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Cover: 'Group of Timor Guerillas, 1942' by war artist C. Bush.
No. 274, MARCH 1972

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An enemy photograph taken on 4 March 1942 showing the town of Darwin and the RAAF airdrome. The aircraft which took the photo was apparently undetected, as the only reported sightings over Darwin that day were eight Zero fighters, whereas the two Japanese names on the print indicate it was photographed from an aircraft carrying at least a crew of two.
INTRODUCTION

It is not possible, in an article of this nature, to deal fully with a subject of the scope and complexity of the Army reorganization. Apart from the work of the Army Review Committee itself, quite extensive examinations and reports were made by a large number of Working Parties dealing with specific aspects of the reorganization. This article can only touch lightly on the many aspects and factors which have been examined and discussed. All this article attempts to do therefore is sketch in some of the philosophy behind the Army Review Committee’s approach to the subject and describe broadly the main areas of change.

The present organization dates from Federation, when it was proper to leave the previously independent colonial forces grouped on a State basis, but over the years this organization became outmoded and needed to be re-examined in the light of present-day circumstances. The progressive development of the Army during this time, the experience gained in many campaigns, most recently Vietnam, the rapid advances in the field of com-
munications and, most importantly, changing strategic circumstances, all indicated that reorganization was necessary to meet defence tasks in the seventies and eighties.

In general terms, the Army Review Committee was required to examine the overall command and organizational structure of the Army in Australia. In pursuance of this task the Committee established, as its prime objective, the need to design a structure best suited to the preparation of the Army, in the peacetime conditions it foresaw and for the type of war we might anticipate. The Committee endeavoured to look well into the future — beyond the range of existing strategic assessments — when more emphasis might have to be given to an organization better suited to the defence of Australia and its Territories; at the same time the aspects of regional involvement, including the possible dispatch of a force overseas, were recognized.

Within this over-riding intent the Committee sought to provide an organization which would best meet the criteria set out below, and it was against these criteria that various alternatives, each with merit, were assessed in order to decide which organization would best meet our national requirement. The following criteria for the new organization were adopted. It should:

- Be suitable to meet the dual strategic requirements of having land forces readily available for the direct defence of Australia and its Territories, as well as for employment in an overseas theatre.
- Achieve the best possible results from the manpower and finance allotted by the Government.
- Be sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of an army of whatever size and shape and deployment it might assume in the future; in particular it should meet the needs of mobilization.
- Provide an adequate and proper system of command for a field army in peace and war.
- Provide an adequate and fully co-ordinated system of logistic support for both field and base elements of the Army.
Minimize the handling of detail by AHQ and by other superior headquarters, with a consequential reduction in their size.

In an emergency, enable the field army and its supporting units to separate readily from the base and training structure without undue dislocation to either.

As far as practicable avoid divided command and place formations and units reasonably accessible to their superior headquarters.

Be suitable for both the ARA and the CMF and provide for close and effective relationships between them.

Permit maximum delegation from superior headquarters to subordinate echelons.

Be compatible with the overall defence organization and its various elements and, as far as practicable, with that of our Allies.

The Committee recognized that the disposition of formations and units, particularly army schools, under a geographic system of command does not suit entirely a functional system. Some changes will be necessary but will take time to achieve as accommodation and other circumstances permit.

Furthermore, the old procedures which we all know so well are going to change and it may be thought that the new system does not provide the best arrangement in all local domestic circumstances. This may be so, but we should remember that it is the army organization as a whole which is important, and isolated elements may have to modify their position for the benefit of the whole.

This article describes the reorganization in the sequence:

- The rationale and the outline plan.
- The rationalization of logistic functions.
- The reorganization of AHQ.
- The reorganization outside AHQ.
- The implementation sequence and timetable.
RATIONALE AND OUTLINE PLAN

The present geographical command organization does not lend itself to a war situation. For example, to meet the wartime role:

- There is no headquarters below AHQ which is responsible for any one complete function. The responsibilities for command of field force, training and logistic units are divided between AHQ and the seven geographic commands. This results in fragmented control and the overloading of AHQ with responsibilities for direct command of units.

- The organization is not suited to meet the mobilization requirements of enlisting, training and organizing a large influx of manpower in a short period of time. Most training units are directly responsible to AHQ, but on mobilization AHQ would be so absorbed in a variety of major policy matters that it would be undesirable for it to have to concern itself with the details involved in the planning and execution of such an expansion. The present geographic Command Headquarters would face similar problems in such diverse fields as an expanding field force, heavy training commitments and increased demands for logistic support.

- In the past, when an emergency arose, the Army has had lead-time to prepare its wartime logistic structure. It has also received Allied support but this may not be available in future in the early stages, when it is urgently required. If we continue with the current organization we would persist with a system in which detailed control of logistic support is vested in AHQ, and the command of logistic units is divided between AHQ and geographic commands. What is needed, is to have in being a single organization which will provide the flexibility and centralized detailed control which are essential for efficient logistic support.

- In our present organization there are no operational and logistic headquarters between AHQ and divisional level which, as well as meeting the peacetime require-
ments, could provide the senior headquarters required in war. There is a need to have in peace, headquarters which are as adequately trained and experienced as the units they command.

Therefore, despite the many modifications made over the past half century, the present geographic command system is not suited to meet the type of war situation which could arise as the result of changing strategic circumstances. Furthermore, as it takes years to reorganize an army, it is unsound that the Army should have to undergo a major organizational change in a time of defence emergency.

Even in peacetime the present organization handicaps us in a number of ways:

- The degree of command exercised over units is, in many cases, weak and divided. There were, at the time of the review, some 140 units involving approximately 14,000 personnel under the direct command of AHQ, with matters of local administration being the responsibility of geographic commands. AHQ is not organized to command units directly, nor should it be. The fact that these AHQ units function as well as they do is more a tribute to the commanding officers concerned, than a measure of organizational worth.

- The problem of having too many units directly under headquarters with all-embracing responsibilities is also demonstrated at the geographic command level. For example, Headquarters Eastern Command, at the time of the review, had directly under its command about 80 units which contributed to the whole range of army functions. This span of control and the diverse nature of the units means that the effectiveness of command must necessarily suffer.

- Under the present system, commanders and staff at Command Headquarters must, of necessity, become heavily involved in a host of local matters which are time absorbing and are not directly connected with the primary task of preparing the Army for war.
though it is acknowledged that some provision must be made for these local involvements, it should be made easier for senior commanders and staffs to concentrate on their primary tasks.

- The diversity of command produced by a geographic system causes a lack of uniformity in standards and methods. Clearly, there is a need for centralized control of the main functions.

- Joint service considerations are becoming increasingly relevant to the Army’s role, and our organization is not readily compatible with the Navy and Air Force nor with Australia’s major Allies, which are organized on functional lines in a theatre of war.

- The present organization does not permit AHQ to delegate much of the detail with which it is concerned, as there are no subordinate headquarters which have Commonwealth-wide responsibilities for any of the major functions.

Summary

These then are the underlying reasons for the reorganization. Although suited for such purposes as liaison with government authorities and administration of the CMF and the Australian Cadet Corps, the geographic command system has become outmoded and is not the best organization for our peacetime role of preparing for war.

THE OUTLINE PLAN

The Functional Organization

The Army Review Committee proposed a reorganization of the Australian Army along functional lines and this has been accepted at government level. There are three broad areas affected:

- A change from a geographic system of command to a functional system.

- A rationalization of logistics tasks.

- A reorganization at AHQ.
Functional Commands

The first essential of any functional system is the establishment of a Field Force Command. This Command will command all ARA field force units in Australia, except for certain ARA communications zone logistic units which will be allotted to Logistic Command, and initially it will also command all the CMF.

If Field Force Command is to function effectively it must be relieved of the responsibility for logistic support other than that which is organic to its own formations. It has therefore been decided to establish a Logistic Command which will have the overall responsibility for the logistic support of the Australian Army. It will comprise all depots, base installations and logistic units within the Australian Support Area including some ARA communications zone logistic units.

Another group of units and installations that lends itself to a functional grouping is the individual training organization which comprises training battalions, army schools and training centres. The difficulty of effectively commanding this large group of units from AHQ, as is done at present, has been referred to already. There is a need for a separate Training Command which will provide a proper command organization for the many training establishments and enable detail to be removed from

Figure 1: THE FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM
AHQ. HQ Training Command will be responsible for the conduct of individual training at army schools and training centres and for the development of training doctrine under the policy guidance of AHQ.

As a result of the proposal to establish these three functional commands the present geographic command HQ will be disbanded and State matters and residual matters of local administration which must be performed on a geographic basis will become the responsibility of small Military District headquarters created in each State.

**Figure 2: STAGES IN THE AHQ REORGANIZATION**

**Logistic Rationalization**

It is intended to rationalize logistic functions. The principal logistic tasks, which at present are the responsibility of seven logistic corps, will be re-allotted and carried out by three corps concerned with transport, supply and repair.
AHQ Reorganization

AHQ is being reorganized and one of the key aspects is the appointment of a Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCGS) to deal with the day to day management of the Army and to take charge of the Army reorganization. Initially, and only as an interim measure, the present four main military branches will be retained, with some re-allotment of responsibilities. These branches have been renamed Operations, Personnel, Logistics and Materiel Branches. In time, when Logistic Command is established, the number of main military branches will be reduced to three by amalgamating the interim Materiel and Logistics Branches into the final phase Logistics Branch.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th>COMPONENTS OF FUNCTIONS</th>
<th>BEFORE REORG</th>
<th>AFTER REORG</th>
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<tr>
<td>TRANSPORT</td>
<td>MOV CONTROL ROAD AIR WATER</td>
<td>Q RAE RAASC</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUPPLY</td>
<td>SIGNAL PROJECT STORES MAPS ENGR STORES RATIONS POL ORD STORES MED STORES DENTAL STORES</td>
<td>G RA SIGS RA SYY RAE RAASC RAAMC RAADC</td>
<td>LOGISTICS RAAOC</td>
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<td>REPAIR</td>
<td>MAJOR REPAIR</td>
<td>G MGO RAE RA SIGS RAEME</td>
<td>LOGISTICS RAEME</td>
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Figure 3: RATIONALIZATION OF LOGISTIC FUNCTIONS

Headquarters and Staffs outside Australia

PNG Command, the forces in Singapore and our overseas staffs will not be directly affected by the reorganization. Al-
though they will remain under the direct control of AHQ, they will be involved in some indirect consequential effects flowing from the reorganization, in particular, logistic rationalization.

**RATIONALIZATION OF LOGISTIC FUNCTIONS**

The principal logistic tasks will be rationalized and carried out by three functional corps concerned with transport, supply and repair. Under the present system the transport function is shared by two major corps, the supply function by seven and repair by three. A rationalization should allow significant financial and manpower savings and centralize expertise.

The Service Corps will be disbanded and a new corps, the Australian Corps of Transport, will carry out the transport and movements functions. It is hoped that in due course this corps will be titled the Royal Australian Corps of Transport.

The new Corps of Transport will be formed from:

- The resources of the Army Movements Organization.
- The transportation components of the Engineers.
- The transport and air dispatch elements of the Service Corps.

The supply function will be carried out by an enlarged Ordnance Corps which will be formed from:

- The present Ordnance Corps.
- The stores components of Engineers, Signals, Survey, Medical and Dental Corps.
- The supplies and petroleum elements of the Service Corps.

RAEME will undertake repair functions, including the repairs at present performed by Engineers and Signals other than those carried out by the operators of equipment. Ammunition repair will remain as a specialized Ordnance function as it is closely linked with storage and safety.
It should be noted that:

- It is only the transport, movements, stores or repair elements of Engineers, Signals, Survey, Medical and Dental Corps which are transferred to Transport, Ordnance or RAEME.
- Staff clerks will form part of Ordnance.
- The Army Fire Service will remain with Engineers.
- The Army Postal Service will form a part of the Transport Corps.

Initially, the rationalization of the logistic functions will be carried out without inter-corps transfers, but these transfers will take place later when satisfactory detailed arrangements have been determined.

REORGANIZATION OF ARMY HEADQUARTERS

General

The Army Review Committee proposed a number of changes in the organization of Army Headquarters because of the following major deficiencies in the old organization:

- AHQ was involved in too much detail.
- The CGS was overloaded.
- There was an uneven distribution of work among Board members; in particular the DCGS was overburdened.
- There was an overlap of responsibilities between G, A, Q, and MGO branches in equipment and logistics.
- Experience over the past few years has shown that the organization was not geared to handle the increased demands of defence planning methods.

To overcome these difficulties AHQ is being reorganized in two stages: an interim stage before functional commands are established, during which four main military branches are retained, and a final stage when the number of main military branches is reduced to three.
Figure 4: THE INTERIM AHQ ORGANIZATION

AHQ Interim Organization

Figure 4 shows the outline interim organization in which branches have been given functional titles.

The Office of the CGS contains The Executive, which comprises the CGS, the VCGS, and their personal staffs. The creation of the appointment of a Vice Chief of the General Staff has been approved, initially as a temporary measure, to supervise the implementation of the reorganization. He will also assist the CGS in his many responsibilities. Although the appointment will ease the load on the CGS, the principal reasons for recommending that such a position should be created were to improve management at the AHQ level, particularly co-ordination between branches, and to provide the facility to supervise and co-ordinate the activities of the functional commands. It is believed that for
AHQ to function efficiently, responsibility for overall co-ordination had to be removed from a busy branch head and raised to a higher management level. The appointment of a VCGS enables this to be done. In summary therefore the VCGS’s primary duties will be:

- The ‘day to day’ management of the Army.
- To co-ordinate military activities within AHQ and between functional commands.
- To deputize for the CGS.
- To manage the reorganization.

To assist the VCGS, in the Office of the CGS, there is the Directorate of Co-ordination and Organization (DCO) which replaces the Directorate of Staff Duties. The Army Reorganization Planning Staff, the Inspectorate of Administration and the Office of the Superintendent of the Army Scientific Service also form part of the Office of the CGS and are directly responsible to the VCGS.

Figure 5: STAFF RESPONSIBLE TO THE VCGS
Operations Branch

Operations Branch will be headed by the Chief of Operations and organized as shown in Figure 4. Points to note are that:

- DMO&P functions will not change.
- DMI functions will not change.
- The Directorate of Military Training has been retitled the Directorate of Training Policy (DTP). This directorate will remain in Operations Branch, but many of the previous DMT responsibilities are in the process of being transferred to the present HQ 1 Div.
- The Directorate of Army Development, which was set up in 1970, is enlarged to include the Directorate of Combat Development and some of the functions of the Directorate of Equipment Policy, which has been disbanded. It will handle force structure matters ranging from concepts to tactical doctrine and future organization and equipment objectives.
- Heads of Arms will work directly to the Chief of Operations.

Personnel Branch

Apart from renaming A Branch as Personnel Branch the Army Review Committee did not propose any changes in this area. It noted that the Adjutant General was currently reviewing his branch organization and that any changes would be internal and have little or no effect on the reorganization of AHQ as a whole. The Adjutant General has been redesignated Chief of Personnel.

Materiel Branch

Materiel Branch is an interim measure only and is essentially a modified MGO Branch. Its primary concern is the management of the introduction of new equipment and stores and studies leading to selection of items to be purchased. The head of this branch will be known as Chief of Materiel. The
principal tasks involved in the establishment of Materiel Branch were:

- The transfer of DOS, DEME and the Unit Stores Management Section from MGO Branch to Q Branch. This was done on 15 November 1971.
- The production of new procedural instructions.
- The establishment of the three new directorates; the Directorate of Materiel Requirements (DMR), the Directorate of Materiel Development (DMD) and the Directorate of Trials and Evaluation (DTE).
- The disbandment of D Eqpt.
- The transfer of HQ AIS from being an AHQ unit to a staff directorate within Materiel Branch, with its role remaining unchanged. This directorate is known as the Directorate of Army Inspection (DAI).

The responsibilities of the new directorates are:

- The **Directorate of Materiel Requirements** will translate the broad requirement for equipment provided by Operations or Logistics Branches into more detailed terms to allow actual development of the equipment or its evaluation to proceed.
- The **Directorate of Materiel Development** will be responsible for design studies, equipment development, production of technical specifications and control of pattern.
- The **Directorate of Trials and Evaluation** will be responsible for conducting trials to assess the performance of equipment.

In the final phase of the AHQ reorganization the responsibility for the development and introduction of equipment into service and its allied functions will pass to Logistics Branch from the interim Materiel Branch. This interim Materiel Branch has been created to relieve the pressure on the logistic organization whilst it is heavily involved in restructuring the logistic system, plus advising on the establishment of Logistic Command and the command and control of the logistic units.
Logistics Branch

Logistics Branch has been formed from Q Branch which had been modified by the transfer of DOS, DEME and the Unit Stores Management Section from MGO Branch. At that stage, DOS and DEME assumed the status of staff directorates and DST also became a staff directorate. While Materiel Branch exists, Logistics Branch, headed by the Chief of Logistics, will consist of five directorates — the Directorate of Supply (D Sup), the Directorate of Transport (D Tpt), the Directorate of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering (DEME), the Directorate of Logistic Development and Plans (DLD&P) and lastly the Directorate of Accommodation and Works (DAW). DAW has the same responsibilities and organization as it had before the reorganization.

- The Directorate of Supply is being established by the amalgamation of DOS with the stores and procurement elements of: the Engineers, the Service Corps, and the Medical and Dental Corps. Its function is the provision of materiel and services needed by users at the required time and place. Associated with the directorate is the Central Army Supply Agency (CASA) which is responsible for implementing the directorate’s policy on procurement and distribution. As such, it replaces the Directorate of Procurement and Development and the stores management sections of RAE, RAASC, RAAMC and RAADC. The directorate acts as the Corps Directorate of the Ordnance Corps with the Director of Supply as the Head of Corps.

- The Directorate of Transport has been established by amalgamating the transport functions of DST with the Directorate of Movement and the previous Directorate of Transportation. It is concerned with the movement of personnel and materiel. The Director of Transport is the Head of Corps.

- The Directorate of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering has been given slightly greater responsibilities than before but this does not involve any major changes in
the directorate’s structure. The Director also remains as Head of Corps.

- **The Directorate of Logistic Development and Plans** is broadly responsible for the longer term development of logistic planning and the co-ordination of logistic matters. During the interim period it will be involved with some detail which will eventually pass to Logistic Command.

**AHQ Final Organization**

When Logistic Command is established, Materiel Branch will be disbanded and the final stage organization of AHQ will be adopted. At that stage the following directorates will transfer from Logistics Branch to HQ Logistic Command with staff directorate status:

- The Directorate of Transport.
- The Directorate of Supply, including the Controller of Army Catering and CASA.
- The Directorate of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering.
- The Directorate of Army Inspection.

Figure 6 shows the final phase of the reorganization of AHQ with three main military branches.

These points should be noted:

- DMT has been reduced in size, retitled DTP and made responsible primarily for broad training policy.
- Personnel Branch’s final organization has yet to be confirmed.
- D Tpt, D Sup, DEME and DAI have moved from AHQ and located in HQ Logistic Command.

**REORGANIZATION OUTSIDE AHQ**

**The CMF**

At the time of the ARC’s examination a separate detailed study of the CMF and reserves was being undertaken by AHQ
and therefore the organization of the CMF was not part of the ARC's Terms of Reference. However, the Committee examined the CMF in relation to the reorganization proposals and were convinced that even though the citizen forces have strong territorial affiliations, they also should be developed on functional lines with an Australia-wide outlook.

As most CMF units are field force units, it is intended that the whole of the CMF be placed initially under HQ Field Force Command; but in time, as the new system develops, CMF units will also take their place in Logistic Command and Training Command.

**Functional Commands**

A major feature of the reorganization outside AHQ involves the raising of the three functional commands. The present geographic Command Headquarters will be disbanded and their
responsibilities for State and local administrative matters will be taken over by Military District headquarters of which there will be one in each State.

Before the new command headquarters can be raised, several preliminary steps will have to be accomplished:

- AHQ will have to complete its interim reorganization.
- The logistic functions will have to be rationalized and the new logistic corps raised.
- As an interim measure, ASA logistic units will have to be placed under command of AHQ, pending the raising of Logistic Command.

![Diagram of Field Force Command]

**Field Force Command**

Field Force Command will consist broadly of a Command Headquarters and the elements of three divisions as shown in outline in Figure 7.

HQ 1 Div is shown as a formation of Field Force Command, but to minimize posting turbulence the present HQ 1 Div
which we know in Sydney will become the Headquarters of Training Command. The new HQ 1 Div will be formed in Queensland from most of the present staff of HQ N Command, the remainder of the staff of that headquarters being allotted to serve on HQ Queensland Military District. The new HQ 1 Div has been placed in Brisbane because there are so many field force units in Queensland that there is a need to have a senior field force HQ in that State.

A few points concerning the headquarters Field Force Command:

- The headquarters will be organized on the pattern of a corps headquarters with some modifications to enable it to meet its peacetime commitments.

- In the event of mobilization, HQ Field Force Command will be capable of expansion and would 'throw-off' the next senior headquarters required — probably the headquarters of a corps. Assuming that other corps headquarters may have to be formed subsequently, HQ Field Force Command would progressively develop into the headquarters of an army.

- The HQ Field Force Command will be located in Victoria Barracks, Sydney. It will be manned by transferring most of the existing staff of HQ E Command to HQ Field Force Command, the remainder being transferred to HQ NSW Military District. This of course will not occur until HQ E Command is able to relinquish its present responsibilities. This in turn will not be possible until such time as the ARA logistic units in the ASA are regrouped and HQ E Command is relieved of responsibility for those units under its command at present.

In addition to command of its formations and units, HQ Field Force Command will have the following responsibilities:

- In peace, command of all ARA and CMF field force formations and independent units within Australia except certain ARA communications zone units.
The responsibility for operational readiness of all formations and units in the Field Force including operational readiness inspections, overall supervision of all collective training and the setting of formation exercises.

In war, command of the land forces of Australia and any other Allied land forces that may be allocated to it for the defence of Australia and its Territories.

Development of detailed army contingency plans for the defence of Australia and its Territories and for the dispatch of any army force to an overseas theatre.

Provision of a field force structure which is capable of the expansion necessary on mobilization.

In peace, command of New South Wales Military District.

The location of HQ Field Force Command in Sydney will place it close to the HQ of the Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Fleet, and HQ RAAF Operational Command. This will allow ease of liaison for the development of appropriate joint service plans and joint service exercises.

Comm Z Logistic Units

In the geographic system of command, communications zone logistic units, which provide logistic support in an operational area, are part of the Field Force, but ARA units are loaned back to geographic commands to perform tasks in the ASA. After the reorganization some of these units will continue to fulfil this peacetime role under the command of HQ Logistic Command. They will however train with Field Force Command at appropriate times.

HQ 1 LSF

A point of interest is that HQ 1 LSF will not be part of Logistic Command. The reason for this is that the headquarters is designed to administer and co-ordinate a group of communications zone units that may be committed at short notice under a contingency plan. By locating the headquarters within Field
Force Command it will be better placed to assist in the detailed operational and contingency planning and will be available for quick deployment by that command either on operations or on exercises.

**Advantages of Field Force Command**

The new Field Force Command organization will achieve a number of advantages over the present organization of the field force. In summary, these are:

- It is the type of organization which is best suited to the land defence of Australia in that it provides centralized control of all field force units and a centralized command for the mounting and dispatch of a force overseas.

- It provides an appropriate operational headquarters which is responsible for the preparation of our field army for war.

- The organization will make it easier to obtain a planned and consistent standard of training over the whole field force — both ARA and CMF.

- The headquarters which is responsible for the execution of contingency and mobilization plans is also responsible for the development of these plans in detail.

- It provides a centralized source of study and advice to AHQ on organization, tactics and equipment.

- It can undertake liaison on joint service matters with the operational headquarters of the other Services.

**Logistic Command**

Logistic Command will consist of:

- All functional ASA units concerned with transport, supply and repair.

- The units concerned with the development and trials of materiel and, in peace, certain ARA communications zone logistic units.
HQ Logistic Command will contain the normal staff elements associated with a senior headquarters and the following staff directorates, some of which will transfer from AHQ when HQ Logistic Command is raised:

- Transport;
- Supply;
- Electrical and Mechanical Engineering; and
- Army Inspection; plus
- two new directorates, the Directorate of Logistic Planning and Operations; and
- the Directorate of Method Study and Management.
HQ Logistic Command will be located in Melbourne and will be formed from the present staff of HQ S Command and the directorates which will transfer from AHQ.

In addition to commanding non-divisional logistic formations and units, the responsibilities of the headquarters will be:

- Operational readiness of units under its command, overall supervision of unit training and participation in appropriate exercises.
- Control of materiel, movement and repair requirements of the Army and agreed support for other Services, including logistic support of forces overseas.
- Control of reserve stocks and development of plans for an expansion to meet the needs of mobilization.
- Provision of a structure which is capable of the expansion necessary on mobilization.
- Command of all units concerned with the design, research and development of materiel required by the Army.
- In peace, command of Victoria Military District.
The advantages of Logistic Command can be summarized as follows:

- It provides an organization which will meet logistic requirements both in peace and war.
- An effective command structure is provided for all non-divisional logistic units.
- The organization permits the decentralization of executive logistic management from AHQ.
- It provides a means for the overall co-ordination of the logistic function including co-ordination with the other functional commands.
- It provides better facilities for the training of units and developing experienced logistic staff.
- The headquarters provides for development of detailed logistic plans for mobilization and support of contingency forces.
- It makes available a centralized source of advice to AHQ on all logistic aspects.

**Training Command**

Training Command will consist of all schools and training units, all Cadet Corps units and all Education Corps sections.

HQ Training Command will be formed from the present HQ 1 Div and some elements of the present Directorate of Training Policy. It will be located in Sydney and its main responsibilities will be:

- Command of all army schools and training centres.
- Command of the Australian Cadet Corps.
- Development of training policy and doctrine for the AMF and their promulgation by means of training aids, films, training pamphlets and other publications.
- Provision of a structure which is capable of the expansion necessary on mobilization.
- Civil education of members of the ARA, and CMF where appropriate.
- Conduct of the AMF promotion and educational examination system.
- Production of major AHQ exercises, such as the CGS Exercise as directed by AHQ.

IN EACH STATE

* AUST CADET CORPS BDE
* DISTRICT TRAINING CENTRE
  COMPRISING EXISTING COMMAND
  - TRADE TRAINING CENTRE
  - TRAINING CELL
  - EDUC SECT

As far as Training Command is concerned the overall broad training directive issued to the functional commands by AHQ will relate only to individual training at army schools and training centres. Collective training and individual training in units will be the responsibility of Field Force and Logistic Commands.

The present Command Training Centres, Training Cells and Education Sections will be formed into District Training
Army Reorganization

Centres, which in turn will be under HQ Training Command. These District Training Centres will conduct appropriate courses for all units located within a district, but local administration will be co-ordinated by District Headquarters.

The forming of a Training Command will provide the following advantages:

- It provides a suitable structure for wartime expansion.
- It provides a command structure for all army schools and training centres.
- The organization facilitates a rationalization of individual training and makes it possible to ensure that there are common doctrine and techniques between training establishments.
- Detail can be removed from AHQ because the detailed management of individual training, and such matters as the preparation of manuals and training aids and the conduct of examinations can be delegated to HQ Training Command.
- It provides a suitable headquarters for the command of the Australian Cadet Corps.
- It provides an organization well suited for adaptation to any future rationalization of individual training between the three Services.

Military Districts

Figure 11 provides an example of the sort of organization which is envisaged for a Military District HQ. Once detailed responsibilities have been established there could be amalgamations of some staff sections. Moreover, the organization could vary from one district to another.

Figure 11: Possible Outline Organization of Military District Headquarters
From what has been described it will be appreciated that the functional commands have Australia-wide responsibilities. Many units, however, require regular contact with local authorities such as State Government and Commonwealth Government Departments in the States. In addition, there are local recruiting and ceremonial functions which of necessity must be handled on a State basis. These matters and minor matters of local administration will be the responsibility of a Military District Headquarters in each State.

It is stressed that the size of the Military District Headquarters will be as small as possible. In NSW and Victoria, it is likely that the Military District Headquarters will be co-located with the headquarters of functional commands and in Queensland with HQ 1 Div to achieve economies in manpower and overheads. All Military District Headquarters will however operate as independently as possible and have direct access to AHQ.

IMPLEMENTATION SEQUENCE AND TIMETABLE

AHQ Reorganization

The reorganization of AHQ is now in its second phase. The first phase was completed by 31 December 1971 and the changes which occurred were:

VCGS was appointed.

G Branch

- The Directorate of Co-ordination and Organization was raised and the Directorate of Staff Duties was disbanded.
- A percentage of DMT responsibilities for individual training transferred to HQ 1 Div.

Q Branch

- DST, DOS, DEME became staff directorates within Q Branch.
- The Unit Stores Management Section (USMS) transferred from MGO Br to Q Br.
The Directorate of Logistic Development and Plans (DLD&P) was raised.

**MGO Branch**
- DOS, DEME and USMS transferred to Q Br.

In the second phase the main changes were:

**Office of the CGS**
- DCO became solely responsible to VCGS.
- I of Admin and SASS transferred from G Branch.

**Ops Branch**
- G Branch was renamed Ops Branch and the residual DMT was renamed DTP.
- DMO&P, DAD, DTP and Heads of Arms continued as part of Ops Branch.
- DEP was disbanded and its staff was transferred to DAD and Materiel Branch.

**Log Branch**
- Q Branch was renamed Log Branch.
- New D Tpt was raised and the former D Tn, D Mov and DST were disbanded.
- D Sup and CASA were raised.
- The former DOS and D Maint were disbanded.

**Materiel Branch**
- MGO Branch was renamed Materiel Branch.
- DMR was raised by the transfer of a percentage of the DEP staff and a percentage of the Services Directorates.
- DMD was raised and D Eqpt was disbanded.
- DTE was raised.

The above sequence has shown that a percentage of the responsibilities for individual training is being transferred from DMT/DTP to HQ 1 Div. Recent events have introduced a situation which has influenced the implementation of the reorganization. The cancellation of major exercises at Shoalwater Bay
decreased the responsibilities of HQ I Div and this created the opportunity to transfer some of the detailed responsibilities for individual training from AHQ to HQ I Div.

Army training establishments are coming under command HQ 1 Div progressively after 1 February 1972 in the order:

- Recruit Training units.
- Training establishments in E Command.
- The remaining training establishments throughout Australia.

Once HQ 1 Div has taken over these responsibilities it will be well placed to be renamed HQ Training Command but this will not take place until the other functional commands and military districts are ready to be established and other preliminary steps have occurred.

Timetable

Studies are in hand regarding the details involved in the formation of functional commands and military districts. Although these will not be completed for some time, a provisional timetable for the reorganization has been drawn up based on preliminary estimates. The provisional timetable is:

- Interim reorganization of AHQ. 1972
- Rationalization of logistic functions. 1972
- ASA logistics units pass to under command AHQ as an interim phase. 1973
- HQ 1 Div and HQ Qld Military District raised. 1973
- HQ Trg Comd raised. 1973
- HQ Field Force Command and HQ NSW Military District raised. 1973
- Military District Headquarters in SA, WA, Tas and NT raised. 1973
- HQ Log Comd and HQ Victoria Military District raised. 1974
- Final Reorganization AHQ. 1974
CONCLUSION

Two aspects of the reorganization require emphasis. The first is that the reorganization in itself does not involve any major reduction or relocation of units. It is essentially a reorganization of command and control and does not significantly affect the number and location of ARA or CMF units or the level of headquarters which exist at present in each State. The second is that it would be a remarkable situation if we were to get all aspects of this quite complex reorganization right in the first instance; changes in detail will undoubtedly be necessary in the light of practical experience.

ATHENS, MARCH 1941

As their ships steamed into the gulf towards Piraeus the shores seemed to the New South Welshmen strangely like home—the hard light, the grey-green trees clothing steep hills, and the clear water evoked memories of Australian ports. It was stranger still to find themselves among a friendly people, who cheered them and threw flowers as their trucks drove along the streets to the staging camp at Daphni. For the first time since they had reached the Middle East these men were on the soil of a people who genuinely welcomed them, and in a land as green and pleasant as their own.

'What a contrast! Instead of awakening with eyes, ears and noses full of sand we breathed a pure crisp air with the scent of flowers. Flowers!—We hadn't seen them since leaving Australia. After months of desert glare the landscape at Daphni was a dream come true. The troops stood and gazed at the natural gardens full of shrubs and flowers which scented the breeze; at the grasses that made a swishing noise as you walked through . . . . We saw civilians dressed as we used to dress before the war — civilians whom you could trust . . . . From the hillside one could look back into the valley below and see Athens.'

The troops who were given leave in Athens acquired an increasing respect and sympathy for the Greeks. 'Greeks gloriously happy to see us . . . worth fighting for and with,' wrote one young officer in his diary. They found them resolved not to allow pleasure to interfere with the business of war. Greek soldiers were not seen in the city's few cabarets, and bars were closed at midnight. A cup of coffee at a cafe appeared to be the only relaxation the drably-uniformed officers and men of the Greek headquarters and depots in Athens allowed themselves—a sharp contrast to the gaiety and lavish eating and drinking surrounding headquarters in Cairo.

— Gavin Long, Greece, Crete and Syria (1953).
ONE of the most significant developments in Papua New Guinea during the life of the second House of Assembly (1968-1972) was the emergence of a party system. There were several parties formed in 1967 to contest the 1968 House elections but only one of these, Pangu, really survived that election and it had only about eleven parliamentary members. Since then, several new parliamentary parties have been formed and most members of the House of Assembly now claim membership of a party.

Organized political parties with some measure of party discipline are important in most political systems. In the type of modified Westminster or parliamentary system which is evolving in Papua New Guinea they are essential. In such a system the government is the group which holds a majority of seats in the parliament and the executive or ministry is drawn from that government. Without organized major parties or firmly based coalitions, that government group either cannot be discerned

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or will frequently change. Thus no stable executive can emerge and without this a country cannot be governed.

Like so many other features of life in Papua New Guinea, political parties are very new. There were some minor attempts, mainly by conservative expatriates, to establish parties in the early 1960s but all else failed. Parties were of virtually no importance in the elections for the first House of Assembly. This was in part because there were almost no ‘national’ issues and very little national feeling which might have united groups of candidates. Candidates, especially indigenes, were overwhelmingly local men who limited themselves to local issues.

(Voters examining photo ballot papers inside a polling station.)

The Territory’s first indigenous-based party, the New Guinea United National Party, was formed in 1965. It was founded by Oala Oala-Rarua, a trade union leader in Port Moresby, though the party had no formal trade union support.
It was quite radical for its time with a platform which included internal self-government by 1968 and accelerated localization in private enterprise businesses. The party failed fairly dismally. Very few indigines understood or sympathized with its aims and the wide (and probably premature) publicity given it by the local media scared potential supporters away. MHA's whose support had been expected failed to join. After about eighteen months the party was dissolved when Oala-Rarua joined the new Pangu Party.

In early 1966, the United Christian Democratic Party was formed. This was a bid for a political voice by the Territory's influential missions, in this case predominantly the Catholic missions of the East Sepik. Just before the 1968 elections the party dropped the 'Christian' from its name.

Pangu, the Papua And New Guinea Union Party, was formed in mid-1967. Its membership was predominantly indigenous though some non-indigenes have played important roles. Most of the party's early members had Territory Public Service backgrounds. They had better than average education and considerable experience of urban life. Many had travelled outside the Territory. This better education and wider experience had given the early Pangu members greater expectations which they sought to realize by political process.

Two specific issues sparked the formation of Pangu in 1967 — public service salaries and the Territory's political development. Throughout the 1960s there was considerable dissatisfaction over public service salaries for indigenes. A new award announced in May 1967 granted a much smaller wage rise than had been sought. Indigenous members of the Public Service Association, led by Oala-Rarua organized a protest march to present a petition to the Administrator in June 1967, just ten days before Pangu's formation was announced.

The second main issue which explains Pangu's formation in 1967 was doubt about the Territory's political future. From about 1960 the Australian Government had often affirmed that it was preparing the Territory for self-government but it was reluctant to impose a timetable or to predict what political forms
self-government and independence might take. Not until mid-1967 did the Australian Government openly indicate that Australian statehood was not a practical goal for the Territory’s political development. A mainly indigenous group interested in more rapid and more clearly defined political development presented submissions to the first House of Assembly’s Select Committee on Constitutional Development in 1967. The submissions called for ‘home rule’ (a form of responsible government with a cabinet elected by the House) by 1968 and accelerated localization of the public service. Most of the signatories of these submissions were early or founder members of Pangu. They included Albert Maori Kiki, Oala Oala-Rarua, Ebia Olewale, Michael Somare and Cecil Abel.

The Pangu Party’s formation was officially announced on 13 June 1967. Its first public advertisement appeared three days later. It listed many aims, mainly economic and social. However, its major immediate aims, and those which became best known, were probably the two it listed first — ‘Home Rule leading to Ultimate Independence’ and ‘One name, One country, One people’. Some ten to fifteen members of the House soon joined Pangu. The parliamentary leader was Paul Lapun from Bougainville and Albert Maori Kiki was Secretary-Treasurer of the Party.

Four other parties, the All Peoples’ Party, the Territory Country Party, the National Progress Party and the Agricultural Reform Party were also formed in 1967 to contest the 1968 House of Assembly elections. However, parties actually played a very minor role in those elections. As in 1964, candidates were gene-
rally local men and campaigned on local issues. Many candidates regarded party membership as a hindrance. Others indicated an interest in as many as four different parties to pick up what votes they could. In the opinion of E. P. Wolfers, probably the best informed student of Territory politics, ‘Parties probably got no one elected although they may have damaged some candidates’ chances at the polls.’

Only Pangu survived the election as a real political force, with some eleven seats in the House. Successful Pangu candidates included Michael Somare who became parliamentary leader, Paul Lapun, his deputy and Pita Lus the party whip. Two non-indigenous Pangu members were elected. These were Cecil Abel, an Administrative College lecturer who was born in Papua, and A. C. (Toni) Voutas an Australian-born former patrol officer. John Guise was a declared Pangu supporter but when elected Speaker he assumed a non-partisan stand. Oala-Rarua, an early Pangu member, won the Central Regional seat but had broken with Pangu. Maori Kiki was defeated at the 1968 elections and remained the party’s Secretary-Treasurer. The party decided to cast itself in the role of a political opposition and its members would not accept appointment as ministerial members.

Pangu has grown in strength and in public acceptance since 1968. In 1971 it had some 16,000 to 17,000 members. It is still predominantly urban-based and polled well in recent local government elections in Port Moresby, Madang and Lae. In Lae, Pangu narrowly won control of the local council.

In October 1971 Michael Somare released the Pangu election manifesto for 1972. The manifesto makes no specific mention of dates for self-government. In releasing the document the Pangu leader said that self-government ‘will come in the next few years whether we like it or not’. The manifesto stresses preparation for self-government through political education, accelerated localization and the fostering of political parties. Pangu candidates will also emphasize land problems, education and economic development. The party gives support to trade

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unions, advocates the creation of a national shipping line and wants attempts made to prevent the drift of population to the large towns.²

Pangu planned to endorse about 70 candidates for the 1972 elections. There may have been more than that, for in some electorates several candidates regarded as Pangu members or supporters nominated for the same seat. Parliamentary leader Michael Somare was re-elected unopposed in the East Sepik Regional electorate. Pangu's National President, Gavera Rea, contested the Moresby Coastal electorate. One of the party's best known members, Australian-born Toni Voutas, decided to stand down in favour of an indigenous candidate. He took over as acting Secretary while Maori Kiki campaigned for the Moresby Inland seat. Toni Voutas also became a national campaign director.

The Pangu Party should poll well in most large towns. However most observers give it little chance of winning thirty seats, the number it had indicated it is aiming to win.

The most important development in parties since 1968 has been the growth of an organized party of the conservative members of the House. 'Conservative' in the political parlance of Papua New Guinea indicates those who wish to prolong direct Australian political involvement in the Territory and generally support Administration economic and social policies.

The very populous Central Highlands which accounted for 30 seats out of 84 in the second House of Assembly is regarded as politically conservative. This area has been penetrated by Europeans only very recently and so is less developed than many other areas. The great growth in coffee production and the introduction of other new crops have lessened the area's economic backwardness but its inhabitants still feel the need for Administration, or at least expatriate, guidance and financial support for what are still very new economic enterprises. The area is still educationally backward. Fewer than one-quarter of Central Highlands children of primary school age can attend school com-

pared, for example, with more than four-fifths of such children in the New Guinea islands. Very few adult highlanders and almost none of those old enough to be village leaders have attended school. Thus most adult highlanders understand little of political responsibility and independence and are still wary of it.

Most of the members of the second House of Assembly, including almost all the Highlands representatives, were conservative. Soon after the House first met many conservative members loosely allied themselves in what was called the Independent Members Group. At the time there was suspicion among such members of political parties. These were thought to be premature in the territory and politically dangerous. During the life of the second House the pace of political development accelerated. Greatly increased powers were given to ministerial members and
the Select Committee on Constitutional Development proposed what was, in effect, a loose timetable for self-government. The changes led many conservative members to feel the need for an organized and firmly-based conservative party.

In October 1970 a meeting of predominantly indigenous highland representatives at Minj in the Western Highlands formed a new party — Compass. The name was an acronym from Combined Political Associations, an organization which had been designed to bring together all the local political associations formed by members of the Independent Group. The Minj meeting elected the first Compass executive. This was composed of Tei Abal, Sinake Giregire, Kaibelt Diria and Andrew Wabiria, all ministerial (or assistant ministerial) members and all from the Central Highlands and T. J. Leahy the spokesman for the Administrator’s Executive Council. In 1971 Compass changed its name to the United Party.

There have been numerous wrangles within the party over such issues as alleged Highlands domination and alleged expatriate domination. In September 1971, the party’s executive was extended to make it more representative of all areas in Papua New Guinea. Angmai Bilas and Brere Awol from New Guinea coastal regions. W. A. Lussick and Matthias Toli- man from the islands and N. I. Uroe and Tore Lokoloko from Papua were added to the existing executive. The party’s General Secretary is Anton Parao who nominated for a highlands seat in the 1972 elections.

Several observers have claimed that the United Party had a majority in the second House, some 47 of 84 elected members, and party spokes-
men often suggested this. However, the parliamentary leader Tei Abal said in November 1971 that the United Party had 35 elected members in the second House. This group included twelve expatriates.

The United Party held a national convention late in 1971. The convention adopted a constitution which seeks the establishment of a National Council for the party. This council is to consist of four delegates chosen annually from each district, the majority not to be MHA’s, and the parliamentary leader and his deputy. The Party stood candidates for most seats at the 1972 elections and hoped to win a majority and form a government. Such rule by a single party would be a new feature of Territory politics. The executive of the second House was non-partisan and drawn from a variety of shades of political opinions. Many observers give the United Party a chance of winning the necessary majority or at least of enlisting the support of sufficient conservative independents when the new House meets.

A third major party in the Territory is the People’s Progress Party. This was formed in November 1970 by a group of about ten MHA’s who left Compass after one of that party’s internal disagreements. It has been claimed that the PPP draws most of its support from the New Guinea islands and several of its influential members including Julius Chan, the parliamentary leader, Donatus Mola (MHA for North Bougainville) and John Maneke (Talasea) are from the islands. However the party’s Secretary and most vocal spokesman is Warren Dutton.

3 Papua New Guinea Post-Courier, 8 November 1971.  
4 The Age, 27 July 1971.
MHA for North Fly, who has emerged as something of a spokesman for Papuan rights. PPP membership and prestige was bolstered in November 1971 when the Ministerial Member for Labour, Toua Kapena, joined the party. Mr Kapena is from the Port Moresby village of Hanuabada and is another supporter of Papuan rights within a united Papua New Guinea.

The objectives of the PPP have been stated in very broad terms as follows:

The preservation of democracy through the parliamentary system of government and the rule of law. To build a nation dedicated to political and religious liberty and freedom and dignity of man in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights under the Charter of the United Nations.

To create a balance of growth whereby opportunities are equally distributed between the towns and rural areas.

To recognize, encourage and protect private ownership . . . as well as the advancement of free enterprise . . . .

(DIES, Konedobu, Papua)

Drawing a crowd with musicians at the Koki market, Port Moresby.
To provide opportunities for full employment by means of balanced industrial expansion with population growth.
To strive to ensure that every person receives an education suited to his abilities and suited to each successive stage of the country's development...5

Late in 1971 Julius Chan announced that the PPP would sponsor about 30 candidates at the 1972 elections. They would contest seats in the islands, the New Guinea coastal areas and Papua. Mr Chan said that the PPP would not stand candidates in the Highlands where, he expected, the National Party would provide opposition for the United Party.6

The Papua New Guinea National Party was very small in the second House of Assembly, having only one member, Thomas Kavali from Jimi in the Central Highlands. However, the party is said to have strong support from young educated indigenes. It is closely aligned with Pangu and acted as an agent for Pangu in trying to break the United Party's hold on the Highlands seats.7

Two other regional associations which were established during the life of the second House of Assembly have a claim to be considered political parties. These are the Napidakoe Navitu and the Mataungan Association, each of which had a member in the second House.

Napidakoe (a contraction of the names of several Bougainville villages) Navitu (Association) was formed late in 1969 to represent the people of Bougainville more effectively in their dealings with the Administration and Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd. Its leader is Paul Lapun, MHA for South Bougainville. His leadership of Napidakoe seems to conflict with his membership of Pangu, for Napidakoe is essentially regional. Its main political aim is, 'to encourage and foster economic, social and political development on the island of Bougainville and to unite the Bougainville people as one economic, social and political community'.8 One of the Association's most publicized political ac-

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5 Post-Courier, 2 November 1971.
6 ibid, 2 December 1971.
7 The Age, 30 November 1971.
tivities has been to carry out a referendum on Bougainville's possible secession from Papua New Guinea. This resulted, according to Napidakoe, in a great majority of Bougainvilleans indicating a preference for secession.

In 1970, Napidakoe declared its intention to nominate candidates for election to the third House of Assembly. Whether it has done so was not clear at the time of writing.

The Mataungan Association is also essentially local, being based on the Tolai group of tribes of the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain. The name means 'Be prepared' or 'Be vigilant'. It was formed in mid-1969 at the time of the replacement of the all-Tolai Gazelle Local Government Council by a multi-racial council for the Gazelle rural areas. The Mataungan Patron, and generally regarded as the Association's principal organizer, is Oscar Tammur, a former teacher and soldier who achieved local prominence by championing Tolais in land disputes. In 1968 Mr Tammur won the Gazelle rural seat of Kokopo, easily defeating another candidate who had been widely regarded as the most influential Tolai leader.

Mataungan leaders claim about 22,000 committed members and many more supporters, probably a majority of Tolai voters. At the 1972 elections Oscar Tammur stood again for Kokopo and the Mataungan President, Damien Tokereku, contested the East New Britain Regional electorate. The well known Mataungan spokesman John Kaputin was a candidate for the Rabaul Open seat. In the Gazelle Open electorate Blasius Turgone, a lesser known member of the Mataungan executive, stood against Matthias Toliman, President of the United Party's recently formed Gazelle Branch.
Parties do seem to have taken a hold in Papua New Guinea. Though most of the more than 600 candidates in the present election were not endorsed party candidates, probably many successful candidates will be party members. Other successful candidates will probably soon join one of the major parties and the third House might see real party politics develop in a way which began to be evident at the last session of the second House of Assembly. With improved communications and accelerated economic, social and political development in Papua New Guinea, there is an increasing number of national issues and national problems whose resolution will require national parties with national policies.

AN OLD DIGGER LOOKS BACK

... That is how it was at Passchendaele. Alive one minute; dead the next. Hundreds of my battalion including 80 per cent of my own company killed, wounded or engulfed in the quagmire and suffocated. We could not reach them with rifle and bayonet, with my pistol lanyard tied to my whistle lanyard, or by any other means. Some were not even wounded — just sucked under, engorged by the pea-soup soil so saturated with days of rain and stirred by the combined artilleries of British and German guns... 

My later Morlancourt adventures, still as a company commander, saw gory close bayonet fighting at night of a dreadful type. But despite the mists of Morlancourt and the uncertainty of whether he who appeared out of the murk was friend or foe, at least the dewy grass of those mornings, slippery as it was, bore no comparison with the slough and morass of Flanders, that fighting field of wickedness, on 12 October 1917...

[Yet] I think that the war days were the happiest days of my life. That seems incredible. But they were days when everyone sacrificed. No one asked for leave. Any absentee from the line would reappear the moment the word went around 'We are going back in tomorrow night.' Anyone would part with his last cigarette, his last franc — for a cobber. In fact many sacrificed life for a cobber, deliberately, knowingly, willingly. Mate-ship? We have never known its like since. I feel that what I did in those days were the only 'unselfish things' I ever did.

—Captain R. A. Goldrick in a letter to the Australian War Memorial, dated 29 January 1965.
WHAT IS LOGISTICS?

Wing Commander N. F. Ashworth
Royal Australian Air Force

As with the term management, logistics is rapidly becoming an in word, particularly in defence circles. And like management its precise meaning is not clear. Thus the question is posed: what is logistics?

Word meanings can be determined in a number of ways. These include: the use of dictionaries, examination of common usage, historical surveys, and the use of official definitions. All have their limitations. Dictionaries tend to be out of date, the examination of common usage tends to founder on the mass of data involved, historical surveys are interesting but do not necessarily indicate present day usage, and official definitions are often narrow in scope and limited in value.¹

To attempt to find a precise meaning for the word logistics is to take a trip into a semantic jungle. Not only is logistics itself ill-defined; many of the supporting terms that fall within the general concept of logistics are equally lacking in precision as

1. Wing Commander Ashworth, B.Econ, jssc, psc graduated from the RAAF College at Point Cook in December 1954. Since then he has served in a wide variety of command, staff and training posts, including staff appointments in Department of Air and Headquarters Operational Command and command of No. 10 Squadron RAAF at Townsville. He is presently a member of the Directing Staff at the Joint Services Wing, Australian Services Staff College, and a previous contributor to this journal.
to their meanings. Attempting to define one word sets off a whole chain reaction. And in the end, no matter what method is used, the most likely conclusion will be that logistics means different things to different people. Further, most who use the term do so without any clear understanding of its meaning even to themselves, let alone others.

Yet, if logistics is to be an in word some attempt must be made to clear away the semantic jungle, and to get down to the concept that is behind the word. For it is the concept, not the word, that is important.

**Definition of Logistics**

Notwithstanding the comments in footnote one, the official definition of logistics does provide a convenient starting point for an examination of the concept of logistics. For those without a Glossary to hand, the Australian joint services definition of logistics is:

The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In the most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel;

b. movement, evacuation and hospitalization of personnel;

c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and

d. acquisition or furnishing of services.\(^2\)

In this definition logistics is described as a science. This has evolved from the idea that logistics is one of the three branches of military science — the other two being strategy and tactics. That logistics can in any away claim to be a science is open to serious question. Little of an academic or theoretical nature has been written on the subject. Further, its laws are

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1 This latter statement may deserve some elaboration. An official definition is, like the Aim in a service paper, essentially an acceptable form of words that encompasses the particular subject or topic. The important thing is that it be correct; that it should explain is secondary. That this should be so is hardly surprising having regard to the constraints imposed by the dictums of simplicity and brevity. A complex concept just cannot be explained in a short statement.

merely a far from comprehensive set of generalities and rules of thumb, some of which admittedly go under the heading of principles.

Although its designation as a science is questionable, the idea that logistics is part of a trilogy is important. While strategy and tactics are concerned with the conduct of military operations, logistics is concerned with the provision of the necessary resources. Thus logistics is a supporting function. That this is so is generally accepted. What is less clear is the scope of the support covered by the term. Some would maintain that logistics covers the totality of support for military operations, while the majority see logistics as something less than this. It is around this question of scope, that the variations as to the meaning of logistics revolve.

Administration

At this point it is necessary to digress and enter into the semantic jungle to discuss the term administration. From the official definition, administration has two meanings. The first is that it is 'the management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy; primarily in the fields of logistics and personnel management'. The second is that it is 'the internal management of units'. The use of administration in the first sense, while it has strong historical precedents, is most unfortunate on two counts. The first is the confusion that is generated between logistics and administration. The second is the different meaning given to administration in the fields of government and management, fields that are increasingly intruding their terminology into the military vocabulary.

Two specific aspects of the support for military operations that are not normally considered to be part of the logistic task as such are personnel and finance. But, to add to the general

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3 JSP(AS)101 Australian Joint Services Glossary.
4 It should be noted that the noun is 'logistics' and the adjective is 'logistic'.
5 For those who would dispute this statement it should be noted that while both personnel and finance impinge greatly on the logistic process, logistics does not embrace all aspects of personnel and finance.
confusion there are some contexts in which these two functions are, quite incorrectly according to the official definition, titled administration. Thus there is the dichotomy that the total support for military operations consists of logistics and administration!

**Logistics**

Elaborating further on the official definition, it will be noted that logistics is concerned with ‘the movement and maintenance of forces’. Here the term maintenance means support, while movement pays attention to the fact that military operations tend to be mobile rather than static, and that the support must be brought from afar to the scene of operations. The official definition then goes on to deal with the four aspects of materiel, personnel support, facilities and services.

Materiel is a somewhat difficult term to grasp and is easily confused with the term material. Perhaps materiel can be described by saying that it is material in form, non-living and movable. Thus it covers things or objects that can be moved, as against personnel, facilities or services. Materiel, its acquisition and distribution, is the major function of the logistic process.

The specific aspects of personnel support covered by the definition of logistics are movements, evacuation and hospitalization. The degree to which other medical services, for example, dental and hygiene, come under the heading of logistics is not clear.

Facilities are the fixed installations, the infrastructure, the airfields, roads, buildings, ports and the like, that are required both for military operations and the logistic process itself.

The reference to services as a separate item in the official definition is a little vague. The whole of the logistic process can be viewed as a service function, as can the various other logistic matters covered in the definition. In practice this particular section forms a convenient repository for all those aspects that cannot be conveniently grouped under one of the other sections. This then is the grey area of logistics. Some of the
aspects that could be included here are: accommodation, amenities, canteens, catering, data processing, laundry, office services, postal services, printing, telecommunications and war graves.

**Logistic Functions**

To take the examination of logistics beyond the official definition, it is of value to examine the logistic process as it appears in practice in the various armed services. In making such a study the problem of semantics again comes to the fore, the variation in terminology between the services being quite marked.

Nevertheless, despite the semantic differences, it is possible to discern a common set of functions into which all military logistic organizations can be grouped. These functions are: supply, movements, maintenance, works, medical, and research and development. Also worthy of special mention is the data processing function.

**Supply.** Supply is the major function of the logistic process. Occasionally it is, quite incorrectly, taken to be synonymous with logistics. Supply is concerned with providing materiel and services, which it does through the processes of determining requirements, procurement and distribution to the user. The distribution of materiel in turn covers: receipt, inspection, storage, packaging, warehousing, inventory control, stock control, stock recording and accounting, issue, reclamation and disposal.

**Movements.** Movements is concerned with all aspects of the movement of personnel and freight by land, sea or air, using either military or commercial resources. To a large degree it is closely related to supply.

**Maintenance.** Maintenance is concerned with keeping specific materiel in a serviceable, or usable, condition. Here the term is used in its narrower sense in relation to engineering in

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*There are more than one such set of functions. In this article the one used is a set of work functions which relate directly to the way in which logistic organizations are structured. An example of an alternative set of functions is that used by the US Air Force. These are: requirements determination, acquisition, distribution and maintenance.*
the fields of mechanical, aeronautical, marine and electronics engineering. More specifically maintenance covers; inspection, testing, servicing, classification as to serviceability, repair, modification and reclamation.

**Works.** Works is concerned with the provision, by acquisition or construction, and maintenance (upkeep) of facilities. It is closely related to civil, or construction, engineering.

**Medical.** Medical is concerned with medical care of personnel, and in particular evacuation and hospitalization. It is to a significant degree similar in form to the maintenance function, the difference being that medical is concerned with personnel while maintenance deals with materiel.

**Research and Development.** Although by definition part of logistics, the place of research and development in the logistic process is not always clear. In the main, research and development is concerned with materiel, and is related to the supply function at the requirements determination phase. For those requirements that cannot be readily satisfied by industry, research and development attempts to provide the necessary information to enable the requirement to be met.

**Data Processing.** Data processing has been listed as one of the logistic services. It is also one of the most important tools used by logistic organizations, especially within the supply function. With its vast number of items and transactions the supply of materiel is a logical function to manage per medium of an electronic data processing system.

**Conclusion**

By attempting to cover such a wide ranging and complex subject as logistics in a short article many aspects have not received the attention they may deserve. However, had the article dealt with each aspect in detail it would have been so long as to have missed its main purpose; that is, to give an overview of the matters encompassed by the term logistics.

Further, it may well be claimed that the article does not give a clear definitive answer to the question; what is logistics?
This claim is correct, the reason being that such an answer does not exist. And in part the article is aimed at demonstrating this very point. Before any problem can be solved there must be recognition that a problem exists.

Logistics is concerned with the resources required to support military operations. Yet, despite its undoubted importance, the study of the basic concepts of logistics has not received the attention it deserves. The first step in developing a better understanding, by all concerned, of the logistic process is to clear away the confusion as to the meaning of the term logistics itself.

What then is logistics? ☐

MONTHLY AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded prizes for the best original articles published in the January and February 1972 issues of the journal to:

January: Lieutenant Colonel D. J. Macbride ('Fundamental Principles of War') $10.

THE BATTLE FOR MOSCOW 1941-1942, by Albert Seaton. (Hart-Davis, London, 1971, UK £2.95)
Reviewed by Mr A. J. Hill, Senior Lecturer in History, RMC Duntroon.

Colonel Albert Seaton is the author of The Russo-German War 1941-1945 which immediately became the standard work in its field. His command of Russian as well as German enables him to work in the military literature of both countries but this very considerable advantage is offset by the State policies which control the writing of history and propaganda in Russia. Nevertheless there is a growing body of Russian literature on the Russo-German War which can be collated with the numerous German professional studies and archival material. In this much smaller work, Seaton studies the extraordinary operations of June 1941 to April 1942 when Hitler, winter and the Russian Army together saved Moscow.

The year 1941 would have been more tolerable for all then serving had there been some inkling of the deficiencies of the German armed forces as they thrust deeper into Russia towards Leningrad, Moscow and the Donbas. The British and Commonwealth forces had been driven out of Greece and Crete, the first Benghazi handicap had been well won by Rommel and the successes in East Africa, Iraq and Syria, important as they were, did little to counter-balance the increasing menace of German arms.
However, Colonel Seaton reveals the extent to which the German invasion was crippled by Hitler's failure to give his planners a clear strategic aim, a failure aggravated by the inability of OKW and OKH to influence Hitler's thinking in any significant respect. The invasion of Russia was further handicapped by the unresolved war with Britain and the need to hold down Western Europe from the North Cape to Biscay; all this kept fifty divisions and many aircraft in the West. As if this were not enough, German intelligence on Russia was scanty and in relation to the armaments industry, even misleading. The Army had only 450,000 reinforcements for all theatres, its reserves of petrol were enough for only three months operations, of diesel fuel enough for one month and rubber was so short that the introduction of steel-shod wheels was being studied. Guns and transport in the infantry divisions were moved by about 500,000 horses. As yet the totalitarian state was not organized for total war; '... the war industries of the Reich were ... not on a war footing. Plant was working on a single shift system, there was no restriction on consumer goods, and no direction of labour'.

With so many handicaps, the German Army nevertheless came close to taking Moscow in November 1941. In Seaton's view, such a blow would not have finished the Russians nor caused Stalin to make peace; their industry and their railways were more developed and dispersed than Hitler realized; while for Stalin and the Party submission to Hitler would have meant the end. They had everything to fight for. Why did the Germans fail to capture Moscow? Seaton's answer is simple. 'Mud not snow saved the capital'. The rains had created oceans of mud in which the Germans stuck; not even the horses could cope and as in so many wars, only the infantry with their food, weapons and ammunition on their backs, could move and fight. The advance slowed to a crawl, thus giving the Russians time. Had the offensive of 15 November been launched even three weeks earlier, Army Group Centre would have avoided the mud and may well have reached its goal; a fortiori, had Hitler been capable of taking advice in July or August and continued the drive for Moscow, Seaton considers that nothing could have saved it. 'Yet it would be wrong to attribute the German failure or the Soviet success merely to the weather, even though the onset of
winter was the primary cause. The German defeat, like those which were to follow, rested on faulty war direction, inadequate intelligence and an insufficiency of material resources. German war direction never overcame the problems of climate, time and space.'

One can only marvel at the endurance of both armies in this bitter struggle and one cannot but pity the wretched German soldier in the rags of his summer uniform loyally enduring all for Führer and Fatherland in a wilderness of howling wind, blinding snows and temperatures of minus 30 or 40 degrees centigrade. The Russians were clothed and equipped for such conditions; Hitler, who did not visit the front, was long content to believe that his men had received winter clothing. Indeed, the higher direction of the German Army as described in this book, was not impressive whereas the Russian Army with all the crudity and fumbling which marked its leadership at first, learnt fairly quickly and discovered in time enough commanders of merit. Above them all towered Stalin to whom as supreme commander tribute is due when the tiresome trappings of Russian propaganda have been removed. Seaton finds it 'difficult to escape the conclusion that Stalin was the sole military commander and that plans for the defence of Moscow and the subsequent counter-offensive were drawn up at his direction'. However, he argues that Stalin was no military genius. Like Lincoln, 'he was able and he learned as he went along', but like Hitler he had the faults of 'the untrained and uneducated commander moulded in the communist [or Nazi] pattern, with undue emphasis on a rigid military and political discipline . . . .'

This is a well written book but like many other contemporary military histories its maps are inadequate. It brings out the old lessons of the importance of matching ends to means, of the need to define the aim at the highest levels, of the overriding importance of logistics (and mud), of the impact of personal qualities at every level of command. Above all it is an illustration of that fate which the Greeks taught must follow upon the heels of overweening pride.
MILITARY AIRCRAFT OF AUSTRALIA 1909-1918, by Wing Commander Keith Isaacs, AFC, CRAeS, RAAF. Australian War Memorial, Canberra 1971, 190 pp. $6.50.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Argent,
AHQ Canberra

As one who has done some research into the aircraft that the Australian Army owned and operated over this period, I can begin to appreciate the tremendous effort that has gone into this book. The dust jacket says, 'It is the first complete account of the history of military aviation in Australia', and there can be little argument about that. It is an unfortunate fact that early military (and most other Commonwealth) activities were, at best, poorly recorded officially. Years later a senior public servant — not of the Services — said his department was too busy making history to write about it.

Most of this book, naturally, deals with the Great War aircraft — those machines that Australians in the Royal Naval Air Service and Royal Flying Corps flew, and those flown by the men of the Australian Flying Corps. Of particular interest is the chapter on Naval Co-operation, a subject not as well known as it should be. For example, as early as June 1917 the Second Naval Member raised the subject of the 'Formation of a Royal Australian Naval Air Service'. In the event nothing came of it until almost thirty years later although Australian cruisers during the Great War carried seaplanes.

The book has excellent colour reproductions of Harold Freedman's Australian War Memorial mural of all aircraft flown by Australians. Enemy aircraft that were encountered, such as the Albatros D, are also shown. There are 72 fine drawings of these aircraft by Australian Army Journal staff artist D. E. Hammond. Hammond also painted the striking dust jacket that shows Captain Cobby's chequered Sopwith Camel over Gloucestershire in 1918.
Despite its title, this book covers a great deal more than the aircraft themselves. There is a wealth of interesting material about Australian airmen of this period. An appendix lists the air aces — Captain Little was the leader, followed by Major Dallas, then Captain (later Air Commodore) Cobby. The 57 aces listed — those who shot down five or more aircraft — included Pentland, later of New Guinea fame; McGinness, who with Hudson Fysh gave birth to the idea that lead to Qantas; Manuel, who was still flying last year, and Kingsford-Smith. I believe that this list of aces is unique in that this is the first time it has been compiled and published.

Another Appendix shows that no less than 21 Australians commanded air units, not counting units of the Australian Flying Corps. One of these men was Norman Brearley, now Sir Norman (1971), the founder of Western Australian Airways Limited in 1921 and author of Australian Aviator.

A small point of historical interest not mentioned in this book concerns Oswald Watt’s 2 Squadron AFC when it was training in Lincolnshire in early 1917. Watt’s adjutant was a tall, thin ex-company commander of King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, recovering from gas received on the Somme. His name was Liddell Hart. Fifty-one years later Liddell Hart would write that his CO was a ‘very congenial and remarkable character’ and ‘one of the best commanding officers with whom I ever served’.

This book is the first of four volumes. Succeeding volumes are to cover the periods 1919-1941, 1942-1945 and 1946-1971.

I cannot recommend this book too highly to those who are interested in Australian Service aviation.


Reviewed by Major R. J. Hall, AHQ Canberra

PROFILE Publications are familiar to many of us as the publishers of numerous small paperbacks, each devoted to a particular Armoured Fighting Vehicle. A feature of these little
editions is the coloured centre page drawings of the vehicle. Previously, the rather haphazard sequence of issue made grouping by nation, type or production era almost impossible and was a source of considerable irritation for the collector.

Now, under the editorship of Duncan Crow, a series of seven hardback volumes is being produced which ranges from AFVs of World War One (Volume 1) to Modern AFVs (Volume 7) and includes volumes on Commonwealth, American, Russian, French and German AFVs. British AFVs 1919/40 is the second volume in the series.

The authorship of chapters on light tanks, medium tanks, amphibious tanks and infantry tanks is shared largely by the editor himself and Major-General N. W. Duncan, a former brigade commander of 30th Armoured Brigade, 1943. The brisk economic style of the text is at all times objective. At the same time the reader is left in no doubts as to the sorry state of affairs to which British tank technology declined during the years of financial strain and ambivalent policy.

Apart from the familiar Vickers products — the Medium Mark II and the Light Mark III, there are over 800 photographs to illustrate the numerous experimental designs from that firm as well as the Morris-Martels, Carden-Lloyds, Daimlers and other private ventures. There may be seen, in many of these designs, the results of the Army Council's inability to conceive of armoured tactics outside the strict tenents of cavalry law.

It would be nothing less than carping criticism to take issue with the quality of the photographs culled from the Imperial War Museum and private collections, but it is disappointing to find that, of the eight double-page colour drawings by such accomplished artists as Hadler, Lee, Leech, Broomfield and Davies, an interior cutaway is featured only once. The impact of these drawings is further reduced by the inaccurate captioning of the Australian Second Tank Section (1940) as being 'Australian Light Horse'. This section had been on the order of battle of the Australian Tank Corps since March 1939, hence the initials painted on the tank and faithfully reproduced by the artist of 'ATC'. There is a final damning of the unreliable sus-
pension and drive of the airborne tank, the Tetrack, by the artist's omission of the sprocket teeth altogether!

Nevertheless, there is a wealth of technical information on all the production models and many of the experimental designs. An excellent index supports the text. The edition would make a valuable addition to one's military book collection; however the Australian price for the complete set of $85 may limit its presence to the shelves of unit libraries. Either way, it should be read by all with an interest in AFV design.


Reviewed by Major R. J. Hall, AHQ Canberra

IN 1926, General Sir George Milne came to the British War Office as Chief of the Imperial General Staff with a determination to modernize and mechanize the army. Hopes were high, particularly in the young Tank Corps, but it was not to be. Milne did not have sufficient faith in armour to act decisively. It would have been a drastic step for anyone to take and one which was refused by all the leading generals of the day in Europe. Only a madman said informed military opinion, would commit himself to such a course. But one politician did — Hitler, and the valuable and farsighted work of a British minority provided profits for such as Guderian and Rommel.

The drama of the struggle between the ideals of Fuller and Hobart and the pedestrian generalship of their masters, is starkly told by Kenneth Macksey who, until recently was an officer in the Royal Tank Regiment.

The author is highly critical of what he believes to be the great neglect by the British War Office in failing to profit from the lessons of the Mobile Force Experiments in 1931 and 1934. Similarly, in the USA in 1932, the 7th Cavalry (Mechanized) in their exercises trotted forth to act as scouts or engaged the enemy briefly when he was looking the other way. The concept
of tank versus tank remained incomprehensible to successive Army Councils and Master Generals of Ordnance. As a result, the Allies were to reap a sad reward of under-armoured vehicles, minute calibre guns and indifferent tank ammunition.

By 1941, Britain had five armoured divisions in UK with a further two in the Middle East. Far from promising, in view of Churchill’s plan for twenty armoured divisions with which to spearhead the invasion of the Continent. Both infantry and cavalry were arbitrarily inducted into the new formations. Neither was particularly enthusiastic about the change, but at least the cavalry were imbued with an innate sense of mobility, due, according to the exasperated Hobart, to their ‘frequent practice in nipping in and out of bed with other peoples wives’.

The story is a gloomy one, but in the telling by Major Macksey tends to lack balance. It is with some surprise that the reader finds the Allied victors invading Italy; the Balaclava-like charge to destruction of the 17th/21st Lancers on the previous page is the last event deemed worthy of mention. The capitulation of the Axis forces in May 1943, which brought an end to the campaign in North Africa is recorded only as a map note.

The classic struggle between guns and armour, together with the efforts (not always successful) to balance mobility and protection, receives close and detailed attention, but the infantry-tank co-operation that won the praise of Slim in Burma is confined to a single quotation.

There is, as with previous editions, an almost endless number of photographs. Finding the right caption to match each one becomes an exercise in itself. The few maps are appropriate to the text, but there is no index and the bibliography is sparse. From the Battle of Cambrai in 1917 to the ironically late arrival of the Centurion in 1945 (it was unable to show just how successfully the lessons had finally been learnt), the book makes interesting reading. The student might wish for a little more, but for most it offers a talking point for a resolution of future problems. 
The article ‘Japanese Command Crisis in Burma’ by Major J. H. Moore, ED (Army Journal, December 1971) is a commendable piece of scholarship. In its detailed study of a complex command situation in war and in its analysis of the impact of a forceful commander on the people and events around him, it makes readable and exciting military history, of value to students of the campaign and to 3H candidates in particular.

However, as a thoroughly defeated general Mutaguchi would appear to have only one real claim to fame — his apparent persistent concern with Dimapur. Even this claim to fame can be challenged.

As early as August 1942, six full months before Mutaguchi took up command of 15th Army, Southern Army had ordered HQ 15th Army to draw up a plan for the invasion of Assam. As Japanese records show, the purpose of the plan was to maintain the Japanese initiative, capture important Allied airfields in Eastern India and forestall a suspected Allied counter-offensive. The plan envisaged the capture of Dimapur and an advance to the line Golaghat-Silchar, west of the Naga Hills and resting on the Brahmaputra riverline in the north. Plan 21, as it was called, was referred to the divisional commanders involved — including Mutaguchi as commander of 18th Division — but was not favoured by them because of lack of resources and terrain difficulties.

In any event, the plan was abandoned in December 1942, partly as a result of Southern Army’s greater priorities in the South-West Pacific area, and the Japanese adopted a defensive policy in Burma for the 1942-43 ‘dry’.
There is some evidence, though, that Mutaguchi was much influenced by the Chindit operations of February-April 1943. These operations amply demonstrated the ability of formed bodies of troops to move quite freely 'across the grain of the country' and indicated an increasing Allied aggressiveness. Planning by 15th Army, after he assumed command in March 1943 (not '1944' as given on page 12 of the article), turned once more to a forestalling offensive.

The evidence for Mutaguchi's concern with Dimapur in the planning and conduct of the disastrous 'Operation U' is, however, somewhat equivocal. The plan for Operation U, which Mutaguchi put before Ayabe, the Vice Chief of Staff Southern Army at 15th Army Headquarters in December 1943, makes no mention of Dimapur. The HMSO history (The War Against Japan, Volume III, page 75) notes that Ayabe came to the conclusion that 'if the defence of Burma was to be ensured, it was essential that the general line of the Naga Hills-Kohima and the high ground west of Imphal should be held'. These objectives were well within the boundaries of the defunct Plan 21 and clearly exclude Dimapur. This was the plan put to Imperial Headquarters late in December, and in this context the Tokyo directive of 7 January 1944 (incorrectly shown as '7 March 1944' in the article) would appear to be sufficiently precise. Further, throughout the battle Kawabe was to labour under a misapprehension about Dimapur — an intelligence report given him in January located 'two or three Allied divisions' in the Dimapur-Shillong area; the report was incorrect, but it provided ample reason for the caution Kawabe tried to impose on Mutaguchi.

What of Mutaguchi's direct order to Sato in early April to press beyond Kohima to Dimapur? Setting aside for the moment the question of just how practicable such an order was in face of the critical over-extension of 31st Division, Mutaguchi's earliest mention of Dimapur to Sato is recorded (by Swinson) in a conversation transcript, and can be read simply as an attempt to put an end to that rather wearisome soldier's justifiable quibblings. The direct order to Sato is not recorded in all sources.

Which brings us to the question of sources. The 'Mutaguchi story' as recounted by Major Moore appeared first in
English, I believe, in A. J. Barker's 1963 book *The March on Delhi* — a book for which Mutaguchi wrote the preface and provided much information. It is in this preface, incidentally, that Mutaguchi speaks of a 'dash for Dimapur' and blames the failure of Operation U on weaknesses in the Japanese command structure and on poor relations between Kawabe and himself — surely not the only reasons for the disaster.

Swinson, in his admirable *Four Samurai* (1968), repeats and elaborates the substance of Barker's account in a chapter entitled 'Mutaguchi and the March on Delhi', which in turn provided much of the material for the *AAJ* article. Yet students should note that Barker himself, in the introduction to his book, warns of the need for care in handling Japanese campaign accounts (particularly those produced post-war) where these have been drawn from other than the inevitably scarce primary sources. In 'Journey to the Gods', the final chapter in Swinson's book, the author both admits his own personal interest in Mutaguchi (Swinson was based at Dimapur throughout the campaign) and briefly reviews some of the bitter controversy over Mutaguchi which has raged since Barker's book was first published.

The point is pertinent. If Mutaguchi was, as he claimed and the sources quoted seem to verify, motivated by his recognition of the primary strategic importance of Dimapur, then his bullying, risk-taking and simple bad generalship must be assessed in this light. On this basis, he might be entitled to join the ranks of the often distinguished generals whose inadequate means and tentative superiors robbed them of the fruits of their vision. In the face of the primary evidence we are offered, however, this may be rating Mutaguchi too highly.

Nonetheless, Major Moore's article should be studied for the light it throws on the complex battle for Imphal-Kohima and for the 'feel' it gives for the problems and pressures of command. This is surely the type of military history we should be encouraged to read more often. In the matter of Mutaguchi, however, interested students should read widely and deeply in the many sources available and make up their own minds.

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Lieutenant Colonel R. T. Jones

The errors in dates are confirmed — Editor