridges south of the gorge. He had not been directed there by Allen. Rather, with very little time available after he arrived and expecting the Germans at any minute, Allen accepted Macky’s choices. Allen recalled being ‘puzzled’, when he had arrived at Pinios in the afternoon of 17 April, at Macky not covering his platoon at the roadblock, but believed Macky was ‘rattled’ and considered it ‘safer’ to let the dispositions already agreed to stand. Allen was confident that Macky, with his anti-tank guns, could still perform its task of blocking the gorge and was, in fact, more concerned about his left than the right flank.60

The fact was, once Macky’s battalion vacated the roadblock and the gorge itself, it was too late for other forces to reoccupy them. Allen was rightly shocked when the 21st (NZ) Battalion withdrew at midday without being hard pressed and without permission. It might have been possible, if required, to fall this battalion back through Chilton’s position and reorganise it at Lamb’s fallback line, but Macky had ‘quitted the field’ and went up the ridges to the south instead. All of this, according to Chilton, was a consequence of the New Zealand commander’s mental state. He had, apparently, ‘given the game away before the fight started’.61 The small casualty...
figures for the 21st (NZ) Battalion compared to the 2/2nd Battalion bear out Chilton's accusations. The New Zealanders lost a mere four men killed or wounded at Pinios, compared to sixty-two from Chilton's battalion. In addition, contrary to the idea that the two reserve companies of the 2/3rd Australian Battalion were an unavoidable luxury, the actions of Macky's battalion meant retaining these troops in a fallback position was vital and excluded them from use in a counterattack. Despite efforts to save its reputation, the fact remains that the 21st (NZ) Battalion performed poorly at Pinios and endangered not only this position, but the withdrawal of the rest of W Force as a result.\textsuperscript{62}

Questions concerning the issue of the 21st (NZ) Battalion's performance, however, have at the same time overshadowed another key reason for Allied difficulties at Pinios. Here, attention must turn to the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Parkinson's 4th (NZ) Field Regiment. In many ways this regiment failed as badly as did Macky's infantrymen. No observed fire was ever established, for example, on the roadblock and no artillery observation posts at all were ever set up on the western flank. This meant that the exposed advance of the German 3rd Battalion, 143rd Regiment, which represented a perfect artillery target, went without effective Allied bombardment. So too, throughout the morning the Germans provided tempting artillery targets in the flat ground below Gonnos and across the Pinios River, but poor communications prevented full use of Parkinson's batteries. In addition, artillery fire intended to fall just forward of Tempe when called by Chilton, instead landed within his C Company perimeter, with Parkinson himself having to call for it to cease. In the early afternoon of 18 April, artillery forward observers that had eventually made it to the Chilton's D Company position promptly withdrew despite specific orders from Parkinson to remain in place. In early afternoon some of his guns began moving out against Parkinson's own orders. Thus, when the German 1st Battalion, 143rd Regiment's feint turned into an attack against Evangelismos, effective artillery fire could not be brought down upon it. Parkinson 'appeared very distressed' at this stage, recalled Chilton, and told me he had sent back a senior officer to 'give the gunners 10 minutes drill to pull them together'.\textsuperscript{63} Allen informed Parkinson a little later that his guns were withdrawing without orders and that he was 'expected to stand and fight';\textsuperscript{64} History, quite rightly, has tended to judge Macky harshly. Parkinson, thus far, has escaped the criticism his unit earned at Pinios Gorge.\textsuperscript{65}

While questions of who was to blame for Allied difficulties from 17–18 April at Pinios are important in a historical sense, they are not central to the significance of...
this battle. The engagement at Pinios in many ways represents the Greek campaign as a whole. It is important, yet traditionally under-analysed. When given close examination many of its existing ‘truths’ are exposed as attempts to explain (or explain away) more troubling questions and conclusions. Just because a battle, or a campaign for that matter, does not fit neatly within the celebratory and triumphal Anzac tradition of remembrance, however, does not mean it is unimportant or that it should not be understood on its own terms. There is much more to Australian military history than a litany of glorious victories. Defeat, just as much as victory, is part and parcel of this nation’s military heritage. Thankfully, the number of Australian military failures by no means outnumbers its successes—but this ought not mean such failures are ignored. They are, in fact, a rich source of insight for those of the profession of arms. Victory naturally enables congratulations while defeat engenders reflection and inquiry—and it is through critique, not self-assurances, that an army grows.

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Review Essay

THE ANZAC MAN


Reviewed by Michael Easson, PhD Candidate, UNSW@ADFA

He finally got a real biography. His autobiography, *Carpenter to Cabinet*, was a tired, plodding yawn. Senator Sir George Foster Pearce (1870–1952)—carpenter, union leader, founder of the Labor Party in Western Australia, ‘Labor rat’ during the conscription split of 1917, conservative Minister and statesman, defence advocate, Minister and lobbyist for defence interests—deserved to be seriously noticed. He did play an important part in the defence preparations and strategy of a new nation.

As military history, this book achieves its objective as a well written account of the early years of Australian defence planning and development, and as a biography of an important figure in that story. All the key themes are revealed in the book’s title. Australia was a loyal outpost of the British Empire. Federation created a nation. Australia had to wrestle with its own national interests and reckon where those fitted with Great Britain’s. What should Empire and country do? The First World War brought all those matters into sharp conflict. ANZAC was an Empire event and decisive in the shaping of Australian myths, including our military history. In tackling these themes, the linking of political and defence issues, and debate on the options of Defence policy, Connor has written an extremely competent assessment.

David Malouf in his Boyer Lectures, *Spirit of Play* (1998) captures some of the spirit of the Australians, like Pearce, who saw no contradiction between being British, Empire loyalists and yet proudly Australian. Even so, Malouf says, ‘The idea
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The ANZAC man grew up that if we could only keep ourselves pure in a contaminated world—morally pure, but racially pure, as well—it would be our privilege, as a nation, one day, to carry forward into history the British ideal. The tensions associated with that ideal are conveyed in Connor’s book.

The dilemma for this biography is what more can be said than that the subject was ‘there’ during a period of stress, strain and nation-building? A complication in this case was that Pearce culled from his ‘official papers’ material revealing his internal life. One senses that the man was not worth the prodigious effort. Yet in the piecing together and writing of the first forty years of Australian defence planning, Pearce was everywhere. He was one of the WA Labor’s first senators. Defence was the ‘topic’ he chose to specialise in the Parliament. More by dint of speaking often enough on the topic than any profound insights, Pearce was seen as an ‘expert’, and eventually became the Minister. There is no doubt that Pearce deserves strong biographical treatment. He was Australia’s longest serving defence Minister (1908–09, 1910–13, 1914–21, 1932–34) and over a thirty-five year period influenced and sometimes dominated public discussion on defence issues.

In three major respects Pearce had a massive impact. First, he was one of the founders of Royal Military College, Duntroon; second, in 1917 Pearce told Prime Minister Billy Hughes that the Allies were losing the war and that more troops were required. Thus, Pearce was highly influential in Hughes’s decision for the need for a second conscription referendum—that split the ALP. Third, in the commemoration of Anzac Day, though largely in sensing the public’s mood, he contributed to the shaping of the Anzac legend and style of commemoration.

Connor proposes that there were other achievements and positive effects too, but he is often unconvincing. (For example, surely Deakin was far more articulate and influential than Pearce in articulating an Australian, self-reliant within the Empire, defence policy.) To his credit, Pearce often called on British expertise. Sometimes there were very good consequences. But Pearce’s lack of confident knowledge of where Australian troops were during the war, how they were being led and supported, and a cavalier approach to the obtaining of defence materiel suggests that Pearce was a poor Minister. At one point the lack of business management advice and principles of management are explained away as a Labor man’s prejudice against capitalism and capitalists (p. 101).

There seems to be ambivalence about Pearce by the author, whose research is astonishing; but does Pearce deserve such industry? We are lucky he attracted such attention. We now know an enormous amount about the early years of defence planning, the poor staffing (nearly all of the public servants were degreeless with scant knowledge of defence strategy) and the generally woolly wobbliness about ideas, priorities and funding. The conduct of the First World War, on the Australian side, was a lesson in bravery, drive and shambles.
If Pearce was a more substantial, interesting figure, if his papers were replete with interesting material and laden with strategic thinking, our author might have whiled away his time, one box at a time, sifting through this rich lode, weighing gems of insight and weaving it all into a coherent story.

Connor says that ‘George Foster Pearce was a man of limited talents but he remains an important figure in Australian political history, and not merely because he remains the nation’s longest-serving Defence Minister’ (p. 168). Elsewhere, Connor remarks, ‘Pearce was a great Defence Minister, but his failure to administer his department adequately during the First World War cannot be ignored’ (p. 124). Perhaps our author, setting out confident at the start that there would be material of interest, found that the local quarry was almost bare. Hence Connor needed to turn to resourceful scholarship in Canadian, British, Irish and New Zealand archives, making comparisons with what other Empire Ministers and commanders were doing.

All this is very good. But there is no turning away from the fact that Pearce was a divisive figure, an incompetent Minister, a bloviating fool, a hopeless administrator, who did not attract respect from the Australian command under his control. Yet he was immensely important. Before the Great War we find Pearce ranting that the British alliance with Japan ‘degraded’ the Empire. Elsewhere we read about Pearce during the war vindictively interning people he did not like. One such was a German born priest in South Australia, who arrived as a young infant, who was imprisoned throughout the conflict and deported on Ministerial orders in 1920. During the Conscription referenda Pearce’s clumsy censorship contributed to the annoyance of sections of the population, who might otherwise have been sympathetic, to oppose conscription. He interfered in a Royal Commission into his handling of corrupt practices in defence supply in ways that caused his colleagues to demand his resignation.

Few Australian political figures have ever been as despised as Pearce. A typical Claude Marquet cartoon in the Worker would have him drifting, paddle free, sail-less, in a small rubber dinghy, lost at sea. When in 1916 he served as Acting Prime Minister for seven months, while Hughes visited the UK and France, the West Australian opined that, with Pearce at the helm, the country would be ‘drifting aimlessly’. When he announced that Brigadier-General Gustave Ramaciotti would take charge of defence supply matters, as Pearce’s ‘eyes and ears’, the Bulletin commented that ‘It sounds like a confession that for three years we have had a blind and deaf man in charge of the Defence Department; and there have been times when this paper also suspected that he didn’t have much of a sense of smell.’ Connor does not dispel our feeling that the man was a bit of a dud.

The book fits in nice vignettes such as Pearce’s medical advice to take up smoking to calm his nerves. Pearce’s part in engineering Stanley Melbourne Bruce’s rise to the
top in the UAP and the Prime Ministership is well told. Pearce’s warnings as Minister for External Affairs (1934–37) about the need to re-arm in the mid 1930s onwards sound plausible and prescient. But the uncertainty of claim and achievement against the evidence probably caused Connor to excel in scholarship. If Pearce was a better man, sure of achievement, we might have had a less interesting book.
IN THE FACE OF THE ENEMY—
ONE BATTALION’S STORY


Reviewed by Brigadier Richard Iron, British Army

This is a book to make the blood boil for any military professional. Toby Harnden has written a biography of a single battalion’s tour in Helmand and presents first hand evidence, more convincingly than any government spokesman, of the reality of what happens when a nation bites off more than it can chew. It is the story of good men doing their best in impossible circumstances. Many died; more were maimed.

For those who don’t know the story, The Welsh Guards deployed to Helmand province, Afghanistan, from April to October 2009. They were part of 19th Light Brigade, the seventh British brigade into Helmand, all on rotational six month tours. The Welsh Guards were deployed into a relatively new battle group area of operations—Battle Group (Centre South), the populated area of the Helmand Green Zone to the east and north of the provincial capital Lashkar Gar. Despite initially being on the main effort, the battle group had insufficient manpower and resources to create a security framework that could provide effective security for themselves and the population; their more isolated bases in particular were under siege for much of this time.

The second half of the tour was dominated by Operation Panther’s Claw, a brigade operation to clear and hold an area north of Lashkar Gah. For this, the Welsh Guards were tasked to blocking positions along the north-south Shamalan Canal, at
the western end of the brigade operational area, as a ‘hard shoulder’ against which the Taliban insurgents would be driven by the rest of the brigade on their sweep from the east. Despite all the media spin at the time, the operation was a failure. The brigade sweep failed to clear the whole area and there were never enough troops, British or Afghan, to hold the area they did clear. Furthermore, the Shamalan Canal was found to be easily wadeable, not 3 metres deep as thought by the brigade staff, and so the concept of the block was fatally flawed.

Most of the Welsh Guards’ casualties were suffered during Operation Panther’s Claw, attempting to seize the canal or holding non-effective blocking positions. The only access for the British was up a single skylined canal-side road, so it was relatively easy, tactically, for the Taliban to attack the initial advance and then subsequently interdict the resupply of the isolated bases by each of the vehicle crossing points over the canal.

Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe, the Welsh Guards commanding officer, was killed by an improvised explosive device (IED) on the banks of the Shamalan Canal during Operation Panther’s Claw. He was the first British battalion commander to die in combat since the 1982 Falklands war. Toby Harnden describes well the chain of events. Rocked by casualties since the start of the operation, morale was beginning to falter. So Thorneloe characteristically felt he had to be with his soldiers, putting himself into the most dangerous position in the convoy in an armoured vehicle that had clearly demonstrated its vulnerability to IEDs, but was all they had.

Harnden catalogues Thorneloe’s earlier struggles with his superior brigade headquarters, being critical of some staff officers who mocked the battle group’s attempts to gain the resources they needed to conduct their mission, renaming Battle Group (Centre South) as ‘Battle Group (Centre-of-the-Universe)’.

The email response … when the Battle Group asked for an additional company was: ‘No … why would you get one?’ A request for a vehicle logistics group to resupply his new areas was met with ‘No … there are other BGs [Battle Groups] on this op as well you know.’

It is a long standing tradition in every army that each level of command feels the level above is out of touch. Every platoon commander criticises his company headquarters; every company commander criticises his battalion headquarters. But something else is happening here: in both Iraq and Afghanistan, brigade headquarters were and are more seriously distanced from their battle groups than before. In previous conflicts, part of the role of staff officers was to be the eyes and ears for their commander. They visited units constantly. In 1944 Normandy, it was part of a brigade major’s job to visit battalions every day. As an SO3 in Northern Ireland, I was expected to spend at least one day a week visiting battalions. In this way, staff officers are familiar with and sympathetic to the needs of the units of the brigade.
All this has changed in today’s wars. Distance, the IED threat, and shortage of helicopters all mean that the only person in a brigade headquarters who now regularly visits units is the commander himself; he is now the one who informs his staff of the realities of life in the field, not the other way round. Add to this the burgeoning size of headquarters, filled with specialists all busy with their own specialties, and we have the ingredients for ivory tower headquarters, more concerned about themselves than the units they serve.

This is a real issue which has fundamentally changed the nature of our formation headquarters—for the worse. I don’t know what the answer is, but it needs to be understood and its baleful effects catered for.

Harnden describes well the almost sexual nature of the thrill of initial contact in a fire fight, and the lightheadedness that comes with survival (although probably the best description of this phenomenon remains Patrick Hennessey’s *The Junior Officers’ Reading Club*). But as the tour grinds on, casualties mount, and the never-ending IEDs inflict an inevitable psychological toll upon the Welsh Guards. It is here that everything that is truly great about the British Army becomes apparent: pride in regiment; junior leadership by officers and NCOs alike; stalwartness in adversity; and, for the Welsh Guards, a pride also in being Welsh and guardsmen too. It’s a formidable combination that keeps British infantry battalions fighting longer and harder than most, in the most difficult of circumstances.

Few soldiers set out to be heroes. In the Welsh Guards, as in any battalion, some are stronger soldiers, others are weaker. Yet the disciplined structure of the battalion sustained them through grievous losses. Harnden highlights the steadying influence of the older officers, commissioned through the ranks, who have so much more to offer a battalion in this kind of conflict than simply run logistics; they are invaluable in supporting the leadership and sustaining morale. In the end, they were all heroes, not because they wanted to be, but because the job demanded it and the structure of the battalion allowed it.

The circumstances of each fatality suffered by the battalion are described in detail. After a while, in the book, you begin to dread descriptions of a soldier’s family life back home, because you know you’re going to have to read of his killing in the following pages. But each death highlights the reality of life in Helmand in 2009: insufficient manpower, insufficient IED clearance teams, insufficient helicopters, insufficient ISTAR, insufficient mine protected vehicles and insufficient communications.

The US surge into Afghanistan gathered momentum during the Welsh Guards tour. This meant that in Helmand Province there were some 20,000 US Marines and about 10,000 British soldiers. But it wasn’t just the numbers that made the difference: the Marines also had sufficient of everything the British lacked. It is only when we operated side by side that, to Harnden, the comparison became stark. Harnden
doesn’t specify whether he believes our insufficiency should be blamed on British political leadership which failed to support and fund the mission adequately, or on military leadership which consistently seems to have overestimated what we should attempt with the resources available.

But the reality is that the British Army in Helmand, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, was less well equipped for its task than the equivalent army in Northern Ireland some thirty years earlier—despite the introduction of attack helicopters, UAVs and digitised systems. In South Armagh, which had an equivalent IED threat, it would have been unthinkable to deploy vehicles by road, without first inserting several battalions who would dig in as a cordon for as long as the road move lasted. Instead, all movement was by helicopter. Charlie Antelme, Rupert Thorneloe’s replacement, is quoted saying that the real difference that helicopters made in South Armagh was not just taking movement off the IED-strewn roads, but enabling real tactical flexibility for operations. An eight-hour patrol, for example, might include three or four mid-patrol lifts to random drop off points, creating real uncertainty for the Provisional IRA who would rarely be able to predict British Army movement. Contrast this with the Taliban who are able to mass fighters to ambush a foot patrol on limited predictable routes, or wire up IEDs immediately in front of a British advance. We seem to have lost one of the tactical principles in counterinsurgency: strive to create uncertainty in the mind of the insurgent at all times.

Another depressing feature of the Helmand operation is the weakness of the surveillance operation. The security framework in previous successful operations was built around surveillance, which greatly limits insurgents’ ability to operate. Given the problem faced by IEDs on the roads, one potential solution is a comprehensive surveillance operation, both human and technical, specifically designed to cover the main routes through the area of operations.

But such long term framework operations appear, at least up to 2009, not be attractive to brigade headquarters that only have six months to make their name. More than any other factor, this has probably had the most damaging consequences on the campaign as a whole. It undermined our attempts to build long term relationships with the Afghans, it limited our understanding of the area and its peoples, and it built a rhythm of big operations (of which Panther’s Claw was one) every six months whether they were necessary or not. But perhaps the greatest negative impact was the lack of emphasis given to a long term campaign plan, including building the security infrastructure needed to support it; communications, intelligence databases and surveillance all needed a long-term approach. The absolutely correct emphasis given to cultural awareness in modern counterinsurgency should not blind us from the continuing necessity to do the basics well.

Many of the lessons that are implied in this book are obvious to military professionals; so why has it taken so long for the UK to absorb them? A clue lies at the
In the tail end of the book, in the epilogue, when a Welsh Guards company commander thoughtfully muses that the battalion might not have achieved as much in central Helmand as they thought:

The British are very good at whipping ourselves up onto a sense of achievement. We almost have to, to make it bearable. You can’t do something like this andanalyse it all the way through and think: ‘Actually we got that wrong.’ Youjust can’t. It takes so much emotional investment. I’m not saying we lie to ourselves but there’s an element of telling yourself that it’s all right and it’s going well, just to keep going.

This emotional investment, keenly felt at battalion and company level, ripples all the way up the chain of command. The British Army is still remarkably paternalistic, in the best possible sense, to such an extent that no senior officer can undermine the efforts of those who have risked so much, by questioning what they did and how. So, instead, a positive spin is placed on every six-month tour of Helmand. This is partly, perhaps, to protect the reputation of a small number of senior officers in command, but it is mostly done out of loyalty to our soldiers.

But it is a misplaced loyalty. Our inability to analyse, in a rational manner, what happened and why endangers campaign success and costs soldiers’ lives. Although it has been a very long time since a senior British officer was removed from command for operational failure, in the United States such events do not damage morale. Rather, they have the opposite effect since they clearly demonstrate that soldiers’ lives and welfare are more valuable than a senior officer’s career.

Shortly before the publication of *Dead Men Risen*, the British Ministry of Defence insisted on some cuts to the book that have resulted in a number of sections being redacted in thick black ink. Harnden is remarkably understanding about this in his introduction, although I suspect that the Taliban know rather more about our IED clearance techniques and technologies than those who censored these passages.

I cannot recommend this book strongly enough. It is well written, exhaustively researched, and deeply revealing about the British campaign in Helmand (albeit now two years ago). It is also a fitting memorial to the Welsh Guards who performed so heroically in the most difficult of circumstances.
BOOK REVIEW


Reviewed by Allan R Millet, University of New Orleans, National World War II Museum

Cameron Forbes’s *The Korean War* is an ‘in-between’ account of Australia’s experience in the Korean War. Holding the strategic-operational high ground, Robert O’Neill’s *Australia in the Korean War, 1950–1953* in two volumes remains definitive and rivals General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley’s similar official history of British participation, really a history of all the Commonwealth forces in the theatre.

The literary trenches of combat are held by veterans and storytellers of 3RAR, notably Ben O’Dowd and Jack Galloway. Military professionals should read Bob Breen’s books on the battles of Kapyong and Maryang-sang. There is also a fine book on 3RAR’s battalion commanders of 1950–51: Green, Ferguson, and Hassett.

A veteran war and international correspondent, Forbes can turn a phrase, and his work shows research in printed sources as well as the obligatory interviews. He even puts Koreans and Chinese in his narrative, but his real focus is upon the mates of 3RAR in the war’s first nineteen months. The other two RAR battalions barely make the book, not unusual for units that manned the perilous outposts west of the Imjin, 1951–53. It was not Gallipoli, but it was bad enough.

Forbes is at his best in telling the stories of individual ‘digger’ infantrymen. To cover Reg Saunders is an obvious choice, given his iconic service. To write about Lieutenant Chick Charlesworth, Corporal Kazim Celiker of the Turkish army, Cecil Fisher, and Leon Dawes, the last Australian to die in combat in Korea, is more telling. Forbes also gives the reader a sense of the Koreans’ habitual sadness or han. Koreans in 1950 had plenty of reasons to be fatalistic. The surviving Diggers could go home. The Koreans were home. There were no RSL lodges along the Han River.
Where *The Korean War* can be faulted is in Forbes’s analysis of important operational issues. For example, one reason the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry escaped the casualties inflicted on 3RAR at Kapyong was because New Zealand’s 16th Field Regiment had more time to survey its battery positions and register its fires for the defence of Hill 677. The result was final defensive fires much closer to the Princess Pat’s foxholes. The Kiwi gunners had too little time to establish a proper position and fire plan before the Chinese hit 3RAR. Instead, Forbes focuses on the confused cooperation between 3RAR and Company A, 72nd Tank Battalion. It was the difference in fire support on the second night of the battle that stopped the Chinese, not just sturdy infantry defence combat by the Australian (thirty-two dead) and Canadian (ten dead) battalions.

A strength of Forbes’ book is its inclusion of stories about members of the RAAF and RAN and their undramatic but important service in closing Communist air space and sea lanes. The weather and terrain proved more dangerous than the enemy.

If an Australian reader wants to read only one book or a first book about the Korean War, Forbes’s book will do, as long as the reader understands that the contextual history of ‘the Giants’ and the two Koreas is breezy and limited by a lack of archival research. For example, the Eisenhower administration was far less nuke-happy than Forbes thinks after reading only those memoranda of NSC meetings posted on the Internet.

For all my quibbles, Forbes deserves praise for doing adequate research to recreate faithfully the Australian participation in the ‘forgotten war’. The book is especially good on recreating the combat experience at the individual level. That is a good way to start studying any war.
BOOK REVIEW


Reviewed by Major General Tim Ford (Retd)

When launching the book Do Unto Others, Major General Paul Symon, Deputy Chief of Army and the senior Gunner serving in an Army appointment today, said that Alan Smith 'not only discusses the history of Australian campaigns utilising the practice of counter battery fire—it also seeks to make the technical aspects of this complex science understandable'. Not an easy task, but something the author has achieved.

This book not only fills a gap that existed in the record of Australia's military campaigns by clearly describing the history of counter bombardment—the location, destruction or neutralisation of enemy artillery and mortars—and its impact across campaigns involving Australia from before the First World War to South Vietnam, but it also catalogues the fascinating military science behind the development and application of artillery and counter bombardment.

Over some twenty-two chapters, the author methodically takes the reader from the first use of artillery and indirect fire, through the technical development of the associated survey and locating practices, principally by the Royal Artillery on the Western Front in 1915–18, to its use in other theatres during the First World War. A most interesting statistic is how advances in science and artillery tactics contributed to a very significant drop in Western Front casualty rates in 1918. The story goes on to describe counter bombardment's major contribution during the campaigns of the Second World War, and subsequently in Korea, Borneo and South Vietnam. The author concentrates on the involvement of Australians in the process and the impact within Australia's operations; however, due credit is given to the principal role played by Britain in the development of the skills and techniques, and to the contribution of other allies such as Canada, France and the United States, as well as the responses by opposing armies.
The book is very well researched and laid out. It is replete with photographs, maps, charts, tables and diagrams that amplify the description. In addition to well developed endnotes, bibliography and index, it includes ten appendices that clearly describe artillery procedures, organisations and structures that assist the reader to appreciate the intricacies of artillery and locating practice. The work would have benefitted from a glossary listing the many abbreviations and acronyms throughout the book—although always described initially, their use is prolific and such a list would have been a helpful reference, even to those familiar with many of the terms.

What is so interesting about this publication is the manner in which the various contributors to the counter bombardment battle over the years are identified and explained. For example, I found the description of how the relationship and procedures developed in 1916–17 between the observers from Royal Flying Corps (and later the Australian Flying Corps), the air liaison officers at the airfields, and the Counter Battery Staff Offices, intriguing. How this was then converted to doctrine was of even further interest. The continued development of these techniques over the years to the procedures that were carried out within the Fire Support Coordination Centre (FSCC) at the 1st Australian Task Force in South Vietnam some fifty plus years later is also explained.

Over time, the counter bombardment process has involved many different disciplines—survey, flash spotting, sound ranging, artillery intelligence, radar, air observation, communications, calibration of guns, meteorology, camouflage and concealment, and even the use of unattended ground sensors. All these skills and many of the Australian units that have employed them on operations are addressed in Do Unto Others.

The importance of neutralising the enemy’s offensive capability remains critical on today’s battlefield. Here Gunners still provide key force protection and locating capabilities such as surveillance and target acquisition, and counter rocket and mortar capabilities. Today’s warriors and military historians would gain much understanding of the battlefield by considering counter bombardment developments and processes detailed in this publication. This is not a book that will be picked up and read in a single sitting. Packed with information, the reader will need to concentrate to gain full value.

The author, Alan Smith, describes himself as an Army historian. This manuscript is obviously a labour of love. Smith has drawn upon his service as a Reservist with the Royal Australian Artillery (RAA) and on attachments with the Royal Artillery and Royal Canadian Artillery to build his extensive knowledge of artillery history and heritage and to subsequently research and publish on Gunnery. In addition to editing several RAA biographies, he has published a manuscript in 2008 titled Gunners in Borneo – Artillery during confrontation 1962–66 and he is currently the editor of the RAA Historical Company’s periodic journal Cannonball.

Reviewed by Sue Thompson, Asia-Pacific Civil Military Centre of Excellence

Peter Willetts has written an informative textbook on the role non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play in the realm of global policy-making. He examines a variety of these organisations, their structures and activities and the history of their participation in the post-Second World War international system, claiming that they have developed increasingly important global roles that have contributed to the world shifting from a state-centric to a multi-actor system. The book is part of the ‘Global Institutions Series’ that attempts to provide information on international organisations and important issues in global governance.

The author is an authority on NGOs and he has consulted an extensive range of literature and covered a lot of ground to produce an overview of the international non-governmental institution. He pays careful attention to the complex relationships with other international institutions and tries to highlight the significance of a large NGO presence on the world stage.

The book begins with a definition of an NGO and encompasses the many varieties of such organisations, concluding that a definition can only be employed in broad terms, as ‘there is no such thing as a typical NGO’ (p. 31). Succeeding chapters outline NGO participation in global policy-making, their interaction with the international legal system and global communications. It ends with a study on the impact of NGOs on global politics.

The account is heavy with detail of the many different organisations that fall within the category of an NGO as well as the structure of the United Nations (UN). This is especially so in the first two chapters where it is hard to wade through the mass of information provided to ascertain the author’s claim that NGOs are important in the global decision-making process. As the book continues, this claim becomes clearer as discussion moves away from the UN to other international
networks, providing a coherent account of NGOs' place in the contemporary world. In particular, the chapter on the Internet highlights the work that NGOs have done in pursuing political agendas through effective communications networks.

However, the dense information in the first part of the book does serve a purpose. The aim of the series is to provide 'comprehensive, accessible, and informative guides' and the extent of the descriptions of NGOs and the UN structure is indeed informative and necessary as it provides a historical perspective for their evolution. Willetts points out that it was the UN that created the term 'Non-Governmental Organisation' and the painstaking process of trying to understand the various UN articles and committees that the author documents is important in setting the scene for the rest of the book.

In revealing the significance of NGOs on world politics, the book also assesses their role in mainstream international relations theory. Willetts stresses that to understand world politics since the creation of the UN, one must consider the influence that NGOs have had on governments and vice versa.

This book lives up to the publisher's description that it is a comprehensive overview of NGOs in world politics. It covers a lot of ground and provides extensive and detailed information. The level of detail could potentially cause some readers to lose sight of some of the main objectives; however, what is striking about this book is that it comprehensively maps out how complex the relationship is between NGOs and the contemporary international system.

Reviewed by Colonel Jason Thomas, Australian Army

A young United States Marine Corps lieutenant serving in Vietnam was sitting in a battalion harbour reading the *Small Wars Manual*, the bible of the Corps. The battalion commander walked by and noticing this, commented, ‘Shouldn’t you read about something you don’t know?’ Both these men, Al Gray and Charles Krulak would go on to be distinguished and innovative Commandants of the Corps.

Peter Beale’s *Fallen Sentinel, Australian Tanks in World War II*, is a book that should be approached in this way. This book should be read by those who do not know about the early years of Australian Armour. It will illuminate a neglected corner of Australian military history with lessons that resonant timelessly. For armoured and mechanised warfare professionals the book offers no surprises. It provides a commendably detached and well researched analysis into the development of armoured capability up to 1945.

Beale is a former Royal Tank Regiment officer, who served in Normandy during the Second World War; this book was commissioned by the Army History Unit. He has deftly picked up the multiple issues that impacted on the use of tanks by Australia in World War II. Key decision-makers of that time speak through direct quotes from key documents and correspondence. It is well researched and the analysis objective and sound. Everything from battalion after action reviews to war cabinet minutes receives relevant consideration. The prose at times can be dry and grammatical stilted, but readers should persist. This is a successful attempt to shed light on some fundamental strategic and force development failings of the time. Errors the Australian Defence Force could repeat, despite the promise of numerous reviews and reform programs. The mistakes outlined in Beale’s text are cultural; of understanding, context and vision not of process and committees.
The strange neglect of the tank capability in the inter-war years by both the Australian and British Armies and the strategic shock of the Second World War are well covered. Likewise the near panicked action of the Australian War Cabinet to raise a capability that was non-existent. Both talented leaders and industry performed near miracles to raise a capability that would ultimately be underemployed.

This is not a book that will have you on the edge of your seat, or exasperated at obvious incompetence or inflexibility. Rather this book invites the reader to draw their own conclusions. Australian Defence Force personnel should reflect on how we develop and maximise the capabilities that still remain outside our cultural understanding. Likewise, this text helps any reader to understand what strategically it means to raise and sustain a military capability. This is important when contemporary White Papers simplistically equate numbers of weapon platforms to strategic effect.

_Fallen Sentinel_ is about a nation that came out of one war with a proud and capable fighting force. In the intervening years, owing to institutional neglect and hubris, it failed to prepare for the next. This failing does necessarily end as this book does in 1945. _Fallen Sentinel_ is an important book for us all; especially for those not aware of this small slice of our military history. I encourage you to read about something you may not know about and pick up _Fallen Sentinel_.

BOOK REVIEW  ~  COLONEL JASON THOMAS
MILESTONES

IN MEMORIAM

LIEUTENANT GENERAL SIR DONALD BEAUMONT DUNSTAN, AC, KBE, CB
(1923–2011)

Donald Beaumont Dunstan was born in Murray Bridge South Australia on 18 February 1923. In February 1940 he entered the Royal Military College Duntroon, graduating as part of a shortened wartime course in June 1942. Upon graduation he was posted as a platoon commander to the 27th Infantry Battalion where he served (except for a period in brigade headquarters as a liaison officer) for the remainder of the war in the South West Pacific Area. It was during his service in the 27th Battalion that he was mentioned in despatches for patrol actions in Bougainville in 1945.

Following the war, Sir Donald served with the occupation forces in Japan and was part of the cadre that formed the embryonic Australian Regular Army in 1947. Following his marriage to Beryl Dunningham in 1948, he relocated to Adelaide’s Keswick Barracks where he served in a variety of staff appointments in both the Headquarters 4th Military District and Central Command. In 1953 he joined the 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR), as Second-in-Command prior to the unit’s departure for service in Korea in 1954–55. Between the Korean and Vietnam Wars he held a number of regimental, staff and instructional appointments at home and abroad.

From mid 1964 to early 1968, Sir Donald held command appointments at 1 RAR and 1 Recruit Training Battalion. On promotion to colonel, Sir Donald arrived in Vietnam as Deputy Commander of the Australian Task Force in January 1968, only a few days before the start of the TET Offensive. At that time he assumed command of the Task Force elements remaining in Phuoc Tuy Province and directed the
In 1968, Sir Donald assumed command of the Australians at Fire Support Bases ‘Coral’ and ‘Balmoral’ covering enemy approaches to Saigon. Some of the fiercest fighting experienced by Australian troops in the war took place in this operation. For this service he was awarded the CBE in 1969.

On his return to Australia in 1969 Sir Donald was promoted to brigadier to command 10 Task Force in New South Wales. In 1970 he and his wife went to London where he attended the Imperial Defence College. Upon completion of Defence College he was promoted to major general and returned to Vietnam in 1971, as Commander of the Australian Force. It was during this period that he planned and executed the withdrawal of the Australians from Vietnam. For his service as the Commander Australian Forces Vietnam he was awarded the CB.

From 1972 to early 1977, Sir Donald served in a variety of general officer appointments including General Officer Commanding Field Force Command and Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In January 1977 he was promoted to lieutenant general and appointed as the Chief of the General Staff—this was to become the pinnacle of his career.

After the turbulent 1960s the acrimonious debate over conscription, and the end of the Vietnam War, the Army risked losing its way. It had lost much of the public regard that had been its birthright since the landing at Gallipoli. It was reduced in size and was starved of resources. The challenges that faced the Army leadership of the late 1970s were quite simply, daunting. But their response was both inspired and inspiring. They preserved the ethos and morale of our Army. Sir Donald Dunstan’s finest contribution was made during this critical period.

His reorganisation of the Australian Army in 1980 was of fundamental and enduring importance. It is easy to forget how difficult it was to maintain capabilities during this period, even as the Government demanded a higher state of readiness from the Army in the wake of the Hilton bombing in 1978 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

Sir Donald designed the model that allocated specialised roles to the brigades to resolve the dilemma of higher readiness without sacrificing the ability to maintain the core war fighting skills required of a modern Army. The core elements of that model have survived until this day. Concepts with far shorter shelf lives have been called visionary.

Indeed, it is no exaggeration to suggest that the rapid response of the Australian Army to the East Timor crisis of 1999 was the final bequest of the Dunstan years. The rapid deployment model had stood the test of time and preserved a mobile deployable force capable of a response to a regional crisis. Sir Donald’s work laid that foundation at a time when softer options were available.
As the Chief of General Staff his tenure was twice extended by the government and he completed his tour in 1982. Sir Donald was knighted in the New Year Honours List in 1980 with the award of the KBE.

Following his retirement, Sir Donald was appointed Governor of South Australia, becoming South Australia’s longest-serving governor, from 1982 to 1991.

Sir Donald commanded at all levels—rightly earning the sobriquet of ‘a soldier’s soldier.’ Yet the hard hand of war never eroded his decency or humanity. He was a revered leader whose men always knew he was looking out for them. A lover of football (AFL), cross country skiing and fly fishing, he died in Adelaide on 15 October 2011.
Listed below are a select group of books recently or soon to be published that either contribute to the discussions initiated in the articles in the Australian Army Journal or on subjects that may be of interest in the near future. Some of these books may be reviewed in forthcoming editions of the Journal.


In *Red Zone Baghdad* Colonel Marcus Fielding presents his view of the last months of Australia’s involvement in Iraq. Along with larger concerns like the negotiation of the Iraqi–US Status of Forces Agreement, Fielding describes the day-to-day activities that were required to support and enable the building of the organisational infrastructure of the Iraqi nation, and the complex interactions that required tact and subtlety during the conduct of a complex counterinsurgency. Embedded in the Coalition's Headquarters Multi-National Force-Iraq in Baghdad, Fielding allows us to understand the often-mundane tasks of everyday life in both the red and green zones during the last months of Australian troop deployment and the speed at which camaraderie between soldiers from different countries develops when far from home and family. Although a very personal view of Iraq at this pivotal time, this book is also an important part of the larger picture of Australia’s involvement. In Fielding’s words, ‘my story will add to a patchwork of accounts that portray a soldier’s life, far removed from the peace and certainty of life in Australia’.


The ability of al-Qaeda to become a global organisation in the 1990s and early 2000s has been blamed, in part, on the concurrent globalisation of communications. This is only part of the story though. As state borders became more fluid with the encouragement of global trade from 1945 onwards, armed insurgencies were increasingly able to find sanctuary in neighbouring countries. From there they were able to extend their reach and power base as well as their ability
to destabilise other states. In this book, through in-depth case studies, Idean Salehyan explores the development and effect of this movement from local to transnational insurgencies and how the integration of global methods of organisational structure has led to several regional wars. This, he argues, has in turn complicated intelligence gathering, counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations globally.


Although controversial, mediation with insurgents remains an oft-used tactic for the stabilisation and development of self-governance in countries torn apart by civil strife. Through the empirical analysis of historical case studies both recent, the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding in Aceh, and more distant, Theodore Roosevelt’s 1905 mediation in the Russo-Japanese War, Kyle Beardsley questions the viability of this tactic in producing a long-term peace. If anything, he concludes, reliance on mediation increases the chance of conflict relapse. Although not skirting the repercussions of not negotiating—ongoing bloodshed—Beardsley’s results are important for those brokering negotiations to better understand and balance the risks involved in the process of mediation between warring parties often inflamed by complex rivalries.


Billed as a wake-up call against complacency, Michael Wesley’s book offers an expansive view of Australia’s prosperity and security over the last two decades, and its downside—an insular and introspective outlook that could very well undermine all that has been achieved. To Wesley, the decisions made across successive Australian governments to actively engage diplomatically, economically and culturally in the region has enabled Australia to ride out the economic difficulties of both the Asian and global financial crises. At the same time, this strong regional cooperation, underpinned by the United States, has allowed Australia an enviable level of security. As multilateralism becomes less of a driving force for regional engagement though, and individual states focus more heavily on bilateral agreements to drive their economies, the stability of our neighbourhood is under threat. Michael Wesley’s book is a clear and engaging read; its strength lies in its broad-ranging analysis of not just the effects of rising economies like China and India on Australia and the region. To Wesley, Australia is also in the enviable position where it has many opportunities; it is in an ideal position to ‘make a difference’, particularly through increasing strategic links among other countries in our immediate neighbourhood like Indonesia,
Vietnam, Malaysia, South Korea and Singapore. For the Australian Army, this may mean ongoing engagement through military adviser and mentoring roles, military exchanges, and peacekeeping and humanitarian operations when called upon.


In the Foreword to this book Major General Gordon Maitland explains, ‘within [Australia’s military history] are some hidden gems – stories of young Australians doing surprising things in surprising places’. This book tells one of these stories. Terry Smith enlisted in the 45th Battalion, The St George Regiment in 1959 and volunteered for active service in South Vietnam in 1970. In 1972 he was attached to the US Army Vietnam Forces Army Nationale Khmer Training Command to train Cambodian infantry battalions in Phouc Tuy Province. This book is interesting not just as a recount of the events and experiences of the small group of Australians of the Army Training Team Vietnam during this time, but also as a detailed account of the challenges in preparing a battalion for battle in a very short period of time and the struggles that accompany the role of adviser.


Although this book is more generally an account of the actions of Charlie Company, 7RAR during Operation COBURG in Vietnam in February 1968, the author has another purpose—to right what he believes was the oversight of the courageous actions of both the company and the individual soldiers involved. As he states early in the book, ‘Combat is an uncertain revealer of men. It may bring out the previously unseen best in a man, or it might show him up.’ In combining personal recollections with official sources, Windsor presents a compelling argument that the coincidence of this operation with the events during the Tet Offensive has hindered the recognition of the importance of the operation at the time and the actions of the soldiers involved.


In *Desert Boys*, Peter Rees presents an engaging and very personal picture of Australian soldiers in desert campaigns in the Middle East and North Africa in both the First and Second World Wars. In his earlier book *The Other Anzacs*, Rees focused on the role of Australian and New Zealand nurses serving in the First World War. Here though he focuses on battles, many of which later defined
what were to become collectively recognised as responsible for the formation of the ‘Anzac legend’. Although not pretending to be a military historian, Rees allows the reader to follow the fortunes, hopes and fears of average soldiers, their families and friends, often spanning generations, through the use of letters, diaries and other previously unpublished sources. A long read at 736 pages, this is nevertheless an engaging and evocative book.


Peter Englund, like Peter Rees in the previous book, uses personal diaries and letters to develop a detailed and, in his words, ‘intimate’ view of war, in this case the First World War. The method and structure of this book is different though. By focusing on twenty people from very different nationalities, backgrounds and perspectives, Englund details the ongoing effect of the war each year from 1914 to 1918. Beginning with 2 August 1914, a Sunday, and Laura de Turcynowicz, the American wife of a Polish aristocrat, he evocatively creates an image of a ‘perfect summer’ that is shattered as war is declared. He then goes on to contrast the impressions, consternation and fears of the many and varied characters. These characters, or *Dramatis Personae* as he refers to them, include a German schoolgirl, an English nurse, a French civil servant and a Venezuelan cavalryman in the Ottoman army.

Two Australians—Lieutenant William Henry Dawkins, an army engineer who dies at Gallipoli in 1915 and Olive King, an adventurous young woman who becomes a driver in the Serbian army and watches Salonica burn—and one New Zealander, Lieutenant Edward Mousley, an artilleryman in the British Army who becomes a prisoner the Turks and spends much of the war in a camp in Constantinople, offer a local perspective. Rather than focusing on specific battles though, Englund offers a very ‘ordinary’ perspective—for Dawkins, days and nights at Gallipoli are spent sinking wells to aid the soldiers’ personal hygiene, King writes letters to her father and sets up a canteen for the poor, Mousley struggles through the days as a prisoner. The book is an interesting reminder that among the dramatic occurrences that punctuate wars, there is also a plethora of mundane, everyday actions that go on regardless.
NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The editors of the *Australian Army Journal* welcome submissions from any source. Two prime criteria for publication are an article’s standard of written English expression and its relevance to the Australian profession of arms. The journal will accept letters, feature articles, review essays, emails and contributions to the *Point Blank* and *Insights* sections. As a general guide on length, letters should not exceed 500 words; articles and review essays should be between 3000 and 6000 words and contributions to the *Insights* section should be no more than 1500 words. The *Insights* section provides authors with the opportunity to write brief, specific essays relating to their own experiences of service. Readers should note that articles written in service essay format are discouraged, since they are not generally suitable for publication.

Each manuscript should be submitted through the *Australian Army Journal* Submission Form at <http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/Australian_Army_Journal.asp>.

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THE ARTICLE MUST BE PRESENTED IN THE FOLLOWING FORMAT/STYLE:

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- Automatic word processed footnotes
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GENERAL STYLE

All sources cited as evidence should be fully and accurately referenced in endnotes (not footnotes). Books cited should contain the author’s name, the title, the publisher, the place of publication, the year and the page reference. This issue of the journal contains examples of the appropriate style for referencing.

When using quotations, the punctuation, capitalisation and spelling of the source document should be followed. Single quotation marks should be used, with double quotation marks only for quotations within quotations. Quotations of thirty words or more should be indented as a separate block of text without quotation marks. Quotations should be cited in support of an argument, not as authoritative statements.

Numbers should be spelt out up to ninety-nine, except in the case of percentages, where arabic numerals should be used (and per cent should always be spelt out). All manuscripts should be paginated, and the use of abbreviations, acronyms and jargon kept to a minimum.

BIOGRAPHIES

Authors submitting articles for inclusion in the journal should also attach a current biography. This should be a brief, concise paragraph, whose length should not exceed eight lines. The biography is to include the contributor’s full name and title, a brief summary of current or previous service history (if applicable) and details of educational qualifications. Contributors outside the services should identify the institution they represent. Any other information considered relevant—for example, source documentation for those articles reprinted from another publication—should also be included.