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COVER: 'Going Up Again' by Hon. Lieut Will Dyson, France, 1918. At the Australian War Memorial.
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and do not necessarily represent General Staff opinion or policy.
Bushmen Scouts (former Viet Cong) are employed by the Australians in Vietnam because of their first-hand knowledge of the enemy and in aiding infantry to read signs and tracks in the jungle during operations. Here, one of them assists soldiers of the tracker platoon of 2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment/New Zealand (ANZAC) interpret footprints on a track.

(Army Public Relations)
THE five-man reconnaissance patrol had just had a contact, killing two Viet Cong. They were beating a hasty retreat from the scene. The middle of a VC base area is not a healthy place to be after you have announced your presence. One hundred breathless yards and several minutes later they paused to listen. Through the thick jungle they could hear a follow-up force coming after them.

The patrol commander judged the pursuers to be about fifty yards behind but some twenty yards to their left. To avoid stumbling into...
more VC and in the hope that this group would pass them by, he signalled the patrol to take cover.

The VC got closer. There were about twelve of them. They drew level, AK47s at the ready. Suddenly, one shouted, and they all turned right. They charged towards the patrol from about fifteen yards, firing as they came.

Hear what the last man in the patrol had to say during his debriefing:

'I could see three of them. One had on a white shirt, one a red shirt and the third a black shirt. They were firing bursts from the hip as they came towards me. I shot the one in the red shirt through the heart. I know this sir, because it was tracer and I saw it go in. I shot the white shirt one there too, as I saw blood on his shirt before he fell. By then, the one in the black shirt and some others were about six yards away from me and I'm afraid I must've panicked a bit sir, because I then changed to automatic.'

This brief incident happened in Phuoc Tuy Province, South Vietnam. The whole patrol (from 1SAS Sqn) was eventually extracted without a scratch, bringing with it some valuable information.

Many after-action reports contain examples of bigger battles, longer engagements or more conspicuous courage. Few would better illustrate the value of thorough training. Let us look at this five minute encounter in relation to what are probably the most important by-products of good training — confidence and physical hardness.

Confidence has many facets: self-confidence; confidence in leaders, comrades and subordinates; in weapons and marksmanship; in the team, be it patrol or battalion — confidence also that there is no over-confidence present, since no matter how well trained a soldier may be, he must always have a healthy respect for his enemy.

This confidence gives soldiers that sense of superiority over the enemy which is essential for victory. Some may simply call this morale, but beware — morale is often dependent upon other factors quite unrelated to training. For example, the most superbly trained soldier can suffer a low morale if he does not get his mail, but the best mail service, pay or leave conditions will not give a poorly trained soldier a single ounce of confidence or sense of superiority when he comes to face the enemy.
Referring to the principles of the maintenance of morale and of concentration, Napoleon said that the morale is to the physical as four is to one. This equation was upheld by the results of the patrol contact. This combat morale superiority through confidence can only be achieved by long, hard and thorough training. Confidence gained by easy success, lucky breaks, undeserved glowing tributes or fancy labels, is false confidence and crumbles at the first hard knock. True confidence instilled by training can survive a severe set-back should the luck fall to the enemy — and trained soldiers, like good card players, know which side is favoured by Lady Luck.

The outstanding example of thorough training in the engagement illustrated was the cool, deliberate fire discipline and marksmanship displayed by the last man — that is until he ‘panicked’ and changed to automatic. Such examples of cool confidence by both individuals and units have often turned the tide of a battle. Years of barrack-square drill practised by early British regiments produced the indomitable British square in defence and the thin red line moving steadily forward in attack. Then, as now, soldiers involved in such training drills no doubt failed at first to appreciate fully the value of such long and often boring exercises. A difficult drill movement or field manoeuvre when first executed properly after much practice gives soldiers their initial taste of military confidence. This confidence is gradually increased by repetition, variations and fresh skills to produce such men as were to be found with Wellington at Waterloo, or on this patrol in South Vietnam.

Napoleon referred to the physical in his equation. A physical factor was also evident in the patrol example, apart from the number of men involved. This factor was physical hardness, not to be confused with physical fitness. Physical hardness includes fitness and much more besides. It likewise can only be achieved by training, and is complementary to confidence.

What is physical hardness? Consider the patrol members. They had to operate alone for some days in an enemy area without resupply, carrying everything they might need for this period. They had to contend with an inhospitable terrain and a cruel climate. They had to stay alert for days with little food and little sleep. When they did get some sleep it would be on the jungle floor without benefit of poncho or ground sheet, which might hamper a hasty move. On top of all this, they had to stay healthy enough not to catch cold, get a cough or develop blood poisoning from a small scratch. That is physical hardness.
Few soldiers on active service have to ‘jump a nine-foot ditch landing on both feet’; rather should they have their minds and bodies, skins and stomachs, conditioned to accept the physical hardships imposed by war. It is not that there is too much emphasis on physical fitness tests — far from it; but not enough emphasis is given to developing the physical hardness that is necessary in combat. This can only be achieved by realistic training.

All too often realism in training is frustrated by administrative considerations or misplaced ideas about troop comfort. Realism is obtained when advanced training exercises are conducted under conditions which incorporate and even exceed in severity those likely in combat. Safety precautions are necessary but as far as possible should not be apparent to the troops being exercised. Officers conducting training must be relentless and exacting in its execution and the aim must be understood by all. The best time for troop comfort and safety is in the combat zone: the time for hardness and reality is before getting there. The tougher the training, the safer the soldier in battle.

These remarks on two important by-products of training have been drawn from one small incident in an unusual war. They hold true for any size of force in any type of war. They are not new: Oliver Cromwell proved their worth over three hundred years ago with his Model Army; Montgomery put confidence and hardness back into the shaky Eighth Army before the battle of El Alamein by an intensive and realistic training programme.

It is always rewarding to analyse and relate such incidents to training as a means of keeping clear our individual and collective aims. As soldiers, regardless of corps or rank, most of our professional life is spent in training for war.

The best investment we can make for ourselves, our comrades and our country is to see that the training we give is thorough, efficient and realistic, and that we get the maximum benefit from the training given us. The final result of training should produce in troops that sense of superiority born of true confidence and a physical hardness both of which are essential for success in battle. For this investment, battle is the pay-off.
ON 1 August 1871, after the withdrawal of the last British troops from Australia the previous year, and following the passing of a Military and Naval Forces Regulations Act by the New South Wales Government on May 10th, the Governor of New South Wales authorized the raising of permanent military forces in the colony. These forces were to consist of a battery of artillery and two infantry companies. The garrison companies were soon disbanded, but the N.S.W. Artillery remained in service and expanded with the addition of a second battery five years later. From this beginning the Royal Australian Artillery celebrates a hundred years of continuous service.

That battery, raised a century ago this month, can claim to be the oldest unit of the AMF and the several generations of Australian gunners who have served in its ranks, between them, have seen action in every war in which the Australian Commonwealth has been involved except the Korean conflict.

The formation of what was to become known in 1895 as ‘A’ Battery was not the first time local artillery had been raised. The first volunteer battery was formed in 1854 at the outbreak of the Crimean
War, and the 1860s, when all available British troops were involved in the protracted Maori Wars in New Zealand, saw the formation of many such volunteer units in all the colonies. No colony, however, had permanent forces before 1871.

Although Britain was at peace and had no pressing need to recall her troops from Australia, the last British garrison left in September 1870. It is generally acknowledged that the British Government had come to consider the colonies a burden, and that since they were to become independent nations, they should begin to provide their own defences, but accounts can also be found which suggest a scare in December 1870—that a filibustering expedition had set out from San Francisco supposedly to raid Sydney and which had caused the city's defences to be manned by civilians because there were no regular troops—was the reason for the raising of the permanent forces.\(^1\) Whatever the effect of the public scare, it seems certain that the move was the result of a deliberate policy of the British Government.

\(^1\) This second account can be encountered in many of the ubiquitous authorless 'short histories' which plague the student in this field.
The first years after the battery’s formation were spent in working on the fortifications of Port Jackson and that part of the coast stretching from La Perouse to Newcastle. Apart from manning these defences, the gunners’ tasks involved camps, either for the purpose of training or construction work, guards of honour such as for the arrival of the new governor, Lord Augustus Loftus, in July 1879, or even police work as in September, and again in October the same year, when the N.S.W. Artillery was used to aid the civil authorities in quelling disturbances among miners at Newcastle.

The battery saw active service for the first time in 1885, following the British reverse suffered in the Sudan when General Gordon and his garrison at Khartoum were massacred by rebel forces after a controversial siege. The acting premier of New South Wales, William Bede Dalley, offered the military assistance of the colony to the British Government, and on the 15th February received a message that the offer was accepted ‘with much satisfaction’. Other colonies followed the N.S.W. lead in offering, but were declined. Dalley had offered a battalion of infantry and two batteries of artillery, but only one of the latter was needed. The infantry would have to be raised and trained; the artillery, though already formed and trained, was anything but prepared for a campaign and the government had to advertise for horses\(^2\) to fulfil the promise to supply ‘permanent field artillery . . . properly horsed’.

In a display of patriotic fervour (which was not without its critics\(^3\)), the colony raised\(^4\) and landed the force in the Sudan, as offered, all in the short space of six weeks. The battery’s 16-pounder guns were too heavy for campaigning in the desert, and a battery of 9-pounder

\(^2\) See *Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 February 1885.

\(^3\) One of the main critics of the Sudan involvement was Sir Henry Parkes, although it has been suggested that this was mainly because he had not thought of the idea first. The *Bulletin* was also especially vocal in its opposition. In an editorial on 21 March 1885 it declared that the government was stripping the colony bare to send the contingent, thereby leaving N.S.W. open to invasion. This was followed on April 4th by an even more alarmist editorial after news was received that Russian squadrons had reportedly been sighted off the Cape of Good Hope and Singapore. The same issue carried a condemnatory poem called ‘The Song of the Seven Hundred’, which ended with the lines:

‘We are going, Billy Dalley,
And the people answering shout,
With no thought of taking tally
What the deuce it’s all about.’
Nordenfeldts was sent from England to meet the Australians on their arrival at Suakin, the principal port of the Sudan at that time.

Historians are re-examining such incidents as the Sudan campaign in an effort to better interpret Australia in the nineteenth century, and without doubt many accounts make much of this first colonial military escapade. In reality the troops saw very little action in the seven weeks they were in the Sudan, and the venture's only real importance rests in the fact that it was the first time Britain had allowed one of her colonies to participate in her wars, and the public enthusiasm which had marked the affair and the achievement of even raising such a force were remarkable.

4 The numbers who volunteered for the contingent were far in excess of those required. Among those who volunteered, but were too late, was William Throsby Bridges. Bridges was accepted into the Permanent Artillery on 20 May 1885 with a commission as lieutenant, and was to become one of Australia's most distinguished gunners. In addition to filling numerous artillery appointments, he went on to become Chief of Intelligence (1905), Australia's first CGS (1909), the founder and first commandant of the Royal Military College, Duntroon (1910), and commander of the First A.I.F. on Gallipoli, where he was fatally wounded, and died on 18 May 1915.

On return to Australia the infantry battalion was disbanded, while ‘A’ Battery became the only permanent battery of a Brigade Division of Field Artillery, two other militia batteries being only partially paid. The artillery settled down to peace-time activity again, such as depicted in the painting by Tom Roberts accompanying this brief account, and no major changes occurred until 1899, when, following royal approval, ‘A’ Battery became part of the New South Wales Regiment of the newly formed Royal Australian Artillery.

This change came about just in time for the Boer War, in which some 16,000 Australians were ultimately to serve. New South Wales offered artillery again, as well as other units, and again the offer was accepted, a battery being formed from a nucleus from ‘A’ Battery supplemented by personnel from the Garrison companies. This new battery became ‘A’ Battery, N.S.W. Artillery, and ‘A’ Battery, RAA, remained in existence while the other was overseas. In the two years of the South African campaign, ‘A’ Battery was the only artillery sent from Australia.

In its eighteen months of service in South Africa, the battery served as sections attached to various formations, often operating long distances from one another, and suffered three deaths—only one actually as a result of battle-wounds: of the other two, one died of fever, the second was kicked in the head by a horse. It was while the battery was still in South Africa that the Australian colonies joined in the Commonwealth, though the permanent forces of the various States were not formally made part of the Commonwealth military forces until September 1902, when the strength of the permanent artillery for the whole of Australia was set at two batteries—‘A’ Battery (with four guns) at Sydney, and ‘B’ Battery with two guns at both Melbourne and Brisbane.

At a special review held in Melbourne on 14 November 1904 to commemorate the birthday of King Edward VII, the Governor-General presented ‘A’ Battery, among other units, with an ‘honourable insignia’.

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7 Murray, p. 49, quotes the CO, Colonel Smith’s diary for 25 October 1900: ‘My battery now has its right section at Vryburg, its left at Prieska, and the centre here (Upington), thus covering a front of 360 miles.’
known as the King's Colour, in recognition of service in the Boer War. These banners were not actually colours and battle honours could not be carried on them. It was not until October 1953 that approval was given for the King's Colour of the Royal Australian Artillery to be accorded similar honours as the colours of infantry battalions.

In the period before 1914 the artillery underwent phases of expansion and contraction which often saw the standing force reduced to instructional cadres. On 1 December 1910, 'A' Battery (which at that time was known as 'A' Instructional Cadre) became No. 1 Battery Australian Field Artillery (Permanent), although it continued to fill much the same role as before.

Upon the outbreak of war in 1914, No. 1 Battery remained in Australia, although it was stripped of practically all its personnel to fill and train the ranks of the First and Second Australian Divisional Artillery. Consequently, even though the battery itself did not see active service, members of the battery most certainly did and played a vital role.

With the end of the war in 1918, the battery was reformed and resumed its instructional duties until 1922, when retrenchment saw its reduction to one section with two 18-pounder guns and two 4.5" howitzers. The battery took part in the guard of honour at the opening of the Federal Parliament in Canberra in 1927. In this year too, the battery reverted to 1 Field Battery, RAA, and its strength raised, only to be cut back to a cadre in July 1930.

The 1930s saw experiments with mechanization and, presumably as a result of the worsening European situation, the strength of the cadre was increased in 1939 and the name changed yet again to 'A' Field Battery. When war was finally declared in September the battery hoped to serve overseas as a unit. Instead, groups of the bat-

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9 Letter from the Colonial Secretary, Lord Elgin, to the Governor-General of Australia, Lord Northcote, 13 March 1908, UK Defence Registry file 1874/3/21.

10 Australian Army Registry file A107-1-67.

11 It is not proposed in this sketch to deal with the exploits of the artillery in either of the world wars, as this is better dealt with in numerous other works, in particular the Australian official histories.

12 It is interesting to note that in 1927 four Vickers light tanks arrived in Australia and a nucleus for a Tank Training Section (Permanent) was allotted as under and attached to 1st Field Battery, RAA, the bulk of the personnel for this nucleus being drawn from the RAA and RAE. See p. 18 of the Inspector-General’s Report on the AMF, Part One, 31 May 1928, in the Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1926-7-8, Vol. 69, p. 211.
CENTENARY OF ARTILLERY

13

tery's personnel were used to train newly-formed units and season the artillery units of the Second AIF.

The battery was employed as depot battery until July 1943, when it was reformed as 2 Mountain Battery, equipped with 75-mm howitzers, and sent to New Guinea in September. The battery was constantly on the move until the cessation of hostilities. A small cadre of 2 Mountain Battery formed part of a new unit, 6 Independent Field Battery, and was sent to Japan in early 1946 to serve as part of the forces of Occupation, where it appears the battery resumed its title of 'A' Field Battery.

Upon its arrival back in Australia in 1948 the battery became depot battery at the School of Artillery, and in the following year lost its independent status when it was incorporated into the 1st Field Regiment RAA. In 1954 it appeared the battery would lose its historic title by the decision to number batteries, but a compromise was reached which saw it become 100 (A) Field Battery.

In September 1957 the battery sailed for Malaya where it relieved 105 Battery on 19 October. While on service against the Communist terrorists during the time of the Emergency, the battery dropped the numerical designation and became once again 'A' Field Battery until it left Malaya in August 1959. The battery returned to Malaya (now Malaysia) during the confrontation with Indonesia, and from September 1965 to September 1966 saw service not only on the mainland, but in Borneo and Sabah. Upon return to Australia the battery became a sub-unit of 19 Composite Regiment RAA.

At present 'A' Battery is serving in South Vietnam, and it will be celebrating its centenary on active duty, a circumstance not unbefitting the battery which, under an interminable list of titles and designations, has a history longer than any other unit in the Australian Army.

13 The war diary of 2 Mountain Battery is held by the Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

CORRECTION

Biographical details to Major J. L. L'Eopagniol's article 'Not By Arms Alone' (No. 266 July) should be amended to read '...GSO3 Int with 28 Comwel Inf Bde (1966-68). He served in Vietnam as OC Det 1 Div Int Unit (1968-69)...'. In the footnote to 'Rachel, Who's Minding the Store' in the same issue, Lieutenant Colonel Butler commanded 6RAR/NZ (ANZAC) in South Vietnam in 1969-70.
ADMINISTRATION OF DISCIPLINE

...normal service function or wasted effort?

Major C. C. McGregor, MBE
Royal Australian Infantry

Without discipline all military bodies become mobs and worse than useless...

—Ref: AMR&O 304

Introduction

To meet the requirements of a disciplined Service, a system of military law has evolved to assist the army with autonomy of action in establishing and maintaining discipline. Consequently, military law embodies procedures and a code of discipline to embrace its membership as normal citizens whilst also catering for the special needs of a disciplined organization.

The aim of military discipline is that any soldier or body of soldiers will perform within capacity, efficiently and in an orderly manner, irrespective of the degree of stress or conditions imposed by the requirements of the Service.

The responsibility to establish and maintain discipline lies with the command structure of the army, i.e., the leadership and manage-

Major McGregor enlisted in the AIF in December 1941 and served with the 2/9th Inf Bn in the two New Guinea Campaigns (1942-44) and in Borneo in 1945. This was followed by BCOF service in Japan with 65 Aust Inf Bn and 36 FS Section. He re-enlisted for service with 3RAR in Korea during 1950-51 and was commissioned into the Regular Army in July 1951. Following a variety of regimental and staff appointments Major McGregor is now a DAAG with DPS(B) at AHQ Canberra.
ment capability at all levels. Military law provides a basis for manage-
ment and governs the administration of discipline.

The amount of effort expended on the administration of dis-
cipline runs at an inverse ratio to the standard of discipline obtaining
in the Service.

Aim

This paper attempts to:
- define the reasons for — and areas of — unnecessary effort in the
  administration of discipline; and
- suggest remedial measures.

Susceptibility to Acts of Indiscipline

If it is accepted that evolved military management procedures
and military law are founded on what is best to meet the requirements
of the Service, whilst fully considering the effects on its membership,
then the requirement now is to define susceptibility of the membership
to attract disciplinary action.

No doubt, theories and statistics of offence susceptibility in a civil
community have been advanced by criminologists and sociologists using
factors of law, environment, status, age and mentality. Susceptibility
within the Service to acts of indiscipline which equate to civil offences,
for example, violence, theft, fraud, would embrace the complete army
membership and cannot be measured to any formula distinct from that
applying to the civil community. It could be envisaged, however, that
enlistment screening procedures and closer, continuous and more co-
ordinated control existent within the army should create a lower
susceptibility rate than a civil community of equivalent size. The civil
type breach of discipline is not mentioned further in this paper but the
reasoning expressed in regard to indiscipline and remedy is applicable.

The greatest degree of susceptibility to acts of indiscipline of a
purely military nature lies with the new and consequently, in the main,
young soldier. This statement is based on the requirement to adjust
to and accept Service life and/or acquire motivation towards a Service
career. New soldiers fall within one of the following categories:
- A minority who want to be soldiers and who possess a suffi-
ciently mature attitude in this regard to pursue this motivation
without upset. This category is not susceptible to indiscipline
and, where such acts do occur, redemption to the Service is
probable.
• A minority who do not know what is required by or of them as regards a future and in whom maturity towards any sustained motivation is indeterminate. An inability of this group to readily adapt to any walk of life is probable. They are very susceptible to acts of indiscipline, with any degree of sustained redemption by the Service being difficult to achieve.

• A majority who are not sure where their sustained motivation will lie and at what stage in their life such a motivation will assert itself. They think a Service career may prove suitable, probably view a first engagement as a trial period and live a day to day existence within a Service environment until their decision on a Service career is firmed or rejected. Age is not normally a critical factor in the formulation of this decision and the Service must recognize the fact that it may crystallize at any time during an engagement and is most susceptible to influence by the Service. This group is susceptible to acts of indiscipline but is also susceptible to redemption. The ease and likelihood of sustained redemption is related to the frequency of disciplinary action.

The above observations relate to the new regular soldier. What about national servicemen? Some of these will undoubtedly have decided upon, and possibly have commenced, a defined career before induction. The majority will certainly commence military service without any initial motivation towards a Service career. However, for the purposes of administering military discipline, it is submitted that national servicemen can be viewed in the same general categories and, with the exception of the first category, in the same proportions as outlined in the preceding paragraph. A minimum Service aim towards national servicemen should be to gain effective service during the period of induction. A maximum aim should be to gain effective service for the period that they are capable of serving.

If this describes the human material generally available to the Service, then leadership and management should be so related in any endeavour to reduce Service effort in the administration of discipline.

Soldiering by Habit

Soldiers are creatures of habit. Service procedures and routine are, in the main, repetitive and lend themselves to conformity and performance by habit. On the principle that first impressions are
important and initial habits are quickly engendered, leadership and management is a critical factor in the soldier's introduction to Service life.

The broad role of basic and corps training establishments is to produce self-reliant/self-sufficient soldiers ready for progressive training and absorption into units. This role must not be limited solely to individual training for proficiency in the craft, weapons or tools of a soldier's trade. It must aim at producing a finished product where the soldier is familiar with and has accepted — or is well on the way to accepting — Service routine; i.e., he is a good soldier by habit, not a soldier with bad Service habits.

It is a far simpler process to maintain habit than to change it. Therefore the further the soldier can be advanced through his Service career without transgression, or with minimal transgression, the less susceptible he becomes to acts of indiscipline.

**Soldiers' Problems**

A soldier is subject to problems in three areas:

a. his private life;

b. his service life;

c. the adjustment of one to the other.

The Service responsibility is to solve problem b., assist with problem c., and endeavour to assist and guide with problem a. if so requested or required.

These problem areas are not restricted to any type of soldier but are common to all ranks, irrespective of length and type of service experience. Therefore, there should be no difficulty in the understanding of the problem. There is certainly no deficiency in the quantity and type of existing and related instructions.

Whilst it is axiomatic that the Service should assist soldiers to solve their problems, care must be exercised against the individual developing the idea that he is not solely responsible for the final solution. In the long term, soldiers with this habit would be virtually useless.

**Communication Between Leaders and their Subordinates**

Communication is a means of engendering and maintaining good Service habits. It is also the key to defining and handling problems before good Service habits are prejudiced. To be effective, such communication should flow easily both up and down with the allied knowledge that it is clear, understood and will produce results.
Communication in this context, and in order of effectiveness, is achieved by:

a. *Example.* All members are subject to this 24 hours a day and will look for it, and act on it, from another considered more experienced and knowledgeable in a particular field.

b. *Personal Approach.* Most persons have an inherent desire to ask for, and to give personal advice. The same desire applies to direction and orders.

c. *Written Instructions and Applications.* There is always a doubt that communication has been achieved by written instructions. The correct and timely submission of written applications, being submitted as a result of written instructions, is more a possibility than a probability.

**Leadership and Management Resources**

Leadership includes management capacity and must therefore direct and supervise management agencies.

The major source of leadership potential available to the Service is its own membership. The gaining of knowledge and experience in the application of such knowledge takes time. Therefore the Service will always include a proportion of inexperienced leaders and the number in this category will always increase sharply when the Service has an operational role. The army's commitment in Vietnam is a typical example and the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam must have produced scores of very junior but combat efficient warrant officers. However, combat leadership is a somewhat spasmodic practice.

It is mainly coincidental if a term of active service occurs during a regular soldier's period of engagement. However, he is continuously subject to the material effects of leadership and management in all aspects of personal administration during his engagement, and there is no patriotic fervour against which the blow of mis-management in this regard may be offset. Thus it falls more heavily on the experienced and senior member to provide the example, direction and guidance to bring junior leaders to maturity in leadership and management in the personal administration field and thus instil overall confidence in the system.

**Leadership with Communication**

Normally, a member receives Service management at the unit or sub-unit level. This is certainly where he sees it effected and where he
can measure the degree of effectiveness created by the influence of leaders on management agencies. It is at this level then that communication is all important and demands a degree of personalized command. The two aspects of personalized command considered essential are community briefing and informal contact.

The importance of community briefing is that the commander who makes a plan or unit policy, irrespective of the type of unit or subject of the plan or policy, is in the best position to expound and explain it, i.e., cause and effect. The principle involved is that of early and bona-fide information from the 'horse's mouth' so that members can formulate their individual plans with confidence. Such briefings should not 'play down' adverse effects and not over-emphasize possible benefits. They ensure that all have common knowledge to the common end. Such information is important to a member for his reasons, and the effect on him of this method of receipt is incomparably more reliable than orders/briefing handed down the line, possibly culminating in an inexperienced subordinate leader endeavouring to promulgate all instead of periodical detail which will arise and be connected to the community briefing.

The second aspect of personalized command is that a subordinate's introduction to, or communication with, his commander should not be solely 'at attention' with the subsequent formalities. A commander gets the 'feel' of his command 'where the action is', i.e., during duty and off duty hours to see, listen and converse, but not necessarily direct. In these circumstances he is seen to be accessible, appears to know what is going on and, in fact, does know what is going on and can react accordingly; moreover — and this is equally important — he can react in time.

The unit/sub-unit commander who plans and executes these two methods, who knows and can sensibly apply his powers of amelioration over his subordinates' real and imagined problems, and who can sustain his efforts, will achieve communication and train leaders by example. Additionally, this commander can look sensibly at his unit orders and recognize their full implications and possible shortcomings. He also has additional balance when hearing and disposing of charge reports for disciplinary offences.

Acts of indiscipline in a unit are usually manifest when the unit is static with established on duty/off duty routine. It is in this situation that communication is spasmodic and can become non-existent. Con-
versely, an operating or exercising unit has few routine disciplinary problems. It could be said that these circumstances provide no opportunity for the common run of disciplinary infringements. However, operations and exercises force all members to establish constant contact and the natural desire, or the requirement, of the leader to act ensures continuous communication. Whilst this leadership may not reach the desired heights or application, communication by example is broadened and, in the main, good. There is also a greater tendency towards community briefing.

Community briefing provides good training for a leader. It gives him practice in the art of imposing his will on a group. This is of benefit to him when finally having to issue verbal orders of some importance. It is also surprising what he can learn at question time.

**Punishment**

Punishment in the Service may be inflicted by a person in authority, by informal means (for example by verbal censure) or by formal means within the provisions of the army disciplinary code. The informal approach allows speed in determination and involves minimum administrative procedure. However, the imposer of punishment by this means must supervise its execution; he will experience difficulty in maintaining consistency in his punishment awards and be the personal subject of possible recrimination by the recipient who resents, or doubts the validity of, such punishment. The imposition of punishment by formal means involves additional effort occasioned by the Rules of Procedure pertaining to each case and administrative procedure in its preparation, hearing, disposal, execution of punishment and recording action.

Service punishment is considered to contain the following three elements:

a. punishment of the offender for the offence,

b. deterrence to the offender against committing further offence; and

c. deterrence to others against committing offences.

These elements are probably common to, and required in, any code of punishment be it civil or military. Basically, it is an individual’s responsibility not to render himself liable to punishment. However, as previously mentioned, the military code must cater for an organization, the very basis of which is founded on the maintenance of discipline.
Hence, the military code defines offences which have no civil counterpart. There is another major difference in that military punishment awards contain little or none of a fourth element of civil punishment which can be termed as reward incentive, i.e., the suspended sentence or good behaviour bond.

The imposition of punishment in the army is a leadership function in furtherance of the management process. It should be preceded by consideration of all the elements of punishment and, especially in the case of purely military offences, not awarded solely for punishment’s sake.

It would be appropriate at this time to consider the range of punishment awards existent in the military discipline code:

- **Monetary Fine.** This is a clear cut award that is readily understood by the awarding tribunal and the recipient. It lends itself to scaling and is simple to graduate in relation to severity both in the award and its effect on the recipient. It is easily administered and there are no concealed side issue penalties. It is common in all walks of life. It is strictly defined by limit in the Law Manual and is currently a trifling amount as a single award especially in regard to courts martial. The recovery of a fine from a member’s emoluments does not affect his basic allotment to a dependant or his entitlement to marriage and separation allowances. The member remains on duty and in receipt of pay and allowances.

- **Confineinent to Barracks (CB).** This is predominantly a commanding officer’s award. It entails the recipient performing normal duties plus additional duties under supervision. His liberty is curtailed in that he is restricted to the unit area and debarred from the use of unit amenities whilst under the award. Contravention of the conditions of the award can lead to extension of its duration. The recipient remains in his normal military environment with his normal military compatriots; he practises his designated military employment and receives full pay for his efforts. His interest in the Service, if existent or about to blossom, can be maintained or engendered. He enjoys some ability to take a personal hand in his problems and this is the real corrective requirement. It is possible for his commanding officer to reduce the award commensurate with his reaction and thus there is a remission or reward factor.
Correctly administered, CB is a severe deterrent to both the recipient and the observer population who are in fact a major target for deterrence. The inherent dangers of CB lie in its laxity or over-severity of execution and possibility of duration beyond endurance.

- **Field Punishment.** This is an active service award and may be awarded to be served either in custody or not in custody. To be served in custody presupposes that a field punishment centre has been established and, to the best of the author's knowledge, the Australian Army has not established a field punishment centre since the 1939-45 War. Field punishment not served in custody has similar punishment conditions as described for CB, but when awarded with forfeiture of pay, it is also similar to detention without confinement. Thus, this award when not served in custody does not attract an army manpower loss in that the recipient remains on duty with his unit and there is no custodial requirement.

- **Detention.** This punishment involves confinement for a designated time in a military detention facility. A programme of corrective training can be conducted but there is doubt as to the feasibility of obtaining correction in periods of detention of under 28 days. Sentences of 28 days and over can attract remission of up to one quarter of the duration of the sentence dependent upon the behaviour and attitude of the detainee. Forfeiture of pay and reduction of rank, to the ranks, is an automatic consequence of detention. Detention is non-effective service in the calculation of a period of engagement. It is also non-effective service in terms of entitlement to gratuities, pension, leave and pay increments. The visual deterrent effect is limited to the staff of the detention facility and other detainees.

- **Imprisonment.** This is solely a court martial award and generally attracts dismissal or discharge from the Service as a joint award or administrative consequence.

- **Reduction in Rank.** The immediate effect of this award upon the recipient is loss of pay, prestige and authority, with the possible accompaniment of some sense of shame. The long term effects in relation to career prospects and service retirement benefits are incalculable.
Dismissal or Discharge. The effect of this award on an individual cannot be calculated. It involves stigma on character and a potential loss to a career soldier which is inestimable and cannot be inflicted by other than a Service tribunal. There is a point of view that the award of discharge to a soldier may be considered by him as reward for his indisciplinary efforts. This may be so in the soldier's short term view and during a time of full civil employment and public apathy, or indeed opposition, to the armed forces operational involvement and manpower requirements. However, these conditions will not always pertain but the soldier's record will.

It is not proposed to examine the implications of conjoint awards which can be made as combinations of the above punishments. Nor is it intended to discuss other punishments of an intangible nature such as reprimands and loss of seniority. Mention should be made however that the Army Law Manual does stipulate procedure for the review of punishment awards, suspension of the sentence of detention and appeal or redress action by the recipient against severity of sentence or infringement of the Rules of Procedure during case preparation or tribunal proceedings. However, mention must also be made that review of sentence or suspension of detention can only be made by higher authority and after the punishment has been awarded. It is also a time consuming procedure. The point made in this paper is that any Service tribunal must fully appreciate the implications of punishment when determining what element or elements of punishment are applicable in each case.

Offence

The development of this paper requires consideration of a military offence, and absence without leave (AWOL) is taken as an example. AWOL is the most prevalent offence in the army and is militarily a serious offence. Because of its magnitude and perennial nature, it is probably the largest single cause of 'wasted effort' in the Service. Wasted effort is mainly incurred in cases of prolonged AWOL and is related to both the offence and the consequence. Waste occasioned by the offence is obvious and the following paragraphs investigate possible wasted effort resulting from the consequences.

Under the present disciplinary code and Service procedure emanating therefrom, AWOL is dealt with by awards of fines and/or
CB and/or detention by either summary or court martial tribunals. There is a strict delineation whereby court martial procedure is well nigh mandatory, that is, cases of AWOL in excess of 21 days; or desertion.

Only two tribunals are normally involved and they are the unit commanding officer (CO) and/or a district court martial (DCM). The offence is rarely preferred as desertion and under current punishment practice, detention is normally awarded by a CO for recurrent offences and is almost invariably awarded by a DCM where the offence is not ameliorated by proven extenuating circumstances.

AWOL is a serious offence and must attract punishment. After the offence, the CO's position and responsibility is clear. There is no dispute of the principle of defining his powers of punishment as absolute in a minor punishment award or, in the case of a major award, his powers being conditioned by the offender having the election for hearing by a higher tribunal. Neither is it disputed that the CO should have the prerogative of remand of an offender to a tribunal with greater powers of punishment. But why court martial and why detention?

Consideration of the present AWOL rate and illegal absentee incidence combined with the convening of court martial tribunals and the award of detention, commits the Service to:

- An inordinate number of district courts martial per year.
- Undermanning against establishment by members serving detention.
- Re-training because of previous training being nullified by detention.
- Extensive detention facilities and specialized staff. AWOL offenders comprise the great majority of soldiers in detention.
- Administrative effort as a direct and indirect consequence of the above.

The reasons for AWOL are many and varied and range from an action on impulse to a decision arising out of an accumulation of incidents. It would be foolish to try to arrive at a pattern of reasons simply by analysis of the reasons advanced by offenders at tribunal hearings. However, AWOL, in its civil context, is not a criminal act and it is not normally of an anti-social nature and cannot be defined as simply as other offences. Probably the only common factor in reasons for AWOL is the one of restriction caused by normal Service environ-
ment and requirements. It is therefore difficult to envisage any corrective action being effected by a lengthy period in confinement. Confinement also precludes any individual effort by the detainee to remedy personal causes that may have led to AWOL. It is therefore possible that confinement compounds the restriction element which, when allied to boredom and lack of incentive occasioned by forfeiture of pay, could lead to recurrence of AWOL with an unstated intent to desert.

What are the alternatives to courts martial and detention? Before considering this it should be determined what the army requires during the imposition of and as a result of punishment. Surely this must be:

- Full consideration of the elements of punishment together with impartial action by the tribunal and observance of the Rules of Procedure.
- Redemption of the offender and his subsequent rendition of effective service.
- Minimum administrative effort and speedy conclusion commensurate with the above.
- Complete removal from Service responsibility of the proven incorrigible and useless member.

It has been previously stated that the award of punishment is a leadership function. It is also agreed that a superior authority convenes courts martial and confirms or reviews findings and sentences as an extension of his leadership and management function. However, the composition of district courts martial, including the junior regimental officers acting as prosecution and defence counsel, in the majority of cases would not equate in combination with the Service experience and knowledge of the unit commander required to remand an accused member for trial by court martial. The Judge Advocate in attendance at the court is required for legal direction and procedure. He can only advise or influence the court in accordance with the capability of its membership.

Pure AWOL cases are determined from proof of absence, proof of cessation of absence and the reason for absence. The conditions governing a ruling of involuntary absence are well defined and if a decision is difficult it is better taken from experience and understanding than from an amateur performance in a court. It is considered a rare occurrence where evidence on a charge of AWOL requires technical examination, debate and decision by a military court. Mandatory convening of district courts martial in these instances leads to over-
exposure of courts martial procedure to the point where it becomes commonplace within the Service instead of a rather awe inspiring part of the administration of discipline. It could be argued that the courts provide training for officers as members. But perhaps officers also consider the experience commonplace when acting in a court on an AWOL hearing.

If in fact remand action by a unit commander is required in designated cases of AWOL, it is considered that the remand tribunal should be one of summary powers without further election available to the accused. The formation/area commander is the logical choice as a senior officer with the commensurate experience in regard to the serviceman and the requirements of the Service to provide sound and impartial judgement. He has access to specialist Service advice as required but would require powers of summary punishment not available to a unit CO. For example, he should have the power of discharge, which is currently restricted to courts martial as a punishment award and to designated staff officers on a senior headquarters as a possible administrative consequence of misconduct. He should also have the prerogative of remand for court martial of those cases in which he considers the issues or side issues involved require court hearing with full prosecution and defence procedures under qualified legal surveillance.

The use of detention as a punishment is not disputed and, no doubt, is suitable and has proved effective in numerous cases. But is it always a sensible award in terms of expense of effort against likely dividends? Only due consideration of the elements of punishment and the alternative punishments available, as singular or conjoint awards, will answer this question.

Is an increase required in the range of punishment available? Little or nothing has been heard of suggestions in this regard. Conversely, there is marked opposition to the continuance of field punishment as a military punishment award but this opposition probably stems from the knowledge of some isolated peculiarities in the execution of the award. Surely it must be realized that there are certain offences for which a fine, as a singular award, is not appropriate irrespective of its severity. Therefore, the abolition of field punishment can only lead to a greater incidence of detention awards during active service. Any irregularities in the execution of field punishment awards could be remedied by the conditions of the award being decided and promulgated by the theatre commander.
No. An increase in the punishment range is not required. But there should not be any decrease. What is required is greater flexibility by tribunals within the existing range and this can be obtained by:

- increasing their powers of punishment; and
- allowing them to suspend all or part of a punishment award at the time of imposing the award.

The power to immediately suspend sentence adds the reward/incentive factor as a fourth element of military punishment and should be introduced forthwith. Its use raises the following possibilities:

- It enables the offender to redeem himself and thus not suffer what he may consider is a harsh award.
- The act of trying to redeem a suspended sentence may cause an offender to become a good soldier by habit.
- The dependant of an offender has the opportunity to exercise an influence on that member without being embittered by initial deprivation caused by the offence and punishment.
- The elements of punishment and deterrence remain in the award.

An increase in a unit CO’s powers of punishment in conjunction with his powers to suspend sentence should reduce the incidence of remand to higher tribunals.

Summary

Community briefing doesn’t mean that every order, instruction or policy decision is the subject of wholesale briefing. Neither does it mean that a task force commander briefs 2,500 men. It does mean, however, that a leader should plan when and to what level he will use the briefing medium. It also means that the level of briefing should be extended beyond his immediate subordinates in order that he, his intention, his identity and position in the scheme of things, is known in his command and thus the process of decision making can be identified to a source and not considered as emanating from the omnipotent but mysterious and unknown ‘powers that be’.

Personal contact by a leader with his subordinates doesn’t mean fraternisation. Neither does it mean that he intrudes in his subordinates’ domains nor that he has no time for his own private pursuits and interests. It does mean that he is aware of the impact of his decisions and policies to provide an extension of the communication mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
The offence of AWOL is described as an example and should be related to all offence incidence.

Punishment — methods of imposition and effect — is described in detail because, whilst commonly used in the leadership and management process, it is considered to be a subject that is not widely understood.

The administration of discipline is a leadership function and the effort required can be minimized by:

- A leader's exploitation of his subordinates to prevent or reduce the tendency towards, or commission of, acts of indiscipline.
- A leader's exploitation of his powers of punishment to assure maximum benefit to the Service. Disciplinary action, when warranted, must be taken. If it is overlooked, slackness and disregard of authority will ensue.
- Above all, a leader's exploitation of himself.

Conclusion

The term soldier in this paper can relate generally to any member of the army. Similarly, the term leader can mean anybody in the Service with authority over others.

To foster and maintain Service motivation in conditions of peace, the soldier must be given something on which to 'hang his hat'. The hat peg required is leadership and good example. The promise, or actual provision, of more liberal conditions of service is merely a side issue.

Leadership is a technique. However, there is no technology, degree or certificate which, by possession, ensures mastery of the technique by the possessor. Leadership has to be practical and worked at, continuously. When it breaks down at any level, the subordinate levels will tend to practise self-management at the expense of effort in their leadership and management responsibilities. The practice of self-management in the lower ranks leads to indiscipline and the effort required in the administration of discipline becomes out of all proportion to its share of service function. The effort required for the administration of discipline can reach such proportions as to render that effort ineffective. When this stage is reached the army can no longer function.
The Australian Instructional Corps

Major A. J. C. Newton, MBE
Royal Australian Infantry

‘An’ they’ve drilled us. Strike me lucky! but they’ve drilled us fer a cert!”

—C. J. Dennis.

The purpose of this article is to record some details of the Australian Instructional Corps, based on official records and my personal knowledge.

Beginning

The Australian Instructional Corps came into being on 14 April 1921 by the gazettel of Statutory Rule No. 73 amending the Australian Military Regulations by the insertion of Regulation 52A, the relevant parts reading:

The Australian Instructional Corps shall consist of such members of the Permanent Military Forces as are appointed or transferred to or enlisted in that corps and of members of the instructional staff appointed instructors under the provisions of Section 21B of the Act. There shall be one seniority list for officers and one for other ranks of the Australian Instructional Corps.

Major Newton joined the Australian Army as a senior cadet in 1927, served until January 1936 in the CMF as a field artilleryman and reached the rank of sergeant. He joined the PMF in 1936 and served as a warrant officer in the Australian Instructional Corps with CMF battalions and at RMC until May 1940 when he was appointed RSM of the the 2/17th Battalion AIF. He was commissioned in September 1940 and served subsequently with the 2/17th during the siege of Tobruk and at Alamein.

After his return to Australia in 1943 he was for about a year Staff Captain (Admin) Advanced LHQ and then joined the 24th Brigade as Staff Captain, taking part in the operations at Labuan and in British North Borneo in the final year of the war. He served as Staff Captain on HQ Eastern Command and HQ 2nd Division and was appointed to the Quartermaster List in 1949. After promotion to Major in July 1951 he was appointed DAA & QMG HQ 2 NS Training Brigade (1951-54) and DAAG Eastern Command (1954-57). His present appointment is SO2 Directorate of Infantry, AHQ, Canberra.
On 30 July 1921, Military Order 344 was issued stating that:

The Governor General in Council has approved of the undermentioned Quartermasters and Temporary Quartermasters of the Permanent Military Forces being transferred to the Australian Instructional Corps in the following order of seniority, with effect from the 14th April, 1921.

Then followed a list of 68 officers.

Military Order 409 of 19 September 1921, amended by Military Order 539 of 26 November 1921, then gave in detail the procedure for appointment to, and promotion in, the Australian Instructional Corps as relating to WOs and NCOs. The initial paragraphs are the significant portions:

(a) All substantive Warrant Officers of the Permanent Military Forces, with the exceptions given in sub paragraph (b) below, will be placed on the Instructional Corps list as from 1st August 1921, and seniority will be determined from the date of promotion to their respective classes as Warrant Officers.

(b) The following Warrant Officers will be borne on separate regimental or corps lists as under:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appointment</th>
<th>List to be borne on</th>
<th>Unit, Arms or Corps to be borne on</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master of Steamer</td>
<td>Individual Appointment</td>
<td>RAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coxswain</td>
<td>Special Sections of Units—</td>
<td>RAGA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Draughtsmen's Section</td>
<td>RAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draughtsman</td>
<td>Works Section</td>
<td>RAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman of Works</td>
<td>Military Mechanist,</td>
<td>RAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Mechanist,</td>
<td>Electrician Section</td>
<td>RAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrician</td>
<td>Survey Section</td>
<td>RAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer of the Survey Section</td>
<td></td>
<td>RAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer of the Remount Section</td>
<td></td>
<td>ASC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer of the Ordnance Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer of the Provost Staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>Provost Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Warrant Officers of the Instructional Corps will be allotted for regimental duty with units of the Permanent Forces, or instructional duty at schools and depots, or for regimental and instructional duty with the Citizen Forces as may be required.

End

The date the Australian Instructional Corps ceased to exist has been more difficult to decide. Like 'old soldiers' the AIC just seemed to fade away. Strictly in terms of legal procedure, 19 May 1955 may be accepted as the date of its demise. This was the date on which Regulation 68 of the Australian Military Regulations was amended by
omitting from sub-regulation (I) the words—'The Australian Instructional Corps'. For practical purposes, it may be logical to accept 13 August 1953 as the date on which it expired, as from 14 August 1953 Quartermaster Officers, who up until then had been listed as (QM) AIC, were recorded as (QM) ARA. However, well prior to that date those warrant officers who were former members of the AIC had been transferred to Corps Lists.

ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND

The AIC was not raised as such until 1921 but prior to that time there had been an Instructional Staff in the army. It is reasonable therefore to consider the years prior to 1921 when writing of the AIC. The difference between the Instructional Staff and the Australian Instructional Corps was, the former did not include all the Arms or Corps. It literally included only those WOs and NCOs who were employed as instructors, at army schools or as staff of volunteer or citizen force units. Thus warrant officers of Permanent Force units were maintained on separate corps or unit lists.

After Federation, staff sergeants major and warrant officers from the various States, who had been instructors with the volunteer units, were grouped as members of the Instructional Staff. In general they continued duty with the various voluntary forces. During the first ten years of the Commonwealth many ex NCOs and WOs of the British Army were enlisted directly to this Instructional Staff and after a period of probationary service were either confirmed in their rank or discharged. Similarly, NCOs of the Permanent Military Forces were transferred to and promoted in the Instructional Staff. In 1910 because of the imminence of compulsory military training and the development of the Commonwealth Military Forces, special Schools of Instruction were formed to prepare approved candidates for appointment to the Instructional Staff.

The first school was held in a camp outside Albury, NSW from July to 31 December 1910. Candidates for this school were required to be between the ages of 21 and 35 years, medically fit in terms of the examination for recruits of the Permanent Forces with a minimum height of 5 feet 7 inches and a minimum chest measurement of 35 inches. A simple competitive educational examination in reading, writing, dictation and arithmetic had to be passed before entry. The board of six officers which conducted the educational examination was pre-
sided over by the Adjutant-General and the junior member was Lieutenant T. A. Blamey of the Administrative and Instructional Staff, who later became Australia's first Field Marshal after distinguished service in both world wars. Some 190 candidates qualified on this first Albury school and in later years it was always a source of pride for these members to be identified with this school. Many of these students gave magnificent service to the army in peace and war. For example, James Edward Newland who, when selected for the school, was not a serving soldier but had served in the South African War and later with the RAA in Victoria. He was appointed to the Instructional Staff on 1 January 1911 and sailed to Egypt with the 12th Battalion, First AIF as RQMS. He was commissioned at Gallipoli and as a company commander was awarded the Victoria Cross for conspicuous bravery on three separate occasions in France during April 1917. He had the distinction of being the only member of the permanent forces to be so honoured in the 1914-18 War. It was a distinction he held for fifty years until Warrant Officer Wheatley was awarded a Victoria Cross in Vietnam. Captain Newland served as a quartermaster in the AIC until his retirement in 1941. Lance Corporal Claude Cadman Easterbrook of the 1/4 AIR was also a student at this school. He served with the Australian Light Horse in the Middle East during the 1914-18 War and was awarded the DSO and MC and reached the rank of major. He served in many appointments later and was a member of the staff of the Royal Military College at the outbreak of war in 1939. Colonel C. C. Easterbrook, DSO, MBE, MC retired in 1949 but will always be remembered by those who had the good fortune to know him, as a dedicated soldier, a thorough gentleman and a brilliant raconteur. Sergeant Ernest William Latchford of the 1/6 AIR was another student whose name will be linked with the Small Arms School and the School of Infantry. After service in the 38th Battalion First AIF, where he reached the rank of captain and was awarded the Military Cross, he served in Dunsterforce in Mesopotamia and later with the British Forces in Russia. Between wars he was on the staff of the Small Arms School, Randwick where he enjoyed an enviable reputation as a brilliant instructor and a small arms expert. In the 1939-45 War he became Chief Instructor of the Small Arms School and later the School of Infantry where he remained until 1948. He retired in 1949 as Colonel E. W. Latchford, MBE, MC. He died a few years ago but his reputation as a fine soldier and a superb instructor still remains.
Gunner Harold Chumleigh RAA also qualified at this first Albury school. He was appointed in 1911 the first RSM of the Royal Military College, Duntroon. He remained in this posting until 1928. It is unlikely that this record of length of service as RSM, RMC will ever be equalled.

In the book *Duntroon* by Colonel J. E. Lee, DSO, MC, Warrant Officer Chumleigh is referred to as 'a first class instructor singularly devoted to his job, he was a loyal friend and a sympathetic adviser'.

In 1911 a School of Instruction was held at Portsea in Victoria from 1 March to 30 June. The attendance was limited to 40 students and vacancies were allotted to candidates on a State basis as follows: Queensland 5, New South Wales 15, Victoria 12, South Australia 4, Western Australia 2, and Tasmania 2, but in the event of there not being sufficient successful candidates from any State the vacancies could be distributed proportionately to the remaining States.

In fact the 39 students on the course came from: Queensland 3, New South Wales 12, Victoria 15, South Australia 1, and Western Australia 3. At the school the students held the rank of sergeant and of the 34 who qualified, 30 were appointed to the Instructional Staff on 1 July 1911 and the remaining four were discharged, but were eligible for appointment to the Instructional Staff in any vacancy that occurred within eighteen months of discharge. One successful student was J. D. Shearim who later established a reputation as a marksman, winning the King's Medal on several occasions. His ability with the SMLE .303 rifle was amazing as he could fire 45 to 50 aimed shots in one minute.

In 1912-13 two Schools of Instruction were held at Albury. The first for 40 students ran from 1 February to 16 June. The students on this course came from a wide range of Australian regular and volunteer units, but also included a proportion of ex British soldiers from such units as The Welsh Regiment, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, Gordon Highlanders, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry Regiment, West Yorkshire Regiment and one student from the NZ Military Forces. The Chief Instructor on the School was Major J. M. Antill, CB who in 1921, as a brigadier, was appointed Chief Instructor of the Central Training Depot, Liverpool.

The second school commenced on 18 September and concluded on 31 May 1913. The number of students increased from 40 to 60, of whom 58 qualified. Two young officers attached for duty on this course were Lieutenants J. Northcott and E. C. P. Plant. The former, after a distinguished army career, served as Governor of New South Wales from
1946 to 1957 as General Sir John Northcott, KCMG, KCVO, CB, K.St.J. Lieutenant Plant served in the 1914-18 War and between wars filled a number of senior appointments including that of Commandant, Royal Military College 1939-40. His first appointment to the Second AIF was Commander, 24th Brigade. He retired shortly after the end of World War II as Major General E. C. P. Plant, CB, DSO, OBE, CdeG.

During the 1914-18 War no schools were held but acting appointments were made to the Instructional Staff.

By the end of the 1914-18 War, several problems relating to the Permanent Military Forces had to be solved. Two are of interest in this article. First, it was necessary to fill vacancies on the Instructional Staff. Therefore in 1919 it was decided to hold two Schools of Instruction at Liverpool NSW for the training of candidates for permanent appointment to the Instructional Staff. Each school consisted of 260 students. Successful candidates would be appointed to light horse, field artillery or infantry units. Preference was given to candidates in the following order:

1. Returned soldiers, including Acting Staff Sergeants Major, who had served abroad in the AIF.
2. Acting Staff Sergeants Major employed in Australia.
3. Other applicants.

A competitive examination (educational and practical) was held for applicants. No. 1 School was held from 22 August to 20 November 1919 and No. 2 School from 8 January to 7 April 1920. Candidates other than those temporarily employed were 'attested for the period of the School' and granted the rank of Acting Staff Sergeant Major temporarily. Seniority of all the successful candidates attending either No. 1 or No. 2 School was determined at the conclusion of No. 2 School. The conditions were that successful candidates for whom vacancies existed were appointed on probation for a period of one year with the rank of Acting Staff Sergeant Major. At the end of a year those favourably reported on were to be promoted to the rank of Warrant Officer Class II. Those adversely reported on by the District Commandants were to be discharged from the Instructional Staff. From a study of Military Orders of 1920, it appears that 379 qualified on these two courses, of whom 74 had been employed as Acting Staff Sergeants Major prior to attendance at the schools. On 21 November, 329 of these now Provisional Staff Sergeants Major were confirmed and promoted to the
rank of WOII. (The Military Board had to decide the date of promotion by amalgamating the two courses for seniority—students on the first school either had to serve more than one year on probation or students on the second school had to serve less. The decision was in favour of the latter, who in fact served from April to November 1920 before being promoted).

Many names on this list would be familiar to soldiers who served before or during the 1939-45 War, and even later. Some I recall are, Bert Easter and ‘Dusty’ Mortimer, former British soldiers who were on the staff of the Royal Military College for many years, the former as cavalry instructor and the latter as RSM. ‘Dusty’ later served in New Guinea as an officer in World War II. Andy Skinner, a DCM and MM winner in the 1914-18 War, who served as a captain with the 2/15th Battalion in Tobruk and the Western Desert in 1941-43. ‘Lofty’ Loveband, MM who also served in the Middle East as an officer with an artillery unit in 1939-45. Sid Leworthy, Reg Spence and Charlie Knudsen, three excellent instructors who were on the staff of the Small Arms School, Randwick when a new generation of AIC candidates was being trained in the late 1930s. Alf Etheridge who ended his army career as Lieutenant Colonel (RL) A. R. Etheridge, OBE in the Office of the Military Secretary a few years ago.

The Instructional Staff for these schools consisted of four officer instructors, four WOs Class I, eleven WOs Class II and one WO1 of the Physical Training Instructional Staff. All were under command of the Chief Instructor, Temporary Major (Honorary Lieutenant Colonel) G. F. G. Wieck, DSO, an officer who had served in the 9th Light Horse Regiment from 1914 to 1916 and then filled various staff appointments in the First AIF. After leaving the Special Schools at Liverpool he became Instructor in Tactics at the Royal Military College.

The other problem decided by the Military Board about this time was the employment and status of those warrant officers and non-commissioned officers of the PMF who had been commissioned in the AIF. In all there were 234 members involved; some had been lieutenant colonels and commanded units. Many had reached the rank of major or captain. The solution, which was not a very happy but evidently inevitable one, was that, based on their AIF seniority, 22 were appointed permanent quartermasters and 20 appointed temporary quartermasters. The remaining 192 were granted the honorary rank of lieutenant but paid and employed as Warrant Officers Class I or II, dependent on
their PMF seniority. Among the temporary quartermasters was Captain Newland, VC who stated that he would prefer to resign if not made a permanent quartermaster. In 1921, the Military Board considered his case but did not change its decision, as by being made permanent he would have superseded five of his comrades. However, the acting Minister for Defence did not agree with the Military Board’s decision (though he acknowledged it strictly correct from one point of view) and on 20 December 1921 approved the appointment of Captain Newland as a permanent quartermaster to date from 1 January 1922. In the 1932 Staff Gradation List, 55 WOSI and 7 WOSII of the Australian Instructional Corps were still recorded as honorary lieutenants.

In 1921, in addition to raising the Australian Instructional Corps, the army appeared to reach a practical solution to the problem of training instructors and recruits by the establishment of a Central Training Depot in place of the Special Schools of Instruction held since 1910, which were raised on a requirement basis.

Military Order 321 of 23 July 1921 reads:

**CENTRAL TRAINING DEPOT**

1. The Central Training Depot (Special School of Instruction under Section 21B of the Defence Act) has been formed as from 11th July 1921 and will be temporarily located at Liverpool NSW.

2. The objects of the Central Training Depot are:
   a. To provide and train an adequate supply of efficient NCO Instructors for the Army, other than technical units.
   b. To effect the individual training of all recruits for permanent units.
   c. To conduct such other courses of Instruction for the Army as may be considered necessary by the CGS from time to time.

3. The establishment (provisional) of the Training Staff of the Central Training Depot is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chief Instructor</th>
<th>Instructor</th>
<th>Staff Sergeants Major</th>
<th>Orderly room sergeant or Military Staff Clerk</th>
<th>Assistant Instructors, Staff Sergeants Major</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. The establishment (provisional) for the Depot other than the Training Staff is as under—

   (I) General

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooks</th>
<th>Batmen</th>
<th>Stablemen</th>
<th>Drivers for Vehicle</th>
<th>Animals Riding Horses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (II) Transport

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drivers</th>
<th>Draught Horses</th>
<th>Wagon GS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes. Six stablesmen including one senior stableman in charge.
Two cooks for recruit wing.
Twenty-five riding horses are for the 'cavalry wing' and may be drawn
from the Remount Depot from time to time when required until such
time as accommodation may be available. In addition there will be one
horse for each officer, 1 for RSM and 2 Cavalry Instructors.

5. The Central Training Depot is divided into four wings.
   a. Cavalry Wing       For the training of instructors
   b. Infantry Wing      for these arms.
   c. Refresher Wing     For WOs Class II
   d. Recruit Wing       Individual training for recruits of
                         the Permanent Units

At the completion of the recruit course and before being passed into the
ranks, recruits will be sent for their technical training to Unit Depots as under
RAFA—Maribyrnong
RAGA—Sydney
RAE—Swan Island

No. 1 Course for the training of candidates for appointment to the
Australian Instructional Corps was held from August 1921 until Feb-
uary 1922. The course consisted of 30 students from units of the
Permanent Forces and 40 students from other sources, preference, in
the latter case, being given to ex-members of the AIF or those who
served in other forces of the Empire during the 1914-18 War. Entrance
examinations similar to those for entry to the earlier Liverpool Schools
of Instruction were set.

The Chief Instructor appointed was Brevet Colonel (Honorary
Brigadier-General) J. M. Antill, CB, CMG who, it will be recalled, had
filled a similar role at the Albury Schools in 1912-13. The Senior
Instructor was Brevet Major A. R. Selby who graduated from the Royal
Military College on 14 August 1914. This officer later transferred to
the British Army where he had a distinguished career reaching the rank
of temporary Lieutenant General and being awarded the CB, CBE,
Greek MC and M.I.D.

The Central Training Depot had a short life and not a very happy
one. In December 1921 the Army was required to effect savings in
estimates and the Permanent Forces pay expenditure was limited to
£517,000, requiring a saving of £28,000: To effect this saving the Mili-
tary Board decided (amongst other restrictions) to close temporarily
the CTD and to discharge immediately 20 of the students undergoing
instruction there and 40 probationary instructors temporarily employed.
However, as the result of representation by the general secretary of the
RSSILA it was decided to discharge 44 of the students from CTD and
only 16 of the probationary instructors. The inference is that the tem-
porary instructors were returned soldiers who, although unqualified at a School of Instruction, had been employed for some time.

During its short life this first Central Training Depot conducted one course for training cavalry and infantry instructors for appointment to the AIC, but of the 70 students 20 only completed the course, 44 were retrenched and it is assumed that the six unaccounted for were either, if members of the Permanent Forces, returned to their former units or, if recruited from other sources, discharged for inefficiency or misconduct or at own request. In addition, No. 1 Course of the Recruit Training Wing had an intake of 77 students of whom 60 completed the course. The RAAF was formed in 1921 and it is interesting to note that the CTD conducted two courses for the training of RAAF recruits, the first course had 169 students of whom 154 completed their training, whilst the second course had an intake of 85 of whom 73 qualified.

A perusal of the minutes of Military Board meetings of the period indicates that the staff and students of the CTD had other problems. The staff had housing and expense difficulties. This was indicated from a report which reads:

An appointment to the C.T.D. staff should be looked upon as the highest form of recognition of worth and professional ability and at least should not be accompanied by financial loss and other disabilities which can be avoided.

The Chief Instructor could not accommodate all of his family in the house provided whilst the Officer Instructor had his wife living in a tent, for which he was charged rent. The students on the AIC Course had financial problems as, although according to the conditions of entry free messing and quarters were to be supplied, they had to pay a levy for the employment of stewards and other staff. (I thought that establishment looked a bit thin). As their weekly pay was 70/- per week of which 7/- was deferred until the end of the course there appeared just cause for complaint. As a result of complaints, one Friday afternoon the QMG took off post-haste from Melbourne to investigate the conditions on the spot. He did not arrive at Liverpool until the Saturday afternoon as he travelled by the second division of the Sydney Express, detrained at Strathfield from where he was driven to Liverpool (presumably by horse transport). All members of the course who normally would have been on leave were waiting to see him and despite the moderate tone of his subsequent report, I feel that he must have had a most interesting afternoon. Some alleviation of conditions were made but I was unable to determine if Major Selby was relieved of rental charges for his tent.
The temporary closure of the CTD lasted for nearly eighteen years as it was not until 19 June 1939 that it was reopened at the Hospital Block Liverpool on a temporary basis. (Perhaps some military historian may care to examine the effect on the army if it were not permitted to do things on a temporary basis).

With the closing of the Central Training Depot in 1922 there were no Instructor Courses held until 1935. During this period there were appointments made to the Australian Instructional Corps, probably to offset wastage and to provide staff for the technical arms. NCOs of artillery and engineers (including signals) normally qualified for appointment to the Australian Instructional Corps by attendance at Arms Schools and courses, and in terms of their seniority. Thus warrant officers in these arms prior to appointment had long regimental service as senior NCOs. A well known officer in this category is Colonel S. J. Greville, OBE who served as a signals instructor at the Royal Military College, and on appointment to the Second AIF as an officer went overseas in 1939 with the 6th Division. After outstanding service as a Lieutenant Colonel in signals he retired in 1953. During the period 1923 to 1929 inclusive the average appointments made per year were about 13. Few appointments were made between 1929 and 1935. In 1929 the compulsory clauses of the Defence Act were suspended and the Citizen Army became a volunteer force. In this period the Permanent Army went through one of its unhappiest phases. Retrenchments, salary reductions, the restriction of intakes to the Royal Military College and its transfer from Duntroon to Sydney, were some of the decisions taken, which no doubt affected morale but not to any noticeable degree.

The militia forces were reduced by the linking of the light horse regiments and battalions, thus reducing the requirement for permanent staff. By 1935 there was a requirement to appoint more warrant officers to the Australian Instructional Corps, particularly for duty with infantry units, and so began another system of production. This time the Small Arms School, Randwick, NSW was given the task of conducting Special AIC Courses. This school had been formed in 1911 as the School of Musketry and since its inception had conducted courses for all small arms weapons and mortars, etc. It had a small but highly trained and competent staff who in their new role achieved good results. No. 1 (Special) AIC Course was held from 12 February to 12 June 1935 and the course had 24 students, all but one being regular soldiers. The exception—Harry Smith—had earlier service I believe with the Physi-
NO. 2 SPECIAL AIC COURSE, SAS RANDWICK, 1936

cal Training Staff. Many of the students were junior NCOs in their regular units but accepted the challenge to obtain accelerated promotion and appointment to a corps with a fine reputation. In all, 18 qualified.

In 1936 No. 2 (Special) AIC Course was held from 4 February to 13 June. For this course, serving members of the militia forces were also permitted to apply, providing they had reached the rank of sergeant and had at least three years service. In all, 17 PMF soldiers and 7 members of the AMF comprised the course. The AMF soldiers, irrespective of the rank held, were enlisted in the RAA and given the rank of temporary bombardier after enlistment. For a few weeks prior to the course they were attached to regular artillery units in their home States. The results were that 15 PMF and 5 AMF soldiers qualified. Evidently the decision to permit AMF soldiers to attend was considered successful and for all future courses a high proportion of students were from the militia and in some cases from other voluntary services, or with AIF and British Army experience. Conjointly with No. 2 Course a squad of 8 AIC warrant officers underwent similar training with the aim of selecting some of them for appointment to the staff of the school. Students on No. 2 Course received a few extra-curricular lessons outside of the syllabus from these 'old soldiers'. These special courses at the Small Arms School continued through to 1939, the last course (No. 7) being held from 16 January to 27 May for infantry candidates and 16 January to 17 June 1939 for cavalry students. The extra time for cavalry students was devoted to riding and special cavalry subjects. The staff at the Small Arms School for this additional period was augmented by cavalry instructors and assistant instructors. No. 7 Course had 120 students of whom 101 qualified.

In addition to the course for cavalry and infantry students at the Small Arms School, another wing of No. 7 Special Course was held at the School of Artillery for students of that arm from 13 February 1939 to 22 February 1939, and 17 students qualified. As far as I can ascertain this was the only occasion when such a special course for artillery students was conducted.

In all, on the courses held between 1935 and 1939—307 students qualified and this was undoubtedly the largest influx to the Australian Instructional Corps since the first and second Liverpool Schools in 1919-20. The need for these additional members was the result of the deteriorating international situation and the consequential expansion of both the Permanent and Militia Forces. New units were being raised
and these younger warrant officers were often employed as instructors in areas in which there had been no military activity since 1929.

The Chief Instructor at the Small Arms School until November 1938 was Major John Austin Chapman who graduated from the Royal Military College in 1915 and served with the 30th Battalion, First AIF. After attendance at the Staff College, Camberley in 1931-32 he remained in England attending Small Arms Courses until the end of 1933 when he returned to Australia to take up his appointment as Chief Instructor. After a distinguished career in peace and two wars he retired in 1953 when QMG, as Major General Chapman, CB, DSO. I had the privilege of working closely with him in 1943-44 when he was DA and QMG Advanced LHQ and I know that he considered his tour of duty at the Small Arms School as one of the most rewarding appointments he had filled. Until his death a few years ago he was intensely interested in his ‘old boys’ who had passed through the Special Courses. Major T. N. Gooch, an RMC graduate of 1920, who as a captain had been an instructor at the Small Arms School for the No. 1 (Special) AIC course and had then spent two years training in England from 1935 to 1937, rejoined the Small Arms School staff on his return and became Chief Instructor in November 1938. After service in World War II he retired in 1954 as Brigadier T. N. Gooch, CBE after raising and commanding 2nd National Service Training Brigade for three years.

The next AIC course, No. 8 (Special), was held at the Central Training Depot, Liverpool from June until 17 December 1939 for infantry students and until 11 January 1940 for cavalry students. A total of 113 students qualified. The objects of the Central Training Depot were:

1. To carry out the preliminary and non-specialized training up to the standard of 1st Class Certificate of education of all candidates for the Australian Instructional Corps, except those for artillery, engineers and signals.
2. To carry out the specialized training which is not taught at other army schools of candidates for the Australian Instructional Corps, light horse and infantry.
3. To conduct refresher courses for members of the Australian Instructional Corps posted to arms other than artillery, engineers, signals and army service corps.

In fact I believe the second object only was actually carried out as, like the original CTD, circumstances, including the outbreak of war in
1939, limited the second CTD's existence. Lieutenant Colonel I. G. Fullarton, MC was the Chief Instructor at CTD. This officer graduated from the Royal Military College in June 1915 and after regimental service in the 1914-18 War filled various staff appointments until he raised the CTD in 1939.

The last course (No. 9), for infantry candidates only, was held conjointly at the CTD and the Small Arms School as neither school had the capacity to accommodate the number of students separately. This course ended on 27 June 1940 and 157 students qualified. A significant number of NCOs from the Darwin Mobile Force attended this course. The DMF was a small well-trained highly efficient unit which had been raised in 1938 for special duties in the Northern Territory. Its commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel A. B. MacDonald, who later commanded the 2/16th Battalion in the Syrian campaign. In 1943 he became commandant at the Training Centre, Canungra, the forerunner of the present day Jungle Training Centre.

No. 1 Infantry Officers Training School replaced the Central Training Depot, the functions of which—according to MBI G139 of 30 November 1940—'will be suspended for the duration of the war'. Unfortunately no particular war with specified, and since 1940 the Central Training Depot has ceased to exist.

Although No. 9 Course appears to be the last AIC course conducted, many more soldiers were appointed to the AIC in the following years, mostly in a temporary capacity. The AIC list was maintained and promotions made in the PMF, even though in many cases the personnel concerned were serving in more senior ranks in the AIF. Probably on the assumption that the AIC would function in the post-war years as it had in the past, courses were held at the School of Infantry, Bonegilla in 1946. PMF soldiers, many of whom were at that time commissioned, but who had not qualified at a School of Instruction in terms of section 21 B of the Defence Act, comprised the students. The opinion at the School of Infantry was that a situation similar to that which occurred after the 1914-18 War was possible; namely, that PMF soldiers, irrespective of AIF rank, would revert to their PMF ranks. This, in general, did not occur as the expansion of the army, which included the raising of regular battalions and other units, the occupation forces in Japan and the Korean War, gave opportunities for retention of commissions and promotions never envisaged by warrant officers of the AIC in 1939. It may be worthy of historical note
NO. 3 SPECIAL AIC COURSE, SAS RANDWICK, 1936

that the first course held in 1910 and the courses in 1946 (if accepted as AIC Courses) were conducted in the same geographical area, as Bonegilla, although in Victoria, is but a few miles from Albury where our story virtually began.

Many of the students appointed to the AIC in the 1935-40 period served on in the ARA after World War II and there is an appreciable number still serving. Names no doubt familiar to many are:—Brigadier V. E. Dowdy, OBE, a student on No. 3 Course who retired as DST in 1964 and is now Honorary Colonel RAASC. Colonel J. L. A. Kelly, DSO of No. 4 Course who commanded the 31st/51st Battalion in Bougainville after a fine record of service in the 9th Australian Division. After several senior staff and command appointments, including that of Chief Instructor School of Infantry, Colonel Kelly retired in 1957 and became a successful businessman. He died tragically in a motor accident a few months ago. Captain Kevin Power, MC of No. 2 Course served as a company commander in the 2/33rd Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Thomas, OBE, MC now retired who, after a fine wartime service in the 2/12th Battalion, was awarded the OBE for service with 2 RAR in Korea. Colonel W. G. Clementson who attended No. 1 Course and on appointment to the AIC served in signals units. He had a fine career in both war and peace, filling many senior appointments in signals. His last appointment was Commanding Officer of 17 NS Training Battalion, Western Command.

The brothers Hall—Colonels Eric and Cyril—both officers in the militia prior to attending No. 3 and No. 6 Courses respectively. Eric initially served in the 2/8th Battalion, then transferred to the Ordnance Corps in which he reached the rank of Lieutenant Colonel before his retirement. Cyril had wide infantry experience and after service in the 1939-45 War served with 3 RAR in Korea. Later he was an officer instructor at the School of Infantry and at the time of his retirement was well known in the army as Staff Officer Grade I in the Directorate of Infantry.

Colonel S. R. Edgecombe, MBE, who recently retired after filling an important appointment with distinction in the Directorate of Staff Duties at AHQ, attended No. 5 Course as also did Major Geoff Watson who was commissioned in 1954 after many years as RSM, Royal Military College. There are many more names which I would like to include but space is running out.
VIEWS AND BELIEFS

Many old soldiers speak nostalgically of the AIC and it has been suggested by some that the re-establishment of such a corps is desirable. Others use the AIC as a measuring stick to assess the standard of warrant officers in today’s army, generally to the detriment of today’s WOs. I disagree with both views. First, the army in which the AIC reached its peak was a vastly different army to that of today. Before the 1939-45 War there were very few regular units. One of the ‘in’ terms is to refer to the Permanent Army of ten years ago as a Cadre Army. If we accept the meaning of cadre as a permanent skeleton, then by comparison the pre-war Permanent Army probably consisted of backbone only, not a full skeleton. The largest corps, except for probably the RAA, was the AIC. The majority of its members served as the Permanent Staff of militia or CMF units. There were no permanent infantry—now the biggest corps. There are now corps and sub-divisions of corps never envisaged in the 1930s. To me it appears unnecessary, if not an impossibility, to group all warrant officers of today’s army into one corps. With the eventual disappearance of the granting of OM commissions there appears little reason to maintain even an army wide seniority list of WOs Class I, except to keep a computer happy. Secondly, I have a theory that since armies existed old soldiers always believed that the WOs and NCOs of their youth were far superior to those of the present. If we limit this theory to Australia only, the—probably the only outstanding NCO was a member of the Rum Corps. Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel, in his report as Inspector-General in 1922, stated this of the AIC, ‘Good work has been done during the year and the general efficiency of the Corps has considerably improved but it is not yet up to pre-war standards.’ When, fortuitously, I and several other junior warrant officers on the staff of the RMC were temporarily promoted to WOI in 1939, several of the more senior members of the AIC (some no doubt on whom the Inspector-General had reported in 1922) shook their heads and inferred that standards were not what they were. There must always be room for improvement but it is my firm belief that the Warrant Officers and senior NCOs of today’s army are equal to, if not better, than their counterparts of the past. This opinion is always confirmed when I meet warrant officers and NCOs attending courses at the Infantry Centre or in their units. There are no doubt some poor warrant officers today but there were also some in the AIC. I recall the RSM (a Boer
War veteran) of the first unit in which I served as a member of the AIC, warning me of some of the ‘villians’ I would meet at the first divisional course I attended. Another warrant officer with whom I served was always left back at the training depot when the unit went to camp, because it was considered best in the interests of his own and the unit’s reputation.

FACTS AND FIGURES

The strength and structure of the Instructional Staff and Australian Instructional Corps varied over the years. As at November 1920 it appears that the warrant officer strength was: 133 WOsI, 708 WOsII—a total of 841. The question of promotion was discussed by the Military Board at this time. It was suggested that promotion be on a time basis and WOsII be promoted to WO1 after ten years service irrespective of numbers involved. This suggestion was discarded on the grounds that over a period of years there could be more WOsI than WOsII. The decision was then made that one third of the establishment of WOs would be WOsI. This ratio appears to have been maintained throughout the years. For example, in 1922 when it was evident that cuts in expenditure had to be made, it was decided to reduce the establishment of the AIC by approximately one third: the existing and proposed establishments were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Existing</th>
<th>Proposed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quartermasters</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Quartermasters</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers Class I</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers Class II</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>960</td>
<td>602</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

By 1932, no doubt because of decisions taken after the suspension of universal training, the strength of the AIC was:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quartermasters</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers Class I</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers Class II</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The establishment authorized in 1939 consisted of:

- Quartermasters: 91
- Temporary Quartermasters: 92
- Warrant Officers Class I: 258 including 27 graded ‘A’ for purposes of pay
- Warrant Officers Class II: 516

Total: 957

Promotion in the AIC was governed by seniority and efficiency in relation to the authorized establishment of the corps. In the 1920s and 1930s, promotion was normally slow. For instance, in 1932 most of the WOs appointed from the schools held at Liverpool in 1919-20 were still Class II. The appointments held did not necessarily result in promotion, thus RSMs could be either WOs Class I or II. Until 1939 it also appeared as though temporary promotion was very unusual. In that year, no doubt due to the expansion of the army and the fact that the positions of instructors at army schools were graded as WOsI, many temporary WOsII were promoted to T/WOI. In addition both WOsI or WOsII, irrespective of seniority, were promoted to Temporary Quartermasters and Honorary Lieutenants to fill adjutant and quartermaster vacancies in units.

The dress of the AIC for officers and WOsI was the approved officer pattern uniforms. Field dress included breeches and leggings. WOsII dress, apart from a jacket buttoning up to the neck with a stand and fall collar, was similar. The distinctive features were collar and hat badges, based on the Commonwealth badge (rising sun) but finished in red and blue enamel with the words Australian Instructional Corps inscribed thereon, and two stripes of scarlet cloth on their shoulder straps, ½-inch in width showing ½-inch of the uniform material between the stripes. The badge of rank for a WOIA was the Royal Arms enclosed in a wreath, WOI the Royal Arms as now worn, WOII a crown enclosed in an oval wreath. Badges of rank were worn on the right sleeve only. However, it was not always such and in 1921 the Inspector-General in his annual report made the following comments:

I have noticed during my inspections in districts the great lack of uniformity in the uniform at present worn. I am afraid I have no suggestion to make which would not mean increased expenditure but the situation as it stands at present is detrimental to the prestige of the Instructional Corps and if anything could be done to ensure uniformity and smartness of appearance, it would be in the interests of the service.
Some of the points of criticism were—that hats or caps were worn, breeches or trousers, puttees or leggings, either black or brown boots—and the materials in some cases differed and were sometimes threadbare.

A warrant officer on appointment received at this time £10 for uniform but was then responsible for upkeep.

The Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General of this period passed the report back and forward to each other for action until the Military Board decided it was a matter for the QMG who was instructed to issue suitable instructions. My ferreting has not discovered what these instructions were.

Pay rates of course varied over the years. In 1910 a Staff Sergeant Major on appointment received £3.0.0 per week whilst a Garrison Sergeant Major on his top increment or division received £4.18.6 per week. In 1920 a WO1A received £5 per week rising over a period of nine years to £5.15.0 whilst a WOI received £4.10.0 per week rising after eleven years to £5.10.0 per week (Increments were five annual of 2/- and then two after three years, each of 5/- per week). A Staff Sergeant Major initially received £3.17.0 per week rising by annual increments of 2/- per week to £4.5.0. A Quartermaster in 1920 commenced on £6.5.0 per week rising in biennial increments of £25 to £8.15.0 per week. In 1935 a WOI received £5.0.0 per week on appointment and in the same rank after eighteen years service could reach £6.10.0 per week. A WOI received £6.5.0 on promotion rising to a maximum of £7.0.0 per week after four years service. A WOIA received £7.5.0 rising to £8.0.0 after four years service. A Quartermaster on appointment received £8.3.6 per week rising by annual increments of £25 to £10.2.0 per week. At least in the period 1920-22 the pay rates were not considered satisfactory by authority, as the following statements indicate.

This from the District Commandant in NSW:

Block boys (street sweepers) receive £4.3.0 a week at 21. This compares rather unfavourably with that of a WOII who can only advance to this amount in his fifth year of service.

Whilst in 1922, the Inspector-General in his report indicated that the minimum pay rate of £3.18.0 per week for WOsII, who needed good education and personality to be instructors and administrators, compared poorly with the basic wage for labourers which by States varied from £3.17.6 to £4.0.0 per week.
REFLECTIONS

The fact that the image of the Australian Instructional Corps remains untarnished after nearly thirty years since it was a viable corps, indicates that it must have had some unique characteristics. I believe that some of the factors which project this image are:

• Pride and loyalty of its members.
• The general high standard of training and knowledge within the corps.
• The universality of the AIC.
• Traditions and heritage.
• Character of the Australian community prior to the 1939-45 War.

These factors need amplification and obviously they are only my personal opinions.

Pride and Loyalty

Such attributes in relation to a corps are difficult to pinpoint. However, from my first contact with the AIC in 1927, as a timid senior cadet called up for military training under the Defence Act, I gained the impression that members of the AIC were capable soldiers who had pride in their work. This view was strengthened by closer knowledge during service as a trainee in the Citizen Military Forces and later as a volunteer in the Militia Forces. When I became a member of the AIC, together with those NCOs who qualified with me, I experienced gratification and achievement at being admitted into a corps with a high reputation. These feelings were engendered by the Chief Instructor and the staff of the Small Arms School. I have still in my possession a personal letter written by the Chief Instructor, Major Chapman, congratulating me on my appointment as a warrant officer and enjoining me to maintain the reputation of the school and the corps.

High Standard of Training and Knowledge

In the pre 1939-45 period the majority of the warrant officers were well trained in weapons, equipment and skills of the army. Most had undergone an initial School of Instruction or had graduated as NCOs from PMF units before appointment to the AIC. Subsequent attendance at army schools, which was also a requirement for pay
advancement, had kept them up to date. In addition many members of the AIC appointed prior to No. 1 Special Course at the Small Arms School in 1935 had war service. For example, of the 46 officers and 443 WOs of the corps in 1932, 45 officers and 305 WOs had war service. (That one officer without war service must have felt lonely at times).

**Universality of the Corps**

Only a very limited number of quartermasters and warrant officers of the PMF were not members of the AIC. Thus all soldiers, PMF, compulsory trainees, Citizen Force members, Militia and Cadets, came into close personal contact with members of the AIC during their service. Most of the male population were required to undergo military training prior to 1930, therefore it can be accepted that even outside the army the name or reputation of the AIC was well known. Warrant officers of the AIC tended to remain in postings in the same areas longer than the staff of CMF units do now, so in the universal training days, in particular, young men often heard of the ‘Sergeant Majors’ by name, prior to their call-up, from older brothers or friends. At the outbreak of war in 1939 the earlier AIF units had warrant officers AIC loaned to them as instructors during initial training. Most major units had ex-members of the AIC posted to them as Quartermasters, RSMs, RQMSs and often CSMs (or equivalent). The impression gained by soldiers of all categories who had contact with the AIC appears favourable. To illustrate this view, I recently met a retired highly qualified professional engineer who told me that he had obtained more knowledge of instructional methods and lecturing from an AIC warrant officer on the staff of the Divisional Engineer unit with which he had served in the early 1930s, than from any other source during his career.

**Traditions and Heritage**

These stemmed from many sources and perhaps may be traced back to the early days of the Commonwealth. Certainly, even in my experience as a member of the AIC, more senior members would speak of the many personalities of the corps, some of whom had joined from the first Albury School in 1910. The 1914-18 War had a tremendous impact on traditions. The ‘Spirit of the AIF’, the ‘Anzac Tradition’—call it what you will—but this vital force was nurtured in the army by those officers and soldiers of the Permanent Military Forces who had
served in the First AIF. The more numerous were members of the AIC, consequently the stirring events of Anzac, Gallipoli, Palestine and France in 1914-18 were linked in a fashion with members of the corps.

**Character of the Australian Community prior to the 1939-45 War**

In the 1920s and 1930s there was, in the main, more stability in the community than perhaps these days. Travel was more limited. On leaving school, boys obtained jobs and generally remained in the same employment, probably with the same firm or organization. If you resigned or were sacked the chances of obtaining another job, certainly immediately, were remote. There was less of the materialistic outlook which tends to mark modern society. I may be wrong but I believe that the type of work a man did was more important than the money he earned. Security appeared to be more important. Members of the Permanent Forces, both officers and men, seemed to enjoy a higher status in the community than nowadays. The depression of the 1930s certainly jolted a considerable cross-section of the people and those who remained in regular employment at this time were considered fortunate. The recruiting requirements of the Permanent Army were very small, so therefore a high standard could be demanded, and because of the numbers offering enlistment was most selective. Thus the potential of the PMF was very good and no doubt was a factor which accounted for the large number of soldiers of the permanent arms and the Darwin Mobile Force, plus the direct entries from the militia, who became warrant officers AIC and later, because of the raising of the Second AIF, officers.

**CONCLUSION**

The Australian Instructional Corps was a very fine corps. It, and its predecessor the Instructional Staff, can rightly claim some credit for the proud reputation of the First and Second AIF, and perhaps more tenuously for the standard of today’s army. I shall always be proud of my comparatively short service as a member of it. Its role was important in the army of its era, but I cannot see a place for a similar corps in the Australian Regular Army of the 1970s. The present day warrant officers, collectively, are very good. Many would be considered outstanding in any army, both as men and soldiers. All are worthy descendants of the Australian Instructional Corps. May they continue to hold high the torch.
MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN FREIGHT HANDLING BY SEA
With Particular Reference to Containerisation and its Application to the Australian Army

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PART 2

TRENDS IN MODERN SHIP DESIGN

The Cellular Container Ships now coming into universal use are a comparatively new type of general cargo vessel. As mentioned earlier the first one built anywhere in the world was the Australian Associated Steamships' 6,500 DWT MV Kooringa, and that as recently as 1964.

Prior to that time containers were being carried at sea either in conventional cargo ships or container ships of non-cellular design. These vessels were equipped with level luffing, full slewing deck cranes to handle the containers. Today’s cellular container ships have no deck cranes or equipment for handling containers. The loading and discharge, a simultaneous operation, is the work of electric travelling shore cranes.

With a full deck load of containers, today's container ship tends to look top heavy, however the container ship is a particularly stable vessel, and its loading and discharge is virtually an exact science. All stowage and all withdrawals of containers takes place in conjunction with a continuous container by container check on the ship's centre of gravity in relation to its centre of buoyancy.

Also contrary to popular conception the container ship is not really a deep draft vessel and considering its tonnage draws little water. Fully loaded, Encounter Bay, a container ship of 27,000 DWT, has a draft of only 35 feet 1½ inches; however what the container ships lack in draft
they more than make up for in the beam. *Encounter Bay* has a main-deck 100 feet wide whilst *Kanimbla*, Australia’s largest coastal container vessel of 11,300 DWT, has a beam of 72 feet. These measurements are generous when compared to similar size ships of a different type, for example, the Australian National Line’s ‘Lake’ class 10,000-ton bulk carriers have a beam of 75 feet while their 21,000-ton bulk carrier *MV Musgrave Range* has a beam of only 74 feet.

![Side elevation of an OCL container ship showing the six-high underdeck stowage of containers and the three-high carriage on hatch covers.](image)

The greatest advantage of a container ship from a ship operator’s viewpoint is that the vessel is at sea earning money for a much greater part of the year than is possible with a conventional type of ship. For the shipper and the consignee, container ships are synonymous with regularity and economicalfreighting.

The Unit Load Ship is also of comparatively recent origin and is basically designed to stow and carry cargo, in unitized packs, either on pallets or in containers. A container is of course a particular type of unit load.

The principal difference between the unit load ships and the container ships is that the former carries its own gear for working cargo. Generally this gear consists of level luffing, full slewing deck cranes, having a range of capacities sufficient to handle containers and other unit loads of at least 22½ tons in weight. One of the greatest advantages of the unit load ship is that it may be berthed wherever there is a wharf apron wide enough to receive the various unit loads to be discharged or loaded, and special shore facilities are not required.

The unit load ship operational system requires a minimum of capital outlay for shore based mechanical handling gear, and compared with the container ship for earning time at sea there is little difference. Both types of vessel in the deep sea trades have service speeds of about twenty knots or more.
The forerunner in the deep sea trades of today’s modern, efficient unit load ship was the type known as the ‘Scandia’ ship. Scandia ships set entirely new standards of performance for cargo working speed when they first arrived in Australian ports. Today, productivity level of the Scandia type unit load ship is accepted as the norm and the first ‘Stretched Scandia’, with even greater capacities at the same cargo working speed, in now operating between Europe and Australia.

The EAC Line’s new high speed cargo liner MS Atrevida, showing the stowage arrangements for containers and other unit-load cargo in five holds forward and one aft.

The unit load ship is not a new concept in so far as Australia is concerned, as leading Australian and New Zealand shipping companies have operated unit load ships for about ten years. Most of the vessels are equipped with sets of deck cranes while others make use of stiff-legged shore cranes. Regardless of how its cargo is worked, the unit load ship provides an operational flexibility which cannot be matched by the older, conventional type ship equipped with masts, derricks and sampson posts.

‘Roll on-roll off, Vehicle Deck Ships’, also known commercially as trailer ships, are extremely versatile regarding the type of cargo they can carry. Designed to accommodate cargo brought on board on wheels, through either a stern or bow opening, the vehicle deck ship is the commercial successor of the landing ships of World War II.

The versatility of the vehicle deck ship lies in its ability to accept cargo, whether containerised, unitised, on dolleys, tractor drawn trailers or large semi-trailers. Loose cargo in crates may be brought inboard in similar fashion, or hoisted aboard by wharf or deck cranes, such as those carried by the Union Steamship Company’s two Mainland/Tasmania trailer ships Seaway Queen and Seaway King.

There is another version of the roll on-roll off vehicle deck ship operating in Australian waters — the small coaster King Islander. She loads and discharges through a bow opening instead of through the more
normal stern opening. Both types of vessel do however require a special end loading facility for their roll on-roll off operation.

A further development of the roll on-roll off concept is embodied in a vessel recently constructed in the United States for the Australian service. This ship is fitted with an angled ramp on the starboard quarter, with sufficient length to reach the wharf from the vehicle deck. This obviates the need for end loading berths and special facilities for the roll on-roll off vessel.

Whatever the cargo handling method provided for in the ship’s design the vehicle deck ship has been proved to be both fast working and profitable.

The Union Steamship Company's roll on-roll off and lift on-lift off vehicle deck ship Seaway Queen.

METHOD OF HANDLING CONTAINERS THROUGH A SEA TERMINAL

The basic steps for the processing of containers through a terminal area are relatively simple. Full container lots (FCLs) are packed by the shipper and sent direct to the terminal by road or rail. Loose cargo is delivered into a contractor’s depot from the shipper and is packed or stowed in a straightforward way into waiting containers. The packed containers are then moved from the depot by road or rail to the terminal, where they are unloaded and placed into the five high stacks along with FCLs already there.

The whole stacking operation is planned and co-ordinated from the control room in the terminal and each container is placed into its allotted position, under the direction of the control room planners. Cargo in refrigerated containers will be plugged into a local power point or connected to the central refrigeration plant and kept at the required temperature, pre-determined by the shipper.

When the ship arrives the outbound cargo is marshalled into the terminal stack by electric overhead cranes. This is the most compact
way of holding a very large number of containers and is a system particularly suited to crowded waterfront areas.

The actual loading and discharge of the ship is carried out concurrently after the first hull cell has been discharged. In preparation for this 'cargo exchange' the containers are lifted from the terminal stack two at a time and placed onto internal transit vehicles. They are then moved to the ship's side where containers are lifted onto the vessel and lowered into the hull cells.

Incoming containers are then lifted from the ship in pairs and placed on the internal transit vehicle for transfer back to the terminal. There they are lifted, by the electric overhead cranes, into the stack and a pair of outgoing containers placed on the transit vehicle for movement to the ship.

Discharged FCL containers are then delivered to the consignee for customs and quarantine clearances and thence out of the gate of the terminal. Less than container lots are transferred by road or rail to the depot where the container is unpacked and the cargo, after clearance, is delivered loose to the consignees.

Customs and quarantine officers are stationed full time at container terminals and depots to make the clearance of containers and their cargo simple and speedy.

**MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF CONTAINERS**

So far this paper has considered only the types, and the operation of the larger family of containers; that is those with a capacity greater than approximately 300 cubic feet. This has been by design, as the small freight containers are now well established in the Australian Services and are a familiar sight in overseas areas.

**Container Control**

The small container selected for the army conforms to the Australian Standards Association Standard No. E34, Small Freight Containers. Their introduction at the time of the build-up of the Australian commitment in South Vietnam has resulted in incorrect practices by our army, and in particular the stores services, in the proper functions of a container service. All containers, except for a small reserve, have been allocated to individual stores services and these services have come to look upon the containers as their own property.
A wharf tractor moves two containers to the container crane for shipment.

This allocation has reduced the flexibility of the container system and must be replaced by a proper Container Control Organization as soon as possible if the army is to fully benefit from containerisation. This would rightly be a Movements function where the location, load status, repair condition, etc. of every container is maintained, using modern office machinery and systems. The control organization should at all times record the location of all army containers and be the major tracing organization for army cargo in transit.

Throughout the whole of Europe, United Kingdom and the United States, US Forces container control organizations are in operation. On the introduction of containers to the Vietnamese theatre of operations a container control agency was established. The need for secure and weatherproof storage, plus communications difficulties to control the container system led to the decision that the 'Conex' may be used as desired in the theatre. This resulted in a gross waste of United States Conex containers in Vietnam, where they may be seen in every role from
command posts and bunkers to even septic tanks. One estimate is that over 130,000 Conex containers are ‘missing’ in Vietnam today.

**Military Container Sizes**

Until recently the United States Forces considered that all large sized containers were better handled by civilian contractors. This led to the development of several large civilian container handling complexes in Vietnam, with associated security problems in the port areas, as well as delivery difficulties because civilian vehicles were not desirable in some forward areas. A hotchpotch of operations developed in which contractor’s container trailers were towed by military vehicles to a forward location but vehicles were not available, or not made available, for the return journey to the port. Thus a civilian shipping container was for the time lost to the system.

The United States Army has recently stopped buying Conex containers and is moving into the second generation of military containerisation with an 8’ x 8’ x 20’ size, to be known as the ‘Milvan’. This is planned to be complementary to the use of civilian contractors for a more complete system from depot or warehouse in the United States to the combat troops. A complete system is being purchased consisting of the containers (2,000 of the first procurement of a planned 6,700 are now under construction), a close-coupling chassis and a movable bogey. This system will allow coupled use in 40-foot trailers in the base areas and a split into two 20-foot units under poorer road conditions.

The British forces have over the years considered a policy for the introduction of freight containers into the service, however as far as can be ascertained no purchases of containers or decisions as to size or type have been made other than some wooden containers for the shipment of ordnance furniture. ISO containers have been hired to provide a service between Britain and Europe in support of BAOR and others to conduct trials in the shipment of heavy baggage for troops moved overseas by air.

The introduction of a large freight container into the Australian Army must be made with a full appreciation of the system as a whole for its use and operation. This must include such things as the control, the demand and accountancy procedures, the materials handling equipment necessary to give full utilization of the containers, including demountable kit cranes or gantries for easy movement to field locations etc. Currently, as has been explained earlier, there are both 20-foot and
40-foot containers in use in Australia. The 40-foot container is too large for field use and would be too heavy to handle without very sophisticated lift equipment while any size below the 20-foot container would not give sufficient advantages over the existing 300 cubic foot containers.

The 20-foot container and its accessories, such as clip-on refrigeration, is now in large-scale production within Australia and competitive prices are available. In the event of a sudden major expansion of our army it is a standard size for all manufacturers, hirers and users. These reasons alone dictate that the large freight container for the Australian Army must be based upon the common international 20-foot length but with a width of either 8 feet or 2.5 metres and a height of 8 feet but more probably 8 feet 6 inches. These developments in container widths and heights must be closely watched before a final decision is made and any large scale purchase or vessel construction is undertaken.
To handle these containers on and off railway wagons or road vehicles is not difficult with the equipment available commercially today, however their use across beaches or in undeveloped ports would constitute a problem. All vessels in this type of operation must be self-sustaining with regard to their crane or derrick capacities, or other means of discharge such as the roll on-roll off technique. In an overseas or an exercise area, where suitable cranage is not available on shore, the ship’s gear would land the laden containers onto skeletal trailers and they would remain on the trailers until returned to the shipside, being in effect just a road semi-trailer whilst in the theatre. A balanced number of tractors and trailers would be deployed to the theatre to enable an economical shuttle operation to be conducted.

CONCLUSIONS

The container is little more than a sophisticated packing case and yet its effects on the transportation industry as a whole are without parallel in history. Never has so much money been spent in so short a time on a new and single aspect of any industry than has, and is, being spent on the container and its impedimenta — the ships, the docks, and the materials handling equipment essential for its operation.

Transportation is becoming integrated on land and sea to gain the full benefits from this new tool of the transportation industry. This integration has highlighted the previous separation of the land, sea and air aspects of what is, and must always be, an intermodal concept and operation. It still remains for this integration and standardization to become the byword of some sections of the industry; in particular the law-makers of our government must advance and remove the conflicting regulations which so far have defied efforts at uniformity.

The rationalization of ports into efficient, centralized operations must also be closely watched or they will become the focal points in our nation’s economy, leading to the further concentrations of populations in and around our major cities. To prevent this concentration, and yet still aim for increased sea terminal efficiency, a co-ordinated transportation system including marine, road and rail must be achieved. The container must be the means to develop our economy, not the death of the country. ‘Australia, in common with most of the developed nations of the world, is in the throes of a transport and cargo handling revolution, the end results of which are very far from being in sight.’

1 The Australian Financial Review. June 1970
Recommended Reading

THIS list is prepared at the Australian Staff College and published in the journal to assist any officer seeking to improve his professional knowledge through the study of past events and current trends and developments.


THIS is a collection of lectures, papers and articles on various aspects of war and peace written and published by Howard between 1959 and 1969—many of them while he held the Chair of War Studies in King’s College, London. In his too-modest introduction, typically titled Apologia pro Studia Sua, Professor Howard describes the collection as representing ‘a process of self-education’, providing evidence of a kind of intellectual pilgrimage into fields as various as military history, international relations, strategy and disarmament.

Whatever his interests, the military reader can find gems in Howard’s book wherever he dips. Jomini, Clausewitz, Wellington, William I of Prussia, Haldane, Liddell Hart and Hitler are some among the many figures in military history on whom Howard turns his analytical spotlight. But he is equally at home discussing the contributions of the Princeton Center of International Studies, Herman Kahn and the advocates of disarmament. Nowhere does Howard’s warm involvement in the human aspects of his studies, his denial of an intellectually-sterile approach, appear more strongly than in his ‘Epilogue’, a talk broadcast at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Michael Howard will undoubtedly contribute much more to the rational study of war and peace in the years ahead. While awaiting that contribution, officers should add Studies in War and Peace to their bookshelves—and dip into it often.

HIMALAYAN BLUNDER, by Brigadier J. P. Dalvi. (Thacker and Company Limited, Bombay, 1969)

BRIGADIER Dalvi (Indian Army, Retired) was commander of the ill-fated 7th Infantry Brigade, which bore the first brunt of the Chinese attack on India in October 1962.

The book tells an extraordinary story of the muddled handling of India’s defence policy, the crucial area of relations between the civilian administration and the services in India in 1959-62, and the
deplorable higher direction of the crisis of September to November 1962. At the brigade level, Brigadier Dalvi tells of the acute dilemma of a commander ordered to attack an outnumbering enemy in well prepared positions before any declaration of war, his own force out-gunned, poorly equipped and without a semblance of adequate logistic support. The military system which was responsible for this situation is also analysed critically.

An outstanding career officer who held every significant appointment in command and staff, Brigadier Dalvi is the author of an incisive and valuable study of ‘politicians playing soldiers, of soldiers playing courtiers—and finally of other soldiers dying as soldiers’. □


Mr Barnett’s latest book which follows his very successful The Desert Generals (1960) and The Sword Bearers (1963) describes the history and evolution of the British Army from the reign of Henry VIII to the present day. Although this is a very long book, Mr Barnett’s style is as usual very readable and his comments fascinating and often controversial.

His descriptions of recurring military neglect, principally for financial reasons, which has led Britain to enter so many wars unprepared, has a present day relevance as has his contention that British sea power was largely a myth based on a reluctance to expend large sums on a standing army.

The period covered by the book includes both the acquisition and withdrawal from Empire and suggests that Britain finds herself today in a similar position to the one she occupied at the time of Elizabeth I.

Students of modern history will enjoy the description of the two Great Wars of this century and Mr Barnett’s appraisal of Britain’s new European role in the broad context of her strategic policy. □


This book brings together a variety of opinions on the region by some of the foremost specialists from the United States, Europe, Australia and Southeast Asian States. Contributors include anthropologists, economists, geographers, historians and political scientists. The book has been organized around a number of central problems by its editor, Robert O. Tilman. In Part One, he questions the significance of the
term ‘Southeast Asia’; the five articles he has selected deal with the historical, cultural, social and political dimensions of this problem. Part Two focuses on the changing society and deals with the nature of the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ values, their transmission, interaction and conflict and the process of social change itself. Part Three discusses the political ideologies, structures and leadership of the various Southeast Asian states. Part Four is an examination of the problems of national integration and the outlook for development of a Southeast Asian regional identity. In Part Five, questions are raised about the social and cultural obstacles to economic development and about the prospects for economic progress.

The book is designed for students in area studies and is fruitful reading for those with an interest in the region. Some particularly interesting statistical charts are included in Appendix A.

Robert O. Tilman is Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale University, and is the author of Bureaucratic Transition in Malaya and the editor, with Taylor Cole, of The Nigerian Political Scene.

CHARGE! (or How to Play War Games), by Brigadier P. Young, DSO, MC, and Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Lawford, MC. (Morgan-Grampian Books Ltd, London, 1967)

TO the layman war games have a rather sinister image. They conjure up visions of professional soldiers planning and enacting the destruction of their opponents with an ill-concealed relish. The unenlightened even dismiss war gaming as ‘kids stuff, playing with toy soldiers’.

The authors have not concerned themselves with the true military war game which has been used traditionally to train staff, test strategic plans and evolve new concepts and weapons. They achieve a far more popular appeal by delving in amateur war gaming which lacks the sophistication and precision of the professional game, but nevertheless manages to retain the tensions and excitement of battle. The subject period is 1756-1815 because armies were smaller and tactics more predictable and simple. Large complex, modern armies do not lend themselves to amateur war gaming nor do they give quite the same historical insight.

As successful professional soldiers themselves, the authors have written an absorbing account which will create new interest for any father wishing to share his son’s love of miniature armies by re-enacting Waterloo on the lounge room floor!