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Cover: 'Contact!, Vietnam 1967' by war artist B. Fletcher. At the Australian War Memorial.
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The landing of the 503rd American Parachute Infantry Regiment at Nadzab, New Guinea on 5 September 1943. Thirty-four Australians of the 31st Field Regiment also took part in the drop.
WE'RE GOING TO THE DOGS

Captain G. L. Hulse
Royal Australian Engineers

THROUGHOUT the history of warfare new and ingenious weaponry has changed the course of battle planning and strategy. For instance, the arrival of military aircraft caused camouflage and dispersion problems during World War I. Hitler’s rockets, such as the V1 and V2 during the latter part of World War II, produced early warning problems. U2 spy planes and orbital satellites armed with uncanny camera devices and special lenses or photographic paper, can defeat even the most impeccably placed camouflage over steel military equipment.

Captain Hulse enlisted in the ARA in 1960 and served with 2RAR and 3RAR in Malaysia (1962-64) as a junior NCO. On graduating from OCS Portsea he was allotted to the RAE and after completing the Officers Basic Engineering Course at SME in 1965 he was posted to 2PIR, Wewak as assault pioneer platoon commander until 1967. A period with 24 Construction Squadron followed until April 1968 when he was posted to 1 Field Squadron in South Vietnam. On his return he went to SME. In September 1970 Captain Hulse was sent to the United States Army Infantry School at Fort Benning to study the methods of training mine dogs. While in the USA he visited the Bio-Sensor Research Laboratory and Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Returning in December he went to the School of Military Engineering to start the Mine Detecting Dog Research Wing and is still in this appointment.
As with most technical surveillance or strike military equipment, problems associated with interpretation and rapid dissemination of information inhibits the use of some sophisticated equipment by commanders in the field. A new form of equipment, which is available to commanders at all levels and is capable of interpreting and disseminating information rapidly, accurately, and in the field, would create concern in planning and strategy, especially if this equipment was difficult to recognize, detect, or capture. Such equipment could be available to military commanders in the form of biological sensory devices.

What is a bio-sensor device?

Bio-sensor devices are living organisms which are capable of rational perception. The most common form of bio-sensor device in today's Australian Army is the dog. Other forms of bio-sensor devices are bird, fish, and animals. With training, any bio-sensor device can be conditioned to respond to a set of circumstances or situations. This conditioning or training can be improved and accelerated, in time, by two methods. Obviously, one method is training technique and psychology, the other is by the successful application of selective genetics. What is selective genetics?

Selective genetics is the ability to choose various forms of behaviour from a certain bio-sensor species, and mix or transfer these forms with other bio-sensor devices in the same species. In simple terms, this means that it is possible to select, say, the tracking ability of a Labrador retriever dog, and mix this quality with the aggression of a Doberman pinscher to produce an aggressive dog with a high standard of tracking ability. The methods of application or problems of genetical acceptance are not discussed here; however, suffice to say that it works. In fact, it has already been perfected at the Bio-Sensor Research Laboratory at Maryland (USA) by American geneticists and veterinarians. The aim of selective genetics is to produce a bio-sensor device with certain desirable characteristics and qualities, and then to raise generations of this device under special training conditions and observation until, through hereditary transference, a generation of bio-sensor devices are born with the original desirable characteristics and qualities as normal instinct.
To illustrate, take the case of a bird dog such as the German short-haired pointer. Many years ago this breed of dog was just another form of wandering bird-eating canine. European man saw the value of hunting game with a dog which was already a proficient game hunter. After domesticating the dog, man taught him to point in a certain stance without attacking the quarry. This training was handed down through generations of men and dogs, until the time came when the dog, as a six-week old pup, was pointing out chickens, etc without training. This story is true for most hunting and working dogs throughout the
world. Americans have applied the principles of selective genetics on dogs to the point whereby they claim that by 1974 the US Army will have dogs with the ability to detect mines, booby traps and tripwires as a matter of genetical instinct. Other forms of life, such as birds and fish, could be researched to produce highly trained devices, conditioned to respond to various tactical situations.

Training methods, during and after a bio-sensor device has reached the optimum requirement of selective genetics, remain reasonably constant and are based on Pavlovian training principles, food reward, and audio visual aids. Let us now look at some military uses of bio-sensor devices, once they are produced and fully trained.

**Military Dogs**

There are many roles which dogs can perform for military purposes in a modern army. The following suggested roles are within the confines of known training psychology and would become a reality with the selective genetics principles applied.

*Mine Detecting Dogs* are currently being trained at the School of Military Engineering, Casula, NSW. These dogs when fully trained will be capable of detecting and responding to the presence of mines, booby traps, and tripwires up to fifteen feet each side of the dogs’ axis of advance, dependent on wind condition. In addition, these dogs will alert to the presence of enemy personnel, caches, hides, tunnels, bunkers and equipment. As training progresses, the dog’s ability to perform scout dog functions (explained later) will improve so that our troops will be able to take rapid follow up action, after a contact, with a much reduced risk of being ambushed or booby trapped. Generally speaking, it takes about nine months to fully train a military mine detecting dog which has been recruited from civilian sources. The fifth generation selective genetics dog produced by the Bio-Sensor Research Laboratory in the USA is being trained in fifteen weeks, and it is expected that the tenth generation of these dogs will be able to be fully trained in eight weeks—about the same amount of time to train the human mine dog handler.
Scout/Tracker Dogs are trained to pick up the scent of enemy activity by using both ground and air scents, and then to follow up this scent in the direction required by the dog handler. It is essential that these dogs have some basic training in mine detection and 'alert' training, so that ambushes or booby traps set by the enemy to delay the pursuing force do not achieve their aim. As explained previously, a fully trained mine dog should be capable of performing scout/tracker dog duties.

Pack Patrol Dogs would be dogs trained to patrol or hunt in packs of, say, twenty dogs under the control of pack leaders. Control of the leaders and the pack would be by an ultra-sonic signal not audible to the human ear. Although these dogs would be capable of patrolling under control of an ultra-sonic controller in a base area, etc, probably their best use would be to the front of our patrols. The pack could be controlled at a distance of 100 to 200 metres by the ultra-sonic device or by hand and arm signals given by a dog handler if the dogs are operated within visible range. The pack could detect enemy ambushes or advancing enemy patrols and attack as a group. It is left to your imagination what twenty or so animals such as Doberman pinschers could do to a platoon of enemy in an ambush or in an advancing/patrolling situation. Our own troops could, when ready, call off the dog attack, and mount a conventional assault on what would now be quite a disturbed enemy group. For those who are sceptical of the ability of a dog to work silently in a pack with a leader remember this; wolves and bloodhounds work in packs, and the German shepherd breed of dog is a not too distant relative of the wolf. The selective genetic German shepherd dog in the USA not only works in a pack, but does not bark, growl, or fight other dogs in the pack, as these unwanted characteristics have been bred out by selective genetics.

In addition to patrol duties, pack patrol dogs could also be operated in ambush situations. A group of these dogs could be positioned with cut off groups to provide an early warning service, or with the main party to be used after the ambush has been initiated. The method of operating pack patrol dogs in this manner would be to initiate the ambush by rifle fire or other similar devices, in an effort to put the enemy on the ground and hit as
Mine dog Sabre investigates a smoke grenade suspended in a tree.
many as possible, then release the dogs under ultra sonic control and allow them to attack enemy who have not been hit, or who may have taken cover behind trees, or who may be ‘playing dead’. It is possible to protect friendly soldiers against the likelihood of our own dogs mistaking the identity of their quarries; however that will not be discussed here. At a time when the commander of the ambush is satisfied or wants to call off the dog attack, he could do so by ultra sonic or hand command, and carry on with his ambush procedure.

*Enemy Surveillance Dogs* would be those trained to follow enemy groups alone or observe an area of ground. They would be trained to respond in a certain fashion, so that when the dog mounted tracking transmitter TT626CA was switched on, attention would be drawn to that area of ground or axis of enemy movement. This would be an invaluable aid for standing patrols, listening posts, village searches, PW cages, and protection of friendly installations.

*Miscellaneous Duties.* Dogs have been trained in the past to deliver messages, search for casualties or downed airmen, carry packs, act as sentries or guards, patrol within fences, detect marihuana, and recapture fugitives. With the successful application of selective genetics, every aspect of training dogs is improved.

**Military Birds**

Imagine a device which can patrol at twenty miles an hour and report accurately and immediately what lies over the next mountain or river. Much guess work and patrol time would be saved, let alone casualties. The maintenance cost of this device is, literally, chicken feed. Here are a few examples of what we could train our feathered friends to do:

*Recce/Patrol.* Birds can be trained to respond to enemy personnel, equipment, stores, and the various military hardware such as guns, etc. The keen eye of a bird is capable of differentiation between the real thing and dummies. Its training, which would be based on a food reward system, could be tailored to meet this requirement. The control and direction of the bird
would be identical to methods already perfected by homing pigeon trainers, who use audio signals for direction indication and return to coop. The response of the bird, once it detected whatever it was trained to respond to, would be to land within a certain prescribed distance from the article. The action of the bird’s wings and body on landing could switch on a micro beacon, which would indicate the position of the bird to an aerial configuration in a base area. The decision on whether to bombard, search, or deploy attack bio-sensor devices could be reached by the commander in the field, and the recce bird recalled to base. This device would not replace the necessity for human patrolling; however, it could draw our attention to specific areas of ground when making a patrol plan. The bird could be released from a base for reconnaissance purposes or released by a friendly patrol as an aid to patrolling.

**Attack Birds.** The possibility of training large birds to attack on command has not been researched, although the same principles as those suggested for pack patrol dogs could be followed.

**Sabotage, Incendiary, Nuisance.** Birds could be trained to fly into aircraft jet engine intakes while the aircraft is landing or taking off, land on radio and radar antennae, pick at sandbags, communications wire, and a host of other associated targets. Bats were trained with minor success during World War II to fly into enemy ammunition, POL, stores, buildings etc with incendiary bombs placed on their bodies. Conceive the problems of numerous small fires in ammunition or POL dumps, or of capturing a swarm of birds armed with incendiary devices. Obviously these birds would be a two-edged weapon; however, with successful conditioning the birds could be recalled at a time of our choosing, with the appropriate signal.

**Military Fish**

We know that fish can be trained for entertainment and research. It should also follow that fish could be trained to perform military functions. Of all sea animals perhaps the most trainable and responsive to human handling is the bottle nosed dolphin. This fish is fearless, formidable, intelligent, and
responds well to training. The uses that could be made of fish include reconnaissance, early warning of enemy ship or submarine approach, attacking ships with suitable explosive devices, and creating electronic confusion.

Fish could be trained to respond to submarine electronic signals, and the training behaviour shaped by the use of good training psychology and selective genetics. They could form part of an attack or defence force on naval vessels, or coastal installations.

Dog handler removes a block of TNT from a stump after mine dog Rex had responded to its presence.

**Other Animals**

Horses can be trained for specific military purposes by the use of selective genetics breeding programmes. In the defence of Australia, perhaps the kangaroo may provide similar services
as those described for dogs. Kangaroos are trainable, although it is unknown at this time to what extent they could be used for military purposes. Maybe rats can be trained to provide specific rodent problems.

**Advantages and Disadvantages**

As with all military systems and equipments there are good and bad points to enhance or detract from their usage.

**Advantages of Bio-sensor Devices**

- For the most part they are hard to detect as military devices when first encountered. RAAF roundels would not appear on the wings of military birds, nor tactical insignia appear on a bottle nosed dolphin’s carcase. This would mean that the enemy would have to suspect every bio-sensor device in that species whether military or not.

- Bio-sensor devices can be trained against enticement by strangers, which means that capture would be difficult.

- Even if captured, the enemy may not have the knowledge at his disposal to re-train the device.

- With a proper breeding programme, production of bio-sensor devices is inexpensive when compared with purchases of sophisticated electronic systems.

- Bio-sensor devices are able to distinguish the difference between genuine articles and dummies.

- Bio-sensor devices are capable of being recalled and reused instantly.

- They are capable of pinpointing targets quickly and accelerating interpretation of information available to commanders in the field.

- Bio-sensor devices can be transported in theatre quickly by conventional means.
Disadvantages of Bio-sensor Devices

- The initial setting up of a bio-sensor laboratory is expensive, and results from the research may take many generations of the species, for example, ten generations of dog takes between eight to ten years.
- With effort, the bio-sensor devices can be destroyed or captured using conventional weapons.
- In many cases bio-sensor devices are dependent on weather and daylight.
- Where bio-sensor devices are trained in temperate climates, but are required to operate in the tropics, a long acclimatisation period is required.
- Some bio-sensor devices, such as horses, may be difficult to move tactically in theatre.

Conclusion

Australia is still primarily an agricultural country blessed with some of the world’s leading veterinarians and animal geneticists. Even so, we are behind other countries whose armies are developing bio-sensor devices in some of the military functions mentioned in this article. The Bio-Sensor Laboratory in the USA has had success with dogs in selective genetics, improving as time passes. Australia has the potential to become a world leader in the production of bio-sensor devices, which may in fact make obsolete many sophisticated electronic systems which we cannot afford to buy. Probably a restriction to the acceptance of bio-sensor devices is a normal rejection of a system which is not battery operated or turned on and off with a switch. Such thinking may deprive Australia of a whole new field of weaponry, at this time still in its infancy. Furthermore, should bio-sensor devices be adopted by the Australian Army, the usual reaction of handing over unusual tasks to the RAE should not prevail. Instead, the introduction of a combat Veterinary Corps with geneticists, veterinarians and combat corps representatives should be the requirement.
For those of you who consider this article to be another tall fish story which is strictly for the birds, remember this — we are already going to the dogs.
THE SOLDIER
THE BATTLEFIELD
AND LEADERSHIP

Lieutenant Colonel Ijaz Ahmad
Pakistan Army

THE history of the world is largely the story of man fighting man in groups of ever-increasing size with weapons producing greater and greater slaughter and destruction. As soon as a weapon came into the hands of troops, tactics and methods of employment were evolved; on the one hand, to enhance the effects of the weapon and, on the other, to minimize them. Thus, the science of warfare continues to be a constantly changing phenomenon.

Currently, the question which disturbs military thinkers is the degree to which future war will involve the use of nuclear

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weapons. It has sometimes been theorized that future conflict would mean the massive employment of missiles, nuclear weapons, and electronic means, thereby making it a pushbutton type.

But the attainment of success by these means alone seems impossible. Armies will still remain the sheet anchor. The man, as in the past, will continue to be the supreme force on the battlefield. He cannot be replaced by any mechanical devices. However, recent developments in the technology of warfare and the frightening effects and the destructive nature of the latest weapons are likely to influence his behaviour. These will create mental and physical stresses which will consequently place greater premium on the ingenuity of military leadership.

A glance at events of past wars reveals that the outcome of battles has largely been dependent upon the kind of triangular relationship that existed between combat conditions, the soldier, and leadership. And within this indivisible linkage, the most significant factors in achieving success have been the elements of leadership and moral power. These qualities have been illustrated by great military leaders of the past in various ways:

Genius. Napoleon Bonaparte inspired great confidence in his own genius. He was an outstanding organizer, had a true conception of war, and was thus able to visualize grand strategy correctly—bringing him immense victories. But what Napoleon found most valuable was a thorough study of human nature under war conditions—men’s behaviour, impact of stresses and strains on discipline, effects of fear, hunger, lack of confidence, oppressions of responsibility, and response to the call of demanding loyalty, patriotism, and sacrifice. He was able to work on the minds and emotions of his own men and his enemies—both at long and close range—with skill that few generals have equalled.

Audacity. Audacity and bold self-confidence were exhibited by some of the great Moslem generals like Khalid ibn-al-Walid at the Battle of Yarmuk where he fought against overwhelming odds; Tariq ibn-Ziyad during the invasion of Spain when he
burned his boats on landing ashore to drive home the point that there was no retreat; Mohammed Bin Qasim leading an army at the age of 18 during the conquest of (Sind) India; Salah-al-Din’s magnificent victory at the Battle of Hattin, inflicting final defeat on crusaders of Europe; Sultan Mohammed II during the prolonged seige and final capture of the fortress of Constantinople; and Sultan Tipu’s gallant fight at Mysore in India against the mighty strength of the British East India Company and dissident Indian rulers.

These leaders were immune to the fears and apprehensions that beset lesser men. In fact, they had fully proved what B. H. Liddell Hart had to say much later in 1929, in *Thoughts on War*, that the issue of battles is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders. Additionally, they displayed through sheer dint of their leadership how inferior strength but superior quality can rout much larger armies on the battlefield.

**Physical Fitness.** According to Napoleon, the first quality of a soldier is fortitude in enduring fatigue and hardship, bravery but the second. Poverty, hardship, and misery, he considered, were the school of a good soldier. The soldiers, led by Miltiades during the Battle of Marathon, were very tough, for all Greeks had an almost religious reverence for athletics. The Spanish troops of Hannibal and the Turkish Janizaries, enlisted in boyhood, were well developed physically by planned exercises.

**Discipline.** Many great captains accorded special attention to the attainment of mental and physical robustness by their armies because these factors reflected directly upon the general state of discipline. At the Battle of Austerlitz, French soldiers stood steady in their ranks for hours while hostile cannonballs tore through their ranks. This was a stern test of discipline—both imposed and personal.

**Morals and Faith.** The successes obtained by the Moslem armies beginning with the holy wars under the guidance of Prophet Mohammed, and later during their conquests, starting in early 600, were founded mainly upon higher standards of morality, firm discipline, and, above all, on religious belief.
Loyalty and Spirit. Karl von Clausewitz ranked the military profession supreme. It was, according to him, an intellectually determined activity of men that could force decisions. Therefore, an army which is never overcome by fear, and fights for every inch of the ground, which even in the chaos of defeat does not lose its discipline or the respect for, and confidence in, its leaders, an army which regards every effort as a means toward victory, which is reminded of all these duties and virtues by the short catechism of one single conception, the honour of its weapons — such an army is imbued with the true soldierly spirit.

In essence, the strategy of battle is complex to the extent that its primary tools are men and not machines. An army is an organized mob bound together by discipline and mutual confidence. Its capacity to produce a decision has varied throughout history according to the operational capabilities at the time. These, in turn, depended upon the armament, equipment, and tactics of the opposing sides.

Another essential feature of traditional military strategy has been the capacity to grasp changes in the art of war more quickly than the enemy, and so be in a position to foresee the effect which new factors will have. The changes have sometimes facilitated, sometimes prevented, a successful outcome. There have been developing phases in which war has either been short and decisive or long and exhausting, incapable of producing any worthwhile results. The key to military strategy, therefore, is to understand the process by which the capacity of force to achieve a decision evolves.

In our present era, the battlefield has become vastly more complex than in earlier times. Nuclear strategy has resulted in a major upheaval in the entire concept of the use of force. The nuclear weapon, linked to modern means of delivery, is not, as it has sometimes been termed, merely a more powerful weapon. Its power alone puts it in a separate category. Whereas a nuclear bomb of 20 kilotons produces an explosion equivalent to a salvo from about four million field guns, a one-megaton thermonuclear bomb is equivalent to a salvo from 200 million field guns — affecting an area in hundreds of square miles.
The range of the delivery means, half the circumference of the earth, makes it possible to attack any point of the earth's surface with a considerable degree of accuracy. The two characteristics of power and range have produced an entirely new phenomenon. Furthermore this vast destructive power is almost totally mobile. Conventional armed forces would, therefore, appear to be out of date—at least at first sight.

The Soldier

The advancement in science and technology has not only revolutionized the arsenal of weaponry but has equally had an unprecedented impact on the soldier. The soldier is fading out who, in the past, exhibited immense pride in wearing the sword, considered being in uniform or carrying colours as a distinguished position of nobility, guarded the frontiers jealously, and never thought it too great to lay down his life on the command of his superior.

The new generation is more comfort oriented, attuned to divergent beliefs, socially and politically, so that it will become increasingly difficult to fill the armies with loyal diehard warriors that the forces had in the past.

Heretofore, the bulk of soldiers of most countries came from the rural areas, where the youth was accustomed to a hardy life and adjusted easily to military service and discipline. Today, in contrast, the urban youth lives in a freer, more permissive and sophisticated society. He is bound to be influenced by a number of factors:

- A fast-growing concept of individualism, due to rising standards in education, which may lead to the challenging of authority.

- Progressive attitudes and varying ideological and political affiliations may mean the questioning the validity of wars and the necessity of maintaining unproductive organizations of armed forces.
• Greater zest for accumulation of wealth.
• Lack of martial inspiration due to negative attitudes toward hard physical work.
• Greater requirements for recreational facilities than the army may afford.
• Dislike for routine — a resistance to the subtle sense of discipline.
• Diminishing allegiance to religion and country.
• Increasing psychological and emotional tensions.
• Addiction to drugs and such other vices.

There is, therefore, in man a challenge no less important than the future strategy of employment of nuclear weapons.

The Leader

The third pillar of our military triangle, the leader, comes from almost the same kind of stock already discussed. He will have to emerge as a personality at least the equal, if not ahead, of his predecessors professionally. He will be faced with two major problems: to motivate and lead his modern command, and successfully to outwit and destroy the enemy who may be better equipped.

No less important would be the increased strains of the many imponderables pertaining to operations and logistics under the immense uncertainties of war.

We cannot conclude from the foregoing that war is approaching its end. In an ideological age, the fundamental causes of war are profoundly psychological and cannot be eliminated either by a negation or an increase of physical force. All it means is that one form of war has become obsolete and another is in the process of replacing it. However, a plausible limitation on the means of future war might be the enormous cost of sophisticated weapons. In this regard, it may be noted that it no
longer appears possible for even medium-sized nations to equip themselves with the full range of hardware.

One conclusion that can be drawn from the study of the evolution of war is that, in conventional warfare, stabilization of the front on the pattern of past World Wars will be impossible. The strategic situation will, therefore, be fluid. It can also be said that limited wars, with conventional means, will continue to arise, with the danger that the superpowers will be drawn in and decide to unleash the nuclear weapons. In recent years, a few such sharp engagements have already set the pattern. The war between Pakistan and India in 1965 has been a link in the same chain.

**Mobility Factor**

But significantly, it is the quality and not the quantity of soldiers that will determine the outcome of wars—whether limited or not. Further, manoeuvre is becoming of greater importance owing to the great mobility conferred on modern forces by motorization and high-speed communications, making it possible to achieve rapid decisions.

Air-transported forces will provide great depth to land battles, and battles may take place mostly on an area basis rather than along an extended front of a theatre of operation. Experience has also shown that new inventions allow passing advantages only, until they become general and the entire matter reduces itself to mere manpower. The art of warfare, therefore, calls for a greater extent of knowledge and talent.

Neither can we lose sight of the increased importance of unconventional warfare and infiltration as a form of manoeuvre. Since 1945, these wars have occurred without cessation in one country or another. Under certain circumstances, infantry can easily assume the role of guerilla fighters, thereby maintaining its dominant place on the battlefield.

War will continue to involve great physical exertion and suffering. Since survival lies with the fittest, physical fitness
would continue to remain essential. Similarly, the other military virtue of importance for an army is moral power, and where it is wanting, it will be found that results are not commensurate with the efforts made.

The leader and the led being part of one whole, the greater is the necessity that when a commander leans on his troops, the surer he should be that his demands will be answered.

Psychologically, the fear of the unknown is the enemy of man on the battlefield. Realizing that even well-planned operations during non-nuclear conditions have seldom unfolded as visualized, the nerves of commanders are likely to be heavily taxed during unforeseen situations, particularly under nuclear exchanges. In such confused battle conditions, indecisiveness, especially at higher levels of command, could bring disastrous results.

Equally important will be the effect on young officers and inexperienced soldiers of battle fears, vast destruction, unexpected setbacks, and psychological depression. This will mean low morale. The problem of commanding and controlling such persons will be greater than dealing with the enemy.

Every new war continues to add new dimensions to the fields of tactics and weapons. Therefore, rigidity, complacency, or inflexible attitudes toward the art of fighting are sure to eat away at the very roots of battle efficiency. Human behavior will largely determine the course of battle. Therefore, judicious selection of leaders, as well as men, cannot be overstressed.

The human element that may be available may not meet the desired bill due to changing environmental conditions, but one has to depend upon the material available. What may appear prudent is to ensure that appropriate laws are enacted concerning the educational systems, physical and social standards, and other standards of recruitment. It may also be necessary to so mobilize public opinion that future young men are equipped with the qualities of audacity and boldness, motivated to brave dangers and imbued with the spirit of patriotism and loyalty, free of
unacceptable political affiliations and dangerous social vices, and have genuine respect for authority and discipline.

Once proper selection of troops and officers is made, the next important step is the undertaking of realistic, effective, objective, and progressive training of all ranks, professionally, under acute warlike mental and physical stresses. The qualities of audacity and leadership can be fostered by collective adventure training as an enlightened aspect of army planning.

Man remains the key element in warfare. How he is developed, trained, and led will determine the success or failure of our arms.

MONTHLY AWARD

The Board of Review has awarded the $10 prize for the best original article published in the June 1971 issue of the journal to Baron Geyr von Schweppenburg for his contribution 'Review of 1970'.

REDCOATS
Before the Revolution

Major E. J. O'Donnell, MC
Royal Australian Infantry

They came three thousand miles and died
To keep the past upon its throne;
Unheard, beyond the ocean tide,
Their English mother made her moan.
— Incription on the grave of the Redcoats who fell at Concord Bridge.

Introduction

In an era of carefully limited warfare, Great Britain had been so careless as to win a war decisively." This comment by a modern historian sets the stage for a discussion of the reasons why Britain retained her army in North America at the end of the Seven Years War against France. The second part of this

Major O'Donnell graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon in 1958. He served with 3RAR in Malaysia in 1963-65. During Confrontation he served in Sabah as GS03 (Psyops) and in Sarawak as IO of 3RAR. In 1967-68 he was a company commander with 7RAR in South Vietnam and then returned to RMC Duntroon as an instructor. He is now en route to the British Army Staff College, Camberley.
paper examines the extent to which the presence of the British Army was a grievance to the American colonists up to the time the first shots of the Revolution were fired at Lexington and Concord.

WHY THE ARMY WAS RETAINED IN NORTH AMERICA

Britain was faced with the problem of what to do with the army, which had been expanded dramatically during the war to double its normal size, with an even greater increase in the number of officers, many of whom had important political connections. Pitt, the great war leader, now out of office but still influential, argued that the Treaty of Paris had been mishandled and that a large army was still required in case hostilities broke out again. King George III, who took a childlike delight in manipulating his soldiers, saw that his own political influence could be increased through his control over officer appointments, and obviously his degree of influence would be in proportion to the number of regiments on the Active List. On the other hand, the Tory Opposition (the so-called Country Gentlemen) were anxious for a reduction in the size of the armed forces and were alarmed at the vast increase in government expenditure during the Seven Years War, which had taken the national debt from £72m to £132m. Another significant factor was that the British people shared a traditional dislike of a large standing army in time of peace.

The Earl of Bute’s government prepared the ground skilfully for their plan to retain a large peacetime army. The King asked for 85 regiments. Bute compromised with the Country Gentlemen and proposed 75 regiments. This increase over pre-war figures obtained the strong support of Pitt, while the Ministry’s decision to maintain the pre-war size of the army

2 Perhaps this is unfair to George III because his influence on the Army was generally beneficial and responsible, as was that of the other Hanoverians. See Shy, p. 69.
in the British Isles and to confine the increases to North America silenced the opposition. The effect for North America was that the peacetime army there was to be increased from 3,100 to 7,500 men and that there were to be 15 infantry regiments where there had been two.\(^5\)

As well as for the purely political reasons mentioned above, there were a number of valid military reasons for stationing a large British army in North America at this time. In the first place, the British had acquired vast new territories as a result of the Treaty of Paris. The St Lawrence Valley had a potentially hostile French population of 80,000, and it was obvious that a regular British garrison would be required there. The British government doubtless recalled the difficulty they had experienced prior to the Seven Years War in controlling the Acadians, and knew that their force in Canada would need to be a sizable one and composed of regular troops who would be available at all times. In addition, there was a need to establish effective British control over the 'interior' and the Floridas — not so much for defence, because the threat of external attack from the French on the Spanish had receded, but rather to establish sovereignty, 'guaranteeing if nothing else that British title to this vast area would not be jeopardized by failure to carry out physical occupation.'\(^6\)

The second main reason for maintaining troops in North America was for the regulation of Indian affairs. The American colonists had a long history of mistreatment of the Indians going back to the earliest days of settlement. This gradually became a matter for imperial concern and in 1755, through the influence of the Earl of Halifax, two superintendents for Indian affairs were appointed with the task of maintaining British interests among the Indians by pursuing a consistent and fair policy. The superintendents reported that the Indians were being cheated in the fur trade and through fraudulent land sales. Sir William Johnson, the superintendent for the Northern department, stated

\(^5\) Knollenberg, pp. 34-5. For a more detailed account of the political manoeuvring see Shy, Chapter II.

\(^6\) Shy, p. 55.
in 1762 that military garrisons would be necessary at the trading posts to make government regulations effective. There is an interesting letter from General Gage, then the military governor of Montreal, to Lord Amherst in which he says (also in 1762) that 'to remedy the inconveniences and abuses, which both the English and French have suffered, through the management of

(Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge)

General Thomas Gage, c.1769.

7 Shy, p. 59.
the Indian trade; I know no better method, than to assign a certain Number of Posts in the distant Country, to which only, the Traders should be allowed to Traffick'. There is no evidence that the government looked on the Indians as a military threat at this time, despite warnings from Johnson, while there is ample evidence that Amherst was badly surprised by the Pontiac uprising of late 1763. The conclusion therefore is that defence was not the main aim, but a clear need was seen for army posts to regulate trade in favour of the Indians.

Another reason for stationing British troops in North America, this time on the seaboard, was to curb the activities of American merchants engaged in smuggling principally with the West Indies. This had gone on during the war and had even reached the stage where American merchants were supplying islands about to be attacked by British and American forces. Amherst had complained of this in the strongest terms in 1762. The Privy Council in 1763 issued an order requiring the army to give its assistance for protecting revenue officers in the performance of their duties.

It has long been a matter for debate whether another reason for the presence of British troops was the desire of the British government to keep the older colonies in subjection. There are a number of contemporary documents which indicate clearly that British officials were well aware that the army could be used for this purpose. However, as John Shy rightly points out, 'the evidence is inconclusive because the authors of these documents were not decision-makers, and the degree to which their recommendations were accepted is open to doubt'. Nonetheless, the fact that these documents are to be found in the Shelburne Papers and the files of the Board of Trade proves that the government had at least considered the question of using the army to control the older colonies.

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8 Quoted in Shy. p. 59.
9 Shy. p. 57-62. Knollenberg (p. 88) demolished Beer's theory of 1907 that defence against an Indian rebellion was the main reason for the increase in the size of the British Army in North America.
10 Shy. p. 81.
Conclusion

For political reasons, then, the King and the government wished to retain as many regiments as possible on the Active List because of the power of patronage it gave them. It was more convenient that these regiments should be in North America than in the British Isles because of the traditional British feeling against a large peacetime standing army. The useful jobs to which this British Army in North America could be put were: first, to defend and occupy the boundaries of British North America; secondly, to enforce British regulations regarding the Indian trade; and lastly, to be in a position to enforce the imperial system throughout North America, including the older colonies.

THE EFFECT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE BRITISH ARMY

It is necessary now to consider the extent to which the presence of the British Army was a grievance to the colonists before Lexington and Concord. It is clear that at the end of the Seven Years War, Americans were proud of the Empire and of the contributions toward victory made jointly by the British Army and the colonial forces. The Puritan clergy went overboard in their praise of the men who had brought victory over Catholic France and Spain. A Presbyterian minister in New York exclaimed 'Havannah the rich, the strong, is fallen, is fallen. And this is British property. Sing aloud unto God, and exalt the right hand of his power.'

The first person to question the peacetime function of the British Army was an Englishman, Thomas Pownall, who had been a governor of New Jersey and then Massachusetts. In 1764 Pownall published a book called Administration of the Colonies in which he drew attention to the danger of appointing a peacetime commander-in-chief for America. He did not question the need for regular troops, but he foresaw trouble where a centralized army was located with, but independent of, the different colonial authorities, in particular the colonial governors.

12 Shy, p. 146-7 quotes some colourful examples of Puritan eulogy.
13 Quoted by Shy, p. 146.
One of the principal reasons for American goodwill towards Britain over the years had been the fact that the British had largely left the colonists alone—'salutary neglect' is the term sometimes used. The imperial system required colonists to pay certain customs dues but the laws had not been strictly enforced. Colonial legislatures had been accustomed to relative independence of the governors and the English parliament. With the decision to station a large peacetime army in North America, while at the same time reducing wartime expenditures, the British government was faced with the problem of obtaining revenue. The obvious answer was to make the colonists pay for their own defence. When Welbore Ellis, Secretary at War, presented the army Estimates on 25 February 1763 he said that the army in America was 'to be supported the first year by England, afterwards by the Colonies'. In 1764 parliament passed the American Act, which was clearly designed to raise a colonial

(Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc. New York)

British Troops on Boston Common, 1768.

14 Quoted by Knollenberg, p. 35.
revenue — the duties raised were to be used 'towards defraying the necessary Expenses of defending, protecting and securing the British Colonies and Plantations in America'. Grenville, who presented the bill, explained that it would provide between £225,000 and £400,000 a year towards the cost of maintaining the army in North America. The government made no effort to make the act palatable to Americans. It seems natural then, that some of the resentment against the act should have been transferred to the soldiers themselves.

The presence of the army became a cause for grievance again with the passage of the Quartering Act in 1765. Although the Quartering Act was not a direct tax, it was seen as an order to the colonial assemblies to tax themselves, and therefore it was a tax imposed without consent. All the assemblies dragged their feet when it came to putting the act into practice. Initially, while the army was scattered far and wide, the act did not directly affect many of the colonists, but with the end of the Indian uprising and the beginning of colonial opposition to British rule, Gage began to redeploy the army more towards the centres of population. Opposition to the Quartering Act was especially strong in New York, where many of the troops were stationed. This opposition became so strong that parliament felt impelled to pass the Restraining Act to prohibit all legislation by the New York assembly until provision was made for the King's troops.

The older colonies, especially those which had been settled by Puritans and Quakers, were peopled by men who were descendants of dissenters, many of whom had left England because they rejected those very values represented by the British Army. These Yankees had strong anti-authoritarian tendencies, and they tended to be both powerful and vocal in the community. To these men, the very presence of the army in

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15 Knollenberg, p. 143.
17 This point is ably argued by Edmund S. Morgan, *Birth of the Republic*. (Chicago 1956), p. 32.
North America was a grievance, and having to pay for its maintenance was even more so.\textsuperscript{18}

Other Americans objected to the army because they thought that it ought to be protecting them from the Indians. A document called ‘A Remonstrance of the distressed and bleeding Frontier Inhabitants of the Province of Pennsylvania’ dated 13 February 1764 states in part: ‘We cannot but observe with sorrow that Fort Augusta, which has been very expensive to this Province, has afforded us but little assistance during this or the last War. The men that were stationed at that place neither helped our distressed Inhabitants to save their Crops, nor did they attack our Enemies in their Towns, or patrole on our Frontiers.’\textsuperscript{19} The fact that the British government saw the role of the army more as one of regulating Indian trade was little consolation to settlers who looked to the army for protection and failed to get it.

It would be wrong to think that all Americans were opposed to the presence of the British Army. Gage, the commander-in-chief, was a moderate man who did all in his power to smooth relations between the civil and the military.\textsuperscript{20} He was himself married to an American, and was generally liked and trusted by Americans. When he left for England on leave in 1773 he was presented with the freedom of the city of New York by its citizens,\textsuperscript{21} many of whom had earlier opposed the Quartering Act. The army became partly Americanized over the years and took in many American recruits. Many officers and soldiers settled in the colonies after their regiments returned to the British Isles.\textsuperscript{22} British officers enjoyed a favourable position in colonial society.

Major opposition to the presence of the army began after the movement of troops to the populous seaboard from 1766 on-

\textsuperscript{18} Hargreaves, p. 189.
\textsuperscript{20} John R. Alden, General Gage in America (Louisiana 1948) is a carefully documented and sympathetic biography by a distinguished American historian
\textsuperscript{21} Alden, pp. 193-4.
\textsuperscript{22} Shy, p. 359.
wards. It was widely feared that troops were being used to overawe the colonists following colonial opposition to the Stamp Act and subsequent measures. Although Benjamin Franklin had originally favoured the stationing of regular troops 'not only as a guard against foreign invasion but against intestine disorder', he had become by 1764 opposed to a large peacetime army. The despatch of British troops to Boston in 1768 after British customs officials had been mistreated led to widespread resentment. This was expressed in the Resolutions of the Boston town meeting of 13 September 1768, '... and therefore the raising or keeping

(Oxford University Press, New York)
The Boston Massacre, 5 March 1770. Troops of the 29th Regiment firing on the Boston mob.

23 Quoted in Hargreaves, p. 183.
a standing army, without their consent in person, or by representatives of their own free election, would be an infringement of their natural, constitutional, and charter rights; and the employing such army for the enforcing of laws made without the consent of the people, in person, or by their representatives, would be a grievance'.

Contemporary accounts give some idea of the feeling after the Boston Massacre. The Boston Gazette and Country Journal of 12 March 1770 said 'the town of Boston affords a recent and melancholy demonstration of the destructive consequences of quartering troops among citizens in time of peace, under a pretence of supporting the laws and aiding civil authority'.

Captain Thomas Preston, the officer involved in the affray, wrote, 'it is a matter of too great notoriety to need any proofs that the arrival of his Majesty's troops in Boston was extremely obnoxious to its inhabitants. They have ever used all means in their power to weaken the regiments, and to bring them into contempt by promoting and aiding desertions'. Two years later in delivering the second Boston Massacre Oration, Joseph Warren could use the incident to stir up patriotic feelings against Britain and the troops in purple language. 'When our alarmed imagination presented to our view our houses wrapped in flames, our children subjected to the barbarous caprice of the raging soldiery, our beauteous virgins exposed to all the insolence of unbridled passion, our virtuous wives...' and so on.

Conclusion

In summary, then, it can be seen that initially the British Army in North America was popular, largely because of its success in the Seven Years War. The moderate behaviour of General Gage helped also to make the presence of the army acceptable, at least in the first few years. However, this goodwill was dissipated when Britain enacted her various laws to obtain a colonial revenue. There grew a feeling that the army was

there not for protection but to keep Americans quiet while Britain took away American liberties. The succession of incidents from the Stamp Act, the Declaratory Act, the Townshend Acts and finally the sending of troops to Boston changed suspicion to certainty that the army was being employed to overawe the population. This sense of grievance paved the road to Lexington and Concord, where were fired the first shots in the American Revolution.

**OTHER WARS**

*North America, 1777*: Hitherto events in North America had been the concern of the salons rather than the barracks; for, from the military point of view, the initial operations appeared insignificant to European onlookers. The numbers involved were small. Of the population of the thirteen colonies only one-third comprised American patriots; one-third was indifferent, and one-third remained loyal to England. Only one in twenty-five of the Americans, excluding the loyalist third, ever took the field, and Washington seldom had more than 10,000 men under arms at any one time.

Furthermore, Washington himself was, as late as 1775, 'not conscious of the wish for independence'; while on the British side, General Sir William Howe had actually voted in the House of Commons against his Government's policy toward the colonists, and his colleague, Major-General Earl Cornwallis had done likewise in the House of Lords. Indeed it seemed that the commanders in the field were averse to committing their troops wholeheartedly to battle hoping fondly that the politicians would in the meanwhile compose their differences without the irrevocable breach of all-out war. Until he left America on 24th May, 1778, Howe actually maintained a correspondence with Washington, whose last letter to him read:

'General Washington's compliments to General Howe — does himself the pleasure to return to him a dog which accidentally fell into his hands and, by the inscription on the collar, appears to belong to General Howe.'

*By Command of the Emperor*, by S. J. Watson (1957).
A GUIDE TO MARXISM, by P. H. Vigor. (Faber)

Reviewed by Major J. S. Graham, a candidate at the Australian Staff College, Queenscliff in 1970. The other reviews are by fellow officers attending the Staff College during the year.

To the reader who has been forced by circumstance to study the complicated subject of Marxism, and has found the going both difficult and boring, Mr Vigor's book will come as a pleasant relief. His crisp, succinct style of writing and the clear, logical layout of the book enable the student to grasp quickly the main tenets of Marxism, while the well placed recapitulation paragraphs focus attention on the key points of each section.

The book is divided into four main parts and concludes with a glossary of Marxist-Leninist terminology. Parts one and two contain the real substance of the book as they deal with the main ingredients of the Marxist theory (Part One) and with the Leninist additions to the theory (Part Two). Parts three and four may not be of as much interest to the Australian reader, as they are concerned with basic development of European communism; however, part three does include an interesting chapter on the Chinese variations of the Marxist-Leninist theory, and part four discusses the likely development of Soviet communism in the 1980s.

The author's approach to the subject is interesting and slightly unusual. The reader is first given a brief biography of Marx against the background of his times. Then, realizing per-
haps the difficulty of creating a logical flow from ideas culled from scattered and diverse sources, Mr Vigor gives a concise summary of the Marxist theory. He follows this with a series of chapters each of which deals with one single idea, belief, thought, or inference of Marx. These chapters are short and for the most part simple and uncluttered by Marxist 'jargon'. On the rare occasion when a chapter is unavoidably a little longer and more complicated, such as the chapter on Marx's analysis of the capitalist system, the reader is provided with a concluding summary to clear his mind of any doubts or loss of continuity which he might have experienced.

Because of the clear logical layout of the book, the main points of the theories of Marx and Lenin can be quickly grasped and referred back to. Indeed, if the reader skims through the chapter headings of parts one and two in correct sequence, he has a potted course in Marxism/Leninism to hand. This does not imply that Mr Vigor's writing is without depth, but rather that his techniques of writing and construction are so concise and logical that the mind of the reader is not cluttered by side issues or embellishment.

A Guide to Marxism is in no sense a critique. Mr Vigor has made no attempt to prove or disprove anything, but has set out the ideas of Marx and Lenin quite impartially. He has however felt it appropriate to offer comment at various stages of the book, but in no way attempts to influence the reader. His comment is designed rather to draw attention to theories which can now be looked at with hindsight. The author's method is to invite the reader to consider the stated facts and to draw his own inference; for example, having expounded Marx's proposition (made in 1886) that the workers must rise up and destroy capitalism, he then points out that at the time of writing the book (1966) this had not yet happened. Instead of working for the overthrow of capitalism, trade unions on the whole have used their power to negotiate for better conditions for the worker. Vigor goes on to say:

'What inferences you may care to draw from these facts are purely a matter for you: the important thing, when you have drawn them, is to remember that they are inferences. Myself I
should be concerned not so much to draw an inference as to ask four questions;

Why is it that Western Trade Unions have chosen to ignore Marx’s advice?
Would it have made any difference if they had not done so?
Are they likely to continue to do so in the future? If they are, what are the prospects for the destruction of capitalism?

This technique is used through the book to direct the thoughts of the reader without intruding the author’s opinions.

The book is well worth while. It deals with a subject which demands the close attention of all students of world affairs, and it is a very good starting point for the reader approaching the subject of Marxism for the first time. For those officers whose interests or studies lie in these fields, the book is strongly recommended.

**ISSUES IN THE FUTURE OF ASIA.** Communist and Non-Communist Alternatives, edited by Richard Lowenthal. (Frederick A. Praeger).

*Reviewed by Major H. C. Franklin*

ASIA is the most populous continent in the world and is also a continent beset with many problems. The problems are related to social, political and economic modernization and are of continuing interest to the West because they will still be problems long after the present interest in Vietnam and Cambodia fades away. The alternatives offered to the countries of Asia in solving their problems lie between the West and the two Communist influences of Russia and China.

It is realized that Asia is an area of conflict with Communism, but as the editor says in his preface, ‘the problem posed by the conflict with Communism in Asia is not simply that of repelling a military assault but of responding to a long-term challenge’. This book, a collection of five essays, is concerned with a number of factors that may determine whether Asia will, or
will not, come under the rule of Communist Party regimes. The five essays were presented by members of the International Research Advisory Council of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation at a study conference on Asia assembled in London in 1966.

The essays cover economic development versus anti-Westernism, agrarian reform in Asia, Indian Communism, the political implications of Buddhism and the political thoughts of Sun Yat-sen. The first essay is a good account of emerging states and how these states are faced with the problem of balancing economic development with strong anti-Westernism. The roles of Russia and China in this area are well covered, and by implication, so is the role of the West. The final conclusion leaves the choice between Russia, China and the West as an unsolved dilemma for all concerned.

The contribution on agrarian reform in Asia tends to be an historical account of Asian farming methods, Russian and Chinese agricultural policies and Asian agrarian reforms to date. Japanese and Taiwan agrarian reforms are cited as particular examples of successful reforms in Asia and to highlight the conclusion that agrarian reforms are necessary to contribute to 'a more balanced political structure, a more open society and a more mixed economy than exist at present'.

The third essay adds little to the theme of the book as it is too particular, being concerned only with the social bases of Indian Communism in the State of Kerala. Comparisons are made with Kerala and other areas in India, but, perhaps because of the complex mixture of class, caste and religion peculiar to India, the author did not extend his study to make valid conclusions applicable to other Asian countries.

The final two contributions on Buddhism and Sun Yat-senism come closer to an understanding of the issues in Asia. These two essays may have been better placed at the beginning of the book since they show a deeper knowledge of the nationalist/religious issues in Asia from which the other issues develop.

Throughout, the essays seem to concentrate too much on the historical account and Russian and Chinese policies and reactions, without offering the non-Communist alternatives pro-
mised in the title. If a concluding chapter had been added by the editor, the loose ends of the individual studies could have been tied together to provide the offered alternatives.

The editor wrote the first essay and the other contributors are respectively, Werner Klatt, Donald Zagonia, Emanuel Sarkisyany and Gottfried Kindermann. With the exception of Donald Zagonia, they are either professors or fellows of European universities: Donald Zagonia is a professor at the City University of New York. Each contributor has had books and articles published on world Communism and studies of Asia.

The essayist’s contributions to this volume are such as to provide a worthwhile book for those interested in gaining background information on some of the problems confronting Asia. However, their work is not considered to be in sufficient detail for the keen student of Asian affairs.

SURPRISE WARFARE, by Albert Morglen. (George Allen and Unwin)

Reviewed by Major Satish Talwar (Indian Army).

THE study of military history is to prepare the mind for the unexpectedness and originality of war. Napoleon said, ‘the enemy may have three courses of action, but he is likely to adopt the fourth’. Today this element of surprise stands as a prominent characteristic of modern wars. Surprise Warfare, a translation by Kenneth Morgan of Colonel Albert Merglen’s book La Guerra de l’Inattendu shows how this element in the hand of imaginative commanders and ingenious technicians can outwit and beat a formidable enemy.

The book embraces all subversive, airborne and amphibious operations. It unfolds with the Cuban War of Liberation and goes on to recount the preparation and development of a number of these surprise actions; each of them truly constituting a ‘suspense story’. Among these actions are those that took place during the German invasion of Belgium, Greece and Crete, the Allied operations in Burma and Ethiopia, and the American operations in various parts of South-East Asia.
Of particular interest to the Australian reader is an operation in New Guinea during World War II. Colonel Merglen draws attention to the fact that amphibious and airborne combined operations at Lae demonstrate the great possibilities of air and sea manoeuvre in a theatre of operations characterized by vast distances, airfield difficulties and absence of lines of communications. He further adds that the airborne operation of 5 September 1943 at Nadzab is the only one of this kind carried out by the Allies — a paratroop assault followed by air-landing of a large formation, and no link-up with other ground forces. Operations such as these, and those of the Chindits in Burma, suggest likely future airborne operations.

Those who have fought the weary war in Vietnam may find the French paratroop raids into North Vietnam of interest. Based on accurate intelligence and the flexibility and surprise guaranteed by the paratroop units, the French did gain important successes. But they were lured into measuring their victories in terms of booty captured. Instead of exploiting this new found concept the French remained content in 'gathering a few feathers instead of catching the bird'.

Of the operations in Korea, the author commends the execution of the Inchon Landings as remarkable in its conception. He sets one thinking however with the suggestion as to what might have been the results if an airborne force was landed between Seoul and Pyongyang in conjunction with the amphibious landing! This might remain as one of the 'ifs' of the Korean War.

The author, a colonel in command of the French ecole des Troupes Aeroportees and a leading expert on parachute warfare, writes with the intimate grasp of a professional sure of his job. He predicts that many future wars, whether limited or general, will involve troop dispersion, lines of communications which are non-existent or have been destroyed, and great distances. In these circumstances, parachute troops operating by air will be one of the few bodies of men capable of manoeuvre.

It is a pity that one misses the colonel's comments on the Anglo-French air-landings over Suez in 1956. The book touches
upon subversive operations but remains basically a textbook in parachute operations. In its final analysis it brings home the point that 'uncertainty is the essence of war, surprise its rule'.

The book is simple and lucid in its style and easy to read, it is illustrated with some excellent sketches. On the whole the book should prove a valuable textbook in our tactical schools. It should also be regarded as a 'required reading' for those who wish to understand the element of surprise.


Reviewed by Major I. J. Gollings

'THE thesis of this book is that the Eagle [United States intervention in South Vietnam] played a crucial and vital role not in successfully resisting Communism — for Communism is no weaker now than it was in 1954 or 1961 and may well be stronger — but in weakening the Buddhist-Nationalist alternative. Now that the struggle in Vietnam is more political and social than military, the Vietnamese generals and their army are not very well equipped to handle the situation. I think it is probable that the South Vietnamese Lotus — the Buddhist-Nationalist alternative — would have handled Communism more in the interests of the Vietnamese people, than did the American military intervention, and its pistol-packing generals.'

To support his thesis, the author details the history of Vietnam for the last 100 years. He asserts that the present war is the culmination of a revolution which has taken a century to mature and that its primary cause has been 'the peculiar and lasting nature of foreign control — mainly that of the French'. He admits that 'no one can be sure that he possesses the ultimate truth about Vietnam [and that] simplistic views of the war must be rejected', but goes on to state that 'the only thing dividing the Vietnamese is the question of who should control the united Vietnam, the Vietnamese in the North or those in the South'. Presumably the author does not accept the alternative, that is, each part of Vietnam continuing to control only itself, for he does not discuss this possibility.
His detailed account of events leading to the present situation in Vietnam provides a convincing argument against Western (particularly American) involvement. After quoting the 1964 statement by the US Defense Secretary, Mr McNamara, that ‘The survival of an independent government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of South-East Asia and to the free world that I can conceive of no alternative other than to take all necessary measures within our capability to prevent a communist victory’, he goes on to argue the case that the war in Vietnam, is not a manifestation of a simple, monolithic aim of world domination. Later he rejects the validity of the ‘domino theory’, and criticizes the forward concept of Australia’s defence policy calling for ‘constructive relationships with Asia and a convincing system of continental defence for Australia’ which would have to result from fundamental changes to Australian attitudes.

The governments of Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore will soon want withdrawal of Australian forces from their countries, claims Dr Cairns, and ‘we will begin to see that the vital political, social and economic transformation in economically under-developed countries cannot take place without some upheaval and ... that the people of these countries are best able to handle their matters themselves’. Further, that Australia could benefit from these upheavals and increase mutually beneficial trade with South-East Asia — a matter which is now hindered by our military role and presence in the region.

Two matters lessen the impartiality of his work. One is the assertion that the United States is more interventionist and active in aiding counter-revolutionary campaigns than the Soviet Union or China have been in aiding revolutionary movements, without going on to mention Russian intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1969. The second is the unwarranted ridicule to which he subjects Nguyen Cao Ky, the South Vietnamese Vice-President, which also tends to diminish the objectivity of his arguments.

But these shortcomings aside, the conclusions arrived at by the author are of great topical interest and are convincing. He states that Australia accepted a military obligation (that is, involvement with the United States in South Vietnam) for political
reasons alone, not through any hope that we would be able to make a significant contribution to the war, but rather to 'completely cement the relationships between Australia and America'. This leads on to his main conclusion that 'it is time we began to plan and build effectively to defend ourselves from our own resources', a point of view since stated by the government — Dr Cairns’ political opponents.

As a parliamentarian and university lecturer, the holder of the degrees of Master of Commerce and Doctor of Philosophy and a noted author and lecturer on Asian affairs, Dr Cairns brings to this book the authority necessary to argue his case convincingly from the point of view of his own political philosophy.

In reading the concluding chapters of this work one wonders however what the author’s aim was in writing it. Was it to be an argument against intervention in Vietnam or a discussion of Australia’s defence and foreign policies? Although probably the former he discusses the latter aspect in some detail.

In either case, service readers and those interested in the war in Vietnam, Australia’s defence policy and our relationships with South-East Asia, should read this book. It provides a viewpoint of these topics contrary in many respects to that of the present government, but written as it is, by a prominent member of our alternative government it gives an indication of the possible form of Australia’s defence and foreign policies under a government formed by the Australian Labour Party.

Quotations and references are adequate and well organized but the index is rather meagre. The absence of a bibliography in a work of this kind is disappointing.

Reviewed by Major J. R. Dent (British Army)
MICHELE Ray’s book gives a most fascinating account of her travels and experiences as a war correspondent in South Vietnam. She gives the reader a factual account of her impressions of that unhappy country — impressions formed during her visit from July 1966 to February 1967.
The story starts as the Boeing carrying the author lands at Saigon’s International Airport. She has come on behalf of a French press agency and a French newspaper to cover the war in Vietnam.

The first half of the book deals with Michèle’s reception into the press corps, and with a number of operations on which she accompanies both American and Vietnamese units. Her writing is full of vivid impressionistic detail, and the reader sees many different sides of life in Vietnam as varied as the following: the ubiquity of Saigon’s black market, the boyish yet professional atmosphere aboard an American aircraft carrier, the importance of the country’s underlying French infrastructure and the struggles of an American military adviser to ‘steer’ his Vietnamese counterpart. No detail however small escapes her notice, and each receives her perceptive and most entertainingly readable comment.

The second half of this book deals mainly with the author’s impressions of the Viet Cong. Bored with the round of press corps parties, spasmodic Viet Cong mortar attacks and arduous but routine patrol operations, she decides to go it alone. Relying on her femininity, French nationality, civilian clothing and Renault car, she determines to risk mines and ambushes to travel in territory controlled by the Viet Cong. Old Vietnam hands advise her against such a risky scheme but this girl has real courage and initiative, and duly sets out.

After a number of unique and fascinating journeys, the inevitable happens and the author is captured by the Viet Cong. Although the Viet Cong often kill their prisoners on capture, Michèle survives. Moreover, she is well treated during her three weeks of captivity. Her experiences range from hiding in a Viet Cong dug-out during a heavy American bombing raid to holding friendly conversations in French with a university professor from Hanoi. On her release from the simple, unsophisticated and, in her case, friendly world of the Viet Cong, she is faced with a high pressure barrage of questions and interviews from the Americans and her friends. At this point the book ends, with the author more than a little confused as to where right really lies in this conflict.
Michèle Ray writes with startling clarity and effect. She makes liberal use of anecdotes and quotations both of others and of her own innermost thoughts, and also uses the short paragraph to give extra life to her exciting and rapidly moving tale. The reader really is right beside her throughout all her experiences in Vietnam and is never left with a wish for more detail or realism. Incidentally, the author is a young, attractive and vivacious ex-racing driver and Chanel model. This will explain to the reader why she receives such an enthusiastic welcome from the predominantly male society she meets.

There is little to criticize in this book apart from two small personal biases exhibited by the author. In the first case she is understandably a little too pro-French and perhaps a little envious of the Americans when they seem to succeed where her countrymen failed. Secondly, one cannot help but feel that she paints too glowing a picture of the Viet Cong, not because, as some suggest, she was used as an instrument of propaganda by the Viet Cong, but because of a natural human relief at receiving good treatment and freedom after half expecting torture and death.

This is a book I would honestly recommend to any Service reader, even if it makes him a little angry at times. Read from cover to cover it tells an exciting story and is a hard book to put down. Alternatively it can be opened at any page and enjoyed for its invigorating, pungent and readable style. In addition, it contains adequate maps and over thirty excellent photographs, all of which help to bring the reader even closer to Vietnam.

In conclusion, this is a rare book covering a complex moral and military situation in a strife-torn country. Rare, because it presents all points of view without overall bias, and at the same time exposes failings on both sides. If it causes the most hardened Communist or anti-Communist to pause for a moment and consider the other's point of view, then this book has really achieved something.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel T. L. Gaurano (Philippines Army)

THE book contains a comprehensive selection of Soviet military writings that obviously were allowed to be printed after gaining the approval of Communist Party leaders. The constraint and adherence to party line by the Soviet writers are very evident in the repetitive phrases and propaganda jargon that constantly appear in every article. This monotonous feature must not divert the reader from the significant fact that the dominant theme running through all these military writings is the constant Soviet drive for superiority in all of the forms which military power might develop.

The Soviet Union is unwaveringly committed to a nuclear strategy. The ‘revolution’ has been a complete restructuring of their military forces. It is described as a well planned and vigorously pursued transformation of the entire Soviet Armed Forces, including civil defence. First priority is still given to strategic nuclear forces, consisting of thermo-nuclear weapons and their delivery systems-missiles, nuclear submarines, and long-range aircraft. High priority is also given to strategic defensive forces, now generally known as her anti-ballistic missile system, which have alarmed the United States for well justified reasons. Although some of the articles imply that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the battlefield is being carefully studied, it would be naive to consider that at the present moment the Soviets have not achieved this capability.

Articles selected were written by authors who have won the Frunze prize, given by the Ministry of Defence for ‘excellent writing on military theory’ or who were listed as contributors to Military Strategy or to other recognized publications, or who are faculty members of leading military institutions, such as the Frunze Military Academy, the Academy of the General Staff, or the Lenin Military Political Academy. These men are prolific writers whose works have been for many years authoritative.
Kintner and Scott have effectively discredited the belief among many people in the United States that Soviet military leaders form a group distinct and apart from the leaders of the Communist Party and the general western belief that they are two groups hostile to each other. Senior Russian military leaders are members of the Party and high ranking marshals and commanders are members of the Central Committee. The Russian writers' views are therefore not only official military doctrines but also military views approved by the Communist Party.

Unfortunately, the authors reprinted too many writers' closely similar articles to prove the unchanging and standard military doctrines and strategy. This tends to reduce the reader's interest. A more discriminating selection could have presented the same facts sufficiently at one third the present length of the book. Part III, 'The Adaptation of Clausewitz to Nuclear War', is sufficient to explain the whole contents of the book.

The reader must not miss Article 14: The Tasks Are Important, Crucial, by the Chief of Civil Defence in the Soviet Union. He has the duty of providing a civilian shelter programme to complement the Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems. 'A practical inexpensive approach for protection measures, using materials readily available, is stressed.' All countries, including Australia, would be denying their citizens very valuable knowledge and protection in the event of nuclear attack by not finding out what the measures referred to in the article are.

All in all, the authors effectively put across their purpose of writing the book: 'To make the threat implied by the Soviet military doctrine and matching Soviet military capabilities better understood in the West.'


Reviewed by Major G. K. Corbould (Canadian Armed Forces)

'WHEN an American first begins to question his country's involvement in Vietnam, he is more often than not led to the writings of Wilfred Burchett. For this journalist's name has become
synonymous with accuracy in reporting a people's struggle for liberation.'

The ad-man who composed this statement for the fly-leaf of Wilfred Burchett's book must have taken the same correspondence course as the author. For Burchett's book is anything but an accurate report. Rather it is a masterpiece of innuendo, replete with loaded arguments, half-truths and unsupported accusations.

The author claims to show why the 'people of South Vietnam' have already defeated US imperialism. Starting with a sketchy outline of the grand strategy of the National Liberation Front, Mr Burchett goes on to explain how NLF soldiers are trained and indoctrinated, how their army has been built up under the very eyes of US and South Vietnamese forces, and how it has successfully taken on these forces in battle. He describes the democratic process within the NLF Army and contends that, because of this process, NLF military leaders are superior to any product of any military academy.

The author dismisses the American pacification programme in Vietnam as a complete failure and proceeds to prove, in his view, how only the NLF can win the hearts and minds of the people. Thereafter his book is almost solely devoted to this subject. He capitalizes on every American error resulting in civilian casualties and over-generalizes cases of alleged atrocities. Throughout he backs up his conclusions with quotes from hostile (to the US Administration) articles published in the American press.

This represents perhaps Burchett's biggest mistake in this book. It is so one-sided as to be patently obvious, even to a sympathetic reader. Burchett admits no mistake, no set-back and no defeat on the part of the NLF. He makes but one reference to communist terror tactics, both admitting and discarding them in two short paragraphs:

'And terror — I prefer the NLF term "revolutionary violence" — has been an element in the NLF success in winning the hearts and minds of the people . . . . It was violence selectively applied that brought the first ray of hope . . . .'
To Mr Burchett's credit the book does contain a short index at the end, plus ample footnotes throughout the text. A glance at the index however reveals that the author's experience and a great deal of his examples are derived from the 1967-68 Tet Offensive, which commands by far the greatest number of references.

Another marked characteristic of Burchett's book is the fact that very little of it is really Burchett's at all. Fully 45% of the book is in quotation marks and a good deal of its real meat is contained in the many discourses by NLF leaders. The author has in the end remained a true reporter.

Herein lies the great value of this book. It reveals, assuming that Mr Burchett has at least correctly reported his sources, how NLF soldiers and their leaders view the war, and how they really believe it is going. It also gives some insight into the possible feelings of uncommitted Vietnamese civilians— if indeed such a person can today exist in Vietnam.

Consequently there are lessons to be learned from this book — the major one being that, in attempting to win the hearts and minds of the people, American and, ultimately, South Vietnamese forces can allow no action that might result in injury, loss of livelihood or unnecessary displacement of civilians. If this is allowed to occur the communists will spare no effort in its exploitation. Mr Burchett's book is a testament to this fact and for this reason makes worthwhile reading for any officer involved or about to be involved in Vietnam.
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

What Sort of a Store is Rachel Minding?

Sir, — The authors have already achieved their aim of raising the educational level of the Australian Army officer in writing their provocative article in the July issue of Army Journal (‘Rachel, Who’s Minding the Store?’) by their choice of an exotic vocabulary. Only those favoured with a sound ‘liberal’ education could read the article; the remainder (those 99% of the Staff Corps referred to as not being University graduates), who were fortunate enough to be able to borrow the office copy of Concise Oxford embarked on a self education course as they painstakingly referred to ‘subsumes’, ‘adumbrated’, and other mind stretching words. Such phrases as ‘intruded cadre’, ‘random excursions into oenology’ and ‘unconscionable wonders’ have been set aside for ‘afters’. Like good Polish bread, a slice is a meal, a loaf is a bellyful.

If a tertiary ‘liberal’ education will assist me with my memoirs allow me to pen impressive memoranda to Defence (where they can always be read by other equally well educated staff officers, thus replacing the ‘Need to Know’ restriction with a ‘Can read’ qualification), or even permit me to break off a discussion on Scales and Standards and imbue my audience with the basic values of society, then I am sorry but I’m headed for the dropout queue.

Dear Authors, our primary aim is to produce an Army which can lick the pants off any opposing force of relative size. A well spoken boxer is a delight to the news media, but he can very easily be dumped on the flat of his back by a well trained boxer of the ‘Wanna send a cheerio to me Mum’ school.

By all means encourage the soldier-scholar, open up the avenues for expressive education, but let’s set the store in order for Rachel to mind.

How many compulsory attendance lectures does the Army provide for Staff Officers on Military History? How many Junior
Officer seminars are conducted on Guerilla Warfare? How many Tactics Refresher classes are run as an 18-week course at one two-hour period per week? What aspects of Maintenance are taught as part of a Logistic Staff Officer course at AHQ during lunch hours or after work? How much part time schooling in martial art, either by day or night, is programmed at units, Commands or AHQ.

What sort of a store is Rachel minding?

Army Headquarters

Sir,- Rachel is unravished, though she is titivated by Lt Col Holt’s wit. Despite his obvious capacity to do so, he has not closed with the essential argument. He clearly wants to bite the bullet, and that's admirable. The danger is that it is liable to become a dummy, which is perhaps a comforting but hardly a liberating thought. However, he has usefully pointed to an educational need of a different but not conflicting, kind.

Styles merely differ; it is ideas which clash. There is no clash of ideas between Rachel and Tim, and more's the pity.

Lieutenant Colonels Butler and Milligan.

Part-time Tertiary Study


Although the authors avoid much discussion of the means by which their general proposals might be implemented, they do speculate that ‘sufficient officers to meet this organizational need would voluntarily undertake higher general education if they were given reasonable opportunity, assistance and encouragement to do so’. 
Consider, however, the situation regarding part-time tertiary study by officers of AHQ, Canberra. It is hard to imagine that a more favourable situation for part-time study could exist than that which prevails in Canberra. Two institutions are available, the Australian National University, and the College of Advanced Education, both offering a wide choice of interesting and/or professionally relevant units. At ANU, in many faculties, lectures given during the day are repeated at night for the benefit of part-timers. The School of General Studies Library is open until 11 pm on weekdays, and all day on weekends. The campus is only a short drive from even the outer suburbs.

To learn then that only about six per cent of the officers of AHQ are enrolled at these institutions must make one think that the hopes of the two lieutenant-colonels are a bit optimistic.

An economist's suggested solution might be that the time proven tool of a mixed economy — the price system — be used to achieve the desired goal. For a general economic problem, this works as follows:

(a) The government, wishing to stimulate growth in a certain sector of the economy, causes attractively high prices to be set on the final products of that sector.
(b) Profit-conscious businessmen shift production into this field, attracted by the high prices offered. Thus the desired allocation of resources tends to be met.

If the army required a certain number of officers with degrees, it might let a price system, operating similarly to the one above, cause the desired numbers to be forthcoming. Note that 'price' need not necessarily be in money or promotion rewards — there are other attractions which could be used, such as setting certain qualifications as prerequisites for certain appointments.

I conclude, and I hope underline the above points by mentioning another economic chestnut: that desired goals are best promoted, not by appealing to altruism, but to an individual's self-interest.

Army Headquarters
Canberra

Captain N. A. Jans
The Inniskillings

Sir,—Lieutenant-Colonel Cocksedge raised in your December 1970 issue the old question of the proper spelling of the forces originally raised round Enniskillen, in northern Ireland, in 1689-90; one of the regiments concerned charged in the Heavy Brigade at Balaclava.

The regimental history of the 27th Foot, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, shows the spelling ‘Inniskilling’ on a mid-19th century Colour (i. 556); and, simultaneously, ‘Inniskilling Regiment’ on the waistbelt plate and ‘Enniskillen’ below the castle on the breastplate (i. 560). The last word might be left with the footnote on the first page of the volume:

The name of the parish of Enniskillen is invariably entered in the parochial books down to the middle of the reign of George II as Inishkeene or Inniskilling. By the military authorities, Inniskilling, Inskilling, Enniskilling, Eniskilling, Enniskillen, and other variants of the name appear to have been written indiscriminately until 1741, when Inniskilling was adopted as the official orthography of the titles of the ENNISKILLEN REGIMENTS.

Department of History
University of Manchester
England.

NCO Training

Sir,—I was delighted to read the article by Major Fazekas in the May Army Journal concerning NCO Training. How apt his comments.

There are in my opinion numerous flaws in our present antiquated methods of preparing young soldiers for command. To support the suggestions by the writer and add fuel, might I add:

- A potential section commander is worthy of more than 200 periods of instruction.
- The present requirements do not allow a soldier sufficient opportunity to test his new found knowledge.
- The standard of a cadre will vary within any given unit from time to time depending on the unit commitments and NCO vacancies.
A study of cadres from all units would reveal an alarming difference in drills, techniques and assessment of students.

Unit training will normally suffer as a result while internal cadres are conducted.

Any soldier with average intelligence (but not necessarily leadership qualities or ability) is capable of passing the present day requirements and thus being in the hat for promotion.

No doubt, regardless of where or how NCO training is conducted, there is still the requirement for the NCO to gain never ending experience and guidance from his superiors. How easier it would be for the NCO, his platoon commander and company commander, if he was the product of a school such as that suggested by Major Fazekas. Perhaps it can be agreed that the writer’s suggestions are too ambitious and fraught with problems. We are, I believe, an ambitious army, and near enough should never be good enough for our junior NCOs.

Much could be achieved in ten to twelve weeks. Apart from developing the potential in an NCO, it should also assist in eliminating those not fit to command. Having been through the mill I can still vividly recall the feeling of complete inadequacy when first given command of a section, simply because I had not sufficient training for that responsibility. However, I did have the magical letters A, B & C in my AAB 83. It is well to remember our soldiers expect to be trained hard, and consequently high standards required of them. If not, with few exceptions, they become confused and disappointed.

I believe there is a definite requirement to centralize and revamp the training standards for potential NCOs. The course should be long and severe with a high standard demanded from the soldier. It is odd we can say, ‘they are the backbone of the army’ and yet prepare them so inadequately for the task of commanding a section and, in an emergency, a platoon.

6RAR

Townsville,
Queensland.

Major G. L. Mansford
Failure Rate

Sir,—In his article, ‘Centralized Junior NCO Training’ (Army Journal May 1971), Major Fazekas stated the failure rate of students attending the 17 week Warrant Officer Course at Infantry Centre was 35 to 40 per cent.

This may have been so in 1965 when the last 17 week course was conducted; however, the results of nine Warrant Officer Qualifying Courses conducted since 1968 show a failure of 17.4%.

Infantry School

Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Burnard

Ingleburn, NSW.