Cover: Detail from war artist B. Fletcher's painting 'D Coy 6 RAR, Long Tan, South Vietnam, 16 August 1966' at the Australian War Memorial.
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Troops of the 7th Battalion RAR wait for a helicopter to return them to their base near the fishing village of Phouc Hai in Vietnam during operation 'Ulmarrah', August 1967.

(Army Public Relations)
The commanding officer is the man most intimately concerned with the 'maintenance of discipline and good order among the troops'. My most recent experiences with military law have been as a commanding officer; as such several aspects of military law, as it exists today, and its interpretation and application, were to me unsatisfactory. It is with those aspects I wish to deal.
The Importance of Military Law

Field Marshal Sir William Slim, while he was Governor General, published a book containing talks he had given over a period of ten years. In one of these, ‘Liberty and Discipline’, he discussed in general terms the concept of liberty in a democracy such as ours. He pointed out that we are free to do pretty well as we please. He then discussed the need for restrictions on our liberty (in terms of the rules of the road) for the good of society. Like the good military leader he was, he extolled the virtues of discipline (in terms of obedience to the law) being self-imposed, being the result of a reasoned choice, rather than being imposed by fear. He said, however: ‘In the last resort there must be some force which can punish disobedience to the law.’

No matter how good our leadership, how high the standard of discipline in our units, there will always be occasions when commanding officers must have to resort to the law, to punishment. The law in our case is military law, based on a long tradition and codified in the various acts of parliament and regulations in the Army Law Manual. In its role as the ultimate deterrent it may fairly be said that military law is the basis of military discipline.

Major Francis graduated from RMC Duntroon in 1957 and was allotted to RAE. After completing a degree of Bachelor of Engineering at Melbourne University in 1959 his regimental appointments were 21 Construction Squadron, Maralinga, 7 Field Squadron. He was attached to RSME (UK) in 1963 and then held instructional appointments at SME and RMC in 1964-65. He became OC 18 Field Squadron, Wacol in 1966-67; OC 17 Construction Squadron, Vung Tau 1967-68; CRE Central Command 1968-69. Major Francis attended Staff College in 1970, where this article was written, and at present he is GSO2 HQ PNG Command.

In a reference to the production of a uniform disciplinary code for the Services, the Minister for Defence recently stated in the House that the report of a Committee established to examine this matter had now been received. A number of major policy decisions remained to be made and early discussions with Service Ministers were proposed. If these decisions could be resolved, he hoped to be able to introduce the appropriate legislation into the House during the current session.—Editor.

Military Law as it Exists Today

Our military law is based on the tradition of British civil law. That tradition leads to some time-honoured principles:
- 'The accused is innocent unless and until proven guilty.'
- 'Justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done.'
- 'Justice must be timely.'

It is particularly important, in the use of law to maintain discipline, that retribution, when necessary, is swift. The passage of time can dull both the law's effect and the realization of the law-breaker of the fact of his offence.

An important principle of military law is that an officer may use his general military knowledge in interpreting evidence.

In its codification military law is today unnecessarily complex. The need for rationalization is well illustrated by quoting again from the Army Law Manual:

In respect of some matters . . . the law applicable to the Australian Military Forces is contained solely in the Defence Act and the Regulations made thereunder. In respect of other matters (e.g., discipline on war service) . . . the law is contained partly in the Defence Act and the Regulations made thereunder and partly in the provisions of the Army Act which has been imported into our law by the Defence Act. Yet again in respect of (matters relating to courts martial) . . . the law is to be found principally in the Army Act and Rules of Procedure, except that both the Army Act and the Rules have been modified to some extent by the Defence Act or the Regulations made thereunder in their application to the Australian Military Forces.

Until the code is rationalized, regimental and commanding officers will continue to spend an inordinate amount of time searching from one reference to another. Much has been done to simplify the references since the 'cut and paste' days of amending. But much still remains to be done.

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The Judicature of the Army

Apart from the summary disposal of charges, members are dealt with by courts martial, the findings of which are subject to confirmation by superior authority and appeal to the Courts Martial Appeal Tribunal. Prior to the establishment of the tribunal, reviews of findings and sentences were conducted solely by military officers. The tribunal is composed of eminent civil jurists who, however, lack an important qualification: military knowledge.

The effect of the establishment of the tribunal has been to emphasize the technical legal aspects of courts martial, at the expense of the traditional allowance for interpretation of evidence against a background of general military knowledge. This is particularly noticeable when courts are convened overseas on active service. We have added to the protection of the individual without adding to the protection of the 'maintenance of discipline and good order'. In certain recent well-publicized cases, whether allowance of appeal was correct or not, the court martial has fallen into disrepute. More often than not its finding or sentence has been quashed or altered.

The first remedy is to make some provision for military knowledge or advice in the tribunal. How this should be done, while still protecting the rights of the accused, is for better legal brains than mine.

The second lies with the Presidents and Judge Advocates of courts martial. Presidents must be made equally aware of the dangers of wrongful acquittal as they are of the dangers of wrongful conviction. There could, for example, be some machinery to allow the President to take action to rectify an incompetent prosecution. The Judge Advocate, more than ever, must ensure that all technical legal matters are correct. Between them the President and Judge Advocate must ensure that conviction and sentence are correct in terms of the evidence presented to the court.

3 Courts Martial Appeals Act 1955, Section 8.
Administration — Its Effects for Commanding Officers

The effect of any code of law depends not only on its written content but also on its administration, which can be affected by the social conditions and public opinion of the time. An outstanding example today is the rarity of execution of the death penalty which is still on the statutes of most States.

The 'vocal minority' (and thus publicity) tends to belittle all that is traditional — good and bad — and with it such things as obedience, discipline, patriotism; in short, the things we old traditionalists may call virtues. This modern development and fear of adverse publicity has lessened the support of the hierarchy for the commanding officer. Trust is reduced, decision is centralized at a high level. The actions of the commanding officer are closely circumscribed, in the field of military law as well as others. This circumscription is reasonable in the written law. It has become intolerable in the administration of the law. The commanding officer, as the agent of summary punishment (timely justice), fights a constant struggle against the steady erosion of his authority.

This discussion of the administration of military law results from my own experience.

Again we find increasing attention to the detail of the letter of the law. To frame a routine order, to prepare a charge report, are now jobs for legal draftsmen. No longer is it sufficient for such material to be understood by officers and men. It must now be drafted to provide the absence of loopholes necessary in an act of parliament. In the process, incidentally, it often becomes unintelligible.

'Ignorance of the law is no excuse' has almost disappeared from use. One must almost read unit orders to each soldier personally to ensure adequate proof of his opportunity to know of their existence and content. To prove a case of disobedience to unit orders is now almost impossible. One has only to recall the amendment of the traditional offence of 'accidental discharge' to either 'unauthorized accidental discharge' or 'unauthorized deliberate discharge' to see the direction in which things are moving.
The most important quality of summary justice is fairness. So long as a commanding officer's actions are within the law (its content, not its letter) and are fair, he should be unfettered by the mindless attention to detail which ties him and his staff up in endless legal research.

Another important aspect of support for the commanding officer is placing reliance upon his opinion. Occasionally a commanding officer believes his powers of punishment inadequate. He, therefore, remands a soldier for trial by court martial. To disagree, or to save the administrative bother of a court martial, by referring the case back to the commanding officer without any discussion with him is an insult to his professional ability. It must have a bad effect on discipline.

There is room in the application of military law, as in a number of other fields, to give authority back to the commanding officer.

Conclusion

Military law is the foundation of military discipline. It is currently contained in a confusion of references which defy the efforts at comprehension of the regimental officer. There is a need for rationalization of the written law.

In its application we are paying more and more attention to the letter of the law and less to its intent, to its effect on military discipline. Courts martial must be more competently run. Their review, particularly by the Courts Martial Appeal Tribunal, should be more militarily and less legally oriented.

Summary punishment must be just that. It must be a useful tool for the commanding officer, not a millstone around his neck. More support for the commanding officer in his application of military law is necessary.

Let us put the ‘military’ back in ‘military law’.
As we all know, scientists have an unfortunate habit of taking a simple idea and clothing it in jargon. It is unfortunate, not only because the layman is confused by a tangle of words and is unable to see the power and importance of the idea lying behind it, but also because scientists sometimes confuse one another.

This applies to the subject of this article; so much so that it is difficult to give it a satisfactory title. The work itself is titled variously as 'Mathematical Modelling', 'Simulation', 'Operational Research', 'Systems Analysis', 'Operational Analy-

Mr Strahle has a B.Sc. degree in Physics and an Aeronautical Engineering Diploma. He joined Weapons Research Establishment in 1940 and was sent to the United Kingdom for a two-year training programme on aircraft and guided weapon development. On return he was responsible for a variety of guided weapon assessment and research projects, involving free-flight research, guided-weapon assessment, and the tactical assessment of air-defence systems. All this work made liberal use of analogue and digital simulation.

Mr Strahle is a Principal Research Scientist and has acted for some time as Superintendent of Systems Assessment Division at WRE. He is currently posted to the United Kingdom on scientific liaison work. He is a keen naturalist, spending his holidays exploring the countryside, and has held office with bodies concerned with conservation.
sis', etc. These are scientifically accepted words which may be encountered by the layman and which may have left him puzzled. Their meanings tend to shift about, always overlapping, but sometimes becoming indistinguishable — to the extent that a senior practitioner recently suggested dropping the lot and simply using 'studies'.

Lord Kelvin once said, with a good deal of truth, that a concept was not really understood unless it could be measured. In other words, one should be able to attach a number to it; if it is money, we can speak of dollars, if speed, miles per hour, if heat, calories, and so on. We are then all tuned to the same wave length. Talk about an idea which can't be measured, like 'love' for example, and there's likely to be endless argument even about what it means, let alone how intense it might be.

Taking Kelvin's point a step further, scientific analysis, which is concerned with relating the concepts involved in a problem, should do more than spin words. It should attach numbers to the relationship. This is another way of saying that science should use mathematics. One could almost say that the essence of our present subject, defence studies, is the application of mathematics to problems which might otherwise be dealt with in a purely qualitative or intuitive way.

Of course, science has no monopoly over mathematics. We all use it — every housewife when shopping within a budget, every driver when estimating how long it will take to drive between A and B. The only difference is in degree; in science, mathematics is applied in a more systematic and elaborate way.

During the last world war, a group of scientists in Britain started the predicament referred to earlier by coining the title 'Operational Research' to describe the scientific study of certain rather broad defence problems, answers to which would help in making key defence decisions.

If their choice of title was poor, their work was good and made a vital contribution to allied victory. Moreover, it had a big impact on the world of science and was to blossom forth after the war into a host of applications, including peaceful ones.
A classic example of their early work was a simple study of Allied shipping losses. They studied the records and found that a ship’s chance of survival increased with the size of the convoy it happened to sail in. They then recommended an increase of convoy sizes which resulted in greatly decreased shipping losses.

The blossoming of defence studies since the last world war occurred for several reasons additional to its earlier success. Modern weapons have become very expensive and it is more important than ever to avoid mistakes in purchasing or making them. Their very complexity is an open invitation to apply science in assessing them, especially when one has computers to make light work of the mathematics.

Defence studies cover a wide scale of problems, from the detailed to the very broad (which is, incidentally, one reason for the confusion in jargon). It can best be explained, perhaps, by referring to the history of the subject in Australia.

Work started in the early 1950s in two places — in the Weapons Research Establishment (WRE), Salisbury, and in the Aeronautical Research Laboratories (ARL), Melbourne.

In WRE, defence studies started at the more detailed end of the scale. At the time, when trials of British anti-aircraft guided weapons began at the Woomera range, people asked questions about the meaning and worth of the trials results which were to follow.

Were the results sufficient in themselves to evaluate the weapons? Since targets like Jindivik were to be used, which could not be said to represent correctly many properties of large aircraft (such as their vulnerability to warheads), and could not fly supersonically, the answer was inevitably ‘no’. How then, could the trials results be interpreted?

To cut a long story short, the outcome (in the early 1950s) was that Department of Supply joined with Britain in a programme of theoretical studies of several guided weapons. Fairly complete mathematical descriptions of their behaviour were built up in terms of their launch, flight towards the target, operation of fuse and effect of warhead on the target.

Anti-aircraft guided weapons are, of course, very com-
plicated things and it was therefore necessary to put the mathematics into computers (in the early days, analogue computers, one of which, ARTVS [Australian Rocket Test Vehicle Simulator] was designed and built in WRE; in later work the digital computer has been used much more).

Into every mathematical description must be built assumptions: the more complex the description, the more the assumptions and the greater the likelihood of errors. This problem of doubt on the validity of theory and the problem of how to use the inadequate trials results, then merged into one solution — use the trials results to establish confidence in the theory, which is then applied to predict the performance of the weapon for the real targets against which it was designed to provide a defence. In a systematic way, this approach was later applied to the point where trials were deliberately planned with the main objective of establishing and confirming theory.
A number of these evaluations has now been completed. This has been a big achievement, for many people had said when the work began that the behaviour of guided weapons was too complicated to be accounted for in theory. Costs of the theoretical side of the evaluation turned out to be small compared to costs of the range trials, and totally insignificant in comparison to weapon development costs.

Thus, there are at one end of the scale, defence studies applied to predicting the performance of individual guided missiles against individual targets. This work was later broadened, step by step, in a programme of work to study the overall effectiveness of a guided weapon complex.

The first step arose from the Australian Army's interest in the capabilities of certain types of weapons to defend key vulnerable areas from air attack. By broadening the mathematical descriptions and taking advantage of the capacity of a digital computer to deal with logical sequences of events, it was possible to deal with air strikes by numbers of aircraft on a target defended by a number of a given type of guided weapon.

Account was taken of many tactical factors, for example, strike aircraft attempting to evade detection by flying close to the ground. Also many events in a general problem of this kind are of a chance nature, and the lay reader may wonder how they can be accounted for in the computer.

What is done is to make the computer generate random numbers, rather like a roulette wheel, and assign them to the simulated events so that they turn up with the same likelihood which is expected to occur in reality. There is a picturesque and self-explanatory term to describe this procedure — the 'Monte Carlo' technique.

The next step was to tackle similar problems in which a mix of weapon types is involved. Further, with assistance from the Services, estimates have been made of the costs of procuring, operating and maintaining weapon systems, and costs have been compared for a given effectiveness, without which defence studies are incomplete.
Finally, in this work, the computer representation of an air strike has been extended to include the use of a variety of attack tactics and air-to-surface weapons, and the representation of the defence to include a mix of guided weapons, anti-aircraft guns, fighter aircraft, early-warning radars, etc. Thus it is possible to predict the outcome of a whole battle.

It is just as important to reconcile theory with practice in the case of more general studies of this kind as with the more detailed work described earlier. There are several ways of going about this. First, the representation of each individual system should be checked out as before (an ideal not always realized for all sorts of reasons!).

One may compare the results of a Service air-defence exercise with computer predictions when the computer is set up to represent the same conditions as the exercise. In a similar way use is made of any results coming from a real war.

Needless to say, each of these approaches has its limitations, and there are limitations which are common to all approaches (such as difficulties of accounting for human behaviour under stress, as against the behaviour of automatic systems). All one can finally do is to make the most of the data available.

Although first applied to air-defence problems, a similar spread of studies has more recently been applied in WRE to other defence problems. For example, intensive studies on aspects of under-sea warfare have been in progress for some time.

It does not take much insight to realize that these theoretical studies are of great value in a number of ways. They can provide a guide to the best use of existing weapon systems, to the purchase of new systems for closing defence gaps and to the specification of the ideal systems of the future. Again, the point should be made that the cost of such theoretical work is minute compared with that of the weaponry it deals with.
The need for even broader defence studies culminated about two years ago in the formation within the Department of Supply of the Central Studies Establishment (CSE) in Canberra. Based on a nucleus of experienced people from the studies groups in ARL and WRE, CSE has built up a staff which studies the place of proposed weapon systems and other equipment in the structure of the Australian forces.

To do this properly requires contributions from a wide range of sources. There is the need for military knowledge to guide thinking on how weapon systems would be used. Important also is a contribution on defence policy to indicate the aims and constraints of the operations under study.

CSE was set in Canberra primarily to achieve ready access to sources of this information. Information on the technical performance of weapon systems is of course required, and WRE and ARL studies are a useful source of such information.

The results are usually cost-effectiveness studies which can be used by the appropriate department — a Service Department or Defence — to assist in deciding between competing weapon systems.

ANNUAL AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded the annual prize of $60 for the best original contribution published in the Army Journal during the year ended June 1971 to Captain J. F. Crossman for ‘Whatever You Say’ (March issue).

The second prize of $20 has been awarded to Lance Corporal C. D. Clark for his ‘The Sioux Wars, 1854-91’ (November issue).
AMF Gold Medal and ASCO Prize Essay Competition 1971

1. Entries for the AMF Gold Medal and ASCO Prize Essay—1971 close with the Secretary to the Military Board on 31 March 1972.

Eligibility
2. All ranks of the active and reserve lists of the Australian Military Forces are eligible to compete.

Aim
3. The aim of this essay competition is to encourage original thought and good writing on a military topic of general interest to the Army.

Subject
4. Competitors may select their own subject. As essays may be published in the Australian Army Journal or similar unclassified publications they are not to contain classified material. Essays must be written solely for the competition.

Sections
5. There are two sections:
   a. Senior—for officers
   b. Junior—for other ranks.

Prizes
6. Prizes may be awarded as follows:
   a. For best essay overall—AMF Gold Medal and $100.00.
   b. For best essay in each section (other than best overall) $50.00 each.
   c. The referees are empowered to recommend that the Medal...
and Prize not be awarded if, in their opinion, no essay submitted is of a sufficiently high standard.

d. A prize of less than $50 may be awarded to the winning essay in either section, if, in the opinion of the referees, the standard of the essay does not warrant the award of the full amount. In the case of two or more essays of equal merit from the same section, the prize money for the section may be shared.

Judging

7. Essays will be judged by at least three referees appointed by AHQ.

8. The decision of the referees will be final.

Submission of Essays

9. Essays are to be typewritten and submitted in quadruplicate. Units are to provide typing assistance where so requested.

10. Length of essays is to be between 3,000 and 5,000 words.

11. Authorship is to be anonymous. Each competitor is to adopt a pen name and enclose with his essay a sealed envelope with the pen name and section identification typewritten on the outside and his name and unit address inside.

12. The title and page number of any published or unpublished work to which reference is made in the essay must be quoted.

13. Essays are to be addressed to the Secretary to the Military Board, Army Headquarters, Canberra, A.C.T., 2600. The envelope is to be marked ‘AMF Gold Medal and ASCO Prize Essay’.

Promulgation of Results

14. The results of the competition will be promulgated in AAOs and in a Notice to AROs for display on unit boards.
My proposition is that the only way infantry soldiers are ever going to train properly is to use rubber bullets. At present infantry soldiers training to fight use blank rounds. Blanks make a lot of noise. But they don’t train a soldier to keep his head down or to apply his marksmanship effectively under stress.

To fight effectively, and survive, a soldier must be able instinctively to find cover, to find good fire positions, to apply
effective covering fire and to hit every target that presents itself. He must know in an instant when to move, how to move, where to move, what risks to take, what not to take.

The soldier receives lessons in these skills. But there is no effective way of developing the skills of a soldier beyond a rudimentary level. At present, and despite the initiative and enterprise of various commanders, the development of fighting skill is left mainly to the soldier himself.

The soldier is no doubt given the opportunity to develop his skill. He has range practices designed to develop his marksmanship in action. He is put into the field on exercise and has the opportunity to practice all the skills that will enable him to beat the enemy.

And the instructors are there to help him. The instructor yells at him to get behind cover. The instructor yells at him to find a better position to give fire support. If the soldier would have been killed in similar circumstances in action, he is told he is 'dead'.

The 'enemy' react according to the instructor's wishes. If the attack is successful they will die at successive stages as the assault sweeps in. If it is not successful they will get 'difficult'.

In advanced training, especially the training of battalions, the exercises can be very realistic — the enemy can be quite nasty. But at no stage does the training, no matter how seriously it is intended, ever lose the appearance of a game.

The soldier is not going to be killed; he is not even going to be hurt, no matter how he performs. Never does he have the feeling of the soldier in action; that his head could be blown off at the very next moment.

If, on the other hand, a soldier feels the thud of a rubber bullet against his chest, he gets a very different idea of what his training is all about. 'Had that been a real bullet, I would be dead,' he says. He knows what he did. He slackened for a moment and walked out into the open. If the bullet somehow
splatters and leaves a red stain on his shirt, advertising he is
dead, the lesson is all the more forceful.

A soldier in a practice attack sees the enemy and quickly
fires. He misses and before he can get a second shot away a
rubber bullet has struck him. He gets training for this on the
sneaker range, but he has to react quickly and accurately all
the time — not one lapse can be permitted.

A platoon commander in executing a platoon attack
places his fire support section in what he thinks is a good
position even though he has not had a close reconnaissance. The
fire support makes a lot of noise, but the assault faulters under
a shower of rubber bullets. Not one round from the fire support
section went anywhere near the enemy because the section was
in dead ground.

If soldiers were instructed to die or lie wounded when
struck by a rubber bullet, the success and failure of training
manoeuvres, and the strengths and weaknesses of soldiers and
their commanders would be easy to judge.

Many times I have heard an argument in training con-
cluded by the remark: 'Oh well, the only way to really find
out is to use live rounds.'

I once heard a referee on a contact circuit say: 'I'll give
it to this side, but that's only because I have to make a decision.
The only way we could find out for sure would be to give you
all three mags of live rounds and let you have a go.' With
rubber bullets, not lethal and not likely to cause any sort of
injury, we could indeed 'have a go'.

A man training for a boxing match chooses a good sparring
partner who punishes him for every mistake. Slowly, the
boxer raises his standard of performance, because he has been
hit too many times to be satisfied with less. Any aspiring boxer
looks good while shadow sparring. But unless he has been
subjected to hard, painful sparring sessions against good
opponents he will not raise his performance.

The infantry trainees, firing in the general direction of
the enemy and advancing inexorably against the furious wall of blank rounds, are shadow sparring. They are not being hit, and they will never learn until they are hit, no matter how skilful they think they are.

At present, because of the danger of fragments of blank rounds causing injury, soldiers must aim off at distances less than thirty metres. Where is the training here? A soldier must be taught to fire accurately and with intent to kill, all the time. If he doesn't, and gets away with it, he is being trained negatively.

Training for battle is not the explosions of blanks and pyrotechnics; it should be a test of skill between one soldier and another, between a friendly and an enemy, with the winner being the first to land a rubber bullet on the other. This, after all, is a very minor adaptation of what happens in action.

With rubber bullets, training would be as much play as a sparring session between two boxers. It should not be beyond our technical ingenuity to produce rubber bullets for training and the value in training would far outweigh any additional expense. Eyes could be protected by the compulsory wearing of goggles.

Perhaps in order to make rubber bullets safe their velocity would have to be reduced to such an extent as to make the trajectory too different from a real bullet. But even this problem could be overcome, perhaps by using special sights. Even if the velocity were not reduced much, and a soldier sometimes got slightly bruised, surely it is better to be bruised a bit than to go into action never having experienced projectiles being fired at him.
Quinn of Quinn's Post

Lieutenant Colonel A. Argent
Australian Army Aviation Corps

'Somebody turned round to offer me a cigar.
"You'd better light up this."
And, as I paused for a moment . . . the smell of death floated over the ridge above and settled down upon us, tangible, it seemed, and clammy as the membrane of a bat's wing.

Immediately along the top of the ridge were the trenches of Quinn's Post with the Turkish trenches hardly twenty yards beyond . . .'

— Gallipoli Memories, by Compton MacKenzie

On Thursday morning, 29 April 1915, a company of 15 Battalion AIF left the beach of Anzac and moved eastwards towards the firing line, along a valley. After leaving the valley floor they struggled up a steep slope, and then, under sniper fire, they took over a string of disconnected, shallow rifle pits less than 10 yards below the crest line. The company, C Company with a platoon of B Company under command, had a strength of

Lieutenant Colonel Argent enlisted in the AIF in 1945. In 1948 he graduated from the Royal Military College and was allotted to Infantry. After service in Japan and Korea with 3 RAR he completed a Flying Instructors Course in the UK. This was followed by service with BAOR Germany. From 1958 to 1962 he held flying appointments in Australia and qualified at the Australian Staff College. Service with 2 RAR and 3 RAR in Australia, Malaya and Borneo followed, then a staff appointment in AHQ Canberra. In 1968 he was attached to AAS Washington as Exchange Officer (Flying). On his return to Australia in February 1970 he took up the position of SOI in the Directorate of Army Aviation, AHQ Canberra. He is at present in Vietnam on the staff of HQ AFV.
six officers and 220 men and they relieved exhausted troops of 14 Battalion, a sister unit of 4 Infantry Brigade. The OC C Company was Captain Hugh Quinn, a Queenslander, just one week short of his 27th birthday.

The last two days had seen some re-organization and disentangling of the terribly intermixed units of the two Anzac divisions and with it the adoption of names for features. The 150 yards or so of frontage for which Quinn was responsible was to be the most dangerous and nerve-racking of any position occupied by Australian soldiers in all our wars. The position has gone down in history as ‘Quinn’s Post’.

But the story of Quinn’s Post begins much earlier than that April day. It begins perhaps on 6 May 1888.

Early Days

On this day, in Rutherford Street, Charters Towers, a mining town in the north of the Colony of Queensland, Quinn was born. He was a first child. His father was a mounted constable who had migrated from Tyrone, Ireland in 1881; his mother was born in New South Wales. Hugh Quinn, a younger brother and sister (who was to die of influenza) grew up in Charters Towers. He attended Millchester State School then, as now, a local school.\(^1\) Later the family moved south for two years and Quinn attended Dixon’s School at Southport in 1903 and 1904. On his return to Charters Towers he joined the firm of Cummins and Campbell, chartered accountants and auditors, who are still active today. He left this firm in 1913 and set up his own business as a commission agent in Townsville. This was his occupation until he enlisted in 1914.

Whilst he was at Charters Towers, Quinn had two interests outside his job — the Army and boxing. He joined the local militia unit — C Company of the Kennedy Infantry Regiment

\(^1\) A teacher at Millchester was C. H. Brand who, after South African War service, joined the permanent Army. He served at Anzac and on the Western Front, was QMG 1930-32 and, after retiring, was a Senator 1934-47.
(now given the prosaic title of 31 RQR) and rose in rank from private to Acting QM Sergeant before being commissioned a provisional second lieutenant on 6 April 1908. He was promoted lieutenant on 25 September 1911 and later captain on 9 July 1912. By this time, the first effects of the young Commonwealth's compulsory military training scheme appeared — the increase in unit strengths.

Quinn's solid build put him in the light heavyweight division of boxing. He had little formal tuition but made up for this with great natural aptitude. He was the Northern Queensland Champion and in 1911, at Brisbane, he narrowly lost on points the fight to decide who would represent Queensland in the Australian Amateur Championships. In addition to his own boxing, he helped organize and train a team which won most of the events in North Queensland in 1912 and which toured Victoria and Tasmania.

The most important national event that was to take place during these years was the federation of the States into the Commonwealth of Australia. As this was proclaimed on 30 December 1900, schoolboy Quinn did not get a holiday. Other main events were related to the rural developments in Australia — flood, drought, shearer's strike and a bank crisis.

August 1914 therefore, saw Quinn as a young unmarried man of 26, running his own business in Townsville, a remote town in a young country, but in a world of increasing pace and conflict; a captain in the local militia battalion and intensely interested in boxing. His police pensioner father had died in Charters Towers. Quinn, like so many young men of those days with similar backgrounds, was devoted to his mother.

The Great War Begins

When war was declared on 4 August 1914 the Kennedy Regiment was called up and in accordance with the mobilization plan they prepared for garrison duties on Thursday Island. For

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2 MO 95/1908, 137/1908, 423/1911, 397/1912 and 607/1912 list these appointments and promotions.

3 One of Quinn's 18-year-old compulsory trainees was L. C. Lucas — later Brigadier Lucas, DSO, MC. He was CRE 6 Division in the Western Desert and Greece and later Deputy E-in-C LHQ, Australia.
some years owners of horses and vehicles liable for impressment had been paid a retainer against this event but there were long faces when the event actually arrived. The Transport Officer had the rather unfilial task of commandeering his father's horses and vehicles. A ship, a 6,942 ton coal burner, Kanowna, which sailed into Townsville, was requisitioned and on 8 August the captain saw his passengers unloaded and in their place horses and over 1,000 men were embarked. Quinn was then OC A Company.

The mobilization had been so urgent because of the threat of Admiral von Spee's Pacific Squadron, that the Kennedy Regiment had no proper medical inspection, some of the compulsory trainees were under 18 years of age, there was a shortage of officers, some members who sailed were middle-aged rifle club members and there was a shortage of all kinds of supplies, including food and boots.

But they arrived safely at Thursday Island, after picking up some more men at Cairns, and, for a few days at least, the reinforcements relieved the monotony and boredom of the permanent gunners there.

Meanwhile, other plans were being made in Melbourne and Sydney. A force known as the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (AN&MEF) was hurriedly raised to seize the German possessions in the Pacific. It was decided that this force should be augmented by some of the men on Thursday Island and volunteers from the Kennedy Regiment were called. It was necessary to call volunteers because, under the Defence Act, a member of the citizen forces could not serve outside Australia without his consent. Quinn was among the 90 per cent who volunteered. He was appointed adjutant and the 500 men selected were given the unit title of '2nd Infantry, AN&MEF', although they gave themselves the more romantic name of 'North Queensland Expeditionary Force'. They re-embarked on Kanowna and reached Port Moresby early in September.

Shortly afterwards, on 4 September, the Berrima, carrying the 1st Battalion (which made up the army portion of the AN&MEF) and escorted by a number of warships, including two
Australian submarines and HMAS Sydney, arrived at Port Moresby. The commander of the AN&MEF, Colonel Holmes, an officer with South African experience, was not impressed with the 500 men of his newly constituted second battalion and then and there decided they were good only for garrison duties. Soon after he concluded they were neither trained nor equipped even for that humble task and he wished to return them to Australia. However, the views of the Admiral commanding the Australian Fleet prevailed. The Admiral wanted as many men on the expedition as he could get. But other factors were to intervene.

The convoy left the safety of Fairfax Harbour, four miles north-west of Port Moresby on 7 September for the capture of Rabaul, on New Britain. Soon after sailing Kanowna was seen to drop behind, stop and then make the 'Lost Control' signal. The stokers had mutinied — they refused to take the ship out of Australian waters. The soldiers on board Kanowna volunteered to stoke the ship to Rabaul but the commanders decided that it would be best if she returned to the mainland. In the event, the soldiers took over the duties of firemen and stoked on the hot voyage back to Townsville and earned themselves the title of 'the Dirty Five Hundred'.

Raising the AIF

Meanwhile, as this small drama was being played out at sea, plans had been made in Australia to raise an expeditionary force. This was necessary because the compulsory training scheme had begun only in 1911 and would not reach its full development until 1919. Although there was a citizen army of 45,000 (for a population of 4,970,000), because of the stage of development of the scheme, the soldiers were all aged 19-21 years and mostly commanded by officers and NCOs of the old pre-1911 militia. Clearly this imbalance would be wrong for a war and so a special force — the AIF — was raised. This meant there were virtually two Australian armies — the AMF in Australia and the AIF overseas. The AIF was to have its own commander, its own promotion, seniority and rates of pay.

Thus, as Kanowna was steaming for Townsville, recruiting for the AIF was under way and one can imagine the impatience
of the men on board. An event which was to have a great impact on many of the men occurred on 14 September at Brisbane. On that day, recruiting for another Queensland battalion began at the Exhibition Grounds. On 23 September, it was designated 15 Battalion and four days later, a 32-year-old militia officer, Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Cannan, was appointed Commanding Officer.

Quinn Enlists in the AIF

When Quinn returned to the mainland, he enlisted in the AIF on 28 September 1914 and was granted the rank of captain. Most of the men of the Kennedy Regiment who enlisted in the AIF went to A Company 15 Battalion. However, another captain from Charters Towers (a cousin of Quinn) was OC A Company and Quinn was given command of E Company 15 Battalion. Most of his new command were enlisted from the Darling Downs. At this time, British and Australian companies had three officers — the OC who was usually a captain and two half company commanders who were lieutenants or second lieutenants. They each commanded 50 men. On 30 September, 15 Battalion consisting of 653 all ranks from A to F Companies, was transferred from the Exhibition Grounds to Enoggera and there began its training. The young CO faced a huge task as 85 per cent of his men had had no previous training. G and H Companies, his other two companies, had been raised in Tasmania and were in camp at Claremont, a northern suburb of Hobart.

Training consisted of drill, route marches, rifle exercises and musketry. The troops were gradually toughened — in a temperature of 92 degrees during a march to Sandgate, only about three men per company fell out. That night the battalion bivouacked at Sandgate and on their return to Enoggera a number of men were discharged for drunkenness.

4 He was much younger than other battalion commanders of the time. The average age of the twelve battalion commanders of 1 Australian Division at the Landing was 48. (For the same battalions, during the August 1918 battles, the average age was 30. The nine infantry COs of 6 Division in 1939 on its raising had an average age of 44; at Wewak 1945, it was 34. It was also 34 for Korea, but Malaya and Vietnam have seen a steady rise.)
15 Battalion was a unit of 4 Infantry Brigade commanded by Colonel John Monash at Broadmeadows, Victoria. His only battalion there was 14 Battalion (Victoria), but later the brigade closed up with 13 Battalion from Sydney and 16 Battalion from Perth. 15 Battalion moved south during the period 24-26 November 1914 and rather proudly the CO reported to his brigade commander that the rail journey had been accomplished without loss or expense. At Broadmeadows, G and H Companies from Tasmania at last joined their battalion. The strength of the battalion was then:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine gun Section</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals Section</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Section</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each rifle company</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>991</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 Battalion Sails

4 Infantry Brigade had little time for training at Broadmeadows. In fact, until later in the war, very little training was done in Australia at all. The plan was for this to be done in England or Egypt and consequently, most efforts in Australia were directed to equipping the soldier, giving him a few rudiments of the basic military skills and then sending him overseas for sub-unit, unit and formation training.

Therefore, training at Broadmeadows embraced simple things such as marches, march discipline, protection on the march, outposts, occupation of defensive positions, hasty entrenchments and musketry. There was one field exercise where familiar phrases like ‘General Idea’ and ‘Special Idea’ were use.

Horses were drawn from the Remount Depot on 5 December. The CO found that the transport horses were too heavy, the riding horses too light and ‘unsuitable for hacks having been used for driving’.

After receiving more stores and equipment, the brigade marched through Melbourne on 17 December. 15 Battalion was led by their pipe band. The Governor-General took the salute.
from the steps of Parliament House (then the Federal Parliament) in Spring Street. Five days later, on 22 December, 15 Battalion, with 16 Battalion and some minor units crowded aboard SS Ceramic, 18,500 tons, at Railway Pier, Port Melbourne. Ceramic was referred to by its Australian Government troopship number ‘A40’. 15 Battalion embarked 32 officers, 996 men, 57 draught and pack horses, 11 riding horses, 17 vehicles (i.e., carts) and 9 bicycles. The battalion’s first reinforcements went on board Berrima which Quinn and other members of the 2 Infantry AN&MEF had last seen at Port Moresby, ten weeks earlier.

The first convoy which left Albany, West Australia on 1 November with the 1st Australian Division and the NZ brigades had a naval escort. However, this second contingent in 19 ships carrying 10,500 Australians and 2,000 New Zealanders steamed unescorted, for in the interval the raider Emden had been destroyed and most of the German Pacific Squadron had been sunk off the Falkland Islands on 8 December.

The route of the convoy took it through the Bight to Albany and thence in calm seas and hot weather across the Indian Ocean to Aden. Shipboard tedium was occasionally relieved by lectures, boxing and vaccinations — the latter a somewhat uncomfortable process in those days compared with the painless procedure today.

There were solemn moments also because of deaths on board Ceramic. Two 15 Battalion men died — one from pneumonia, the other from sunstroke — and in the days of innocence before Anzac and the Western Front, these deaths received prominence.

Training during the voyage was restricted to four hours a day and was mainly PT and weapon training. Officers had

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5 In this convoy, she towed the Australian submarine, AE2, to the Mediterranean.
6 Up to April 1915, Routine Orders included paragraphs such as, ‘The Commanding Officer regrets to announce the death of No 885 Pte L. Clegg which took place on the 9th instant from pericarditis and pneumonia.’
The photograph was taken at Broadmeadows, Victoria in December 1914. The variations in uniforms were typical of the early days of the AIF, and such things as cap style, badges and puttee roll reflected the officer's previous military experience; for example, one officer wears a Corps of Staff Cadets badge. Leggings were worn by the Transport Officer although, in this photograph, the Signalling Officer is wearing them.

**Back Row** (left to right) 2Lt J. A. Good, 2Lt J. Hill, 2Lt T. Robertson*, 2Lt L. G. Casey, 2Lt L. N. Collin*, 2Lt A. Douglas, 2Lt F. L. Armstrong*.


**Front Row** 2Lt C. E. Snartt, 2Lt S. W. Harry*, Lt H. Kessels*, Lt F. Moran*, Lt L. J. Waters*, 2Lt N. O'Brien. (Missing from photograph Capt G. F. Luther* (RMO), 2Lt B. G. Matthews, 2Lt H. P. Armstrong*).

*Killed at Anzac. Underlined are Quinn's officers in April, 1915.

Most of the other officers were wounded at Anzac. A measure of the high casualties may be gauged by the fact that on 6 October 1915, less than one year after this photograph was taken, the youthful Dickinson (on Quinn's left) was acting CO 15 Battalion at Anzac. The battalion had received its 8th Reinforcements and its field strength then was 13 officers and 453 men.
lectures on map reading, military law, lessons from military history and the supply of food and forage.

*Ceramic*, like other troopships was dry, and this state was reflected by a timetable of events proposed by a contributor to the ship’s news sheet:

- disembark in Egypt
- drink beer
- visit Pyramids
- drink beer
- shave off (some) moustaches
- drink more beer

and so on.

Quinn, with the other officers of the battalion, 16 Battalion and ASC details, did a very typical thing during the voyage. They all signed their names around a photograph of the *Ceramic* and even 56 years later it makes sad reading.

**In Egypt**

After the 41-day journey from Melbourne, 15 Battalion disembarked at Alexandria on 3 February 1915. They entrained for Zeitoun and then slowly marched two miles on sea legs to their camp at Aerodrome site, Heliopolis, on the northern outskirts of Cairo.

Almost immediately after settling in, the battalions followed the British Army re-organization and changed from eight rifle companies to four companies each of four platoons, called the double company system. This was a simple operation. Quinn’s new command was 3 Company, formed by the amalgamation of the existing C Company and his own E Company. Thus, he and other company commanders gained a second in command. Quinn’s officers were Captain C. F. Corser; 9 Platoon, Lt F. Armstrong, a friend of Quinn’s who had seen service in South Africa as a very young soldier; 10 Platoon, 2Lt T. Robertson; 11 Platoon, 2Lt D. S. Freeman; 12 Platoon, 2Lt L. N. Collins. All these officers, except Corser who was wounded were to be killed at Anzac in the first two weeks. When at full strength, a company had 228 all ranks.
Companies were called No 1, No 2, etc, in 15 Battalion until early April 1915 when they reverted to A Company, B Company, etc. However, at Anzac in early May, some officers and men (but not Quinn) were still referring to their sub-units by their previous numbers.

4 Infantry Brigade, with the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles were formed into the New Zealand and Australian Division (NZ&A Division). This division and the 1st Australian Division constituted the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps under Lieutenant General Birdwood. Both divisions carried out arduous training in the desert. Although they started to train after the Australian division, the NZ&A division had a more ambitious programme and soon reached unit and formation exercises. Later there were to be divisional field training days. In the light of history, this higher level of training was probably wrong, thought it undoubtedly helped senior commanders and their staffs. At Quinn's level there were no such things as bombs or hand grenades or mortars; periscopes were almost unheard of, although some thoughtful 15 Battalion officers had some made at their own expense at Cairo. Unfortunately there was little advice on infantry minor tactics, and on the more important trench warfare from the wealth of experience that was then being accumulated on the Western Front.

There was still no thought of fighting the Turk, except on field training days. White (Great Britain) would clash with Khaki (Turkey) when the wily Ottoman would cross the Canal and threaten Cairo. At the same time when this picture was painted in the 'General Idea', Quinn would read in Battalion Routine Orders that the onus was on him to ensure that the men of his company were, '...physically fit, trained (particularly in marching, musketry and use of bayonet), disciplined and efficient to endure the European Campaign'. A few days later he would read that it was quite probable that white handkerchiefs would be banned in Europe and that his men should buy coloured ones.

In the midst of this intensive training, there was the inevitable day-to-day routine in the battalion. Routine Orders show
Quinn as ‘Captain of the Day’. On 27 February 1915 Captain Quinn was appointed President of a Board to enquire into and report upon the loss of four stretchers on charge of 15 Battalion.

Later, he and the other company commanders received a tart letter (which required an ‘ACK’) from their CO reminding them that several helmets\(^7\) and rifle barrels had been issued but had not been paid for. The letter went on to say that at the end of the South African War, officers of a certain regiment had to jointly meet a deficiency of £300 (about $5,000 in today’s money) from their own pockets. One suspects that the letter was drafted by the 2IC who had South African experience.

There were many returns to be furnished. One required Quinn to list the names of carpenters, bricklayers, plasterers, slaters, masons, painters, plumbers, gasfitters and (as an after-thought almost, it seems) saddlers in his Company.

Drunkenness and absence without leave were the two most prevalent offences. The former transgression met with fines from 2/6 to 10/-, the latter with detention and forfeiture of pay. Those men who contracted venereal disease had their names and the dates they spent in hospital — usually 14 to 21 days — listed in Battalion Routine Orders. They were also levied 2/- per day for hospital and maintenance charges.

There were brigade and divisional parades. For the inspection by Colonel Monash on 11 March, 15 Battalion paraded en masse. Soldiers who had lost their hats wore helmets. The pioneers carried axes, in addition to their rifles. Riding horses for Quinn and the other three company commanders, the CO and his batman, the 2IC, adjutant, RMO, transport officer and his sergeant, machine-gun and signalling officers, QM and Chaplain were on parade. Also on parade were 57 pack and draught horses and nine bicycles.

Then there occurred an event that was to have its echoes during the desperate fighting at Quinn’s Post in a few weeks’

\(^7\) The Wolseley helmet, not steel helmets. The steel helmet did not come into use until 1916. Quite a number of Australians coveted the tropical helmet which made them look like, they thought, British regulars.
time. Six transport drivers insisted on wearing emu plumes in their hats — an embellishment accorded only to the Light Horse. They were charged with disobeying a lawful command and their charges were investigated by the GOC NZ&A Division. Eventually, the drivers promised their CO that they would obey orders of dress, and all other orders without demur and they reluctantly took down the offending plumes.

It was during this time that colour patches, denoting a man’s unit, were sewn on to both sleeves, just below the shoulder. In Australia, unit lines had flags which showed their brigade and the numerical seniority of the battalion in the brigade. Colour patches were miniatures of these flags. 15 Battalion colour patch was a rectangular brown (third battalion in the brigade) over dark blue (4 Brigade colour)⁸. For a while units flew their battalion flags from their transport carts until the GOC ordered them not to do so. From this distance one can sympathize with the 48-year-old British GOC NZ&A Division (Major General Sir Alex Godley) as he strove to weld his disparate colonial units into a fighting formation.

The Australian troops in Egypt were on the British ration scale and like their sons and grandsons fifty years later, in such places as Malaya, they were to find the scale inadequate. To compensate for this each man was allowed an extra sixpence a day for messing.

When Quinn’s CSM read out Routine Orders for the 23 March, the interests of those on parade must have been stirred by the words ‘warm clothing and cardigan jackets or jerseys will be required on embarkation. Caps will invariably be worn, but hats may be taken for the voyage’.

Much had happened over the last few weeks. On 2 January 1915 the Russians asked Great Britain for assistance. Kitchener (the Secretary of State for War) and Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) decided the best way to assist would be

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⁸ Colour ‘patches’ were first used by Australians during the later stages of the South African War when ribbons were attached to the left shoulder strap. The last unit to use colour patches was 67 Battalion, later 3 RAR, in BCOF Japan. They were worn on the puggaree until 1950.
by a naval demonstration against the Dardanelles. However, early thoughts of a demonstration quickly gave way to a full blown naval attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as the objective. The fleet base was formed at Mudros Bay, on the island of Lemnos, 50 miles from the tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The navy bombarded the Turkish batteries on 19 February and again on 25 and 26 February. Small parties of sailors were landed at Cape Helles and at Kum Kale on 27 February and 1 March. Although they met with some opposition, they destroyed some guns before they returned to their ships.

Also on 1 March began the attempts to force the Dardanelles after minesweeping and bombardment of the forts. These preparations culminated in the failure of the fleet to shoot its way through on 18 March.

A little earlier — 20 February — occurred the event which was to be the beginning of Anzac. Assuming the navy could get through to Constantinople it was realized that troops would be required to overawe the Turks. Initially, 29 Division — a regular British formation — was earmarked but Kitchener wanted them in France instead and so he signalled Egypt to prepare the Australian and New Zealand troops for this service. Thus, as early as 4 March, a brigade of Australians was on Mudros in answer to this signal.

In the event, it was decided that the fleet could only get to Constantinople by a combined army and navy assault on the Gallipoli Peninsula. So, with their intentions made all too clear to the enemy and with all too little time left for planning, the tragedy of Gallipoli was about to unfold and Australia about to become a nation.

**Embarkation and Mudros**

On 11 April 15 Battalion, with the rest of 4 Brigade, travelled by train to Alexandria and there embarked. Fifty-six years later, the CO of 15 Battalion would write, with justification ‘... the Navy, presumably with the concurrence of the Army, did what I consider a stupid thing — they divided my Battalion. ...’ A Company and Quinn’s C Company boarded the Seeang Bee; Headquarters, B and D Companies went to the Australind. Food
has always loomed large in the soldier's life and it was perhaps strange that whereas the Seeang Bee had the reputation for the best messing in the fleet, the Australind had the worst. So bad was the food that men of D Company landed on Gallipoli with dysentery.

The journey from Alexandria to Mudros Harbour on Lemnos, a Greek island, took a little more than 48 hours. Here the men of 15 Battalion, as did all others, remained in their troopships because of the lack of water on the island. For the next ten days they practised disembarkation by cutters and horseboats. The amount of .303 ammunition which the troops lost into the water during these exercises worried Colonel Monash.

After the operation orders were issued for the attack on the Peninsula (which, incidentally, said that each battalion would take three bicycles ashore), all COs were taken by destroyer for a reconnaissance of the Gallipoli coastline. As the destroyer cruised up and down, Lieutenant Colonel Cannan and his fellow battalion commanders scanned the tawny cliffs and hills through their field glasses and tried to pick up features and their objectives. Unfortunately there were no large scale maps of the Peninsula.\(^9\) There were only the laboriously drawn sketch maps.

The overall army plan was for the main assault to be made by the 29 Division — the division that Kitchener first wished to send to France from England — at Cape Helles at the tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula and for the 1 Australian Division to assist this by landing near Gaba Tepe, up the coast. The NZ&A Division of two infantry brigades was to be reserve to the Australian division. They were not due to go ashore until the afternoon of Sunday 25 April.

**The Landing**

The story of the Landing a mile or so north of the intended beaches and the resultant confusion and the terrible intermingling of units is well known. By noon of 25 April, the Australian position was critical because by then Turkish reinforcements were being thrown into the fight. As 4 Brigade units began to land

\(^9\) This defect was to remain until good maps were taken off Turk dead and copied.
late that afternoon they too were committed piecemeal to fill gaps in the line. The main gap was at the head of a valley that was to be called Monash Valley. Most of the Brigade were sent there but Lieutenant Colonel Cannan’s 15 Battalion was to be scattered widely. Quinn saw A Company leave the Seeang Bee that afternoon and unbeknown to him B and D Companies from the Australind were split up upon reaching the beach at dusk. Battalion HQ was established in Monash Valley, below where A Company were manning the firing line on the edge of a plateau. Thus 15 Battalion, less Quinn’s Company on the Seeang Bee and the Transport Section on the Australind, were ashore but the command system had completely broken down.

While the rest of 15 Battalion, often in small parties under officers and NCOs of other brigades, fought and dug on the night of 25/26 April, Quinn and his men remained on board the Seeang Bee. Most of the troops displayed a studied disinterest in what was going on ashore. Some of them played a rather simple but macabre card game. Whoever was dealt the nine of diamonds — ‘the curse of Scotland’ — would be the first member of the platoon to die.10

Next morning orders finally arrived for their disembarkation. The destroyer HMS Usk, took C Company off the Seeang Bee at 0930 hours. The men were heavily loaded. They wore the 1908 pattern web equipment — pouches, water bottle, haversack, pack and entrenching tool. On top of the pack each man had fastened a small bundle of firewood. They also carried two white bags of emergency rations. These bags had resisted dyeing by coffee and strong tea. Caps were worn because it was thought that the Australian hat was too distinctive, although very soon it was discovered that the regular outline of the cap was as equally dangerous.11 Therefore, the wire stiffener was removed shortly

10 The curse referred to the Earl of Stair who sanctioned the massacre of Glencoe, 1692. His armorial bearings resembled the nine of diamonds. The soldier who received the card, in fact, went through the whole war unscathed.
11 Lambert’s fine painting of the Landing in the Australian War Memorial is incorrect insofar as he shows the soldiers wearing hats and with their sleeves down. The artist was aware of this, having been told of it by C. E. W. Bean, but Lambert was repelled by the idea of rolling up sleeves to identify friend from foe and by 1919 the hat was too Australian to reject.
after landing. Each man went ashore with 200 rounds of .303 ball.

As they neared the beach the destroyer stopped and the men transferred to small boats by scrambling down nets or sliding down wooden chutes. From the boats the activities on shore reminded some soldiers of ants on a log, there being so much movement there. They came under shelling on Anzac Cove and four men were hit. Here they were met by the QM who issued them with an extra bandolier. After a hasty meal they were told to report to their colonel who was up forward.

In single file they started up what was soon to be known as Shrapnel Gully and Monash Valley. They were occasionally shelled. Streams of wounded passed them on the way to RAPs and dressing stations near the beach. About a mile from the beach they halted and Quinn went forward to report to his CO. Shortly after this a staff officer — the GSOI of 1 Division, Lieutenant Colonel C. B. B. White — ordered Captain Corser to take the men ‘up to the high country’. This was a further instance where staff officers meddled with the affairs of sub-units and to some extent shows how completely the command system had failed. Corser took two platoons up the steep side of the valley and they were temporarily lost to Quinn and his CO. Later that afternoon Quinn and his two remaining platoons took part in the confused and ill-starred advance where further to the south-west 4 Battalion was to suffer so grievously.

That night a strange event occurred. Lieutenant Robertson, an original E Company officer, and 25 men of his 10 Platoon were led forward by a guide and told to dig in. One account says that the guide was a German and that he lured Robertson into the trap. Later Quinn wrote that the orders came from the brigade major of 1 Brigade who was to be killed next day. When dawn of 27 April came, Robertson and his men were dug-in to a depth of four feet but they had Turks on three sides. The Turks called upon them to surrender. Robertson refused to do so and

12 CGS 1920-23 and 1940. Killed in aircraft accident, Canberra, 13 August, 1940.
when they tried to escape only about seven got back. Robertson (it was his twenty-first birthday) and the others were killed.

The remainder of Quinn’s men spent Tuesday and Wednesday (27 and 28 April) digging a six feet deep, winding communication trench from the valley to the firing line, so as to lessen the casualties from artillery and sniper fire.

On 28 April the disentanglement of the force began. In Quinn’s sector it was done by passing slips of paper down the line. The men wrote their names and their units and from this information they were filtered out to a rendezvous. Quinn’s platoons came out under their own officers and NCOs when they were relieved by Royal Marines at midnight. Their rendezvous was the beach but they had little rest there. First, Quinn had to send a patrol north up the beach under his 2IC because there were fears of a Turkish flanking attack. Then, as Quinn was to write later, ‘... the Company was withdrawn and breakfasted. At 12 a.m. we were ordered to report to our brigade and were allotted a position to relieve Major Rankin. ...’ Thus, that position received the name of Quinn’s Post.

Quinn’s Post

Quinn’s Post, as approached from Monash Valley rose abruptly and precipitously to a height of about 150 feet. The Australians and New Zealanders who fell back to this crest on the afternoon of 25 April and held on, suffered heavy casualties there, as both flanks and the left rear of the post were open to aimed fire. By now the Anzac Line was like a rough triangle with its base along the beach, one side held by New Zealanders on Walker’s Ridge and Russell’s Top and the other running down the ridge towards Lone Pine. Quinn’s Post was at the apex which looked down to Monash Valley, the main communication and re-supply route.

It was not possible to dig or move during the day. Because the crest itself was overlooked by the enemy in the Chessboard and German Officers’ trenches, it was manned only at night. The frontage and the situation were such that Quinn put his complete company in the line.
On the extreme left there remained a few men of a weakened company of 13 Battalion and this group came under command of Quinn. Next to them was the platoon of B Company, then 9, 12, 11 and finally the remnants of the depleted 10 Platoon. His total strength was 9 officers and about 300 men. The enemy had a marked local superiority in both bombing and small arms fire and the best that the garrison could do was to keep their heads down. In spite of these enforced passive meas-
Quinn's men remained in the Post for a week until they were relieved by 16 Battalion and some Royal Marines on Wednesday, 5 May. During the week Quinn lost another platoon commander — Freeman of 11 Platoon who was killed in a sniping duel — and his 2IC, Captain Corser, who was wounded in the stomach. The company went into local reserve in Monash Valley where things were only a little less dangerous, as the enemy could aim rifle and machine-gun fire from the features that looked down into the busy valley.

By now the methodical Colonel Monash had his brigade under his command again and he ordered that 13 Battalion should permanently garrison Pope's; 14 Battalion, Courtney's (a post 150 yards south-west of Quinn's) and 15 and 16 Battalions should alternate every 48 hours at Quinn's. Monash's 4 Brigade had a front line strength on 3 May, nine days after landing, of 41 officers and 1,770 men. Of this number, 15 Battalion had 8 officers and 350 men. They had landed 25 officers and 934 men.

Apparently on the orders of the CO, company commanders on 9 May submitted a brief report for the war diary of what had happened to their commands since the Landing. Of neces-
sity their descriptions are vague because, for the first few days, features had no recognized names. Quinn’s report on C Company is in his own very neat handwriting on the familiar ½-inch squared paper of a field notebook. He called his position ‘Quinn’s Hill’ and he makes one curious error throughout his three-page report. He had the correct day but used the date of the previous day, e.g., ‘to relieve Major Rankin at which place the company has been on and off since Thursday the 28th (sic) April, 1915’. In action most men, at any rate before the advent of recent Japanese watches, could recall the date but rarely the day. He signed himself ‘Captain’ although he had been a major since 1 May.

**Attacks and Counter-attacks**

Quinn dated his report 9 May and on that night and early next morning his company and the remainder of the recently reinforced battalion were to suffer heavy casualties in a reconnaissance in force ordered by the GOC NZ&A Division to Colonel Monash. The aim of this local, but costly attack, was to find out what the enemy was doing in front of Quinn’s. Patrolling was obviously out of the question so it was to be a matter of seizing the Turkish trenches about 20-25 yards from the front line and digging communication trenches to them. One of the men who was wounded in this action still recalls talking to Quinn before the attack. Quinn appeared confident that the attack would succeed. The assault did succeed, but the Turkish counter-attack was too strong and the trenches had to be abandoned. The casualties that night were 14 officers and 193 men. Ten of the officers were killed. Two of them were Quinn’s platoon commanders, Lieutenants Collin and Armstrong. Armstrong, who was Quinn’s best friend, was killed beside him.

Had the Turks followed up their successful counter-attack by continuing on to the post itself the situation could have become most critical as, perhaps not unnaturally, a number of reinforcements had become unsteady that morning and a part of the post was unmanned. However, the wearied, more experienced men held on and by their example rallied the waverers.

Quinn, like all others, had his share of close shaves during this period. A New Zealander engineer was shot dead while they were talking; another bullet grazed his neck.
Gradually, improvements came to Quinn’s Post. New Zealand and Australian engineers were attached to the post to supervise and assist in the digging at night and the construction of tracks. There are never enough engineers and this was true at Quinn’s and throughout Anzac.

Sandbags and some periscopes became available. The locally manufactured jam-tin bombs came up with the fatigue parties from the beach. The menace of the Turkish bomb was decreased a little in the central section of the post. Previously the bombs would roll downhill into the support trenches, a few yards behind the front line. One 15 Battalion officer renewed a pre-war friendship with an officer who was in charge of the beach parties. Late at night 50 men from the battalion carried 36 sheets of galvanised iron and heavy timber up to Quinn’s and set about roofing two lengths of the support trench closest to the Turks. The iron was covered with two feet of earth and the trench then widened to form a chamber. These were called ‘bomb-proofs’.

Early in May, 15 Battalion received their first issue of Maconochie rations. These tinned stews were a welcome relief from the bully beef, biscuit and the occasional cheese and jam. Maconochie was a novelty then. Later it was to be loathed.

The soldiers also had more time to take in their surroundings. The vegetation around Quinn’s Post was cut down by small arms fire, but elsewhere it was thick and scrubby and mainly dwarf oak which the soldiers called holly. There were (and are today), firs, arbutus, flowering thorn and laurel. There were a few birds — doves, pigeons and hawks — and the hot days brought out scorpions, centipedes and spiders. At night the tortoises, moving through the scrub, froze the blood of sentries. The full force of the summer had not yet arrived on the Peninsula, but the smell of unburied bodies was even then pervasive. Flies and lice were becoming bad, as the days were warm, but nights were still chilly. Few men were not stirred by the splendour of the sunsets behind Imbros Island, 15 miles out to sea.
On Thursday 13 May Quinn received the good news that his company was to be relieved by the Light Horse, who had arrived at Anzac only the previous day as dismounted troops. It was clearly wrong to put raw, unblooded troops into the worst part of the front but the Anzac commanders had little choice. 2 Light Horse Regiment, appropriately a Queensland unit, took over from 15 Battalion troops. Unfortunately the handover-takeover was very hurried. In answer to the question, ‘What is it like?’ the wearied 15 Battalion soldiers replied that there may be some bombs. It was surely the understatement of the campaign. The Light Horse were to suffer quite severely that afternoon from bombs and sniping.

Later that afternoon Quinn wrote his last letter home. He headed his letter ‘Quinn’s Hill’ although he said the official name was ‘Quinn’s Corner’. He paid a compliment to the enemy: ‘The Turkish Army is not to be trifled with. They are great fighters, well equipped and clothed and daring.’ In this, Quinn was a little ahead of his countrymen because general admiration for the Turk did not come until after the enemy attacks of 19 May. In this letter to his mother he went on to say ‘I have built my name not alone in the ring but also on the field’ and finished by saying that it was cheerful and amusing to dodge the bombs.

Quinn was not long out of the line because 15 Battalion were ordered to relieve the raw 2 Light Horse Regiment the following afternoon.

**Monash Valley Command**

The arrival of the Light Horse meant additional spare headquarters and one of them — 1 Light Horse Brigade (Colonel Chauvel) — was given the duties of Monash Valley Command. Colonel Chauvel appointed permanent staffs at Pope’s, Quinn’s and Courtney’s, so as to get continuity of work and supervision as the battalions came in and out of the line. At Quinn’s, Lieutenant Colonel Cannan was appointed commandant with a 2IC from 16 Battalion and an adjutant who was, in effect, a Works Officer — Lieutenant McSharry, 2 Light Horse Regiment. Quinn’s was now to be held by 13, 15 and 16 Battalions, each on a 48-hour roster.
Turkish Attack of 19th May and the Armistice

This was the supreme Turkish effort to drive the invaders into the sea. It failed for a number of reasons, one of them being that the Turkish troop concentrations were picked up by Royal Navy aircraft. 15 Battalion, again in Quinn’s, were forewarned. Troops stood to at 0300 hours, thirty minutes earlier than usual. They tried to throw out barbed wire on knife rests, but were unsuccessful. As an additional precaution, two companies of 16 Battalion, were brought forward to the post. Turkish attacks against Quinn’s and other parts of the line early in the morning never stood a chance against machine-gun crossfire from the flanks and rifle and bombing from the front. The terrible enemy casualties led to an Armistice on 24 May. Burial parties worked in no-man’s land under the Red Crescent and the Red Cross, and the remainder of the troops of both sides looked out upon the strange scene through loop-holes in their trenches. During the unnatural quietness of that day 15 Battalion men in Quinn’s again heard the sound of enemy tunnelling.

Turks Break into Quinn’s

As part of their attacks against Quinn’s Post, the Turks had planned to tunnel and mine under the Australian line. There were a number of miners in 15 Battalion and these men heard the enemy digging as early as 17 May. Unfortunately their warnings were largely unheeded, one reason being that the New Zealand engineers mainly came from the UK and they were inclined to be sceptical. The Turks were unable to tunnel far enough forward in time for their attack on 19 May but continued their steady, underground advance in the following days and nights.

Again and again a soldier of A Company, 15 Battalion reported that the Turks were getting nearer. On the day after the Armistice — 25 May — the engineers in the listening gallery heard the enemy digging and they were alarmed to find them so close. They in turn started five offensive tunnels and that evening fired the first camouflet charge. The unfortunate 15 Battalion, which had only that afternoon been relieved from Quinn’s Post, manned the rear slopes in case the Turks attacked.
The Australian and New Zealand counter-mining was not completely successful. The enemy was still heard digging and on 2 May the second camouflet charge was blown. Again 15 Battalion manned the rear slopes and again the countermining did not stop the enemy digging.

The next charge was set off in the early hours of the morning of 28 May. For the third time, 15 Battalion were posted to the rear slopes of Quinn's, in case the enemy should fire their mines and threaten the post. By an oversight the battalion remained on the slope that night and were not stood down. They were tired men by the time they eventually returned to the bivouac area in Monash Valley.

On the evening of Friday, 28 May, when the Australian counter-mining team left the post, the soldier who had urged upon his seniors for almost two weeks the serious nature of the Turkish operations, dolefully reported that it was only a matter of hours before the post would be blown up.

That night the post was garrisoned by 350 men of 13 Battalion and 100 men of 10 LH Regiment. The CO 13 Battalion had command of the post, for Lieutenant Colonel Cannan — the commandant of Quinn's under the Monash Valley Command structure — was on board Arcadian.12 15 Battalion, now down to three companies, was the local reserve; 16 Battalion, of only two companies, was a further reserve; in addition there was the remaining company of 13 Battalion and some Light Horse regiments.13 The moon was full.

At 0320 hours Saturday 29 May the Turks blew their mines, which destroyed the front trenches in the central subsection of the post. The Australians there were either killed or

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12 Arcadian was the Headquarters ship and General Sir Ian Hamilton would from time to time invite commanders to spend a day or so on board for a complete rest. Monash had just returned from the ship. The Gallipoli Campaign was unique in that there were no rear areas, the Allies always fought with their backs to the sea a mile or so behind them and very few places were safe from bullets or shelling.

13 At full strength, a Light Horse Regiment had about 500 men, equivalent to two rifle companies.
suffocated. The Turks, bombing freely, entered the post and reached the bombproofs behind the front trenches. It was the most critical development since the Landing.

Fairly naturally, to begin with there was confusion. However, three important things occurred which were of immeasurable assistance to the garrison. Both flanks of the post held firm and prevented the enemy from expanding north and south and Lieutenant McSharry, the permanent adjutant who had been awakened 20 minutes before the blast, had already determined a course of action. He took a supply of bombs and some men and began to bomb the Turks. Very early he realized that the Turks were bottled up, and with the approaching first light the enemy would risk heavy casualties should they attempt to exploit their initial success by reinforcing across no-man’s land. Although there were to be many other officers senior to McSharry around the post that morning, it was to be he who would most fully control the situation.

By now the reserves — the 15 Battalion companies — were reaching the slopes behind Quinn’s. The first company was simply told — ‘You must charge and drive them out.’ Shortly after this the Post Commander — the CO 13 Battalion — was wounded and evacuated and Lieutenant McSharry had the leading company reinforce both flanks of the post. Casualties were suffered as the men moved across the rear of the post to do this.

The CO 16 Battalion now took over the duties of Garrison Commander. He was pressured by the GOC NZ&A Division to retake the lost trenches at whatever the cost. In addition, Colonel Monash’s headquarters, as the morning wore on, asked if the trenches were re-taken. It was easy enough to order a charge to re-capture the trenches. The difficult thing was to arrive at a plan of how to launch an attack. Movement on most of the higher rear slopes of Quinn’s was open to enemy fire and, of course, to charge over the top of the bomb proofs in order to reach the front trenches would mean annihilation on the skyline.

The second company charged the occupied trenches and bomb proofs diagonally. They included the men of the transport section who had for some time refused to take down their un-
authorized emu plumes in Egypt and, because recklessness was necessary, their former platoon commander used some simple psychology — ‘Come on, transport. They want you to show them how to do it.’ The assaults were signalled by Major Quinn blowing on his whistle. The assault met with the greatest number of bombs yet thrown by the Turks at Anzac. Eventually, the Turk was cleared out of the northern bomb-proof and surrounding trenches. They were now confined to the area of the southern bomb-proof. More than ever, the enemy were cut-off in a defined space. It was now daylight.

However, Colonel Chauvel had arrived at Quinn’s Post and he decided that the charge had failed and that the risk of charging over the bomb-proof must now be faced. He gave the order for another charge to Quinn personally. The next reserves
were Quinn’s own C Company and a company of 13 Battalion. Quinn’s company formed up on the left, the other on the right. The men were in three ranks because, as the CO 16 Battalion wrote later, he expected the first two waves to be mown down on the crest and the third would be left to clear the trenches. Efforts by the junior officers to convince Chauvel that it would be better to weed out the remaining enemy by filtering in from the flanks were of no avail. One report says that Quinn was in a very argumentative mood. The charge was delayed a number of times until Quinn was told he could postpone it no longer. He returned to his men and was seen twice to place the whistle in his lips as if to blow the signal for the assault. He then decided to go up to the front line himself to see what the position was. He took McSharry with him. On entering the front line he was shot and killed from behind and fell back into McSharry’s arms.

And Afterwards

Quinn’s death delayed the charge and a further delay occurred when the enemy opened heavy machine-gun fire on the crest. When this stopped the Australians sprang forward and such are the fortunes of war that the Turks attacked across no-man's land at the same time. The Australians suffered only a few casualties as the Turk machine gunners could not fire for fear of hitting their own men and the front line was re-occupied. Unfortunately, the Turks still held out in the southern bomb-proof and, after causing some more casualties, they finally surrendered at about 0800 hours. They were slapped on the back and offered cigarettes as they came down the slope.

The Australian casualties for the action were 33 killed, 178 wounded. All told the Turk suffered about 300 casualties.

Quinn’s Post was eventually repaired. Between 29 and 31 May the post was handed over to the New Zealand Infantry and 4 Brigade went into reserve.

The New Zealanders, benefitting from their comparative freshness and an increase in engineer stores made vast improve-
ments at Quinn's. They cut sheltered terraces into the hillside near the crest. These were roofed with iron and sandbags and here the supports bivouacked. They also gained an ascendancy in sniping. However, for both Anzacs and enemy, Quinn's Post remained the most dangerous part of the line during the campaign.

For his actions at Quinn's Post on the morning of 29 May, Lieutenant McSharry became the first Australian to be awarded the newly instituted Military Cross. Later, on 21 June 1915, he transferred from the Light Horse to 15 Battalion and was the CO when he died of wounds in France on 6 August 1918.

Lieutenant Colonel Cannan commanded 15 Battalion in action in France and on 31 August 1916 took command of 11 Infantry Brigade with the rank of brigadier-general for the remainder of the war. He was awarded the CB, CMG and DSO. Between wars, he returned to his insurance business and commanded CMF units. In the Second World War he was the QMG from 1940 for five years. Despite the tremendous responsibilities he carried throughout those difficult times his services went completely unrecognized and he was placed on the Reserve of Officers as Colonel, (Honorary Major-General), one grade lower than the rank he had held 27 years previously. He lives in Brisbane.

His company commander, who was killed in the front line of the post that bore his name, was buried in Shrapnel Valley Cemetery, near Anzac Cove, with many others who fell that night. His death was officially recorded in Military Order 382 of 6 June 1915.

Quinn's Post Today

A small Commonwealth War Graves Commission cemetery marks Quinn's Post today. It has the graves of men who were reburied from the Pope's Hill cemetery after the war. On entering

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14 11 Brigade was a formation of 3 Division. Monash was the divisional commander.
the gate in the rosemary hedge one looks over Monash Valley down to the Aegean Sea. A gravel landrover truck runs past the front of the cemetery. The further gutter was once a Turk trench. Soon it will be difficult to identify landmarks for the Turks have planted pine trees on the slopes that run down to Monash Valley.

MONTHLY AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded prizes for the best original articles published in the July and August 1971 issues of the journal to:

July: Major J. L. L'Epagniol ('Not by Arms Alone') $10.

Reviewed by Brigadier M. Austin, DSO, OBE (RL), AHQ Canberra.

ONE of the problems facing the student of history is to recapture the circumstances under which an event, or series of events occurred. This is particularly important when studying military history where the environmental background — economic, geographic, sociological and political, plays such a decisive part in determining the course of events leading up to the declaration of war, and subsequently to the aftermath to victors and vanquished.

Factual background can be established readily, if painstakingly, but the feelings of those who played the decisive role, both at home and in the trenches, are not so easily found, even from an extensive investigation of contemporary sources. For this reason John Laird's anthology Other Banners is important to the study of the part played by Australia, but more particularly the part played by the Australian private soldier in World War 1.

By a judicious selection of the extensive literature available, this anthology takes us through the beginnings of nascent
nationalism; the heroics, mistakes and battle conditions on Gallipoli, the Desert and the Western Front; disenchantment; and the final return of those who came back, some quite cynically, to civilian life. The overall impact is a skilful blending of events as they affected individuals, from Monash to the private soldier, as well as Australia as a nation.

The vivid word pictures will recall similar, but perhaps not such harsh conditions, to those who have been involved in more recent theatres. In addition, the wry flashes of humour which seem so much a part of the Digger's ethos, always show through to mitigate the stark reality of war.

Whether individuals agree or not with Bean's thesis on the Australian national character, this anthology is a substantial contribution to the environmental background of the reactions of Australians to World War I, as well as an effective illustration of 'mateship' between authors, editor, publishers and printer.

The human elements during the entire course of the First World War are vividly portrayed, and since human nature does not change, this book should give a deeper insight into, and understanding of, the problems of man management which inevitably arise in war.

A book worthy of a place on any bookshelf.


Reviewed by Dr R. C. Thompson, Lecturer in History, Royal Military College, Duntroon.

This slim volume is the journal plus a few letters written by Roger de Mauni, a lieutenant, and later a captain, in a French battalion of raw conscripts in the Franco-Prussian War. de Mauni's is an interesting account because of his intelligence and literary ability and because it deals mostly with the less well known 'People's War' after the disastrous French defeat at Sedan.

de Mauni's battalion was part first of the Army of the West in Normandy and then of Chanzy's Army of the Loire.
The only major battle in which it participated was the fall of Le Mans in January 1871, and only a small part of the journal deals with this and other minor skirmishes. These descriptions of actual fighting well reflect the perspective of an infantry lieutenant who knows no more than what his own battalion is doing.

Most of the time de Mauni and his men were marching back and forth across the picturesque valleys of the Loir and Sarthe rivers south-west of Paris. The deteriorating effect on their morale of little fighting, of a lack of faith in a high command that continuously promised impending victories but seemed mostly to be ordering retreats, and of an uncertain supply of food and adequate shelter, combined with the rigours of an icy winter, is well depicted. It becomes easy to understand why troops like those of de Mauni's battalion broke and ran at the battle of Le Mans. Though de Mauni's men suffered few battle casualties, the wonder is that half of them were still with the colours at the end of the campaign.

The journal also casts an interesting light on the so-called 'People's War'. The civilians suffered nearly as much from their own soldiers — who burnt their supplies of fuel, ate their reserves of food and crowded them into cold corners of their own houses — as they did from the invading Prussians. There was a consequent damning of both sides among many of the peasants de Mauni encountered. The author himself sympathized to some extent with their attitude; he suggested: 'it is very doubtful whether the French are more in the right than the Prussians, and whether the God to whom both parties offer up their supplications does not regard us all as being wrong'. (p.87). On the other hand there were villages where the French troops were patriotically welcomed.

The value of the journal is enhanced by the concise comments by the editor, Colonel David Clarke. These provide a clear framework in which to place de Mauni's record and also balance his judgements, which at times are less than objective. There is also an adequate index and three maps which, though reasonably detailed, would have been more useful had they explicitly delineated the path taken by de Mauni's battalion.
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Four-Ball-Best-Ball

Sir, — In their stimulating essay ‘Rachel Who’s Minding the Store?’ (Army Journal, July 1971), Lieutenant Colonels D. M. Butler DSO, and B. S. Milligan recommended upgrading the general educational standing of the Staff Corps of the Australian Regular Army. This most desirable aim, and their sub-themes of ‘parity with external reference groups’ and ‘intrinsic demands of the military role in the present age’, justify examination from some other viewpoints.

Educational Standing of the Australian Staff Corps

The authors clearly indicate that they are concerned with standard as well as standing. I regret that it is in the matter of standing that we as staff corps officers have most let ourselves down. From 1911 until the recent changes the RMC conducted a four-year course of tertiary education of considerable academic standard (I include military subjects in this assessment) for cadets who had passed the Leaving Certificate and many of whom had matriculated. This was a broader and in most cases longer academic course than provided by faculties such as arts, science or engineering at a university. Cadets of all corps gained academic depth to the extent of four years of general study which, whether in military or civil subjects, was comparable to an arts or science course. Cadets, heading for Engineer Corps, qualified for two years exemption as well in engineering at university. The extra maturity and education gained from their total RMC course was frequently commended by their professors at university.

The tragedy was that we did not recognize among ourselves that most officers had completed four years of tertiary education which equated at least with a three-year university arts or science course. So in post-World War II, when the need to demonstrate the RMC graduates educational standing was considered important, our RMC graduates were the first to deny their own education and cry for university guidance, instead of demanding recognition of a West Point style military degree.
This strange inferiority complex is perhaps the result of most graduates of RMC being overawed by the unknowns of universities. Those who were graduates of both RMC and a university were apparently considered unworthy of consultation on such an important problem of leadership.

The authors quote from US Army experience without noting that the curriculum of West Point, which gives each graduate a degree (Bachelor of Science in Military Engineering), closely paralleled that of RMC up to the end of the 1960s, with the exception that mathematical and engineering subjects were emphasized at West Point for all cadets. Of the 77 per cent of US infantry career officers with bachelors degrees quoted, West Point graduates may account for 20 per cent with the rest mainly Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) graduates of the vast array of universities or colleges of varying standards which correspond to our universities, technical colleges and business colleges. In the ROTC system military subjects, including small arms training, drill and PT, are accepted as credits towards achieving a degree in any faculty. Even in recent years, when the ROTC System has come under heavy attack, the military credit towards a degree can be up to 16 per cent.

Australia has no government controlled university system like the ROTC and this is probably the chief reason for shortage of long service officers with degrees. On the other hand RMC graduates of the past, without formal degrees, should not themselves deny possession of a good academic standard and they must face the world, the public service and Sir Henry Bland with this self confidence.

To summarize on this point, we as graduates of RMC have failed to establish recognition of the standing of the fine education we received. In attempting to compensate we have submitted our choice of curriculum, discipline and management of RMC to at least partial control by a civilian university. I cannot think of any other country that has done this. I share with the authors each his individual pride for being a graduate of RMC or Sydney University. I sincerely agree with their theme.
that to be a graduate of both should be of advantage to one's army.

*Standard of Education in the Australian Staff Corps*

Turning to the standard of education in the staff corps, I share the authors' dismay at the deficiencies that are apparent. The standard of education achieved can be influenced by two factors. The ability of the student and the quality of the education offered.

The standard for RMC entry has always been reasonable. Originally, a leaving certificate with matriculation desirable, latterly, matriculation is a requirement. It is clear that the quality of the education is adequate to provide bachelors degrees to all those who are willing to enter and who reach the entry standard. Entry to OCS is partly from those who have not achieved these educational standards, and allowing for a reasonable percentage who through various misfortunes did not have the opportunity, the remainder seem destined to a greater struggle to achieve a degree at Australian university standards despite the extraordinary statistics arising from Professor Karmel's prediction. At the same time their educational standards compare reasonably with ROTC officers from lesser US universities whose degrees equate with something less than Australian university standards.

Attendance at the staff colleges and joint services staff colleges (our own and overseas) equates reasonably with post graduate work. The syndicate size and tutor (Directing Staff) relationship is favourable. Even if the pressure of staff duties allows little time for liberal studies and the content does not readily parallel with any civilian masters degree course, they should not be undervalued by post graduate education standards. The year at the Royal College of Defence Studies (Imperial Defence College) is, by any measure, of PhD status. The main shortcoming here is the small number of Australian officers allowed to attend. The Public Service vacancies seem to be eagerly filled despite the authors' demonstration of the existing superior degree holding status of that body.
The more cadets who can be enticed to enter RMC, the more bachelor degrees there will be in the army which can lead to higher degrees for those who need them and are capable. If enough of those capable of reaching degree standard can not be attracted to the army we can only make the best of what we get. Our excellent system of education should not be decried because insufficient volunteers reached past or present RMC standards. The pressing need is to find ways to increase the quantity of acceptable volunteers.

Direct Entry From University

The long successful British university direct entry scheme and the US ROTC system undoubtedly provide both armies with a far higher proportion of bachelor degrees than possessed by the Australian Army. Direct university entry for staff corps officers has been a mere trickle and cannot be regarded as notably successful. The main deficiency appears to be inadequacy of military training and background obtained by the applicant before joining the staff corps. The ROTC system with its strong US Government entry into university organization and management and the compulsion inherent in its application to National Service has produced the great majority of the quoted 77 per cent US infantry career officers with bachelor degrees. Even so, pressures including those that kept ROTC type training out of our universities in the past century are stirring in the USA. No matter what the outcome is there, the chance of the Australian community reversing its historical decision is small.

National Service Appraisal of the Status of a Degree in the Army

So where else can we turn? Our National Service has produced a flow of soldiers and officers with bachelor degrees, some of whom could be absorbed into the staff corps on very reasonable terms to themselves and likely advantage to the army. As they have the labelled, educated intelligence the authors are seeking they may well have examined what the army does with its regular officers possessing bachelor degrees. As the authors noted, many of these regulars with degrees will be
from Engineer and Signal Corps. Taking RAE as the sample the enquirer might expect to see a parallel with the RE.

The Engineer in Chief of the British Army on 23 November 1970 addressed the Institute of Civil Engineers in the following terms:

'Higher Management' in the army may be defined as incorporating the ranks of Brigadier and above, which are held by 3 per cent of the army's officers. 4.2 per cent of RE officers hold these ranks — a higher proportion than in any other arm. Over half of these 4.2 per cent are in general management (not engineering) posts, open to competition by all arms. For example two (about 15 per cent) of the army's infantry and armoured brigades are commanded by engineers. About 1 per cent of the army's officers and of RE officers are Major-Generals or above, but of the 10 RE Generals only 3 are needed to fill engineering posts, the other 7 being in general management.

More significant, and already mentioned, has been their continued selection for at least one of the five places on the Army Board — sometimes two and occasionally three. In other words, though the Royal Engineers only amount to 9 per cent of the army, they have provided on average 25 per cent of the Generals on its 'Main Board'. Similarly, within the hierarchy of the Ministry of Defence, there is no departmental military chain in which there is not at least one RE officer in the higher echelons.

This use of RE officers throughout the full field of command and staff is undoubtedly making good use of their broad education and proved ability.

Can the same be said for the Australian Army? Engendered by shortage and expediency our RAE officers have had an over-abundance of Q appointments, and mostly a rank ceiling of brigadier. This undoubtedly led to the resignation of a number of ex Engineers-in-Chief in the last two decades in the rank of brigadier when they should have been at the prime of their careers. A precious commodity of RMC officers with broadened education was lost. The young officer with a degree, whether national service or regular, can only wonder whether there is a worthwhile career for him, be his degree for engineering, economics, social sciences or literature, when Kings Medallist and often Sword of Honour winners with engineering degrees have not been used by their army in the way other armies do. I am sure that the collective experience of the authors recognize

1 The Royal Engineers Journal — December 1970.
that the very hard discipline of achieving an engineering degree does not merely produce a technical officer without enlarging his decision making and management abilities. If our army can demonstrate it values the officers already possessing degrees, the overall standard of young men seeking entry must improve.

**University Courses for the Mature**

What can be achieved in retrospect for the older officer? There is the frustration posed by the authors for each of us who completed a fine academic course at RMC, but was not honoured by a title recognized in the civil community for what he achieved. This of course applied equally to the engineer who, after this academic training, did further work for a BE. Although now reaching senior rank like Lt Col Butler with a wealth of education at RMC, staff college and other places and the great confidence of operational experience and management, there perhaps are a number of RMC graduates who would also like to add a visible sign of their education. If we have some quiet years ahead the army may be able to spare them (and capable OCS graduates) the one to three years required to achieve their wish. Dare I suggest that this could also leave room for senior engineer officers to be absorbed back into the mainstream, or even to be in a position to pursue the army’s cause with equally erudite public servants at the higher levels?

I hope I have demonstrated my sympathy and substantial agreement with the aims of the authors of ‘Rachel Who’s Minding the Store?’. To continue their golfing analogy I would like to be partner to their joint authorship in a Four-Ball-Best-Ball against those who belittle our collective standard of education.

SDSLO

Colonel P. D. Yonge

Vietnam

**Dissimilar Situations?**

Sir,—May I be permitted to make a belated comment on Mr A. J. Sweeting's rejoinder to General Berryman's letter about
the landing of the Australian troops in Java in February 1942 (Army Journal No. 265, June 1971).

Mr Sweeting falls into the error of comparing dissimilar situations. First, the military situation in the Middle East in 1940-41 and the military situation in the ABDA area in February 1942 were totally dissimilar. Secondly, in the Middle East in 1940-41 Blamey, in resisting efforts to split the AIF, could reasonably expect to have the support of his government, whereas Lavarack in 1942 received a direct order from his government to obey Wavell's instructions and land the Orcades troops in Java.

Despite the clearly expressed intention of his government, Blamey was only partially successful in his efforts to keep the AIF together in the Middle East. In March-April 1941 he took the 6th Division to Greece, leaving the 7th and 9th in Africa. After the withdrawal from Greece and Crete, 6th and 7th Divisions were in Palestine and Syria while 9th Division and 18th Brigade of the 7th Division were in Tobruk. It was not until November 1941 that all the Australian formations in the Middle East were concentrated under one headquarters.

South Warrandyte

Victoria

Colonel E. G. Keogh (retd)

Sir,—I do not agree with Colonel Keogh that the military situation in the Middle East in 1940-41 and the military situation in February 1942 were 'totally dissimilar'. The comment seems too sweeping. Were there no similarities at all?

In 1941 the Australians formed the largest national contingent of fighting troops in the Middle East. Given their unrestricted way, the British commanders would cheerfully have employed them to fill the gaps wherever they occurred and from the outset consistently sought to do so. In 1942, in the ABDA area, Australians were intended again to form the bulk of the fighting troops. Once again Wavell sought to employ
them in a way that was opposed to the Australian government's policy and the wishes of the local Australian commander.

Colonel Keogh's statement that Lavarack received a direct order from the Australian Government to obey Wavell's instructions to land the Orcades troops in Java is not supported by the official history, which was read in draft form by General Lavarack, and it seems inconsistent with Curtin's attempts to have the troops withdrawn (see The Japanese Thrust, pp. 456-7).

After Greece in 1941 Blamey wrote that the outstanding lesson of the campaign was that 'no reasons whatever should outweigh military considerations when it is proposed to embark on a campaign, otherwise failure and defeat are courted'. The Orcades troops were landed in Java to protect airfields for non-existent aircraft and to bolster up the morale of Dutch forces whose fighting efficiency was about on a par with a home guard.

Incidentally, Colonel Keogh's statement about the dispersal of the AIF in the Middle East is misleading in some respects, and by omission makes his case seem better than it was. When Blamey took the 6th Division to Greece he did so expecting the 7th Division to follow. The German advance came too swiftly for this to happen. The good fortune enjoyed by the 7th Division was denied the Orcades troops in 1942 in circumstances not greatly dissimilar to Greece in 1941, with the Japanese rate of advance, instead of the German, outstripping belated Allied plans to build up their forces.

Australian War Memorial
Canberra

A. J. Sweeting

This correspondence is now closed—Editor

Administration of Discipline

Sir,—I have read with interest Major McGregor's article 'Administration of Discipline' (Army Journal No. 267, August 1971). I should, however, like to make a few observations by way of emphasis and amplification.
First, I would emphasize that, in my opinion, the Army disciplinary system is hierarchical for the following very good reasons:

- Minor infringements are dealt with immediately by an officer aware of the local conditions, and probably of the persons involved. This officer has only limited powers of punishment, and the main point of such punishment is its timeliness with respect to the 'crime'.

- Offences of a more serious nature, rendering the soldier liable to more severe penalties, are dealt with by authority progressively more remote from the occasion and in progressively more formal, judicial manner. This parallels very largely, the civilian situation.

The Court Martial system provides a very good assurance that the soldier will get justice, in that:

- The members are not from the accused member's unit.

- The members represent a diversity of rank and experience which should lead to a good understanding of the circumstances brought out in evidence.

- The procedure allows, and the responsibilities of the prosecuting officer in particular demand; that all circumstances, including those favourable to the accused, are adduced. To emphasize, the duty of the prosecuting officer is not to secure a conviction, but to ensure that the full facts are disclosed.

- The presence of a legally qualified Judge Advocate ensures that advice is always available to the court on matters affecting any person's legal rights.

- The method of arriving at a finding prevents the senior members imposing their views on the more junior members of the court.
It has been my experience, as the president of such a court, that the members, when considering their findings are at great pains to ensure that:

- The evidence is thoroughly considered and that all facts have been presented and the accused given the benefit of any doubt.
- Any sentence awarded is commensurate with the offence but is such as to best serve the interests of both the Army and the soldier, i.e., will punish; should act as a deterrent; but should have the result of encouraging the soldier to become a useful member of the Army community. The question of retributive award was never raised.

After all this, the findings and sentence are subject to review and confirmation before being implemented.

Add to this the extensive system available for redress of a soldier’s wrongs, and the Army disciplinary systems looks pretty good.

I agree with Major McGregor that some specific areas could be reviewed, but overall I would consider a Court Martial to be, when conducted in accordance with the principles and ideals of military justice, the fairest possible.

Army Headquarters

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