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ARMY JOURNAL

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On USS Missouri, Tokyo Bay, 2 September 1945. General Sir Thomas Blamey signs the surrender document on behalf of Australia. Immediately behind him, from left, are General MacArthur, Lieutenant General F. H. Berryman, Air Vice-Marshal W. D. Bostock, Rear Admiral G. D. Moore, Lieutenant Colonel D. H. Dwyer. To the rear, from left, are officers representing: the American Navy, China, Royal Navy, Russia, Australia, Canada, France and the Netherlands.
The Intelligence War

Lieutenant Colonel J. O. Furner, MBE
Australian Intelligence Corps

Introduction

IT is a commonplace now that success or failure in counter-revolutionary warfare depends heavily upon the intelligence support available. This is true in the sense that in a contest with shadows any enemy substance that can be defined is a welcome bonus. More than anything else it is the difficulty of establishing and maintaining contact with the enemy that focuses attention on the intelligence process. The process itself remains unchanged. It unfolds within, and contributes to the commander’s concept of operations. If that concept is long range and methodical, intelligence can be timely and useful in winning the initiative. If, on the other hand, it is short term and spasmodic, intelligence will tend to be used only as a justification for hasty, and marginally successful reaction. In the worst case it may only be developed and used after the event to close the stable door.

The Situation

It is even more commonplace that ‘the situation’ dictates terms to some extent. However, at the outset it is most important to underline that the situation should never be allowed to stifle the full play of versatility and imagination. The intelligence and operations staffs share these qualities, the first in developing advice to the commander and the second in executing the commander’s plan. Without labouring the point too much the stringencies of a situation that generally persist and frustrate, are terrain and time. The more a force is moved from one area of operations to another the more difficult it will be for it to reduce those handicaps. The terrain may differ widely and there will be no time to develop detailed local knowledge, which is such an essential requirement of the intelligence effort in counter-insurgency operations.

Depending on circumstances, a force may enjoy a relatively static situation in which it can develop its own intelligence and plans, or a
more mobile situation in which it will generally be dependent on the intelligence and plans of higher headquarters. In the first situation the commander retains intimate control and understanding of the intelligence services and products in his area. In the second he is forced, at least initially, to rely on the force or theatre-wide intelligence system. In both cases success begins when the commander can initiate and maintain actions that catch the enemy off guard and hurt him, or when he can deploy units early enough and accurately enough to forestall enemy plans—whether those enemy plans are for a major offensive against a strategic area or the infiltration of an agent into a village. The intelligence service must anticipate a wide range of demands by the commander.

The Mission

It must be allowed that the essence of a counter-insurgency campaign is to win back the support of the people for the established government. There will be a requirement to provide the time and assistance needed by the government to establish an enduring state of law and order which will involve many courses of action, and these will demand maximum intelligence support. They could include:

- Reduction of enemy main force capability to the point where it cannot significantly interfere.
- Total destruction of the enemy infrastructure.
- Assistance in conversion of the people from an attitude of acceptance of the government to one of positive support.
- Adequate population and resources control.

This limited statement of possible tasks to be accomplished is sufficient to indicate that many government departments and interests must be involved. Each will require its own full measure of intelligence for successful operations. The birth, death and reincarnation of many basic intelligence programmes in South Vietnam serve to illustrate that 'there is no magic formula for perfect intelligence. It is based on lots of hard work, and it won't attain any greater degree of perfection than any other human endeavour'.

endeavour is worth noting. It suggests immediately the need for the intelligence operator, at all levels, to proceed on the basis of tireless collection, imaginative collation, commonsense interpretation and appropriate dissemination.

**The Means**

The collection of information, from which the vital intelligence is produced, is done by employing a variety of sources—human, documentary and technical. Each group of sources and each source within a group has advantages and disadvantages. To exploit the advantages by suitability of source allotment, and to offset the disadvantages by multiplicity of source employment, are established practices. The implementation of such practices is only possible by a headquarters in which the operations and intelligence activities are completely fused and complementary.

The human group of sources is the largest and, at the same time, is the best and worst group. It is the best because forward troops are the commander’s eyes on the enemy and his base areas. It is through them that the commander gains familiarity and understanding of his local enemy. It is only they, who through their operations, can give the intimate feel for the enemy’s military capability in relation to a particular area. This is the beginning of a wider understanding of enemy deployment and intention. If developed in detail this understanding can, in time, suggest countermeasures to minimize, if not cancel out, the enemy’s advantages in local knowledge and use of terrain. The human group is the worst group because it provides a multitude of agents and informers who sometimes bring in their train a misleading and potentially dangerous band of peddlers and fabricators.

In between these two extremes of human source material lies a large volume of information obtainable from various other kinds of people—prisoners of war, ralliers, refugees, agents and local inhabitants. While they are all good potential sources they are usually more disappointing than helpful. Due to the relatively low educational standard of the South-East Asian enemy his map reading is poor and often nonexistent. He will often use place-names that differ from those on government maps. The painstaking compilation of a gazetteer of enemy place-names can greatly assist interrogators and translators. Accurate locations are difficult to obtain unless the subject can be taken out on to the ground and indicate physically in familiar surroundings.
Apart from major items of military information that the higher level prisoner-of-war may be able to provide, there are always enough small scraps which, when collated, assist in the continuous attempt to understand patterns and foresee trends. The collation and interpretation of this mass of human reporting will vary in value depending upon the intelligence operator's own knowledge and understanding of the area and people from which it came. He must be aware of the possibility of emotion breeding exaggeration, prejudice obscuring truth, religious belief altering sensitivity and socio-economic conditions dictating individual actions, to mention only a few examples. Such limiting factors should never allow persistence by the collector to degenerate into neglect. Unless local officials understand and believe the value of listening to the local people and considering their feelings and opinions they will be denied a valuable source of information. The earlier this interest is taken in the local people the greater will be the reward. If it is ever present the basis for subversion is difficult to create.

Documentary sources can be quite voluminous and broadly provide two important insights into the enemy mind. First, they can provide an estimate of his current status and, hopefully, a glimpse of his future plans. Secondly, they sometimes appear as a chronicle of the effects of our own operations against him. In this way they have proved to be a most useful factor affecting our own forward planning. There is of course always the danger of a 'plant'—a document or map left intentionally to deceive. This degree of sophistication is generally not necessary for the enemy fighting a revolutionary war in the jungle. With plenty of space and the ability to disengage he achieves deception by movement rather than this particular type of stratagem. Besides, circumstances of capture more often than not suggest that the enemy's mind at the time has been bent on preservation and not dissimulation.

Technical sources have developed rapidly in recent years and many devices now exist to assist the intelligence staff to locate an elusive enemy. It is to be hoped that in future they will develop and be refined into more useful information gathering aids. A common defect is the limitation on the power of discrimination that can be built into the machine. There is still no full substitute for a pair of human eyes on the ground. But it must be emphasized that these machines are aids and it is up to the intelligence operator to get the maximum value from them. If the advantages and disadvantages of radar, infra-red and personnel detectors are clearly understood there is a place for them in the intelligence collection plan, in conjunction with other sources.
No particular grouping of air sources has been mentioned. Visual air is better regarded by the intelligence staff as another aspect of information from forward troops. In this way it fits more smoothly into a relationship with current force activity and is continuously assessed for possible exploitation in operations or fire planning. Air photography must be pursued as much as in the past although the yield, particularly in terms of tactical order of battle information, will never be as high as in a more conventional situation where the line is both more regular and more difficult to conceal. Comparative photographic studies can provide useful track information which assists in understanding enemy movement patterns. The air photograph tends to be used more as an aid to our own commanders in their preliminary operational planning and search for landing zones, fire support bases, headquarter locations, unit strong points and block positions, and associated areas in terms of force objectives. The main limitation with air photography is that there is never enough of it. Passing mention must also be made of hand-held air photography. The simple act of taking a single exposure with a hand-held camera from either a light fixed wing aircraft or helicopter can be extremely valuable in this type of warfare, where decisions must often be made on a succession of small events. It would take many pages to list all the applications of this type of photography. Just as the field for a holiday enthusiast is limitless so it is for the intelligence staff in counter-revolutionary warfare. The camera has been useful in correctly defining a burnt-out aircraft wreckage, first reported as ‘enemy truck concealed under foliage’; a discarded aircraft fuel tank reported as ‘rocket component at side of road’; and so on to great length.

The Problems

Having touched upon some difficulties arising from sources it is essential to proceed by considering wider problems that complicate the intelligence process. The spasmodic cycle of enemy activity makes interpretation difficult. Intermittent action, widely-separated objectives and constant shifts of emphasis by the enemy complicate anticipation and invite reaction rather than counter-action. The answer of course is to reduce the enemy’s alternatives; close up some of the courses open to him. The early and continuing efforts of the intelligence staff therefore must be to see the enemy picture clearly enough to suggest courses of action that may make him react where and when he has not planned to. The enemy in revolutionary warfare seeks his opportunities carefully and abhors any action that increases his level of risk and hence
his vulnerability. To force the enemy to increase his level of risk is the beginning of winning the initiative from him. This is a many sided problem and demands co-ordination and co-operation by all government agencies involved.

Lack of balanced assessment by agencies will usually be a troublesome factor in the interpretation of information. Very often intelligence agencies will have to be built from scratch and until experience and a degree of professionalism develop, every report will tend to be overgraded (rated too high in probability). This process is safe and easy for the intelligence operator who has no one in an executive position to advise. It is too indiscriminate for the intelligence officer advising a commander. Overgrading will tend to produce over-reaction which can lead to the disruption of operational priorities, invite wasted effort and provide a small but cheap psychological victory to the enemy. Another annoying tendency in the assessment of information by agencies is the selection of a neutral and non-committal grading as a substitute for thought.

Lack of timeliness in reporting will continue to plague the vital step of interpretation. When the movement of two or three suspect people could be very important it is frustrating to have the observer of the evening before report the sighting on the morning after. Even worse is the case where an outpost delays the reporting of movement of a known or suspect enemy sub-unit. Generally it is only disaster that impresses the value of timely reporting.

Impatience has been cast as the besetting sin of counter-revolutionary warfare. It can be destructive to the intelligence effort. It is precipitated, in part, by a mathematical and sterile approach to intelligence. This means the attempt to cancel out all variables without waiting for the emergence of constant factors. As soon as a blip appears on a radar screen shoot at it, as soon as an emission is traced on an infra-red sensor shoot at it, as soon as an enemy transmitter is heard shoot at it. Sometimes it is better to wait. The target will usually disappear rapidly on engagement. The more it can be allowed to develop consistent with our own security, the better will be our engagement of it, and the more difficult it will be for the enemy to move it.

Co-ordination is a well-proven principle of intelligence but there will always be many obstacles in the way of forming a single, integrated intelligence organization. Competition will sometimes obstruct co-ordination. Parallel chains of command can send information in the wrong
direction, or in the right direction but often on a far too circuitous path. Active participation by military intelligence staffs in district and province committees is essential. The case for the military intelligence officer living and working with indigenous agencies is strong. This however is only a starting point. Even after a number of successes, and the growth of some mutual respect between foreigner and indigene, some limiting factors on co-ordination will persist. These are not only psychological but also simple and practical. For instance, the security of an operation and own troops will tend to limit the degree of co-ordination achieved with co-operating indigenous units or personnel. Time and trust must be finely balanced in combined intelligence processing to achieve maximum exploitation of all co-operating units and officials.

Continuity in intelligence staff is mandatory, and rapid turnover of key intelligence personnel is unacceptable. Only after some months can the intelligence officer gain the confidence that comes with experience, the understanding that improves with background, and the familiarity with his own commander’s concepts that is vital. Continuity or overlap is necessary not only within the intelligence staff but also between senior operations and intelligence reliefs. Lack of continuity at any level imposes a measure of delay at that level, restricts independent assessment of pronouncements from above, and deprives the next lower level of the sounding-board it constantly needs and seeks.

The Uses

The problems of intelligence in counter-revolutionary warfare are acute. They must never become stifling. In fact, with patience and maximum source exploitation the habits of the enemy become manifest to a degree that permits the gradual achievement of permanent success. As in any military situation, the basic task of intelligence is straightforward and unchanging. It is to provide the commander with continuous, detailed and timely information on enemy unit locations and intentions. In counter-revolutionary warfare, engagement with enemy main forces is anything but continuous. When the break is made the ability of the intelligence staff to keep touch with the enemy will depend largely upon the background knowledge of the operator who directs sources in the collection plan. It is unlikely that he will be able always to maintain even loose contact, through any source, but the more he understands his enemy’s aims and tactics in all fields, the shorter will be the gaps in coverage.
Just as the enemy will change his type of activity to make advances in different spheres so the intelligence staff must be aware of enemy vulnerabilities and be able to suggest their exploitation, at appropriate times, in the overall plan. During an obvious and protracted lull in enemy main force activity it could be advantageous to switch our own efforts to more sustained and concentrated destruction of his logistic support systems and installations. The painstaking search by infantry troops of base areas in this type of operation can yield the detailed information that initiates the most effective next step in furtherance of the commander’s plan. The aim and use of intelligence in this way is to advise the commander on operational priorities in order to maintain maximum pressure on the enemy.

The daily pre-planned expenditure of ordnance assets will score best results if controlled by the artillery commander and advised daily and in detail by the senior intelligence officer.

The direction of medium range reconnaissance (ground and air) must begin in the intelligence office. Patrol activity out to the limits of a tactical area of responsibility can contribute much useful information. It provides detailed knowledge of enemy base areas, early indications of size and direction of enemy movement, and describes suitable ambush areas. Such ingredients can be most useful in the subsequent disruption and forestalling of the enemy’s plans.

Concurrent with these straightforward intelligence pursuits there is a responsibility on the intelligence staff to offer more in an insurgency situation. It must gain sufficiently detailed knowledge of enemy aims and habits to be able to contribute the necessary information for the commander and his operations staff to conduct specific operations important in counter-revolutionary warfare. These include rice denial, internal security (cordon and search), tactical psychological operations, and exploitation of information leading to the capture or removal of enemy officials and agents (‘infrastructure’). Rice denial operations, to be successful, require a clear assessment before operational planning begins of just how the enemy will go about collection of his rice requirements. Of course the better the co-ordination of all intelligence services in the area of operations, and the more extensive the use made of local knowledge, the less will be the time wasted by our units, particularly in the early stages of rice denial operations. Intelligence participation in cordon and search operations is demanding. It includes organization of screening points, interrogation centres, meeting the police and marry-
ing them up in rendezvous with search parties, issue of passes so that the village chief and council are not arrested by mistake, provision of blacklists and other military/civilian arrangements. Tactical psychological operations represent an art of capitalizing so adroitly on the enemy's state of mind (especially in adversity) that he loses the will to resist. Perception and understanding of the enemy must be very clear to seize the fleeting, best chance of exploitation.

Summary

The intelligence process in counter-revolutionary warfare remains unchanged. Because the area of interest for the intelligence staff is wider the background required is more extensive and more detailed. Local knowledge and time to develop it are important considerations. A thorough understanding of source employment and limitations is essential. Versatility, imagination and resourcefulness in 'tracking' the enemy must be developed. Complete integration within the operations staff orbit must be achieved early. Gaps in coverage of the enemy will be inevitable. They must be filled with persistence and not desperation. In the search for the spectacular the intelligence officer must never lose sight of the mundane.

KOREA, SEPTEMBER 1950

Experienced Diggers found that the business of war hadn't changed much in the five years since the Japanese had surrendered. An infantry battalion in Korea had greater fire-power because there were more automatic weapons to a company. Before long the Commonwealth Brigade had up to sixty American tanks to support it and an artillery battalion of sixteen 155-mm guns with a range of 20,000 yards. In addition they could call on close air support almost whenever they needed it. Nevertheless, they soon learned that war in Korea was basically an infantryman's war in which terrific supporting fire-power was no substitute for the patient, footslogging grind of direct action and the responsibility of personal initiative.

—Norman Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea (1954).
Performance Appraisal and the Confidential Report

Major O. J. O'Brien
Royal Australian Infantry

Annual reporting is an aid in the determination of an officer's effective use to the Army.

—Military Board Instruction 166-9

My brave officers . . . Such a gallant band of fellows! Such a band of brothers! My heart swells at the thought of them!

—Horatio Nelson

On Appraisal

HUMAN judgement is something less than a precise application of scientific knowledge—it is a product of many conceptual attitudes and personal experiences. Man's methods of appraising the virtues and vices of others have always been relatively imprecise, and if appraisal methods are to be improved then they should themselves be critically appraised. This article seeks to examine one of the Australian Army's methods of appraising its officers—the Confidential Report which is submitted every year on officers from subaltern to colonel. Much can be gained from consultative argument, and the writer acknowledges the debt he owes to those who assisted in the preparation of the article. He has gratefully accepted their criticisms on the drafts and shamelessly incorpor-

Major O'Brien graduated from the Royal Military College in 1957, and served as a platoon commander in 11 NS Trg Bn (1958) and 2 RAR (1959-60). He served in Malaya as a platoon commander with 1 RAR 1960-61 and as a company second-in-command with 2 RAR 1961-63. In 1963-64 he was a platoon commander and then second-in-command of the SAS Coy RAR. Following this he was a member of the ENTAC ATGW Trial Team at the Armoured Centre and in 1965 was adjutant and then instructor at the Officer Training Unit. He joined 6 RAR in 1966 and served as a company commander in Australia and Vietnam. He attended the RAAF Staff College course in 1968 and then assumed his present posting as GS02 at the Directorate of Military Training, AHQ.
ated their suggestions, but he has chosen to dispute some of their points of view and remains open to rebuttal.

**Reporting Systems**

Reporting upon officers has become more pragmatic since the 18th century when officers were appraised as 'Gentlemen, and Men of Character ... actuated by Principles of Honor, and a Spirit of Enterprise'. And although in the British Army commissions could be purchased until about 1870, promotion and appointment to command have always been based on the accepted criteria of the day. Throughout military history officers have been observed and evaluated for appointment or promotion by standards of breeding, social grace, affluence, competence or a combination of these. References to officer efficiency can be found in the Bible and Caesar's Gallic Wars. Although military management is a modern term it is a concept as old as warfare: within its realm lies the field of personnel management—and within that exist the many techniques by which military leaders are evaluated and appointed. Written reports on officers constitute but one of these techniques—one which, although fallible, has proven acceptably reliable, and which the Australian Army has employed in one form or another for many years. Essentially, a written report 'marks a progress and development on the part of a commander capable at first of commanding only a small unit to become capable of commanding a big one'. Much the same can be said of staff officers, logisticians, and military educators. The fact that the Australian Army has produced many capable commanders and some outstanding military figures is testimony to the effectiveness of its selection and training processes in general and, incidentally, to its methods of observing and recording the effectiveness of its officers. Among those methods has been the Annual Confidential Report.

Nevertheless, few would presume that Annual Confidential Reports on officers (and I confine this paper to reports on Regular Army officers) are beyond improvement. Doubtless the reporting system has been developed and refined over many years, and of course it has been

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oriented towards the particular personnel management requirements of the Army whilst duly recognizing other criteria such as documentary clarity and administrative simplicity. Yet if our reporting system is less than perfect we may not be extracting optimum management value from it; it could well be that by reappraising our reporting method we could improve our evaluation of officers and, fortuitously, encourage officers to develop characteristics which are most relevant to maintenance of our professional standards in a competitive society.

It may be optimistic to suggest that one man's research and proposals could consummate the matter; I wish only to examine some possible weaknesses and outline some avenues for deeper investigation. Aspects of our reporting system deserving examination and review include: the timings of report submission; training of reporting officers in techniques of appraisal; the relationship between job description and performance appraisal; and the range of personal or professional characteristics now assessed. By way of comparison of some of the aspects under review, appended are relevant extracts from Confidential Report forms used by the NZ Armed Forces, Canadian Armed Forces, RAAF, RAF, Imperial Oil Limited, UK Atomic Energy Authority, UK Civil Service, London Transport Executive and UK Eastern Electricity Board. This comparative sampling is not meant to be comprehensive or conclusive; it is rather a representative selection to illustrate common components and divergent methods.

Certain premises should be made clear before discussion of the aspects mentioned above. One is that the concept and the purpose of the Annual Confidential Report are properly understood and accepted by all officers. Explanations to reporting officers and subject officers, contained in MBT 166-9 and on the Form A26, are sufficiently clear and precise, at least in this respect. Another premise is that some form of reporting system is required for efficient personnel management in the Army. Moreover, reports help officers to evaluate their own career prospects and to recognize their own deficiencies. A third is that the 'open reporting' system, whereby the subject officer must see and initial each Confidential Report submitted on him, is considered desirable and indeed essential by most Australian Army officers (though many other Services and organizations, Imperial Oil and the RAAF for example, do not permit subject officers to see their reports). A fourth is that a degree of simplicity in the format of the report is necessary, both because reporting officers are not (and probably should not be) formally
trained psychologists, and because complexity could induce administrative difficulties in processing the report. An allied assumption is that the report form must be neither too mathematically precise nor excessively interpretive, i.e., it should qualify characteristics so that reporting officers work to acceptably uniform standards, yet permit scope for expressive word pictures of the subject officer’s qualities. Lastly, the A26 should not, and does not, represent the sum of our executive appraisal method—special reports are required and used at particular times to meet particular management requirements.

The legendary comment, ‘This officer is sober and industrious, but never at the same time’, may not constitute a comprehensive word picture but it is marvellously expressive. The same could be said of a senior officer’s recent comment on some officers ‘whose only contribution has been to the DFRB Fund’. But literary gems must not be given undue weight, and the report form must have a structure which will yield reliable information independently of the literary skills of the reporting officers. The structure of the shades of opinion in the A26, and in other military and industrial executive appraisal forms, should be such that levels of opinion are definable and ratable. This is important. In short, ‘Formal appraisal plans have been developed to reduce the elements of favoritism and snap judgement in personnel decisions . . . appraisal is essentially subjective and therefore cannot be exact, but if it is based on pooled judgements periodically rendered by supervisors when each employee is compared with every other employee in the same work group or rated against specified standards of performance . . . these results are certainly better than the individual judgements and hasty opinions that might otherwise be used’.

**Timing of Reports**

At first glance, the notion of preparing an officer’s report each calendar year on a prescribed date has advantages of regularity and simplicity, advantages dear to the heart of the administrator. Yet it could be argued that twelve months is too facile a period over which to review an officer’s performance in an appointment. For example, it is not unreasonable to expect that for the first few months in a new appointment, while an officer is mastering his duties, he is less than fully productive. No doubt most reporting officers would make due

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allowance for the problems of a settling-in period; however, a report based largely on, say, an officer's first six or seven months in an appointment may not always be truly representative of his capabilities. I stress always, for whilst many subject officers and many reporting officers may not be affected by such circumstances, we should try to obtain reports that are as objective as possible, as accurate as possible, and as valuable as possible. Any diminution of this ideal should be, indeed must be, minimized.

Not only may the settling-in period be suspect as a reliable time over which to evaluate task performance or personal qualities; those first six months or so may for other reasons not truly represent quality of performance. Many appointments have, for instance, cyclical work loads including predictable peaks and troughs of activity: thus, if a major in October 1970 takes up an appointment which has its greatest commitments between May and September, a report submitted in April 1971 cannot evaluate him under the total conditions of his employment. Now it can be argued that, first, the April 1972 report would 'catch up' and, secondly, that the 1971 report would evaluate the subject officer under adequate circumstances. Countering the first is the possibility that the officer may be reposted or promoted in October 1971 (and thus his April 1972 report may not refer to his performance in the June-September 1971 peak), and countering the second is the requirement that reports should cover not only 'adequate' but most, and if possible all, circumstances of an appointment. As this hypothetical case is a particular and probably uncommon one, it serves to illustrate rather than to prove a point. And it must be remembered that decisions regarding officers are rarely, if ever, made on the basis of one report. Nevertheless, the fact remains that there exists the possibility of an incomplete picture of the subject officer and, whether this be to his advantage or disadvantage, that possibility degrades the value of the reporting system. Annual reporting based upon predetermined submission times may therefore be imperfect.

A further doubt can be cast on the value of a regular and annual reporting system: changes of reporting officers can, and often do, occur at times which prevent (or at least inhibit) the production of comprehensive and searching reports on officers under their command. As long as there is a rigid requirement to submit reports at times unrelated, as they must be, to arrival and departure times of both reporting and subject officers, we are probably accepting less than optimum report
value. Although reporting officers are required to report only on those officers and those characteristics which they have observed for sufficient time, clearly at least some reports are rendered less useful by regularity of submission — and if even some reports are degraded in value, the reporting system cannot produce its greatest benefit to the Army.

It is interesting to note that in the RAAF, Canadian Armed Forces, RAF and NZ Armed Forces reports are submitted on several occasions, namely, annually, on reposting of subject or reporting officer, and when called for. The British Army’s system is similar, as is the US Army’s. The USAF report is submitted under various circumstances and requires the reporting officer to specify the period of supervision by days—discounting periods of leave, detachment, travel, hospitalization, etc., of over thirty days. The UK Atomic Energy Authority, Imperial Oil, UK Civil Service and Eastern Electricity Board reports are generally on an annual basis. Thus other Armed Services cited seem to require reports at times dictated by posting circumstances, while the civil organizations (with probably less personnel turbulence) rely upon regular reports.

It is easy of course to detect in any system areas of weakness, yet much more difficult to provide practical solutions. This article does not pretend to have all the answers; however, it could well be that the above arguments indicate cogent reasons for review of the current routine regularity of our Confidential Reports on officers. The answers may lie in a procedure whereby reports are submitted at the end of each appointment, or on changes of reporting officers, or even on both, and EDP could well be programmed to produce due-date reminders. Perhaps reporting in this way would provide irregular (though probably no less frequent) reports of greater value, and could ensure that reports are more relevant to job performance than to an arbitrary period of time. Much of this presumes that task performance is a sufficiently considerable proportion of the whole report (this may not now be so, but I will discuss later the estimable performance criteria which could, and perhaps should, be included in Confidential Reports). In any event, although reports are probably required at least once per year, a case exists for a review of the present submission times of reports.

The Expertise of the Reporting Officer

The Army system of reporting on its officers has a vital role to play in officer development and promotion, and the value of reports is
proportional to the reporting competence of reporting officers. There is no reason to doubt that most, indeed probably all, reporting officers are conscientious in the task of reporting and are aware of the heavy responsibilities they bear. However, there is reason to suggest that, if reports are to have optimum validity, somewhere in the military educational process officers should be taught to report on subordinates. It is not sufficient to be trained and experienced in the arts of human relations and man management; it is necessary also to be trained and competent in techniques of personnel reporting. 'Staff reports are useless . . . unless reporting officers . . . take the job of reporting seriously . . . understand the form . . . work to a common standard; and give candid reports . . . training is therefore of vital importance, and the objective of training should be to secure those four ends'.

The earnestness and sincerity of reporting officers are not in question. It is probably true, moreover, that many reporting officers possess, by virtue of their managerial abilities and wide experience, considerable skill in personnel reporting. Yet it cannot be assumed that all reporting officers have great capabilities in this regard, especially in view of the fact that officers are not specifically trained in this work. This is not to say that there is some mystique in the art of personnel reporting — psychologists would regard it as a matter of common sense and integrity. Nevertheless, if reporting is as important as we believe it to be, it should and must be carried out in the best way possible. Effective appraisal is a necessary component of good personnel management, and effectiveness in personnel reporting would be at least improved by training.

We train our officers to think, to lead, to administer and to command, but we do not directly teach them the techniques of reporting on others. Personnel reporting is not included as a taught topic at RMC, OCS, OTU, or the Staff College, although officers on the staff of OTU are given some instruction in the matter. Certainly, reporting officers are given instructions and advice on the completion of the A26 in MBI 166-9 and in the A26 itself. These instructions are brief and they do not indicate standards against which to measure qualities, i.e., whether against the average qualities of officers of the same rank or experience

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as the subject officer, or against a specified ideal, or against the virtues of other officers within the same organization. The stipulation in the A26 is that the reporting officer should 'make an objective judgement of ... qualities', and only knowledge is to be evaluated against 'rank and experience'. Estimable qualities are broadly defined but there are few discernible guidelines for the reporting officer. And guidelines are clearly necessary in one form or another, for the A26 rates and ranks traits which are highly personalized: these traits are common, in varying degrees, to reporting officers, subject officers, and reviewing officers. Interpretation of human characteristics is inherently subjective, and to achieve a significant degree of objectivity in reporting it is important to recognize and compensate for subjective weaknesses. Ranking and rating of traits 'is an analytic method, and has the advantage of clear-cut quantification ... It suffers from the drawbacks of ratings in general, particularly the lack of consensus about the meaning of terms and the quantitative standards used. ...'

Our reporting system appears to assume that, because reporting officers have observed over some years a random sampling of officers in the ranks of those on whom they report, experience gives to them a reporting expertise sufficient to make their reports generally reliable. If this assumption does underlie our system, then the validity of the assumption must be demonstrably sound for the reporting system to be also sound. Now, there is little doubt that experience gives to all officers some measure of skill in human assessment, whether intuitive or otherwise. But it does not follow that experienced judgement necessarily implies competent reporting, for there is more to personnel reporting than sound judgement and literary skill. Some understanding of report processing, and of its relationship to promotion and selection, are surely components of effective reporting. So too are clear definitions of comparative standards and of the implications of statistical analysis. Experience, then, contributes only part of the ideal, and perhaps we should seek informed reporting as well as experienced appraisal.

If the assumption that experience teaches all is of doubtful validity, equally doubtful would be a premise that education in reporting methods would provide the complete solution. Problems may still exist, for 'Training programs designed to teach the skills of appraising

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do help, but they seldom eliminate* those problems. Such education would not attenuate the importance of a reporting officer's experience in personnel judgement; it could rather sharpen reporting effectiveness by heightening his ability to apply his judgement to a particular reporting system. If reporting is experienced and informed we may more nearly attain the ideal. It is likely that frequency of reports tends to compensate for variations in reporting competence, as does our method of applying corrective factors, based on analysis of the reporting officer's appraisal skills, to our management interpretation of reports. This should of course continue, if only to minimize human error. Yet it is also apparent that some form of instruction in reporting techniques (at, say, the Staff College) would result in more effective personnel appraisal. Clearly there is room here for research to define the need and to devise ways of meeting it.

**Job Description—Important to Performance Appraisal**

The Confidential Report form requires the reporting officer to list duties which are 'actually performed' by the subject officer, 'with enough detail to show scope of work'. Now, mere listing of duties may be quite adequate for reporting officers, who understand the tasks of the subject officers, and even for immediate superiors; it may be less than adequate years later when the capabilities of the subject officer are being reviewed by promotion or appointment committees. The duties of a company commander, an adjutant, or the AA & QMG HQ 1 Div are no doubt well known. However, how many officers now serving on promotion committees have a full grasp of the responsibilities and problems of the DADEME in EME 16 (Aircraft Planning) of DEME at AHQ Melbourne? Or even of the GSO1 Battle Analysis Team, a relatively new appointment?

A glance at the AHQ Telephone Directory shows that, within the Directorate of Military Training, the GSO1 (Trg 3) is responsible to the DMT for 'the promulgation of tactical and logistic training doctrine and the preparation and conduct of the CGS Exercise, for training films and audio visual sequences, for GS publications and staff control of Army libraries, for air photographs used in training'. The GSO1 (Trg 2), on the other hand, is responsible to the DMT for 'collective training.

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joint and combined exercises; Army aspects of SEATO exercise co-ordination; annual training and operational readiness reports'. Such brief job descriptions do not, and cannot, sufficiently explain duties and responsibilities. Although both appointments are Grade 1 staff appointments, the former controls a staff of 9 officers, 17 other ranks and 30 civilians, whilst the latter controls a staff of one officer and one NCO. Whether one appointment is more or less responsible than the other is not at issue; the fact remains that they are very different appointments with vastly different staffs and dissimilar duties, and brief explanations of duties as 'responsible for' simply do not provide a basis for evaluation of performance. Unless the reporting officer chooses to explain the number of subordinates controlled by these officers, and he is under no obligation to do so, his evaluation under the paragraph 'Management of Subordinates' loses some of its relevance. (Granted, many reporting officers may explain this, but do they all?) Moreover, if both officers are rated as 'gets the best out of subordinates' those ratings, based as they are on observed circumstances that are poles apart, must be almost meaningless to a senior officer reviewing both reports unless the ratings are related to a statement of staff size.

A list of duties, then, is not enough; if task performance, as a component of overall professional competence and as an indicator of promotion potential, is to be properly evaluated, then the scope and complexity of the task must be explained. A detailed job description, in fact, is necessary. This should obviously not be in inordinate detail, but should include sufficient information for a balanced comparison of task responsibility and task performance; not only the duties as listed in the standing orders should be shown, but other pertinent data also. Included in this could be span of control, details of subordinates, channels of responsibility, levels of delegated authority, and responsibility for technical advice to the reporting officer. In any case, there is need for research to define the relevant parameters which will provide comparative job descriptions for reporting purposes.

The manning state of the organization is also closely relevant to task performance. Although it is probably true that unit undermanning need not detract from individual, as distinct from unit, efficiency, it is fallacious to think that it will never do so. We go to great lengths in our job analysis in order to create workable establishments, i.e., tasks and responsibilities and capabilities and experience levels are carefully evaluated and fitted into organizational structures. Yet if an organiza-
tion is under strength, or if its individuals are committed to duties beyond their designed capabilities, organizational efficiency must inevitably be affected. If then, we evaluate individual performance within that organization, we should logically take account of all factors which affect organizational efficiency and which may therefore affect individual performance. The Form A26 does allow the reporting officer to do this, but does not require him to detail personnel circumstances (including strength, commitments and turbulence) which could, whether the organization be at strength or gravely undermanned, cast important light on the subject officer's capabilities. Again, most reporting officers would consider these factors—what is not certain is how many would explain them.

Superior reporting officers and Heads of Corps need precise and balanced information on which to review reports. So too do senior officers concerned with promotions and appointments. Unless performance appraisal can be viewed against those circumstances—favourable or unfavourable—in which the performance took place, it may be less than adequate as a basis for comparison of officers. And here is the heart of the problem—the important thing is to ensure that officers who review reports do so with proper knowledge of the conditions under which the subject officer was working. There is probably no need to mathematically weight the job circumstances—merely a need to provide reviewing officers with details relevant to objective review, details not only of task performance but also of the task parameters.

Clearly, a requirement exists for definition of organizational factors which qualitatively affect individual job performance. Although this need not imply a system of weighting the variables, it does require at least recognition of those variables. This may be more easily said than done. J. Kelly, Ph.D., Professor of Management at Sir George Williams University, Montreal, says of job description: 'Most personnel specialists experience real difficulty in the preparation of accurate, meaningful and relevant job descriptions. Their fundamental difficulties are ultimately theoretical and refer to the need for a proper theory of work and for accurate empirical research using this theory as a framework to discover what executives do.' He suggests that a job description include — a title; an introductory paragraph; a list of functions (the

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simple 'list of duties' derogated above); details of decision making implicit in the job; performance review methods (i.e., whether by confidential report, estimate of unit efficiency, production criteria, etc.); and details of personal and technical qualifications required to fill the role. To that I would add details of subordinates and span of managerial control.

**Personal Qualities and Performance Criteria**

Field Marshal Slim was being modest when he said 'by good fortune in the game of military snakes and ladders, I found myself a general'. An officer's effectiveness (or suitability for appointment, or readiness for promotion, or command and staff capabilities) may be measured by evaluation of certain estimable characteristics—this is the broad rationale behind personnel reporting systems used by armed forces, industrial and commercial organizations, and civil services. Organizations and reporting systems are by no means unanimous on precisely what characteristics are important, apart from a compendious 'general ability' category, and it is interesting to compare the various categories of characteristics used for evaluation. The Form A26 divides the qualities, though they are not so grouped, into three broad categories—task competences (Knowledge, Judgement etc.), interpersonal competences (Acceptability as Colleague, Management of Subordinates etc.) and personal qualities (Appearance, Ability to Speak etc.). The RAAF groups characteristics under Personal Qualities, Proficiency in Administrative Details, Proficiency in Management of Personnel, Proficiency in Planning and Directing, and Proficiency in Category. NZ Armed Forces groupings are similar. The RAF examines qualities like those listed by the RAAF, but under the group headings of Personal Qualities, Ability, and Qualities of Leadership. Among civilian organizations, such groupings as Character and Personality, Capacity and Performance of Duties are common. All groupings may be variously termed personal qualities, interpersonal competence or task competence. It appears, therefore, that different organizations group the estimable qualities in similar ways though with variable emphasis. Very likely, quality grouping is subjective and not especially important. What is obviously very important is the selection of characteristics upon which to compile a report.

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In this respect, we should examine whether the particular qualities which we evaluate in the Form A26 are as specific or as useful as those selected by other organizations. Lack of specificity, of course, may not be a vice, generality may be a virtue, and the submission of special reports on particular occasions (e.g., occasions of superlative performance or gross incompetence or grave misconduct) may properly highlight particular attributes. Nevertheless, in periodic reporting, the examination of less detailed qualities may produce less detailed information; this may in turn indicate less than optimum report value. It is fair to say that if one is interested in specific competences one must ask specific questions about them, and many organizations have evolved their report forms in the direction of greater specificity. Not so the Australian Army. Table 1 shows, in outline, some aspects of the A26's evolution 1949-70. Clearly, though the form has been progressively refined it has not become more specific, and comparison of the A26's estimable qualities with those of other report forms suggests that other organizations ask more searching and detailed questions about their executives. It is distinctly possible that they thereby acquire more precise knowledge than do we upon which to evaluate work suitability and promotion potential.

Before such a comparison, however, it is important to recognize that unanimity of reporting systems need not have merit ipso facto. Any reporting system must have a proven validity for the organization it claims to serve, and it follows that the qualities it evaluates must by definition be those most relevant to professional excellence. Moreover, many qualities, however defined, are highly correlative and even psychologically identical. Two cognate notions arise from this; first, that comparative examination of qualities in different reporting systems will be relevant only in so far as different organizations require similar executive characteristics (they need not be identical, for this may lead to semantic absurdity) and, secondly, that provided the total of estimable qualities adds up to the broad executive ideal then specificity is not of critical importance. Further, proliferation of estimable qualities is independent of specificity, and thus the number of qualities estimated is not of consequence—what is important is the psychological validity of the chosen qualities, again in terms of the executive ideal, whether those be primary or general qualities. And it is fair to assume that qualities should have statistical as well as theoretical value. The crux of the matter, then, is whether or not the A26 quantifies the Army's execu-
tive ideal and, if it does not, whether or not examination of other organizational report forms can indicate avenues of improvement.

Table 2 shows qualities selected as officer effectiveness criteria by several armed services, and Table 3 shows those selected by several civilian organizations (private, public and corporate). In each table the Australian Army officer effectiveness criteria are shown for comparison. Similar qualities are broadly equated for ease of comparison. I stress similar qualities, for it would be a useless semantic exercise to compare or contrast in great detail the relevance of 'Output' to 'Performance', or the synonymity of 'Leadership' and 'Management of Subordinates'.

What is apparent from the two tables is this—the A26 lists considerably fewer qualities than do other report forms. Moreover, other organizations define some qualities which are capable of rather more precise evaluation than are the qualities on the A26, and some which are not. For example, Management of Subordinates may be justly claimed to include delegation of authority, welfare of subordinates and maintenance of discipline. However, the A26 qualifies the matter as 'gets the best out of subordinates' through 'subordinates work well for him' to 'gets indifferent results from his subordinates because he relies too much on them/tends to drive too hard/does too much himself/other reasons'. Thus it is possible in the A26 to identify whether a mediocre leader is a harsh disciplinarian, a fastidious perfectionist, or an impractical delegator. And there is scope for the reporting officer to picture the better man management qualities of subject officers by word picture. But man management is a complex matter, and perhaps the form should allow for rather more detailed attributes within that field without relying heavily on the reporting officer's literary skills. As stated before, if one wants details of specific competences one must ask specific questions about them.

Of the other qualities in the A26, some are almost universally accepted and to question them would be pedantry. These include Appearance (or bearing or turnout or presence), Ability to Speak, Acceptability as Colleague, and Judgement. Paperwork (or writing ability, or written expression) is a quality common to most reporting systems, in greater or lesser detail. In the A26, detail is lesser, i.e., 'Written work is clear, concise and to the point' through 'Writes quite a good paper' to 'Written work leaves something to be desired', with five gradations despite the three phrases. By comparison, the NZ Armed Forces report, although it uses a four point rather than five
point scale, appears more searching, for example, from 'Expression is clear, concise and convincing' through 'Conveys his meaning with few faults in grammar and style' and 'Not always clear, grammar and style can be faulty' to 'Below acceptable standards'. Again, the specific question on a specific competence. But such qualities as those of Expression, Presence and Acceptability as a Colleague should obviously be included in any objective evaluation of an officer. Even Quickness of Apprehension and Interest could be so classified.

Knowledge of Work is a quality in the A26 deserving particular attention. Quite obviously, professional knowledge is part and parcel of competence, but the A26 defines knowledge as 'Consider how proficient for his rank and experience he is in the discharge of his day-to-day tasks'. It then qualifies the matter as 'thorough grasp of knowledge' through 'sufficient knowledge' to 'not know enough'. It could be argued that, while knowledge is undeniably elemental to proficiency, there is more to proficiency (or efficiency, or competence) than mere knowledge. And if there are other components of proficiency, they are probably of sufficient importance to be separately evaluated.

In fact, the paragraph under Knowledge of Work, broad though it is as a measure of proficiency, is the first mention of task performance in the A26; a later paragraph enjoins the reporting officer to 'provide a vivid general picture of the . . . efficiency with which he is working', and this is the only other reference to efficiency, accomplishment or quality of achievement, although the total report is concerned with these. Granted that consideration of qualities such as Judgement and Attention to Detail can assist in describing the officer's efficiency—there are nonetheless no precise questions asking; is this officer, or is he not, efficient? Even though the statistical analysis gives a clue to this it can hardly do so with great precision. Without specific questions, there may well be no specific answers.

A consideration of the selected qualities raises the question of qualities which could be enumerated, but are not. For example, there is no precise reference to or obligation to report on an officer's decisiveness, foresight, instructional skills (oral expression being but a part of the instructor's technique), initiative, organizing ability (other than the management of subordinates), vision, problem-solving abilities or capacity to work under stress. This last, as shown in Table 1, was deleted in 1955. Whilst such qualities can be covered by word pictures, they may not be, and if they are not then the evaluation of the officer may
well be incomplete. It is generally accepted, indeed indisputable, that the Army seeks decisive, imaginative, determined officers skilled at problem solving and having high managerial abilities, but an examination of the A26 shows that our officer reporting system may not evaluate those qualities in precise terms. And it may be that we could have some officers who are of good appearance, quick on the uptake, interested, accepted by colleagues and subordinates, knowledgeable, literate, articulate — and perhaps inefficient. Or unable to cope with crises. Or reluctant to make decisions. Or drearily unimaginative. Or lamentably unproductive. Although special reports and expressive word pictures may produce this information there is no guarantee that they will do so. And although it can reasonably be said that an Army can, and perhaps must, carry a proportion of inadequate executives, it is just as reasonable to demand that they be identified.

Tables 2 and 3 show that in the broad category of task competence, especially, the Australian Army seeks measurably less information—or at least seeks information in notably less detail—than does any of the civil or military organizations listed for comparison. In interpersonal competence, differences in estimable qualities are almost as marked. Now, it cannot be argued that we have an intuitive capability to extrapolate with great precision from limited information; nor could it be fairly stated that we somehow seek different officer qualities than do other large organizations concerned with efficient management; it is likely, then, that we evaluate officer effectiveness in less precise manner, at least in the Confidential Report. Task competences are important and probably sufficiently so to justify greater emphasis in the A26.

. . . executive characteristics appraised . . . leadership, initiative, dependability, judgement, getting along with people, ambition, and so on—do not necessarily measure a man's effectiveness on the job . . . the great weakness in this approach has proved to be the lack of performance criteria that are related to job responsibilities'. Indeed, the Canadian Armed Forces report is called a 'Performance Evaluation Report' and all criteria, even personal characteristics, are related to task performance. I do not suggest that trait-oriented appraisals are inadequate, but I do suggest that positive performance evaluations are necessary in addition to trait evaluations, provided that evaluable norms can be defined.

Against this should be argued the recognition that estimable criteria must not only appear to be appropriate but must be so proven. I have no doubt that the validity of the questions we ask has been tested over the years, yet I have likewise no doubt that there is room for more detailed research on the matter. Also, if the format of the A26 is related to the statistical method we use to assist in evaluation of reports, and it probably is, then there is further good reason to believe that it is time for change to keep pace with our improved statistical capabilities in the field of EDP.

As the Army's officer corps grows, so probably should our use of mathematical method in report processing. The format of the A26, as shown in Table 1, has changed but little in fifteen years. In any case, although proliferation of estimable factors may not necessarily improve the validity of our reporting system, the fact that other organizations evaluate on rather more criteria than does the Australian Army suggests that either we are more perceptive than they—or that our reports are less searching.

Conclusion

In a sense, it is profitless to ponder on whether or not our executive appraisal system is adequate now, for it can be fairly stated that the Confidential Report is a functional element of a working system. There is no evidence that our reporting method has caused glaring injustice to the individual or the group, and it must be remembered that personnel management goes beyond a reporting system—indeed a reporting system is but a part of executive appraisal. That our whole management method continues to produce acceptable levels of competence is testimony to its past and present efficacy. The point in question is, of course, whether or not our Confidential Report as now constituted can meet our management requirements for the decades ahead.

Those decades ahead are likely to make increasing demands upon our military organizations and correspondingly increasing demands upon our military leaders. From the captains of 1970 will come the Military Board of the year 2000; for the next three decades they must be reported on and evaluated, and during that time they will be reporting on and evaluating their successors. The reporting system must identify competence in a society where the Army will compete not only for human resources but, increasingly, for human resources of sufficient quality to cope with technological and sociological challenges.
This article has attempted to highlight facets of our reporting system which may require review. It has carefully avoided either detailing the extent of weaknesses or pontificating on solutions, for change—if it is proved desirable—should come only after thorough research. It may be necessary to clarify our personnel management objectives by first defining our executive ideal in terms of our future military requirements, and then identifying better means of appraising qualities in terms of that executive ideal. In the future, our military achievements will be derived from not only our tactical skills but, increasingly, from our ability to manage a vast technological enterprise. Appraisal and selection of executives during these 1970s will be reflected in our corporate competence for decades ahead. It seems that a review of timings, job description, estimable criteria and reporting techniques could be fruitful endeavour towards improving our Confidential Report, endeavour that should reap tangible benefits in personnel and military management.

**TABLE 1—EVOLUTION OF THE FORM A26 SINCE 1949**

1949 (a) The form requested that the reporting officer give a comprehensive word picture of the subject officer, and explained relative standards of comparison, for example, Average being ‘the average of all officers of similar rank and approximately the same seniority’, and Exceptional, Above Average, Below Average and Poor as related to this.

(b) The form explained differing requirements for commanders (Energy, Determination, Independence of Thought, whether Deliberate or Impulsive, Leadership, Resourcefulness etc.) and staff officers (Military Knowledge, Tidiness of Mind, Mental Elasticity, Constructiveness, Clear expression etc.).

(c) Estimable characteristics were Initiative, Judgement, Ability to Command, Zeal and Energy, Reliability, Administrative Ability, and Professional Ability—all rated from 1 to 9.

1953 By 1953, the A26 was in its now familiar format. Qualities were evaluated according to descriptive phrases graduated from excellent to inadequate. Estimable qualities were Appearance, Interest, Response to Pressure, Quickness of Apprehension, Judgement, Output, Knowledge of Work, Attention to Detail, Paperwork, Acceptability as Colleague, Management of Subordinates, Leadership, and Ability to Speak. Ratings were scored by AHQ under headings of Personal Qualities, Intellectual Qualities, Work Proficiency and Management of Personnel.
1954 The same thirteen qualities were evaluated, but AHQ scoring was shown under fewer headings, i.e., Intellectual Qualities, Staff Proficiency, and Management of Personnel.

1955 The qualities of Response to Pressure, Leadership, and Output were deleted. AHQ scoring categories were no longer shown.

1956-61 Consideration was given to the inclusion of Delegation of Responsibility, especially for reports on staff officers, but this was not implemented. Similarly, suggestions that reports be other than annual were not accepted.

1961-70 Only minor changes in the report form were made during this period. It is still essentially similar to the 1955 version.

### TABLE 2—COMPARISON OF ESTIMABLE QUALITIES LISTED IN REPORT FORMS USED BY AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND OTHER ARMED SERVICES

#### PERSONAL QUALITIES

**Australian Army:** Appearance, Ability to Speak, Quickness of Apprehension, Interest.

**RAAF:** Appearance and Bearing, Power of Oral Expression, Integrity and Fairness, Sense of Duty, Energy, Social Conduct.

**RAF:** Presence and Turnout, Oral Expression, Intelligence, Integrity, Loyalty, Social Conduct, Example.

**NZ Armed Forces:** Appearance and Bearing, Determination and Integrity, Sense of Duty, Power of Oral Expression, Social Conduct.

**Canadian Armed Forces:** Loyalty, Oral Expression, Credit to Service, Example, Action towards Self-Improvement, Appearance and Manner, Personal Conduct.

#### INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCES

**Australian Army:** Acceptability as Colleague, Management of Subordinates.

**RAAF:** Developing Teamwork, Co-operation, Ability to Inspire Confidence, Delegating Authority, Welfare of Subordinates, Maintaining Discipline.
RAF: Tact, Power to Inspire, Attitudes to Subordinates, Welfare of Subordinates, Discipline, Power of Command.

NZ Armed Forces: Co-operation, Loyalty to Others, Delegating Authority, Maintaining Discipline, Developing Teamwork, Ability to Inspire Confidence.

Canadian Armed Forces: Management of Subordinates, Consideration for Subordinates, Co-operation.

**TASK COMPETENCES**

**Australian Army:** Judgement, Knowledge of Work, Paperwork, Attention to Detail.


**RAF:** Judgement, Level of Service Knowledge, Level of General Knowledge, Written Expression, Reliability, Organizing Ability, Self Confidence, Presence of Mind, Initiative, Determination.

**NZ Armed Forces:** Understanding Instructions, Performance of Own Work, Knowledge of Organizations and Procedures, Power of Written Expression, Taking Responsibility, Decisiveness, Judgement, Initiative, Planning Ahead.

**Canadian Armed Forces:** Knowledge, Work Organization, Problem Analysis, Performance Under Stress, Written Expression, Adaptability, Decisiveness, Acceptance of Responsibility, Initiative.

**TABLE 3—COMPARISON OF ESTIMABLE QUALITIES LISTED IN REPORT FORMS USED BY AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS**

**PERSONAL QUALITIES**

**Australian Army:** Appearance, Ability to Speak, Quickness of Apprehension, Interest.
**Imperial Oil Ltd.:** Penetration, Sensitivity to Ambiguity, Flexibility.

**UK Atomic Energy Authority:** Oral Expression, Penetration.

**UK Civil Service:** Oral Expression, Penetration.

**London Transport Executive:** Ability to Present a Case Verbally, Mental Capacity.

**UK Eastern Electricity Board:** Personality and Appearance, Self-Expression. Mental Alertness, Application.

### INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCES

**Australian Army:** Acceptability as Colleague, Management of Subordinates.

**Imperial Oil Ltd.:** Skill at Personal Contacts.

**UK Atomic Energy Authority:** Relations with Colleagues, Management of Subordinates, Contacts with Public.

**UK Civil Service:** Relations with Colleagues, Management of Subordinates, Contacts with Public.

**London Transport Executive:** Acceptability as Colleague, Ability to Train and Lead Staff.

**UK Eastern Electricity Board:** Leadership.

### TASK COMPETENCES

**Australian Army:** Judgement, Knowledge of Work, Attention to Detail, Paperwork.

**Imperial Oil Ltd.:** Knowledge of Function and Related Matters and Business Economics, Job Performance and Technical Competence, Acceptance of Responsibility and Decision Making, Originality.

**UK Atomic Energy Authority:** Judgement, Figurework, Expression on Paper, Constructive Power, Output, Quality of Work, Organizing Ability.

**UK Civil Service:** Judgement, Figurework, Expression on Paper, Constructive Power, Output, Quality of Work, Organization of Work, Responsibility.
London Transport Executive: Judgement and Sense of Proportion, Knowledge of Work, Ability to Handle Figures, Writing Ability, Initiative and Enterprise, Performance, Ability to Organize, Sense of Responsibility, Adaptability, Ability to Withstand Pressure of Work, Foresight and Originality.

UK Eastern Electricity Board: Knowledge of Work, Speed and Accuracy, Self-Expression, Initiative, Temperament.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Gunship Application—Continued

Lieutenant Colonel A. Argent
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I THINK that Squadron Leader Dirou (who I believe is now flying less lethal aircraft for Australia’s overseas airline) and most readers of Army Journal, February 1970, would agree that his article on gunships could be categorized as ‘once-over lightly’ and that it only dealt with limited areas of operations. For example, no mention was made of the M-5 armament subsystem (the 40-mm grenade launcher) or such things as riot control agent dispensers and the use of gunships at night. In addition, his views on firepower control and future use of gunships are open for comment and will be discussed in this article.

Brief History of Gunships

Both the French Army and the US Army started working on the armed helicopter idea at about the same time in the mid-1950s. The French had an added impetus to their innovations—the Algerian War. During this war, from 1956 to 1960, French Army aviation units, assigned the eastern half of Algeria, used offensively armed helicopters successfully. For example, the CH-21, a twin rotor, banana-shaped helicopter was armed with two 19-tube rocket pods, similar to the present XM-159 launcher.

Across the Atlantic, the US Army raised an experimental unit called the Sky Cavalry Platoon at the Aviation School, Fort Rucker, Alabama, in March 1957. This was a reconnaissance force mounted in armed helicopters. It had no ground vehicles. In December 1957 the Army Aviation School proposed a QMR (qualitative military requirement) for the development of helicopter weapon systems.

During this time the Sky Cavalry Platoon changed its organization and took on a more mundane title—8035th Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Company. This unit was equipped with the H-34 helicopter.
(now called a CH-34 — something like the Wessex but with a piston engine), the Sioux observation helicopter and, in 1960, with the then new utility helicopter, the Iroquois. Trials were conducted using .30 and .50 calibre machine-guns, rockets, including the firing of 24 4.5 inch rockets from the H-34, and anti-tank missiles, for example, the SS-11 missiles. In one trial a 12½-foot, 570-pound missile was fired from a H-34.

(Bell Helicopter Company)

Utility helicopter firing one of its six SS-11 wire guided anti-tank missiles.

These and other trials were the genesis of today’s air cavalry units and armed helicopter platoons.

The first US Army offensively armed helicopter unit in South Vietnam was the Utility Tactical Transport Company in 1963. This unit had 24 UH-1B helicopters and was based on Tan Son Nhut airfields. The aircraft were armed with 2.75-inch rockets and M-60 machine-guns.

Present Equipments

Since those early days many other armament subsystems have been introduced into service, mainly by the US Army, the US Marine Corps and US Navy. Table 1 shows some of the more common armaments and it includes the XM-27E1, the minigun used on the observation helicopters.

Tables 2 and 3 show the armament subsystems used on the Huey Cobra. This aircraft was the first helicopter specially designed as a gunship by and for the US Army and was deployed in South Vietnam in October 1967.
Other wing stores not listed in the tables for the Huey Cobra may be:

- Pod-mounted 40-mm grenade launcher.
- Pod-mounted .50 calibre machine-gun.
- Pod-mounted 20-mm gun.
- TOW missiles.
- Smoke tank.
- Minelayer.
- Anti-personnel bomblet.
- Riot control agent dispensers.

Some of these stores, for example, the bomblet and dispensers, can also be fitted to the utility helicopter.

The bomblet dispenser subsystem consists of four canisters mounted on both sides of the aircraft. Each canister contains 400 small anti-personnel mines or bomblets which are capable of producing incapacitating wounds.

One type of riot control agent dispenser consists of a canister fitted to each side of the aircraft. As a planning figure, one aircraft load can cover an area 100 yards by 100 yards. While the purists may argue that this subsystem hardly makes the aircraft a gunship, nevertheless there are indications that non-lethal chemicals, used early enough in the proper areas, may save many lives, on both sides.

**Present Organizations Using Gunships**

In the US Army, gunships are found in aerial weapons companies (18 armed helicopters) of the non-divisional airmobile battalions, the air cavalry squadrons (35 armed helicopters) and in the infantry and airborne divisional aviation battalions (6 armed helicopters).

The US Marine Corps have armed helicopters (Hueys and the twin engined AH-1J—the Sea Cobra) organized as squadrons, whereas the US Navy raises units for special tasks, for example, in the Mekong Delta. The British and Canadian Armed Forces have no gunships except that the British Army ‘Scout’ may be equipped with the SS-11. The German Army have ordered Huey Cobras, mainly for an anti-tank role. A little surprisingly, apparently the Israeli Defence Forces have not yet used gunships. The French Army, one of the pioneers in gunships, still arm their helicopters. At the time of writing, the RAAF
have one gunship section in No. 9 Squadron in South Vietnam. This section has 3 UH-1H helicopters—a heavy fire team in effect—fitted with the M-21 subsystem, that is, two pods each of seven 2.75-inch rockets and two miniguns. In addition there are crew served, pintle mounted M-60 machine-guns.

The M-21 armament subsystem. Photograph shows the M-134 7.62-mm minigun and the XM-157 2.75-inch folding fin aerial rocket pod. The miniguns are flexible, the rocket pods are fixed.

The Gunship at Night

Despite all the lessons and experience that range from the Old Testament times to the pleadings of Liddell Hart, western armies tend to shy away from night operations. Gunships, however, are being used successfully at night. An instance of this is a fire-fly mission. Another example where control and direction of fire is more critical is during night extractions.

Weather and visibility are the more important factors during support operations at night and pilots must have a high standard of instrument flying because of the dangers of disorientation; the loss of the natural horizon due to glare, flashes and reflections, and perhaps because of inadvertent entry into low cloud.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armament Subsystem</th>
<th>XM-27E1</th>
<th>M-2</th>
<th>XM-3</th>
<th>M-5</th>
<th>M-6</th>
<th>M-16</th>
<th>M-21</th>
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<tr>
<td>Used on Aircraft</td>
<td>OH-6A</td>
<td>OH-13</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
<td>UH-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Cayuse)</td>
<td>(Iroquois)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Automatic gun (mini-gun) of six barrels mounted on left side of aircraft</td>
<td>Twin M-60 machine-guns mounted on right side of aircraft</td>
<td>24 rocket tubes each side of aircraft</td>
<td>One grenade launcher mounted on chin of aircraft</td>
<td>Two M-60 mounted on each side of aircraft</td>
<td>M-6 system with addition of two fixed 7-round rocket pods</td>
<td>Two miniguns and two fixed 7-round rocket pods</td>
<td>SS-11 Wire guided missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>2,000 rounds</td>
<td>1,300 rounds</td>
<td>48 rockets</td>
<td>150 rounds</td>
<td>6,700 rounds</td>
<td>6,700 rounds</td>
<td>14 rockets</td>
<td>6 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type(s)</td>
<td>7.62-mm</td>
<td>7.62-mm</td>
<td>2.75-inch</td>
<td>40-mm grenades</td>
<td>7.62-mm</td>
<td>7.62-mm</td>
<td>2.75-inch</td>
<td>SS-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burst Radius (metres)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Ranges (metres)</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>9,300</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Ranges (metres)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>9,300</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Ranges (metres)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible Limits Vertical</td>
<td>+10°, -24°</td>
<td>+9°</td>
<td>Fixed</td>
<td>+15°, -35°</td>
<td>+15°, -60°</td>
<td>+15°, -60°</td>
<td>+10°, -90°</td>
<td>Wire guided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weights (lb)</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>1,439</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loaded</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unloaded</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1,439</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Fire (Complete subsystem)</td>
<td>2,000-4,000 rounds/min</td>
<td>1,000 rounds/min</td>
<td>6 rounds/sec or selective</td>
<td>220 rounds/min</td>
<td>2,200 rounds/min</td>
<td>2,200 rounds/sec or selective</td>
<td>As for M-6</td>
<td>As for M-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sighting</td>
<td>Power reflex sight</td>
<td>Fixed sight</td>
<td>Overhead reflex sight</td>
<td>Overhead reflex sight. Turret slaved to sight</td>
<td>Guns slaved to flexible sight</td>
<td>As for M-6</td>
<td>As for M-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Used in scout operations</td>
<td>550 rpm/min</td>
<td>Defensive armament</td>
<td>Used by aerial rocket artillery units</td>
<td>Can be a very accurate weapon</td>
<td>* Machine-guns only</td>
<td>* Miniguns only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* SS-11 Wire guided missiles
New equipments and techniques, including TV, have been employed in South Vietnam to track and fight from gunships at night.

In summary, given the communications, reasonable weather and visibility, and perhaps navigation aids (for example, the FM radio homing device) gunships can be profitably and effectively used at night.

**Firepower Control**

Should a FAC be used to control the fire of gunships? Squadron Leader Dirou thinks there should be a FAC when close support is being given. Ideally there may be a case for a FAC or perhaps, better still, for an airborne air contact officer. However, there will be times when these controllers will not be available and when this happens there is no reason why, if directions are needed, they could not be given by the Command and Control aircraft or by a scout aircraft or by the commander on the ground. The important thing is that the flexibility and quick response of the gunship is not tied to or hampered by an agency that is not equally responsive.

**The Future**

The Army needs gunships. Squadron Leader Dirou favours the utility helicopter with guns rather than the specialized (and at about twice the cost) AH-1G, the Huey Cobra. He says that the Iroquois can be converted from a gunship to a utility helicopter in about sixty minutes. This is so, but the reverse does not hold true. It takes hours to fit the guns and rockets again because of bore-sighting and harmonization requirements and the testing. However, there is another important point which the author fails to mention that favours the utility helicopter. It is that four pairs of eyes in the utility helicopter—two of them looking to the flank—see more than the two pairs which look ahead, say in the Huey Cobra. And it is this ability to see more which in the long run may make the slower helicopter less vulnerable and more effective.

In a small Army such as ours, where a piece of equipment has more than one prime function, the gunship can best be used in an air cavalry role. For example, an Air Cavalry Squadron of the divisional cavalry regiment would have a reconnaissance (or scout) troop of light, defensively armed helicopters; an assault troop of utility helicopters capable of immediately deploying a platoon; and a support troop of
### TABLE 2  **AH-1G (Huey Cobra) XM-28 Flexible Turret Armament Subsystems**

(Turret flexible limits are: $+20^\circ$, $-50^\circ$, $110^\circ$ left or right)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>MODE 1</th>
<th>MODE 2</th>
<th>MODE 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>One 7.62 minigun (XM-134)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Two 7.62 miniguns (XM-134)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Two 40-mm grenade launchers (XM-129)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>One 40-mm grenade launcher (XM-129)</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,000 rounds 7.62-mm</strong></td>
<td><strong>600 rounds 40-mm</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,000 rounds 7.62-mm</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>400</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>300 rounds 40-mm</strong></td>
<td><strong>40-mm—400</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,200</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,500</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rates of Fire (rounds/min)</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.62 mm—4,000 40-mm—400</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,200</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effective Range (metres)</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.62-mm—1,200 40-mm—1,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burst Radius (metres)</strong></td>
<td><strong>40-mm—10</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weight loaded (lb)</strong></td>
<td><strong>876</strong></td>
<td><strong>896</strong></td>
<td><strong>870</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weight unloaded (lb)</strong></td>
<td><strong>401</strong></td>
<td><strong>378</strong></td>
<td><strong>418</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3  **AH-1G (Huey Cobra) Wing Stores**

AH-1G has four 14-inch bomb shackles (two on each wing) for carrying these external armament stores.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
<td><strong>7 tube, 2.75-inch</strong></td>
<td><strong>19 tube 2.75 inch</strong></td>
<td>podded XM-134 (minigun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity</strong></td>
<td><strong>28 rockets</strong></td>
<td><strong>76 rockets</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,500 rounds per pod</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rates of Fire (rounds/min)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ripple of 6 rockets/pod/sec or selective</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ripple of 6 rockets/pod/sec or selective</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,000 or 4,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effective Range (metres)</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,500</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,200</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burst Radius (metres)</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weight loaded (lb) (one pod)</strong></td>
<td><strong>264</strong></td>
<td><strong>525</strong></td>
<td><strong>320</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weight unloaded (lb) (one pod)</strong></td>
<td><strong>119</strong></td>
<td><strong>130</strong></td>
<td><strong>240</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
gunships. This organization of course only follows precepts that are as old as warfare itself—finding or finding out about the enemy (the scouts), firepower (the gunships) and movement (the troop carrying utility helicopters).

The AH-1G, the Huey Cobra gunship. Wing stores are the XM-159 19 tube 2.75-inch folding fin aerial rocket pod and the XM-18E armament subsystem which is basically built around the M-134 7.62-mm minigun. In the XM-28 flexible turret can be seen another M-134 minigun and part of the barrel of the XM-129 40-mm grenade launcher. The turret is electrically controlled and hydraulically and electrically driven.

Finally, let us once and for all lay this ghost of the days of shibboleths that say such things as, ‘. . . in a less permissive air environment . . . use of gunships may be precluded completely.’ To begin with, the enemy cannot be everywhere, always.¹ And then, even assum-

¹ World War II experience in using Air OP aircraft where the enemy held local air superiority showed that the slow-moving, low-flying aircraft could, on an average, carry out a 20-minute daylight sortie before being attacked by hostile aircraft. Recent exercises in NW Europe where conditions were somewhat weighted in favour of the ‘enemy’ showed that the 20 minutes or better rule still holds good.
ing that the pilot of the high performance enemy aircraft knew exactly into which sector he had to descend, possibly through cloud, and that he had sufficient fuel to loiter around looking for dull-painted helicopters above the tree-tops, I still think most of us would prefer to be airborne than in a truck or manning a static 105-mm howitzer. And if the enemy has an abundance of cheap, homing missiles which he, from the ground, could aim in the general direction of your turbine noise, this is no ultimate in the world of weaponry. Already there are counters to this in the way of heat shields and other devices.

It's safer to be in the air. □

RABAUL, SEPTEMBER 1945

It was then discovered that the strength of the Japanese forces round Rabaul was far greater than had been estimated: the Australian estimate in August was 50,000 army and 5,000 navy men. There were, in fact, 57,368 army personnel including 4,156 civilian workers, and 31,923 naval personnel including 15,705 civilian workers—Rabaul had been a very big naval base. On New Ireland were 12,400 Japanese. In addition there were at Rabaul 28 European prisoners, 5,589 Indian prisoners, 1,397 Chinese, 688 Malayans and 607 Indonesians. The Japanese claimed that the Indians, Indonesians and about half the Chinese were not prisoners but had been released on parole and were working as a service corps of the Japanese Army.

The Japanese at Rabaul were found to be well fed and in fairly good health. Normally the number of men in hospital ranged from 5 to 8 per cent. There was much rice, and supplementary rations included fish, eggs, poultry, beef, pork and vegetables. The Japanese had gardens aggregating thousands of acres. The port and airfield were in ruins, the town overgrown with jungle, and from the air 31 sunken ships could be seen, but the Japanese had honeycombed the hills around Rabaul with a system of tunnels totalling more than 150 miles in length and in these they lived and kept their vehicles, stores and even workshops. Some tunnels were concreted and had stairways, telephones, electric light and built-in furniture. Men's quarters were lined with tiers of bunks. Hundreds of tons of rice were in underground stores. The underground radio station was about 40 feet below the surface and 60 feet long.

—Gavin Long, The Final Campaigns (1963)
Japan’s Reluctant Return to Military Power

Major A. Weaver
Royal Australian Infantry

The true warrior picks his teeth on an empty stomach.
—Samurai Philosophy.

Background

JAPAN’S defeat, which ended World War II, was complete. Even before Hiroshima and Nagasaki were obliterated by atom bombs, the cities of the Japanese home islands were destroyed by countless air raids. The industrial empire of Japan lay in ruins. Her naval and merchant ships had been sunk. Her foreign trade was non-existent; her seven-million-strong army had returned from the battlefields of Asia and the Pacific despondent and morally crushed. Her once mighty air force was smashed. Twenty-five years later, and after a thorough programme of demilitarization, Japan has again emerged as a significant power. The technical skill, sheer dedication and diligence of her people, and their complete participation in the fulfilment of national aims, have, in no small measure, contributed to this phenomenon. Significantly, all this was achieved under a democratic system of government. The remarkable buoyancy and vitality of Japan today has impressed the world. Her sphere of influence is being widened in a most spectacular way whilst her prosperity and economic power continue to grow at an unprecedented rate.

Major Weaver enlisted in the AIF early in 1942. He served with the 29/46 Infantry Battalion in SWPA and later with 67 Infantry Battalion in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. A Japanese linguist, he also served in various Intelligence postings in Japan. During the Korean conflict he was a platoon commander with 3 RAR. From 1954-57 he was again posted to Japan, with HQ British Commonwealth Force, Korea. In 1962 he was appointed GSO2 to HQ, Northern Territory Command, Darwin and in a recent posting served as 2IC of the Australian Civil Affairs Unit in Vietnam. At present he is the commander of the Battalion of Apprentices at Balcombe and supervisor of Regimental Training at the Apprentices School.
Some Vital Considerations

Japan's continued prosperity depends to a great extent on the maintenance of her trade relations with other nations. The escalating tempo of this trade, if in anyway curtailed, will inevitably upset her economy. Consequently any instability which adversely affects her trading partners will have a direct impact on her own economic balance.

Japan is thus faced with the problem of having to protect her increasing wealth. Although not threatened by any apparent hostile designs on her homeland, her trade could be endangered as a result of unrest, confrontation and limited conflict in places such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Indo-China, Malaysia, South Korea, Burma, India, Pakistan and the Middle East.

Japan is vitally concerned that the maintenance of peace and security in such regions is continued, and that the security of the high seas and accessibility of safe ports for her vast merchant fleets are guaranteed. A case in point is the important fact that Japan imports, daily, over 400,000 tons of petroleum, iron ore and coking coal via the often contentious Straits of Malacca.

Constitutional Factors

Against this background the Japanese have been forced, reluctantly, to take positive steps to prepare themselves militarily within the framework of their national constitution, the restrictive article of which states:

Renunciation of War

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Despite this war-renouncing clause Japan, as early as 1950, spurred by the United Nations requirement for the execution of the Korean War, and encouraged by the occupying powers, embarked upon a programme of rearmament and military training. This was necessary to meet the fundamental needs for defence of her homeland. Initially this requirement was met by the formation of a National Police Force of 750,000 men and an 18,000-strong coastal navy—both of which became the embryo of the expanding ‘self-defence forces’ of Japan.
Since then considerable developments have taken place, highlighted by the Supreme Court ruling in 1961 which interpreted the non-war clause to imply that it was not to limit Japan's inherent right for self-defence in face of aggression. Thus expenditure on defence is not in any way limited by the constitution.

**The Japanese Defence Structure**

The Japanese defence structure is designed to fulfil the requirements of self-defence strictly within the framework of her constitution. The euphemism 'Self-Defence Forces' (*Jieitai*) has been selected advisedly to designate her military services.

1970 saw the postwar defence budget establishing a record increase over the previous year. However, although Japan enjoys the distinction of being the world's third wealthiest nation, she occupies only tenth position as a military power in the world. Over the past decade she allocated about one per cent of her gross national product to defence. Most significantly, as the fastest growing economic power in the world, she will only have to maintain this level of expenditure to attain fourth place as a military power well before the end of the seventies. It is of note that Japan's economy grows by 15 per cent each year.

**The Japanese Self-Defence Forces**

The Japanese Self-Defence Forces, presently numbering 300,000 men, are grouped under a unified command and comprise the Ministry of Self-Defence, Ground Self-Defence Force, Maritime Self-Defence Force, Air Self-Defence Force.

All three services have a high proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers to provide the nucleus for a much larger force. Each service has its own training establishments, staff schools and hospitals.

**The Ground Self-Defence Force (Army)**

Already a main factor in the overall Asian military picture, the Ground Self-Defence Force consists of 180,000 men organized into five highly mobile armies; of twelve infantry divisions, one mechanized division, one airborne brigade, artillery, engineer and signals brigades. In addition the army has a voluntary reserve force of 33,000 men.
The Japanese infantry division's establishment is approximately 9,000 men, with four infantry regiments, an artillery unit, a tank battalion and an engineering battalion.

Four divisions, including the only mechanized division, one artillery brigade, one Hawk battalion, a tank group and an engineering group, are undergoing constant training in the northern main island of Hokkaido. They often operate under near arctic conditions, ostensibly with a weather-eye on likely Soviet aggressive intentions.

The inventory of the force includes 1,800 tanks—mostly equipped with US 75-mm guns; 4,560 artillery pieces; 5,700 armoured personnel carriers; 100 missile launchers (surface-to-surface and surface-to-air); two Hawk anti-aircraft missile battalions.

The old tanks will gradually be replaced by the new Mitsubishi amphibious tank which has a 105-mm gun with anti-vibration device and a computerized trajectory calculator. The height of the tank is adjustable and the tank can be fitted with a snorkel. An airtight compartment is installed for protection of the crew against NBC attack.

The training of the officers and men, and the equipment they use, are superior to those of Japan's neighbours. The army is well-paid, highly disciplined, well-trained and enjoys a high morale. Unlike the fanaticism of the men of the old Imperial Forces who marched through Asia, conscripted and poorly paid, the modern soldier is a volunteer who may resign at any time. He enjoys the most modern conditions any army can offer. The height and physical strength of the soldiers are greatly increased as a result of improved nutritional standards enjoyed by the Japanese people in recent years. Only ten per cent of applicants for commissioned rank are accepted for training, in keeping with the policy of attaining the highest professionalism possible. On the lower levels, the forces must compete strongly with industry for their recruits; a formidable problem in the highly competitive society of modern Japan.

Although strong emphasis is placed on technical skills, all ranks are given exhaustive and strictest training in unarmed combat. Kendo, Judo, Karate and physical fitness programmes are of primary consideration at all times.

The Maritime Self-Defence Force (Navy)

The Maritime Self-Defence Force, manned by 40,000 officers and men, consists of 240 vessels with an overall tonnage of 186,700 tons. Contrary to the temporary reliance on United States equipment by the
Japanese Army and Air Force, the Japanese Navy can boast that it is almost exclusively equipped with ships and submarines designed and built in Japan.

The Self-Defence Fleet is broadly divided into a Fleet Escort Force, a Fleet Air Force, Minesweeper and Icebreaker flotillas. The 3,050-ton missile destroyer *Amatsukaze* is the fleet’s largest vessel; it is armed with Tartar guided missile systems and ranks as a top level destroyer on world standards. The fleet air force is primarily equipped with P2V-7 (Neptune) fighters and HSS-2 helicopters. The prime mission of these aircraft is anti-submarine warfare.

![Image](image_url)

Lientenant General R. Bierwirth, C-in-C BCFK, inspecting a guard of honour provided by the first post-war Maritime Defence Force sailors at Kure in 1956. He is accompanied by his ADC, the author.

Additionally the force comprises: 25 destroyers, 13 submarines, 18 frigates, 2 minelayers, 34 coastal minesweepers, 20 patrol vessels, 6 minesweeping boats, 10 motor torpedo-boats, 27 motor launches, 4 landing ships, 6 landing craft, 3 depot ships, 2 oil tankers, 3 tugs and 150 auxiliaries. Eight destroyer escorts and a number of training ships and minesweepers are currently under construction.

The strong air arm of the navy includes 58 2SF and 60 P2V anti-submarine patrol bombers, 65 trainers, 43 helicopters and 11 other aircraft.
The ‘Maritime Safety Agency’ (Coast Guard) comprises 12,000 men, it controls 8 large patrol vessels, 22 medium patrol vessels, 57 small patrol vessels, 197 patrol craft, 26 survey ships and 25 navigational supply vessels.

The destroyers are mainly 3,300-ton craft, equipped with the latest anti-submarine weapons such as the Asroc and Dash. Highly trained naval landing parties are available to the force as a nucleus for a marine force. The navy is primarily designed to meet the demands for intimate self-defence of the homeland and lacks aircraft-carriers, cruisers and a substantial marine corps necessary to operate against other countries. Japan’s industry, however, is most certainly capable of constructing such vessels at short notice. To illustrate this observation, it is interesting to note that one of Japan’s super-tankers weighs twice as much as her entire navy.

The protection of Japan’s extended sea-lanes is of vital importance to her because she relies heavily on import and export trading activities. Accordingly Japan is determined to increase her anti-submarine capabilities, a course of action possibly considered expedient, as at times the Soviet Union deploys up to one hundred submarines in the region of Japan. Furthermore, Mainland China’s powerful submarine fleet poses a considerable threat.

As a matter of naval policy, a state of constant surveillance and vigilance is being perfected by submarine and surface craft, equipped with sophisticated sonar devices and anti-submarine control systems developed by Japan's highly capable electronic industry.

The Air Self-Defence Force (Air Force)

The Air Self-Defence Force, consisting of 41,000 men, and about 1,000 aircraft, relies mainly on the United States for aircraft design, but its aircraft are assembled or built under licence in Japan. The mainstays of the Japanese Air Force are 200 F104J Starfighters, organized into squadrons each comprising 24 aircraft. The force consists, in addition, of 300 F86 Sabres with modified armament. It has a number of training aircraft, helicopters, transport-reconnaissance and search aircraft, including the RF-86F reconnaissance fighter and C-46 transport aircraft. Some of these aircraft are equipped with special electronic systems for ECN duties. By 1975 Japan intends to raise her arsenal to 35 F4G Phantom fighters, easily converted to effective bombers. Thus,
for the first time since the end of World War II, Japan has aircraft with offensive, as well as defensive capabilities. The Phantoms will become the nation’s front line defensive weapon and, in time, will be manufactured by the mighty Japanese combine Mitsubishi.

Four NAMC YS-11 turbo-prop transports and thirty S62 and H19 helicopters are occupied on search, rescue and general duties, with MV-2E twin turbo-prop beginning to replace them.

In the not too distant future the Japanese may well consider developing their own fighting aircraft. The current emphasis on true autonomy dictates such a course, which is well within the scope of the highly efficient Japanese industry. The competent Japanese electronics industry is busily developing air defence installations and surveillance satellites and undoubtedly Japan will eventually develop her own missiles. Several Nike-Ajax and Hawk surface-to-air missile battalions are in service.

Training units use piston-engined T-34 Mentor basic trainers, Fuji T-1 jet intermediate trainers and T-33 jet advanced trainers.

**Nuclear Consideration**

Japan’s nuclear capability, although by no means as developed as that of China, has considerable potential. There are eleven nuclear reactors in the country, which are expected to generate 6,000 megavolts of power. This will give Japan adequate capabilities of producing great quantities of bomb-usable plutonium.

The nuclear deterrent poses an enigma which forces powerful nations to withhold their strength in the face of massive retaliation which, at its best, would end in a pyrrhic victory. Japanese defence philosophy is certainly coloured with such considerations.

The Japanese government is most reluctant to embark upon an extensive nuclear weapons programme as she fears that such action would result in a nuclear arms race between China and herself. On the other hand, Japan is quietly preparing the way for rapid expansion in the nuclear field should the situation demand such action.

**Envisaged Role of Self-Defence Forces**

The Japanese government insists that her forces will only be employed for defence, and in the more specific sense, for self-defence.
But in practical terms the training of the individual serviceman and of the combat teams to which he belongs is both defensive and offensive. There is no other alternative.

The Japanese are acutely aware of the fact that instability in the world, particularly in Asia, is caused by economic inequality. Japan is therefore determined to play a larger role in the assistance of underdeveloped nations to offset such anomalies. Reluctantly however, Japan may have to do so from a position of military power, particularly in the light of eventual United States and British military withdrawals from the region.

Should the stability of any of Japan’s trading partners be threatened by revolutionary action or foreign intervention, she may be forced to provide some form of military presence abroad. Alternatively she may have to accept the most unsavoury situation of becoming a highly geared workshop without an acceptable consumer demand, and without adequate raw materials. Such a situation would set off a chain reaction of economic chaos not only in Japan, but also in countries intimately involved in trade practices with her.

In view of these considerations the eventual role of the Self-Defence Forces, presently forbidden by Japanese Constitution to operate on foreign soil, will most certainly be determined by development on the international scene. Consequent legislative adjustments to the no-war clause of the National Constitution will further decide this issue.

In the face of likely threats against Japan’s interests at home and abroad, such constitutional amendments could well involve the Japanese Navy in extensive escort duties for merchant convoys and on protective tasks over home and foreign trading ports. The highly trained naval landing parties may be deployed, whenever necessary to afford ground protection and security, on invitation by friendly trading nations experiencing armed threats against their trading installations. The Japanese Air Force may establish bases protected by Japanese soldiers (in agreement with friendly powers) as a further stabilizing factor in the security of certain regions.

It is most unlikely that Japan would ever again embark upon military adventures against Asia. Her abortive experiences in China, confirmed by the American dilemma in Vietnam, will most certainly influence her against such a course. Consequently it is unlikely that her army will be increased beyond fifty divisions under present day requirements.
The rebirth of the Japanese Imperial Marine Corps is a strong possibility. The nucleus of such corps is at present provided by the naval landing parties of the Maritime Self-Defence Force. The role of the marines aptly caters for the type of operations Japanese forces may be faced with, under circumstances already mentioned.

**Japanese Public Opinion**

The majority of Japanese are still opposed to militarism of any kind. They remember their disastrous defeat in World War II and the swashbuckling tyrannical power of her military clique (*Gunbatsu*). It will, however, be a relatively simple matter to convince the masses that the necessity exists for some rearmament, particularly in the field of passive defence. Being the only victims of nuclear attacks the Japanese are aware of the requirements for such preparation.

To further support any argument for rearmament the government may well exploit the latent national paranoia which has manifested itself in the older and middle-aged groups of Japan. Those people vividly recall the punishment they sustained from hostile aircraft in World War II, when their defences were inadequate to repel such attacks.

Certainly there are strong leftist socialist factions militant in Japan. Irrespective of their political alignment, however, the homogeneous Japanese people still retain their traditional patriotism and awareness of the importance of national unity and solidarity. They particularly rally in the face of political, economical and military crises.

There is ample evidence that a new-style nationalism is making itself felt in Japan; mostly emanating from a just pride in post-war achievements. The proud, resourceful and ambitious Japanese are increasingly aware of the fact they will progressively play a greater part in the shaping of world history. But the likelihood of such national consciousness bringing about a return of the old style militarism is most remote, in the light of the strong leftist influence which permeates the Japanese political scene. Nor would the rightist factions countenance the progress-inhibiting revival of *Bushido* (The Way of the Warriors).

It is however certain that a nation of the size and importance of Japan will hardly carry on without military forces. The realistic Japanese are aware that the execution of foreign policy and political intervention abroad carry no credibility unless pursued from a position of power.
Power Alignments

Japan will not consider joining an Asian Regional Security plan: her existing treaty with the United States does not make it feasible to enter into a similar treaty with other countries, nor does the constitution no-war clause make such alliance workable. The United States Security Treaty with Japan is currently under revision. It is widely predicted that the United States will require Japan to spend a higher percentage of her gross national product on defence. Japan, on the other hand, will bargain for early return of strategically important Okinawa, being one of the last thorns of post-war humiliation in the thigh of resurgent Japan.

In addition the Japanese government realizes that her self-defence forces are not strong enough to deal with the grim international situation. Voices are thus making themselves heard in Japan advocating modifications to the treaty in favour of greater Japanese participation, so that her likely military involvements will be uninhibited by foreign consideration.

Significant also is the growing determination for self-reliance by the Japanese. Although still relying on American strategical or tactical equipment they are determined to achieve complete autonomy by replacing obsolete weapons with those developed and manufactured in Japan.

Japan’s relationship with her immediate neighbours is cordial. Although she has not recognized the Communist government of China, and has not yet concluded a peace treaty with Russia, trade with those countries has been resumed.

The Chinese, however, frequently refer to Japan’s ‘militarized economy’ and ‘revival of militarism concurrent with economic encroachment’. Smaller nations, such as the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore are also somewhat apprehensive of a Japanese military come-back. The Soviet Union has so far shown little sign of giving way over the Kuriles, which have been theirs since the surrender of Japan.

Traditionally, the position of Taiwan is a singularly vital one in Japanese security considerations. Japan’s trade with the prosperous Chinese nationalist republic flourishes. Against this, Communist China has recently warned Japan that all trade practices between their two countries would be cancelled unless Japan ceases trading with Taiwan. Also the recent withdrawal of the United States Seventh Fleet, which
served as an effective wedge set between the two Chinas for the last twenty years, is a matter seriously affecting Japanese strategic concepts. Faced with the utter unlikelihood of the realization of Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek’s ambition to overthrow the Communist regime in China, Japan is most anxious to maintain at least a status quo of power in the region. To achieve this Japan may well have to be prepared, again reluctantly, to do so by a ‘show of might’.

**Japan’s Future in Power Politics**

The Japanese are obsessed with their aim to convince the world that they are at least comparable industrially, economically and technically to the West. Indeed, some eminent economists believe that well before the end of the century Japan will surpass the United States economically and in her living standards. It is even predicted that Japan could well assume first place in the field of car manufacture.

To illustrate Japan’s enormous potential it is worthy of note that her military power today is only a fraction of her pre-war strength. Her forces then boasted a might consisting of eight million men in uniform, 1,400 aircraft, 1½ million tons of warships, 10,000 artillery pieces and 10,000 tanks. Modern Japan, with her increased technological and industrial capabilities, could greatly improve on such achievements if the need arose.

Japan’s low defence spending, when compared with the enormous defence budgets of her neighbours, may, together with her constitutional restriction, render her a militarily impotent economic super-power without super-weapons. Nevertheless, even without increasing her defence spending— with her ever-increasing gross national product and her industrial potential—Japan has the capability of becoming the most significant military force in Asia. Should Japan decide to increase her defence spending by merely one per cent of her gross national product, a truly significant growth of her forces would ensue.

The contentious political developments in the regions surrounding Japan’s economic sphere will inevitably force her into amending the war-renouncing clause of her democratic constitution. Japan will, reluctantly, be induced to re-enter the military scene to meet any threats against the security of her trade practices. In the light of the requirements for survival as a nation dependent on continued and ever-increasing overseas trade in a turbulent world, Japan cannot shirk her involvement in military preparedness and, perhaps, likely eventual military involvement.
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MONTHLY AWARD

The Board of Review has awarded the $10 prize for the best original article published in the June 1970 issue of the journal to Captain J. Stevenson for his contribution ‘Oriental Insurgent Strategy.’
Letters to the Editor

Tawitawi 1945

Sir,—On page 21 of the April 1970 Army Journal there is a quote from The Final Campaigns by Gavin Long. It is headed ‘Tarakan 1945’ and includes the following: ‘... the Tawitawi airfield, which, with Jolo Island, had been taken by American forces without opposition early in April.’ The statement is true but there is an underlying story which may be of interest.

In better days the safe anchorage bounded by the islands of Tawitawi to the north and Simunul to the south had been used by elements of the Japanese fleet but as their fortunes changed they gradually withdrew westwards within the Tawitawi group for evacuation by sea from Sanga Sanga and Bongao.

In late February 1945, my small detachment of two officers and ten men landed at dawn from two Catalina flying boats in a channel in the mangroves, to the east of the main island of Tawitawi, to be met by the Filipino guerillas operating in the area. The planes took off again immediately, leaving the party to disperse and meet again at the guerilla headquarters after separate passages through the mangrove maze.

We came from Section 22, GHQ SWPA, and the task of this mixed group of Australian and American soldiers was to carry out radio and radar interception in the general area of the Sibutu Passage and to observe enemy movement. The guerillas had established a very fine intelligence network amongst the inhabitants still under Japanese control, and it was found that there was a general movement westwards by the Japanese. They still controlled all to the west of Batu Batu and patrolled east to Batu. Even so, with guerilla assistance, all our equipment was moved in about two days to a site on Balimbing Hill, overlooking Batu Batu.

It was soon established that there was no radar in action within range and, although a skeleton watch was maintained, it became possible to co-operate more closely with the guerillas. Patrolling was carried out to Batu Batu, Sanga Sanga and to Papahag for close observation of the Japanese positions on Bongao, which were being turned into their last stronghold.
Taking with me the detailed information on the Japanese dispositions we had obtained I kept a rendezvous with a PT boat at Banaan Island on 24 March. I was taken to US Eighth Army HQ at Zamboanga [Mindanao], where I was briefed on the general situation and the suitability of the Sanga Sanga beaches for the landing due to take place on 2 April.

The return to Tawitawi was made with a full load of mortar and machine-gun ammunition for our use, and at slow speed in order to conserve fuel. There were four PT boats and the intention was to engage the enemy on the east of Bongao. At noon on the 25th the air cover arrived and our bombardment began. The action was brief and inglorious. Enemy fire holed each PT boat and set fire to one of them; only their speed and their ability to make smoke averted an even worse fate. The engagement was broken off; I was allowed to disembark, gratefully, and the PT boats limped back to Zamboanga.

On 27 March air raids began on Bongao and Sanga Sanga and we began mortaring the Japanese barge concentrations at Bongao Point from Papahag. On the 29th we managed to clear the enemy from the Sanga Sanga airstrip; however, a signal to this effect to Eighth Army was not immediately accepted by that headquarters, with the result that we had a somewhat trying time until the aircraft were told to concentrate on Bongao.

By the time of the American landing on Sanga Sanga, our positions had been consolidated and the only remaining enemy were on Bongao. The landing was quite impressive; with one cruiser, some destroyers and a variety of landing craft. However, it must have been somewhat of an anticlimax for the very determined assault troops to whom we served freshly-brewed Celebes coffee on arrival.

You will appreciate that I have no quarrel with the quoted statement. It is true—there was 'no opposition'—but there is no recognition of the part played by about two hundred Filipinos and six Australians. I thought it should be mentioned.

Army Headquarters

D. J. P. Tier, Col.

Melbourne.