Australian Army Journal

- Army After Afghanistan
- Australia and the Neglect of Defence
- Army's All Corps Training into the Future
- The Military Needs More Disruptive Thinkers
- Counter-IED Strategy in Modern War
- Two Key Challenges for Army's Intelligence Capability Post-Afghanistan
- Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) within the Australian Intelligence Corps
- A Commander’s Responsibility in the Formation, Development and Training of Today’s Combat Team
- A Simple Operation: The Japanese Invasion of Christmas Island
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I write this while attending the Pacific Armies Management Seminar in Canberra, which has once again highlighted the need for close cooperation amongst allies within the region. But it has also served as a way of elucidating thoughts on regional states on the role of land forces in what some have called the Asian Century. In light of the US pivot towards Asia, as well as the straitened economic circumstances that many militaries are facing, it is more important than ever that armies articulate their role in the future regional security environment. Seminars like the one I am attending is one way of doing that, and constructing arguments regarding the way in which Army is able to adapt to these circumstances is another. Professional journals like the *Australian Army Journal* are an excellent way of doing the latter.

In this edition Dr Al Palazzo again demonstrates the relevance of understanding history when dealing with contemporary strategic and defence policy issues, as it is rare that certain policy approaches have never been tried before. Lieutenant Colonel Gills provides the type of analytical piece that we welcome; using his subject-matter expertise and experience to try to influence the future direction for elements of the Army in the post-Afghanistan environment. We have also included transcripts of two speeches in the Journal. One from Afghanistan on Anzac Day and one from the Chief of Army. We will include transcripts of speeches occasionally. They are presented either for their historical or emotional significance, or in order to give a wider readership the opportunity to understand the senior leadership's thoughts on Army-related issues.

In this edition the *Australian Army Journal* is reproducing some excellent articles from a number of similar publications from around the world. The articles include two from *Small Wars Journal* on the subject of disruptive thinking. When these articles were introduced for consideration by the *Australian Army Journal* Board there was significant interest in the content but also in the very fact that a junior officer had written the first of the two; an article that suggests how the US Navy should approach the development of new ideas, but in doing so was highly
critical of the Navy’s Professional Military Education and promotion system. Some members of the Board pointed out that there was little chance that an Australian junior officer would write such an article and that this was a failing of our own professional military education system and lack of desire to engage in debate. The Journal approached the Commandant of the Royal Military College Australia, as the officer primarily responsible for the Army’s all corps training continuum, to provide an introduction to the articles and comment on how our own professional military education system is being developed and how we might encourage engagement in debate.

It is particularly pleasing to see a submission from WO2 Sharp on the place of psychological operations within Army, not only for the subject itself but for the fact that it was written by a warrant officer. The Journal is a resource for the whole Army; however, it has been difficult in the past to get warrant officers, SNCOs and soldiers to write articles for publication. Everybody is encouraged to write in our professional journal, and I am certain that WO2 Sharp’s article will prove the catalyst for more submissions from outside the officer corps.

Of course, while it is right and proper to discuss the future of the Army in changed strategic circumstances post-Afghanistan, we should at the same time remember that we still have hundreds of soldiers deployed on current operations. One of those soldiers, SGT Blaine Flower Diddams was killed on operations in Afghanistan and he will be remembered by his family, fellow soldiers and the nation for his sacrifice.

I continue to welcome suggestions from our readers about ways to improve the Australian Army Journal. As the publishers of the Journal, the Land Warfare Studies Centre is building its research capacity and agenda that will include the use of social media to allow our products (including the Australian Army Journal) to become more readily available in the not too distant future. As part of the Centre’s development of an electronic presence we have started using Twitter to highlight articles of interest and the release of new publications. For those who use Twitter you can follow us at @lwscaustralia.
It is an honour to address the Sydney Institute. Over more than two decades Gerard and Anne have cemented the reputation of the Sydney Institute as the premier forum in this city for the serious discussion of public policy as well as the arts and culture. Theirs is a considerable achievement, and I am grateful for the opportunity to deliver my first address to an audience outside Defence as the Chief of the Army at this Institute. My topic today is the ‘Army After Afghanistan.’

Having named my topic, I would like to make two points at the outset. Firstly, I have no greater priority than making certain that Army’s soldiers are as fully prepared for their role in Afghanistan, and in other operational areas where they are deployed, as is possible. The title of this address is not intended to convey any impression that we are moving on from the operational challenges that face our men and women deployed in dangerous environments across the world today. However, my job as Army’s Chief is to also look forward, to the outer years of this decade and beyond, and to ensure that Australia has an army that is as relevant and robust as is affordable.

Secondly, while I will speak almost entirely about my Service, my primary consideration is ensuring that Army can function as part of a joint force, in concert with
Navy and Air Force, and other Government Departments, and indeed with coalition partners. While it is not given the credence I think it deserves, Australia has a Defence Department that is very collegiate and strategic in its focus. Australia needs its ADF more than it needs its navy, its army or its air force if it is to possess robust military options now and in the future. Its about being a joint force and Army knows that.

I have assumed command of the Australian Army at a challenging time. We are an Army with a real operational focus. The war in Afghanistan is now the longest ever waged by Australians. The men and women of the Australian Defence Force are in dire peril on a daily basis, engaged in combat operations against a determined, ruthless and tenacious enemy. All three services are performing splendidly but this war is demanding the greatest focus, commitment and, indeed, sacrifices from the Army.

Nor should we forget that we continue to sustain significant deployments in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands as well as a range of smaller operations all over the world. My number one priority, as I have said, is the support and sustainment of our troops on those operations.

Yet those demands cannot divert us from the continuous process of modernisation and adaptation which is essential to keeping the Army abreast of changes in technology and the character of war itself. Our force planners refer to these twin obligations in the convenient short hand of fighting ‘the war’ while developing forces capable of fighting ‘the next war’. In other words we must continue to deploy potent forces capable of prevailing on the contemporary battlefield, as exemplified by the war in Afghanistan, while continuing to modernise the Army in conformity with the strategic guidance from the Government of Australia contained in the White Paper of 2009.

Over the past decade we, the Army, have also substantially enhanced our firepower, combat mobility and levels of protection. This has reversed what I believe was a long term, albeit gradual, decline in the fighting power of the Army, which took place in the period from the end of the Vietnam War until the strategic shock of the Timor crisis of 1999. The goal that I have set myself as the current Chief is to lay the foundations for the Army of the third decade of this Century. It is vital that we do not succumb to the sort of thinking that justified a serious reduction in the strength and capability of the Army that we experienced in the wake of withdrawal from Vietnam.

I am well aware of the many competing demands on Government revenue that exist currently and in the timeframe that I am speaking about. It is on me to look at these matters objectively, to plan prudently, to be fiscally responsible and to use sound and logical arguments to put that case forward. I have been Chief for over 8 months and I have been very conscious of the great support from the Government in terms of changes to our force structure and to capability enhancement within my Service.

Nonetheless, I believe that so called ‘peace dividends’ seldom, if ever accrue. It would be a serious error to conclude that in the wake of our draw-down in
Afghanistan that the Army will never again need to deploy overseas. Such implicit assumptions were made from 1976–1999. They were sustained in the face of evidence to the contrary such as significant deployments to Cambodia, Somalia, Namibia, Rwanda and Bougainville. This divergence between our declared strategic preferences and practices has been described by the respected scholar Mike Evans as the ‘Tyranny of Dissonance.’ History has clearly demonstrated that ‘peace dividends’ invariably become ‘peace liabilities’ when the military must restore its capabilities when the next threat arrives.

Ultimately, the deployment of INTERFET marked a strategic watershed for Australia. For the Army it brought to an end the benign era known colloquially as the ‘Long Peace.’ Our strategic policy makers had been very reluctant, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, to see Australia commit troops to a foreign war. We would rely instead on astute middle power diplomacy, the primacy of our closest ally the United States, and the stability of the Suharto regime to posture our forces to defend Australia from behind the sea-air gap. As we achieved deeper engagement with our Asian neighbours, the era of ‘forward defence’ came to be viewed as an anachronism. There is a broad consensus now that Australia seeks security ‘in Asia’ rather than ‘from Asia,’ a consensus perhaps inspired by the realisation that the so-called ‘sea-air’ gap is, in fact, a ‘sea-air-land’ gap.

Throughout much of my career as a junior and middle ranking officer we trained for operations to defeat small raids and incursions across Northern Australia. Many in Army were critical of these scenarios and the force structures that they supported. But the Army was also, in part, a contributor to this particular approach.

We were, perhaps, too insular in the wake of our withdrawal from Vietnam and possibly somewhat slow to adapt to the changing military and strategic paradigm of the times. Notwithstanding the extraordinary valour shown by our soldiers in that long war, the Service after Vietnam was not immune to the age old problem of armies: that of being more comfortable looking back with pride, rather than looking forward with focus. The broader developments in combined arms warfare in the wake of events such as the Yom Kippur war of 1973, the growth in the use of technology to enhance intelligence and surveillance capabilities, and the exponential increase in both lethality and precision of available weapons systems did not pass us by rather it left us interested but not too much changed.

Over time the Army evolved into a force of single capabilities. We became too light, too dependent on wheeled vehicles and our organisations hollowed out. Operations in East Timor in 1999–2000 exposed serious deficiencies in our land forces. Much of the work of my predecessors as Chief of Army has been focused on remediating the shortcomings that we identified in East Timor. While a lot has been achieved a great deal remains to be done.
The operations of the past decade have informed much of our force development. Unlike some, who continue to suggest that our deployment of forces to East Timor the Solomon Islands, Iraq and Afghanistan have been an aberration, I am convinced they are symptomatic of the changing character of war. Moreover, they provide an indication of what can be expected of the medium term future.

Australia is one of the world’s oldest continuously functioning democracies. We are an advanced, wealthy trading nation deeply enmeshed in the global system of free markets. We are also an ally of the United States and a committed and active member of the United Nations. For that reason we have always had a vital national interest in supporting the global equilibrium provided by our major ally—originally Britain and since the Second World War—the United States.

That global system is in a state of flux. We are still coming to grips with a number of meta-trends, the full implications of which will only become apparent long after my military career ends. But warfare, as Clausewitz so wisely observed is inextricably linked to politics and indelibly bears the imprint of the era in which it is waged.

Since the end of the Cold War, dynamic and disruptive forces have undermined the stability and predictability of the bi polar balance of power. While rumours of the demise of the state have proven to be premature, the period since 1990 has been characterised by the proliferation of non state security actors. Ethnic, religious and tribal politics have been the major source of war since the end of the Cold War. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union civil, ethnic and tribal wars have been more prevalent than state on state conflict. Indeed, hybrid wars, to employ a term that I find useful, have become the predominant form of war.

In Afghanistan we are confronted by a range of irregular forces, ranging from religious extremists and tribal militias through to potent criminal organisations. However, the increasingly widespread availability of modern technology and weaponry is blurring the distinction between regular and irregular forces and rendering theoretical differences between conventional and guerrilla war to the almost meaningless.

The level of tactical lethality available to irregular forces today means that armies such as ours must deploy highly protected, agile and flexible combined arms teams across the entire spectrum of conflict. The era when combined arms warfare was only synonymous with conventional state on state conflict has gone forever. And the professional and scholarly consensus is that state on state warfare is less likely than hybrid war in the next couple of decades. Indeed conventional war has become steadily less frequent since Waterloo, although when it has occurred it has been increasingly intense and lethal.

Be assured I am not endorsing some modern variant of Norman Angell’s thesis, published as The Great Illusion in 1913, which predicted an era of uninterrupted peace. Soldiers are naturally realists with a disposition to pessimism. Our fundamental force development principle is that military operations against a credible,
technologically enabled opponent, possessing war fighting capabilities similar to our own, must remain the foundation of all planning. Mastery of foundation war fighting skills is the core competency that the Government demands of Army. That immutable precept will inform Army’s modernisation program out to 2030. An army that can fight, manoeuvre and defeat a credible enemy, can adapt to less demanding contingencies. The converse is not true. Australia’s soldiers, must be confident and capable when facing an array of environments and threats, including an adversary as well equipped and trained as they are.

Army does not plan and implement modernisation in a vacuum. We constantly analyse the changing character of war—both through our own experience and through our sharing of doctrine and technology with our allies. And we must maintain fidelity to the strategic guidance contained in definitive policy statements, notably the White Paper of 2009 and any additional Ministerial guidance. The current White Paper allocates tasks to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) according to a scale of priorities.

All of these tasks make heavy demands on the Army. The thread binding all these tasks together is the direction that ADF implement a maritime strategy in the Defence of Australia. In order to execute this strategy the ADF requires comprehensive understanding of, and an ability to conduct decisive operations within, the archipelagic approaches to Australia. This renders as naive the notion of defending the sea-air gap through the exclusive use of sea and air power.

The relatively small size of the Army at times encourages an almost tactical level thinking about its employment when, in reality, Australian statecraft has made frequent and diverse use of land forces over the past century. For a middle power like Australia, the use of strategic land power is not so much related to size and mass, but rather to effect and objective. When judged against these criteria, it is clear that Australian policy has, since 1942, used elements of land power for strategic purposes more frequently than any other military instrument—particularly in Asia.

Indeed, since the White Paper of 2000, the prevailing trend in strategic guidance and force structuring has been the enhancement of joint ADF capabilities to support the simultaneous deployment within our Primary Operational Environment of a brigade on sustained rotation, while a battalion group conducts a less demanding contingency. The Army in which I served for the first half of my career could never have achieved this. The second Timor crisis in 2006 demonstrated that we have made enormous progress towards achieving that.

Just as important as structuring forces to be able to implement strategic guidance is developing relevant and robust doctrine. In this regard I believe Army has kept abreast of our allies in grasping the character of war. The intellectual conceptualisation of war from which our Future Land Operating Concept is derived is sound, and generates a common joint and inter-agency framework and cohesiveness across the Army.
Indeed, I believe that the Australian Army has developed insights into the character of contemporary conflict which have subsequently been emulated by other nations. The respected US analyst Frank Hoffman, who has pioneered the concept of hybrid war for the United States Marine Corps, credits the Australian Army with commendable foresight in identifying and responding to this convergence in modes of conflict over the past decade. Our doctrine and force structures permit us to respond appropriately to a range of contingencies from humanitarian support and disaster relief to medium intensity war fighting using the same force packages with modest adaptation. This is essential in the era of hybrid war, or war among the people as Sir Rupert Smith memorably defined it.

And so it is essential that Army continues to evolve and develop a robust and efficient structure in order to generate forces for sustained operations. And yet we currently have a mechanised brigade split between Darwin and Adelaide, a light infantry brigade in Townsville and a motorised brigade in Brisbane. These three organisations differ somewhat radically from one another in composition and culture.

The effects of this have cascaded through our career management, training and posting systems. And the ultimate effect on overall capability output has been detrimental. A sound system of collective training, force generation and operational rotation must be built on a standard brigade structure in all three locations. Under Plan BEERSHEBA, which the Government announced in December of 2011, Army will achieve this vital structural reform. This is one of the most important reforms since the end of the Vietnam War.

In simple terms, it involves the development of Multi-role Combat Brigades (MCB), based on the 1st, 3rd and 7th Brigades which are essentially ‘alike’ to enable well prepared forces capable of sustained operations.

Plan BEERSHEBA describes a phased program to adjust Army’s force structure to ensure a more optimal capability can be generated to conform to strategic guidance and meet contemporary threats.

It has, at its core, a view of Army’s place in the ADF; and within a Whole-of-Government and Coalition framework; and a thorough appreciation that our Regular and Reserve Forces must be fully complementary if future capability is to be delivered in a timely and affordable way.

Underpinning this organisational reform is the most significant re-equipment program for the Army since the Vietnam War. Under the guise of the LAND 400 project we are introducing a coherent and integrated Combined Arms Fighting System. This will support our efforts at standardising the basic building brick of the force—the multi-role combat brigade—and provide combined arms teams with greater protected mobility, firepower and communications.

But solving the force generation and rotation dilemma is only half the battle. The ability to deploy credible amphibious forces within our Primary Operating
Environment will require Army to continue to develop an expeditionary mindset. The cultural and training challenge involved in being able to embark a battle group on amphibious platforms and mount an operation offshore is very significant.

These amphibious platforms, known to us as ‘Landing Helicopter Docks’ (LHDs) are not water taxis- they are systems which enable Army to generate an effect on land. Lord Edward Grey once eloquently argued that the British Army needed to be ‘a projectile fired by the Navy’. I am very fond of that quote as it provides an aiming mark for me and my force developers as we seek to create the land component of the joint amphibious capability. The weapon system of the new LHD is in fact the embarked force, and the true capability is the joint effect delivered through Army, Navy and Air force within the Amphibious Task Group.

It is a capability we have not been able to field since the end of the Second World War. The training involved in permitting soldiers to even travel on such platforms is significant. Given the highly specialised nature of amphibious operations my intent is to initially nest this capability within a battalion group of the 3rd Brigade in Townsville.

Moreover, we also need to develop a much better understanding of that Primary Operating Environment, at a cultural and social level. The shifting geo-political dynamic in South East Asia and the Pacific provides challenges, and opportunities, for the nations and armies of the region. My first bi-lateral visit as Chief of the Army was to Indonesia. Developing robust links to the land forces of all of our South East Asian, and Pacific, allies is one of my main priorities. These links support our overall national strategy in the immediate neighbourhood. Land Forces occupy a central place in both the security policies and national identities of our key neighbours.

Finally, I wish to make some points about Army’s culture and the role of women and our reserve component. I am immensely proud of the Army and I am confident that sentiment is widely shared in the community. We have a strong culture built on values of Courage, Initiative and Teamwork. Moreover, our performance on operations over the past decades demonstrate that our soldiers are worthy custodians of the ANZAC legend.

There was perhaps no more poignant example of the relationship between the Army and the nation than the spontaneous affection shown to our soldiers during the series of natural disasters that occurred on the East Coast last year. We were able to mobilise thousands of troops whose own summer vacations were disrupted at very short notice in order to help their fellow Australians.

At the core of our identity is a strong combat culture. We must preserve this as it is vital to our success. But we must concede that this culture has tended to exclude women and some ethnic groups who are under-represented in our ranks. This will prove unsustainable with demographic change over the next few decades.

I am passionately committed to expanding the opportunities for women within the Army. You are no doubt aware the Government has directed the Army to remove


the few remaining restrictions on the employment of women in combat units. We can do this without detriment to our exacting standards in combat units. And the Government and community expect no less from us. Harnessing the full potential of our workforce is a capability issue rather than a diversity issue for me and I want to remove any artificial impediments to the best use of all of our people.

In the complex battle-space of the 21st Century, distinctions between combat and non-combat tend to be arbitrary if not meaningless. A large number of ADF women have already been in harm's way during the operations of the past decade and they have performed splendidly. Removing the few formal impediments to their employment within the Army will not undermine our performance. Exactly how I make a quantitative impact on the numbers of women serving in the Army and secure their advancement to the senior ranks is one of my major priorities.

Likewise, we have expanded the opportunities available to our Reserve component. The Reserve is already significantly engaged in operations abroad, essentially providing our force elements in the Solomons and Timor Leste. The new force generation model is designed to efficiently link the Reserve to our Regular combat brigades to sponsor the generation of a reserve combat team available at short notice to each brigade. This is a significant improvement and will allow us to continue to deploy reserve forces to a range of military operations. We will at last be ‘One Army.’

Finally I want to make one very clear commitment to all of our men and women wounded on operations. To some extent they have been invisible casualties of war except inside the Army. All of us are moved by the genuine expressions of national sympathy and support each time we farewell one of our fallen. But the wounded do not receive the same level of recognition. And many of them have been seriously injured—either physically and obviously through loss of limbs, blindness and blast injuries or less apparent, but just as debilitating, by psychological scarring and longer term damage. I have made a pledge to our wounded personnel, and their families, that, we will find continuing employment within the Army for every one, in a way that meets the needs of the Service and the individual. And should it prove not to be possible, for health or safety reasons, then all of our considerable resources will be employed to finding civil employment.

We will not abandon one of our own. Implementing that will be challenging, but it is what I think this old and distinguished national institution that I lead should do.

The Australian Army faces the third decade of this century with great pride in its past and confidence in its future. We aspire to provide ready, relevant, agile land forces capable of joint and multi-agency operations both inside Australia and abroad in the service of our nation. We will do so on the shoulders of our men and women, many of them young, many of them with recent combat experience, all of them committed to the security of this nation. We’re in good shape.
AUSTRALIA AND THE NEGLECT OF DEFENCE

ECHOES OF 1942 IN THE FORMULATION OF PRESENT SECURITY POLICY*

DR ALBERT PALAZZO

ABSTRACT

The provision of national security is one of the essential responsibilities of government. As the Japanese advance neared Australia in early 1942 it became clear that Australia’s interwar political leadership had failed to provide adequately for the nation’s security. This article explains how in 1942 Australia found itself virtually bereft of military power as well as the steps to remedy the crisis. In doing so, the article questions whether the recent budgetary decisions by today’s political leadership will also result in an Army with a similar degree of unreadiness, and one that is incapable of meeting the challenges of today national security environment.

* An earlier version of the article was presented at the Military History Heritage – Victoria Conference in Melbourne in April 2012. It will be published later this year by Cambridge University Press in a book titled Australia 1942: In the Shadow of War.
INTRODUCTION

When Japanese bombs fell upon Darwin on 19 February 1942 the situation facing Australia appeared grave. Singapore had surrendered, much of the Netherlands East Indies had been overrun, the Japanese had occupied Rabaul and would soon land on New Guinea, and Australia’s 8th Division was in captivity. In addition, the US position in the Philippines had been effectively decided, although the defenders of Corregidor would hold out until 6 May. Making Australia’s position appear even more desperate was that, as David Horner has noted, ‘Most of its trained soldiers were overseas, mainly in the Middle East. The RAAF had few planes in Australia, many of the larger vessels of the small RAN were in distant waters, and the home defence force, the militia, was poorly trained and equipped.’ The Japanese advance had been so rapid and unchecked that fear of imminent invasion swept the country and panicky coast dwellers fled inland—even though today we know that the Japanese never had any intention to penetrate so far.²

This article will explore how Australia found itself in this desperate situation. First it will examine the assumptions and decisions that led to Australian territory being virtually bereft of military power as the Japanese threat neared. Second, it will discuss the measures initiated by Australia to remedy this deficiency and the steps taken to convert the country into one of the lines of Allied attack that would lead to Japan’s defeat.

In doing so, this article will provide a case study on the Australian government’s efficacy in the determination of national security policy that has ongoing relevance for today. Defence is one of the core responsibilities of government. This article will not pretend that it is an easy responsibility; it is certainly not. But to be successful the articulation of an effective national security policy requires leadership, honesty and resoluteness …
AUSTRALIAN UNPREPAREDNESS FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE

That Australia found itself at war with Japan, and that its territory would soon come under attack from Japanese forces, should not have come as a surprise to the government’s political and military leaders. After all, a succession of Australian governments, and their military advisors, had determined that Japan represented the country’s primary security threat. This assessment was longstanding and was reached soon after the nation’s founding in 1901. The Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 and its emergence as a great power confirmed Australia’s perception of a deterioration in its security situation. This found expression in numerous national security studies while senior military officers spoke openly and directly of the threat Japan posed to Australian territory and interests. For example, the members of a 1920 conference of the Army’s senior officers were quite emphatic that Japan was Australia’s only identifiable potential enemy. The conference also reconfirmed that Australia would not be able to resist Japanese aggression on its own but would require the assistance of a friendly great power.

The post-First World War territorial settlement only served to reinforce Australia’s fears. Japan retained control of the German island colonies it had seized in the Central Pacific and, because Australia received a mandate over the former German territories in New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, the two countries were now virtually neighbours, if still separated by sea. The effect of the confirmation of the new boundary was that from Australia’s perspective Japan no longer represented a distant menace but a near one.

Japan’s actions in 1941 confirmed that there was nothing wrong with the rationality of Australia’s national security policy and the objectivity of those responsible for its determination. Its designers had correctly deduced that Japanese militarism posed a realistic threat to the nation’s welfare. What is at issue, however, is the linkage between the government’s risk assessment process and the design and implementation of a national security strategy by which to offset the danger Japan posed to the nation’s security. In determining national security policy it is vital not only to determine the risks correctly, but also to provide for appropriate mitigations of said risks, if the process is to have legitimacy. It is to the failure of the Australian government to balance policy objectives with an efficacious security strategy that this paper will now turn.

Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister at the commencement of the Second World War, informed the Australian public that the country was at war soon...
after the expiration of the ultimatum that Britain and France had given Germany following its invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939. Menzies had no hesitation in taking the step and he saw no leeway for Australia to pursue an independent path. Australia was a part of the British Empire and the Empire was at war.

Even though an imperialist, Menzies proved reluctant to dispatch any of Australia's admittedly limited military strength to the other side of the world. Despite the approaching crisis Australia's military capability was nearly nonexistent when the war broke out. The Defence budget had suffered heavily over the preceding two decades and as a result the nation's military forces were unprepared for war. The Army was undermanned, poorly trained and largely equipped with leftovers from the First World War. Due to the restrictions of the Defence Act the existing part-time militia could serve only within Australia and as a result the country would have to raise an expeditionary force from scratch for overseas service, as it had done in the previous conflict. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) had suffered even more than the Army during the interwar period and had barely survived as an independent institution. The aircraft it did have were largely obsolete and were no match for modern war planes. Of the three services Royal Australian Navy (RAN) had fared the interwar period the best, but the fleet was small, as were the majority of its ships.

Menzies reluctance to send Australian forces to Britain's aid was not because of their modest capabilities, however. The Australian Prime Minister displayed little enthusiasm for taking this step mainly out of a concern for Japan's intentions. Japan had already demonstrated a preference for military expansionism as the peoples of Korea, Manchuria and China well knew, and soon so would the inhabitants of the French colonies of South East Asia. The unknown was at what point Japan would become a sated aggressor, if at all. Before agreeing to dispatch Australia's military strength to Europe and the Middle East, Menzies sought reassurance from imperial authorities that Australia would not be left undefended if Japan decided to push southwards. Britain needed to offer reassuring security assessments before Menzies agreed to London's demands.

In October the government decided to dispatch part of the Australian fleet to European Waters and to the nation's participation in the Empire Air Training Scheme. But it was not until the end of November that Menzies acquiesced to demands to send ground forces and he did so only after he receiving a promise that in the event of war with Japan the Admiralty would 'make such dispositions as would enable them to offer timely resistance either to a serious attack upon Singapore or to
the invasion of Australia and New Zealand. At the end of November the government agreed to dispatch the newly raised 6th Division to the Middle East. The first contingent sailed in early January 1940.

Australia reached this decision point not specifically as a result of Germany’s invasion of Poland. Rather, that act was only the catalyst that revealed two long-standing, but known and understood, potential problems in the government’s conception of its national security policy. The government’s security policy supported a navalist strategy that in turn rested on great power acquiescence. It was up to the Royal Navy to prevent an enemy from approaching Australia’s shores and the policy downplayed the need for land forces. In addition, in doing so, it emphasised the defence of territory at the expense of interests, while still insisting on the security of Australia’s interest within the imperial network. This was an incompatibility that the government chose not to reconcile, because to do so would have prevented it from achieving the second objective of its security policy: a desire to transfer the greatest possible share of defence responsibility onto the shoulders—and finances—of a great power.

After the end of the First World War Australia decided to base its security on what was to become known as the Singapore Strategy. In brief, the Singapore Strategy placed the defence of Australia in the hands of the Royal Navy. In case of war in the Pacific the Imperial Fleet would sail to the east where, from its base in Singapore, it would undertake operations to prevent a hostile country from attacking or invading Australia and New Zealand.

In accepting the Singapore Strategy as the basis of its security policy the Australian government continued its reliance on a great power as the guarantor of national security. Yet from the start the Singapore Strategy had a flaw; there was nothing to prohibit an aggressor from deciding to attack when the Imperial Fleet was distracted by other and more pressing demands. The Army’s leaders made this point frequently to their civilian masters. For example, at a 1923 meeting of the Council of Defence, General CBB White questioned the ability of the Royal Navy to come to Australia’s aid. They insisted that it was unimaginable that the British government and people would consent to the dispatch of a major part of the fleet to the other side of the world. This was because ‘command in the Atlantic is of vital importance to the British people, command in the Far East is not’.

However, the Singapore Strategy came with an implied obligation, one that reinforced the existing obligations of kith and kin. If Britain came under threat Australia would have no choice but to come to its aid. This was because if the mother-country fell,
Australia’s security policy would unravel. Britain’s survival was essential for Australia’s security, although the inverse, it should be recognised, was not necessarily true.

Yet, instead of seeing the Singapore Strategy as requiring Australia to invest in defence capability, it was viewed by the Australian government as an endorsement of the massive cutbacks that the government imposed after the signing of the Washington Naval Treaties in 1922. The onset of the Great Depression worsened the military service's position even further. Such savings resulted in a considerable reduction in the country’s military establishment to the extent that the Army, for example, was essentially a ‘mothballed’ force that would require considerable reanimation in order to restore any degree of capability. Unfortunately, by the onset of the Second World War little had been done to restore the force’s strength.13

This article is not minimising the problems the Great Depression created for the Australian government. These were indeed challenging times. But what must be remembered is that even in hard times governments do not reduce the spending of public monies to zero. Rather, the critical question facing governments in times of austerity is how monies are allocated. During the interwar period the Australian government’s adherence to the Singapore Strategy gave it a rational for a reduction of the defence estimate, far below levels that its military advisors thought wise. In doing so, the government reduced its own defence force’s capability to impotence while devolving responsibility of the nation’s defence to Britain. At the time, this may have appeared to be an efficient allocation of resources, but it was a decision that led to the implementation of a strategy which was incapable of meeting defence policy.

Perversely, once the war began, the government still continued to go slow on defence rearmament, and it was not until June 1941 that Menzies called for an ‘unlimited war effort’.14 This contrasted with the casualness of the ‘business as usual’ mantra that had been his government’s preferred catch-phrase up to that point.15 Moreover, as the Army raised the 2nd AIF for overseas service the government continued to neglect the militia home defence role. In fact, the militia’s condition worsened as its best soldiers transferred to the AIF. In a denial of the true situation, financial considerations, more suited for peacetime conditions, still dominated the government’s decision making. The Treasury’s attitude was that ‘the war should not be an excuse for undue extravagance on the part of the services’.16 Instead of intensive training, militia soldiers continued to report to all-too-brief camps at which they experienced limited training with obsolete weapons. As Jeff Grey has observed, the ‘home army was in a dreadful shape’.17

The Treasury’s attitude was that ‘the war should not be an excuse for undue extravagance on the part of the services’.
A few days after Japan’s entry into the war the Chiefs of Staff presented the government with the advice that it was ‘necessary to establish and train now the force that would be required to prevent and to meet an invasion.’ David Horner has observed that ‘Clearly this would have been an admirable aim a year earlier.’

In late January 1942 the Chiefs of Staff presented to the government a major appraisal of the force’s readiness. The report was damning and highlighted the defence force’s inability to defend the country. One of the report’s conclusions was that the Army could make improvements at one point only by weakening a different point. The Air Force was in a particularly dire state and it was no great exaggeration when a RAAF senior officer observed in February 1942 that the Air Force had ‘hardly a feather to fly with.’

Some of these ongoing liabilities can be explained by competing demands across the empire for scarce resources, such as modern guns, tanks and planes. After all, Australia had outstanding orders from overseas suppliers for all manners of equipment. But such an explanation is inadequate and, possibly, too kind. In preparing for war time is unforgiving, and when allowed to slip away it cannot be regained. The government had neglected defence requirements throughout the interwar years and commenced rearmament far too late. Once the war began the failure to bring the militia on to a war footing prior to the Japanese onslaught signalled the government’s continued faith in the imperial fleet for the nation’s defence, no matter the worsening situation in the Far East. This guaranteed that the militia would remain incapable when the threat did come.

In addition, this policy of national defence avoidance contains more than a suggestion that the Australian government believed military strength could be extemporised at will. Perhaps this reflects the nation’s ongoing faith in the citizen soldier and the myth of the natural warrior ability of the Australian male. Yet what this belief fails to recognise is that armies, like navies and air forces, require long lead times if they are to attain effectiveness and sustained maintenance if they are to retain skills. As is true for the sea and air domains, land power is more than the sum of the abilities of individual soldiers. Rather it is their deep integration into a system of combined arms that creates combat capability. Just as the addition of a ship to a fleet needs considerable lead time to allow for design, construction, trial and adoption, the same is true for land forces. If Australia wanted effective divisions in 1941 it needed to begin their creation in 1939, if not sooner.

Perhaps this reflects the nation’s ongoing faith in the citizen soldier and the myth of the natural warrior ability of the Australian male.
Recalibrating National Defence

Japan’s entry into the Second World War completely changed Australia’s strategic position. Whereas for the first two years the war seemed a distant disturbance, it was now in Australia’s backyard. Civil defence suddenly took on a new urgency and coastal dwellers learned to live with a blackout, or considered fleeing inland. For the government the need to provide for the defence of the continent became a task that it could no longer ignore. Australia had two options: provide for its own defence by increasing its military forces and capabilities, and seek the additional assistance of a great power protector. The government would do both.

On 27 December 1941 John Curtin, only two months into the job as Prime Minister, issued a statement that formalised a shift in Australia’s security focus from the United Kingdom to the United States. Curtin said:

> Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.22

In fact, Curtin was being a little disingenuous as the transfer in security affiliation had been underway for some months.

In early October 1941—two months before the start of the Pacific War—Australia received an approach from the United States (via the United Kingdom) seeking access to Australian bases by elements of the United States Army Air Forces.23 The United States made similar approaches to the United Kingdom regarding access to Singapore and to the Dutch government in exile for access to military facilities in the Netherlands East Indies. In making these approaches the United States was exploring ways to strengthen the air defence of the Philippines and adjacent territories. By opening its airfields Australia would enable the United States to transfer air units between Hawaii and Manilla without them having to traverse Japan’s Central Pacific territories. The Australian government replied to the United States with an emphatic yes, stating that ‘the Commonwealth Government welcome[s] the United States proposals … and will do everything necessary to arrange for the facilities required in Australia and its territories …’24

In November 1941 Major General Lewis H Brereton, Commander of the Philippine based US Far East Air Force, made a secret visit to Australia.25 More detailed and expansive requests for basing rights from the United States soon followed. Australia agreed to give the United States access to airfields at Rabaul,
Port Moresby, Townsville, Darwin, Rockhampton, Brisbane and a variety of smaller fields in Queensland and the Northern Territory. The United States also agreed to provide Australia with the guns and equipment it needed to improve the defences of Rabaul. The US Navy sought these improvements as it hoped to use the harbour as a base for operations against Japanese forces in the Caroline Islands. The United States agreed to provide Australia with six 7-inch coast guns, eight 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, as well as radar sets, search lights, sonar buoys, anti-submarine nets and other equipment. Australia’s part of the arrangement was to provide the personnel required to staff these enhancements, approximately 1600 additional personnel. Again Curtin readily agreed to these requests.

At a conference in Melbourne on 22 November 1941 the United States broadened its request from just transfer rights to basing rights. This request was made in two parts: the basing of squadrons for the purpose of training, and the basing of squadrons for the purpose of conducting offensive operations against the Japanese. Ultimately, Brereton hoped to operate up to 50 per cent of the Far East Air Force’s strength from Australian bases. Locations identified were: Townsville, Charter Towers, Cloncurry, Batchelor, Port Moresby, Rabaul, Broome and Darwin. In addition, Australia gave the United States permission to set up maintenance facilities at Alice Springs, Daly Waters, Longreach and Charleville and an engine repair workshop in Townsville. In total, the plan called for the basing of up to seven squadrons plus associated command, administrative and support elements. In manpower terms this represented the basing of over 8000 US military personnel in Australia, at a time when Australia was not at war with Japan.

Of course, events in the Far East moved far too quickly for the implementation of most of these plans, and few eventuated, at least in the form agreed upon. However, by mid November at least thirty-five US B-17s had traversed Australia en route to the Philippines.

Once the war in the Pacific began the new relationship between Australia and the United States intensified as the two countries became formal allies. The catalyst for increased cooperation was the arrival of General Douglas MacArthur in Australia on 17 March 1942. The US General saw Australia as a base from which to organise a counterstroke against the Japanese, striking initially towards the Philippines and then on to Formosa and the enemy’s homeland. MacArthur’s desire to go on the offensive as soon as possible—a desire that was matched by Australia’s land commanders—worked well with Curtin’s hope to secure Australia with the help of the United States.
In a mutually beneficial arrangement MacArthur and Curtin worked together to draw US resources to the South-West Pacific, a tactic in which they were largely successful. By the end of 1942 there were over 160,000 US personnel in Australia and New Guinea and MacArthur’s command would eventually total in excess of 750,000. As a result Australia would become a major base of operations for an allied offensive against Japan.

However, in turning to MacArthur, Curtin did sacrifice some degree of the nation’s sovereignty. MacArthur’s influence over Australian military affairs became immense as he became Curtin’s primary military advisory, not General Thomas Blamey, Australia’s senior-most officer. Curtin would also place Australian forces under MacArthur’s command, a privilege the US General retained until the war’s conclusion.

GALVANISING AUSTRALIAN STRENGTH

While seeking US assistance was vital in safeguarding the nation, the Australian government also undertook to increase the country’s military and infrastructure capabilities. The AIF would be brought back from the Middle East while the militia was brought up to a war footing. In addition, across the north of Australia, a massive military construction boon commenced as the nation transformed itself into a base for war.

While it served Australia’s interests, the return of the AIF from the Middle East to Australia was not an Australian initiative. Instead, the decision’s origins lay in London. The British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, recognised that reinforcements were urgently required in the Far East if the Allies were to contain the Japanese advance. Sending the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions back to the Pacific Theatre, rather than British troops, was a logical decision. Where Australian influence was decisive, however, was in the AIF’s ultimate destination. Churchill viewed military requirements from the centre of an empire and perceived the threat to Burma as more immediate than that which Australia faced. Consequently, he wanted the Australian troops to reinforce that theatre. Curtin, however, insisted that the Australians return home, which they did, although only after the two political leaders had exchanged strong words. Eventually, the 9th Australian Division also returned to Australia, and the three divisions went on to play a critical role in turning the tide in New Guinea.

The AIF, however, was only one of Australia’s land forces. The other was the long neglected militia—or Citizen Military Force as it would become known. As noted
above, the militia had been ignored in favour of the AIF since the war’s outbreak in 1939. By early 1942 it was more than 30,000 soldiers under strength—only a third of the force was on full-time duty at any one time—and still suffered from serious deficiencies in weapons and equipment. The remainder rotated through three-month camps that provided little continuity and at best fragmented training. In many ways the militia had become a basic training organisation for the AIF while it remained an inefficient force of part-time green soldiers.

Making the situation worse was that as the Japanese attack neared, the militia remained deficient in most categories of weapons and equipment. An inventory conducted in November 1941 showed that some critical categories, such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, were only at 50 per cent of requirements, while others, such as tanks, were virtually non-existent. Mechanical transport was also well below requirements with the force meeting less than half of its needs for trucks. It was only in basic weapons, such as rifles, that supply came closest to meeting demand, although shortages still remained.

Bringing the militia up to strength was a chaotic activity that was carried out in necessary haste. The CMF underwent a series of reorganisations as units were swapped between formations in order to provide some force that was combat ready, while others were broken up and its members transferred in order to bring surviving units up to strength. The militia also had to be reorganised at the unit establishment level as its structure remained on the prewar pattern, whereas the AIF had been reorganised to the British standard when it was in the Middle East. Thus the composition of AIF and militia battalions was different, a situation that should have been addressed much earlier. The result was that by 1943 the militia bore little resemblance to its prewar design.

Of course, those in the militia continued to serve under the restriction of the Defence Act, which prevented their dispatch outside of Australia or its territory. Because of this Australia maintained what was in effect two armies for service in a single theatre. It was not until February 1943 that the government modified the Defence Act to extend the service obligation to anywhere in the South-West Pacific Area. Yet despite this extension, few militiamen were to serve beyond Australian territory.

Despite these impediments remarkable progress was made. In a mid-year report to the Advisory War Council it was admitted that the Army had been transformed from an ill-armed and ill-trained force to a sound and efficient one. One suspects, however, that this was an overly optimistic assessment, as the report goes on to note
that a further three months were required before the Army would be ready to undertake any task it might be called upon to perform. The RAAF lagged somewhat behind the Army due to difficulties in acquiring modern aircraft, as well as the continuing need to provide personnel to the Empire Air Training Scheme for service in the European Theatre. As a result the report did not expect the Air Force to be completely ready before mid-1943. The Navy also suffered from handicaps, primarily related to its lack of integral air power; the report's writers believed that without carriers the Australian fleet would never reach its full potential. 41

As the militia developed the Australian government also focused its efforts on improving other components of national power. The government continued to expand the nation's coastal defence and anti-aircraft system, the latter handicapped by a shortage of 3.7-inch anti-aircraft guns. Throughout the interwar period coastal defence improvements had advanced at a torpid pace, largely due to underfunding. The commencement of the war had seen a big push to finish the planned defences. Now, to further protect the coast, the United States provided Australia with a number of 155mm gun batteries. As the war was to be fought in the islands to the north the Australian Army raised an entirely new arm—water transport. Formed in September 1942 this arm would eventually include 1900 watercraft ranging from workboats to ocean going ships.

In 1942 the government further expanded its home defence force, the Voluntary Defence Corps. Its origin was as a privately formed body of enthusiastic Australians and it was formed under the sponsorship of the Returned Sailors' , Soldiers' and Airmen's Imperial League of Australia. In May 1941 the VDC became a part of the army and the following year a corps of the CMF. 42

During 1942 the VDC grew rapidly and quickly exceeded its initial establishment of 50,000. By the end of the year it had doubled in size and the government sought a further expansion, despite Blamey’s opinion that there was little military need. Its contribution to the nation’s defence was mixed and the VDC’s raising was not without cost. The force competed with the militia for scarce weapons, uniforms and other equipment, and the government struggled to prioritise requirements between the two services. Moreover, the need for the VDC passed quickly. After all by mid-1942 the threat of invasion had past but the home guard continued to grow. It was not until late 1943 that the government proved able to contract the scale of the organisation.

As the war progressed the government also made greater use of women in the military. Women began to replace male personnel in a large range of military tasks, including coastal and aerial defence positions, radar and radio operators, cipher and...
signal positions, as well as administrative and clerical roles. In 1942 the government called for a virtual doubling in the number of women serving in such tasks.

Simultaneously with improvements in its military capabilities Australia also had to address an inadequate infrastructure base, particularly in the country’s north. Logistics are correctly known as the ‘lifeblood of war’, and without adequate support it is difficult, if not impossible, to project and sustain military power.43 Viewed from the perspective of early 1942 the ability of the Australian countryside to serve as a base for war would not have looked promising to those tasked with taking the war to the Japanese.

When US military staff toured the north of Australia in late 1941 they were not impressed by what they found. After Brereton visited Batchelor, near Darwin, he described the airfield’s condition as rudimentary—three American B17s had already been wrecked attempting to land there.44 In early 1942 another US general commented that Australia is as undeveloped as the central United States was before the Civil War, or even more so. Everything that is developed is on a miniature scale.45 This condition would not last long, however.

The need to transform Queensland into a base for war touched off a massive construction boom across the state, as well as the Northern Territory. Part of the work was done by Australian and US military engineers but the state construction authorities—such as the Queensland Main Roads Commission—were also critical. The Australian government also formed a national body called the Allied Work Council, which raised its own labour force known as the Civil Constructional Corps (CCC). At its peak the CCC had an enrolment of more than 53,000 men and by the end of 1942 had completed over 750 jobs with another 1200 underway.46

The improvements these agencies implemented were profound. For example, by the war’s end Queensland hosted over 200 airfields, with associated support facilities, and the Australian Army had built its critical Jungle Training Establishment in the Atherton Tablelands. The Allied Work Council laid 7500 kilometres of new roads while its workers improved many existing roads to a military traffic standard. New ports also appeared; the Brisbane River would host a US submarine base while Cairns became a major maritime trans-shipment hub. Without such infrastructure improvements the South-West Pacific Theatre would never have been able to serve as a line of counterattack against the Japanese.
CONCLUSION

Government defence thinkers had correctly assessed the risk Japan posed to the country. Yet, despite identifying the correct policy objective, a series of interwar governments failed to provide adequate means with which the nation’s military forces might counter this threat. These governments took comfort in the false promise of the Singapore Strategy and they saw it as an opportunity to cut defence capabilities and expenses in a period of increasing threat. When war came, the true nature of this ‘peace dividend’ was revealed to be a ‘peace liability’ and the nation’s military forces had to struggle to regain capability that had been allowed to wane.

In the end Australia was never at a risk of invasion and the continent remained a minor theatre in the enemy’s plans. This fact, however, should not excuse those who had reduced the nation’s military forces to impotence. A national security policy that is based upon the kindness or limited ambition of your opponent is a hollow one.

Australia would muddle through in the end. It would reinvigorate its military strength and, in conjunction with the United States, turn back the Japanese. This reanimation of strength was left critically late, however, as political leaders failed to consider the lengthy time required to regain capabilities that are so quickly lost. By the time the nation began to address the danger, the Japanese threat was real and immediate; a situation that could have been avoided—or at least made less grave—had the government pursued a more rational and honest defence policy.

As the course of security decision-making in the years leading up to 1942 demonstrates, it is easy to be self-deluding about defence requirements. The governments of the interwar period, and even after the outbreak of the Second World War, avoided the hard decisions, preferring instead to assume that all would be well, or at the very least a saviour would arrive in the nick-of-time. Their failure to address national defence with the seriousness it deserved placed the nation in a dangerous position from which there was no easy or quick escape. In effect, this was a dereliction of duty because the development of an effective national defence policy and the provision of the means to enact this policy is a basic obligation of all governments.

In the national security world it is incumbent upon decision makers that they both identify a correct defence policy and provide the means for its animation. The two steps are equally essential. The difficulty of this task should not be minimised; it requires insight, intellect and courage and can only be undertaken successfully if
it is taken seriously. As the nation’s leaders of 1942 discovered, the consequences of
the failure to do so can be severe, even unimaginable. Let us hope that Australia’s
leaders of today are aware of this.

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The Australian Army currently conducts individual training for soldiers, non-commissioned officers, warrant officers and officers in two forms: ‘All Corps Training’ and ‘Corps Specific Training’. As my authorities extend only over the All Corps Soldier and Officer Training Continuums, it is there that I will focus my encapsulation of that aspect of Army’s professional military education.

The All Corps Soldier and Officer Training Continuums provide the foundation warfighting knowledge, skills and attitudes required of Army’s Service men and women. The training extends from the respective point of entry into Army at either the Army Recruit Training Centre or the Royal Military College – Duntroon, through career continuums to the conclusion of the Regimental Sergeant Major Course and in an officer’s case, the Advanced Operations Course. On behalf of the Chief of Army, the Commandant of the Royal Military College of Australia also maintains oversight of the Army component of the Australian Command and Staff College course; however, this joint educational experience remains outside the All Corps Officer Training Continuum, albeit linked to it.

A concerted effort is underway to optimise the balance between training and education in all areas of All Corps Training. While the All Corps Officer Training Continuum has recently been reviewed and is currently undergoing testing and

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refinement of the revised content, the All Corps Soldier Training Continuum is in the midst of a review that is aimed at improving the appreciation of a trainee’s knowledge, skills and attitudes at each developmental level and better focusing foundation training and education towards more appropriate developmental outcomes. Recruit training is and must remain more heavily oriented towards training while, conversely, the development of warrant officers preparing for appointment as Regimental Sergeants Major can take account of prior experience, development and maturity, and contain a larger educational component as a consequence. The balance between training and education has reflections in both the nature of content and the style of delivery, and an optimal balance will better accommodate the trainee’s development profile and provide an improved learning outcome as a result.

Concurrently, there is effort being applied to improve the development and management of Army’s instructor population through Qualified Instructor and Qualified Assessor training, successive instructional experiences and intervening distance learning development, and more deliberate career management of those with an ability and desire to instruct. The aim is to align the trainer’s/educator’s abilities with a refined training/education balance in a way that supports optimisation of the development and delivery of foundation warfighting content throughout a career continuum.

The articles published hereafter challenge the motivation and ability for debate to occur within the Australian Army. Soldiers, non-commissioned officers, warrant officers and officers in today’s Army have shown throughout the range of All Corps Training exposures that they have the ability to mount and sustain debate on a range of topics relevant to the current and future state of Army. What appears to be lacking is the motivation to formally engage in debate outside of those training environments. While the reasons for a lack of engagement may be many and varied, an improvement in motivation could be initiated by leaders at all levels creating the opportunity and sufficient ‘space’ for debate to be opened and, as appropriate, flourish. As the Royal Military College of Australia refines the training–education balance there is a parallel opportunity provided by improvements in access to electronic information for Service men and women to be better informed of Army issues both in greater range and to greater depth. With ability improved through further education and access to information, and motivation stimulated by encouragement at all levels, there is enhanced opportunity to advance Army’s professional conversation.
through further education and access to information, and motivation stimulated by encouragement at all levels, there is enhanced opportunity to advance Army’s professional conversation.

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For my generation, there is one profession that captures our imagination more than any other: Entrepreneur. This is especially true of those leaving the military and going to business school. It would seem logical for the military to find ways to blend the best of entrepreneurial and combat cultures in ventures like a joint Harvard Business School/Naval War College degree program.

Yet, in reality, the very word entrepreneur is met with blank stares by career service members—and in some cases, viewed as an anathema. This is primarily because entrepreneurs see a need and without consulting higher authority, simply go ahead and try to solve it. Their very nature inclines them to disrupt the status quo. And of course, the one thing a vertically integrated organization like the military hates most is change. Or at least, change that wasn’t decreed from on high.

Part of this stems from an antiquated, 1950s career model. A large bureaucracy thrives best when it can promote the average individual in a one-size fits all ascension program. This, however, necessitates sloughing off the highly talented instead of

* The Military Needs More Disruptive Thinkers by Benjamin Kohlmann is reprinted from Small Wars Journal per the Creative Commons license granted upon its original publication at http://smallwarsjournal.com
promoting them in accordance with their ability. For example, a younger, Marine reservist friend of mine can be a Vice President of Goldman Sachs, overseeing their Hong Kong branch by the age of 31, but would barely be commanding a Marine rifle company at the same point.

To be frank, and to use the words of Joshua Cooper Ramo, “we’ve left our future largely in the hands of people whose single greatest characteristic is that they are bewildered by the present.” This is mostly because our senior leadership grew up in a time when the internet was still a twinkle in DARPA’s eye. The only flag officer I know of that consistently and effectively uses social media is Admiral James Stavridis. He also created cells of innovation among his subordinates, and implemented their suggestions rather frequently.

The future lies with those individuals who can see connections across a myriad of professions and intellectual pursuits. The mind that can see that a phone and entertainment device can be intertwined into something like, say, an iPhone. Or, an intellect that recognizes how secondary and tertiary networks are often more valuable than first-order relationships, thus creating something like LinkedIn. Or the strategist who understands that crowdsourced, horizontally structured non-state actors pose a greater threat to our security than Nation states.

A great part of this lies in how we educate our military members. We educate them in the art of war, but do so with a focus on mere tactics. We educate them when they are well past the age of agile and innovative thought. We preach adaptability, flexibility and maneuver warfare, but only do so in relation to the movement of military kit.

The average age of someone attending Harvard Business School is 27 years old. Most war colleges require at least a rank of O-4, and in some cases, O-5. By this point, most students are in their mid-30s. Creative impulses are largely repressed, and most go to get their check-in-the-block degree with no real intellectual rigor. It’s considered a leisurely billet with plenty of time off where little studying need be done.

Harvard Business School compiles the best society has to offer—from politics, to non-profits, to military, to tech, to entertainment and athletics. They get a myriad of viewpoints, classmates who have traveled the world in entirely different capacities, and the synergistic effect of diverse intellects. They push them hard, keep them busy, and encourage them to change the world.

The Naval War College has no civilians enrolled. Their diversity comes from other services, whose only difference in viewpoint comes from navigating a slightly different bureaucracy. Far from sending students there in their mid-20s who have just returned from the dynamic task of rebuilding a wartorn Afghan village, we wait until they’ve proven their mettle in the bureaucratic morass of a staff job.

There is a reason the likes of HBS and Stanford produce people who create multi-billion dollar, world changing organizations and our War Colleges don’t. You can’t
innovate and have a long term impact if you are only surrounded by like-minded people. You must challenge closely held assumptions daily if you want to have an impact. This, again, is anathema to a career military person.

Furthermore, our war colleges teach doctrinaire procedures, not critical, creative thinking. They focus primarily on the tactical employment of forces rather than the strategic context those tactics play out in. Where are the courses on trends in physics like chaos theory? Behavioral economics and psychology? Investment strategy? Creating and adapting a dynamic balance sheet? True strategic leaders are generalists who can pull from a variety of interests, not hedgehogs who can only do one thing well.

The reason John Boyd was so successful was because he understood the world of thermodynamic physics and saw a connection with fighter aviation that his peers never could. Steve Jobs built elegant and useful technology because he explored calligraphy in college. It was the fact that they investigated beyond their respective professions that gave them a truly brilliant edge.

At the O-6 level and below, the military has voluntarily removed itself from heavy interaction with civilians. We’ve sent more of our graduate students to places like the Naval Post Graduate School instead of MIT in what is a very short term cost saving measure. We limit their creative potential to defined projects, instead of open-ended interaction with brilliant civilians in an unfamiliar environment.

Instead, the DoD should be partnering with our nation’s preeminent institutions and create joint degree programs to promote cross-pollinating interaction. HBS and the Naval War College would be perfect partners. You give aspiring business leaders a view into strategic thought, and future strategists a glimpse of how an entrepreneurial culture is transforming our culture. And this doesn’t even begin to address what happens after ad hoc alliances are formed between young, energetic minds of various professions.

As a result of the frustratingly single-minded education the military offers, a fellow officer and I started an organization designed to foster what we call a “disruptive mindset.” Our goal was to bring together intellectually curious officers with successful civilian innovators, get them to chat, and see what happened. We did this around a monthly syllabus designed to foster creative thought and new avenues of discovery. We call it Disruptive Thinkers, and it has started to change the shape of San Diego.

We’ve seen entrepreneurs team up with a Destroyer skipper to implement a new type of pump technology. We’ve had teachers use our wide-ranging syllabus with students as young as the fourth grade. We’ve helped develop the business plan for a disaster relief social entrepreneurial project. And we’ve even gotten four of our junior officer Disruptive Thinkers to sit on a panel at a recent USNI/AFCEA conference and proclaim the gospel of innovation in strategic situations.
It’s military education without anything to do directly with the military. We’ve done topics on the future of energy, crowdsourcing, leadership, challenging established political institutions, and biomimicry. We’ve linked up venture capitalists and cryogeneticists with F/A-18 pilots and Surface Warfare junior officers. We’ve seen teachers integrate our syllabi into their fourth grade classrooms. Mostly, we’ve seen an excitement around ideas and a willingness to push innovation in the military that was not previously seen in our monolithic culture.

The most notable benefit is that our military peers are starting to see connections and relationships between seemingly mutually exclusive fields. They see the potential for new avenues of procurement, new ways of approaching battlefield problems, and most importantly, new ways of integrating the trends that are affecting every part of our world into their professional culture.

Orson Scott Card12 noted that “every officer learns how to function within the system that promoted him.”13 So we get officers who think small, don’t understand the importance of broad understanding, and miss the trends that are shaping our world. We get procurement officials who buy $150 million strike fighters when the future may be in autonomous, cheap, swarming drones.14

It’s time we get leadership that understands the present. This necessarily requires understanding the context of our world. That context is not merely in artillery shells and Tomahawk missiles, but rather crowdfunding, horizontal management, social media and broad interaction with people not like us. Adaptable strategy requires the ability to consider everything, not merely one thing. The beginning of such thought is a Disruptive Mind.

ENDNOTES

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THE MILITARY NEEDS MORE DISRUPTIVE THINKERS

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Benjamin Kohlmann’s essay, “The Military Needs More Disruptive Thinkers,” struck a chord like no other essay published recently in the Small Wars Journal. In brutal honesty, I have to say that the many sniping comments struck exposed flesh. While an ardent fan of Kohlmann’s essay, I have to agree that his argument was more akin to birdshot at maximum range than a mailed fist to the throat of the problem. Perhaps a better analogy is that his was a marking round lobbed in the general vicinity of the problematic enemy fire. Whatever it was, it was a wildly popular read. For all the comments on the article, the one that rang truest with me came from commener “Null Hypothesis” and asked, “What problem are we trying to solve again?” This was absolutely the right question.

Kohlmann called for disruptive thinkers, but the real question is why? And what are we disrupting? We cannot waste time with harassment and interdiction fires. We must define what targets we are servicing.

* Disruptive Thinkers: Defining the Problem by Peter Munson is reprinted from Small Wars Journal per the Creative Commons license granted upon its original publication at http://smallwarsjournal.com
Today’s military is facing a significant crisis. This crisis has several dimensions. The rank and file of the military who have made or witnessed the massive efforts and sacrifices of the past decade, and who have seen so very little in the way of satisfying results in return, are puzzled by the self-assuredness of their leadership. They question the slogans and the continued assurances that things are “on-track” and that we are accomplishing the mission. They are disappointed by the failures of leadership and imagination that have yielded toxic commands, a rash of firings in some services, and a breach of trust with our most vulnerable servicemembers. They wonder about the future of the weapons systems that support and defend them as they read tales of acquisition woe. They question the growing focus on bureaucratic minutiae. They question how they can be trusted so completely in a combat environment, but are treated as children in garrison. They wonder how a military system that prides itself on justice will reward the generals that have presided over failure, whether at the operational and strategic levels on the battlefield, to the continued failures of the institution in the realms of personnel, acquisition, and budgetary policies, while at the same time eroding the autonomy and discretion of junior commanders with a creeping campaign of bureaucratic centralization.

These are symptoms of a malaise facing the military, of an ossified and decadent institutional culture and a bloated bureaucracy that has grown a profusion of power centers that jealously guard their territory and their budget. This sick institution is facing a time of strategic reset and budgetary retrenchment. Without disruptive thinkers in the organization to question sacred cows, debate reappropriation of funds and efforts, and to challenge the conventional wisdoms created by institutional stakeholders to defend the status quo, America’s military will miss an opportunity to cut and reshape itself into a force both affordable and relevant to coming challenges. Without disruptive thinkers, the coming cuts and reorientation will prove to be a disastrous reinforcement of the dysfunction that decades of an advantaged “resource position” have bred in the Department of Defense.

WHAT PROBLEM ARE WE TRYING TO SOLVE AGAIN?

The Department of Defense is exhibiting the classic symptoms of a “resource advantaged” corporation that has passed its prime, as I will describe in slightly more detail below. This is a common problem in the business world and, while we cannot run the military entirely like a business, we can certainly learn lessons from the business world about how to avoid decline into irrelevance and how to regain competitiveness. Sure, the U.S. military remains peerless, however we must acknowledge that it has lost some of its edge and surely has passed the point of diminishing budgetary returns. At the grand strategic level, we must recognize that a national security apparatus that insists that we must spend as much on defense as the next 19 nations
combined, only two of which can be defined as potential adversaries, has lost sight of the big picture. We should be seeking to husband our fiscal resources and recreate the conditions for our hegemony by investing not only in military capabilities, but in the bases of our economic predominance. Thus, the problem we are trying to solve is as follows. America’s defense complex faces a period of strategic reset and retrenchment, during which disruptive thinking is required in order to challenge the status quo and effect a reorganization and reprioritization of the Department of Defense and its industrial and conceptual supporters. A detailed treatise on all the aspects of this challenge and the potential solutions lies far beyond the scope of this essay. My intent here is only to begin to outline the broadest aspects of the mission and to highlight some specific problem areas where disruptive thinking is needed and some solutions have already been suggested.

The first challenge is to acknowledge the effects of a long, “resource advantaged” position. Richard Rumelt\(^2\) described this well in his business book *Good Strategy/ Bad Strategy*,\(^3\) must reading for anyone interested in charting a path for organizational success. (It is important to note as an aside here—in light of the debate over business schools and other degrees stemming from the Kohlmann piece—that Rumelt is on faculty at the UCLA Anderson School of Management and has also taught at Harvard Business School, where he attained his doctorate, and INSEAD. He started off, however, as an electrical engineer with a Masters degree, working at the Jet Propulsion Laboratories. He, like many others, was a doer, a technical expert, before turning to management. Business school is not solely made up of young elites headed for Goldman Sachs. Things, institutions, and people in the real world are far more multi-dimensional than either Kohlmann, or especially some of his detractors, would have made it seem.) Rumelt describes a very familiar picture of a resource-advantaged organization. “Success leads to laxity and bloat, and these lead to decline. Few organizations avoid this tragic arc.” While organizations with few strategic resources are forced to “adroitly coordinate actions in time and across functions,” as these organizations gain a strategic advantage, they will “loosen their tight integration and begin to rely more on accumulated resources and less on clever business design. … They will lose the discipline of tight integration, allowing independent fiefdoms to flourish and adding so many products and projects that integration becomes impossible” (pp. 136–137).

Rumelt goes on to describe how organizations on the rebound from monopoly positions or regulated industries have a difficult time in adjusting because of the “inertia in corporate routines and mental maps of the terrain.” They also lack cost data because they have “developed complex systems to justify their costs and prices, systems that hide their real costs even from themselves.” It thus takes years to “wring excess staff costs and other expenses out of its systems” (p. 195). These organizations have created not only a culture, but institutional structures, procedures, and doctrinal
justifications for an inefficient, uncompetitive status quo. Why do we need disruptive thinkers? We need disruptive thinkers to challenge this status quo, to break its inertia, and to fight for the much needed cultural and institutional changes.

“The first step in breaking organizational cultural inertia is simplification,” Rumelt continues. “This helps to eliminate the complex routines, processes, and hidden bargains among units that mask waste and inefficiency. Strip out excess layers of administration and halt nonessential operations—sell them off, close them down, spin them off, or outsource the services. … The simpler structure will begin to illuminate obsolete units, inefficiency, and simple bad behavior that was hidden from sight by complex overlays of administration and self-interest” (p. 211). Following this logic, the coming defense cuts present a significant opportunity to simplify the organization and reinvigorate its culture, but only if disruptive thinkers are willing to challenge the growing mantra in staff headquarters across the military: “Protect the institution.”

To break up these dysfunctions, we need not focus on an entrepreneurial mindset in the form of innovative product development, but rather bold leadership of institutional change and adroit change management once the course is set. We need thinkers willing to disrupt the status quo and willing to do the detailed work of streamlining and reorganizing institutions. We need leaders cognizant of the power of powerful inertia of organizational culture and structure and versed in how to affect change. Despite the many comments to the contrary, these skills can be learned from the business world and from business schools. These skills need not be delivered in the form of a MBA, but they could be. A model to consider is the executive MBA program that many schools have begun to offer for mid-level executives. I am not arguing for a one-size solution for the force, but we may consider creating a tailored executive MBA-type course, or sending those mid-level executives we believe will be change leaders to existing courses.

These courses require significant self-study along with a series of residencies, but they are designed for fully employed managers and can be completed in 1.5 to 2 years. The MBA is not the be-all, end-all, but without skilled, educated, and empowered change leaders, all the other educational and entrepreneurial initiatives would be for naught. We must start with change of the organizational culture and structure, breaking up the fiefdoms and conservative “protect the institution” praetorian guards.

The focus on institutional change is paramount. Without institutional change, all other initiatives will only be window dressing. What is more, many who doubt the extent of the cultural problem have only their relatively positive experiences at the division level and below as a reference point. This is where leadership talent is rightfully focused and where long-standing tables of organization have kept wartime bloat away, however these commands have very little control over the broad
organizational and strategic decisions that will affect the future of the force. Service and combatant command headquarters, on the other hand, have seen a profusion of additional staff, activated reservists, contractors, special staff sections, and centers of excellence in the past decade—the symptoms of a resource-advantaged position that Rumelt spoke of. Each of these added populations brings its own incentives and interests to defend, complicating the organizational dynamic.

What is more, the desire of most officers to be in the operational world, and the institution’s rightful decision to put our best leaders in charge of troops in combat, means that with the exception of select pockets of excellence, staff headquarters are often a bit of a B-team, and they know it. When you add all of these factors together, the dynamic within these headquarters that determine the future of the force is decidedly dysfunctional, if not outright toxic. Finally, decisions are increasingly made by consensus between these headquarters, allowing each to protect their interests in a very political log-rolling dynamic. Rumelt warns, “Universal buy-in usually signals the absence of choice” (p. 64). Without bold institutional leadership and organizational and cultural change, a crisis is coming as we drift through the cuts and a strategic reset.

The catch-22 is that military leaders have been trained and educated to take bold and decisive action on the battlefield, but have been bred to be risk averse in the organizational environment. This culture came through loud and clear in the comments, from the abhorrence at the term “disruptive” to the many jabs at LT Kohlmann’s inexperience and junior rank. Kohlmann’s treatment was mild compared to those who question budgetary and institutional sacred cows. Few people will continue to put their head above the intellectual parapet in such an environment. Granted, Kohlmann’s essay had flaws, as does every endeavor, but we do not encourage the refinement of dissenting thought, we attack it. This is a facet of the institutional culture I discussed above. Furthermore, while many attacked his assertions about professional military education (PME), I would agree that it is doctrinaire, especially in the distance education formats that most officers take, and that is not a good thing (please look it up).

More damning, education and intellectual abilities are not truly valued. In the Marine Corps, for example, our physical fitness scores and height and weight are prominently displayed on every fitness report, yet PME, while required, cannot be failed unless one does something criminal. While real learning can be gleaned from PME, at least in residence and if one fully applies oneself, it is not institutionally valued.

Furthermore, PME does not provide students with radically different outsider perspectives. While the attendance of different services’ officers, foreign officers and defense civilians, and employees of other agencies provides some diversity, this hardly brings disruptively new ideas to the classroom from disparate fields of
experience. In all, these deficiencies are extremely crippling when it comes to trying to change the institutional culture of a closed organization. While corporations can bring in outside experts and executives to reinvigorate their culture, the military would never countenance such a thing in their leadership ranks. This is reasonable, but all the more reason to encourage diversified education and innovative thought from the earliest days of an officer’s education and training. The attitude of many commenters toward outside perspectives was quite symptomatic of a force that is increasingly isolated from society and has a growing sense of entitlement and superiority. These are hardly characteristics of a healthy organization, especially one facing a period of reorganization and retrenchment. Building more cross-disciplinary ties and increasing linkages with the society we serve—the sole reason for our being and the sole source of our military might—are absolutely critical to our future. We must mend our relationship with society and should seek partnerships that nurture both the business sense of our leaders and the innovative talents across our force. Most solutions will not come from PME or MBAs, but creativity must be nurtured by healthy and vibrant relationships and experiences, giving our talent “more dots to connect” when creating solutions.

Finally, as the military begins to draw down in the coming years, a dysfunctional institutional culture will drive some of its most talented officers out. Whether due to generational differences or a decade of operational experience, or perhaps the tyranny of the creeping centralization by the growing headquarters staffs, many of the “middle management” in today’s military are deeply disgruntled with the dysfunctional, if not toxic situations they find themselves in. They are disgusted by the excesses of a resource-advantaged organization and dismayed that despite their best efforts, their leadership has not been able to lead them to strategic victory, or at least something approaching it. When they do comment on their perception of the strategic, budgetary, acquisition, and institutional failures of their organization, they are patronizingly told that they do not and cannot understand the issues. Their concerns are dismissed, often with disdain, by the guardians of the institution and the hangers-on who are older and supposedly wiser. These dismissals ring especially false in the face of continued poor institutional performance. As a result, there is a growing breach of trust and respect between elements of the middle management on one hand, and the institutional leadership and their guardians on the other. It is not pay or operational tempo that will drive talent out, but disgust with a broken organization that does not utilize them to their full potential.

Kohlmann’s reference to a 31-year old Goldman Sachs vice president was perhaps unconvincing to this audience. The critics will likewise find fault with this example. President Obama nominated 38-year old Brett McGurk to be the next ambassador to Iraq. While many are attacking this choice, McGurk is being considered for a job roughly equivalent to that of a 4-star general, while his military counterparts
of the same age would just be pinning on lieutenant colonel. What is more, he has already held positions of far more influence than even a lieutenant colonel would muster. The point is that a military that needs agility and cultural change would be well served to bring some flexibility into its personnel policies, recognizing that some people will internalize more experience in 15 years than others would in 30. Additionally, the growing trust gap is I alluded to is fuelled when extremely talented middle managers languish under incompetent leadership that the system has promoted beyond their level of competence.

On the point of competence, I completely agree with all the comments that stressed the bedrock requirement for tactical and technical proficiency above all. Competence breeds confidence and confidence is what is lacking in almost every toxic commander. Like a flight instructor, you have to be confident in and cognizant of your capabilities and limitations in order to let the student learn to fly the plane. Toxic leaders lack this confidence and self-understanding. They scream at juniors for trying to fly the plane ahead of their time. Then when they need the junior to fly a plane they haven’t been taught or groomed to fly, they scream at them for not knowing how. Just as we must learn our tactical jobs, leaders need to be properly selected and educated for the far different challenges of organizational leadership and management at higher levels. Our promotion and education system often fails in this task, putting senior officers in waters they never could handle, while talented juniors look on in disgust, the most talented knowing they could do better. If we do not let them do better, we are missing an opportunity to improve the organization and we will be missing their talents when they walk away to greener pastures.

Disruptive thinkers are not a threat to good order and discipline, nor to mission accomplishment. Disruptive non-thinkers, on the other hand, are. We are in for times far more challenging than most of our force can currently foresee. In order to find success, we will have to encourage disruptive thinking to spur innovation from the bottom up. This will never happen, however, if we do not get the coming transition right by empowering the right change leaders to think and act disruptively to change our organizational structure and culture from the top down.

ENDNOTES
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Peter J Munson is a Marine officer, KC-130 pilot, and Middle East Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command. He is the author of two books, *Iraq in Transition: The Legacy of Dictatorship and the Prospects for Democracy* (Potomac, 2009) and *War, Welfare, and Democracy: Rethinking America’s Quest for the End of History* (Potomac, forthcoming in fall 2012). A frequent contributor to multiple journals and blogs, including his own (http://peterjmunson.blogspot.com), he is also the Editor of the *Small Wars Journal*. All views are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Marine Corps or Department of Defense.
In the years since improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became symbols of asymmetric warfare and modern military conflict, very little has changed in the realm of counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) strategy. The military is always searching for better vehicles and equipment to defeat what is, at its core, a homemade device made for a fraction of the cost of our technological countermeasures. As a result, C-IED strategy has primarily focused on developing new ways to mitigate the effects of an IED blast rather than trying to prevent it from occurring. Billions of dollars have been spent in the name of saving lives, yet the true cause of the problem and its origins remain largely ignored, leaving out the crucial role played by population-centric counterinsurgency operations.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

When elements of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment arrived in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, in July 2010, they faced an area of operations that had seen constantly increasing IED

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activity for several years in the same spots along Highway 1, an important maneuver corridor running from Kandahar City to Kabul. Casualties quickly mounted as IEDs with large net explosive weights detonated on convoys and route clearance vehicles, destroying even the largest of their kind. The insurgents had the propaganda victory they sought by obliterating American “tanks,” and security forces were scrambling to stop the bleeding and maintain freedom of movement.

Initial counter-IED plans sought to facilitate the relief in place between two Romanian battalions conducting operations along the highway. Conceived as a means to deter enemy IED emplacement, the plan was simple—flood the engagement areas with security forces, occupy established checkpoints, and maintain near constant surveillance to interdict any attempted insurgent activity on the most dangerous sections of the road. A combined arms approach integrated route clearance platoons with organic maneuver units to patrol the highway. Improvised explosive device activity decreased rapidly despite insurgent attempts to exploit the seams of units’ battle spaces and emplace IEDs in the least-patrolled and least-overwatched areas.

The mission was considered a success. The Romanian battalions were able to conduct their transfer of authority, and overall insurgent IED activity on the previously lethal sections of the road remained mostly low or ineffective, even during the usual summer fighting surge in southern Afghanistan. The presence of security forces along the highway decreased in favor of operations in other areas, and the IED threat was believed to be mostly pacified.

Yet, the IEDs never really went away. A few months later, in the period leading up to the provincial elections in September, new engagement areas were steadily appearing just outside the previously established boundaries of the first operation. By November, the same sections of the road had re-emerged as the most dangerous routes in the area of operations as over 1,500 pounds of homemade explosives detonated in the course of only a few days. With the arrival of spring in 2011, IED activity resumed in the same areas it had taken place during the previous three years. Initial suppression operations had succeeded in temporarily relieving the pressure, but failed to address the true source of the IED problem—the pervading influence and support of a homegrown local insurgency.

SECURITY AND INFLUENCE

The first step for any counterinsurgent is to secure the population against the intimidation and influence of the insurgency. Doctrine (and conventional wisdom) argue that the surest way to accomplish this is by establishing a persistent partnership with local security forces and living among the population. Merely conducting weekly visits and key leader engagements with local elders and officials may provide insights into governance and development issues, but they achieve few lasting effects unless the people feel safe.
Because both sides of a modern asymmetric conflict must continuously vie for the support of the local population, the counterinsurgent can develop a baseline security assessment of an area by tracking reports of insurgent activity against civilians. In this case, distinguishing between active anti-civilian and passive anti-civilian activity is critical. Active anti-civilian activity can include intimidation, forced taxation, and isolation through the emplacement of mine or IED obstacle belts that limit the population’s freedom of movement. Clearly, counterinsurgents cannot engage in such activity because it would lead to a complete loss of popular support and bring a swift end to their efforts. Insurgents, on the other hand, may use these tactics to increase their control and influence in a given area. Popular support need not be given happily, but it must be at a level to ensure that the influence of government security forces and the people’s desire for economic and essential services aid never outweigh their fear of insurgent retribution or punishment. As an example, there have been cases in which the Taliban senior leadership replaced insurgent commanders because they were thought to have been too harsh on local civilians and therefore a threat to the insurgency’s popular support.\footnote{1} The most successful insurgent commanders know to use intimidation only when necessary to maintain their control of the people.

Consequently, areas experiencing limited insurgent intimidation are more likely to be insurgent-dominated support zones than areas with higher numbers of reports, especially in places with a significant International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) or Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) presence.

In this regard, the term “freedom of influence” is introduced in order to more precisely define the variable that the insurgents use to control the population. Whereas freedom of movement describes the ability of a maneuver element to project combat power at a chosen time, space, and purpose, freedom of influence reflects the capability of the insurgent or counterinsurgent to engage with and directly affect the local population’s attitudes, opinions, and perceptions.

In the situation described earlier, although ISAF and ANSF security forces were able to maintain their freedom of movement by conducting disruption and interdiction operations along Highway 1, the insurgents held their freedom of influence on the population in the surrounding villages. This led to a continuously accessible support zone just outside the operational boundaries and focus of friendly security patrols. The early positive effects they achieved did not translate into lasting security gains, leaving the next rotation of units open to the same dangers as before.

**MEASURING SUCCESS**

In a field replete with numbers, statistics, metrics, and assessments, defining a true measure of success for C-IED operations and strategy is difficult. The standard model tends to weigh heavily the number of IEDs found and cleared by security
forces against the number that detonate. The underlying assumption is that an increased percentage of IEDs found and cleared means that insurgent forces are less effective with their IED emplacements, and that friendly forces have adapted to enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Further analysis looks at the rate at which the percentage of cleared IEDs increases or decreases, which measures how quickly friendly forces are adapting to changes in insurgent tactics (or, conversely, how slowly the insurgents are changing their tactics to match the counterinsurgents’ countermeasures). Another way of looking at the problem is to assess the effectiveness of IED detonations by determining how many IED strikes damage vehicles or cause casualties. However, most of these methods are better for identifying contested areas rather than assessing a district’s overall security because IED activity will typically mirror any increased presence of security forces.

Additional methodologies of quantitative and qualitative data analysis attempt to track overall security trends at both a provincial and district level. Unfortunately, most of these are defined in terms of counterinsurgent activity rather than that of the civilian population. For example, a “route status matrix” provides commanders with a graphical depiction of freedom of movement on primary and secondary roads based on recent IED activity (normally an aggregate set against ISAF and ANSF patrols) as well as deliberate clearance operations conducted by engineers and route clearance platoons. However, this matrix does not consider freedom of movement of local traffic, which could present a vastly different picture if an insurgent has decided not to limit the security forces’ freedom of movement but rather to maintain his own freedom of influence by placing obstacle belts between the population and the roads.

The metric perhaps least reminiscent of classic and modern counterinsurgency doctrine is tracking the number of high-valued individuals (HVIs) killed or captured in raids or direct attacks. Those classified as HVIs are normally senior insurgent military commanders or shadow government leaders with influence within the Taliban. They are rarely, if ever, low-level insurgents actually conducting the attacks. Such individuals are considered expendable and easily replaceable.

Yet throughout the last several years, insurgent networks have grown increasingly larger and more interconnected. Finding an irreplaceable leader or personality has proven nearly impossible. Little quantitative data exists to support the hypothesis that HVI targeting operations have any measurable long-term effect on levels of insurgent activity; their operations may slow down or even cease after they lose a key leader or explosives expert, but it is only a matter of time before the void is filled and operations resume. Treating the symptoms does not cure the disease.

However, one metric may effectively measure security gains in the Afghan counterinsurgency conflict and modern asymmetric conflict in general, particularly at the local or district level—IEDs turned in or reported by civilians. In these instances,
a local national provides unsolicited information to ISAF or ANSF forces that leads
to the discovery of an IED or its components. Care must be taken to distinguish an
unsolicited tip from that of a paid informant or source. While an informant may
provide potentially reliable information, there have been cases of sources intention-
ally emplacing weapons or explosive materials themselves and then leading security
forces to the cache site simply to collect a monetary reward.

The importance of an IED turned in by a civilian comes from the direct interac-
tion between that person and representatives of the government, particularly if the
device is turned in to the Afghan National Army, police, or local governance centers.
A local population willing to point out the locations of explosive materials could
indicate security gains in that area, especially if the area already has a high level of
insurgent IED activity. The more the people feel that the government can protect
them and provide better stability than the insurgents, the greater the stake they have
in their own security against insurgent intimidation. Similar developments led to the
beginning of the highly successful Sunni Awakening and the Sons of Iraq program
in late 2006, as well as the onset of the Afghan Local Police program in 2010.

The most successful C-IED operations nest within counterinsurgency strategy
and doctrine. They do not focus on the devices themselves, but on the population. A
company-sized element that moves into villages adjacent to a primary IED engage-
ment area and remains there for an extended period, habitually interacting with the
villagers and conducting key leader engagements, should begin to see security gains
in the form of local national tips and turn-ins. In some cases, a lack of available
maneuver units can limit combat power for such operations, forcing commanders to
attempt to cover large areas and reducing the number of possible engagements with
the people. However, in the end, a continuous presence somewhere is better than a
fleeting presence everywhere. As the people begin to believe that the security will be
lasting and not just temporary, they are more likely to provide intelligence and turn
against the insurgency.2

An area with a large ISAF presence, and consequently an increased amount of
violent activity, but with no increase in IEDs turned in is cause for concern. Villages
with a higher number of turn-ins likely feel more connected to their government
and security forces and are more willing to take a direct stand against the insurgency.
Conversely, low turn-in areas may fear intimidation and retaliation for assisting
security forces and would rather hold their tongue and remain isolated than fight back.
In that case, the insurgent influence in the area is probably strong enough that the
people fear the repercussions of cooperating with the government more than they seek
its protection. Special attention should be paid to IED events within a short distance
of a village, since the people in the village likely knew something about the device and
its emplacement, but were too afraid to say anything. These events are far too common
and must be countered by comprehensive counterinsurgency operations.
Each explosive detonation against ISAF or ANSF is a psychological victory for the insurgency, demonstrating the weakness of the government and its inability to provide security and stability for its people. The government must convince the people, especially their influential community and religious leaders, that the insurgency poses the greater threat to their villages and people. All too often, the sporadic presence of security forces in an area leads to a rapid spike of activity in response, conditioning the people to associate the government with increased violence. To actively engage the population and garner support against the insurgency, the counterinsurgent must overcome this mindset.

Separating the people from the influence of their government is one of the primary objectives for an insurgency in order to maintain its influence over the population free from outside intervention. Afghanistan expert Seth Jones notes that “by threatening the population, the insurgents give individuals a strong rationale to refuse or refrain from cooperating with the indigenous government and external actors.” Successful counterinsurgency operations must aim to defeat this insurgent influence. The first step in that process is security; a population can never have faith in its government if it is not trusted to provide even basic protection. A periodic presence will not suffice, since the insurgents can (and usually do) wait until a patrol has left the area to aggressively counter any positive relations and reclaim their control of the people. Only persistent security during the initial stages of operations can set the conditions to tip the balance of support in favor of the government and away from the insurgents.

SEPARATING THE INSURGENT, ATTACKING THE NETWORK

Successfully securing the population will lead to the separation of the insurgent, as the insurgency requires the support of the people to survive. One of the key advances in modern counterinsurgency has been the application of biometric and forensic intelligence to catch an elusive enemy capable of blending in with the population. Biometric enrollments have become part of campaign plans, and the addition of law enforcement personnel and trained explosive ordnance disposal technicians has provided units with increasingly more information about the construction and origins of IEDs through their detailed post-blast analysis. Separately, biometrics and post-blast analysis each provide invaluable intelligence unavailable to previous generations of counterinsurgents, but their benefits become even more evident when combined.

Conducting independent biometric enrollments is an excellent way to build a database of citizens but by itself does not separate the insurgent from the population except in certain rare cases. Similarly, comprehensive post-blast analysis provides a wealth of information about IED construction and composition, often including fingerprints and other biometric data found at the scene of an event, but ends short of positive identification. Although latent fingerprints can be matched to others
found in different events, they provide little information about the actual person emplacing or constructing the devices.

When biometrics and post-blast analysis merge, they have the capability to truly separate the insurgent. Fingerprints recovered from IED materials in one area can be linked to a specific person enrolled somewhere else, painting a more detailed picture of the device’s origin and defining the insurgent network more clearly. Such success depends on training units to treat each IED event not as an impediment to maneuver that they need to breach or clear, but as a legitimate crime scene with valuable forensic evidence available to catch the perpetrator and identify his supplier.

Education for indigenous and coalition security forces as well as the local population is paramount to understanding how both biometrics and post-blast analysis can be used to isolate the insurgents from innocents, identifying those who act against the interests of the people and the government. A robust biometrics and forensics program should be at the forefront of any “attack the network” strategy because it can link explosive events to their locations on the battlefield and potentially provide the identity of those responsible. Developing a picture of these low-level insurgent networks is the key to understanding the origins of the explosive devices and identifying the supply chains that support them.

Ultimately, the true goal of biometrics and forensics is to develop the rule of law through the host nation government and judicial system. Evidence collected from explosive materials or post-blast analysis can help convict criminals in local courts. Warrants and arrests are the direct result of a concerted effort by ground units in partnership with indigenous security forces to conduct a thorough investigation of an event rather than clearing the scene and moving on to the next objective. The gratification may not be as instant as catching an insurgent in the act, but the long-term effects are considerably more beneficial.

Despite the potential advantages of quickly enrolling an entire population into a biometrics database, care must be taken to ensure that indigenous security forces take the lead in all biometrics operations to avoid the perception of continuous foreign intervention and the systematic cataloguing of local citizens. More direct action on the part of ISAF forces runs the risk of aggravating the very population they mean to protect, while host nation forces can build relationships with the local civilians while conducting a legitimate census. This has the added benefit of engaging many communities that traditionally do not see a regular ANSF presence. Although biometrics collection is an important element of C-IED strategy, it should not come at the expense of alienating the people.

Attacking the network through a concerted evidence and biometrics collection effort is an integral aspect of C-IED strategy, yet it must complement rather than substitute for counterinsurgency operations. Understanding the difference between actively targeting insurgent nodes and indirectly eroding their support and influence
through the population is important. While analyzing insurgent TTP and attack methods will certainly provide valuable information to ground units conducting operations, it does not eliminate the source of the threat. A constantly evolving game of spy-versus-spy only circumvents the issue, showing no signs of ending as both insurgent and counterinsurgent vie for the tactical upper hand.

**FINAL THOUGHTS**

Military strategy in Afghanistan has scarcely changed since the early days of hunting the Taliban in 2001. Even today, we place more emphasis and attention on targeting operations designed to crumble insurgent networks than on population-centric counterinsurgency. Improvised explosive devices are considered a lamentable byproduct of the insurgent’s general unwillingness to engage in direct action. Technological advances continue to flow into theater to guard against increasingly sophisticated and dangerous threats that, in spite of the new technology, continue to injure and kill soldiers and civilians.

Both of these methods—targeting and technology—are essentially defensive and reactive in nature. Even operations against Taliban leaders and facilitators seek to reduce insurgent capability to conduct attacks, their success measured in complicated slides, graphs, and charts arranged in whatever way best represents progress. IEDs are simply the weapon of choice to support the insurgents’ political cause, facilitating consolidation of power and influence from within the population.

Although counter-IED strategy is a microcosm of counterinsurgency, our intelligence and operations groups sometimes treat it as a separate function, preferring to develop new methods to defeat the device (or its intended effects) rather than understand it. The tools needed to effectively neutralize IEDs as a battlefield threat will not be found in technological systems or equipment, nor in killing insurgent leaders, but rather in building relationships with the people who have become the battleground for all modern military conflicts. Their silence speaks as loudly as the next explosion.

**ENDNOTES**

2 See for example the Canadian’s experience in Kandahar in 2009; Carl Forsberg, “The Taliban’s Campaign for Kandahar,” The Institute for the Study of War, December 2009, 52.
ABSTRACT

Since 1999, reinvigorated understanding and investment has seen an increase in the effective use of intelligence and its associated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection capabilities during recent operations in the Middle East and South Asia. During this period Army’s intelligence capability has demonstrated agility in tailoring its organisation to meet evolving expeditionary force requirements—this has been no more evident than during deployments to Afghanistan. This article examines two key challenges for Army’s intelligence capability post-Afghanistan. Initially, it will examine the challenge of introducing the provision of professional intelligence support to commanders at Army’s highest levels in order to improve synchronisation of effort regarding intelligence activities across the Service. Secondly, it will review the provision of intelligence support to amphibious operations and the challenge of preparing personnel for employment within a new capability, while being constrained by time and a lack of current knowledge, skill and experience.
And in all honesty, while some view the next few years as the post-Iraq and after 2014 the post-Afghanistan period, the reality is the next few years are likely to be the ‘pre-war’ years for a contingency, crisis or conflict beyond prediction today.¹

INTRODUCTION

For over a decade, the Australian Intelligence Corps has deployed in support of operations across the globe. Intelligence Corps personnel have been required to display a high degree of agility and adaptation as they have gone about their task of conducting and coordinating intelligence support to military and civilian decision-makers, policy-makers and planners. The nature of recent operations in which the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been involved, namely distributed counterinsurgency operations, irregular warfare, and joint and coalition cooperation, has resulted in a number of improvised and ad-hoc arrangements, practices, technological innovations and tactical support structures. During this period Army’s intelligence capability has demonstrated marked agility in tailoring its organisation to meet these evolving expeditionary force requirements—no more evident than on operations in Afghanistan.

However, the messy, hybrid, irregular conflicts of the post-Cold War era are unlikely to suddenly end with Afghanistan, and nor should the Army’s ongoing systematic capability development and adaptation to confront such conflicts.² Such adaptation, both procedurally and organisationally, must continue in a constantly fluctuating geostrategic operational landscape. Intelligence personnel must capitalise on a decade’s worth of valuable experience and continue to remain prepared to provide first-class support in a world where global stability is increasingly threatened by such issues as nuclear proliferation, shifting power dynamics in strategically vital regions, an increase in non-state actors and threat groups, cyber warfare and transnational crime. Indeed an array of these threats will most likely co-exist in potential future operating environments.³ As these threats constantly change and adapt, so too will the environment and tools which they exploit.

Globalisation, sophisticated satellite technology, the universal reach of the Internet, and hand-held smart phone devices enabled by clever social networking software all contribute to a highly complex and ever-changing threat environment.⁴

Like many of the capabilities within Army, intelligence faces many challenges in the post-Afghanistan environment. The purpose of this article is to highlight two key
challenges for Army’s intelligence capability. It will posit that senior commanders within Army do not receive adequate professional intelligence support. Despite the increased understanding and recognition of intelligence there remain many challenges, some of which are longstanding. Army’s most senior commanders require dedicated, professional, intelligence support in order to provide effective synchronisation of effort to intelligence activities and capabilities across the Service. It will also review the specific challenge of providing intelligence support to amphibious operations. Intelligence forms a critical component in the planning and conduct of any amphibious operation. Along with the other staff functions, and in concert with its maritime intelligence partners, the Intelligence Corps faces the challenge of preparing personnel for employment within a new capability while being constrained by time and a lack of current knowledge, skill and experience.

PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO ARMY’S SENIOR LEADERSHIP

Creating effective intelligence is an inherent and essential responsibility of command. Intelligence failures are failures of command—just as operations failures are command failures.  

While it is widely understood in Western military doctrine that the commander directs the intelligence effort, it is the principal intelligence officer, regardless of level, who manages this effort. This responsibility includes acting as the commander’s principal advisor for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and implementing activities that carry out the commander’s intelligence responsibilities. As important, the principal intelligence officer is a full participant in the commander’s decision-making process, ensuring that intelligence is effectively used during all phases of mission planning and execution. Australian Intelligence Corps personnel are the only personnel within Army that are trained and qualified as principal intelligence officers.

Army’s expeditionary tactical-level ISR collection capabilities consist of disparate stakeholders including the signals, artillery and intelligence communities. Due to operational necessity, over the past decade the Army has invested considerable resources into improving these previously neglected capabilities. This includes expanding its tactical human intelligence capability, establishing its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities, improving the tactical signals intelligence capability, increasing dedicated tactical intelligence staff support, and providing increased tactical ISR collection capabilities at battle group level. Some of these improvements were further reinforced in March 2010, with the reorganisation of these expeditionary tactical ISR collection capabilities into a single formation—6th Brigade—albeit alongside eight other unrelated units.
The UK Director of Naval Intelligence in the Second World War, Rear Admiral Edmund Rushbrooke observed that ‘Intelligence is the Cinderella service. War is the Fairy Godmother who changes Cinderella into a Princess’. If the last decade is any indication, this metaphor remains true for Army. Yet despite the increased intelligence capabilities and growing recognition of its importance on the battlefield, there remains a lack of qualified and dedicated professional intelligence support to Army’s most senior commanders. Currently, the professional principal intelligence advice to commanders within Army peaks at Headquarters 1st Division and Headquarters Special Operations Command. This section will examine how professional intelligence officers at Army’s highest headquarters could ensure the improved management of intelligence continues unabated and that the Army’s intelligence capability is ready for the next fight.

HEADQUARTERS FORCES COMMAND

Established in mid-2009, Forces Command replaced both Land Command and Training Command as the single organisation responsible for individual and collective training. With the notable exception of intelligence, each staff function is represented in the current structure at Headquarters Forces Command. Personnel, operations, logistics, plans, signals, training, health and chaplains are each led by a colonel. Furthermore, Headquarters 6th Brigade also has colonels to represent artillery and engineers. Bereft of intelligence staff, Commander Forces Command and his key staff are deprived of critical intelligence support including qualified advice, coordination and management of a number of intelligence and broader ISR-related issues. Commander Forces Command can draw upon Commander 6th Brigade and his limited ISR staff for expertise regarding highly-specialised, deployable, tactical-level ISR collection capabilities. However, there remains no trained and dedicated professional intelligence staff that can provide the necessary support for the management and coordination of intelligence personnel, capability and policy-related issues across the command.

Due to the mission of Forces Command, the principal intelligence officer’s role of the provision of all-source intelligence would likely be of less focus. However, a principal intelligence officer can ensure Commander Forces Command and staff have the appropriate qualified specialist advice on intelligence and ISR-related issues (tactical through national) including policy, manning and structure, capability development, emerging doctrine, personnel management, and individual and
collective training. For example, intelligence staff can ensure that intelligence and associated tactical ISR and national collection capabilities are effectively integrated into the individual and collective training continuum. In the past decade, this shortfall has largely been overcome by a cohort of tactical commanders and staff who have deployed and experienced what a complete intelligence staff function and supporting ISR collection capabilities provide.

On the present All-Corps Officer Training Continuum such as Staff Officer Grade Courses and Command and Staff College, as well as the Combined Arms Officers Course, officers are exposed to little more than the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace staff process. In order to improve the status quo in preparation for future operations, commanders and planners will require a broad understanding of how Army, ADF and allied ISR capabilities can support forthcoming operational deployments. This involves the complete structure of a deployed intelligence staff including its all-source capability and the various products it can produce, the capabilities and limitations of Army’s tactical ISR collection capabilities, and the role and functions of the national collection agencies.

Consistent and well-developed individual and collective training exposing Army officers to the roles and capabilities of Army intelligence and ISR capabilities will ensure these future commanders and staff understand what can be brought to the fight. Post-Afghanistan, the education received during individual training must be reinforced by exposure to these capabilities during collective training, including battle groups undertaking collective training for independent deployment. These battle groups should be supported by formation-level ISR including the complete intelligence staff function and national agency integration. Where appropriate, the intelligence staff at Headquarters Forces Command would provide the capability to coordinate allied ISR representation and integration into individual and collective training as required.

Additionally, intelligence staff at Headquarters Forces Command would supervise, coordinate and provide valuable input into emerging doctrinal and capability developments, thus ensuring a rigorous, informed and balanced debate on evolving issues. Examples include the ongoing or future responsibility for the size and role of Army’s deployable counter-intelligence and protective security capability. Currently it seems there is no informed representative at any level within Army who understands the issue beyond the force element. This could have serious effects on the battlefield, particularly as green-on-blue incidents (also known as the ‘insider threats or attacks’) in Afghanistan become increasingly prevalent.12

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Post-Afghanistan, the education received during individual training must be reinforced …
The ADF is less than two years away from receiving the Landing Helicopter Docks (LHD) capability, yet there is little discussion regarding intelligence in any amphibious concept documents beyond some talk of tactical ISR collection assets. This all-important concept of employment should drive the development of intelligence-related individual and collective training, doctrine, equipment and standard operating procedures, not to mention how intelligence staff structure will support the commanders. Due to the lack of adequate intelligence advice or representation at the right levels, these issues are in danger of being left unattended. Worse still, decisions risk being made based on well-meaning but ill-informed advice from staff who lack the experience and detailed understanding of the challenges at hand.

The final example of how dedicated intelligence staff can be used effectively occurred in July 2011 when the Chief of Staff of Headquarters Forces Command directed the Deputy Commander of 6th Brigade to undertake a review of Army’s intelligence personnel, stating that Army cannot manage the range of responsibilities currently assigned to it without better management of the asset.13 Why a brigade headquarters—of which one of its many responsibilities is Army’s expeditionary tactical ISR collection capabilities—was tasked with a review of Army’s intelligence personnel indicates a management deficiency that clearly highlights the need for intelligence staff at Headquarters Forces Command. Although the review was well intentioned and long overdue, this further begs the question why this task was not initiated or undertaken by the appropriate intelligence staff at Army Headquarters.14

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

The responsibility for intelligence plans and capability development at Army Headquarters resides under three key appointments: Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning, Director General Developments and Plans, and Director Network Enabled Warfare, where there are two intelligence officers—Staff Officer Grade 1 and Grade 2—for intelligence. These officers are the only qualified and dedicated intelligence professionals within Army Headquarters. Additionally, there is another Staff Officer Grade 1 responsible for ISR. Due to the growth and importance of intelligence in the past decade, the staff effort dedicated to Army’s intelligence plans and capability development is insufficient.
Given the growing importance and size of ‘ISR enablers’ and Army’s revitalised commitment to its ISR capability, Army Headquarters requires additional personnel with the requisite knowledge and expertise to advise the Chief of Army, through his senior staff, on intelligence plans and capability development. This includes liaising with the other services to ensure the ADF has a cohesive development strategy, and is not wasting valuable resources competing for or duplicating the same or similar capabilities. Although an ‘Intelligence Career Pathway’ exists from lieutenant colonel onwards, there are no intelligence appointments for colonels or above within Army. The experience, knowledge and expertise these officers can apply is significant, yet this resource remains untapped.

A possible solution is the establishment of a ‘Director of Army Intelligence’ at the O6-level who would provide a holistic approach to the coordination and management of intelligence related development across the entire service, an approach which is currently lacking. The Director of Army Intelligence and qualified specialist supporting staff would provide dedicated management to Army’s ISR capabilities and related intelligence disciplines such as geospatial, human, signals, technical, open-source, measurement and signature, and counter-intelligence. The Director of Army Intelligence staff need not all be intelligence professionals, rather a balance of personnel with the requisite subject matter expertise in the various collection capabilities and/or intelligence disciplines. This would provide the Director General Development and Plans with a highly skilled team to advise him and his plans, organisation and establishment staff. The Director of Army Intelligence's staff would apply significant knowledge, experience and consistency into the ongoing personnel challenges and ISR Force Modernisation Review that commenced in 2008 and remain unfinished. On behalf of Army the Director of Army Intelligence would also manage and coordinate the relationship between the Services including joint and single service ISR projects, allied partners and organisations within the Australian Intelligence Community.

The Director of Army Intelligence should have the capacity to supervise Army's external intelligence representation to ensure Army’s interests are represented effectively, especially when supporting land-centric operations. Further, the Director of Army Intelligence would provide the Chief of Army with a suitably qualified and experienced officer who would provide intelligence security, policy and personnel advice, including a coherent strategy for intelligence-related postings to...
the non-Army Group and into allied organisations overseas. Finally, the appointment of a Director of Army Intelligence would complete the staff relationship and centralised control intelligence and of ISR capabilities within Army that commences at Army Headquarters, through Headquarters Forces Command and finally into Headquarters 1st Division integrated intelligence staff function and Headquarters 6th Brigade with its resident deployable tactical ISR units. Although the Director General Developments and Plans recognised this gap during an establishment review in early 2011, the inability to identify a suitable offset postponed the issue until the next Army Headquarters establishment review scheduled for 2013. In the meantime it is disappointing that Army’s professional intelligence support remains under-represented at its highest headquarters.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE HEADQUARTERS

The Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) is the Department of Defence’s strategic all-source intelligence assessment agency. The Director DIO is responsible for commanding the organisation, and is also the Chief of Defence Force’s (CDF) principal intelligence officer, known as the ‘Strategic J2’. The 2004 Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies by Mr Philip Flood recommended that the selection of Director DIO be made ‘on merit with a preference for a suitably qualified high-quality military officer if such an officer is available’. Director DIO is considered the most senior uniformed intelligence appointment in the ADF, yet no long-serving professional intelligence officer has held the position.

There is merit in appointing non-intelligence professionals, especially former commanders, in leadership roles within a nation’s peak intelligence organisations. As previously mentioned, commanders direct the intelligence effort at all levels. Throughout their careers these former commanders have been consumers of intelligence and understand the role it plays in both decision and policy-making. Importantly, the appointment of a non-intelligence professional can sometimes bring fresh insight into the way intelligence is produced and disseminated, leveraging off years of experience as commanders at various levels during their careers. Further, commanders possess experience leading large organisations, or supervising staff responsible for large, budget-heavy projects. Both the United Kingdom and Canada appoint a ‘Chief of Defence Intelligence’ at the two- and three-star level, many of whom are former commanders. However, while the UK and Canadian intelligence chiefs lead large intelligence organisations, they are not employed as principal intelligence advisors. The United States, whose intelligence budget and capability eclipses the combined worth of its Commonwealth allies, overwhelming appoints intelligence professionals to lead their peak national intelligence agencies and as principal intelligence advisors.
The appointment of a professional intelligence officer to lead strategic intelligence organisations and provide advice to national decision-makers offers significant benefits. In Australia’s context, considerations include:

- **Representation at this rank level assists in the aspiration of delivering intelligence-led decisions, policy and operations and provides centralised control.** As a member of the Strategic Command Group, Director DIO provides all-source strategic defence intelligence to senior defence and civilian decision- and policy-makers. As the ADF’s senior principal intelligence officer (the ‘Strategic J2’), Director DIO is a full participant in the CDF’s decision-making process. The role of the ‘Strategic J2’ is more than simply providing intelligence assessment. Like a principal intelligence officer at any level, in his capacity as the ‘Strategic J2’ Director DIO must ensure the ADF’s intelligence capabilities are employed as a strategic asset and are effectively considered throughout all phases of strategic planning and policy-making. A senior intelligence professional will intuitively understand this based on their training and depth of experience. They will possess instinctive knowledge of what to ask for and from whom. Of note Director DIO has no staff to assist him in his ‘Strategic J2’ role except for the Director General – Intelligence who is also employed as the J2 for Headquarters Joint Operations Command. Finally, the appointment of an intelligence professional as the ‘Strategic J2’ will, via the proposed Director of Army Intelligence and Principal Intelligence Officer Headquarters Forces Command, ensure intelligence is controlled and coordinated centrally, thereby adhering to a key principle of intelligence.

- **The size, importance and complexity of intelligence has grown exponentially since 1999.** The Army has recognised the importance and benefits of appointing suitably trained and qualified intelligence professionals as unit-level intelligence officers throughout Army’s three regular brigades; they are no longer extra-regimental appointments. This was due to the evolution in the level of complexity and importance of the role intelligence now undertakes at the tactical-level during operations. Arguably, this complexity increases exponentially at the strategic-level. Here, large, well-resourced, national intelligence agencies manage highly sensitive collection and assessment capabilities, and the policies and relationships that underpin them. Ultimately, these assessments inform decisions and policy-making at the national level. However, despite the growth in size and complexity of intelligence at the strategic levels, the recognition of intelligence professionals is yet to translate into the higher echelons of Army and Defence intelligence.
- **Draw upon a career of professional intelligence networking both domestically and internationally.** Intelligence in the Australian context relies on a network of allies not least of which is the United States. Throughout their career, intelligence professionals working within the intelligence community have increased opportunities to build strong professional networks and can draw on such relationships to good advantage. The same network of professional relationships applies domestically both in the Defence Intelligence Community and wider Australian Intelligence Community. An intelligence professional is less likely to require an in-depth introductory period learning about DIO, the Australian Intelligence Community, and the allied intelligence agencies and organisations for the first portion of their posting. Furthermore, this introductory process probably inhibits any momentum generated by the previous executive administration.

- **Strategic messaging.** The message to Australia’s allies is an important one. Australia leverages heavily on the United States for intelligence support. Each service in the United States possesses an intelligence specialisation where officers can reach a two-star ranking as a Service, Combatant Command or Joint Staff J2, and three-star ranking in command of the Defense Intelligence Agency—DIO’s sister agency in the United States. These officers are overwhelmingly career intelligence professionals who have been employed as principal intelligence advisors or commanding intelligence collection capabilities at unit or formation-level throughout their careers.

- **The symbolism associated with the appointment of a professional intelligence officer aids the retention of capable, ambitious intelligence talent.** ADF intelligence professionals from the three services look to Director DIO and his position as the CDF’s principal intelligence advisor as the culmination of a career within their service and wider defence intelligence community. These are officers who have spent their careers providing intelligence advice to commanders at almost every level domestically and during operational deployment. The experience, knowledge and expertise that these officers can apply is significant, yet this resource remains unexploited. The ADF and Army have senior specialist officers at the O6-level and above employed in the logistics, special forces and communications communities to name a few, yet fails to capitalise on leveraging the experience of its intelligence professionals both within Army and DIO. Of the eight directors of DIO since 1990, only one possessed an intelligence background. By inference this could imply that Army has no suitably qualified, high
quality, professional military intelligence officers capable of assuming the appointment of Director DIO. However, an examination of available personnel indicates this is not the case. Acknowledging that ‘suitably qualified’ covers a range of competencies, demonstrated competence within the field of intelligence should rate highly.26

Currently, the Army has five brigadiers each with more than twenty years experience within the intelligence community. Three of these brigadiers have served as the assistant principal intelligence officer (Deputy CJ2) to the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, while another is currently serving in the position. The Deputy CJ2 ISAF position is the highest non-US intelligence appointment in theatre and is the second most senior intelligence representative behind CJ2 ISAF—a US Army major general who is a career military intelligence officer. The Deputy CJ2 ISAF is responsible for assisting CJ2 ISAF in the supervision and management of the intelligence architecture in Afghanistan, which ranges from tactical through to strategic intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, thousands of personnel and hundreds of millions of dollars of specialised equipment. During his year-long tenure, the Deputy CJ2 ISAF is often called upon to act as the CJ2 ISAF in his absence.

For the first time since the Vietnam War, Army now possesses a significant depth and quality of senior professional military intelligence expertise ready to provide advice to senior commanders and lead or hold senior appointments within intelligence or collection organisations. While the appointment of former operational commanders to lead intelligence organisations can be seen to offer fresh insight, career intelligence professionals not only possess the requisite skills, knowledge and experience, but also inherently understand the nuances, relationships and culture having developed and grown as a professional within the intelligence community. Although there are arguably some benefits from appointing non-intelligence professionals, given the current depth of talent and expertise of senior intelligence professionals currently available in Army, the time is ready for the balance to shift.

**ARMY’S INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS**

*Major Earl ‘Pete’ Ellis wrote the seminal conceptual treatise on amphibious operations, ‘Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia’, in 1921. At that time the Navy and Marine Corps did not possess a single amphibious ship, landing craft, or amphibious vehicle.*27

In 2014/15 the ADF will introduce into service two Canberra class Landing Helicopter Docks (LHD).28 The Canberra class LHD will be the largest warship ever operated by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and will represent a sea change in force projection capability. At the launch of the first LHD hull in February 2011, the
then Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Crane, stated that ‘with a new generation in technology would come a new way of thinking in terms of how Navy would operate and crew this new capability. I am confident we will have the people and the know-how by the time the first LHD comes on line.’

His statement is not only relevant to the Navy, but applies equally to the Army as the projection of land forces provides the raison d’être for the purchase of these naval platforms. Providing intelligence support to amphibious operations enabled by these platforms represents a challenge to the Intelligence Corps: how does the corps position itself to provide suitably trained and experienced personnel that have the requisite know-how to operate effectively as part of the (new) amphibious capability? While this section addresses intelligence support to amphibious capability, it should be noted that this cannot be considered in isolation; changes brought about by the need to support the amphibious capability must be synchronised with other developments in order to maintain a holistic approach to both the ADF’s and Army’s intelligence capability.

The ability for government to project military power throughout Australia’s region and beyond, by deployment and sustainment from the sea, places land force maritime manoeuvre in the littoral environment as a key component of future ADF capability. The ADF’s future Amphibious Task Force (ATF) may be directed to undertake amphibious operations in the near region or beyond, in a range of environments and the Amphibious Force enabled by the new naval platforms provides joint commanders with scalable, expeditionary combined arms response options. The primary component of Army’s contribution to the ATF will be the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG).

The Operational Concept Document for the Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment System (JP2048) defines the ARG as ‘a Battle Group based organisation with enablers such as armour, artillery, aviation, engineers and logistics.’ The LHDs will be able to embark all of the necessary Combat Support, Combat Service Support and ISR capabilities necessary for a battle group to operate independently and, when desired, to fully integrate the battle group into a joint, interagency and/or coalition operation. Jon Hawkins and Albert Palazzo have examined how the Army and the ADF would undertake and sustain a dedicated standing ARG, including the challenges of certification and effective collective training. Both Hawkins and Palazzo consider the United States Marine Corps (USMC) to be the world’s best practitioners of amphibious operations but also acknowledge the UK, Netherlands, France and Italy as having useful models.
Regardless of the future environment or operation in which the ARG will be employed, intelligence will be required to provide support throughout all operational and tactical phases. The Intelligence Corps will be required to support amphibious operations by providing analytical support from the strategic through tactical levels. Intelligence support to strategic decision-making will be required at Australian Defence Headquarters, into operational and contingency planning at Headquarters Joint Operations Command, and into tactical planning at Headquarters 1st Division and 3rd Brigade. When afloat, the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force will be supported by his own maritime intelligence staff, while the Commander Land Forces and the Commanding Officer of the ARG will require support from an integral intelligence staff and broader intelligence architecture. Additionally, such a staff will need to be capable of integrating the specialist intelligence staff required to support a Special Operations Task Group, Rotary Wing Task Group or a Logistics Support Element. The Australian Intelligence Corps is approximately 500-strong; directly or indirectly supporting the deployment of the ATF will likely require a considerable number of these personnel.

US Joint Doctrine states that amphibious operations have been characterised as one of the most complex and difficult military operations. Palazzo observes that among the most pressing requirements facing Army is to learn the complexities of amphibious operations and to work with Navy with a degree of intimacy and cooperation that has rarely existed before. Palazzo argues that the baseline for amphibious skills greatly exceeds that of traditional land warfare; personnel in the landing force must become masters of both land and maritime environments, particularly the dangerous transition from ship to shore (and back again). Intelligence is no exception.

Although the fundamental nature of intelligence support remains extant, there are areas where the support requirement differs from a purely land based operation. Amphibious operations involve extensive planning in all functional areas to ensure that personnel, ships, aircraft, landing craft, and supporting fires are synchronised to take advantage of an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities and expedite combat power build-up and sustainment ashore. Intelligence challenges cited in United States Joint Doctrine include a heavy initial reliance on national and theatre collection assets, the lack of amphibious force ISR assets in the operational area during the planning phase, the transition ashore, and the requirement to provide analysis to compensate
Concepts

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Gills

for relatively longer periods of uncertainty. Despite some of these challenges not being unique to amphibious operations, the complexity of the littoral environment underpinned by unfamiliarity of operating afloat alongside a nascent maritime intelligence capability will most certainly present a significant initial test for Army intelligence personnel.

The RAN also recognises the importance of the joint intelligence function. The RAN’s maritime joint warfighting capability document, *Future Maritime Operating Concept 2025*, identifies the importance of the fusion of multi-source intelligence data to produce a coherent picture for the joint force. While encouraging, there is more to the provision of intelligence support than picture compilation and this reinforces the need for all services to broaden and deepen their understanding of the intelligence support requirements to amphibious operations.

The importance of intelligence during the conduct of amphibious operations is highlighted by the personnel and space allocated within a United States Navy (USN) *Wasp* class LHD. The Joint Intelligence Centre on a *Wasp* class LHD has approximately sixty secure compartmented intelligence spaces for up to 120 USMC and USN intelligence personnel, divided evenly across both services and split between two shifts. While recognising that the RAN’s *Canberra* class LHD is around 10,000 tonnes smaller than a *Wasp* class LHD, the dedicated secure compartmented intelligence space is for eight personnel. This does not include spaces allocated to intelligence personnel within the Main Planning Room or Joint Operations Room, which may fluctuate depending on mission requirements. This physical limitation will define the operating parameters for both land and maritime intelligence staff while afloat. These parameters provide impetus for more effective and efficient intelligence-related systems and procedures—pending the amount of dedicated bandwidth—in order to compensate for the lack of allocated space. As highlighted previously, although the *Australian Amphibious Concept* was published in 2010, there remains no concept for the employment of intelligence support to amphibious operations which outlines proposed intelligence architecture, structure, capabilities, roles and responsibilities.

Despite this lack of concept, both land and maritime intelligence organisations have the right foundation to confront these challenges—their personnel already undertake individual training in a joint, interagency environment at the Defence Intelligence Training Centre. This training is reinforced by postings, deployments and experience in this environment from an early stage. The challenge for Army’s intelligence personnel is how to obtain the required experience and knowledge in the available time and current operational tempo, and invest this back into the individual training system while simultaneously being ready to provide support to amphibious operations. Specific subjects to address during individual training may include understanding amphibious command and control, planning considerations...
for amphibious operations including the Mission Appreciation Process/Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield-specific differences, additional allied and maritime ISR capabilities, and the constraints and limitations of the provision of intelligence support while afloat.47

The Army’s Intelligence Corps will need to rapidly introduce intelligence support to amphibious operations to its individual training continuum. However, before it can be introduced into training, instructional staff must acquire the requisite expertise in order to effectively train others. The simplest and most effective option is to gain the knowledge from one of Australia’s closest allies—the United States—and their naval expeditionary force in readiness for the USMC.48 Although Palazzo warns that the Army should carefully consider aspiring to the competency of the USMC, tapping into existing intelligence expertise offers a low risk, high pay-off opportunity given the USMC’s reputation as leaders in the field and underpinned by the likelihood of undertaking coalition operations in the future.49 This opportunity is further enhanced by the announcement of the deployment of US Marines to Darwin where they will conduct exercises and training on a rotational basis.50

In the short term, personnel identified for instructional postings or with tenure at the Defence Intelligence Training Centre would benefit from attendance at training conducted by the United States’ Expeditionary Warfare Training Group. Their programs focus on integrating intelligence with deliberate planning (operational and contingency) as well as rapid staff planning in support of crisis response. Courses for consideration include the Amphibious Warfare Indoctrination Course and Expeditionary Warfare Staff Planning Course. This individual training experience should be reinforced by experiential learning on annual collective training exercises such as the Battle Staff Training Program conducted by the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group and participation as integrated intelligence planning staff on USMC amphibious exercises such as Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR. Once trained, these personnel can return to instructional appointments to embed amphibious warfare knowledge, skill and experience into the Intelligence Corps individual training continuum. In order to create a sustainable instructor continuum, longer term options such as deployments or postings as intelligence planning staff in a marine expeditionary unit, the reactivation of an instructional exchange appointment at the Navy and Marine Intelligence Training Center, or the introduction of a liaison officer to the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance – Enterprise (MCISR-E) should

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Despite this lack of concept, both land and maritime intelligence organisations have the right foundation to confront these challenges …
also be considered.\textsuperscript{51} While the Strategic Reform Program\textsuperscript{52} and Brady Review\textsuperscript{53} are not particularly supportive of such arrangements, the magnitude of the capability and cost of capital assets indicates that this is a cost effective investment opportunity to ensure the Army can get the force at the right place, at the right time, in order to achieve the right effect.\textsuperscript{54}

As Palazzo observes, ‘there are few areas in Army that won’t be affected by the arrival of the LHDs.’\textsuperscript{55} Intelligence forms a critical component in the planning and conduct of any amphibious operation. Along with the other staff functions and in concert with its maritime intelligence partners, the Intelligence Corps faces the challenge of preparing personnel for employment within a new capability while being constrained by time and a lack of current knowledge, expertise and experience. The Army’s Intelligence Corps must rapidly prepare to provide intelligence support to amphibious operations in order to meet the intent of government and ADF headquarters in relation to their amphibious warfare aspirations. Although the ADF does not yet possess the LHD capabilities or even a concept for intelligence support, like the USMC of the 1920s the Army’s intelligence personnel, in close coordination with its RAN maritime intelligence partners can examine, test and introduce training and doctrine in preparation to integrate effectively into the amphibious capability. For the relatively small short-term investment in training and postings, Army’s intelligence personnel would be well positioned to support amphibious operations upon the arrival of the LHD capabilities.

CONCLUSION

\textit{Meaningful change will not occur until commanders at all levels take responsibility for intelligence.}\textsuperscript{56}

The reinvigorated understanding and investment has seen an increase in the effective use of intelligence and its associated ISR capabilities during operations in the Middle East and South Asia. Over the past decade the introduction and maturation of a new range of training organisations and capabilities underpinned by a depth of operational experience throughout all ranks provides a solid platform from which to continue development. However, like many of the capabilities within Army, intelligence faces many challenges post-Afghanistan.

The impending arrival of the RAN’s LHD capability heralds a new chapter in the ADF’s history. One which both land and maritime intelligence capabilities are currently unprepared for. Along with its maritime partners, rapid decision and solid
investment need to be undertaken to ensure that Army’s intelligence capability is
ready to contribute to this most complex and demanding of military operations. A
concept for intelligence support is urgently required in order to guide individual and
collective training, capability development and structure. In the meantime, Army’s
intelligence personnel, in close coordination with RAN maritime counterparts, need
look no further than one of their closest allies for expert advice on how to effectively
prepare. While mindful of their size and inherent capabilities, tapping into existing
intelligence expertise of the USMC offers a low risk, high pay-off opportunity given
the USMC’s reputation as leaders in the field and underpinned by the likelihood of
undertaking coalition operations together in the future.

The lack of intelligence input into, and preparation for, the introduction of the
amphibious capability is one of the consequences stemming from the lack of profes-
sional intelligence support to Army’s senior commanders. Army currently does
not have adequate professional intelligence support at the right levels in order to
effectively provide synchronisation of effort regarding intelligence activities and
capabilities across the Service. The unsustainable demand for intelligence personnel
to support current operations, the introduction of game changing intelligence capa-
bilities, the ongoing ISR Force Modernisation Review, and the ADF’s requirement
to refocus following Afghanistan all indicate the requirement for commanders to
receive the best possible professional intelligence support. Both of Army’s principal
commanders, the Chief of the Army and Commander Forces Command, require
additional integral, qualified, intelligence staff.

At this time, neither commander has immediate access to suitably qualified and
experienced professional intelligence officers to support them on issues including
training integration, policy advice, capability development and personnel manage-
ment. This lack of support is especially detrimental to the coherent and consistent
development of Army’s ISR capabilities. Although Army has recognised the impor-
tance of intelligence professionals at the tactical level, this is yet to transcend to its
highest headquarters, or indeed the Australian Defence Force Headquarters. The
CDF’s principal intelligence officer and director of the ADF’s peak analytical body
is rarely an intelligence professional. With the completion of combat operations
fast looming in Afghanistan, the maintenance of knowledge and understanding
of intelligence represents a challenge; future generations of commanders, policy-
makers and planners need to be active participants in the intelligence process, and
not just passive recipients. The investment in these qualified intelligence profes-
sionals means Army can optimise the overall management of one of its most critical
enablers, and not risk being underprepared for the next fight. Without this informed
and improved support, Army will once again risk stagnating development rather
than preparing its intelligence capability for the next contingency, crisis or conflict
beyond prediction today.
ENDNOTES

3 Ibid., p. 4.
6 The US, NATO and ABCA have no definition for ‘ISTAR’ or ‘ISTAREW’. The ADF definition of ISR is ‘a collection activity that synchronises and integrates the acquisition, processing and provision of information and single source intelligence by sources and agencies tasked to satisfy a collection requirement’ Source: ADDP 3.7 *Collection Operations*, Department of Defence, 2009.
8 6 BDE (ISR and Combat Support) comprises eleven units, three of which represent the Army’s dedicated expeditionary tactical-level ISR collection capabilities. These units are the 1st Intelligence Battalion, 20th Surveillance and Target Acquisition Regiment and the 7th Signals Regiment. Although Headquarters 6th Brigade is responsible for Army’s dedicated expeditionary tactical-level ISR collection capabilities, until January 2011 it did not have any Intelligence Corps staff at its headquarters. There is now an Intelligence Corps lieutenant colonel employed as the SO1 ISR.
10 The Hon Joel Fitzgibbon MP, Minister for Defence, *A Defence Force for the 21st Century*, Ministerial Support and Public Affairs, Department of Defence, Canberra, <http://www.defence.gov.au/media>, 2 May 2009. ‘The generation of operationally-ready land forces will be enhanced by the formation of Forces Command, located in Sydney, which will be responsible for all individual and group training.’
11 As part of their training as principal intelligence officers, Intelligence Corps personnel are the only members within Army that are trained and qualified in collection management and coordination of the employment of Army, ADF and allied tactical-through-national ISR capabilities. While there are experts in specific ISR or collection capabilities in Army and the ADF, Intelligence Corps personnel are taught the strength and limitations of these varied collection capabilities and how best to employ them in order to answer a commander’s priority intelligence requirements.
12 Congressional Hearings, *Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Situation in Afghanistan*, 22 March 2012, ISAF internet website <http://www.isaf.nato.int/from-the-commander/from-the-commander/transcript-gen.-john-r.-allen-comisaf-senate-armed-services-committee.html>. ‘Just since the 1st of January, the coalition has lost 61 brave troops in action from six different nations; and 13 of them were killed at the hands of what appear to have been Afghan security forces…’ About seventy members of the NATO force have been killed in forty-two insider attacks from May 2007 to January 2012. Four Australian Army personnel were killed in 2011 from insider attacks.

13 Brigadier J J Frewen, *Terms of Reference – Review of the Operational Sustainability of the Intelligence Asset*, HQFORCOMD/OUT/2011/X2258153/COFS/OUT/2011/315, 26 July 2011, para 1. Email from Career Advisor AUSTINT to author at DOCM dated 8 December 2011. He states that Intelligence Corps personnel currently fills sixty-four deployed corps-coded intelligence positions and 12 of the 35 joint rotational positions for a total of 76. This equates to a raw percentage of 15 per cent of the current 501 members of the Intelligence Corps. However; 34 per cent of captains were on operational respite and 40 per cent were either deployed or identified to deploy within the following six months. For majors, the respective figures were 15 per cent and 20 per cent. Importantly, additional intelligence personnel support current operations throughout Army and ADF including at HQJOC and national agencies.

14 Despite the recognition by Army senior leadership that Army’s intelligence personnel have been overcommitted to operations during much of the past decade, and despite the resulting reviews by various staff into the structure and sustainability of Army’s intelligence personnel – manning remains a challenge. In the latest attempt to remediate this problem, Army recently released a plan calling for non-AUSTINT volunteers (lieutenant-major) to undertake a period of non-corps service with the Australian Intelligence Corps. The intent of this program is to sustain operational commitments to all theatres between now and the end of 2014. At the end of their non-corps posting, officers will be given the opportunity to corps transfer to the Australian Intelligence Corps without loss of seniority. Although not without considerable risk or full consideration of potential second and third-order effects, this plan will probably succeed in addressing some of the short-term Manning shortfall. However, a solution to the enduring Manning challenges remains unresolved. With operational commitments ending in Afghanistan in 2014, in all likelihood this ongoing personnel issue could risk remaining dormant until the next conflict.


16 Email from SO1 Organisation at Army Headquarters to author dated 8 December 2011 and CO 1 Int Bn dated 27 March 2012. In this email, he states that the ISR Force Modernisation Review has been ongoing for over four years. After a hiatus of over 12 months, the ISR Force Modernisation Review will apparently be revived once again with the target completion date being December 2012. Intelligence or
intelligence-related capability reviews are being, or have recently been, conducted by Army Headquarters, Headquarters Forces Command, Headquarters Joint Operations Command, Vice Chief of Defence Force Group, and Intelligence and Security Group.

17 The Intelligence Corps has a number of personnel currently on overseas postings. Aside from Defence or Military Attaché appointments, Intelligence Corps personnel are currently employed in joint and Army exchange and liaison positions which are sponsored by a diverse number of organisations including DSD, DIO, HQ JOC, and HQ 6 BDE.

18 Director General Developments and Plans, comment made during discussions with author at the Australian Embassy, Washington DC, 18 September 2011.


21 Inquiry into the Australian Intelligence Agencies, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet <http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/intelligence_inquiry/chapter8/1_findings.htm#recommen>, Chapter 8 Summary of Findings and Recommendations, 31 July 2004, para 15e.

22 Isabelle Moses, 'CDI: Building a 21st century defence intelligence capability', The Maple Leaf, National Defence and Canadian Forces Magazine, Vol 10, No 5, 14 February 2007, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=3425>. The Canadian Chief of Defence Intelligence is a serving two-star military officer, who is responsible for common policy, oversight, doctrine and procedures for a much broader Canadian Defence Intelligence function. 'Defence Intelligence', Ministry of Defence archived website <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.mod.uk:80/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/SecurityandIntelligence/DIS/DefenceIntelligence.htm> UK Defence Intelligence is headed by the Chief of Defence Intelligence who is a serving three-star military officer and who, as the Ministry of Defence’s ‘intelligence process owner’, is also responsible for the overall coordination of intelligence activities throughout the armed forces and single Service Commands. He is supported by two deputies—one civilian and one military. The civilian Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence is responsible for Defence Intelligence analysis and production; the military Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff – Intelligence Capabilities is responsible for intelligence collection, mapping and training.

23 According to open source Internet research, of the last ten directors of Defense Intelligence Agency since 1981, eight have been intelligence professionals or had previously served in a number of intelligence command or staff appointments. Of
the last six directors of NSA since 1985, all have been intelligence professionals. Of the five directors of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency since 1996, four have been intelligence professionals. The principal intelligence officers at the Combatant Commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are all intelligence professionals.

24 ADDP 2.0, *Intelligence*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, Chapter 1, para 1.5, ‘Principles of Intelligence’ 2009, ‘Intelligence is controlled and coordinated centrally. This recognises the often sensitive nature of intelligence activities and promotes the efficient use of scarce collection, analytical and staff resources according to leadership priorities. Centralised control also enables effective technical control of intelligence staffs and agencies, ensuring that legal obligations and operational direction are complied with.’

25 P Gourley, ‘I spy another intelligence whitewash,’ *Canberra Times*, 3 April 2012, ‘Between 2000 and 2010, the combined budgets of Australia’s intelligence agencies increased from $317 million to $1070 million.’; S Neighbour, ‘Hidden Agendas: Our Intelligence Services,’ *The Monthly*, November 2011, <http://www.themonthly.com.au/monthly-essays-sally-neighbour-hidden-agendas-our-intelligence-services-2857>. ‘Australia now spends around $1.4 billion per annum on intelligence, out of a total national security budget of about $4 billion. According to the *Australian Defence Almanac 2010–2011* published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, since 2001 ASIO’s budget allocation has increased by 535%, Australian Secret Intelligence Service has increased 344%, while analysis agency the Office of National Assessments has increased by 443%.’ Figures were not available for DIO or the other defence intelligence agencies; however, respective resources allocation is likely to have grown commensurately.

26 Arguably, this logic should also apply for all senior leadership positions within both DIO and J2 Branch of HQJOC. At the O6 and 1-star level, Army intelligence professionals compete against non-intelligence professionals from other services for senior joint intelligence positions. Recent examples include O6 and 1-star level non-intelligence professionals from both the RAN and RAAF occupying senior intelligence leadership positions in both DIO and HQJOC. If the ADF aspires to be a truly joint organisation that demands the best from its personnel, then selection of the most suitably qualified high quality professional intelligence officers—regardless of service—should apply, rather than rotational postings.


32 Ibid., pp. 11–17. A permissive environment is one in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. An uncertain environment is one in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. A hostile environment is one in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct.


37 Doctrinal phases of an amphibious operation: planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement and action (PERMA).

38 Email from Career Advisor AUSTINT at the Directorate of Officer Career Management (DOCM) to author dated 8 December 2011. He states that the Australian Intelligence Corps has an authorised strength of 567 officers and soldiers, and a current asset of 501 personnel. The potential number of intelligence personnel dedicated to supporting an amphibious operation includes intelligence staff supporting ATF and ARG, intelligence staff supporting attached aviation and special force elements, specialist intelligence staff employed as part of ISR collection capabilities, intelligence liaison staff from supporting national agencies, intelligence planning staff at HQ 3 BDE, HQ 1 DIV, HQ SOCOMD and HQ JOC, and intelligence analysts supporting strategic decision and policy making at the national-level.


Remaining Timely and Relevant


44 Lieutenant Colonel Scott Gills, *Exercise BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012 Post Exercise Report*, 30 February 2012. The author spent three weeks aboard the USS Wasp (LHD 1) as the Assistant G2 for the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2 MEB).

45 Joint Publication 3-02, *US Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, Chapter V, p. V-3. ‘The immense volume of data required overtaxes communications and intelligence systems, to include critical graphic products that must be distributed during the planning phase.’ Amphibious operations require a large degree of imagery and geospatial intelligence support. Although these images can be preloaded onto existing IT systems, real-time full motion video feeds and associated imagery from existing platforms such as maritime surveillance aircraft and UAVs, as well as future platforms such as Joint Strike Fighter, Maritime Patrol Aircraft and UAVs, will need considerable bandwidth in order to receive feeds in a timely manner.

46 The Defence Intelligence Training Centre was also ‘combined’ until both the US Military Intelligence and UK Intelligence Corps personnel were reallocated or withdrawn circa 2008.


50 ‘Australia-United States Force Posture Initiatives’, Prime Minister of Australia website, 16 November 2011, <http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/australia-united-states-force-posture-initiatives>; Bruce Vaughn, *Australia: Background and US Relations*, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 13 January 2012, p. 1. ‘During his visit to Australia, President Obama and Prime Minister Gillard announced that the United States will deploy on a rotational basis up to 2,500 Marines, which are part of a Marine-Air Ground Task Force, to the Northern Territory and that there will be additional joint air force cooperation between the two nations.’
The Army has recently activated a captain Operations position and a captain Logistics position in a USMC marine expeditionary unit. There is currently an Intelligence Corps captain posted to the headquarters of 3 (UK) CDO BDE as an intelligence planner. This position will provide useful insight into an alternate amphibious force of similar size and capability to the ADF’s. However, given the USMC’s reputation as leaders in the field and underpinned by the likelihood of undertaking coalition operations in the future, consideration should be given to transferring the position to a marine expeditionary unit. In 2012 Army activated a liaison officer position (lieutenant colonel) to the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). Headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. INSCOM is a global command with ten major brigade-size subordinate commands and a variety of smaller units with personnel dispersed over 180 locations worldwide. Given the similar size, culture, doctrine and training to Australian ISR capabilities, a liaison officer position to the MCISR-E offers considerably more advantages. Additionally, this position could also provide assistance in leveraging USMC knowledge and experience in providing intelligence support to amphibious operations. Following discussions in the 2012 A2MC ST, it was agreed that the AALNO to INSCOM should also be accredited to the MCISR-E.

“The Strategic Reform Program will comprehensively and fundamentally improve the supporting “backbone” of Defence, making the organisation more efficient and effective, and creating significant savings to reinvest in building a stronger Defence Force. These savings and reinvestments are essential to ensure the capability goals set out in the White Paper are delivered.” The Strategic Reform Program: Delivering Force 2030, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, p. 5.

“The Brady Review is a review of Intelligence Capability and is one of eight internal “Companion Reviews” commissioned to examine key parts of the Defence Organisation.” The Strategic Reform Program: Delivering Force 2030, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, p. 4.


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CONCEPTS

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOPS) WITHIN THE AUSTRALIAN INTELLIGENCE CORPS

SHOULD IT STAY OR SHOULD IT GO?

WARRANT OFFICER CLASS TWO DALLAS SHARP

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the current ADF psychological operations (PSYOPS) capability and whether it should be managed by the Australian Intelligence Corps or whether it requires a new capability manager.

The essence of war is a violent clash between two hostile, independent and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other.¹
INTRODUCTION

While political and technological developments change the character of warfare, its nature, as a violent clash of wills, remains unchanged. Warfare is profoundly influenced by political processes at the local, regional and global levels. These processes are driven by human perceptions—’winning the perception battle underpins military operations and is an essential prerequisite for success’.2

When this is over, it will be asked what was different about this operation from others. One of those things will be that we conducted information operations.

General Peter Cosgrove, AC, MC

As General Cosgrove eludes, information operations, with psychological operations (PSYOPS) being key to its effective use, is an important element of all forms of warfare and has consistently been used by the ADF as a non-kinetic combat multiplier, having influenced selected target audiences on operations within Vietnam, Bougainville, East Timor/Timor Leste, the Solomon Islands, Iraq and most recently in Afghanistan. In recognition of this importance, the PSYOPS capability should be carefully managed and it is worth reviewing its current home in the Australian Army’s Intelligence Corps.

PSYOPS are operations planned to convey selected information to a targeted audience to influence attitudes and behaviours of governments, organisations, groups and individuals. To accomplish this goal, PSYOPS must have a clearly defined mission and the ability to conduct in-depth analysis, evaluate appropriate target audience/s and measure their effectiveness on the targeted audience against the supported commander’s mission and/or line of operation. Furthermore, PSYOPS can be employed to gather information to enhance situational awareness, undermine hostile PSYOPS and enhance own force capabilities.

The basic aspects of modern PSYOPS, as employed by the ADF, have been known by many other names, including psychological warfare, political warfare, propaganda and the more recently coined ’hearts and minds’. But the name PSYOPS is the current accepted terminology and is defined as ’… the use of propaganda and tactics in a hostile situation to influence people to accept a particular belief, undertake a course of action, weaken their will to resist …’.3

For PSYOPS to be employed effectively, it must be synchronised and deconflicted across the full spectrum of war and all lines of operation. In order to allow a commander the flexibility to achieve this, PSYOPS is divided into the following three categories, commonly referred to as White, Grey and Black:
White PSYOPS are those operations in which the source of information is acknowledged by the originator. Since re-raising the ADF's PSYOPS capability after the Vietnam conflict, White PSYOPS have been the cornerstone of its success. From the production of news leaflets, music cassettes and use of the much enjoyed soccer ball, White PSYOPS overtly amplify the goodwill of the commander's mission to those whom it is aligned. White PSYOPS is often incorrectly referred to as 'hearts and minds', a term often mistaken or misused by the media for a number of information operations capabilities, particularly PSYOPS, civil-military cooperation and public affairs.

Grey PSYOPS are those operations in which the source is not identified and/or acknowledged in any manner by the originator. Grey PSYOPS are employed across the entire operational environment, although are not as common as White PSYOPS. Furthermore, Grey PSYOPS, when employed in a manner supporting governments, organisations, groups and individuals (who do not have the capability to produce their own information (PSYOPS) but are aligned to the commander's intent), immeasurably bolsters a target audience in support of the commander's mission.

Black PSYOPS are inherently deceitful, with the information contained in the product being attributed to a source that was not responsible for its creation. More often Black PSYOPS is conducted to foster insurrection and/or internal disruption within a threat group, whether that be a conventional military force or an insurgency (as experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan). Black PSYOPS supports kinetic and non-kinetic targeting, particularly within the command and control component of a threat force. But due to its inherent nature, and if not employed correctly, there is an increased risk to the commander of being exposed as deceitful, untrustworthy and lacking credibility. This has the potential to severely degrade the commander's ability to achieve the mission. Black PSYOPS is thereby the most tightly controlled and least used of the three categories.

Considering the role of PSYOPS, let us briefly examine intelligence in the context of military intelligence and its employment within the Australian Army. As mentioned, the ADF’s PSYOPS capability resides within the Australian Intelligence Corps, whose role is to ‘provide the intelligence support required by commanders and staffs at all levels of command.’ Australian Intelligence Corps officers and soldiers are employed in two core areas: combat intelligence and counter intelligence.
Combat intelligence is defined as the knowledge of the enemy, weather and terrain, which is used in the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Counter intelligence is the activity that pertains to all security control measures designed to safeguard information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and installations or material against sabotage.

In a holistic sense, military intelligence is a discipline that exploits a number of information collection and analysis approaches to provide guidance and advice to commanders in support of their decisions. This is achieved by providing an assessment of available data from a wide range of sources, directed towards the commander’s mission requirements or responding to focused questions as part of the operational or campaign planning activity.

To surmise, the function of PSYOPS is to identify target audiences and influence their perceptions so they act in a manner favourable to the commander’s mission. Whereas the function of military intelligence is to identify the threat, and inform the commander of what the threat is and what it will do next in order to support the commander’s decision making process.

PSYOPS and intelligence, therefore, are distinct skills, despite having some subtle similarities. The PSYOPS capability, as per most military functions, should be intelligence-led, preferably with organic intelligence support, but the capability does not require intelligence trained personnel to conduct its specific forms of operations. As a result, it does not necessarily belong within the Australian Intelligence Corps (or the intelligence domain). In recognition of this fact, PSYOPS has previously been housed in a number of Australian Army corps including Psychology, Education and Public Affairs. Further, PSYOPS is often perceived, and rightly so, as an operations or plans function.

CURRENT PSYOPS COMMAND AND CONTROL

The outcome of conflict will increasingly be decided in the minds of these populations rather than on the battlefield.

The dilemma now exists: PSYOPS is not an intelligence function, nor is it referred to within Army’s Intelligence Surveillance Targeting Acquisition Reconnaissance (ISTAR) doctrine. Nevertheless, it now resides within Army’s ISTAR organisation. The reason for this predicament is the end result of the PSYOPS capability’s higher headquarters having changed several times since the creation of 1st Intelligence Battalion (2000), which was originally commanded by Land Headquarters, then...
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) within the Australian Intelligence Corps

commanded by Headquarters 1st Division (2006), and more recently commanded by 6th Brigade (2010). None of these changes have taken into account that the capability is not an intelligence function, nor is it an ISTAR function. Within the ABCA community the ADF’s model is in stark contrast to that of its allies. The US, UK and Canadian militaries maintain standalone PSYOPS capabilities.  

Nevertheless, since the mid 1990s the Australian Intelligence Corps has been responsible for the raise, train and sustain functions of the PSYOPS capability and since that time there has been, and continues to be, much debate with regards to the capability; predominantly, where it should reside.

This debate in itself, and the uneasy acceptance of PSYOPS within the Australian Intelligence Corps, has proven to be a constraint to the capability and its ongoing development.

**PSYOPS AND NATIONAL/STRATEGIC POLICY**

The 2009 Defence White Paper *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030* identifies that ‘The Government has decided that it will further develop the ADF’s capacity to deploy specialists to conduct field intelligence and information operations’.  

Therefore, PSYOPS as one of the key information operations elements has been and continues to be integral to the ADF’s non-kinetic arsenal and when used effectively is a recognised combat multiplier.

*Information operations (IO) underpin all operational activities conducted by Defence.*

*Adaptive Campaigning – Army’s Future Land Operations Concept* is a capstone document that provides the framework for force modernisation and is guided by the intent of the White Paper. *Adaptive Campaigning* seeks to generate effects in the modern complex operational environment, via the use of five lines of operations, being: joint land combat, population protection, information actions, population support and indigenous capacity building.

The functional analysis within *Adaptive Campaigning* details that information operations conducted by Army within the tactical and operational sphere are known as ‘information actions’, with PSYOPS being one of the twelve information action ‘tools’. Information actions inform and shape the perceptions, attitudes, behaviour and understanding of target population groups and assure the quality of our own information while attempting to disrupt or dislocate enemy command capabilities.

*Information Actions underpin every element of Adaptive Campaigning and are an essential prerequisite for success.*
The importance that the 2009 Defence White Paper and *Adaptive Campaigning* either directly or indirectly place upon information operations and information actions indicates that the PSYOPS capability, as one of the key elements or tools, needs to evolve. But the PSYOPS capability cannot move forward in isolation. A holistic approach must be considered in order to synchronise all the information operations elements and information actions tools already available within the ADF, from the tactical through to the strategic levels of operations.

**FUTURE OF THE PSYOPS CAPABILITY**

It is important to reemphasise that the intent of this article is to analyse the PSYOPS capability and its position within Australian Intelligence Corps. It is not addressing information operations or information actions within the ADF. Nevertheless, the proposed future of PSYOPS is inextricably linked to all other ADF capabilities that aim to shape and influence target audiences. Therefore, the proposed course of action (COA) for the future of PSYOPS within the ADF (detailed below in Table 1) also considers other ADF shaping and influence tools, albeit fleetingly.

As identified, a change in the PSYOPS capability sponsor is clearly needed in order to meet the demands of the 2009 Defence White Paper and *Adaptive Campaigning*’s intent. Furthermore, depending upon where the PSYOPS capability will ultimately reside within the ADF, the requirement to raise, train and sustain the PSYOPS capability will determine its structure with regards to composition, manning and resources, just to name a few. The courses of action identified in Table 1 are amplified below.

**COA 1. PSYOPS, ALONG WITH ALL THE INFORMATION ACTION TOOLS/INFORMATION OPERATIONS ASSETS, BECOMES A TRI-SERVICE CAPABILITY, EMPLOYING SPECIALISTS TRAINED FROM ALL CORPS/SERVICES.**

It is envisaged that COA 1 is the most holistic course of action but would require a significant timeframe to develop and replace the current tactical capability. It will require a complete rethink with regard to the role of PSYOPS and the other eleven information actions tools within the ADF, supporting tactical, operational and/or strategic level intent. It is, however, not without precedent within the ABCA community. The Canadian Armed Forces (Land) have raised a regular
Table 1. Courses of action for the employment of the PSYOPS capability within the ADF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability Owner</th>
<th>COA 1</th>
<th>COA 2</th>
<th>COA 3</th>
<th>COA 4</th>
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<tr>
<td>Manning</td>
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<td>Arm Force</td>
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<td>Recommended</td>
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<td>future PSYOPS</td>
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<td>teams</td>
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<td>1 x Analyst – Aust Int Corps</td>
<td>2 x Disseminator – Tr Service</td>
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</table>

PSYOPS capability (Bn) from a small reserve component (Coy -) within the past six years. 16

COA 2. PSYOPS REMAIN AN ARMY CAPABILITY, BECOMING A CAPABILITY OUTSIDE OF THE AUSTRALIAN INTELLIGENCE CORPS, EMPLOYING SPECIALISTS FROM ALL THREE SERVICES.

COA 2 would result in the potential re-raising of the 1st Psychological Operations Unit (1 POU). As this article has demonstrated, PSYOPS is neither intelligence nor operations, but rather an intelligence-driven, non-kinetic, shaping and influencing
capability. Given its unique nature, it does not fit well into existing command structures, and as such consideration should be given to creating a unit specifically for the capability. This also is not without precedence; during the Vietnam War, Army formed 1 POU. This course of action would see this unit re-raised, commanded directly by Forces Command. The re-raised 1 POU could be manned by tri-service personnel, with the bulk of the analytical expertise driven by the Australian Intelligence Corps upon which the success of the ADF’s PSYOPS capability has been based.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{center}
COA 3. PSYOPS REMAIN AN ARMY CAPABILITY, MANAGED BY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, EMPLOYING SPECIALISTS TRAINED FROM THE ALL CORPS ENVIRONMENT
\end{center}

COA 3 models itself on the US PSYOPS construct. A potential downside of this course of action is that the conventional Army’s access to a PSYOPS capability may be constrained by Special Forces ownership and therefore may not support the Army’s overarching information operations effect.

The conventional Army has specific paradigms that can limit PSYOPS nuances and thus its ability to employ the PSYOPS capability to its full effect. Too often the conventional Army applies the ‘hearts and minds’ methodology as opposed to a capability that can be divisive, achieving lethal effects. Special Forces are not as constrained by this mindset, and are therefore likely to employ the PSYOPS capability, or a component of it, to its full potential (as per the US model).\textsuperscript{18} This is particularly evident with regard to counter-leadership targeting and the more sensitive Grey and Black categories of PSYOPS.

The US PSYOPS capability, now referred to as Military Information Support Group,\textsuperscript{19} is within Special Operations Command, allowing it to be resourced and employed in a dynamic nature—making full use of assets, targeted audiences, and an open and less restrictive mindset.

\begin{center}
The conventional Army has specific paradigms that can limit PSYOPS nuances and thus its ability to employ the PSYOPS capability to its full effect.
\end{center}

\begin{center}
COA 4. PSYOPS REMAIN AN ARMY CAPABILITY, MANAGED BY THE AUSTRALIAN INTELLIGENCE CORPS, EMPLOYING SPECIALISTS TRAINED FROM THE ALL CORPS ENVIRONMENT
\end{center}

COA 4 is the least disruptive though worst long-term outcome for the PSYOPS capability. In this scenario it is possible the capability could remain stagnant, receiving limited resources, manning and forethought from Australian Intelligence.
Corps. It would continue to play second fiddle to the Australian Intelligence Corps’ core function of providing military intelligence to identify and inform the commander of the threat.

The employment of all corps personnel within the capability will assist Australian Intelligence Corps redistribute personnel to other core Australian Intelligence Corps functions, though not to the degree of COA 2. Despite PSYOPS not being an intelligence function, PSYOPS skill-sets use intelligence processes and methodologies, particularly with regard to battlespace analysis concerning human and information terrain, and hostile PSYOPS (propaganda) analysis.

CONCLUSION

PSYOPS is not an intelligence function. It does not need to remain within the Australian Intelligence Corps. Nor does it have an ISTAR function.

The uneasy acceptance of PSYOPS and competing priorities faced by the Australian Intelligence Corps has meant that the development of the PSYOPS capability has lacked attention in recent years. Without significant changes to its command and control, force composition and internal architecture, the PSYOPS capability is likely to remain stagnant, leaving the Army and the ADF with a second rate information actions capability. Therefore, it is recommended that the PSYOPS capability be removed from the Australian Intelligence Corps and placed within the tri-service environment or Special Operations Command (COA 1 and COA 3 respectively).

Regardless of which direction the PSYOPS capability goes, it must, and almost certainly will, remain within the ADF’s non-kinetic arsenal.

ENDNOTES

1 FMFM1 – Warfighting, United States Marine Corps, 1989, chapter 1, p. 3.
6 Ibid.
8 Adaptive Campaigning 09 – Army’s Future Land Operating Concept, Department of Defence, 2009, p. 5.
CONCEPTS  WARRANT OFFICER CLASS TWO DALLAS SHARP


12 Ibid, chapter 1.

13 Adaptive Campaigning 09 – Army’s Future Land Operating Concept, Department of Defence, 2009, Glossary.

14 Ibid, p. 50.

15 PSYOPS is an ‘element’ of information operations and a ‘tool’ of information actions.

16 Lieutenant Colonel M K Purcell, Canadian Forces College, JCSP 33: Core Requirements for the Successful Development of a Psychological Operations Capability for the Canadian Forces, 2007.


19 Ibid.

THE AUTHOR

Warrant Officer Class Two Dallas Sharp is an Australian Intelligence Corps soldier and is currently posted to Headquarters 1st Division. He has been involved in the PSYOPS capability for the past five years, attending the Psychological Operations Officer Course at the John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School in 2006, prior to commencing exchange within the then 4th Psychological Operations Group, both at Fort Bragg, NC. He deployed to Iraq as the PSYOPS Detachment 2IC, supporting OBG(W)-2 and OBG(W)-3 in 2007. Since that time WO2 Sharp has been instrumental in developing the new ADF PSYOPS training continuum and ADF PSYOPS doctrine for which he received a Forces Commander Bronze Commendation in 2011.
ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) inexorably connected Australia and New Zealand with these words:

It was eighteen minutes past four (5:48am Afghanistan time) on the morning of Sunday, 25th April [1915], when the first boat grounded…the men leapt into the water, and the first of them had just reached the beach when fire was opened on them from the trenches on the foothills which rise immediately from the beach.¹

This ANZAC action occurred at Gallipoli, Turkey, which is approximately 4000 kilometres north-west of Kandahar. In the next five days, more than 850 Australians and almost 150 New Zealanders died, following sustained fighting which …²

… will go down to history, when Australian [and New Zealand] brigades stormed, in the face of fire, tier after tier of cliffs and mountains [which were] apparently … impregnable … It is hard to distinguish between the work of the brigades. They all fought fiercely and suffered heavily…nothing could take away from the Australian and New Zealand Infantry the fame of last Sunday’s fighting.³

Eight months later, when the Gallipoli campaign ended, more than 50,000 Australians had fought, sustaining over 28,000 casualties; some 56 per cent of their
force. In addition, 8500 New Zealanders fought with more than 7400 casualties; a staggering 87 per cent of their force. In approximately 260 days of fighting at Gallipoli, 120,000 soldiers died, including 80,000 Turks and 44,000 ANZAC, British, Indian and French troops; this equates to almost 500 deaths each day.

Today, it is with great pride and honour that you, as the daughters and sons of ANZAC stand this dawn, in the service of your nations, on the critical crossroads of southern Afghanistan.

To your north-west in July 1880, a British force of 2700 fighting troops was defeated at Maiwand, resulting in the loss of 1000 British and 5500 Afghan lives, and the awarding of two Victoria Crosses.

To your north-east in 1897, a young Winston Churchill, as a 23-year-old journalist, was attached to the Malakand Field Force in the Swat Valley, as Britain fought rebellious Pashtun tribesmen, on the then northwest frontier of British India.

Also to your north-east, more than 2000 years ago, at Qalat, the Dari word meaning 'faithful place', General Alexander the Great built a castle during his advance to India. Since then, nearly every military force has used it, including the British, the Russians, the Taliban and now Afghan National Army and Coalition soldiers.

ANZAC Day also commemorates the 330,000 Australians from a population of 4 million, who served overseas in World War I. Of these nearly 60,000 died, 152,000 were wounded, and 64 were awarded the Victoria Cross.

Approximately 103,000 New Zealanders served overseas during World War I, some 10 per cent of New Zealand's 1 million population. A total of 18,500 New Zealanders died, nearly 50,000 were wounded, and eleven were awarded the Victoria Cross.

We remember the courage, initiative and teamwork of Australian and New Zealand soldiers in all wars. We remember the more than 102,000 Australians and more than 30,000 New Zealanders who have fought and died in war across the world. To paraphrase Charles Bean, we remember a familiar refrain in the hearts of our soldiers:

Life was very dear, but life was not worth living unless they could be true to their idea of Australian [and New Zealand mateship].

ANZAC Day is not about glorifying war; it is about honouring ordinary citizens who were asked to perform extraordinary service for their country, and who did so willingly at the greatest of costs.

We honour those who were injured or disabled in the tragedy of war.

We remember those who suffered as prisoners of war, and those who died in captivity.

We remember those civilians who serve and have suffered in all wars, especially our civilian colleagues who gather with us this morning.
We remember staunch friends and allies, especially the fifty-nation International Security Assistance Force serving here in Afghanistan. We remember the 32 Australian, six New Zealand, and almost 3000 Coalition personnel who have died in Afghanistan since 2001.\(^\text{14}\)

We remember the Afghan people who have suffered, and continue to suffer in this conflict.

Our Service men and women have gifted us their magnificent heritage. May we and our successors prove worthy of their sacrifice.\(^\text{15}\)

We will remember them.

ENDNOTES


5 ‘The Gallipoli campaign’. The Gallipoli Campaign, land operations, was fought 25 April 1915 and 9 January 1916. The ANZACs departed by 20 December 1915. CEW Bean, ‘Chapter IX, The Expedition to the Dardanelles’ in Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, Volume I – The Story of ANZAC from the outbreak of war to the end of the first phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, 4 May 1915 (11th edition, 1941), pp.169, 171, 172, 175, 201. How was this military misadventure conceived? In the stark words of Australian World War I historian, Charles Bean: ‘through a Churchill’s excess of imagination (to seize the Dardanelle Straits and capture Constantinople), a layman’s ignorance of artillery (if forts were valueless against big land-guns [in France], how could they withstand the enormous guns of the [Royal] navy?), and the fatal power of a young enthusiasm to convince older and more cautious brains, the tragedy of Gallipoli was born.’ Churchill, who was only thirty-nine years of age, was possessed of a ‘brilliant, restless intellect and a passion for adventure’.

of 2700 fighting troops commanded by Brigadier George Burrows was defeated
at Maiwand, resulting in the loss of 1000 British and 5500 Afghan lives, and the
awarding of two Victoria Crosses (Sergeant Mullane and Gunner Collis)

7 ‘Winston Churchill on the Tribal Territories’, Frontline, 3 October 2006, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/tribal/churchill.html> accessed 13 April 2012. In 1897, Winston Churchill was attached for about six weeks to the Malakand Field Force in the Swat Valley as Britain fought rebellious Pashtun, or Pathan, tribesmen in the region—at the time, the northwest frontier of British India.


11 Overseas campaigns for Australian deployments include: New Zealand 1860–61, Sudan 1885, South Africa 1899–1902, China Boxer rebellion 1900–01, First World
ANZAC DAY ADDRESS


13 Charles Bean, ‘ANZAC Requiem’, 1944, quoted in ‘Their Spirit, Our History’, Department of Veterans Affairs and Australian War Memorial, <www.awm.gov.au/commemoration/anzac/theirspirit.pdf> accessed 17 April 2012. This ANZAC Requiem includes the poignant paragraph: ‘We remember those who fell amidst the valleys and ridges of Gallipoli, on the terraced hills of Palestine, in France and Belgium, on the sands of the North African desert, amidst the mountains and olive groves of Greece, Crete and Syria, in the skies over Europe, in Singapore, in the jungles of Malaysia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the Pacific Islands, in Korea and Vietnam, in later conflicts and in peacekeeping, in the skies and seas in many parts of the world, and on our own soil and in our sea lanes’.


15 Bean, ‘ANZAC Requiem’.

THE AUTHOR

Brigadier Chris Field is serving in Headquarters Regional Command – South, Kandahar, Afghanistan.
COMBAT FOCUS

A COMMANDER’S RESPONSIBILITY IN THE FORMATION, DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING OF TODAY’S COMBAT TEAM

CAPTAIN SCOTT KLIMA

ABSTRACT

The many pressures and competing requirements of the modern sub-unit commander can easily see the commander’s attention only fleetingly focused on what should be the primary role of his unit: combat. It is easy for a modern commander in today’s corporate governance-driven training environment to comply with the administrative reporting, resource management, risk mitigation and non-linear command structure necessities, and in so doing losing that essential mindset that will enable those he commands to win the fight. The purpose of this article is to look at what our role should be as soldiers, or more importantly as commanders of soldiers, as we prepare to fight and survive on the battlefield of today’s hybrid threat environment.

Peace is an armistice in a war that is continuously going on.

– Thucydides¹
Recent history has seen an environment of persistent conflict around the world. Today’s Australian Regular Army has been deploying combat teams into this environment to conduct government directed operations. The combat team must be prepared to fight—from peacekeeping, low level and counter-insurgency operations to medium intensity warfighting. This takes a dedicated focus from the field commanders who will lead this organisation on the battlefield.

To command, or more specifically to command in combat, requires a professional mindset that is focused on the task of training the unit to fight, and to fight as a unit. In the paper ‘Future Joint Operating Concept 2030’ it is acknowledged that ‘warfare will remain an exercise in organised violence’. We train for war in order to mitigate the chaos of combat. Combat is fast, violent, confusing and bloody and we train our muscles, our thought patterns and our instincts to function in a certain sequence for when our minds turn to panic.

So what do we need to raise, train and sustain an effective, battle ready combat team in today’s Army? The purpose of this article is to discuss the role of the commander and the requirements needed to command as you prepare for and are involved in combat, highlighting that it is the unit that is the centre of gravity for tactical battlefield success.

**CREATING THE COMBAT TEAM – THE BASIS FOR BATTLEFIELD SUCCESS**

*Adam Collins: ‘I think some guys are playing at this like it’s a game, but this is real, isn’t it?’*

*Chris Terrill: ‘It certainly is Adam.’*

A combat team is a unit. To understand what we are dealing with, Colonel D Malone (US Army) gives us a good starting point.

By definition a unit is a whole composed of parts put together to create a single ‘thing’. We need to picture this ‘thing’ in its intended environment—the battlefield. It is there to fight, to destroy the enemy, to seize and hold ground. It is designed to do this, the result of countless centuries of adjusting and adapting to the demands of thousands of battles. In battle, only the fittest survive and this ‘thing’ is the result of all the lessons learned from those battles won and lost. It exists on the battlefield for one reason—to fight. It lives by the simple standard: survive. And survival on the battlefield means you must win.

To win on the battlefield, to inflict tactical defeat on one’s adversary, the Roman Empire learned that to achieve victory it required a professional, trained army; an army trained to fight as a cohesive force. The spectacle of individual combat had no place on the battlefield; each soldier was a part of something more—their unit, and
it was that unit, which controlled the ‘thing’, that would win the battle. This lesson was taught in blood at the hands of the Carthaginian Hannibal Barca at the battles of Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae only to be retaught throughout history by the Huns, the Mongols, the Saracens, Napoleon, the Zulus and the Germans to name a few. The modern battlefield is even more demanding of a unit to operate as one cohesive force. 1st Platoon, Battle Company, 2nd Battalion, 173 Airborne Brigade’s reaction to an ambush in the Korangal Valley in 2007 is an excellent example of this. ‘The reason 1st Platoon did not get wiped out … was because the men acted not as individuals but as a unit.’

It must be understood that the combat team is one force. It must be nurtured, trained, employed and rested as a single unit. The sub-elements of the combat team, the troop and platoon organisations that form it, should not be split. From the basic building block of individual soldier skills to high-end collective training, the combat team should train together. The inherent bonds that uniquely exist within a military unit start here as soldiers begin to identify with each other and with their unit, learning the capabilities, both at the personal and unit level, of the different force elements and enablers that form the combat team.

The concept of Mission Command, nested within the Adaptive Army, provides us with the vehicle to achieve success on the battlefield. The foundation of its success lies in trust. Trust in your junior commanders to lead their troops, trust in the soldiers to do their job and their trust in you to lead them well. Richard Winters captured it in assessing the reasons for his company’s success ‘… [we] knew each other’s strengths and weaknesses, we could assign the right men to the proper job. … my contribution to the success of Easy Company and 2nd Battalion was based on my knowledge of what to expect from each [soldier].’

Individual and collective competence, trust and understanding takes time to develop and it is time that is critical to the combat team’s success. The end-state of this cycle is the creation of a standard of confidence within each member. The standard is simple: it is the sure knowledge that each soldier and every crew is highly trained and that they belong to a solid, firm, competent, well-trained outfit that knows where it is going and what it has to do. This is the basis of trust—there are no shortcuts to it, it takes time to develop, but is essential to success on the battlefield because at the end of the day ‘… combat is a series of quick decisions and rather precise actions carried out in concert … the unit that choreographs their actions best usually wins!’
COMMANDING IN THE COMBAT TEAM – INJECTING THE FIGHTING SPIRIT

It is not enough to fight. It is the spirit which we bring to the fight that decides the issue. It is morale that wins the victory.

George C Marshall

The Defence publication ADDP 00.1 – Command and Control provides us with higher commands definitions of both command and control. However, these definitions leave it unclear as to how these two separate but inter-related functions combine at the tactical level to enable effective operations to occur within the combat team or battle group.

Missions today are complex, involving the efforts of many different force elements and organisations to succeed. Couple this with the ever shrinking window of opportunity to take advantage of battlefield situations and it becomes clear the traditional linear approach to command and control cannot be relied upon. The network centric warfare construct necessitates that the command and control model be well understood at all levels as it bypasses the rigid, linear structure that previously aligned command and control with the lines of communication.

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery said, ‘I do not believe it is possible to conduct operations successfully in the field unless there exists a good and sound organisation for command and control’. The dispersed nature of the battlefield coupled with the sheer volume of information coming into the command post, from sources both within and external to the combat team, can easily result in the commander looking in, or rearward, rather than out. As armies progress more and more towards unmanned aircraft and vehicles, electronic sensors and detection, and active defensive suites, the stresses from information volume on decision making will only increase for the modern commander.

To reduce the battlefield complexity and possibility of information overload, the principles of Mission Command must be embraced and the command team enabled to grow in its ability, understanding and confidence through the conduct of drills, rehearsals and independent planning. No spreadsheet exists to tell you your soldiers are trained beyond a basic individual level, yet you—the commander—are solely responsible for ensuring that your men are trained—trained as a unit and trained to win. Pompey Elliot would tell us to bear in mind the consequences of not training properly for the real fight.
Will you be thinking of this good man or that good man dead, wounded or missing and thinking; did I do right in taking this or that action? … If you have well and truly and zealously applied yourselves to the task of mastering the science and art of war, your conscience at least will be easy, however heavy your heart; but if you have neglected your opportunities and looked upon your connection with [your unit] as merely a sort of amusement, or a means of attaining some sort of … distinction, then you will be as Judas was, for like him you will have betrayed a sacred trust. 13

In its continual assessment of the conduct of operations, the US Army has been reviewing its primary guidance on operations, FM 3-0 _Operations_, since 2001. The US Army has realised that the threats and nature of the modern battlefield, as highlighted in the Israeli conflicts of 2006 and 2008, are likely to be hybrid in nature. To embrace this they have reviewed their guidance on command and control to highlight the importance of the commander and command, specifically the commander’s ability to exercise command as opposed to the control systems they use.

On the ground, a well-trained command post controls the battle. They monitor (battle track), assess, report and operate in accordance with the commander’s orders and direction. This highlights once more the tenet of trust within the Mission Command framework that must exist to facilitate the decentralised execution of operations. The main command post will most likely be physically dislocated from the commander and, as a result, that command team must be trusted to control the battle while the commander focuses on the current main effort, plans the next operation or attends orders. By extension, Mission Command must also be fostered within subordinate commanders. A clear commander’s intent and adequate allocation of resources within your orders will enable your subordinate commanders to achieve your intent. The ability for your subordinate commanders to process information, take advantage of fleeting battlefield opportunities and make tactical decisions will significantly enhance your ability to effectively command your combat team.

Historically, the separation of command and control is met with resistance due to the misconception that the commander is relinquishing command of an operation to a junior commander. This is obviously incorrect. David Alberts provides us with a better understanding of the nature of the command and control relationship applicable to today’s operational environment. The command function provides the initial set of orders (allocation of roles, responsibilities, resources and setting the
conditions), the continual assessment of the situation and possible changes to intent. The control function then determines if the current plan is on track and, if they are required, to make adjustments if they are within the guidelines established by the commander.\textsuperscript{14} In simple terms, you plan the battle and issue orders for its conduct, and your headquarters team runs (controls) the battle within the guidelines you have set.

The Wermacht understood that the personality of the commander is decisive. Imagination, flexibility, an understanding of the mission, determination, skill in the use of terrain, coolness, and rapid and independent action are essential requirements.\textsuperscript{15} In short, those entrusted to lead must study their profession to become proficient in tactics and technology. As a professional soldier, as a commander of soldiers, you must be prepared. Before you take command you will have studied and learned as much as you can, enabling you to focus your time in command on developing and empowering your subordinates, for it is they who will ultimately achieve your end-state. In the profession of arms the unit is the soldiers, not the commander. You are simply the caretaker of both the history and the future of the unit for a short while—its successes are theirs, its failures are yours.

\section*{SUSTAINING THE COMBAT TEAM – WINNING THE ‘COME AS YOU ARE’ BATTLE}

\textit{The purpose of technology is to equip the man. We must not fall prey to the mistaken notion that technology can reduce warfare to simply manning equipment.}

– US Chiefs of Staff, 1997\textsuperscript{16}

To develop from the previous section, General Sir David Richards, the British Chief of General Staff, said in his 2009 Annual Defence Lecture ‘Future War’:

if you do not possess the fighting spirit, however good or high-tech your equipment, you will not win against opponents who do, whether they are part of another states army or Taliban style insurgents, however shoddy or out of date their equipment.

The Chief of Army has directed your combat team to be at a certain state of readiness. At any given time you may be given your deployment orders and within that notice to move your troops must be mounted and ready to deploy. General Sir David Richards also warned us that ‘today we are in Afghanistan. Tomorrow
it may be in a rogue state [in the Pacific rim] ..., [or] a central African state with well trained forces ...‘ He highlights our dilemma as tactical commanders in that we may be deployed, with little notice, into a situation that constitutes what today is broadly termed a complex political emergency. Deploying to fight in these circumstances is the ‘come as you are’ battle. To set the conditions for follow-on forces, be they a battle group or non-government organisation, you must win this battle.

To do this you must train your soldiers to win. The guidance provided by the Foundation Warfighting concept is an excellent platform from which to start. ‘Brilliant at the Basics’, taken in its literal meaning, requires continual, effective and cohesive training. The Special Forces achieve their level of expertise by continually rehearsing the basic drills, just as a professional footballer or cricketer continually practices their basic skills.

Being a warrior and a leader of warriors requires the mental toughness to execute your decisions and tactical plans, no matter what the circumstances. The ability to do this comes from thorough training, knowing your soldiers and their capabilities as well as knowing your own. As a leader you must hold yourself to a higher standard in your mastery of the profession of arms. You set the example for your subordinate commanders and are responsible for their professional development and their professional mastery.

Underlying this must lay the understanding that you cannot train for every contingency, and as such it is impossible to establish procedures for every situation. Therefore, an understanding of the principles within which you will operate will develop the solid base from which trust, that underlying tenet, will grow.

The US Marine Corps gives the guidance that ‘Commanders must ensure that training ... involves all participants. Compartmentalised training, insufficient individual training and failure to conduct thorough unit training creates the conditions for failure’. In essence, you must plan your training program thoroughly with a clear end-state and measures of effectiveness. Thorough training builds the confidence of your soldiers in both themselves and their unit. The desired cohesive end-state is highlighted by the differences in the French and British forces as they entered the Crimean War. From their experiences in Algeria, the French had learned the crucial importance of the small collective unit for the maintenance of discipline and order on the battlefield.
You are preparing to fight, preparing for combat. The training cycle will see you increase your level of readiness over a relatively short period of time, a period measured in months, and as such you must instil that fighting spirit within your unit. ‘Do not expect the combat fairy to come bonk you with the combat wand and suddenly make you capable of doing things that you never rehearsed before. It will not happen.’

The Combat Team Nested Within Army – Beyond Excel Readiness

Some accounts of fighting ... emphasise the element of confusion, where much depended on the initiative of leaders of small parties, since circumstances obviously prevented senior officers from influencing events outside their own immediate vicinity.

The standard is to win the first battle—the ‘come as you are’ battle. It is leadership that makes this happen. It is leadership that puts together skill, will and teamwork. Remember that we train for war in order to mitigate the chaos of combat; we train our muscles, our thought patterns and our instincts to function in a certain sequence for when our minds turn to panic. Erwin Rommel reminds us that ‘it is difficult to maintain direction and contact in the front line; the commander can only control the men closest to him.’ However, your unit must fight as a unit, that single ‘thing’. On today’s dispersed battlefield this requires thorough training, from which is developed the confidence and trust within each member, to choreograph their actions, and win.

A trained unit is not a tangible or visible outcome for higher command to display. No spreadsheet exists that shows you that your unit is ready to fight. But the cost of not training your unit effectively is all too visible in the casualty lists it will produce. Complacency through the conduct and participation in unassessed activities and an over-reliance on technology must not be allowed to gain a foothold in our training ethos. ‘Sweat saves blood’—you must maintain the realisation that what you train for is real, fought in the field with an experienced enemy that has a say in the outcome each day.

It is functional leadership that produces the confidence and trust your unit needs. It is this same leadership that ensures that soldiers fight smarter and better. It is operational leadership—command—that determines who wins. And in war, winning is the only standard. As we enter into the period of the ‘Army after Afghanistan’, the
chance to re-establish the unit cohesion and tactical coordination needed to survive on the battlefield is ours as commanders to seize and apply. Don’t let the individual nature of our recent deployments, as these ‘task forces’ come and go, distract you from your responsibility. It is only by looking beyond the spreadsheet readiness paradigm that inhabits our reporting toolkit that you will be able to develop your combat team into a truly capable fighting force.

How will you know if you have succeeded? True satisfaction comes from getting the job done. Richard Winters again summarised it perfectly by saying:

the key to successful leadership is to earn respect—not because of rank or position, but because you are a leader of character. In the military, [your country] may nominate you as a commissioned officer, but [they] cannot command for you the loyalty and confidence of your soldiers. Those you must earn by giving loyalty to your soldiers and providing for their welfare. Properly lead and treated right, your lowest ranking soldier is capable of extraordinary acts of valour. Ribbons, medals and accolades, then, are poor substitutes to the ability to look yourself in the mirror every night and know that you did your best. You can see the look of respect in the eyes of the men who have worked for you.27

Are you ready?

ENDNOTES

2 Within the draft LWP-G 3-3-12 Combat Team Handbook a combat team is defined as ‘A combined arms grouping based upon a manoeuvre sub-unit headquarters’ consisting of no more than five force elements. A sub-unit refers to a squadron/company level headquarters.
3 Future Joint Operating Concept, Department of Defence, Canberra, 25 March 2011.
4 For the purpose of this article, ‘unit’ is used as a general reference term as outlined by Colonel Dandridge M Malone’s definition in Small Unit Leadership, Ballantine Books, New York, p. 42. For ease of reference, the use of ‘unit’ in this article will infer a squadron/company level organisation. Other levels of command will be referred to by name.
6 Malone, Small Unit Leadership, p. 42.
7 Sebastian Junger, War, Twelve (Grand Central Publishing), New York, 2010, p. 120.
9 Junger, War, p. 120.
10 Nate Allen and Tony Burgess, Taking the Guidon, Centre for Company Level Leadership, Delaware, 2001, p. 105.
Training

Captain Scott Klima

11 Command is defined as the ‘responsibility for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions’, while control is defined as the ‘authority exercised over part of the activities of subordinate organisations or other organisations not normally under command’, pp. 1–3.
15 Bruce Condell and David T Zabecki, On the German Art of War, Truppenführung, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2009, p. 42.
17 Luc Rey切尔 and Thania Paffenholz, Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London, 2001. The term ‘complex political emergency’ is used here and in recent publications to encompass the diversity of situations that have led to conflict since the early 1990s. It highlights that while conflict, in its essence, remains constant in its violent application, the root causes and by extension their resolution is unique to each emergency.
18 Askew, Warrior Mindset, p. xii.
19 Condell and Zabecki, On the German Art of War, Truppenführung, p. 58.
25 Ibid.
26 Malone, Small Unit Leadership, p. 23.
27 Winters, Beyond Band of Brothers, p. 290.

THE AUTHOR

Captain Scott Klima enlisted into the Army in January 2004. Graduating from the Royal Military College – Duntroon in 2005 he was posted to the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and deployed to Iraq with Security Detachment 10 as a Troop Leader and Afghanistan with the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force 1 as the Combat Team Second in Command, returning to Afghanistan as the Chief of Operations for Combined Team Uruzgan 1. He is currently posted as the Senior Instructor Gunnery Wing, School of Armour and is studying part-time towards a Bachelor of Professional Studies and a Bachelor of Arts in Military History.
Military History

A Simple Operation
The Japanese Invasion of Christmas Island

Colonel Tim Gellel

Abstract
In a little known episode of history, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) seized Christmas Island unopposed on 31 March 1942. Pre-landing air and naval bombardments led the tiny garrison to surrender, but also damaged key facilities, frustrating Japanese efforts to quickly remove the valuable phosphate ore. When Japanese engineers determined the island was not suitable for the construction of an airfield, the occupying force was left solely reliant upon sea lanes of communication, vulnerable to submarine interdiction. A late-1943 submarine attack led to the IJN’s complete withdrawal from its Christmas Island outpost.

On the last day of March, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) captured what would become, if only for a short time, the Japanese Empire’s southernmost outpost.1 The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and IJN had between them invaded and occupied the British territories of Borneo, Malaya and Singapore, as well the Netherlands East Indies. US resistance in the Philippines had been crushed, and the IJN was unchallenged across the western Pacific Ocean. As a prelude to the IJN carrier strike force’s operations in the Indian Ocean, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered the seizure and occupation of the (then) British possession of Christmas Island, 190 nautical miles southwest of Java.
In mid March the IJN Netherlands East Indies Force Commander, Vice Admiral Takahashi Ibō, planned the invasion and occupation of the island. He planned to secure the island’s rich phosphate ore deposits and to determine the feasibility of establishing a fighter-capable airfield there to extend the IJN’s reach into the Indian Ocean, thereby further choking the shipping lanes that linked Australia with India. If it were feasible, the force was to then commence preparatory work for the airfield’s construction. As for the phosphate ore, Christmas Island had long been an important exporter to Japan, so much so that the triangular Islander Jetty was also referred to as the ‘Japanese Pier’.

Despite its location, Christmas Island had limited strategic potential and was not well defended. By late 1941, the Singapore government, which had jurisdiction over the island territory, had responded to the threat of German raiders—such as the Kormoran, which sank the Royal Australian Navy’s light cruiser HMAS Sydney II off the West Australian coast on 19 November 1941—as well as the growing Japanese menace by establishing a garrison on the island. Given the competing strategic pressures face the British Empire at the time, that force was necessarily a token one, comprising around thirty Sikh soldiers, serving under one British officer and four British non-commissioned officers (NCO). In addition to small arms, this tiny force was equipped with a single 6-inch gun, sited on top of the hill at Smith Point so as to overlook Flying Fish Cove—the island’s only harbour.

OPENING SHOTS

The first visible IJN presence around the islands came on 20 January 1942, when the submarine I-59 torpedoed the 4184-ton Norwegian freighter MV Eidsvold, standing off Flying Fish Cove. Heavily damaged, the Eidsvold then drifted and eventually sank off West White Beach. In February, the Garrison claimed to have sunk a Japanese submarine with the Smith Point 6-inch gun, which had been ‘trained at an extreme angle and at close range’ (presumably in Flying Fish Cove) until ‘part of the submarine surfaced and large amounts of oil’ were seen. But the counterattack was unsuccessful; I-59 lived to fight another day—if indeed it was her—nor was any other IJN submarine sunk in that area.

On 9 February, Christmas Island experienced its first air raid, which resulted in the death of three Chinese labourers. Further raids followed on 1 March and 9 March, the latter causing extensive damage to the main town, which was referred to as the Settlement. This was followed on 7 March by an initially cautious and somewhat
Outline of Japanese Invasion of Christmas Island
31 March 1942

1. First suppressing fire ship
2. Second suppressing fire ship
3. Arcs of suppressing fire
4. Transport Kimishima Maru disembarkation point
5. Transport Kumagawa Maru disembarkation point
6. Patrol Boat No. 36
7. Patrol Boat No. 34
8. Arc of covering fire
9. Kumagawa Maru mooring point
10. Kimishima Maru mooring point
11. Islander Jetty ("Japanese Pier")
12. Smith's Point
cursory bombardment of the island’s commercial installations by the battleships *Haruna* and *Kongo*. Unsure as to whether it might be being used as a submarine or air base, the ships approached from a distance, using their floatplanes to first reconnoiter the island.

After they had determined that the British defences were minimal, the floatplanes dropped 60-kilogram bombs on the island—two of which dropped by one of *Kongo*’s aircraft destroyed the island’s telegraph station—before directing the battleships’ fire. The bombardment appears to have been desultory—*Haruna* reportedly only fired a total of three 14-inch and fourteen 6-inch rounds—but was nevertheless sufficient to convince the island’s defenders to capitulate.

As a white flag was raised on the island, the two ships ceased firing and observed as a motorboat, also bearing a white flag, came out to meet them. But as neither the IJN nor the Imperial General Headquarters had planned to occupy Christmas Island at this point—that decision came around one week after the battleships’ bombardment—the two battleships departed, leaving the undoubtedly confused defenders behind. *Haruna* and *Kongo* were escorting Rear Admiral Yamaguchi Tamon’s 2nd Carrier Division and had proceeded to Christmas Island at his direction. Yamaguchi was renowned as an aggressive commander, who frequently railed against more passive superiors and the bombardment was probably his own initiative, rather than part of a central, strategic plan.

Although the Union Jack was restored to its place on the flagpole, the sight of the IJN battleships proved too much for the Sikh soldiers who, joined by the island’s Sikh policemen, mutinied on the night of 10/11 March, murdering the Garrison Commander, Captain Williams and his four British NCOs. They then placed the remaining twenty-one Europeans in captivity, until the Japanese landed twenty-one days later.

**OPERATION X**

‘Operation X’, as it was known, was a purely IJN operation without any direct IJA involvement. The sizeable but very much second rate IJN force comprised an 850-strong landing force carried aboard two freighters and escorted by three old light cruisers, two destroyers and two patrol boats, and supported by one tanker.

Rear Admiral Hara Kensaburō commanded the operation from on board his 16th Cruiser Division flagship, the *Natori*, accompanied by her sister ship, *Nagara*. *Natori* and *Nagara* were old (both were commissioned in 1922) triple-stack, 5570-ton light
cruisers, armed with seven 5.5-inch guns. The third cruiser, *Naka*, was a slightly younger (1925), four-stacker of similar size (5500 tons) and armament (also seven 5.5-inch guns), and was the 4th Torpedo Flotilla’s flagship. Two destroyers from *Naka*’s subordinate 9th Destroyer Squadron, the *Natsugumo* and *Minegumo*, accompanied the cruisers and provided the primary anti-submarine force.\(^{17}\)

These ships set out from Makassar on 25 March,\(^{18}\) and were later joined by the 16th Destroyer Squadron’s *Amatsukaze* and *Hatsukaze*. Finally, two small (1162 tons, one 4.7-inch gun) patrol vessels (No. 34 and No. 36),\(^{19}\) escorted the requisitioned freighters, the 5193-ton *Kimishima Maru*\(^ {20}\) and the 7508-ton *Kumagawa Maru*,\(^ {21}\) and the ex-merchantman, converted fleet tanker, the 10,182-ton *Akebono Maru*.\(^ {22}\)

The landing party, carried aboard two transports, was drawn from the IJN’s 24th Special Base Unit, based at Ambon. At that time, the 24th Special Base Force had already absorbed into its organisation sailors from the Kure No. 1 Special Naval Landing Force SNLF,\(^ {23}\) and was in the process of incorporating the Sasebo No. 1 SNLF.\(^ {24}\) It is probably from those SNLF ranks that the 450-strong landing assault group was drawn. Although often referred to as ‘marines’, these landing forces were comprised of sailors who had been provided with a modicum of infantry training and organised into rifle companies.

The island’s only harbour at Flying Fish Cove, on the island’s north coast, was selected as the main landing site, with an alternative landing site identified at the waterfall on the northeast coast.\(^ {25}\) It was intended from the outset that the landing force would be withdrawn quickly after the island had been secured.\(^ {26}\) To garrison the island, 200 sailors from 21st Special Base Unit would man four 12-centimetre naval guns and four 8-centimetre anti-aircraft guns—at least one of which remains—that were to be emplaced on the island.\(^ {27}\) They would defend the planned airfield, to be constructed by the 200-strong detachment from the 102nd Naval Construction Force, who would repair the phosphorous mine and loading facilities.

**THE LANDING**

*Amatsukaze’s* captain, Commander Hara Tameichi, described the landing as a ‘simple operation’, the ‘easiest’ he had ever witnessed.\(^ {28}\) At 0547 hrs,\(^ {29}\) floatplanes from the three cruisers bombed the Settlement near Rocky Point (at the eastern edge of east Flying Fish Cove) and then the 6-inch gun position at Smith Point. At around 0545 hrs, the *Naka* opened up on the Smith Point gun with her own 5.5-inch guns from a range of about 9000 metres.\(^ {30}\) But *Naka* ceased firing after only three rounds, when a white flag was observed at around 0600 hrs.\(^ {31}\) The freighters then moved into their positions in Flying Fish Cove around 0710 hrs, and at around 0745 hrs the landing force commander reported his sailors had reached their initial objectives without encountering any resistance.
Unopposed, the IJN sailors quickly rounded up the Sikh soldiers and local police, with the landing force commander reporting at 1225 hrs that the Settlement had been cleared, the 27-strong Sikh garrison captured, and the Smith Point gun confirmed as inoperable.\(^3\) The landing detachment then commenced repairing the phosphate facilities in order to load the precious ore onto their freighters, and started to survey the island.

### TORPEDOED

Although there was no resistance ashore, the IJN did not have things entirely its own way. At around 0749 hrs on the morning of the invasion, while the *Naka* was covering the landing, the USN submarine *Seawolf* made an unsuccessful attack when she fired torpedoes (Japanese records indicate a three torpedo salvo). The IJN escorts counterattacked with six depth charges, and although they claimed to her sunk, having witnessed steam and large amounts of oil on the surface of the water, and having also lost hydrophone contact,\(^3\) the *Seawolf* managed to escape.

Later, the following morning, at around 0450 hrs, *Seawolf* lined up a second unsuccessful attack against the *Natori*. But it was her third attack, at around 1604 hrs, that finally resulted in a single hit on the *Naka*,\(^3\) which:

> ‘hit smack amidships and broke *Naka*’s foremast. The impact and explosion left a five-meter hole gaping in its hull. Miraculously, however, not a single crewman was killed.’\(^3\)

Although *Naka* had taken on 800 tons of water,\(^3\) her compartments held and she was taken under tow by the *Natori*. Four additional destroyers from the 22nd Destroyer Division were dispatched to protect the crippled cruiser as she was brought first to Bantam Bay (where she arrived on 3 April) and then to Singapore (6 April).\(^3\) After making some temporary repairs, *Naka* returned to Japan two months later where she underwent further repairs and refitting at Yokosuka before eventually returning to service in March 1943, twelve months after *Seawolf*’s attack.

### WITHDRAWAL AND CONCLUSION

*Nagara* returned to Bantam Bay ahead of *Natori*, arriving on 2 April, and left for Japan that same day, having handed over escort duties to the four destroyers.\(^3\) The
following morning (3 April), having loaded as much of refined phosphate ore—around 4000 tons out of the 20,000 tons available—as could be carried was loaded into the freighter,\textsuperscript{19} the remaining ships at Christmas Island together with most of the IJN landing force sailed for Java. The IJN engineers had determined that the island was not suitable for the construction of an airfield, and so only a small force was to be left behind to maintain order among the island’s subdued inhabitants.

Although the full-scale invasion and occupation had lasted only four days, Japanese ships continued to call at Christmas Island until the 17 November 1943 sinking of the phosphate carrier \textit{Nissei Maru} (ironically while she was alongside the Japanese Pier)\textsuperscript{40} by an Allied submarine demonstrated the tenuous nature of the island’s continued occupation.\textsuperscript{41} In December, the remaining handful of Japanese forces and miners were evacuated to Surabaya aboard the minelayer \textit{Nanyō Maru}.\textsuperscript{42}

The IJN’s decision to invade and occupy Christmas Island was made following the string of successful advances across South-East Asia. Although the IJN committed an overwhelming force to Operation X, it expected only limited British opposition. That assessment had probably been encouraged by the absence of resistance during the aerial and naval bombardments. Together, these assaults had secured the psychological defeat of the garrison prior to the landing operation itself.

On the other side of the ledger, the bombing and bombardment missions damaged key infrastructure, which impaired the loading of the valuable phosphate ore into the Japanese transports.\textsuperscript{43} Meanwhile, USS \textit{Seawolf}’s persistence necessitated the despatch of additional IJN forces, in the form of the destroyers \textit{Amatsukaze} and \textit{Hatsukaze}, and the damage she finally inflicted by one torpedo removed from the battle all three cruisers and probably hastened the withdrawal of the remaining covering forces. Combined with the poor showing of the escorts’ anti-submarine warfare efforts, \textit{Seawolf}’s captain demonstrated the results, both physical and psychological, an aggressive submarine commander could achieve.\textsuperscript{44}

From the outset, Vice Admiral Hara’s orders were that the invasion force be withdrawn quickly, leaving only the engineers and gunners to fortify the island and to prepare an airstrip. When it was decided that construction of an airstrip was infeasible, both the engineers, and the bulk of the gunners appear to have been withdrawn, leaving only the minimum garrison necessary to enforce the Christmas Islanders’ compliance with Japanese rule and to ensure the continued supply of phosphate ore. Although the island remained under Japanese control for almost two years, the occupation was a sideshow during an otherwise dramatic phase of the war. In October 1945, the frigate HMS \textit{Rother} formally liberated the Islanders and officially restored Christmas Island to British control.
ENDNOTES

1  At 10°30’ South, Christmas Island lies just south of Indonesia’s southernmost point, the uninhabited Pulau Dana (also Pulau Ndana – south of Roti / Rote Island) which lies at 10°28’ South. In Papua New Guinea, Milne Bay, which is at 10°25’ South, was invaded but not held by Japan.

2  In accordance with Japanese convention, family name precedes the given name in this article.

3  The order for the force was dated 18 March 1942. Bōei Kenkyūsho Senshishitsu (Japan National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Department), Senshi Sōsho (War History Series), Vol. 26, Naval Operations on the Netherlands East Indies, Bengal Bay Front (Ran’in, Bengaruwan Hōmen Kaigun Shinkōsakusen), Asagumo Newspapers, Tokyo, Japan, 1969, p. 613.


5  Because Japan was the Island’s best phosphate customer. J Adams and M Neale, Christmas Island: the Early Years, Bruce Neale, Canberra, 1993, p. 71.

6  In May 1942, she was renumbered as the I-159.

7  Adams and Neale, Christmas Island: the Early Years, p. 71.


10  Ibid.

11  Ibid. Figures for Kongo’s ammunition expenditure are not available.

12  Ibid.

13  Ibid.

14  Adams and Neale, Christmas Island: the Early Years, p. 91.

15  Ibid., pp. 71, 91.

16  Ibid. Most of the European staff and their families had already been evacuated to Perth.


21  Ibid., p. 277.
22 Ibid., p. 252.
24 K Shigaki, Kōbo Hiyō Kaisenki (War Diary of the Carrier Hiyō), Köjinsha, Tokyo, 2002, p. 42.
26 Ibid., p. 614.
27 Adams and Neale, Christmas Island: the Early Years, p. 75.
28 T Hara, (with F Saito and R Pineau), Japanese Destroyer Captain, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 2007, p. 84. Although interestingly, the Official History points to Hara's arrival on the scene as having been at 1830 hrs, well after the landing had been completed. Bōei Kenkyūsho Senshishitsu, Senshi Sōsho (War History Series), p. 617.
29 I have converted these times from Tokyo Time (GMT +9 hours), as used in the Senshi Sōsho, to Christmas Island time (GMT +7 hours).
30 Bōei Kenkyūsho Senshishitsu, Senshi Sōsho (War History Series), p. 617.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 C Blair, Silent Victory, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2001, p. 190.
35 Hara (with Saito and Pineau), Japanese Destroyer Captain, p. 84.
36 Ibid.
38 Dull records that Natori returned to Christmas Island on 3 April, but Natori's Tabulated Record of Movement places her at Bantam Bay that morning, whereas Nagara's has her arriving at Bantam on 2 April and then departing to sea on the same day. H Idachi, 'Keijunyōkan Nagara, Isuzu, Natori Kōdōnenpyō' ("Tabulated Record of Movements for the Light Cruisers Nagara, Isuzu and Natori") in Kawajima, Shashin: Nihonsenkan (Warships of Japan in Photographs), pp. 174, 177.
39 The 4000 ton figure is from Adams and Neale, Christmas Island: the Early Years, p. 71, and is consistent with the capacity of the freighters available. The 20,000 ton figure is drawn from the Japanese landing force commander's report in the Bōei Kenkyūsho Senshishitsu, Senshi Sōsho (War History Series), p. 617.
40 Adams and Neale, Christmas Island: the Early Years, p. 72.
41 Ibid., p. 91.
42 Ibid.
44 Seawolf's captain, Lieutenant Commander Warder, claimed to have sunk three of the four light cruisers he believed to be off the island. Blair, Silent Victory, pp. 190–91.
THE AUTHOR

Colonel Tim Gellel has enjoyed four postings to Japan, culminating in service as Australia’s Defence Attaché to Tokyo from 2008 until 2011. Colonel Gellel developed his interest in Australia and Japan's shared military history during his time as a student at the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Command and General Staff College, and later at the National Institute for Defense Studies.
At initial consideration, these books don’t easily pair. However, upon deeper examination, themes resonate between Eitan Shamir’s mission command publication, and the pragmatic professionalism espoused in Colonel Wesley Fox’s leadership book.

In exploring the fundamentals of mission command Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the US, British, and Israeli Armies, Shamir has written a short and surprisingly lively book. Defining mission command as ‘the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders’, Shamir provides an excellent primer for officers attending, or on the cusp of attending, Command and Staff College. For non-commissioned officers, Shamir is usefully read by people assigned to senior command teams and prior to assuming the responsibilities of warrant officer.
The crux of Shamir’s analysis, and this book’s real value, is that due to the impact of internal cultural factors and external strategic settings, the implementation of mission command across the US, British and Israeli armies demonstrates a ‘gap between theory [interpretation] and practice [praxis].’ In other words, no nation can simply pick up and implement another’s conceptual thinking and practices, no matter how compelling, without applying their own societal, cultural and organisational biases and norms to the process.

Shamir argues that closing the gap between theory and practice, for any conceptual change in an army’s warfighting capabilities, is dependent upon: education, training and personnel policies; employment of technology as an enabler, not a panacea; and carefully defined and understood civil-military relations. In examining the theory and practice gap, Shamir’s book provides excellent context for students of warfare on how the US, British and Israeli armies:

- adopted mission command – made an organisational decision to embrace a foreign concept, in this case the German concept Auftragstaktik
- adapted mission command – integrated mission command into an organisation/ army
- practiced mission command – employed Shamir’s idea praxis, which ‘focuses on the factors that affect an organisation’s ability to implement a foreign concept in combat.’

Military practitioners will be interested in Shamir’s comments on the lack of literature available on the ‘comprehensive study of command.’ He notes that most books on command are: (1) biographies or autobiographies; (2) social sciences-oriented studies where command is considered as a subcategory of leadership and management; or (3) technically oriented studies devoted to command and control procedures, euphemistically simplified as command and control. Shamir identifies command as a ‘collaborative, rather than individual endeavour, involving an entire system’ … [and] ‘command is an organisational activity exercised under the chaotic conditions of battle and that it both reflects and creates military and organisational cultures.’

Shamir traces mission command to its Prussian origins following their humiliating defeat at Jena in 1806. From these origins, Shamir examines the conceptual tenets of Auftragstaktik; analyses Prussian reforms, 1806–1819, which converted mission command ideas into practice; and describes the institutionalising of Auftragstaktik through the leadership of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder. Shamir notes that ‘Moltke did not actually choose his style of command; it was dictated to him by the realities of his era’ … ‘Auftragstaktik was the German response to both the genius of Napoleon and the unavoidable friction and fog inherent in the phenomena of war.’ Shamir’s historical analysis of mission command’s conceptual underpinnings provides excellent context for practitioners seeking to understand the complexities and efforts required to adopt, adapt and practice mission command.
In framing readers’ understanding of the circumstances that shaped approaches to warfighting by US, British and Israeli armies, Shamir’s book narrows in his examination of land forces as armies rather than as core elements of wider joint, coalition and interagency warfighting capabilities. If Shamir chose to widen his examination of how armies fight, noting that such an analysis would make for a longer book, he could draw into his argument the complexities of applying mission command in inter-Service, international, and interagency environments. Friction, uncertainties and discontinuities caused by such environments further emphasise the need for armies to lead, learn and adapt in all conflict environments.

Once Shamir frames US, British and Israeli armies’ approaches to warfighting, the book examines how each army adopted and adapted mission command. All three armies sought to introduce mission command following shocks to their existing military systems; for the US it was defeat in Vietnam, for the British it was the tough fought victory of the Falklands War, and the Israelis were jolted into action following their decline in performance during the 1973 Yom Kippur War and subsequent wars in Lebanon.

Shamir notes that for the US, British and Israeli armies, ‘mission command was not adopted independently but rather within the context of broader doctrinal transformation’ and this new framework became known as ‘manoeuvre warfare’.9 Shamir also notes that, for all three armies, manoeuvre warfare’s development was ‘facilitated by, if not dependent upon, the efforts of individuals within the army who were convinced of [manoeuvre warfare’s] necessity and adaptability’.10 These individual agents of change did not always agree and included General William DePuy, Mr William Lind and Colonel John Boyd for the Americans; Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall and Mr Richard Simpkin for the British; and Colonel Hanan Shai and Shimon Naveh for the Israelis.

Shamir’s examination of the three armies largely trails off in the 1990s, which somewhat limits his analysis of US, British and Israeli adoption and adaptation of mission command, especially in this last decade’s era of persistent conflict.11 In a quick 25 pages, Shamir ‘tests’ mission command, briefly examining US, British and Israeli warfighting experiences in the last 20 years. Shamir’s almost cursory analysis of mission command in recent conflicts, arguably, weakens this otherwise excellent book.

While the Australian Army is not mentioned by Shamir regarding the implementation of mission command, critically minded readers who served in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in the late 1980s and 1990s will recognise some of the challenges faced by all three subject armies in adopting, adapting and practicing mission command. As the ADF trains to meet and defeat national security challenges into this decade and beyond, understanding and recalibrating ADF approaches to mission command are necessary. Shamir’s book provides an excellent base from which to begin this work.
Six Essential Elements of Leadership: Marine Corps Wisdom from Medal of Honor Recipient is written by Colonel Wesley L Fox, USMC (Ret), who was awarded the Medal of Honor for actions as a 1st Lieutenant, commanding Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine Division, in Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 22 February 1968. He defines the six essential elements of leadership as: care, personality, knowledge, motivation, commitment and communication. Colonel Fox has vast experience as a Marine and a leader during the Korean War, in three deployments to Vietnam, and as a trainer of Marines. Colonel Fox retired in September 1993 having completed 43 years service as a Marine.

This is a book on leadership, which naturally encompasses aspects of command, and as Shamir notes, many books on command are biographies or autobiographies. In Colonel Fox’s case, this is definitely an autobiographical book and seems a companion book to Colonel Fox’s memoir Marine Rifleman: Forty-Three Years in the Corps (Memories of War) (2002). His style is easily read, and the Six Essential Elements of Leadership contains excellent anecdotes to explain and provide context to Colonel Fox’s points on leadership.

Colonel Fox’s views are simultaneously challenging and thought provoking. He defines leadership as ‘being able to influence others to reach deep down inside themselves and pull up that something they didn’t know they had’, or as stated by US President Harry S Truman ‘a leader is a [person] who has the ability to get people to do what they don’t want to do and like it’.12 Colonel Fox stridently distinguishes between leadership and management by stating ‘care and concern for subordinates mark the leader; the subordinates of such a leader become followers. Management does not necessarily care about the people hired and fired; they are only the means’.13

It is through Colonel Fox’s differentiation between leadership and management that the strongest theme resonates with Shamir’s mission command publication. Colonel Fox argues that leaders are concerned with ‘esprit’ and leaders ‘create and maintain esprit in the hearts of their people’.14 For Colonel Fox, ‘true esprit de corps is founded on the great virtues of unselfishness, self-control, energy, honour, and courage’.15 Arguably, mission command as ‘the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders’ also needs esprit de corps to ensure that teams will fight, adapt and win, often in changed and changing circumstances, without close supervision.

Colonel Fox also addresses practicalities of mission command when examining ‘motivation’ as an essential element of leadership. During his Marine service, orders were his orders to his Marines and not ‘the colonel wants us to’.16 Simultaneously, Colonel Fox encourages the execution of mission command ‘depending on the situation and the details of the order … [leaders] have the option to add and modify to the mission as [they] move forward’ … ‘situations change as we begin
to accomplish a mission, and allowing subordinate commanders the freedom and opportunity to change as required is a sound principle.\textsuperscript{17} With these thoughts, Colonel Fox reflects Shamir’s idea that mission command is partly necessary based on the uncertainties of combat where ‘friction and fog [are] inherent in the phenomena of war’.\textsuperscript{18}

A key thought that current and future leaders can borrow from Colonel Fox’s book is the observation that every leader comprises ‘five people’. Colonel Fox encourages leaders to look at themselves, and quotes General Perry Smith’s view that a leader is really five people: ‘you are who you are; who you think you are; who your subordinates think you are; who your peers think you are; and who your superiors think you are’. Colonel Fox’s bottom line: ‘you are probably not as good-looking … brilliant, witty, or charismatic as you sometimes think you are … [and] there are times when you will be perceived, by yourself or by others, in a much less favourable light than deserved’.\textsuperscript{19}

While this book contains multiple anecdotes on warfighting, Colonel Fox includes significant emphasis on families, values and integrity as foundations of leadership … ‘teach, train, guide, and take care of your Marines, including their families to the degree that you can …’\textsuperscript{20} Colonel Fox’s emphasis on ideas beyond warfighting gives this book universality, making it a useful reference, beyond warriors, to wider sections of society.

ENDNOTES

2  Ibid., p. 5.
3  Ibid., pp. 157–89.
4  Ibid., pp. 3–5.
5  Ibid., p. 10.
6  Ibid.
7  Ibid.
8  Ibid., pp. 39, 52.
10  Ibid., p. 130.
12 Colonel Wesley L Fox, USMC (Ret), *Six Essential Elements of Leadership: Marine Corps Wisdom from a Medal of Honor Recipient (Leatherneck Original)*, Naval Institute Press, 15 September 2011, pp. 7, 53.

13 Ibid., p. 18.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., p. 94.

17 Ibid.


Reviewed by Major Dayton McCarthy, Department of Defence

The best selling horror writer, Dean Koontz, noted that ‘the only reason I would write a sequel is if I were struck by an idea that I felt to be equal to the original. Too many sequels diminish the original.’ Sequels, whether works of literature or film, always carry with them an air of heightened expectancy. Will the sequel match or even surpass the original? Or will it be a workmanlike effort that leaves its audience unfulfilled or at worst, nonplussed?

*Anzac’s Dirty Dozen* is the sequel (of sorts) to 2010’s *Zombie Myths of Australian Military History*. Like the first book, it is a series of twelve chapters on various topics edited by ADFA lecturer and former army officer, Craig Stockings. Where primarily *Zombie Myths* re-examined myths surrounding discrete incidents, organisations or individuals, *Dirty Dozen* seeks to put to rest the ‘landscapes of legends’ that have become ‘the minefields of misconception’ and, as such, has grander aims than its predecessor. Killing off an idea (or in this book, an *idée fixe*) is indeed difficult.

Craig Wilcox’s chapter on pre-Gallipoli Australian military history does not so much slay a myth but rather highlights the general disinterest in this period. He posits that this could be for a number of reasons—embarrassment over the conduct of the frontier wars, belief that any military history pre-Federation was unworthy of study or that this was a distinctly ‘British’ period in our military history and hence does not sit well with modern Australian ideals. On this last point, he notes the love affair with the slouch-hatted soldier was relatively recent phenomenon; until the First World War, colonial and Federation-era Australians equated military prowess with the British redcoat. Thus he argues that Australia’s military history did not begin at Gallipoli. Although it often appears that today’s Army seems intent on forgetting this, the military profession in this country was most certainly founded by British or British-trained officers in the decades before April 1915.
I would quibble that the abiding perception of Australia’s war in Vietnam was one of conventional ‘landmark’ battles a la Long Tan or the US experience in the northern provinces. In this regard, I think that Bob Hall and Andrew Ross are off the mark. However, their chapter on the Army’s combat operations in Phuoc Tuy is an excellent example of the kind of qualitative and quantitative operations research-style analysis often lacking in military history. By interrogating statistics such as numbers of patrols, incidents of contacts, rates of fire, one can pierce the murk of conjecture and discover the often concrete reasons behind events transpiring as they did. In this regard, Hall and Ross demonstrate why the counter-revolutionary warfare doctrine was practised with considerable success in Phuoc Tuy (and why it is so very far removed from the counterinsurgency theory of today).

But John Connor has a genuine myth to slay—that the AIF was the only volunteer force in the First World War and *ipso facto* made the AIF far superior to conscript armies. On the first point, he demonstrates that other allied forces—most notably South Africa and India—never introduced conscription. Moreover, he argues that while the AIF comprised volunteers—insofar as they were not compelled by the government to serve—there existed a very real kind of indirect compulsion. Many enlisted for economic reasons, while others sought to avoid the very real societal opprobrium reserved for those not donning a uniform and doing their duty. On the second point, he demonstrated that some conscript armies performed very well indeed—especially those that developed, and then benefitted from, combined arms technology and tactics and thorough training regimes. If the conscripted German army was so poor, why did it take more than four years to defeat it?

Many of these myths are perpetrated for, and by, the general Australian population. Other myths seem to have the most currency in government and the military itself. Al Palazzo and Dale Blair tackle two myths beloved by the political and defence establishment. Palazzo questions the notion that militarily Australia ‘punches above its weight’. This conceit, ridiculed by anyone who has actually served in or alongside allied units in the last decade and scarcely believed by any officer below star rank, holds that the small ADF has a disproportionate operational effect. Instead of ‘punching above its weight’, the ADF seems to have become a purveyor of niche capabilities such as special forces and support elements. When conventional combat troops are deployed, they often have extreme caveats placed on them and force protection becomes an end unto itself. Palazzo systematically demolishes the myth of ‘punching above its weight’ but also notes that politically, our small commitments have been enough to pay the ongoing dues for the upkeep of our various unilateral and multilateral relationships.

Similarly, Dale Blair writes about the inherent fairness of Australians in war. This supposed trait has recently been cited by an Australian general as making
Australian soldiers particularly suited to the in-vogue population-centric brand of counterinsurgency. Yet in his chapter, Blair recites a number of documented cases in previous conflicts of Australian soldiers killing opponents who were *hors de combat* and how this was portrayed as just the unfortunate by-product of aggression and fighting spirit. He notes that a combination of military professionalisation (including education in the laws of armed conflict), increased participation in peacekeeping and the omnipresence of modern media suggest that such actions are unlikely to occur again. But he also cautions that the inherent savagery of war means that we can never completely shield our soldiers from its dehumanising effects or stop them from committing such war crimes.

Two chapters did not sit well with me. The first, Michael McKinley’s analysis of the Australia-US alliance, read like an undergraduate political science essay, full of rambling diatribes and vitriol directed towards the usual suspects. It is a muddled chapter, in which he first disputes the efficacy of alliances (citing the school of thought that believes ‘power politics’ of alliances make war more likely), before arguing that the United States would not have the ability or inclination to come to Australia’s aid anyway. He even manages to squeeze in barbed remarks about the importation of nefarious practices of the ‘military-industrial complex’ as a direct result of the US alliance and the ‘perfidy’ of Great Britain in the Second World War! I agree that alliances can and have dragged countries into wider conflagrations but they have also provided long periods of stability. For middle ranking powers, such as Australia, there is often little choice as going it alone can be costly (in more ways than one). I suspect that McKinley would be among those complaining loudly when asked to pay for an independent Australian defence posture when the true, exorbitant expense of such policy and the opportunity costs on health, education and so on, were revealed.

Peter Stanley’s chapter on the centrality of war in the Australian psyche promised a lot but ended, in my mind, as an exercise in post-modernist hand-wringing. Much of his chapter responds to the arguments raised in Marilyn Lake’s and Henry Reynolds’ 2010 anthology *What’s Wrong with Anzac? The Militarisation of Australian History*, a nasty little polemic comprising contributions from the hard Left of academia. I will not go into all the contentious arguments raised by Lake *et al* and discussed by Stanley, but three are worthy of comment. Stanley argues that many other types of tragedy—death by drug overdose, car accidents or heat waves—could justifiably have equal billing with war commemoration, so why does war have such a central (and by their argument, growing) place in our national consciousness? I for one agree that some language and commemoration around Anzac Day is often flowery and excessive. However, to equate deaths due to drug overdose with deaths in war, is, on a number of argumentative levels, sophistry of the highest order.
Secondly, Stanley makes the bizarre allegation that Anzac Day is really about celebrating the First World War and therefore is only special and relevant to the ‘minority’ of Anglo-Celtic families who lost family in that war. The implication here is that Anzac Day is not ‘inclusive’ enough for new Australians. I will leave alone the non sequitur in logic here—remember this chapter largely complains that Anzac Day has become a de facto national day and that war commemoration has subsumed all other aspects of our historical memory. Surely, if Anzac Day was simply the preserve of a few, isolated, ageing Anglo-Celts, Lake et al have nothing to fear? (It must also be one of the few instances from academia where ‘minority’ is a dirty word.) At any rate, Anzac Day has long since evolved from a day simply commemorating the First World War. The operations of the last decade mean that Anzac Day is now full of veterans in their 20s and 30s, many of whom are not Anglo-Celtic. The ADF has always been inclusive, and these new Australians’ service to the nation is put on show annually on Anzac Day and celebrated nationally. This is surely a good thing, right?

Stanley carries this meme further. If Anzac Day is only an affair for a minority of Anglo-Celts, why has it become so popular? Enter the villain: the Department of Veterans Affairs, which has single-handedly whipped up war commemoration fever through the publication of histories to be studied in schools. This is followed by a (false) assertion that Australia alone in ‘comparable Western democracies’ has afforded its veterans’ affairs department such power and influence and that the wider repatriation and welfare apparatus created after the First World War was somehow excessive. For the sake of their very sanity, I suggest the likes of Lake stay out of the United States, especially during the Memorial Day weekend. I think Australia has some ways to go before it comes even close to the United States in terms of commemoration of wars and treatment of serving soldiers and veterans by the community and government alike.

So as sequels go, how does Dirty Dozen stack up? As Koontz asked, is this sequel’s idea equal to the original? Stockings, in his introduction, warned readers that Dirty Dozen might ‘disturb, or even offend’ more so than Zombies Myths. I am not so certain. To be sure, it has attacked some of the most persistent myths of military history, but I feel that Dirty Dozen lacks some of the punch of the first book. It definitely wants for some of the cohesive feel of its predecessor; in its own way and despite comprising discrete chapters, Zombie Myths possessed a certain thematic thread. For example, the conclusions in McKinley’s chapter—the cost and lack of utility of the US alliance—are refuted in part in James’ and Palazzo’s chapters as well as Stockings’ own contribution, which disproves the idea that Australia’s military commitments have largely been to fight ‘other people’s wars’ rather than calculatingly serving our national interests.

Like Zombie Myths, Dirty Dozen is a paperback and suffers from middling production values. It would also benefit from tighter editing and spell-checking.
The great irony (and sadness) of this is that many of the myths Stockings seek to slay are repeated and enriched in attractive books with superior production values. And I still cannot get past the choice of titles for both books, which I believe undersell the generally high-level academic work which lies within them. However, by and large, *Dirty Dozen*’s chapters are pithy and insightful and grounded in empirical research. And for the most part, they land their intended blows on the target myth. But it is simply not enough for the blows to be landed. For it to be put to rest forever, the myth must be seen to be slain by all and sundry. Herein lays the rub. The audience for whom the book would most benefit (and for whom intended) are the ones least likely to want to read it. There is no stopping wilful ignorance or self-delusion. For readers of the *Australian Army Journal*, *Dirty Dozen* is worth the effort; it may challenge some long-held beliefs or, failing this, introduce readers to some historical issues they were unaware of. It may not be on par with *Godfather II* or *The Empire Strikes Back*, but *Dirty Dozen* passes Koontz’s sequel test.

Reviewed by Justin Kelly, Department of Defence

In *Bully Beef and Balderdash* Graham Wilson sets out to debunk some myths surrounding the First AIF—an objective that is comprehensively achieved. The myths that Wilson addresses are varied and range from those—like the one in which the diggers were born bushmen and natural soldiers—reflective of an emerging Australian nationalism, to the more mundane examination of the pervasiveness of bully beef in the soldier’s diet.

Myths are important to societies. They form part of a cultural narrative that helps establish a shared identity based on a core set of cultural and moral values. In most cases these cultural narratives aren’t based on what we are but on what we aspire to be. If the narrative presents a set of values that are beneficial in adapting to reality they can be both an important source of cohesion within a group and an important mechanism for coping with an evolving world. The myths examined in this book are potentially important because they are held—more or less—by (at least) two social groups: the Army and the wider Australian community.

However, not all myths are created equal. Some are big myths that continue to help shape an Australian identity and still impact on the way we approach the world while others, about the fighting-est chaplain in the AIF or whether Edward Gaby VC was photographed posthumously, are of specialist or local interest only. However, Wilson isn’t selective; he has apparently gathered all the myths surrounding the First AIF and subjected them equally to forensic examination. Whether or not this completeness adds to the worth of the book is moot. None of the myths is examined for its importance or continuing impact—if they had been a different book might have emerged. What we have is essentially a series of essays, each of which addresses a single myth and each of which is structured along these lines: the myth, its origins, and then the facts that refute it.
In assembling the refutation Wilson presents tightly structured arguments supported by extensive examination of primary sources. He is not shy about laboring a point and in a number of the chapters this reviewer was absolutely convinced by the half-way point. Generally, only the most committed and fervent myth-holders will be able to sustain their beliefs to the end of any of the chapters.

However, in the last chapter—examining the charge at Beersheba—Wilson is at risk of over-extending himself. Suggesting that the charge represented a ‘last desperate throw of the dice by Chauvel to make up for his bungling of the Desert Mounted Corps’ part in Third Gaza and an effort to save his reputation’, Wilson ventures, for the first time, into the world of tactics. This is a different kind of history to that contained in the previous thirteen chapters. In it the types of questions are not just ‘what happened’ but what were the options available, what risks were perceived at each level of command, how did one regiment differ from another in morale, aggression or competence—in short, rather than converging onto a single truth, historical examination of tactics needs to open up consideration of the vast array of potentialities and only then, possibly, arrive at a ‘on the balance of probabilities’ assessment of the most favourable course of action. In the four pages of text Wilson commits to the task of deconstructing Chauvel’s decisions there is insufficient space to do this kind of analysis and in the end, Wilson bases his refutation on the availability, and rejection by Chauvel, of a single alternative course of action. In the rest of the chapter, which goes on to show that the claim that Beersheba was the last great cavalry charge is bunkum, Wilson returns to his strong suit and makes his points with aplomb.

So what is in this book for the professional soldier? Really, the importance is in the subtext rather than in the text. What the book indirectly reinforces is the complexity of warfare, the importance of training and organization, and huge demands for solid, detailed, grinding staff-work. *Bully Beef and Balderdash* is a diverting light read—ideal for the staff college student on a beach holiday.
BOOK REVIEW


Reviewed by Dr Robert Stevenson, Research Fellow, University of New South Wales

This biography is Peter Edgar’s second book examining the life of Sir William Glasgow (1876–1955). In 2006 he published *To Villers-Bretonneux* examining the military service of Glasgow as the commander of the 13th Infantry Brigade (AIF) on the Western Front. Although this work was not so much a biography of its commander as it was a study of his command, it was groundbreaking because it remains the only published study of an Australian infantry brigade during the Great War. At the time this reviewer was impressed with the author’s research and approach, and only disappointed because Glasgow’s earlier Gallipoli service and his later appointment as commander of the 1st Australian Division lay outside the period under investigation.

Edgar’s new volume admirably fills the gap and expands on his earlier work, providing the first full length biography of Glasgow. At one time Bill Glasgow was a household name in Australia, though today he barely rates a mention in most histories as he has been overshadowed by other more colourful and chronicled contemporaries such as the mercurial Harold ‘Pompey’ Elliott. While an imposing bronze statue of Glasgow stands in Post Office Square in central Brisbane, it is doubtful if many of the busy workers and shoppers who daily pass his image recognise his name or appreciate his lifetime of national service. As Edgar accurately and assiduously charts, Glasgow had a remarkable life growing up in colonial Queensland before enjoying successful careers as a banker, storekeeper, grazier, businessman, soldier, senator, Minister of the Crown and diplomat. A tyro in each of these new fields, invariably he rose to command great respect in each of them. Although a man of many parts, he was like so many of his generation forged in war and it is his military career that consumes more than half of this study.
Glasgow held a life-long belief that every man had a duty to defend his homeland, be it colony, dominion or independent country. He understood that more often than not, war catches people and nations off guard descending, as he described, 'life a thief in the night'. Joining first the school cadet corps and then the local part-time colonial forces, three times in the first half of the twentieth century war erupted and on each occasion Glasgow stepped forward. In South Africa during the Anglo-Boer War he earned the Distinguished Service Order. When war broke out in Europe in 1914 he joined the light horse, seeing service on Gallipoli, where he was wounded and earned a reputation as a brave soldier and competent regimental commander. When the Australian forces were expanded following the withdrawal, Glasgow left his beloved mounted troopers to command an infantry brigade. Over the next two years he commanded his formation with skill, culminating in the brilliant night time recapture of Villers-Bretonneux on 25 April 1918, an action involving both his and Elliott's brigades. Following his success Glasgow, who had proven to be more dependable and balanced, was promoted over the head of Elliott to command the 1st Division. He led the division through the final 100-day campaign that saw the defeat of the German army. In four years he rose from major to major general and ended the war as Sir William Glasgow.

While the general reader might find the level of military detail daunting, Edgar does an excellent job of explaining the different issues with which Glasgow grappled, from troop leader on the Veldt all the way up to divisional commander on the chalk uplands of Picardy. The text is supported by more than 70 photographs and a total of 35 maps. The maps are clear, relevant and well laid-out, allowing the reader to follow the military actions described. As an aside, this volume is one of a series of studies published by Big Sky Publishing in association with the Army History Unit in its Australian Army History Collection. Both organisations are to be congratulated for publishing this volume in hard back and at a reasonable cost. While some might find the 400 pages excessive and cluttered in places with background information, this is a minor criticism (if at all), since some readers will undoubtedly appreciate the context it provides.

Edgar goes on to describe Glasgow’s equally impressive post-war achievements. He was elected to the Senate in 1920 and seven years later was appointed Minister for Defence, holding that position until his party lost the 1931 election. In peace as in war, Glasgow maintained the same degree of diligence and integrity in his parliamentary affairs as he did on the battlefield, rising by force of character, capacity, loyalty and hard work. When war broke out in 1939 he again volunteered, at the age of 63, and although rejected for a military command, he was appointed the first Australian High Commissioner for Canada. Between 1940 and 1945 he again gave distinguished service in a pioneering role, including exercising a supervisory function for the Empire Air Training Scheme. While Edgar’s narrative
includes an interesting chapter on Glasgow’s role in Australian-Canadian wartime relations, including an unsuccessful Australian plea for reinforcements as Japan advanced southwards, one surprising omission is that Edgar makes no mention of the Canadian brigade lost in the defence of Hong Kong, surely one reason for Canadian reticence.

The author examines the man and his times, avoiding the propensity to view the past coloured by today’s attitudes and sensibilities. He describes Glasgow as he was: a life-long Freemason and committed Presbyterian, who was not immune from the anti-Catholic prejudices of the day. On the other hand he also liked a smoke, drink and joke. He was staunchly conservative in his attitudes and politics and unforgiving of those he thought failed in their duty. He was one of a number of Australian officers who supported the application of the death sentence to Australian deserters. He was a tough, uncompromising man who drove himself as hard as those he commanded without being a martinet. Glasgow emerges with his strengths and weaknesses because Edgar avoids injecting his judgements from the distant future, allowing the reader to respect the man despite the passage of time and despite the generational differences.

In summary, this is a well researched, easy to read, solid biography. It will appeal to those interested in the Australian Army during the Great War and those with an interest in the development of Australian foreign relations. It is a welcome addition to the growing body of biographies on Australian commanders and that twentieth century phenomenon, the soldier-politician. Perhaps when next in Brisbane the reader might take the time to stop and admire Daphne Mayo’s statue of the general and reflect upon his considerable and wide achievement. Certainly Peter Edgar has done his subject justice by presenting a clear and unvarnished account of a great but largely forgotten Australian.

ENDNOTES


Reviewed by Dr Craig Wilcox, freelance historian, Sydney

I’ve been reading a little, the first book for many, many months, and I cannot settle to it,’ admitted Eric Evans of the Australian Imperial Force’s 13th Battalion in 1917. He confessed the reason to his diary: ‘my mind has been persistently on the topic of women, women, women.’

What exactly was Evans trying to read when finding himself so sorely distracted? What books did he and other members of Australia’s masculine, infantry-based expeditionary forces of the twentieth century turn to, if restlessly and briefly, in precious, private moments out of the firing line and off fatigue duty? What comedians made them laugh, what films made them cry, and what songs did they sing among themselves? Questions like these prompted this brilliantly conceived, carefully researched and clearly written book by Amanda Laugesen, a cultural historian at the Australian National University.

Laugesen aims at a collective portrait of a military audience, of its tastes and inclinations, perhaps even of its inner life. The result is necessarily more of a sketch than finished painting. The providers of cultural entertainment had plenty of reasons to leave records behind of books they mailed to a battalion, or skits worked up into a revue. Soldiers, on the other hand, had little reason and less time to write down what they made of it all. Laugesen’s sketch is revealing nonetheless.

The effort to provide Australian’s soldiers during the world wars with more wholesome pastimes than grumbling, gambling and whoring mobilised government, charities and families. Books and magazines jostled with jam tins and socks in the millions of boxes of ‘comforts’ mailed to the troops. Screens and projectors rattled in the backs of army trucks bringing the latest newsreels and films to the front line. Comedians and singers went on arduous and sometimes dangerous tours. By the
early 1940s radio programs were beaming current news, cultural discussions and live performances across northern Australia and into New Guinea.

Much of this vast collective effort aimed to improve the morals, intelligence and even politics of a captive mass audience. Bibles and literary novels arrived with detective stories and westerns; Mozart and Ravel were endorsed in earnest radio broadcasts as superior to popular music. Was this cultural conservatism, as a jazz-loving signaller complained during the Second World War, ‘the very thing we are fighting against’ in going to war with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan? Government efforts to distribute books on current affairs, along with the unstuffy army magazine *Salt*, were anything but conservative, hoping to mould readers into more sceptically patriotic citizens by the time peace came.

A returning prisoner of war jokingly warned his family that ‘You will find I am almost a cultivated man.’ Yet as Laugeson tells us, many soldiers resisted cultivation. ‘Call that a library?’ one scoffed at a collection of books on the ship carrying him to the First World War. ‘Why, there ain’t one o’ Nat Gould’s or Charles Garvice’s in the whole show!’ Bestselling writers like Gould and Garvis are forgotten today, but they were firm friends to troops who simply wanted a daydream in print. So was the New Testament, especially when it was a gift from a mother or girlfriend. Equally prized were local newspapers and letters from home. Films were not as popular as we might expect, though much depended on plot and cast. For all their popularity on the home front, movies like *London Can Take It* annoyed men who were taking it themselves. Tough-guys like Humphrey Bogart and James Cagney seemed fake to viewers who really did shoot their enemies, and who knew that no one dies the discreet death of the Hollywood extra on the losing side of a gunfight.

Laugeson’s final chapter leaves the World Wars behind to glance briefly at Vietnam and suggest how her audience and its cultural providers changed after 1945. The effort at uplift largely vanished. Serious reading became rare, comedians and musicians tended to be superannuated bores and provincial copycats, and pornography was no longer confined to a few lurid postcards—a modern Eric Evans no longer had to put aside a magazine to ponder women. Film and music were freed up by the ‘60s to evoke and stoke the doubts some troops felt about their war. ‘James Stewart says some good things,’ one soldier wrote home after watching *Shenandoah*. ‘War is great. The undertakers make the most of it. The politicians know the rights of it, the officers know the glory of it and the soldiers just want to go home.’

Reviewed by WO2 Ian Kuring, Army History Unit

It is difficult to believe that almost a decade has passed since American and Allied forces (including Australian Special Forces) carried out their first major combat operation in Afghanistan. Operation ANACONDA was mounted against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in rugged mountain country around the Shar-i-Kot Valley near the Pakistan border during 2–15 March 2002.

Unknown to the Americans and their allies, the Shar-i-Kot Valley was defended by Taliban and al-Qaeda using prepared positions (including caves) located mostly on high ground and developed during the period from the Afghan-Soviet War. Allied intelligence did not identify that the enemy force was much larger than forecast and also promoted the expectation that the enemy would withdraw when confronted with the Allied force deployment. As a result the Allied forces’ scheme of manoeuvre for Operation ANACONDA was based on the hammer and anvil concept, with Afghan forces led by American Special Forces advancing to push the withdrawing enemy against Allied blocking forces (including elements from the 10th Mountain Division, 101st Airborne Division and various Allied Special Forces) in an effort to trap and destroy the enemy. In this case the enemy did not try to escape but used prepared defensive positions to stay and fight. The authors make the point very clearly that Operation ANACONDA was not an elegant, smooth operation and any consideration of success was due to the determination, perseverance and courage of the participants who adapted and overcame the operational and physical obstacles as well as the fog of war to inflict heavy casualties and logistic losses on a determined and well prepared enemy.

This book provides the reader with a detailed account of the whole operation, including the preparation and decision making and a blow by blow description of the fighting, concluding with a valuable chapter covering operational and tactical
lessons learned. The book is easy to read with the complexity of the operation and combat made more understandable for the reader through the imaginative organisation of each chapter using subheadings incorporating location, event and timing backed up by formation/force identifying symbols. Throughout the book are specially prepared maps that show significant troop locations and movement as well as the terrain. It is a great pity that to keep the cost of the book to a reasonable price the maps were not printed in colour.

Included with the book is an excellent DVD which helps to set the scene for the events described in the book. For this reason I recommend that the reader views the DVD prior to reading the book. The DVD includes some great combat film as well as an interesting 15-minute conversational type explanatory discussion by the authors about the book and the making of the DVD.

The book *Operation Anaconda* by Les Grau and Dodge Billingsley is published by the University Press of Kansas and includes a DVD produced by Combat Films and Research. Even though Operation ANACONDA is comparatively well known (at least by name) most of what has been previously written focuses on battles involving the Special Forces, especially the tragic events on what has become known as Robert’s Ridge. These books include: *Not A Good Day To Die* by Sean Naylor, *Roberts Ridge* by Malcolm MacPherson, *Shadow Wars* by David Pugilesie, *Task Force Dagger* by Robin Moore, and *18 Hours* by Sandra Lee.

The author of the book is Dr Les Grau, a retired US Army Infantry Lieutenant Colonel and Vietnam veteran who is the research director for the Foreign Military Studies Office at the US Army’s Combined and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. He is a prolific researcher and writer of articles published in military journals and is the author of a number of books dealing with the Soviet military experience in Afghanistan—the best known being *The Bear Went Over the Mountain*. Les has visited Afghanistan on a number of occasions including walking the area where Operation ANACONDA took place.

The creator of the DVD is Dodge Billingsley, an award winning documentary filmmaker and the Director of Combat Films and Research Inc. He accompanied US Infantry soldiers into the Shar-i-Kot Valley during Operation ANACONDA and filmed their activities.

While Operation ANACONDA is covered in detail, scattered throughout the text Grau uses his knowledge and experience as a combat experienced infantry officer and military historian to provide the reader with insights and commentary about various aspects of modern combat as it affected operations in Afghanistan a decade ago. Topics covered include: helicopter operations in high altitude mountain country, the employment of night vision equipment, intelligence, air support, unity of command, organisation, long range fighting and the employment of infantry weapons, Army transformation, the support of competent subordinates, mountain
warfare training, the soldiers load, changing key combat force elements during an operation, working with Allied forces, media relations, mobility, communications, and political objectives versus military objectives. None of these topics are new but their application to combat in Afghanistan in 2002 provided problems on the battlefield, even though they had been discussed and known about for decades.

The operational experience and lessons learned from Operation ANACONDA were used by the US Armed Forces to improve their military performance in subsequent operations in Iraq and continuing operations in Afghanistan.

This is a great book that can be read and studied by anyone (all military rank levels and military history enthusiasts) interested in modern combat operations involving land and air forces and the lessons that come from doing things for real, beyond the world of operational and tactical theory where discussion, planning, decision making, training and mission rehearsal exercises point toward perfect results.
The Sixth Wave: How to Succeed in a Resource Limited World is a bold attempt to lay out a road map for a future where economic growth can be decoupled from resource consumption. The premise of the book is that through changes in technologies, institutions and markets, a sixth wave of innovation will dramatically change the global economy, creating a better world while adapting to the limits to growth such as climate change and peak oil.

The book is laid out in two parts. Part one defines the next wave of innovation while part two explains how that wave can be caught.

Part one commences with an examination of innovation cycles, known as Kondratiev waves, since the beginning of the industrial revolution. With the global economy approaching the 'limits to growth', the authors propose that resource efficiency will be the next great market which will drive the sixth wave of innovation. This will be supported by institutional changes where ‘externalities’ such as greenhouse gas emissions are internalised into the price of goods and services. The final element will be ‘CleanTech,’ that is, technologies that achieve more using fewer resources in an environmentally friendly manner.

Part two explores five ideas that will enable entrepreneurs, business and government to ‘catch the sixth wave’. These ideas include using waste as an opportunity, a move from selling products to selling services, producing physical items locally while sharing information globally, a convergence between the digital and natural worlds and looking to nature to solve problems.

The Sixth Wave is an easy read with some complex topics being explained in a light hearted and easily understood manner. The message they are attempting to sell, namely that affluent Western societies can continue to live in a similar but better fashion than we do now, is appealing, and offers hope through numerous
examples of current and projected changes. The key question is whether this hope is misplaced or not.

There are a number of weaknesses in the arguments presented in *The Sixth Wave* which may well undermine the achievement of the vision explored in this book. The first is the timeframe that is considered. Industrial civilisation is a relative newcomer in human history. A longer term view, as identified by Joseph Tainter in *The Collapse of Complex Societies*, would suggest that socioeconomic systems increase in complexity until they outrun their resource base, after which they contract to a lower level of complexity. The author’s suggested approach to mitigating the limits to growth, namely adding additional complexity to a world that is already hyper-complex to solve a predicament that is largely due to too much complexity is an experiment that is unlikely to end well. This is a lesson that can be drawn from numerous past civilisations.

The second criticism is whether increasing resource efficiency as an approach to the limits to growth is even feasible. With the global population expected to reach around nine billion by mid century and billions more people aspiring to developed world living standards (and hence resource consumption), the authors offer little analysis to identify the magnitude of the increases in resource efficiency required and how such increases could be achieved. This is particularly salient given that such changes in resource efficiency are subject to diminishing returns and as the authors identify, increases in resource efficiency have ‘not yet been able to keep pace with increases in population and affluence’.

This leads on to a final criticism being that even if it was feasible, it may already be too late for the approach proffered in *The Sixth Wave* to be applied. While it will only become clear well into the future, it could well be that the global economy has already reached the limits to growth. If this is the case then many of the changes proposed will become subject to the ‘law of receding horizons’ and never come to fruition.

James Bradfield Moody and Bianca Nogrady are to be congratulated on their attempt to define an approach to managing industrial civilisation’s battle with the limits to growth. This is an area that, given its importance, is the subject of far too little discussion including within Army. Unfortunately the authors suggested solution, in this reviewer’s opinion, is one that is unlikely to succeed. With Army on a capability development approach of ever increasing complexity, this raises some serious questions on how we adapt to a world subject to the limits to growth.
MILESTONES

IN MEMORIAM

WO1 WALLY THOMPSON, OAM
(1932–2012)

Wallace Talbot Claxton Thompson was born in Sydney on 9 November 1932, to Albert and Alice Thompson. In 1950, aged 17, he was conscripted under the National Service Scheme into the Citizen Military Forces after having completed his schooling at Ashfield Technical School. In 1954 he relinquished the rank of Sergeant and enlisted in the Australian Regular Army where he was posted to the 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (RAR), serving with the battalion on operations in Malaya. Thompson saw active service with the 2nd Battalion in Malaya during the period 1955–57 as a section commander and was promoted to Sergeant.

In 1958 he married Judith Edwards with whom he had a daughter, Sharyn, followed eleven months later by a son, Brett, in 1960. In November 1961 he was posted to the British Army Jungle Warfare School in Johor, Malaya, and the couple had two more daughters, Catherine and Elizabeth, who were both born in Singapore. Thompson returned to Australia in 1963 and was posted to the 1st Battalion RAR. In July 1964 he was promoted to Warrant Officer Class Two. In the following month of August he was posted to the Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam. For service during this time Thompson was awarded the South Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Silver Star for action with 3rd/5th Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

After his first tour of Vietnam in 1965, Thompson was posted to Sydney University Regiment as an instructor. In 1967 he was posted to Headquarters 10 Task Force as Company Sergeant Major, Headquarters Company. In 1968 he was
deployed on a second tour of duty in South Vietnam where he fought at the Battle of Coral and was mentioned in dispatches. During the battle he was wounded by a rocket-propelled grenade after which he returned to Australia. He was then posted to the Infantry Centre at Ingleburn in 1969 and Scott, his second son, was born.

In 1970 he was promoted to Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) 4th Battalion RAR where he did his third tour of South Vietnam. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, in the Queen's Birthday Honours list 1977, honoured Warrant Officer Class One Wally Thompson with a Medal of the Order of Australia. Between 1970 and 1983 Thompson held numerous RSM appointments before being appointed the inaugural Regimental Sergeant Major-Army. The then Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Philip Bennett, decided there was a need to create the position of WO1-A. Thompson was the ideal candidate as he had completed three tours of Vietnam, had mentions in dispatches, and had been wounded and awarded as a result of combat. He was described as having readily displayed the qualities of courage, initiative and teamwork. He was said to be a man that led by example and was a highly regarded RSM. In his appointment as WO1-A, he was able to give a soldiers’ perspective to the Chief of General Staff, as well as communicate the General’s direction and strategy to the ranks. Those who knew him best said he belonged to the ’grin and bear it’ generation and that he could be best described by Rudyard Kipling’s poem ‘if—’:

IF you can keep your head when all about you
   Are losing theirs and blaming it on you,
If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you,
   But make allowance for their doubting too;
If you can wait and not be tired by waiting,
   Or being lied about, don’t deal in lies,
Or being hated, don’t give way to hating,
   And yet don’t look too good, nor talk too wise:
If you can dream – and not make dreams your master;
If you can think – and not make thoughts your aim;
   If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster
And treat those two impostors just the same;
If you can bear to hear the truth you’ve spoken
   Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools,
Or watch the things you gave your life to, broken,
   And stoop and build ’em up with worn-out tools:
If you can make one heap of all your winnings
   And risk it on one turn of pitch-and-toss,
And lose, and start again at your beginnings
In Memoriam

And never breathe a word about your loss;
If you can force your heart and nerve and sinew
To serve your turn long after they are gone,
And so hold on when there is nothing in you
Except the Will which says to them: ‘Hold on!’
If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue,
‘Or walk with Kings – nor lose the common touch,
if neither foes nor loving friends can hurt you,
If all men count with you, but none too much;
If you can fill the unforgiving minute
With sixty seconds’ worth of distance run,
Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it,
And – which is more – you’ll be a Man, my son!

He held the position of WO1-A until his official retirement in 1987, but many maintain he never really retired. Wally Thompson passed in Bankstown on 19 April. He is survived by his wife Judith, his sons Brett and Scott as well as his daughters Sharyn, Catherine and Elizabeth.
Listed below is a select group of books recently or soon to be published that either contribute to the discussions initiated in the articles in the *Australian Army Journal* or on subjects that may be of interest in the near future. Some of these books may be reviewed in forthcoming editions of the *Journal*.


  As the title of the book suggests this is a collection of personal accounts told by soldiers those who have lived the story. The work spans the period of the First World War through to current operations and captures the range of experiences of what it means to be an Australian soldier.


  *Rwanda* is the inaugural volume in the Army History Unit’s latest venture with Big Sky Publishing, the Australian Military History Series. The aim of this series is to analyse aspects of Australian military history that do not comfortably fit under the banner of battles and campaigns. *Rwanda* maintains the high standards set by the AHU Campaign Series and is richly illustrated with maps, photographs and drawings and contains numerous sidebars on weapons and personalities.


  In *China’s Regulatory State* Roselyn Hsueh argues that China has adopted a new developmental model, one that deviates significantly from its communist past but also from that implemented by the region’s liberal developed states—Japan and South Korea. Hsueh shows that deregulation is occurring within a framework of state control. By investigating how China combines the introduction of competition with reregulation Hseuh provides a different picture of China’s new regulatory state and explains its implications for twenty-first century capitalism.

A textbook, *Contemporary Challenges to Australian Security* provides a guided introduction to the threats Australia may face. The book examines the critical issues that security thinkers need to consider, including terrorism, environment security, and failed and failing states. To encourage the reader to delve deeper each section contains source documents and discussion questions.


This small volume is the proceedings of a conference co-organised by the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Its contributors consider the Five Power Defence Arrangement’s origins, contribution to regional security and the Alliance’s role into the twenty-first century. Contributors include, Geoffrey Till, Carlyle A Thayer, Sam Batemen, Ang Cheng Guan and Jim Rolfe.


In the *New Arab Revolutions* Farhad Khosrokhavar offers an accessible explanation for the social upheavals and revolutions that have swept much of the Arab world. He examines how these changes have affected the region and sheds light on the potential of such citizen movements to inspire further change in the region.


This work examines how the US Army reinvented itself after it became mired in the Iraq insurgency. Serena outlines what can be best described as a monumental process of organisational adaptation. In doing so he also assesses the US Army’s ongoing ability to adapt to future adversaries.
NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The editors of the Australian Army Journal welcome submissions from any source. Two prime criteria for publication are an article's standard of written English expression and its relevance to the Australian profession of arms. The journal will accept letters, feature articles, review essays, emails and contributions to the Point Blank and Insights sections. As a general guide on length, letters should not exceed 500 words; articles and review essays should be between 3000 and 6000 words and contributions to the Insights section should be no more than 1500 words. The Insights section provides authors with the opportunity to write brief, specific essays relating to their own experiences of service. Readers should note that articles written in service essay format are discouraged, since they are not generally suitable for publication.


Please make sure your submission includes the following details:

- Author's full name
- Current posting, position or institutional affiliation
- Full mailing address
- Contact details including phone number(s) and email address(es)

Please also include the following fields in your submission:

- 100-word article abstract
- 100-word author biography (please see the following biography guidelines)
- Acronym/abbreviations list

The article must be presented in the following format/style:

- Microsoft Word (.doc) or Rich Text Format (.rtf)
- 1.5 line spacing
- 12-point Times New Roman
- 2.5 cm margin on all sides
- Automatic word processed footnotes
NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

- No 'opcit' footnote referencing
- Australian spelling (e.g., –ise not –ize)

GENERAL STYLE

All sources cited as evidence should be fully and accurately referenced in endnotes (not footnotes). Books cited should contain the author’s name, the title, the publisher, the place of publication, the year and the page reference. This issue of the journal contains examples of the appropriate style for referencing.

When using quotations, the punctuation, capitalisation and spelling of the source document should be followed. Single quotation marks should be used, with double quotation marks only for quotations within quotations. Quotations of thirty words or more should be indented as a separate block of text without quotation marks. Quotations should be cited in support of an argument, not as authoritative statements.

Numbers should be spelt out up to ninety-nine, except in the case of percentages, where arabic numerals should be used (and per cent should always be spelt out). All manuscripts should be paginated, and the use of abbreviations, acronyms and jargon kept to a minimum.

BIOGRAPHIES

Authors submitting articles for inclusion in the journal should also attach a current biography. This should be a brief, concise paragraph, whose length should not exceed eight lines. The biography is to include the contributor’s full name and title, a brief summary of current or previous service history (if applicable) and details of educational qualifications. Contributors outside the services should identify the institution they represent. Any other information considered relevant—for example, source documentation for those articles reprinted from another publication—should also be included.