ARMY JOURNAL

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INDONESIA contains within its island territories 46,675 villages in which live almost 120 million people. The village is the basic unit in the structure of the Indonesian community. Just as a house buyer should probe the foundations and look carefully at the uprights, joists and beams before making up his mind to close a deal, so should the foreign observer, if he wishes to understand Indonesia, study the villages and the organizations that bind them together.

Because of her widely ranging conditions of geography, her great variety of ancient traditions and customs and her diversity of cultures, Indonesia’s villages are of many different types and forms; all of them, however, possess certain fundamental similarities.

The villages are the strong timbers forming the framework of the national structure. They are set in a solid foundation made of a special Indonesian mix known as Pantjasila, the ingredients of which are the five principles upon which the Republic is based—namely, Belief in the One God, Just and Civilized Humanity, National Unity, Democracy Guided by Wisdom in Mutual Consultation, and Social Justice. They are fastened and braced by sound organizations of government, in which the civil administration and the armed forces, including the police, each plays a part.

Colonel Sharp graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon in 1941 and served in 1 Australian Parachute Battalion during the 1939-45 War. After graduating from the Australian Staff College in January 1948 he served as an instructor at RMC until 1951 when he was posted to 1 RAR. He was 2IC of the battalion in Korea in 1952 where he was awarded the OBE. In 1955 he went to Singapore as Comd Aust Army Component, British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve. In 1959-60 Colonel Sharp attended US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and this was followed by two years in the Office of the Military Attache, Washington. After commanding the Infantry Centre, Eastern Command in 1963-64 he attended the RAAF School of Languages at Point Cook. In 1967 he was appointed Military Attache at the Australian Embassy, Djakarta. He took up the appointment of Colonel in charge of Administration, Eastern Command, in March this year.
It is, of course, fundamental in such a society that ‘who controls the villages controls the towns and cities.’ This fundamental truth was proved in the 1945-50 battles for freedom and again in the long campaign to achieve internal security from 1950 to the present day; the period 1945 to 1969 has in fact been 24 years of struggle to establish territorial influence in the villages.

A village is more than a place where people live. It is a complete community. Its central figure of authority is the village headman, known in different regions as the Lurah, Kepala Desa, Kepala Negeri, Wali Negari or Kepala Marga; he is a man of standing elected by his own people, who has as his right-hand man the policeman, custodian of law and order in the village society. The headman is the chief executive authority.

The village council is the legislative body. Made up of elected representatives of the people, it includes as a permanent member the religious leader, who guides the destinies of all through his teachings in the mosque. To this council the people bring their petitions, requests, grievances and suggestions in matters affecting the life of the village.

In the hands of the chief executive and the council rests all the business of the families, official contact with higher authority, decision-making, arrangements for village security, organization of work in the fields and in village projects, recording of marriages, births and deaths, issuing of certificates and identity cards, maintenance of records to show where every person lives, how many goats, cows, horses, chickens and ducks he owns, and all other business of an orderly society.

A village is the smallest unit of local government. Indonesia’s widely spread land area, extending in an arc of islands from Sabang in the west to Merauke 3,000 miles away to the east, is divided into twenty-six provinces, each with a governor as its head. A province contains sub-divisions known as Kabupatens, which in turn are made up of a number of Ketjamatans. Each Ketjamatan contains its share of villages. There are, of course, many towns along the main arteries of communication, but the villages remain the basic framework of the community.

The military territorial organization parallels the civil government at all sub-divisions from province down to village; providing a headquarters at each intervening level, so enabling the men in uniform to stay in close contact with the people and their civilian leaders in every strata of the civil administration.
Throughout the recent struggle against subversion and insurrection and the hard uphill climb towards the beginning of economic and political stability the Indonesian people have been supported, guarded and assisted by their military men. In the village the army has been physically present in the person of a non-commissioned officer known as the Pembina Desa. He has held a position of great authority, surpassing even that of the headman in times of emergency, by virtue of his responsibilities as representative of the military territorial organization, and therefore as the personal link between the village people and the armed forces.

A village is people. Of the almost 120 million in Indonesia only a small percentage has gravitated towards the magnetic attraction of the cities. Even the seething national capital, Djakarta, sprawled across the humid flat-lands where the River Tjiliwung sloshes its embarrassed way through waste-disposal canals into the Java Sea, embraces within its boundaries no less than 141 villages.

A village in Indonesia is a family made up of many families. In it no man can be a stranger; in its warmth no one remains unwanted. In the family the very young are deeply loved, the very old are cherished. To belong to a family is a foremost desire of the Indonesian heart. Among 120 million people one man can be quickly reduced to a blurred face in the crowded stands, whereas in the family environment of the village he walks tall as a member of the team. But, as with all creatures living cheek-by-jowl with mother nature, subject to her unpredictable moods of flood, famine, fire and volcanic destruction, their code of life is a harsh one. Against those who violate that code the warm hand of village friendship dons knuckle-dusters. Witness to this fact are the many Communist Party suspects recently released from custody by the central government, but rejected as outcasts by the villages which once were their homes.

In the village each man is a partner with his neighbours in the great co-operative effort that follows the wet and dry seasons, in a never-ending endeavour to harness nature for the production of daily necessities. This co-operative effort, this working together for the common good, is known as gotong-rojong.

A typical village shelters peacefully behind its green curtain of bamboo thickets and coconut palms, an island in the watery expanse of ricefields which provide its food and income. Whether it be a small group of a few hundred souls or a substantial community of 10,000, the
village cannot live without gotong-rojong. Single-handed, a farmer can neither plough, harrow, irrigate, tend and harvest his crops nor afford the cash for hired labour. Within the village, buildings to be erected, wells to be dug, flood or volcano damage to be repaired, guards to be mounted by night against intruders, and a multitude of other tasks require the combined efforts of the people.

At planting time many backs bend to the task in the mutual assistance effort known as 'Gotong-Royong'.

Where decisions affecting the whole village must be made there is no place for systems such as one-man-one-vote, neither is there room for a dictatorship. Since the dawn of history a decision-making machinery known as 'consensus by discussion,' or 'musjawarah,' has been in operation throughout Indonesia: it has proved to be a highly successful method of arriving at decisions which affect the whole village or group of villages. Musjawarah involves a discussion of all aspects of a problem by the parties concerned, continuing until a consensus is reached. Some village problems are complex, some simple. By far the most involved are those connected with the age-old activity on the success of which depends life itself — namely, the production of food.

In Indonesia rice is life; in the village life is geared to the rice-growing cycle. Each ricefield is a small masterpiece of irrigation; a
whole series of them, terraced up the slopes of a mountain or along the steep floor of a valley, is a triumph of engineering skill. Fed by mountain streams, a hillside of terraces must spill its water from one flooded basin to the one below it, and divert a share to fields on its left and right, in exactly the correct amounts to ensure the proper depth at each stage of the rice plant’s life. Crops may be staggered, necessitating the draining of certain fields while others remain filled. A mistake by one farmer in the channelling of water into or around his crop can result in disaster for a whole irrigation system. Where planning of such intricate procedures is involved a concensus must be reached.

A typical village . . . an island surrounded by rice fields.

At harvest and planting times it is essential that hundreds of backs bend to their tasks on precisely the right days; each worker must know his or her place in the fields. Planting and harvest require careful planning, good organization and skilful supervision. Musjawarah produces all three; gotong-rojong gets the jobs done.

In any melting-pot, what bubbles through and is skimmed off at the surface — although its form may have changed — is still composed of the basic ingredients. So it is that in Indonesia the time-tested system of Musjawarah, concensus through discussion, has bubbled up
from the villages at the bottom of the pot and been piped off at the various levels of sub-regional, regional and national government to form the essential ingredient of the decision-making process.

The foreign observer of the Indonesian scene, provided he is prepared to look beneath the surface, can discover the village brew of gotong-rojong and Musjawarah permeating the political life of the nation—for example, in functional groups such as those organized by farmers, labourers, businessmen, intellectuals, religious groups, youth and women’s organizations. He can even see it rising to the very surface of the political pot if he pays a visit to the House of Representatives or the National Assembly in the nation’s capital, Djakarta.

Neither the armed forces nor the central government, however, needs such things as the presence of Musjawarah to remind them that, even in these days of exciting development, coupled with progress towards political and economic stability, the village remains the basic substance in the diversified mixture that is Indonesia. The voice of the villages sounds a constant reminder to them. It reaches Djakarta through many mediums, perhaps the most clearly discernible of which is the table of cold, hard facts telling of progress in production of such things as rice, rubber, tea, tin and timber, and of continuing efforts in the hundreds of other activities vital to the nation’s prosperity; all depending on the labours of village people. It also reaches other ears, for there are friends and enemies who make untiring efforts to hear it, knowing that from its tone and modulations can be interpreted the mood of the village, or the sub-district, district, province—even of the nation. The Indonesian armed forces have established themselves in the best possible position for listening; by staying close to the people they hear the voice of the village before it can be distorted or drowned by other influences.

In a few instances in recent times the voice of the village has been shouted down by the clamouring of large towns better able to reach up to the microphone in regional government auditoriums. On such occasions the result has been near-disaster. South Blitar, a neglected area of East Java, was one such example. There the voice of two hundred thousand village peasants, scattered in the hill country, became too weak to be audible, even as far away as the seat of local government a few kilometres to the north across the wide brown swirl of the river Kali Brantas. They fell easy victims to Communist infiltration.
In mid-1968 the South Blitar peasant population spawned the resurgence of the PKI Central Committee and its followers. They had been sheltered and nurtured there, under cover of the people's discontent, since the Party's defeat in the backlash of the vain 1965 coup attempt.

Fortunately for Indonesia, her military men, by their presence in the villages, by their vigilance, and by their purposeful work in support of and supported by the people, have removed most of the irritations responsible for infectious outbreaks such as South Blitar. For this the nation owes them a substantial debt of gratitude, for their success has created the atmosphere in which the flame of the ambitious Five Year Development Plan is now able to burn.

The closing days of 1969 are bringing with them dramatic changes in the structure and responsibility of the Department of Defence and Security and in the army itself. With these changes comes news that the authority of the army's non-commissioned officer in the village, the Pembina Desa, is to be subordinated to that of the village headman.

The army does not pretend that the paths trodden by all NCOs in their Pembina Desa roles have been strewn with roses. In some
instances the military helping hand has had to take a firm grip in order to achieve what has eventually turned out to be for the good of the village.

The change in the Pembina Desa’s authority means a recognition by the Department of Defence and Security, by the army and by the central government itself, that the village has ‘come of age.’ It means that through the efforts of the armed forces and the co-operation of the people, internal security against Communist and radical group subversion has been strengthened to the extent that no longer need the soldier wield so much power in the village.

Such a change means that the army’s Pembina Desa will become the adviser and assistant to the headman. From the territorial organization of the army, of which the Pembina Desa forms part, will continue to come protection against disruptive and subversive elements, advice and assistance in local government matters and physical support in the form of men, transport, equipment, tools and ‘know-how,’ which for a number of years has been provided in order to help the people to help themselves. But, although military support and protection will still be close at hand, the village will be obliged to stand more squarely on its own feet in the administration of day-to-day affairs. The headman of the village will resume a position of authority and standing in the eyes of his own people akin to that enjoyed by his predecessors in earlier times.

The price demanded of the village for such an upgrading of the headman’s position will be an increased and sustained vigilance against subversive elements. For the armed forces the price will be a greater effort in internal security measures at Ketjamatan and Kabupaten levels, next higher sub-divisions of local government above the village, and a stronger-than-ever dedication of purpose in combating the greatest danger of all — loss of contact between the armed forces and the people.

In Indonesia such contact continues to be vital to the success of the armed forces in their dual function as forces for the political, social and economic advancement of the nation and defenders of the homeland’s security. To the military man contact with the people means contact with the villages. Should the man behind the rifle, through neglect, apathy or pre-occupation in other fields, allow himself to become remote from his brother behind the plough, a vital tactical and strategic advantage would be lost to the enemy.
Such loss would be equally as serious should the enemy strike from within by subversion and insurrection or from without by military aggression; its seriousness would multiply should he strike from both directions at the same time, for in the army’s concept of defence against internal and external aggression the village is the basic unit.

Indonesia’s fighting men proved the soundness of this concept in 1947-48 during operations against the Dutch, when several times they were thrust to the brink of disaster by the superior might of the enemy. In those dark days, with no air support, no heavy weapons, inadequate equipment and the threat of the Communist dagger at their backs, they pitted themselves against the onslaught of an opponent who brought to the battlefield all the advantage of modern weapons, aircraft and mechanized units. They saw that enemy quickly seize the large towns, ports and cities in Sumatra and Java.

The Indonesian Army, born of the people and fighting for the freedom of the people, in those days spun a web of power across the land, anchoring its threads at the strong-points, the villages. By gradually tightening the web, and so tying up the Dutch inside the towns and cities, the ‘freedom fighters’ achieved sufficient military advantage to support the political pressure under which their opponents were eventually forced to give up the struggle.

As it was in 1947-48, so it is today, and will be in the future—who controls the villages must control the towns. Military men are as aware today as they were in the struggle against the Dutch that by staying close to the people and in sympathy with them in times of peace they will, in periods of internal or external aggression, be assured of that vital support which only the villages can give—support in the form of foodstuffs, shelter, recruits, information and communications: of equal importance is the knowledge that these same vital elements will be denied to the enemy.

In 1945 the villages of Indonesia gave birth to their fighting men. Throughout the stormy, bloody years that followed they succoured them and kept them alive. Today the armed forces repay their debt to the villages by safeguarding their security, by aiding them in tasks they are not yet able to tackle alone and by playing a leading and stimulating role in political, economic and social development. To these ends they have pledged their full support for the republic’s recently launched Five Year Development programme.
While not pretending to be a short-cut to prosperity, the programme is at least tangible evidence for the village people that Indonesia has halted her downhill backward slide, regained her balance and thrust her foot forward in the first step towards an improved living standard. There are men of vision, in the armed forces and elsewhere, who can now see that at the end of the long road ahead lies a future into which Indonesia, with her vast natural riches, will some day stride confidently as a nation strong in primary and secondary industry.

These men see the village in that new age as the driving force behind production. They see it, not in its present form, but transformed into an efficient, dynamic unit brought to a high standard of productivity by the application of advanced methods and modern technology.

The first signs of movement in the long process of change towards the transformed village of the future are already discernible. For example, the recent introduction of high-yield rice seed and new fertilisers has nudged slightly open the hitherto closed door of age-old methods, giving the peasant farmer his first glimpse of great things in store for the future.

For the military man, in close day-to-day touch with the village, there is a substantial challenge in these days of coming change. He is aware that to him must fall the task of closely monitoring the process of change taking place in the minds and hearts of the peasant people. He accepts the challenge of regulating that process to the pace of new developments. He knows that Indonesia, having ridden out the storm of revolution, in which the nation lifted itself off its knees on to its feet and headed itself in the right direction, must now plunge afresh into a new revolution — one that will take place in the minds of 120 million people, most of them village folk.

In this new revolution ancient beliefs, customs, methods, superstitions, fears and ingrained habits, dating back not hundreds but thousands of years, must struggle and eventually be reconciled with new ways of life that will follow on the heels of modern day progress.

It is likely to be a long time, perhaps even beyond the completion of this first Five Year Plan, before the villages experience any direct, concrete benefits from the foreign aid and investment funds now being applied towards national development. This is necessarily so because of the great deal of ground to be regained following Indonesia’s many years of political and economic deterioration; it is a fact of life which
may cause the Five Year Plan to bring with it a certain internal security danger.

The danger is not that the village folk will become tired of waiting for the better life. They are blessed with a stolid patience inherited from generations of men and women in close contact with nature. They ask for and expect very little. The danger lies rather in the possibility that during the waiting period certain parties, radical groups and external agents, striving to undermine the Five Year Plan, will seek to stir up in the minds of the peasant people a belief that they are being unjustly treated or let down by the government.

Indonesia’s military men know full well that anti-government sentiments in the villages can quickly manifest themselves as anti-military feeling. The memory of South Blitar is fresh; prior to the operations there in 1968 no small group or individual soldiers dared venture into the hostile hill country beyond the Kali Brantas. An anti-government village is not merely a weak link, it is an acid that can eat into the whole chain of the republic’s security.

The greater part of the awesome responsibility for maintaining the internal security of the nation still rests squarely upon the shoulders
of the army, under the direction of the Department of Defence and Security. In the coming years, as the first development plan begins to move the country forward, many subversive activities will be directed at the peasant community. Provided the men in uniform can continue to protect the people against this subversion, the villages will stand firm as the framework upon which Indonesia's prosperity can be built.

WARTIME PROPAGANDA

References have been made... to instances where leaflets aimed at depressing the spirits of Australian troops in the Middle East not only failed to do that but had the opposite effect of enhancing their self-esteem and improving their spirits. May not such broadcast addresses... have had a similar effect on the Japanese? The Japanese soldier well knew that the Japanese army on Bougainville was isolated and hungry. Each man in the front line knew that his chance of survival was poor. Broadcast addresses... were perhaps likely somewhat to dispel loneliness, and to raise the spirits of the men of those isolated outposts—it must be an important position they were holding and they must be holding it well if the enemy chose to adopt such elaborate and roundabout methods of taking it.

The Australian Army's experience both at the receiving and giving end of 'psychological warfare' of this sort suggests that the positive results achieved were not worth the labour that was spent on it. In the years before the outbreak of war the rulers of Germany and Russia had acted on the assumption that intensive preaching could alter the outlook of a community at fairly short notice. Many politicians, administrators and economic planners of the democratic nations developed as great a faith in 'propaganda' as Dr. Goebbels possessed: if the citizens' outlook was not what was desired, one simply drugged it with 'propaganda', and if the required result was not rapidly achieved that was because the drug was not properly mixed and administered. However, Australian experience of battle-field broadcasts and leaflets suggests the possibility that the roots of national character are far too deep for fundamental changes to be brought about in a day, a year, or even several years of exhortation, no matter how cajoling or threatening.

—Gavin Long, The Final Campaigns (1963)
Towards Regional Security in South-East Asia

Squadron Leader R. W. Bradford
Royal Australian Air Force

Introduction

THE security of South-East Asia is at once a critical and controversial problem. It is critical because the countries of this broad area are endangered by a wide range of threats to their stability and security, threats which arise out of their own internal weaknesses and the external pressures of subversion and conventional attack — and in the future there will be the problem of confronting a nuclear armed China. It is controversial because of the serious disagreement about the best way to defend the area. The support of external powers in a front line and guarantor role is at present essential to the security of the indigenous countries, and, in the absence of a regional security alliance, is likely to remain so for some time.

The concept of defence arrangements through formal multilateral pacts has not widely taken root in South-East Asia where, after a millennium of conflict, there is no tradition of intra-regional military co-operation. Since the early 1950s most Communist challenges in South-East Asia have been met by direct Western intervention and by the foundation of two collective and several bilateral security pacts with external powers. Thus, although the age of colonial rule has virtually passed, the Western powers have remained deeply entangled.
in the disputes and tensions of the area. This has stultified the growth of a sense of collective responsibility among the new nations of South-East Asia.

However, the proposed British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore by 1971 and the likelihood of an American withdrawal from the Asian mainland in the post-Vietnam era indicate that the future responsibility for the internal security of the South-East Asian region will rest with the indigenous nations alone. These nations will then have to solve their intramural problems collectively, for to remain as individual nations would be to encourage the endemic threats that have played havoc with the security of the region for the last twenty years. It is against the background of these threats that the ability of the South-East Asian nations to develop a regional cohesion must be assessed.

The Changing Balance of Power in South-East Asia, 1949-1969

By 1949 the tenuous post-war balance in South-East Asia had begun to crumble. The Dutch were forced by the tenacious Indonesians and by international opinion to grant their colony independence; Great Britain was engaged in a major armed struggle against Communist terrorists in Malaya; the French were fighting a costly war against the Viet Minh guerillas in Indo-China; and in the Philippines the government was hard-pressed to cope with the Huk rebellion. Furthermore, Communist forces had taken control of mainland China and were providing arms for the Viet Minh. By encouraging Communist uprisings against the colonial powers, Russia and China were greatly increasing their influence in the area, even though they had no military forces there.

The United States reacted to this situation by providing economic and military assistance to the Thais, and to the French in Indo-China. However, the subsequent French defeat and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea were dramatic evidence to the rest of the world of the breakdown of the post-war balance of power in Asia, and of the strength of Asian nationalism coupled with aggressive Asian Communism. In 1954, the United States with seven other nations concluded the Manila Treaty that resulted in the formation of the South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).

1 Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand.
But by 1960 the security arrangements so carefully pieced together six years earlier had begun to disintegrate. North Vietnam had launched armed insurgency against the Diem Government; the United States had negotiated a settlement with Russia over Laos, but by doing so had reduced the credibility and thus deterrent effect of SEATO; and, to the south, an armed and belligerent Indonesia was adopting an irredentist attitude towards neighbouring territories.

The end of 1965 saw a shift in the security balance in South-East Asia back towards the Western powers. The massive deployment of American troops to South Vietnam staved off what would have been certain defeat by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces, and Commonwealth forces successfully defended Malaysia and Singapore against Indonesian confrontation. The balance was further improved by the crushing of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) by the Indonesian Army. This latter action vitiated Indonesia as a potential ally to Hanoi and Peking and as an immediate threat to the area.

However, the future disengagement of American and British forces could well presage a further shift in the balance point between the forces of stability and instability in South-East Asia. The direction of this shift will depend critically on the ability of the indigenous nations to cope with both the existing internal conflicts and the threats likely to develop in the post-Vietnam era.

The Threats to Security — Communism and Communalism

Except for the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation, the sequence of military events in South-East Asia during the last twenty years has been determined by Western reaction to Communist pressures. But whether Communist expansion, either overt or covert, will continue to be the major threat to the region in the immediate future remains to be seen, and will certainly depend heavily on the outcome in Vietnam. However, one can argue that the recent trend of developments in South-East Asia has, broadly speaking, favoured the pursuit of Chinese political objectives rather than those of the West, and this does not bode well for the future.

The future avenues of Communist pressures are likely to be through continued subversion and insurgency, rather than through overt armed aggression. Regardless of the nature of the solution to the Vietnamese conflict, Communist activities in north-eastern and southern Thailand, in northern and eastern Malaysia, and in Indonesia will con-
continue to act as destabilizing forces on the political equilibrium of the area. Some of the countries have made encouraging attempts on their own initiative to control this problem. Malaysia, for example, is receiving the co-operation of both Thailand and Indonesia in her attempts to eradicate Communist guerilla activity along her borders. However, previous attempts to counter subversion have resulted in a heavy reliance on external assistance, and although such subversion is becoming a total neighbourhood problem, there is little sign of an overall readiness to co-operate on a regional basis.

Another aspect of the likely threat that must be considered is communalism. Viewed from the West the danger of Communist subversion may appear obvious and overriding, but that is not necessarily how it seems to Asians. To several countries it is by no means the only danger nor the most imminent. Cambodia’s policy for instance is not determined solely by cold war considerations; Prince Sihanouk sees a greater threat to the continued sovereignty of his state from Thailand and a resurgent Vietnam than he does from Communist China.* The Philippines’ claim to Sabah is taken most seriously by the Filipinos and the Malaysian frontier with Indonesia is likely to be uneasy for some time, whatever formal agreements may be signed.

Further, in each of the South-East Asian countries there exist the overseas Chinese. These people constitute the so-called ‘Third China’ and are widely regarded as the enemy within the gates. In the view of many, the overseas Chinese may or may not be Communist, but they are Chinese. Their role in the economy makes them a special focus of animosity, probably more than their supposed fifth column activity. Generally they are looked upon with suspicion which can produce dire results, as shown in 1965 in the Indonesian bloodbath where the Chinese community suffered along with the PKI, and in the communal riots following the recent Malaysian elections. Communalism stands in the open as a threat more obvious than the insidious probings of Communism; nevertheless, its impact is very real as the Malaysian riots showed, and it may well turn out to be the more immediate danger to future regional security.

A consideration which cannot be divorced from any discussion of the more direct threats to the security of South-East Asia is that of the imminent economic weaknesses of the area. These were partly

*This article was written before the right-wing coup d'état of 19 March.—Editor.
inherited from the colonial powers and stem partly from the inadequacies of the newly established regimes. South-East Asia has sharp divisions of religion, race, and culture, and the inhabitants have little in the way of common experiences and connecting ideals. Thus, economic cooperation on a large scale, as has only recently developed in Europe, cannot be expected in the near future. However, the appeal of Communism and the jealousies that foster the divisive communal interstices in the community can best be combated by raising economic standards. Hence any arrangement devised for future regional security must be capable of handling the economic as well as the military threats to the region. At the moment SEATO is the only security arrangement in existence in South-East Asia. Can it meet this commitment?

SEATO — Its Effectiveness and Future Role

SEATO appeared in 1954, along with NATO and CENTO, as part of the American policy to delineate spheres of influence and to consolidate a Western ‘fortress’. SEATO was a logical expression of the Foster Dulles’ belief in regional pacts as a means of containing Communism and of exerting American leadership in South-East Asia. It is the most ambitious essay at collective defence in the region and appears to represent the most that can be achieved there in terms of formal military alliances.

However, SEATO has been beset with troubles since its inception. The gaps in the bulwark it sought to erect in order to counter a Communist advance are obvious. India and Burma, both with borders against China, refused to enter the system; Cambodia vacillated between Eastern and Western orbits; Laos disclaimed its aegis; and the island congeries of Indonesia circumscribing the southern SEATO flank remained outside the organization and opposed to it.

Further, the credibility of the alliance has been eroded by the action of its members during the last ten years. A distinguished American journalist² described it as a deserted house, adding: ‘Its famous tenants never really moved in with us. France and Pakistan drifted off for reasons that are well known. Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand decided that they were discharging their South-East Asian commitments by covering Malaysia, which is not in the alliance at all, and the Philippines ceased to take an active part.’ Even the Thais have

become disenchanted with the organization which has done more to protect Thailand than any other country. At the last SEATO conference, Mr Thanat Khoman, the Foreign Minister of Thailand, was quoted as saying: 'The military capability of SEATO is a fiction.'

But to say that SEATO has been ineffective during the last fifteen years would be to charge the alliance with responsibilities far greater than those it intended to shoulder. Article II of the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty states that member nations are, *inter alia*, 'to maintain and to develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.'

Admittedly, SEATO's value as a deterrent to armed attack within the Treaty area and, specifically, to armed attack by China has been assumed rather than demonstrated. However, it has brought and kept the United States on the mainland of Asia; it has preserved the integrity of Thailand; and it has been the context for operations by the Western nations in Vietnam. It has resulted in some regional collective effort although bilateral agreements did in fact replace the multilateral contract of the Treaty. The alliance did fail, though, despite special provisions within the Treaty, to contain indirect aggression, subversion, and insurgency within the region.

While the likelihood of overt Chinese aggression in South-East Asia in the next ten years may be small, it must still be considered in formulating future defence alliance for the region. China has already tested a nuclear device and is undoubtedly in the process of developing a means of delivering such a weapon. Although the indigenous nations may not have much faith in the ability of SEATO to deter a nuclear threat to the South-East Asian region, they do not possess, individually or in concert, the requisite military strength to meet such a threat.

This prospect of aggression from a nuclear armed China confirms the need for some form of continuing Western military support in the area. However, recent statements by both the American and British governments, supported by Australia and New Zealand, have indicated that in future these nations will be prepared to act in a guarantor role

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3 *Canberra Times*. 'Importance of SEATO as Bulwark'. 19 May 1969.
only and not in a front line role as before. Thus, the withdrawal of British and American troops from mainland Asia increases the military importance of SEATO as there is no viable alternative in prospect. Further, it will bring with it the need for a review of the SEATO functions and mode of operation to ensure that the alliance will be capable of acting as the main instrument of Western commitment in the area.

However, a Western presence to combat a nuclear threat is only one ingredient of a South-East Asian defence system. It needs to be supplemented by a regional system of collective defence that is capable of handling the lower orders of threats. An essential prerequisite of such a system is a sense of common responsibility for the security of the region among the indigenous nations themselves. Unfortunately there is no tradition of co-operative activity in South-East Asia, nor does each of the countries see an identical threat to its security. What then are the chances of a collective security system developing in the region?

Prospects for the Formation of an Intra-regional Security Arrangement

The prospects for a system of collective security in South-East Asia which has a broader Asian participation than SEATO will depend ultimately on the degree to which the countries concerned develop a collective responsibility for their own security. Developments in Asia since 1954 have increased the concern of individual countries for their own security in the face of threats from China and Indonesia, but it is less certain that any sense of common responsibility has been evolving. None of the Asian countries joined SEATO after its formation, and the conflicts and antagonisms which are present in the area have continued to inhibit the opportunities for collaboration among the countries for mutual defence. Impulses towards regional co-operation do exist but they remain weak in comparison with the divisive forces. Asian thinking just does not seem to give high priority to regional defence.

The more favoured line of co-operation has been via political, economic and cultural associations such as the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC)⁵, and the association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)⁶.

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⁵ Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Nationalist China, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand.
⁶ Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand.
and it is possible that one of these may eventually expand its charter to include defence co-operation. ASPAC was established on South Korean initiatives in 1967 and its first communique contained proposals for co-operation in economic, technical, cultural and social matters. It is a modest attempt at regional co-operation, and initial attempts by South Korea and Nationalist China to inject an anti-communist flavour into its workings met with little success. In fact the member nations have made considerable efforts to expand the area of their activities, and at Manila in June Mr. Carlos Romulo, the Philippines Foreign Secretary, was quoted as saying that Communist countries were welcome to join the Council. The possibility of Communist membership of ASPAC, combined with the large region it embraces, militate strongly against its possible development into a security arrangement.

ASEAN developed as an outgrowth of the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASA) and Maphilindo. ASA was the first strictly regional institution that included mainland Asian states. It was formed in 1961 and was designed to promote economic and cultural relations among Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines. Although it foundered on Filipino claims to Sabah it did represent a tentative step towards regional co-operation. Maphilindo, a loose ethnic confederation of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, did not survive the ravages of the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation although it did serve with ASA as a basis for the formation of ASEAN in 1967.

The emphasis in ASEAN is on economic and social co-operation although the door has been left open for future political and defence co-operation. Efforts have been made to bring in other Asian nations such as Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, and Vietnam so that the association may be more truly representative of the region. However, Australia and New Zealand have been excluded, presumably 'because Indonesia did not want a second centre of initiative and leadership'.

ASEAN offers a hope for the future in that it represents an initial attempt by the indigenous nations to combine in a purely Asian endeavour without the participation, and thereby direction, of non-Asian powers. The concept has a great attraction for the Asian states as it

7 'Open Door Policy by ASPAC'. Canberra Times. 17 June 1969.
8 'Delay Likely for ASEAN'. Canberra Times. 8 July 1969.
appeals to the nationalist yearnings of their educated élites to exercise an independent voice in world affairs.

However, there is a considerable difference of viewpoint among the five ASEAN nations on how the security of the region may best be ensured. Thailand and the Philippines still see SEATO as the principal means of their defence. Malaysia and Singapore are eager to retain a Commonwealth presence on their soil. Indonesia, for the time being, wishes to remain neutral. Consequently, any possibility at this stage of a security role for the association has been de-emphasized while its members have concentrated on its economic and social roles.

At the moment ASEAN can be seen as complementing SEATO and the American and Commonwealth presence in South-East Asia in contributing to the overall stability of the region. While the indigenous nations do not have the military strengths to protect themselves, some Western presence will remain essential. This will enable the region to proceed with its much needed economic reforms. It is very much in the West's interests that these nations do not spend too much on defence and thus weaken their prospects for economic growth, since their security rests ultimately on an economic basis. And Western economic support will remain an essential factor in ensuring the security of South-East Asia during the next ten years.

In the post-Vietnam period, when it is most likely that Western military support will be available only for situations involving external aggression to the region, ASEAN, perhaps with expanded membership, should be capable of making significant contributions to peace in the area by providing a framework in which South-East Asian nations could solve their essentially internal political and security problems before they develop into open hostilities. Further, it could conceivably develop an economic apparatus that would be responsible for channelling into the region economic assistance from external sources, mainly the United States and Japan, in accordance with pre-determined priorities. Regional security for South-East Asia would thus be strengthened by collective efforts to bring the nations of the area into a closer economic community.

The above prognostic may seem somewhat optimistic; but although ASEAN is presently in its infancy and its future as a security alliance is uncertain, the foundations on which it can build already exist in the
area. Malaysia is currently co-operating with Indonesia and Thailand with respect to Communist insurgency in her border areas. Thailand and the Philippines have strong SEATO associations. The Philippines and Indonesia have recent Maphilindo relations. Even if ASEAN does not rise to its expectations in the immediate future, one can thus foresee a build-up of a series of bilateral security arrangements within the region that could eventually form the framework for regional security operations by ASEAN.

CONCLUSION

The responsibility for the security of South-East Asia is collective, and the problems of defending this divided and threatened region will not be resolved purely by a reliance on multilateral or bilateral pacts with the external powers. Although the possibility of aggression by a nuclear armed China confirms the need for continued Western military support, probably in the form of a reorganized SEATO, the responsibility for internal security must, in future, rest with the South-East Asian nations themselves.

However, in order that the Western nations might assume, over the next ten years, more this guarantor role and less a front line role in relation to South-East Asia, there must first be an indigenous defence system in existence. Further, the intramural tensions resulting from the pervasive threats of Communism and communalism, and the economic weaknesses of the area, demand that this system be more than just a security alliance. It must be capable of dealing with the whole gamut of disruptive forces likely to affect the stability, and hence the internal security, of the area.

ASEAN is the only regional arrangement that appears to have the potential to meet these threats. It has the support of more than half the indigenous nations and is presently partaking in economic and cultural activities. But because there is no tradition of military co-operation in South-East Asia, its future as a defence alliance seems uncertain. However, the prospects are favourable as there currently exist within the area a sufficient number of bilateral bonds that could form a firm foundation on which regional co-operation should flourish. The development of such co-operation is essential, for in the final analysis it is only through the growth of collective endeavour that the South-East Asian nations will move towards the attainment of the regional security they seek.
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The European Scene—
A Visitor’s View

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Introduction
AUSTRALIAN military involvement in Europe appears to be of the past: the politics and economics of Europe play a diminishing role in Australian affairs. Yet diminishing as they are, they are still important to us.

Despite our natural and possibly overdue pre-occupation with South-East Asia today, a brief look at some aspects of the European scene may be of passing interest.

In Western Europe since 1945 great efforts have been made to reach a close degree of understanding and co-operation in political, military and economic fields. The concentrating factor has, of course, been the threat of Communist expansion from Eastern Europe. These efforts to achieve a united front have generally been rewarded, in that Western Europe has had peace and prosperity since World War II. This is no small achievement in an area of the world whose history is stamped with wasted years of fratricidal wars.

However, situations, emotions and attitudes change constantly and these factors should be reviewed and analysed at the same rate of change. One important factor that is changing and will continue to change in the early 1970s is the role of the USA in European affairs. In particular, the reduction of the dominant USA military participation

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in NATO appears inevitable. Should this occur it may be difficult to maintain a high degree of unity and co-operation between the West European countries. This situation will be complicated by the fact that the unifying threat of a massive Russian invasion appears to be diminishing, even though Russian force levels remain more or less constant.

The three strongest powers in Western Europe are the United Kingdom, Germany and France, and the relationship between these three is of the utmost importance for the continued security of Western Europe.

This article was written to examine the strategic interests within Europe, of the United Kingdom, West Germany and France, and to indicate where conflicting interests hinder the development of a common strategy.

NATIONAL ATTITUDES AND RELATIONSHIPS

Before comparing the strategic interests of these three powers, their national attitudes to and relationships with each other and with the two super powers—USA and Russia—should be briefly examined.

United Kingdom

The UK is not a ‘European’ power in the same sense as is France and Germany. It is an independent island nation and is extremely loath to surrender any economic, political or military independence to a European consortium. The UK’s indecision on conditions of entry to the EEC is an excellent case in point. Where only co-operation is required, as in NATO, the UK has shed some of its European inhibitions and clearly demonstrated willingness to co-operate with France, Germany and other member countries. But this organisation has, of course, no supra-national powers, and as such is a natural extension of British defence policy in the same way as SEATO, CENTO, and other treaties.

Towards the USA the UK attitude is one of traditional friendship, although there is a degree of disapproval for America and things American which is irrational and disappointing. The ‘special relationship’ between the UK and the USA does exist, but the strength of the bond appears to be steadily diminishing. The UK’s attitude to Russia is one of extreme wariness in view of the threat Russia poses. Nevertheless the UK and Russia are not traditional foes, and each year sees increasing cultural and economic ties between the two countries.
West Germany

Towards NATO, West Germany has the positive approach one would expect from a country looking directly into the mouth of a considerable number of Russian cannons. The Russian threat also conditions West Germany's attitude to the UK, France and USA. Whatever Germans may think privately of the British, French and Americans, they are determined to be as co-operative as is necessary to ensure their continued military support. As strong as it is West Germany cannot stand alone. Economically West Germany is now so entwined in the threads of the EEC that it is extremely doubtful if the old spectre of a powerful, nationalistic, militant Germany can ever rise again. It appears also that West Germans today do not wish the old Germany to rise again. Between Russia and West Germany there is an attitude of mutual hatred and fear which has changed little in the last twenty-five years. However there are signs that a more constructive relationship may develop between West Germany and Russia under the new German Government.

France

Towards NATO, the French attitude has been markedly different from the attitude of other member countries. She has now withdrawn her military forces (but not her membership). France agrees with the NATO aims but not the methods of achieving them. For example, France is strongly opposed to the theory of flexible response and the USA control of nuclear weapons. Towards the UK, France is not convinced of the UK's determination to became a truly European nation, nor does France welcome a rival to the political leadership of Western Europe which she held under De Gaulle. Towards West Germany, France has made a tremendous and successful effort to overcome the memory of past conflicts and hostility. Relations between the two are extremely good. Not so with the French-American relationship. France dislikes in particular USA interference in European policies, the USA dominance of NATO, the European economy and European technology. Towards Russia, France, although realistically apprehensive of her military might, has made strenuous efforts to establish a special relationship. From her experience in two world wars, France, to some extent, understands and sympathizes with the Russian attitude that Russian forces are purely defensive against a rearmed Germany. However, the attempts to establish a special relationship have so far not succeeded. It may be that the attempts are before their time.
STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Against this background of attitudes and relationships we will now examine the strategic interests of the three countries.

United Kingdom

The major European strategic interests of the UK are:

a. *The Containment of Communism*. This is a strategic interest in the broadest sense. In support of this more detailed interests are:
   (1) Strong support for NATO and the provision of one corps plus.
   (2) A concept of forward defence in Europe, i.e., the stationing of British troops on German soil and the total involvement of British military interests as far east as possible.
   (3) Support for the theory of flexible response as propounded by the USA.
   (4) The involvement to the maximum extent of the USA in European defence.
   (5) Positive co-operation with other NATO countries in the fields of defence, research, development and production.

b. *Development of the European Market*. Although the UK is not a member of the EEC, the countries of Western Europe provide a major market for the UK’s industrial goods. Any disruption of the market will seriously affect the country’s economy. In its present state the economy of the UK can ill afford any adverse influences. Britain has once again applied to join the EEC but there is still considerable domestic opposition to this step.

c. *The Containment of Germany*. Germany is an ally but one to be watched closely. A strong Germany has meant war and destruction twice this century and the UK has no intention of allowing it to happen again. Unlikely as it seems at this time in view of the massive Russian threat, and however much care is taken to avoid this subject, the containment of Germany remains an important and long term strategic interest.

Germany

German European strategic interests can be summarized as follows:

a. *The Containment of Communist Expansion*. This is a matter of national survival and dominates German thinking. The containment
is achieved by means of NATO and the Germans have no wish to see this organization contract in any way, or to see the USA's interest or involvement in NATO diminish. Germany would like nuclear weapons but, unlike France, is not prepared to disrupt NATO relations to achieve this. Should USA force levels in Germany be reduced the Germans will no doubt increase their own force levels, and speak with a stronger voice on NATO councils.

b. Development of the European Market. The maintenance of a stable and prosperous market in Europe is vital to the continued growth of the German economy. The EEC provides this and its preservation is of the utmost strategic interest. The expansion of this market is also important and Germany is a strong supporter of the British entry to the EEC. It is not unreasonable to suppose that West Germany strategic interests will increasingly include expanded trade with eastern bloc countries, particularly East Germany and Poland.

c. German Reunification. As a German strategic interest this is important but long term. Realistically it is not now possible. The Russians will not allow it and are strong enough to prevent it. The West Germans cannot and will not forget it but are not able to achieve it. The question of German reunification is at the very core of European political problems, but a problem which is forced to wait for solution.

France

French strategic interests in Europe are:

a. The Containment of Communist Expansion. Like the UK and Germany the massive Russian threat to Europe has dominated France's European strategic interests since World War II. Unlike the UK and Germany, France does not agree on the best way in which to contain the Communists. In support of this broad strategic interest France has followed these policies:

(1) Strong support for independent control of nuclear weapons.
(2) Strong support for the theory of massive nuclear retaliation and no support for the theory of flexible response. France does not believe that the USA will involve itself in nuclear war to save Europe.
(3) A strong objection to the USA dominance of NATO.
(4) Strong support for a European community of nations under (one suspects) French leadership.
b. Development of the European Market. Like the UK and Germany, France depends heavily on a stable European market for her prosperity. The success and expansion of the EEC are of the utmost importance to her, but expansion has been subordinated to the almost paranoic desire to exclude the UK except on French terms. This French attitude may now be changing sans De Gaulle.

c. Dominance of Europe. Under De Gaulle there was little doubt that one French strategic interest was the political and economic dominance of Europe. Implicit in this interest is the fact that France was determined to control the destiny of West Germany. De Gaulle’s departure and France’s internal economic and monetary problems have made French domination of Europe unrealistic. However, the containment of Germany and the prevention of its reunification remains a strong if unspecified interest.

THREATS TO STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Communist Aggression

The chances of a major attack, conventional or nuclear, against NATO countries by the Warsaw Pact countries appears to diminish year by year. The balance of NBC weapons between USA and Russia is too fine and the threat too massive. There are three main points however that stand out.

a. Russian force levels in the Warsaw Pact countries have not decreased and their capabilities, if not their intentions, remain ominous.

b. If NATO is weakened considerably (e.g., USA reduction or withdrawal) the Eastern Bloc may be tempted to try limited military adventures.

c. War by miscalculation following a Czechoslovakian type situation is a frightening reality.

European Instability

The strategic interests of the UK, France and Germany are continually being threatened by major forces of instability in Europe. The main ones are:

a. Weakening of NATO. This is caused by the anticipated reduction of USA and other forces, the withdrawal of French forces, the French preference for bilateral treaties, and the dispute and desires of member nations concerning the control of nuclear weapons.
b. **Reunification of Germany.** The West Germans will never forget they are a divided nation and may some day be tempted to reunite their country by force. The Russians however are determined, in the foreseeable future, to keep Germany a divided country. This is a serious and unstable state of affairs, although not a currently volatile one. Twenty Russian divisions in East Germany are effective enough to take the heat out of the situation.

c. **Student and Industrial Unrest.** Unrest and violence amongst students and industrial workers is increasing in all Western European nations. This is dangerous for three main reasons. The first is that it distracts the countries from external problems and international co-operation. The degree of introspection will vary with the extent of the unrest. Secondly, industrial unrest is expensive and may force a reduction in military expenditure. Thirdly, unrest is a good opportunity for the extension of Communist influence and may lead eventually to the weakening of political direction towards international co-operation.

d. **USA Involvement in Vietnam.** The war in South Vietnam is increasingly distasteful to the UK, West Germany and France though it is hard to find a rational reason for this as all three countries have a long history of wars of doubtful validity. Nevertheless it is felt that the USA is preoccupied with SE Asia at the expense of Europe and the thought of the reduction of the USA military umbrella is inclined to make politicians nervous and the situation somewhat unstable. In the long run, any USA force reduction may have a beneficial effect on the relations between the UK, West Germany and France in that for their own security it will force them into closer co-operation with each other.

e. **Sino-Soviet Dispute.** Because of this dispute NATO countries might think that Russia is preoccupied with its eastern borders, and politicians may press for lower force levels.

f. **Balance of Payments.** Both the UK and France are currently undergoing economic and financial difficulties which are not conducive to European stability. Prosperity on the other hand is a great stabilizer.

**AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST**

The areas of common interest between the UK, West Germany and France have developed greatly since World War II and continue to grow. In summary they are:
a. Containment of Communist expansion. However, the methods of achieving this differ.

b. Development of a strong and stable European market. In this regard the entry of the UK to the EEC would be a progressive step.

c. Reduction of defence costs. Increasing co-operation on the development and production of military equipment, especially tanks and aircraft, may lead to reduced defence costs.

d. European control over European defence. There is a considerable difference of opinion amongst the three countries about how to achieve this, even if all agree in theory that European defence should not be entirely reliant on the USA.

AREAS OF DIFFERING INTEREST

It is in those matters where the UK, West Germany and France do not agree that we are mostly concerned here. It is these areas of differing interest that prevent the development of a common strategy. In summary they are:

a. NATO Strategy.
   (1) The Forward Defence Line. West Germany and France are convinced that military contest should be decided as far east as possible. The UK is not convinced that this makes military sense.
   
   (2) Theory of Flexible Response. Here the UK and West Germany are in reasonable agreement with the USA while France is strongly opposed. In its opposition to this theory, France has withdrawn its forces from NATO and developed its own nuclear weapon system, as yet an aerial delivery one. The use and control of nuclear weapons is probably the major hindrance to the development of a common NATO strategy.

   (3) Degree of USA Participation. In this matter the UK and West Germany are determined on the maximum American involvement for as long as possible. France, on the other hand, wants a reduction of and eventual end to its influence.

   (4) Border Crisis. West Germany naturally becomes more concerned with border crises, e.g., Czechoslovakia 1968, than does France or the UK. This differing degree of concern does not assist the development of a common strategy. What is war to West Germany may be regarded as a border incident by public and politicians in the UK.
b. **Approach to Russia.** France again has been the odd man out here in that she has tried to establish a special French-Russian relationship. This has not appeared feasible to the UK and West Germany at this time but there are signs that their attitudes are changing.

c. **EEC.** West Germany and France are both members of the EEC but the UK is not. Should the present British application to join the EEC be successful this will change the working relationship between London, Bonn and Paris to a profound extent. Much closer co-operation in all fields between these three countries can be expected if Britain is drawn into a European family circle.

d. **UK Relationship to the USA and the Commonwealth.** The special relationship between the UK and the USA is a particular annoyance to France as are the UK's Commonwealth ties. France is convinced that the UK wants the best of all worlds and will not be an asset to the EEC until such time as it is determined to devote its energies and interests predominantly to Europe.

e. **German Reunification.** As already discussed the West Germans are determined to achieve this in the long term. The UK and France pay lip service to the idea but in practice do not welcome it any more than the Russians.

**CONCLUSION**

There is little doubt that the long term key to the stability and influence of Western Europe lies in the degree of understanding and determination displayed in London, Bonn and Paris. As the USA reduces its force levels in Europe and possibly eventually withdraws altogether then this triangular relationship becomes increasingly important. Considering the absolute lack of co-operation achieved in the first half of this century, and indeed for hundreds of years before that, the progress that has been achieved since 1945 has been remarkable.

There are still many areas, as discussed, where national interests differ and sincere and determined efforts will be necessary to find acceptable agreement. There are four main areas which will prove to be the most difficult:

a. The wide divergence of views between the UK, West Germany and France on the control and use of nuclear weapons, and by implication, the theory of flexible response.

b. The question of German unification.
c. Lack of accord on the assessment of the Russian threat. This may be likened to witnesses at an accident—it depends on where you stand as to what you see. West Germany will always see the threat looming largest and the UK may well in time see it in miniature. This may result for the UK in a disastrous lack of political will and a severe reduction in force levels in West Germany.

d. The UK entry to the EEC. Should the UK gain entry a unique commonalty of military and economic purpose will have been achieved. If the UK does not gain entry, true co-operation between London, Bonn and Paris will always be difficult.

The successful operation of a close UK, West German and French relationship will provide the basis for a stable and prosperous Europe and a real third voice in a double-sided world of super powers. However it would be foolish of the UK to think that West Germany and France cannot achieve much together—indeed, they have done so, as seen by the success of the EEC. As difficult as it may be for the UK to plunge wholeheartedly into a European consortium there is little doubt that that is where its future lies.

VIETNAM DIORAMA

On display at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra is an eighteen feet by ten feet by three feet deep diorama depicting one aspect of the war in Vietnam. Completed in time for the Royal Visit the model illustrates a cordon and search operation of a Vietnamese village. Troops, villagers, helicopters and a Viet Cong tunnel system, with a cache of rice and enemy weapons, are featured in considerable detail. It is the first time a model showing events of a war still in progress has been on display in the galleries and is the first diorama in the memorial built by the army. WO1 J. Feltham, BEM, WRAAC and soldiers of the Directorate of Military Training designed and constructed the diorama.
The Fallacy of the Doctrine of Tactical Mobility in Vietnam

Major Michael F. Parrino
United States Army, Retired

ONE of the least understood aspects of our conduct of the war in Vietnam is that relating to tactical mobility, that is, the science of manoeuvring military forces for battle in order to achieve definite and lasting military objectives.

The tactical mobility that has been employed in Vietnam, revolving mainly around the airmobility concept, has probably been the most overrated and costly ever undertaken by any army in the history of warfare. Thus far, it has not prescribed the complete military victory that was so enthusiastically foreseen by the proponents of this latest innovation following its first full-scale commitment at Ia Drang in late 1965. The reason lies in a basic deficiency: the airmobility concept has assumed the role of a field army in land warfare, and has not fulfilled it very well.

One reason for the failure of airmobility is the fallacious assumption that since it possesses the only appropriate tactical mobility for modern warfare—the ability to move fast, to hurdle great distances, and to get as close to the enemy as possible—these conditions are all that is necessary to conquer the enemy in this particular war. This philosophy has failed to take into account the fact that this war is defined by more than just speed and distance. The very nature of the terrain—not to mention the enemy’s unique capabilities and even for-
tuitious limitations — prescribes other, more suitable forms of ground tactics, such as manoeuvrability, surprise, stealth of movement, and self-sustenance. If in fact these are the tactics that should have prevailed in Vietnam then our whole concept of the conduct of war, in so far as tactical mobility is concerned, has not been quite up to the standards of military reality.

Some students of warfare, like Lieutenant Colonel Prentice G. Morgan, have enlarged the scope of these principles in terms of troop concentration, the offensive, economy of forces, surprise, security, and co-operation. The tactical mobility of airmobility can attain some of these, but it cannot attain them all, as numerous battles in this war have demonstrated: it is that which it cannot attain that has made the airmobility concept largely inadequate for this campaign—its mobility is much too sophisticated for what is essentially a ground war. The defect lies not so much in the quality of its mobility, but in its incapacity to blend it with basic principles of land warfare, thus constituting a drawback to the finality of combat action, that is, the ability to secure and exploit ground after it has been taken. Clear-cut military victory, therefore, becomes almost impossible.

On the other hand, one factor remains clear—all of these principles can be attained with the tactical mobility of a field army. An integrated but flexible land force—attuned to the mobile requirements of the kind of terrain that Vietnam specifically offers—is the key. The field army is nurtured on three time-proven elements—a line of battle that is capable of attack, a fire element that is capable of supporting it, and a highly mobile assault element that is capable of rendering a rear or flank attack in order to exploit battlefield successes. The line of battle is the crucial element, for it defines how well ground that has been gained can also be secured and successfully exploited. General E. Dorman O'Gowan, the great tactician of the British Army, characterized it in the following terms: '... to outmanoeuvre the enemy on one or both of his flanks, either to deliver a decisive attack on them or alternatively by feinting against one hostile flank to make the enemy over-extend and then to break his original front by a direct and violent onslaught.'

These elements, more or less, underly the kind of tactical mobility that has been necessary in this war—a mobility that could secure and exploit gains and to render a decisiveness to ground action; in more precise terms, the kind of tactical mobility that would have
readily facilitated the deployment of infantry divisions and other specialized troops on the line, with an appropriate fire power to support them and an assault potential to solidify their offensive gains.

Airmobility, with no patent land force of its own whereby it can 'outmanoeuvre' the enemy on the ground—as a field army can—has had no alternative but to extend the quality of its tactical mobility to 'search and destroy' missions, based on sheer concentration of troops and fire power, but with no respectable regard for either the security of its force or the continuity of the action. Not the least in importance, however, is the ultimate fact that these missions have fallen far short of extending stability and permanency to battlefield objectives.

From the point of view of sound military doctrine, then, airmobility's tremendously great capabilities have been misdirected, resulting in nothing more than repeated exercises in futility; as relentlessly as the enemy has been pursued and pounded, these capabilities have somehow not been able to pin him down very well and, consequently, have left him free to roam again. One writer has characterized such misdirected efforts as 'thrashing about like elephants chasing mice'. In brief, airmobility's operational doctrine has not been able to adjust to the first principle of warfare—the domination of the battlefield in order to deny its use to the enemy. Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, who recently retired from the Marine Corps, refers to the factor of battlefield domination in terms of 'clear and hold' tactics. The lack of such tactics may explain, in part, why the enemy has been able to return repeatedly to the same areas where he once suffered defeat.

This flaw has been manifested in numerous operations undertaken by airmobility: Khesanh—abandoned, after a hard-fought battle in the early part of 1968; Dak To—fought again, after the enemy had been defeated there. Other battles have demonstrated similar checkmates. Hamburger Hill—the latest territory to have been conquered by airmobility units—offers a concrete example of airmobility's power to deploy rapidly, and its subsequent disjoinder from the basic objectives of ground warfare: that of gaining, securing, and exploiting ground, despite its oft-doctrinal insistence that the objective is not to hold ground but 'to search for the enemy and destroy him'. These have been the kind of tactics that have generally characterized many of airmobility's operations in this war, notwithstanding its many hard-fought but costly 'victories'—victories which, in a sense, have had a distorted
value: without a line of battle to infuse them with a finality, they have faded as quickly as they have been won.

‘A war that has no frontlines,’ as observed by B. Drummond Ayres of The New York Times, thus poses some serious doubts regarding airmobility’s claim to supremacy over the more all-encompassing and less costly field army, utilizing a tactical mobility that can readily adjust itself to the requirements of the terrain and, at the same time, can expeditiously attain the principles of war to a degree that will give stability and permanency to its campaigns.

In one highly significant aspect, however, airmobility can be viewed as the most innovative incursion into war that has ever been devised. With its tremendous fire support and rear or flank assault capabilities, there is little doubt that it could effectively support a field army—if we had one. Its superior mobility and long-ranging capability to maintain lines of communications not only could ably supplement a field army’s basic air—but also could lash out at the enemy’s rear or flanks during the exploitation phase of battle far more devastatingly than has ever been done in war by cavalry or tanks. In these respects, its singular attributes could unmistakably serve as the highly mobile assault factor that defines the third element of a field army. Airmobility’s principal instrumentality—the helicopter—would then be no match for the enemy, particularly during the exploitation phase of the initial battlefield success. Despite its indubitably all-around capabilities, however, the helicopter, as tactically employed at present, has helped to give airmobility a pre-eminence not wholly compatible with sound military doctrine; its employment in this respect has not quite measured up to expectations, in so far as bringing stability and permanency to the battlefield.

Since the airmobility concept has not fulfilled the role of the field army very well, the fact remains that at no time have we been prepared to effectively support a field army for Vietnam, even if we had been disposed to commit one. The key has been the lack of an appropriate fire element to support it.

The only organic fire power that could have adequately supported a field army in the rugged jungles and highlands of Vietnam is pack artillery, that is artillery transported by animals, such as the mule, for one. This type of artillery is difficult to detect, and could enable a field army to attain the principles of jungle and mountain movement,
and self-sustenance—thus bringing some measure of stability and per-
manency to its forward thrust.

To put it bluntly, the lack of pack artillery is basically one expedi-
ten reason why a field army type of operation has never been planned
for this war; we were simply not prepared to equip such a force with
the specialized fire power that could have adequately supported its line
of battle in any extended operation. The inability of a field army to
sustain an extended operation (because of this lack) is why airmobility
has been held in much prominence in current military doctrine. Ironi-
cally, however, its tactical mobility has been inadequate to achieve some
of the sound principles that should have governed the conduct of this
war.

It is within the context of the distinctions that have been made
between the tactical mobility of airmobility and that of a field army,
that military operations in Vietnam are at times so difficult to under-
stand. At least, one factor is clear: there is more to tactical mobility
than speed and distance, and this is the matter of gaining, securing, and
exploiting ground, by an adherence to the basic principles of war that
only a field army can attain—but a field army endowed with a line of
battle capable of attack (infantry divisions and other specialized troops);
a fire element capable of supporting it (pack artillery and tactical air);
and a highly mobile assault element capable of rendering a rear or flank
attack in order to exploit battlefield successes (airmobility).

By way of a footnote to the second of these requirements, the
main portion of tactical air could be airmobility, itself.

It may not be possible to solve all the problems that beset human
beings compelled to live together in this increasingly crowded earth,
and recent exploration has shown the unlikelihood of escaping to
another planet. We can, however, aim at developing our capacity
to live with the problems without becoming as neurotic as many of
those who declaim against the problems without sincerely seeking
their solution.

ONE of the greatest problems facing non-Asian military commanders who are fighting the communists in South-East Asia is their inability to understand what makes their opponent ‘tick’. The problem is added to when the allied force itself is made up of different groups of Asians.

In the days of the colonial empires, young men from Europe went to Asia and Africa and spent their whole lives with native armies. They got to know their soldiers almost as well as their own kind—often better, because they were free of the social restrictions of home. Even today British officers are commissioned into Gurkha regiments where, long before they are committed to an operational role, they must learn the history, the characteristics, the social and religious customs and, above all, the language of the soldiers they are to command.

You can obtain some understanding of a foreigner by speaking with him in your own language, although you might not know a word of his, but you must be of the same race. To fully understand a person of another race—his philosophies and moods, his feelings about world events and their effect on him, his relationships with his friends and attitudes toward his enemies—you must speak with him in his own tongue. This is particularly the case if the man you are dealing with is a peasant whose knowledge of events outside his own tribe or village is very limited.

During World War II, when divisions of different nationalities fought side by side in the Middle East and Europe, there was always a Pole who could speak English, a Frenchman who could speak Italian, and so on.
an American who could speak Dutch; always somebody to liaise with and, if necessary, to command those formations of another nation in the same Allied group. When prisoners were taken, German, Italian, and French-speaking staffs were on hand for interrogation.

This was not the case in the Pacific Theatre and Burma where the number of Allied soldiers who could liaise with non-English-speaking Chinese and Islanders was pitifully small, and where, when it came to interrogation of Japanese prisoners, a reliable interpreter was difficult to find. Although concentrated courses in Japanese and the various Chinese languages were conducted, the war ended before full use could be made of those students who had qualified.

The number of languages and dialects spoken by the various peoples living in the lands between Korea and Australia makes it almost impossible for any single non-Asian to master but a few.

It is true that today courses in most Asian languages are available for Australian military personnel but the period of study is mostly in the classroom and not in the field, and in areas where there are so many dialects, and where many of the people are suspicious of strangers, whatever their race, it is absolutely essential that to understand them a man must live amongst them.

From the military point of view this may seem at first to be impracticable, and in many cases the people to be studied are so remote that no contact can be made with them at all. However, there are generally groups of exiles and others living on the right side of the 'bamboo curtain' whose languages and characteristics are similar to those in whose land future operations may be conducted.

An Australian infantry officer studying the language and customs of the Chinese living in Sin-Kiang Province does not imply that the Australian Government has designs on that area, whatever the communist propagandists might make of the fact, but at the same time no one can be absolutely sure where present conflicts may lead. Lack of intelligent military planning by the British and French before 1939 was emphasized by the disasters that followed in 1940 and 1941.

The present system of sending units overseas for tours of limited periods before a return home, and then perhaps a tour in another overseas area, has undoubted advantages. But the system does not allow individuals to gain any lasting knowledge of the country in which they have served, or of the people who live there. It should therefore be possible to introduce a scheme whereby selected officers, warrant officers
and senior NCOs (male and female) would be able to serve in overseas countries on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. If the situation altered and it became impossible for them to continue to serve in a particular country, they could be moved to another area where the people were the closest in language and custom to those they had left. In many diplomatic services, officers become specialists in the affairs of a certain nation, so in the armed forces there could be built up similar groups of specialists.

Of course, the knowledge of language alone does not fit a man to take command of people of another race, and many other factors about an individual would have to be taken into account even before starting on the language course. In the first instance none but volunteers should be considered, and then only after very careful selection. It does not always follow that an efficient commander of a company of Australian regular soldiers could command a company of tribesmen from Northern Siam with the same degree of efficiency. Many an enthusiastic young westerner has come unstuck in the worlds of commerce and politics by assuming that Asians and Africans interpret his logic in the same manner. This can also be said of military matters, with very often more disastrous consequences to those directly concerned, due to misunderstandings.

The meanings of loyalty, patriotism, sympathy etc., which to us are fairly straightforward (provided that the political influence is not too marked) can evoke quite different emotions in the hearts of Asians. Of the more primitive groups it is said that they do not possess the faculties of analysis, comparison and criticism, and these are the groups which the armies of Asia are most likely to be drawn from.

We, as a racial group, whatever our public feelings on the matter, have an inherent air of superiority when we come into contact with other races en masse. We may think that this goes unnoticed by the Malay rubber tapper, the Chinese fisherman or the Vietnamese soldier, but if we do think so we are mistaken and give ourselves good reason for a greater study and deeper understanding of these people. The Asian has a canny knack of appearing to accept our belief that we are superior, as a means of bargaining for what he wants — without having to pay for it!

Lack of sensitivity is perhaps one of our greatest handicaps in an inability to appreciate just how serious ‘loss of face’ is to many of the peoples of South-East Asia. In our dealings with our fellows we
have become brash and forthright — ‘down to earth’ we call it; admirable qualities no doubt when Australian deals with German, or American with Dutchman, but not necessarily the best line to adopt with an Asian. The sense of urgency is not always the same and the aims, so clearly defined in our plans, can become somewhat confused when translated into Tonkinese or some remote Thai dialect.

It was Noel Coward who wrote ‘mad dogs and Englishmen go out in the midday sun’, not the Indian poet Tagore. We may appear to ourselves as humourous or serious, depending on the situation, but to the Asian onlooker we may portray the exact opposite. A study of the Indian Mutiny of 1857 will show how standards of loyalty vary, even at the regimental level.

To achieve success in war men need to be exploited but full use of manpower cannot be made unless the commanders understand that ‘power’ completely. We know the need for good morale but how can a military commander fully appreciate the morale of his troops if he cannot speak their language. Interpreters have their weaknesses.

Our affluent society has tended to soften us and we see a marked contrast between war and peace, but to the Asian peasant/soldier the difference is not so apparent. He moves more easily from one situation to the other; he is more fatalistic, and to him death is death whether due to starvation or a bullet.

Australia, because of its geographical location, is in a better position than most western nations to understand the eastern mind. But even so the Australian soldier or diplomat must not forget that to the great majority of people living in East Asia he is just another ‘long nose’. Just as any Singaporean, Thai, Vietnamese or Mongolian is another ‘chink’ as far as many Australians are concerned. What then are some of the considerations we must make before we can get onto the same net as our Asian neighbours?

Before language, it is essential that we are sympathetic and know something of the real fears and aspirations of the people with whom we work. To gain this knowledge a study of their history is essential, and not only from one source. History of the more primitive peoples is very much a part of their mythology and folklore and this of course can best be learned from the people themselves. However, the more we know of them before contact, the better we are placed to understand them when we do meet.
When at last the westerner does join the Asian he should maintain a degree of reserve and remember that open-hearted friendliness is not always the best approach. The 'white' will know when the barriers are down and he is accepted, but even so he should never consider that he is one of them completely — that happens only rarely.

'Going native' can be the answer to closer communication but from the military point of view a man can be lost to his own race in doing so. Setting up house with a Malaysian girl on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur and keeping an Australian passport might appear to be having the best of both worlds, but the great danger is that the Asian influence might become paramount and colour the western reasoning and logic, so necessary to our way of military thinking.

Mysticism is a characteristic beloved of Asians generally and history shows that westerners who held most influence over the people of the east with whom they came into contact, were those who seemed to have that sixth sense. Gordon of Khartoum and Lawrence of Arabia are two names that come to mind.

The ability to act a part is most important and Gordon and Lawrence were nothing if not great actors. In fact it is all a great charade; a guessing game that never ends — even at the moment of death — because unlike most of us the eastern mind is convinced of immortality. It would be interesting to know how truly successful the purges of communism in China have been in eradicating the beliefs of many thousands of years.

The task of getting to know Asians is not helped when we encourage them to adopt our style of dress. Superior equipment and weapons of western design are essential in the fight against communist subversion, but to make the native soldier wear our dress is to heighten the barrier between us. They become alien to their own kind and are apt to lead a 'Jekyll and Hyde' existence which makes for greater difficulty in getting through to them.

In more modern times, perhaps the most successful military relationships between westerners and non-westerners were in the French colonial regiments of North Africa and in the militia of the North-West Frontier of India. There the Europeans adopted the local style of dress and living, and penetrated the minds of their soldiers — and through them their enemies — better than most. This matter of dress has a psychological significance of which most of us are unaware. Imagine a
battalion of Australian infantry going to war in sarongs and sandals led by Burmese officers! Tales of West and East Africans in World War II going into battle with their boots slung around their necks might prove a point.

Warfare in Asia, in which Australia could be involved, is going to call for closer and closer contact with native peoples, particularly by smaller groups of Australians in the manner of the AATTV. For this reason more emphasis should be placed on exchange schemes where young officers and NCOs can gain experience of this sort early in their careers. There must be no resentment at having to serve under Asians, and what better way could there be of making a study of a man than by working under him? This situation would be accepted much more readily by a young lieutenant of twenty than by a major of thirty who finds himself in this position for the first time.

The Australian soldier who has seen service in TPNG must generally find it easier to come to terms with life in Vietnam and Malaysia than the man who goes to either of these countries without having served previously outside Australia.

No doubt there are many reasons why aboriginal units do not exist in the Australian Army, but from the military point of view this can only be a loss. It would certainly be a challenging role for officers and NCOs to serve with such units, and what better place could there be for them to start on the road of learning what makes the other man ‘tick’?

Armies are not the worst educational systems and this could lead to the successful integration of the two main racial groups in Australia. It might help to dispel the myth that western man is superior in all things that matter, and perhaps a little humbling could be beneficial and enable us to understand the other man’s (friends and foes) points of view.

The cold fact is that time is not on our side and the near future could find Australia the only western nation in the Asian sphere of operations. There would seem to be two alternatives — ‘Fortress Australia’ and the isolationism that would follow, or a true penetration of the eastern mind to a point where we know them better than they know themselves.
Capitation Reimbursement—
A Logistic Tool

Captain B. H. Manning
Royal Australian Army Service Corps

General
AUSTRALIAN military experience has been such that, when a force has been sent overseas, it has generally been deployed alongside the troops of one or more allies. This has been the case in World Wars I and II, Korea, Malaya, Borneo and currently South Vietnam, and has led to the logistic teaching that a portion of our force logistic support, particularly in the fields of POL, ammunition rations and garrison utilities, will be supplied by our major ally.

As a nation of significant economic independence our national pride, and the expectations of our allies, require that some reimbursement be made for the provision of that support. It is doubtful whether many service personnel have an adequate knowledge of previous or present reimbursement agreements and their implications for force accounting. It is the intention of this article to describe the capitation system of reimbursement currently used in South Vietnam and discuss its implications for war accounting.

The dictionary definition of capitation is a ‘tax, fee, or grant per head.’ As a logistic concept the most appropriate sense of this definition is that capitation is a ‘fee per head’. Capitation reimbursement is therefore a system of payment for the provision of stores and services between two or more agencies, based upon a mutually acceptable procedure of cost averaging in terms of strength and time criteria, for example, payment for gun ammunition, $X per 105-mm howitzer per

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month; payment for rations, $Y$ per man per day; payment for aircraft fuel, $Z$ per aircraft per operating hour.

Referred to above are three strength and three time criteria. It can be readily seen that any attempt to rationalize all reimbursement between two allies to a rate expressed in terms of one criterion and one time frame is fraught with problems and inaccuracies.

In order to ensure greater reimbursement accuracy (i.e., payments closely equalling the value of physical receipts) and thus greater mutual acceptability between allies, it is best to establish a number of capita criteria and the time frames most appropriate to the criteria, (e.g., aircraft and operating hours). Costs associated with each criterion can then be expressed as a rate for the particular criterion and its most suitable time frame. Consequently any system of capitation reimbursement between two allies is likely to be a series of capitation rates and not a single rate.

A mutually acceptable system of repayment is reached from the derivation of capitation rates, and the provision of criteria-strength data. This mutual acceptability is a recognition by both parties that either party will make slight real losses or gains, whilst both parties will make real gains from the reduced need for detailed accounting. Therefore, by definition the crucial accounting fields are those of cost factor derivation and the provision of criteria-strength data, not the detailed accounting for stores and services within and between the contracting agencies.

**Derivation of Capitation Rates**

Capitation rate preparation as a task involves:

- Establishing the capitation criteria.
- Extraction of real cost, strength and usage data over an acceptable time frame.
- Cost averaging, i.e., the extension of the above data to an acceptable capitation rate.

The cost averaging procedure is possibly the easiest of these tasks. This is seen in the example below:

*Example*

Criterion—105-mm howitzers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistical Data</th>
<th>Receiving Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 months 5 guns</td>
<td>8 months 5 guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fired 40,000 rounds.</td>
<td>fired 48,000 rounds.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cost per round $10.00
Cost per gun per month $10,000 $12,000
Factor cost established by compromise $11,000 per gun per month.

As these cost factors must be mutually acceptable they must be established by joint consultation between the two contracting agencies. The consulting parties have available to them two types of information:
1. Projected agency activities.
2. Established real cost and usage data.

The former is a projection, the latter is fact, and therefore the information will be used differently. Projected agency activities will be of significance in establishing the capitation criteria. Activity projection forecasts the personnel and equipment requirements and mode of employment, thus providing a basis for deducing the possible criteria available. The availability of real cost, strength and usage data will lead to the selection of the final group of capitation criteria.

Normal operational statistical returns will form the basis of real statistical data. It is not necessary that both agencies supply data as the joint consultation procedure is used to establish the requisite understanding and trust. Real data will select the final criteria and real data will have the greatest impact in the cost averaging task. Therefore cost factors are like the data they are based upon, retrospective in nature. Cost factors must be subject to periodic review in the light of wider and newer statistical data. It is essential that all personnel working with factor costs understand their retrospective nature and their requirement for frequent review in order to preserve their mutual acceptability.

**Capitation Reimbursement—A Justification**

Accounting is a primary task in logistic support. It is the control medium used in ensuring the availability and provision of stores and services when and where the combatant force requires them. The size of the accounting task is a direct function of the volume of logistic support, and the detail required of the accounting system.

Consequently in a South Vietnam type situation, where a large ally provides logistic support for many smaller allies, the accountancy requirement for each ally to extract, collate, cost and reconcile in detail all transactions between them, in order to provide a basis for reimbursement, would add an unacceptable administrative burden to their operational commitment.
Such a reconciliation is almost not feasible, if only due to minor human errors in records which may have limited geographical accessibility. Capitation payments therefore provide a relatively accurate and administratively simple basis for two or more allies to discharge their financial obligations for the provision of stores and services.

**Capitation Reimbursement—Some Weaknesses**

An area of weakness of this form of reimbursement is that the actual value of stores and services provided may be more or less than the payments resulting from factor cost payments. This weakness is accepted by both agencies by the signing of a contract derived in joint consultation.

It is possible that capitation reimbursement could lead to casual accounting and confusion in the provision of logistic support which would impair operational efficiency. The administrators of the system must clearly define their policy with respect to the implications of capitation reimbursement for actual support provision, and the overall accounting system. It is in this definition of policy that the balance between detailed accountancy and operational requirements will be met.

**Requirements of a War Accounting System**

This topic could be the subject of many separate papers, but here only a brief statement of the requirements of a war accounting system will be made so that the implications of capitation reimbursement can be considered in relation to the requirements. The primary task of war accounting is the control of movement in war inventories with the aim of ensuring continuous stock availability. Therefore the emphasis must be placed on continuous accurate knowledge of stock holdings, and on procurement action, especially as war supply channels are relatively tenuous.

This task demands that war accounting be more conscious of the present and future as opposed to the retrospective outlook of peace accounting. It must accept human errors, and reduce detailed investigations of past inventory discrepancies whilst increasing its emphasis upon spotchecks and stocktakes and the quick, simple adjustment of inventory records. These aspects of the system are all necessary in order that accounting systems can more readily accommodate the requirements of operational plans (i.e., the present and the future).
Capitation Reimbursement—Some War Accounting Implications

Capitation reimbursement accommodates human counting errors especially at receipt or issue whilst recognizing that, excluding basic dishonesty, human errors will very seldom significantly affect transactions. This result is a reduced audit requirement (internal and external) at all levels, allowing staff to concentrate on the tasks of the present and future.

In war it is necessary for the logistics staff to:

- Detail during the operational planning stage any stores and/or services restrictions likely to influence the plan.
- Ensure that during the conduct of the plan the supply of stores and services meets, as a minimum, the quantities specified in the plan.

This requirement can only be met by an inventory control system which places emphasis upon stock, and stock record, agreement at all times and not upon detailed retrospective investigation of discrepancies to determine the cause of discrepancies—and adjust the cause of error—which is frequently a minor stock record entry error.

Under capitation stock records are not required as a basis for reimbursement. They are required solely for stock control purposes and therefore stock discrepancy adjustments become merely a ledger entry. Manpower at all levels is therefore released from the investigation of many stock discrepancies. In this paper some emphasis has been placed upon the relationship of capitation and stock discrepancies because the very nature and requirements of an operational area will readily produce a significant number of stock discrepancies.

Capitation allows the effective use of machine or electronic data processing for accounting whilst meeting the requirement for actual data to marry-up with programmed data. For example, an accounting process can be established using standard pallet contents — 64 cases. The machine can process demands and print vouchers for 64 cases whilst for other reasons, e.g. pallet repacking (frequent in a war theatre) the physical issue may be 56 or 72 cases. Discrepancy action by the consignee is not necessary, except in the case of suspected theft, as the consignee is not reimbursing on the basis of issue data. He therefore takes on charge the actual receipt. By sampling techniques agencies using machine or electronic data processing for accounting can accurately predict the accuracy of their stock records despite this variation.
in pallet size. Thus machine or electronic data processing systems can accommodate unprogrammed, non-standard conditions whilst maintaining accurate control of war inventories.

CONCLUSION

Capitation reimbursement is an economic, administratively simple, yet practicable means of effecting payment between two allies for the provision of stores and services. If accompanied by a clear policy statement on its implications it provides the requisite conditions for simplicity in war accounting systems.

MONTHLY AWARD

The Board of Review has awarded the $10 prize for the best original article published in the February 1970 issue of the journal to Colonel D. G. Sharp, OBE for his contribution 'Single Army—Dual Function'.


Reviewed by Major R. T. Shambrook, a candidate at the Australian Staff College, Queenscliff in 1969. The other reviews are by fellow officers attending the Staff College during the year.

MUCH has been written of the German occupation of European countries during World War II. There are also many references to Britain's frantic preparations to continue the war after Dunkirk. If the Germans had occupied Britain in 1940 it would have been a harsh occupation, harsher perhaps than Nazi rule in Eastern Europe.

David Lampe gives a detailed study of the known intentions and preparations by both sides. His years of research for new and more comprehensive material are apparent, as he presents the German plans for occupied Britain and a surprisingly exhaustive coverage of the British answer. The author deals with his subject in two basic categories; first, the German preparations, plans and intentions which are covered in three chapters; secondly, the British Resistance organizations to which Lampe has devoted nine chapters.

German draft orders and decrees for occupied Britain, some of which are quoted in full, are presented in appendices as well as the text. These support Lampe's theme which is produced in logical sequence — from pre-war intelligence sequence through to Gestapo and military directions for the occupation. The Gestapo arrest list for Great Britain is published in full — in extremely small print — as an appendix.

The author is obviously impressed by the degree of improvisation, imagination and state of efficiency achieved by Auxiliary Units, which was the name given to the British Resistance Organization. He emphasizes the strict security measures taken to keep secret the real purpose of these units, and the fact that they often received new-type weapons before conventional units. Lampe succeeds in conveying his enthusiasm to his reader.
It is of interest to the army reader to compare construction and siting of arms and weapons caches—as well as personnel hide-outs used by Auxiliary Units—with those used over twenty years later by the Viet Cong. The similarity is amazingly evident.

The book is easy to read, well indexed and has a number of interesting photographs and diagrams. There are two maps and five appendices, including the Gestapo Arrest List.

I recommend this book to readers in general and to the military student interested in clandestine operations in particular.


Reviewed by Major B. J. O'Neill

'WE were told to be very careful in any telephone references to future movements, so in speaking to the White House he (Churchill) said: "I mustn't mention how we are travelling; but we are coming by puff-puff".'

This amusing extract from one of the six essays that make up this book gives both an indication of the intimate association with Sir Winston Churchill of those whose memoirs form the volume, and the humaneness and impish humour of the great war-time leader.

Action this Day: Working with Churchill is an edited collection of the memoirs of six former members of Churchill's personal staff—his 'Secret Circle' as he himself named it—who worked with him at varying times when he was Prime Minister of Britain at war. Their qualifications to write of the personality, probity and powers of their former master are placed beyond question in Sir John Wheeler-Bennett's explicit introduction to the volume.

Each of the essays is self-contained and serves to crystallize for history certain episodes and personal memories in association with a common subject depicting Sir Winston Churchill in moments of relaxation, annoyance or exhilaration, as well as of greatness.

That these memoirs owe their existence to the earlier publication of a volume entitled Winston Churchill: Struggle for Survival 1940-1965 based on extracts from the diary of Lord Moran, Churchill's personal physician, in no way detracts from their value. Indeed, the reader is
continually made to feel grateful to Lord Moran for the publication of some of his more controversial theses, particularly those concerning the supposed decline of Churchill’s intellect during the latter years of World War II, for such form the raison d’être of this book.

In considering such theses the contributors to this book have, from personal experience and day-to-day contact with the man and his circumstance, not only been able to refute such suggestions, but also throw new light on situations and decisions which may otherwise have been incompletely recorded for posterity.

Despite occasional reiteration of points in some of the essays, the book on the whole offers pleasant and informative reading. There is a notable absence of the officialese that one might have expected in view of the civil service background common to each of the contributors. Indeed, the laudable clarity and conciseness of style throughout the essays is possibly due in part to their former master, who is related to have considered it ‘sheer laziness that thought not be compressed into reasonable space’.

Worthy of special mention is the editor of this volume, Wheeler-Bennett, who not only provides an extremely helpful and complete index, but whose introduction serves as a masterpiece of descriptive prose, befitting one appointed Historical Adviser to the Royal Archives.

For the historian of the Second World War, and the devotee of Churchilliana, this book is indispensable. To the general reader it will provide a valuable and absorbing insight into the mind and matter of one of the greatest figures of the twentieth century.

SINISTER TWILIGHT, by Noel Barber. (Collins, 1968, $3.95).

Reviewed by Major N. T. Robb

THE sub-title chosen by the author explains the book; ‘The Fall and Rise Again of Singapore’. Most of the book deals with the seventy-day period from 7 December 1941 to 16 February 1942, the period of the Japanese advance through Malaya and the siege of Singapore. The remainder deals with the years of internment, with the last nine pages devoted mainly to the fates of the principal characters since the war. The book deals with people; the world-shaking events of that time are important only as they affected people and how people reacted.
The subject is not treated as military history. Strategy and politics are discussed, but usually in reference to a personality and his decision—or indecision. The major messages of the book deplore both the unworkable government and military command structures and the generally archaic military thinking, and laud the fortitude and gallantry of the 'polyglot' (Mr Barber likes the word) population of Singapore.

A great deal of weight is given to the argument that Lieutenant General Percival, as Army Commander, disregarded the advice of his Chief Engineer, Brigadier Simpson. This advice was, in brief, to construct field defences and beach obstacles to prevent Japanese landings on the island. Percival is said to have rejected these proposals because of the bad effect on morale. In emphasizing this the author is almost convincing that it was a major factor in the defeat; whereas the divided control, lack of communications and inter-service co-operation, and lack of air power, had already doomed Singapore.

Whilst Mr Barber is at pains to point out the bravery and fighting qualities of some of the military, he equally highlights some of the ill-discipline, drunkenness and desertion that marked the later stages of the siege. That he treats the multi-national force as a whole and has not singled out any particular group is to his credit. At the same time, the blame for this is laid squarely at the doors of the service chiefs and the government hierarchy for their inability to control the situation and their refusal to accept things as they really were and keep the public informed. A sympathetic but tragic picture of the Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, is presented showing his inevitable decline to figure-head status through lack of forcefulness and constitutional power to co-ordinate.

The author’s style lends a great deal to the enjoyment of the book. It is simple and very easily absorbed. Considerable use is made of footnotes in reference to other writers. These books are listed at the back, along with a comprehensive index of people, places and organizations. A useful ‘Cast of Principal Characters’ is included at the beginning. The only maps needed are printed inside the covers where quickest reference can be made, and as a frontispiece.

This book is not a complete history of the fall of Singapore. It is useful background to such a study. It is essential reading for any officer posted to Singapore and for any officer interested in preventing the future conception of such an ill-controlled and directed organization as existed in Singapore.

Reviewed by Major J. L. MacPherson

Most Australian military libraries would suffer from a paucity of authoritative writing on the vital subject of leadership. Taking Command offers the student of the theory of leadership additional thoughts and comments on American leadership traits, which appear to have influenced the writers of our pamphlet ‘Leadership (Provisional) 1957.’ Additionally, the student of the practice of leadership will derive some benefit from the ‘Situational Studies’ included at the back of Taking Command.

The book is the product of twenty years of research of fifteen officers who have served at various times on the staff of the United States Military Academy, West Point. Two of these officers edited the contributions and take full responsibility for the views expressed.

These edited contributions have been sorted into three sections dealing with ‘The Leader’, ‘The Group’ and ‘The Situation’ in turn. The first section contains chapters on ‘A Usable Concept of Leadership’, followed by leader selection and development and training; the second section ‘The Group’ explores the relationship between the leader and the group. The last section guides the leader in ‘The Situation’ from society to combat and to foreign advisory service. The last chapter in Section III—Situational Studies—provides fifteen case histories of typical situations which might confront military leaders of various levels of experience. Readers are invited—‘how would you think about “taking command” in this situation? See page 287 for one man’s solution.’

The thoroughness of research is shown by the often recurring references to behavioural science studies. However, the abstract explanations offered as a consequence tend to make one reread frequently in the hope of detecting non-existent facts in verbose paragraphs. The inclusion of sections in Management and Inter-Personal Relationships is highly commendable but again impact is lost by verbosity.

Importantly, ‘the leader’ remains the significant character throughout. The editors recognize and develop the theme that leaders are individuals with brands of leadership based on sound theory and applied with common sense.
The book is compiled for American readers. Therefore readers unfamiliar with the American idiom may find close study difficult. The presence of a ninety-six word glossary does not help greatly as it contains many definitions of terms rather than word meanings. Also an early assumption is made that the reader knows, or knows of, the American Services' military and moral codes. Unless one detects the insertion of these codes on pages 250 and 251 in a preliminary survey some doubts could arise on the basis of American leadership throughout the book.

Close inspection of the very comprehensive bibliography reveals many useful references whose authors are acknowledged as successful leaders in their own right.

The value of the book for Australian readers lies in its close relationship to present teaching on leadership. Extracts in precis form and the Situation Studies would make an excellent supplement to the current Australian pamphlet.

I recommend Taking Command as a reference book for those involved in leadership training.
Letters to the Editor

Educated Officers


Apparently the United States Army does not agree with the General. In order to present a balanced and factual picture to your readers the following data from the US Army Register is worth presenting:

**Generals possessing advanced degrees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number with advanced degrees</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>Two of fifteen</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Nine of forty-one</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Seventy of two hundred and one</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>One hundred and thirty-two of two hundred and fifty-five</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously in the future more and more top US Generals will possess higher qualifications which the US Army encouraged and paid for.

It should be noted also that the United States magazine Infantry (Jan/Feb 1970 issue), in an article, 'Career Outlook 1980', authoritatively states that ‘our society is producing a better educated, more inquisitive and far healthier individual than ever before. This person, in turn, demands a better educated, more enlightened, and more responsive leader’ and ‘the Army’s position and goal regarding civil education was stated by General Westmoreland to the American Association of School Administrators on 15th February 1969: “Nearly 90 per cent of our career officers today hold baccalaureate degrees . . . our goal is, of course, to attain 100 per cent . . . . And, some 20 per cent of our career officers already hold advanced degrees. We estimate that approximately 75 per cent of our career officers may expect the opportunity to gain advanced degrees during their service”. It goes on to state that
'Infantry Branch alone has 450 positions requiring advanced degrees and each year the number of such positions increases' and 'Currently 77 per cent of career officers in Infantry hold baccalaureate degrees and 12 per cent hold advance degrees . . . . All of our careerists should obtain the MA degree level which is accepted in government and industry as the norm.'

HQ Eastern Command
Paddington, NSW.

D. J. Binney, Lt-Col