Cover: Detail from 'Reducing a Pillbox', near Polygon Wood, Flanders, September, 1917, by war artist Hon. Lieut. Fred Leist. At the Australian War Memorial.
Contents

Towards a CMF Revival 3
Captains H. D. Swift and R. A. Ringe

The 'Invasion' of New Caledonia 9
Staff Cadet C. D. Clark

Fire Support Co-ordination and Airmobility 20
Major F. J. McConville

Britain's Professionals 26
Gordon Lee

A Volunteer Army: Three Views 37

Book Reviews: 55
  Armoured Forces
  The Impartial Soldier
  Montgomery — The Field Marshal
  Britain and Her Army
  Job Evaluation

No article in this Journal is to be reproduced in whole or in part.

The views expressed in the articles are the authors' own and do not necessarily represent official opinion or policy.

© Commonwealth of Australia 1972
Members of 125 Signal Squadron, an integrated Regular Army and CMF unit, climb 1,100 feet to the summit of Ayers Rock, where they established communication with units in all mainland capitals. This was one feature of a two-week exercise by the Darwin communications unit carried out in May this year through the Centre in some of Australia's most spectacular and difficult country.
Captains H. D. Swift and R. A. Ringe

The authors of this paper hold a basic belief in common. We believe that there is a place for the CMF as part of Australia's defence forces. It has a valid and important role as a source of officers and men who are trained to varying degrees of skill and efficiency. We feel, however, that the resources presently being applied to CMF training could be used more efficiently by restructuring and re-organizing the service to make better use of cadre staff, material and training time available. We think that a higher standard of training and efficiency could be achieved in the following ways.

The present training system of night parades, bivouacs and annual camp should be replaced by an annual camp and eight bivouacs. These bivouacs would be of two and a half days duration and this system would give a training year of thirty-four days. The problem of alternative parades will be dealt with later in the paper. Night parades as they exist now would be

Captain Swift enlisted in 14 NS Bn in 1955 and then transferred to 2 Fd Regt RAA where he served until 1961. He was commissioned in 1957. After a period on the R of O he transferred to CSTU S Comd (1964-65), 2 RVR (1966-71) and 6 Coy RAASC (OC 6 Coy Wksp RAEME) in 1971. At present he is administering command of 6 Coy RAASC.

Captain Ringe enlisted in 6 Coy RAASC in 1962. Commissioned in 1966 he was promoted Captain in 1971. He has served as Admin Offr, 2IC 14 Tpt Pl and Trg Offr. Presently he is OC 14 Tpt Pl.
abolished and could be replaced by lectures, films, etc. on topics of both military and general interest on a voluntary, unpaid basis.

The present geographical affiliation and location of units should be discontinued. Units should be located in existing military areas such as Puckapunyal, Watsonia, Ingleburn, etc., where training could take place in a fully military environment. Existing depots would be used for the evenings mentioned previously and as assembly areas for onward movement to bivouacs and camps. The larger depots would be manned by one ARA staff member for recruiting and enlistment procedures and the handling of day to day administrative matters and documentation and their forwarding to unit headquarters in camp and bivouac areas.

Cadre staff, stores, vehicles, etc. which are presently distributed throughout the country would be concentrated in centralized areas as mentioned in the second paragraph. The staff would maintain records and equipment, issue and return stores and carry out a similar function to their present one for all CMF units based in the area. With the large number of units involved, these areas would be in almost continuous use and some rationalization and amalgamation of units appears inevitable if this system should be adopted. This system would result in a more continuous use of staff, stores and vehicles and, in fact, fewer would be needed; while simultaneously each unit would find that its full entitlement was available for all its training. We see the sequence of events for a bivouac as being similar to the following:

(1) Unit members report to their local depot on the Friday evening for onward movement to bivouac areas.

(2) On arrival at bivouac areas all stores, tentage, huts, bedding, vehicles, etc., depending on the type of unit and type of bivouac, would be ready for immediate issue and use. These would be prepared during the week by cadre staff.

(3) Training could commence within one hour; in many cases even sooner.
(4) Training would continue until the Sunday afternoon when the unit would return stores and move to its home area for dismissal.

(5) Due to the centralized staff and stores facilities, training would be possible at all levels, from recruits to officers. New recruits would move with the unit in civilian clothes and be issued with personal equipment and clothing at a bivouac area.

We have listed what we consider to be the main advantages and disadvantages of a CMF structured along the lines we have suggested. We would appreciate the views of both the CMF and ARA as to those which we may have overlooked.

**Advantages.**

- More efficient use of staff, stores, equipment, vehicles, etc.
- Units with more realistic numbers of troops and better officer/NCO/men ratios.
- Less training time lost due to necessary but repetitive administrative matters.
- Greater availability of stores, training aids, vehicles, etc.
- The development of more highly trained, more skilful and more efficient CMF soldiers with a consequent improvement in self-confidence and morale.
- Cadre staff would spend both their working and recreational time in a Regular Army atmosphere. They would thus be able to keep more closely in touch with current doctrine and practice and developments in their chosen careers.
- Country CMF members would have a wider variety of postings available. Many country units are limited in this regard, with detrimental effects on the training and experience of their members.
The development of viable nuclei on which any future expansion could be based. This includes the fixed facilities, the stores and equipment pools, the cadre staffs and, not least, the CMF units themselves.

**Disadvantages.**

- The necessity for cadre staff to work almost every weekend of the year. This could be overcome by a roster system and stand down days during the week.

- A probable reduction in the number of CMF units with a consequent reduction in the number of postings for officers, WOs and NCOs. This would be compensated for by a system of training to be detailed at a later stage of the paper.

- A possible drop in public support due to the loss of regional affiliations. This could be minimized by intelligent use of evening activities mentioned previously.

- A possible loss of continuity and intra unit contact.

- A possible initial drop in numbers due to the necessity for members to attend a total of ten weekends during the year, including the two during annual camp.

- A greater effort required by officers and senior NCOs. This would apply especially to the organization of an interesting programme for evening activities at home depots.

- The time needed for distant units to move to training areas. Air movement could help to overcome this as could the movement of stores, etc. to units in special cases.

We have drawn up a possible training cycle for CMF soldiers. This cycle would require almost double the number of officers and NCOs than would be needed to fill the available postings. In this way it compensates for the reduction in postings mentioned previously. Although the time taken to reach various ranks may seem excessive, we believe that a system of
alternating regimental or staff postings and detachment to training units will result in better trained, more knowledgeable and more competent specialists, NCOs and officers. This will lead in turn to an improvement in the training of recruits and those members, and there are many of them, who wish to serve as private soldiers.

**Proposed Training Cycle**

*Recruit Training.* One year’s training including a centralized recruit training camp. Then appointed private.

*Basic Corps Training.* One year’s training including a centralized corps training camp. On qualification as a trained soldier, eligible to apply for specialist or NCO training. Members not so applying to undergo advanced corps training in a variety of postings.

*Specialist Training.* Members selected to be detached to a specialist training unit for the necessary period. On qualification to be posted back to unit.

*NCO Training.*

- To Corporal. One year’s NCO training including an annual camp. Examinations to be held in the second week of camp. Substantive rank of corporal to be a prerequisite for training for sergeant, warrant or commissioned rank.

- To Sergeant. Two years satisfactory service as a corporal then one year’s further NCO training including an annual camp. Examinations to be held in the second week of camp. Substantive rank of sergeant to be a prerequisite for training for warrant rank.

- To WO2. Three years satisfactory service as a sergeant. Detached to a training unit for two years. When qualified, to be posted back to unit. Substantive rank of WO2 to be a prerequisite for training for WO1.

- To WO1. Five years satisfactory service as WO2. Detached to a training unit for two years. When qualified, to be posted back to unit.
Officer Training.

- To 2nd Lieutenant. Substantive corporal. Recommended by commanding officer. Approved by formation commander. Detached to officer training unit for two years. When commissioned to be posted to unit.

- To Lieutenant. Two years satisfactory service as a 2nd Lieutenant. Recommended by CO. Approved by formation commander.

- To Captain. Two years satisfactory service as a lieutenant. Recommended by CO. Approved by formation commander. Detached to OTU for two years. Promoted to captain. Posted to Unit.

- To Major. Victorian Leaving Certificate or equivalent required, except in cases given special recommendation. Four years satisfactory service as a captain. Recommended by CO. Approved by formation commander. Detached to OTU for three years. Promoted to major. Posted to Unit.

- Above Major. As at present.

We feel that the reorganization we have outlined would result in a more efficient, better trained and more vital CMF. The system as we see it does not demand that units hold their annual camps in the same place each year, nor does it lead to a lessening of a commander’s prerogative to determine the best methods and areas in which to train his command. As various units would be using training areas almost every week-end, alternative parades could be carried out with another unit of the same corps and the centralization of headquarters would make this administratively simple. Training courses at all levels could also be run on a centralized basis and this would lead to an improvement in standards throughout the service. In our opinion, unless something is done to revitalize the CMF as a whole, the efforts of many devoted citizen soldiers will be wasted and a force which has served Australia well will wither and die.
I t occurs to few Australians that their nation was born while vigorously engaged in prosecuting a war, yet such was the case. When the six colonies, about to become states, federated to form the Australian Commonwealth in 1901, they had been supplying troops, horses and equipment for service with British units in far-off South Africa since the end of 1899. The war did not finish, in fact, until 1902, but an account of Australia's involvement in the Boer War is not the purpose of this essay.

Even as the war against the Boers continued, the British Government was showing great interest in matters much closer to Australian shores. The activities of the French in the New Hebrides and especially in New Caledonia, only seven hundred and fifty miles from the Queensland coast and little over a
thousand miles from Sydney, had always been of considerable concern to Britain. Although originally discovered and named by Cook in 1774, the latter island was one of the few plums that Britain overlooked in her early colonization policy in the Pacific; in fact, she had showed little interest in New Caledonia until the French flag was first hoisted over it in 1843, an act which the French Government was subsequently forced to renounce. France finally gained possession of the island a decade later, and turned it to use as a penal settlement. Britain, ever watchful of her great rival, endeavoured to keep informed of developments there. In December, 1900, details were sought about the local defences on New Caledonia, knowledge which would prove invaluable should it become necessary or desirable to seize the island, with its superb land-locked harbour at Noumea, the principal town.

On this occasion, the Director of Military Intelligence in London, Sir John Ardagh, had written to Major-General G. A. French, the Commandant of the New South Wales Forces, asking him whether he could spare one of his officers to carry out some discreet espionage on the island. French had readily complied, instructing one Captain Tupper, R.N., who was already under orders to proceed to Noumea on other duties, to furnish the required information.¹

In February 1902, however, another request was received from London, this time from Lieutenant-General Sir William Nicholson, Ardagh's successor. Nicholson wrote to the General Officer Commanding the Commonwealth Military Forces, Major-General E. T. H. Hutton, a British officer on loan to the Australian Government. General French, complained Nicholson, had not specially detailed a military officer for the initial task at Noumea, and consequently the original report, while giving 'some useful information', had been 'deficient in many important respects'. He would be very glad, he told Hutton, if another officer (preferably an artillery or engineer officer) could be sent with all the necessary verbal instructions as to what to look for, and fully cautioned to proceed in the matter while drawing as little notice to himself as possible.²

² ibid., pp. 246-7.
Hutton replied that he had the very man for the undertaking ‘an Artillery Officer of very high calibre, Major Bridges, R.A.A.’. He informed Nicholson that since Bridges was heavily committed with work on re-organization schemes for the Commonwealth Forces he could not attend to the matter immediately, but it was gathered from the tone of the letter that there was no great urgency.3

(Australian War Memorial) The officer Hutton proposed to send, Major W. T. Bridges, was an ideal choice. A man of ‘exceptional experience and attainments’, as Hutton said of him, Bridges spoke fluent French, and had completed brilliant courses in gunnery at Woolwich and Shoeburyness in 1891-92. Following his return to New South Wales he had established a School of Gunnery at Middle Head in Sydney, where he not only acted as Commandant for a period, but was also the Chief Instructor. He had also been the Firemaster for the New South Wales Artillery for some nine years. During his service in South Africa in 1900 he was to have been on Hutton’s staff with the 1st

3 Hutton to Nicholson, 21 March 1902; ibid., p. 248.
Mounted Infantry Brigade, but his illness from enteric fever forced his evacuation to England for hospitalization. Hutton had known Bridges from earlier days too, when, as Commandant of the New South Wales Forces from 1893-96, he employed Bridges as secretary on several important inter-colonial military conferences. In the post-Federation Military Forces, Hutton again relied on Bridges’s capacity and ability, giving him tasks not only in keeping with his appointment on the Commonwealth Headquarters Staff as Assistant Quartermaster General, but which meant he was Intelligence and Mobilization Officer as well.

Not for two months was Bridges able to depart on his mission. Leaving Sydney on May 24th, ostensibly on sick leave, he sailed for Noumea fully briefed and with instructions ‘to carry out a careful and complete Military Survey of New Caledonia generally and of Noumea in particular’. Before Bridges left Sydney, Hutton had arranged for him to be provided with a ‘cover’ for his activities. A Major Knox, an officer in the volunteer New South Wales Lancers regiment, also happened to be the managing director of Messrs Dalgety and Co. Limited, a large firm of produce merchants with mining interests in New Caledonia. With this officer’s co-operation Major Bridges, Royal Australian Artillery, now became ‘Mr Bridges’, a commercial agent travelling for the firm.

Bridges was away for what appears to have been a rather eventful five weeks. The French authorities in Noumea were very sensitive about all English visitors, but just before Bridges’s arrival they had become particularly suspicious, and Bridges’s task was therefore an extremely delicate one. The watchfulness of the local military and prison authorities not only hindered his movement about the island but added a very real element of danger. Certainly the risks involved in carrying out his task in such a small town without being questioned and detected as an officer were very considerable, and Bridges did not complete the mission without a few anxious moments.

It was of course desirable to keep his business in Noumea unknown as far as possible to both friend and foe alike, and in

a slightly breathless letter written a week after his arrival, Bridges reported how he thought he had been recognized one day on the steps of the British Consulate by a British naval officer, and had therefore taken the officer into his confidence. The officer, Captain Francis Noel, was in fact in Noumea with his command, the cruiser Wallaroo, which was officially listed as assigned to ‘the protection of Floating Trade of Australasian Waters’. Bridges related however, how he had overheard the Governor’s aide-de-camp tell another Frenchman that the Wallaroo was there ‘to spy out the land’, which elicited the bemused observation from Bridges that the French ‘do not like us’. After hearing an explanation of Bridges’s presence on the island, Captain Noel expressed disapproval of Bridges’s mission, though he nonetheless agreed to take the letter for Hutton on to Sydney with the Wallaroo, which was about to sail.

Deliberately taking his time so as not to draw attention on himself, Bridges checked out the town’s defences. Noumea then had a population of less than ten thousand, and though the white wooden buildings with their galvanized iron roofs and verandahs were far removed from the elegance of Paris, the clean avenue streets, the cafés, and the French-speaking residents combined to give the town a distinctly French flavour. Nearly all the principal buildings were situated either on or just off the main thoroughfare leading from the wharf up to the tall hill standing behind the township. In his letter to Hutton, Bridges enclosed several photographs taken from the semaphore station on the hill, from which vessels approaching the town were signalled, on which he had marked the positions of gun batteries commanding the harbour and its passages. Trenches, he discovered, were being constructed around Noumea itself, but, like other works he located, he was unable to have a close inspection

---

5 Bridges to Hutton, 5 June 1902; Hutton Papers, Vol. XII, MS 50,089, pp. 45-9.
6 The Navy List, July 1902, p. 311a.
7 It is not clear whether the French suspicion was justified or not. The Admiral of the Australian station, Sir Lewis Beaumont, told Hutton several months later that he also had an officer at Noumea ‘with a ship engaged in obtaining information’. (Hutton to Nicholson, 22 September 1902; Hutton Papers, Vol. IX, MS 50,086, pp. 260-3), and it is possible therefore that the Wallaroo’s mission on this occasion was a liberal interpretation of the definition of her duties. In this case, the attitude adopted by Captain Noel is indeed an interesting one.
of them. He therefore satisfied himself initially with examining the communications.

As a means of obtaining an idea of the lie of the land, Bridges informed Hutton that he intended crossing the island with a kanaka guide, remarking at the same time that he did not anticipate the trip being ‘amusing’. Despite the daunting aspects of the hike, Bridges presumably carried through with his plan. It appears too, that there was some problem in obtaining maps, and at first Bridges was only able to obtain one of the town area by persuading a French local to loan it to him. In overcoming the numerous difficulties which emerged, he was fortunate in receiving assistance from a local resident, Mr T. Jackson, the Lloyd’s Agent in Noumea, ‘who at some risk and considerable personal inconvenience to himself facilitated this Officer’s movements and rendered him much help, besides procuring valuable information’.8

Bridges left New Caledonia on July 1st, and after the five-day voyage back to Sydney found on his return that he had been promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel. Hutton was delighted with the results of his efforts, and wrote to Nicholson that 'It was no easy matter . . . for Colonel Bridges to carry out what was required,' and only his 'exercise of tact and care' had made the venture a success. Hutton carefully went through Bridges's report with him, ensuring it covered all the required points, then forwarded it to London. With it he included a letter which said, in part: 'I should like to submit the name of Lieut-Colonel Bridges especially to the favourable consideration of the Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State for War for the able manner in which under difficult circumstances he has drawn up and furnished the report.'

In making his initial request, Nicholson had offered to meet all expenses incurred, and Hutton was prompted to suggest that some financial reward might be made to Bridges. Eventually a letter conveying Kitchener's thanks was received by Bridges, but it came from Hutton, who realized nothing would be forthcoming from London. Apart from reimbursing Bridges's expenses of a little over €30 and paying him €1 a day for the thirty-eight days he was away, Nicholson had pleaded poor-mouth, saying the funds at his disposal quite prevented him from making further financial remuneration. Among his private papers Hutton included an angry note concerning this last letter:

A miserable recompense for much trouble, some hardship, and not a little personal danger. Characteristic of War Office methods.

Bridges received the decoration denied to him on this occasion some five years later, when he was made CMG. He later achieved recognition for his work as founder and first Commandant of the Royal Military College at Duntroon, and also as founder and first commander of the Australian Imperial Force during World War I. In the decade after Federation,

---

10 Hutton to Nicholson, 21 July 1902; ibid., p. 250.
11 Hutton to Nicholson, 22 September 1902; ibid., p. 261.
12 Hutton to Bridges, 9 March 1903; Bridges Papers, Massey Library, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston.
he was influential in founding the Australian Intelligence Corps and served as its first Chief of Intelligence, became the first Chief of the Australian General Staff, and was appointed Australia's representative on the Imperial General Staff in London. He was knighted two days after being mortally wounded on Gallipoli, thereby becoming Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges, KCB, CMG, but died the day after the award was announced.

Hutton however, was to suffer further frustration and annoyance with regard to other matters connected with the Noumean adventure. While Bridges had still been on New Caledonia, Hutton received a letter from a friend in London,14 which contained the remark that Australia would 'need its military force for the purpose of undertaking the conquest of New Caledonia and the New Hebrides'.15 Presumably agreeing with this view, Hutton promptly assumed authority—apparently without any invitation from the British War Office—to begin drawing up a plan for invading New Caledonia. In his letter covering Bridges's report, Hutton announced: 'I have carefully discussed with Lieut-Colonel Bridges every detail connected with Noumea and its approaches, and have made up my mind as to the best method of attack.' He added though, that he would be glad of any remarks on the whole question of an attack on New Caledonia which Nicholson had to offer.16

It is clear that in initially requesting information on Noumea's defences, the British War Office was merely collecting data which was primarily intended to keep their stock of knowledge up-to-date, and only secondly to provide details for the purpose of planning specific operations. Nicholson stated, in his first letter suggesting an officer be sent, that the reason more information was needed was simply because new fortifications

---

14 The letter, in the Hutton Papers, is from an address in Sloane Street, Chelsea, and bears an almost indecipherable signature. Its author appears, however, to have been Sir Charles Dilke, the British statesman who seemed certain to become Prime Minister in 1885 until a divorce scandal wrecked his career. Re-elected to the Commons in 1891, Dilke gained prominence, among other things, as something of a military expert. He died in 1911.
15 Dilke (?) to Hutton, 2 June 1902; Hutton Papers, Vol. XX, MS 50,097, p. 150.
16 Hutton to Nicholson, 22 September 1902; ibid., Vol. IX, MS 50,086, p. 263.
appeared to have been built. In fact the information Bridges gathered was only used to compile a general military report on New Caledonia. Hutton no doubt knew this, but he had apparently decided, possibly with Dilke’s encouragement, that should it be decided to invade, such an attack ought to be carried out by Australian troops and he therefore wanted to ensure a plan was on hand for just such an occasion. It seems unlikely that he had taken his political superiors into his confidence concerning this matter, and such would have been typical of him. His superiors in the British Army had found Hutton a ‘difficult subordinate’, and it may have been this which explains his considerable service on loan to the colonies. Hutton had finished a term in command of the Canadian Forces just after the outbreak of the Boer War in rather acrimonious circumstances, where he departed amid stormy accusations that he had volunteered a Canadian contingent for service in South Africa without first consulting the Canadian Government. Indeed, Hutton’s term with the Australian Commonwealth ended in slightly similar circumstances, after the government discovered that Hutton communicated directly with the War Office using a secret code, to which even the Australian Prime Minister was denied access. To add insult to injury, Hutton had promptly billed the Australian Government for the cost of the secret telegrams.

Nonetheless, Hutton had probably accurately gauged the situation when, four days after despatching Bridges’s Noumea report to Nicholson, he confided to Vice-Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, Commander in Chief of the Australian Section, that, as the Labour Party then dominated the Commonwealth Parliament, there would be ‘violent opposition to any idea of utilizing Australian troops for Offensive-Defensive operations’.

It is very curious that a sort of Australian Spread-Eagleism is being created—an instinct towards elbowing France and Germany out of Australian waters—also of keeping out colored labor of all sorts from Australian soil; yet the very Labour members advocating these principles will not tolerate even the power of using, even under Australian direction, any part of their Military Force beyond the 3 mile limit.

17 Hutton to Bridge, 26 September 1902; ibid., Vol. XX, MS 50,097, pp. 185-6.
The national sentiment in Australia would be most favourable to the undertaking of such an enterprise, and any request embodying a suggestion of the kind from the Imperial Government would, in the present temper of public feeling in Australia, be hailed with satisfaction. You are no doubt aware of the growth of a Monroe Doctrine for Australia. New Caledonia has always been looked upon by Australian public opinion as a necessarily integral part of the Australian Commonwealth of the future.¹⁸

This whole time Hutton had been proceeding with the drawing up of a plan of attack. In February 1903, he informed Vice-Admiral Fanshawe that he had given his predecessor, Admiral Sir Lewis Beaumont, a set of proposals for Noumea's capture, and had personally discussed the matter with him in the privacy of Hutton's office.¹⁹

Hutton considered the operation would have to be a joint Army-Navy venture, as naval requirements for disembarking troops had to be considered, as had the naval operations necessary before a landing would even be possible. Writing to Nicholson in December 1902, Hutton had commented, 'The difficulties of navigation and of obtaining all possible knowledge of landing places are greater than I imagined, and even charts in these respects are so deceptive . . . the plan of attack . . . has not reached the stage yet of final solution.'²⁰

In his principal scheme which he outlined to Fanshawe, Hutton proposed landing the bulk of the invasion force at Baie St. Vincent while a small force came ashore at Baie Maa to effect a coup de main. This scheme had originally been submitted to Beaumont, who subsequently expressed reservations about the landing at St. Vincent, saying that he foresaw certain difficulties. Hutton politely suggested to Fanshawe that he did not hold these objections as valid, as he imagined the Navy's information on the subject to be 'not very complete'.²¹

¹⁸ Hutton to Nicholson, 13 June 1903; ibid., Vol. IX, MS 50,086, pp. 283-4.
¹⁹ Hutton to Fanshawe, 20 February 1903; ibid., Vol. XX, MS 50,097, pp. 210-11.
²⁰ Hutton to Nicholson, 9 December, 1902; ibid., Vol. IX, MS 50,086, p. 270.
²¹ Hutton to Fanshawe, 20 February 1903; ibid., Vol. XX, MS 50,097 p. 211.
By mid-June of 1903 Hutton reported to Nicholson that he had drawn up a scheme for seizing and occupying Noumea, but mentioned that there was a lack of satisfactory information regarding the facilities at one or two landing places on the coast north of Noumea. The Admiral, he said, had promised to supply the necessary data and Hutton assured Nicholson that, when the scheme was completed, in ‘about six or eight months’, he would send a copy of the complete plan. He felt sure that the Intelligence Department would like to have in its archives ‘the proposals for an event which would undoubtedly be considered in the case of a war with France’.

It may be assumed that Nicholson subsequently received his copy of the invasion scheme, but events never demanded its implementation. Britain’s relations with France had been soured by the Boer War, and made worse as Britain found herself left on the outer fringes of the system of alliances which existed at the turn of the century, but they never deteriorated to the point of war. When war did finally erupt the two powers fought as allies, and thoughts of invading each other’s far-off colonial possessions were put aside. In Australia, the imperialist interest in the region persisted until just before the outbreak of the war, when all military interest in New Caledonia was also diverted by Australia’s participation in the great conflict in Europe. Hutton’s period of command in Australia was terminated in 1904 and he returned to England, leaving many of his schemes, including the establishment of a military college, either mutilated by government amendments or still being fought for by his protégés, chief among whom was Bridges. His Noumea scheme was forgotten, an easy matter, as the Australian Government of the day most probably never even knew of its existence.

22 Hutton to Nicholson, 13 June 1903; ibid., Vol. IX, MS 50,086, p. 284.
23 ibid.
Fire Support Co-ordination and Airmobility: one way to do it

Major F. J. McConville
United States Army

AIRMOBILITY forces a commander to think in terms of eighty miles an hour. His job can be a bit easier if he knows how and when to blend all available fire support with the other forms of combat power. This essay discusses some fire support co-ordination procedures that have been developed in response to the problems of fighting an eighty-mile-an-hour battle with US Army organizations, equipment and tactics. The writer has used US Army terminology throughout; however, in some instances the comparable Australian Army term appears in brackets.

The System

There are four key positions in the US Army fire support co-ordination system:

Major McConville, who holds the degrees of Bachelor of Science (USMA) and Master in Business Administration (Harvard), wrote this article while attending the 1971 course at the Australian Staff College. A Field Artillery officer, he has held unit appointments in artillery battalions in Germany and Vietnam and has served in a number of staff appointments. After his course at Queenscliff he was temporarily assigned to Washington en route to a Vietnam appointment.
1. The Direct Support Artillery Battalion (Regiment) Commander serves as the Fire Support Co-ordinator (FSCOORD) for the supported brigade (task force). Normally he has three 105-mm howitzer batteries under his operational control (command); however, he may have from two to five such units.

2. The Manoeuvre Battalion Commander (either armour or infantry) must thoroughly understand all aspects of the fire support co-ordination system, from communications to weapon capabilities.

3. The Artillery Liaison Officer (LNO) is the representative of the direct support artillery battalion commander at the manoeuvre battalion. He lives and works with the manoeuvre commander and serves as FSCOORD for his unit. Normally he and the supported commander are airborne in a command and control helicopter over the contact area; however, he may be on the ground (e.g., during the defence of a fire support base under ground attack). There is no command relationship between the LNO and any artillery batteries located on the fire support base.

4. The Forward Observer (FO) is on the ground with the supported company commander. Normally he has the contact area under direct observation.

US Army doctrine holds that maximum utilization of available fire support resources can be achieved when that support is co-ordinated by a single agency. Centralizing control at the highest possible level ensures immediate response and complete coverage of targets. It permits the highest degree of flexibility in rapidly changing situations and provides the commander a decisive means of influencing the battle. The direct support artillery battalion exercises this control for the supported brigade and for each of its subordinate manoeuvre battalions. Although each firing battery normally is located with a manoeuvre battalion on a fire support base, each remains subordinate to the controlling direct support artillery battalion. To reiterate, fire support co-ordination for the manoeuvre
battalion is the responsibility of the LNO and he acts for the direct support artillery battalion commander.

The FSCOORD is charged with the specific responsibility of co-ordinating all fires on surface targets in the zone of the supported unit. He must effect co-ordination with Forward Air Controllers (FAC), artillery fire units, mortars, and leaders of attack helicopter teams. His aim is to achieve the timely and simultaneous delivery of the maximum amount of effective fire power on a target. One hour of artillery fire followed by a half hour of air strikes is not effective fire support co-ordination.

Some of the salient features of fire support resources are reviewed below:

- **Cannon Artillery** is the most responsive fire support means available to the ground commander. The direct support artillery battalion has the mission to provide close and continuous fire support to the brigade. The fire of all artillery fire units within range of a target can be requested through fire support co-ordination channels if necessary.

- **Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA)** batteries extend the range of artillery fire power and normally one ARA battery reinforces the fires of the direct support artillery battalion (at priority call). Operations into enemy-held areas can be undertaken with a greater probability of success when the surprise, flexibility and fire power of ARA are effectively utilized. An ARA battery is not just another gunship unit; its fire is requested through fire support co-ordination channels, is co-ordinated by the LNO and is controlled by the FO in the contact area.

- **Tactical Air** is a flexible fire support means with great range that can deliver a variety of ordnance on suitable targets. Planned and immediate air strikes can be initiated by the manoeuvre commander through his operations officer or the LNO. The LNO must be fully aware of all aspects of the air strike in order to properly co-ordinate it with other fire support means.
Naval Gunfire (NGF) may be available to augment other fire support resources when the division operates near coastal areas. Requests for NGF will be forwarded through fire support co-ordination channels, co-ordinated by the LNO and controlled by a Naval Gunfire Liaison Team or artillery FO.

SHADOW or SPOOKY are Air Force aircraft equipped with automatic weapons and illumination devices. They are an excellent means to employ against soft area targets but must be co-ordinated with other fire support assets by the LNO.

Armed Helicopter Teams include the familiar Light Fire Teams (LFT). They are normally assigned reconnaissance and operational areas by the manoeuvre commander. The LNO provides clearance to engage a target for the manoeuvre commander; however, often an area clearance is granted.

The Procedures

The effective co-ordination of fire support marks the successful combat operation. The key to that co-ordination is the artillery LNO with the manoeuvre battalion. Normally a captain, he must be aggressive, understand all aspects of the situation at the moment and have the confidence of the supported commander. As mentioned earlier, his aim is the timely and simultaneous delivery of effective fire power on the target. This section discusses some procedures for employing typical combinations of fire support assets simultaneously.

Cannon Artillery and Aerial Rocket Artillery. These artillery units will operate on a common fire support co-ordination channel with the LNO. The LNO must brief the ARA section leader on the current tactical situation, the location of friendly elements, targets being attacked by cannon artillery, azimuths of gun-target lines and recommend a direction of attack. Under ideal conditions the direction of attack should be parallel to the orientation of friendly troops and perpendicular to the gun target line of cannon artillery units. Once the ARA section leader has arrived over the contact area he must make a precise
visual identification of friendly locations; normally this is accomplished with the aid of a smoke grenade. The section leader may propose a different direction of attack based on gun-target lines, troop orientation, flight factors or other considerations. The FO will control and adjust the ARA fire. He can continue to control the cannon artillery fire as well; however, normally the LNO will control it and avoid large shifts in fire which might endanger ARA. Once adjusted onto a target, the fire of the entire ARA battery and several cannon artillery fire units can be massed simultaneously.

Aerial Rocket Artillery and Tactical Air. The necessary communications link can be accomplished through the FAC who will operate on a common fire support co-ordination channel with the LNO and ARA section leader. The LNO must co-ordinate air space for both systems. He will brief the FAC and ARA section leader on the tactical situation and location of friendly elements. After recommending a direction of attack for ARA he will recommend a loiter area for ground attack aircraft prior to being directed on suitable tactical air targets. When those targets develop he must also recommend a direction of attack. Flight paths must be clearly understood by all concerned and, if possible, follow easily recognized terrain features. The proximity of tactical air and ARA targets may necessitate alternate passes by the two systems.

Aerial Rocket Artillery and Attack Helicopter Teams. The necessary communications can be established on fire support co-ordination channels. Essentially the procedure is similar to that used to co-ordinate ARA and tactical air, and the LNO must co-ordinate air space for both systems. Targets are specified, friendly locations identified and directions of attack recommended. Again, the proximity of the targets may necessitate alternate passes by the two systems. As an alternative, the manoeuvre commander may designate a specific area for LFT operations and the LNO will relay these instructions to both systems.

Cannon Artillery and Attack Helicopter Teams. The LNO will establish communications with the LFT leader and cannon artillery units over fire support co-ordination channels. As before,
the manoeuvre commander may designate a specific area for LFT operations and the LNO will relay those instructions to the team leader. If the team is operating in close proximity to a cannon artillery target (within four range probable errors plus one bursting radius) the LNO will advise the team, and the leader must keep the artillery point of impact under observation. For his part the LNO must monitor the conduct of the cannon artillery mission and be alert to large shifts of fire that might endanger the LFT. If a LFT leader wishes to engage a target with cannon artillery the fire request will be submitted over fire support co-ordination channels. The LNO will co-ordinate the support and the team leader will control the adjustment.

In all situations the LNO will strive to employ all available fire support simultaneously. When required, he will recommend to the manoeuvre commander temporary restrictive control measures such as fire support co-ordination lines, and quadrant or rectangular allocation of airspace to co-ordinate simultaneous attack by cannon artillery, ARA, tactical air and attack helicopter teams. These restrictions can be applied at the latest possible time and lifted after the last attack pass. In addition, the LNO can provide corridors for troop lift, resupply or Medevac aircraft by applying the same temporary measures.

Prior planning is basic to the proper co-ordination of fire support. Detailed fire support plans serve as mutually understood points of departure and the application of comprehensive SOPs will permit the manoeuvre commander and the LNO to react quickly and effectively to changes in a tactical situation.

Conclusions

Fire support is the most flexible form of combat power available to the commander. The aim of the Fire Support Co-ordinator is to ensure that the right amount of fire support is delivered on the right target at the right time. Fire support co-ordination is one of the most dynamic activities of the eighty-mile-an-hour war and continually offers challenges to commanders. Those challenges can only be met with thorough knowledge of its principles and practices.
N O one joins the British Army to see the world any more. That globe trotting slogan was the way Britain’s regular army tried to attract recruits before World War II. Then, a man signing on for his ‘seven and five’ — seven years with the colours and five years in the reserve — could expect to see some service in India and other parts of the empire.

That slogan was revived in the early 1960s, after Britain dropped conscription and went back to its old love and tradition: a professional, regular army. In the mid-1960s it was still an appropriate slogan, for the army was on guard, or indeed in action, in distant places: Borneo, Arabia and Aden, among them. The idea lost its force — and pulling power — as these worldwide commitments were wound down.

By the late 1960s, it was plain that the army’s primary role lay in Europe, either on the central front in western Germany or on the northern and southern flanks of NATO. The recruiting slogans had to be changed. They were switched to variations on the ‘Join the Professionals’ theme. Today, that remains the basic message that the British Army uses to sell itself to would-be recruits.

It fits the facts. On average, those who join up as adults (that is, over the age of 18) serve six years after completing their initial training and those who join up as juniors nearly 10½ years after reaching the age of 18. During that time, the soldier may serve on a station in the Mediterranean or east of Suez — if he is lucky. He will certainly go on training exercises for short periods outside Europe. But much of his service will be confined either to Britain, in the various depots and training establishments, or northern Germany, in the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). The tank, heavy artillery and missile regiments, in particular, are likely to see little else but Germany.

From ARMY Magazine, July 1971. Copyright 1971 by Association of the U.S. Army and reproduced by permission. Mr Lee is Defence Correspondent for The Economist.
Moreover, if an infantryman sees action these days, he is more likely to experience it on the streets of Belfast than anywhere else. So, to get recruits, the British Army has no real choice but to preach professionalism, hinting to the recruit that he is joining a high-quality elite.

This is not a false picture. The army is well equipped, though not quite so lavishly as some politicians profess it to be. Certainly, it is highly trained. For its size the army has a big back-up of instructional schools and training courses. This is both inevitable and proper: it compensates for the lack of numbers. In this sense, professionalism has worked. As a trained force, the army today compares with the small but superb musketry army which Britain sent to France and Belgium in 1914 and which died hard in the First Battle of Ypres.

But the luxury of sea supremacy which allowed the measured build-up of a conscript army in times of crisis no longer exists or applies in the nuclear age. Britain's defence no longer begins at the Channel but in West Germany. It can no longer dare to pursue an independent strategy. As a second-rank power, it has become interdependent. Yet, up to recently, its allies have clung to the belief that the first line of defence in a policy of deterrence is to be found in the big battalions of conscript forces. Now, Britain may be pointing the way for its allies, not least for the United States but even possibly for western Germany (where the combination of a professional army plus a conscript militia force for local defence commends itself to a good number of military thinkers).

So, it is worth jobbing backwards to look at the three basic reasons why Britain dropped conscription.

First, it was politically unpopular. It still is. The case for some form of national service is sometimes argued in Britain, but there can be no doubt that as a political issue conscription is a dead duck.

Second, it was thought that the end of conscription would save money. To some extent it has, but not, with the growing sophistication and cost of weapons, on the scale that was originally envisaged. Professional forces are expensive for their
size, particularly in manpower costs, and the old problem of any
defence budget—how much to spend on equipment and how
much on manpower—remains as troublesome as ever.

Third, it was thought that the possession of nuclear
weapons would compensate for the reduction in the size of
Britain's conventional forces and might even permit some degree
of 'independence' in defence and foreign policies. In the event,
it has been seen that the possession of such weapons by a
second-rank power, though useful, had been given an exaggerated
importance. Deterrence, it has been discovered, really does
begin with the sentry at the gate.

Behind all these arguments for dropping conscription lay
what can be described only as a historical, national peculiarity.
Professional armed services, with a tradition of staying clear of
domestic politics, were something that the British people under-
stood and wanted. And within the British Army itself there
was an audible sigh of relief when the last conscript—he
happened to be a cook—left in March 1962. 'Now we can get
back to real soldiering again' was the general feeling.

This innate belief in professional forces is almost unique
to Britain. It runs directly, counter to the European tradition of
a 'nation in arms'.

The British Army both gains and loses from this habit of
professionalism. Some of these gains and losses may well be
relevant to others who go professional.

First, the British Army is still very much a society within
a society, more isolated from everyday life and events than any
conscription force would be. It tends to be inward looking, self-
protective and conservative. Against this, however, must be
set the tradition of service and obedience to the state by an
army which remains disciplined and apolitical. While the officers
of the British Army now come from all walks of life, an
aristocratic sense of duty is still much in evidence.

Second, economy in the use of force holds a key place in
the British Army's thinking and tactics. This is well illustrated
by the quite extraordinary restraint the army has displayed in
Northern Ireland. It is the boast of English pubs that no other army, faced with the riots and gunmen of Ulster, would have kept its temper so well. But there is a latent danger in all this: the willingness to use force may well be weakened, though more among the politicians than the soldiers themselves.

Third, in an army where quality has to make up for quantity, the soldiers are trained for and asked to perform many roles and tasks. Versatility is the watchword. Soldiering then becomes interesting for the soldiers themselves: there is always something new, something different to learn. But versatility exacts a penalty. It requires the lavish provision of differing scales and types of equipment and it imposes some strain on the soldier himself as he is switched, say, from armoured warfare in Germany, through internal security duties in Ulster, to jungle warfare in Malaysia. The training programme has to be carefully balanced if the soldier, or indeed his unit, is not to become the jack of all trades and the master of none. The British Army has largely avoided this trap — but not without strain.

Finally, a professional army like the British one always feels that it is being stretched to do the jobs assigned to it. The process of rotation from one task to another, from one role to another and from one area to another is, indeed, quite fierce. Today, there can be little doubt that duties in Ulster, absorbing nearly six per cent of the army, just under 170,000 strong, has produced a feeling of over-stretch. Many of the units, particularly in the infantry and artillery, are under strength — perhaps on average by as much as five per cent — and, in any case, these formations have been cut to the bone. The British Army always finds itself pleading not for a bit of fat, but some much needed muscle. It is always a question of scratching around for enough men and arranging postings in such a way that the men — and their wives — do not feel aggrieved.

The current plan is that the British Army should hold steady around the 150,000 mark in the mid-1970s, though both inside and outside the army, the belief of many is that the army should be held at the 170,000 mark if it is to perform the duties thrust upon it without too great a sense of strain.
So, in the end, everything turns on recruiting. The essential point to be grasped here is that there are still not enough recruits coming forward in Britain to hit the target of 150,000, let alone to think of an army of 170,000, and that both the Royal Navy and the RAF are also short of recruits. This is not just a matter of money, though obviously a loosening of the tight reins on defence spending (which are keeping it down to around 5.5 per cent of the gross national product) would help matters.

It is also a matter of the number of men, aged between 15 and 24, available in the manpower pool. The pool is shrinking. It will shrink still more once the school leaving age in Britain is raised to 16 in 1973. Over the last two years, Britain's three services have been recruiting 1.2 per cent of the available manpower pool. Even that has not been quite enough to keep on target. Moreover, to meet the long term average requirement of 43,000 male 'other ranks' recruits a year the three services together will have to attract 1.6 per cent of the available manpower pool.

That will be an appallingly difficult task, so difficult as to preclude any real hope of getting a British army of the proper size for the jobs it is being given to do. Hence, the feeling of over-stretch is likely to persist. It also raises the danger of an aging army if the young recruits do not come forward.

Officers as well as men are in short supply. It is not unusual these days, for example, to go on to a gun position to find the battery command post in the charge of a sergeant major. Sandhurst is, in particular, finding it difficult to attract enough officer cadets for long-service, pensionable commissions. In contrast, the number of applicants for short-service, three-year commissions is very healthy. One reason is that in these days such short-service officers can go to an industrial or commercial company while they are still serving and get the virtual guarantee of a job when they leave the army.

This situation has two obvious morals:
First, as more and more young men want to go to universities (and then find it difficult to get jobs when they leave), the army has to put more and more emphasis on the recruitment of graduates for long-service commissions as the Royal Navy and RAF are already doing.

Second, the army has to realize that officers as well as men want to 'suck it and see' before they commit themselves to a long-service career which comes to an end for run-of-the-mill officers at the rank of captain or major at the age of 40 or so. So, it may have to trawl more diligently than in the past among short-service officers to induce some of them to take up permanent commissions.

There is also a rather less obvious solution: to do with fewer officers and to rely more on NCOs. It is an option that no professional army can ignore. But it may well be more open to other armies — as, for instance, Germany's — than the British, which has always had the tradition of a proportionately high number of officers for men.

Moreover, the flow of NCOs turns on the flow of the right kind of recruits for the ranks. The plainest lesson from British experience is that such recruits must be caught young. It raises a question for the future: if more and more young men stay on in full time education, will the army — and even more the navy — have to put heavier emphasis on recruiting adults aged over 18? There is no straight answer to that question. But it is clear that adolescents who have stuck it out in the junior training battalions do make the better soldiers, do get promoted and do stay in the army longer.

So, a professional army appears to require a good number of junior training battalions and regiments. The British Army has always been keen on this. It has paid dividends, for, while over the last few years it has not got enough adult recruits, its junior battalions have been full. In the last twelve months or so, the number of junior recruits has risen quite sharply.

One reason for this is that after a thorough and careful inquiry it was decided that on reaching the age of 18 young
servicemen would be given the option either of confirming their original engagement (which could be up to nine years of service) or of shortening it to three years after their 18th birthdays. Such a break-clause came late to the British armed services, but clearly it is essential if the very young are to be recruited.

The army, then, is a young man’s profession. But that also means, as the British Army has found, that the soldiers marry early. Indeed, within the same age groups, the marriage rate of men in the British Army is higher, proportionately, than their counterparts in civilian life. So it follows that there has to be a lavish provision of married quarters, for regulars cannot be denied a life with their families, as conscripts largely are; that training has to take due note of the married man’s natural desire to get off parade early and back to his family; and that the number and duration of unaccompanied tours and postings has to be kept to a minimum.

A professional army, in other words, can no longer be regarded as a home for social misfits or unfortunates. It has to be seen rather as a normal job for normal people with normal career expectations. In particular, the pay a soldier receives must compare with what he might earn in civilian life. Recognition of this fact lay behind the introduction of the so-called ‘military salary’ in Britain. Under it, married and single men alike receive a full salary and then pay, according to a published tariff of charges, for their accommodation and food (unless they are on active service).

This has had two effects: first, it has made a career in the army more attractive to single men (for now they get the same pay as married men). Second, it means that the politicians dare not duck for too long the problem of keeping the pay of the armed services in line with civilian wages.

Today’s tendency in the army’s thinking, as shown by the military salary, is to treat the soldier as a fully responsible citizen standing on his own feet, no more cosseted or protected than a man with a family would be in civilian life. He is still a member of a disciplined, orderly hierarchy, where his responsibility in his job is pretty closely defined. But, outside that job,
he is deliberately being encouraged to take more personal responsibility and initiative.

Another potent tendency that is at work is the movement away from long-service enlistments (i.e., of six or nine years) for initial recruits toward relatively short, three-year engagements. Those signing on for longer engagements get more pay. But, increasingly it is plain that more and more men want to try the army on for size before committing themselves to it for six or more years. It is usually reckoned within the British Army that three years is the shortest period in which it can expect to get enough service from a man to compensate for the time and money spent on training him.

The army must hope that a good proportion of these short-service recruits find that they like the life and, tempted by higher pay and possibly promotion, will re-enlist for longer periods. Britain has been offering three-year enlistments for only a couple of years, but its experience on re-enlistment has already been encouraging: at least 40 per cent of the three-year soldiers have prolonged their engagements already, usually to nine years.

But not even a medal is always bright on both sides. And what is discouraging in the British Army is the high rate of wastage which occurs either at the recruiting stage or in the first six months of training. Out of every 100 men who seriously apply to join the British Army, 47 join up, 30 are rejected on medical or other grounds and 23 per cent drop out. Later, in the initial six months of training, the army loses 20 per cent who have actually enlisted. More than half of these buy themselves out. Others are discharged on medical or other grounds, such as a previously undisclosed criminal record. Some wastage at this stage is inevitable and, in fact, the army has been reducing it, from 24 per cent through 22 per cent to just under 20 per cent. Even so, the last figure is still too high and the belief is that an acceptable rate of wastage at the recruit training stage would lie between 12 and 15 per cent.

One way of cutting wastage is to make sure that square pegs are fitted into square holes. More than 70 per cent of the
recruits to the British Army have no idea what branch of the service, let alone battalion or regiment, they want to join. The appeal of regimental tradition, once so important, is much exaggerated. So, in future, all recruits will go to a special induction centre to give them a small taste of army life while they are being tested and interviewed to see for what branch of the service they are best suited. At that centre, the recruit who is not happy about the job offered to him can still back out.

Such a centre needs, of course, the backing of a widespread net of recruiting offices and lavish advertising. In the last financial year, 1970-71, the army recruited just more than 16,000 adult other ranks and nearly 7,500 junior soldiers. To do so it spent about £13 million on advertising (with another £300,000 going on advertisements for officers) and about £4 million on keeping its recruiting establishments open and fully staffed (with another £1 million being spent on recruiting efforts for officers).

There are 222 recruiting establishments in the United Kingdom with its population of about 56 million. Of these, 55 are main offices, 72 out-stations and 95 information centres. The administrative, clerical and medical facilities are concentrated at the main offices, while the out-stations and information centres are largely concerned with following up direct or postal inquiries from would-be recruits. These 222 recruiting establishments are staffed by 96 officers, 700-odd NCOs and 200-odd clerks.

This may seem lavish when compared with the number of men who actually join up. But such a criticism misses the point. Such expenditures are unavoidable if the country is to be covered properly by recruiters, for when recruits are so short anyone who answers an advertisement must be interviewed. The essence of the matter is to cast the recruiting net wide and then concentrate resources and advertising appeals where they are most likely to be effective. British experience in this respect may be unique, but it is worth setting down as it may have a bearing in other countries.

The key factor, as was discussed earlier, is the size of the available manpower pool. But, proportionately, more recruits
in Britain come from the older urban industrial regions (such as the North of England and the Midlands) than from the country or modern suburban areas (Southern England, for example). This suggests that the desire to get away from a decaying, tatty environment is an important influence. This is linked with another factor. The correlation between recruiting and the rate of unemployment has been found to be small. There is a much closer one, however, with the degree of economic activity (as measured by such things as industrial production and the money supply). This suggests that fears about job security, career prospects and the size of future pay envelopes have a heavier influence on recruiting than unemployment itself. That is not so surprising as it may sound, for the army wants the untrained school leavers who, in normal circumstances, find it easier to get jobs than the more elderly who have been thrown out of work.

Hence, if service pay is seen to lag too noticeably behind civilian wages, recruiting suffers. But if it is reasonably comparable, then it has been found that the number of recruits is closely correlated to the sums spent on advertising. But first the pay has to be seen to be right.

It is often said in Britain that the best advertisements for the army are a contented soldier and second the sight of British soldiers in action. No one disputes the strength of the first comment. But the second needs a little probing: the real effect of combat on recruiting simply is to make men who would have joined anyway join up a little earlier. Combat, in other words, has only a temporary effect.

The result of all this is that today Britain's professional army is differently composed from its predecessors. In the past, many men who joined up regarded the army as their sole career and looked forward to a small pension at the end of it. This was not a marrying army. Today, it is. Moreover, there are now two streams of men joining up. The first, often coming from junior battalions, see the army as a career until they are about 40 and are willing to stay in for 22 years in order to get a pension. They form the corps of experienced NCOs and when they leave the army they have little or no difficulty in getting a
civilian job. The second stream is formed of a growing number of men who see the army as a first career only and want to leave it before they are 30, or even younger, without a pension. That, of course, is what a professional army wants, for the combat value of a rifleman falls rapidly once he is out of his twenties.

Three conclusions would seem to follow from this analysis: First, as has been said before but needs to be repeated endlessly to the politicians, pay must never be allowed to lag too far and too long behind wages in civilian life. Second, it has to be accepted that more and more men will join up initially for only short periods. Then it will be up to the army to provide them with a good enough life for them to re-enlist for longer periods. Here, British experience suggests that higher pay and promotion are a better inducement for re-engagement than the payment of bonuses. Third, if the army is to get recruits, it must be prepared to spend time and money in preparing them for a second career in civilian life. Where a man learns a trade in the army which he can use in his second career, such a provision for resettlement need not be lavish. But, where a man has no such trade (as soldiers in the combat arms have not), then the resettlement scheme will have to be more generous.

ANNUAL AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded the annual prize of $60 for the best original contribution published in the Army Journal during the year ended June 1972 to Major A. C. Newton for ‘The Australian Instructional Corps’.

The second prize of $20 has been awarded to Major T. H. Holland for ‘The Fallacy of Defence on the Cheap’.
WHEN we speak of an all-volunteer Army we are not addressing a critical point of the volunteer aspect. For the true meaning of volunteer, the door should swing both ways. If a man volunteers to join we should also let him volunteer to leave. Now, before envisioning an Army resigning en masse or people quitting at the first harsh word from the first sergeant, take a minute to consider my proposal.

Basically, the concept looks like this:

- A man enlists for three years. If he chooses a combat arm he may, subject to orders for permanent change of station or unit alert, resign or transfer to the ready reserves any time after completing basic and advanced individual training and upon notice of 30 days of intent to do so. If he has chosen a technical Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) he may resign or transfer in the same manner one full year after completing any school course of less than 20 weeks and 18 months after finishing any course of 20 weeks or longer.

- Incentives for completing an enlistment are a pay bonus at the end of the enlistment and veteran’s benefits. Failure to complete the entire enlistment rules out the bonus and benefits. By transferring to the ready reserves instead of resigning, he would earn the same benefits as if in regular status but in a ratio of one-third credit for time served.

From ARMY Magazine, July 1971. Copyright 1971 by Association of the U.S. Army and reproduced by permission. These views are from serving officers of the United States Army.
The size of the bonus is based upon a clearly delineated sliding scale point system with such variables as rank attained, awards, efficiency and conduct ratings, duty in combat arms and certain critical MOS, undesirable tours and the like on the positive side, and disciplinary actions on the negative side. The sum, if even half the proposed current pay boost, would approximate a thousand dollars a year.

Clearly, the path for the young man to follow is to go into combat arm, or critical MOS, take a hardship tour, work like a demon for the highest efficiency and conduct ratings, and strive for those positions that offer the most responsibility and accompanying opportunities for promotion. Some, of course, will follow a course of lesser resistance—with the resultant smaller bonus—in order to learn a trade, broaden previously acquired skills, or simply to have an easier time of it. In any event, the incentive is there to go all-out.

Is there a real incentive today to go all-out in a three-year tour? Bide your time; it all counts toward three years. What about re-enlistments? Wouldn’t this cause the great majority of first-term enlistees to take their bonus and run? Hopefully, yes. They’ve done their job, earned their pay and will leave the Army with their just reward. Rapid turnover in the lower grades will ensure a large, well-trained resource for the country in the event of national emergency. Those selected and electing to re-enlist will ensure high quality in the middle and advanced NCO grades.

Basically, this is an enlistment bonus paid after completing an enlistment, not before. It is essential to any incentive plan. Those who re-enlist under this plan are men who, after each three-year review, elect to 'go another'. The current method of working off a previously paid bonus for a commitment of three, four, five or six years is 180 degrees out from any reward-for-performance incentive plan. Superbowl salaries are guaranteed before the game but paid afterward, the sum depending on performance!
Predictably, when this proposal comes up during a discussion, the conversation leads immediately not to who would stay in, not to the kind of man this would attract, but rather to those who would get out. Of course, some will get out; the real question is who, how many, and what impact this would have on the Army. There are examples:

- **The non-adjuster:** This is the man who hates the very essence of military life, the man who, after joining for whatever his reason, is unable to identify, is inflexible to change and unable to adjust to the rigours of military life. He wants out on the first day he becomes eligible. After advanced individual training (AIT) we let him go. It's as simple as that. We have given basic and AIT to one civilian.

- **The opportunist:** This young man, under fleeting dissatisfaction with home life, a distraught girl friend, or under the proverbial warning of the local judge, has made a spur-of-the-moment decision to join up (to escape). After basic, AIT, and four months in a unit he learns that things at home have cooled. He'd like to go back home. We let him go. Has the country really lost on this exchange?

- **The drifter:** He isn't really dissatisfied — or satisfied. He doesn't really have anything against the Army; he is just hankerin' to move on. He might resign with only six months to do, but he wants to get out and we let him. What has the Army lost?

- **The good man at the short end of an SOB:** He's had his highest bonus benefits clipped by company punishment or by a missed opportunity for promotion, or both. He's harassed and discouraged; he wants out. The Army has lost and it is probably our fault, but unfortunately there will always be a few.

And so on to the endless individual cases: the dropout, the copout, the opportunist, and all the rest. The point is that this is no different from any large personnel turnover picture.
military or civilian. And, when you really think about it, the aspect of danger has very little to do with personnel turnover.

To some, the idea may still be inconceivable. How the hell can you maintain an army when a man can quit when he wants to? How? How can we maintain a police force when a man can turn in his badge when someone shoots at him? How can you get a man to work in the dangerous depths of a coal mine? How can a business survive when a man can quit when he becomes dissatisfied with the job, his boss, or the weather? The fact is, most people don't quit and the relatively few who do, do so more often because of reasons unrelated to the job itself.

What really makes any man take and keep a tough or dirty job? Industrial psychologists incessantly study the causal factors of fluctuating production quotas, schedules of reinforcement and motivational factors, but one point is seldom addressed: How important is the right to quit? Seldom exercised by the individual, it nevertheless is always there as an option. It is fundamental to any voluntary endeavour.

The military service offers as much as, and in many ways more than, industry can in advancement, security, fringe benefits, and the like. We are now dealing with petty harassment, raising pay, stabilizing tours and a number of other measures designed to make service life more attractive. We are on the right track, but that one element inherent in all civilian endeavours is conspicuously missing in service life: the option to quit — honourably.

The voluntary in-and-out is no revolutionary concept. The Japanese Ground Self-Defence Force's system provides a relatively lucrative bonus for completing an enlistment. In our Army, a soldier has always been able to terminate (quit) his airborne status. Voluntary terminations are relatively rare, even though there is no bonus at the end of the tour.

I have proposed two things: the option of resigning or transferring to the active reserves, and the offer of a variable incentive based on performance and MOS attractiveness at the end of the tour, not before. Under such a plan our recruiting
gates may not be besieged by volunteers, but military service might become infinitely more attractive to the top-quality man we need.

Finally, consider for a minute the impact on AWOLs and deserters, court-martial rates and stockade population, and conversely on pride in service if we could say, ‘Shape up or ship out.’

In a short article it is impossible to anticipate all the ramifications of such a system. However, Stewart Alsop in Newsweek, 29 March 1971, had a point: ‘The real question about a volunteer Army is whether it would have the combat power to fight its way into or out of a (choose one) paper bag, a girls’ school, or a nunnery.’

Under the current trend toward avoiding the draft, and the approach to noncombat MOS incentive, I would rather not exercise that option.

Major Michael D. Mahler

Talk of a volunteer army sounds strange to this old volunteer. After 12 years of voluntary service, I wonder why I did it and why anybody would do it today. I started out back there in the ‘silent generation’ with that portion of the USMA class of 1958 who chose a military career before any of us had even heard about a ‘military-industrial complex’. We started out thinking we were doing something worthwhile by joining the professional military, but today, when most of us are in what the business world calls the middle-management positions, ‘the Establishment’ has just about convinced us that we have been on the wrong track.

Let me go back and trace how I, at least, became aware that being a volunteer professional soldier is not the best of all possible worlds. Back there in the silent 1950s, the only difference between those who looked forward to careers in the military and those who looked forward to careers in other fields was that we were a little more aware of our country’s foreign commitments. I remember coming away from a very pleasant weekend with my fiancée at her Ivy League girls’ college thinking...
that the people with whom I had enjoyed myself were a lot less
interested than I was in the events that were taking place around
the world. Indeed, they were as unaware of those events as I
was of the best party fraternity at Dartmouth or the best house
at Smith. In retrospect, I wonder if I wouldn't have been better
off concentrating on those more normal areas of interest.

In any event, my interest in world affairs did not stem from
any early maturity or wisdom. The interest of us would-be
volunteers stemmed from something very personal and very
understandable: if the tossings and turnings of the world led to
U.S. military commitment, we would be the ones to handle it.
We clearly remembered the guys, only a few years older than
ourselves, who had gone off to fight in Korea; we were well
aware that next time it would be our turn. So naturally we
were interested in any signs that indicated that our turn might
be approaching.

Soon after we were commissioned, and while most of us
were still attending basic courses at service schools that would
train us in our particular specialties, the United States did
become involved. A shaky government in Lebanon requested
U.S. assistance, and our country's civilian heads called upon our
military services.

Fortunately, the mere presence of U.S. forces was enough
to do the job, and no fighting took place. The event, however,
provided us newly commissioned officers with our first intimation
that the Establishment might not worry too much about its
volunteers when it did its planning. At the time, the Establish-
ment was talking about 'massive retaliation', the emphasis being
on nuclear weapons.

As a result, a large part of the artillery support organic
to the forces that landed in Lebanon was of the nuclear kind.
Because the Establishment rightfully did not want even a hint
of nuclear warfare to touch the Lebanon action, the nuclear-
capable fire support was never landed, and the forces ashore
never did have anywhere near the artillery support the service
schools were teaching us we could count on. When you are the
guy who is going to be leading a platoon, you don't think about
everything having worked out all right in Lebanon. You think about how you would handle your platoon in that situation if it came to fighting and you didn't have the artillery support you were supposed to have. If there is a possibility that nuclear weapons will not be used, you wonder why somebody somewhere didn't think to provide conventional artillery support to replace the nuclear in just such a contingency. But we were young then, and newly married, and we shrugged off the matter in favour of more pleasant things. Later, I was to realize that Lebanon had provided my first glimpse of what it means to be a volunteer in the service of a nation that has traditionally refused to spend more than the sparsest sums in support of its volunteers, but one that has never hesitated to commit them, properly supported or not, if it appears politically expedient to do so.

The class of 1958 split up after that first year and was scattered over the world as the newest junior officers in our various services. Eventually I made my way to Europe and into the field army that at the time the Establishment was fond of calling the 'shield of democracy'. Though we were only training, the training was realistic and the motivation provided by the East Germany-Czechoslovakia border was high. It all seemed important at the time, what with the frequent practice and updating of plans and the frequent border incidents.

But apparently our activities weren't all that important, because the Establishment soon made it clear that we could get along on less. The balance of payments was off and the Army overseas seemed like a good place to even it off. Suddenly, wives and children could not join their husbands in Europe and, suddenly, we who were already there were told to curtail our spending on the German economy. We were asked to buy American wines shipped over from the United States instead of the less expensive local brands; we were asked to shop exclusively in the Army commissary instead of buying the inexpensive and interesting local produce; and we were asked not to purchase economical foreign cars—the Army warned that they would not be shipped home if we did. As I remember, we
even had a scheme of signing pledges not to spend money on the local economy.

We resented all this bitterly. We weren't being paid so very much and we were working hours that were an awful lot longer than those of our civilian friends, so we thought it was unfair for us to have to make a further sacrifice. It seemed to us that our government was taking the course of least resistance, and we resented being sacrificed to that expediency. We resented it even more when an American car manufacturer invested a sum of money in the British automobile industry that probably equalled a hundred times what our government was saving by trying to restrict our spending.

Far more than the money aspect, we resented the enforced separation from family that resulted when our government sharply curtailed the movement of our wives and children to Europe. When we signed on, we had accepted the prospect of being separated from families at times, but it seemed unfair to lengthen the unavoidable separations through restrictions based purely on economics. When you are training away from your family for five or six months a year in the cold, damp fields of Germany to begin with, it is hard to understand an action that will result in still further disruption of a normal home life. Then, too, even the training was becoming frustrating as the cuts in funds for gasoline and spare parts almost ended the movement of vehicles. We were having our first taste of being unwanted volunteers.

Then the Administration changed and the world situation changed and the Army was important once again. The Berlin crisis was the reason. There was a sudden movement of long overdue equipment to Europe and a gushing flow of urgently needed troops to units that had become woefully undermanned in the waning days of the previous administration. Some of the men returning to Europe had just gone back to the United States after a strenuous three-year tour, one half of which had been spent training away from their home and families. Now, because of the emergency, they were coming back without their families.

For those of us still in Europe, it was a time of scary
urgency. War plans were reviewed with renewed interest and all leaves and passes cancelled; company commanders had to be within reach of their telephones at all times; concern for real ammunition requirements replaced concern for ammunition records; and the procedures for evacuating wives and children seemed very important indeed.

But the crisis passed without serious incident and, aside from the continuing family separations resulting from sudden troop movements, it was over. As with the Lebanon crisis, however, the situation had left some questions. It seemed that though our value as volunteers varied with the world situation, we might well be expendable in peacetime as well as in wartime. That realization left a slightly bitter taste in our mouths as the volunteers from the class of 1958 began to gather back in the United States for our intermediate level service schooling. We had had the training and experience that would save lives in the late 1960s in another part of the world, but we had also become conscious of our growing families; and we wondered whether they weren’t being asked to bear too much of the sacrifice for the sake of government expediency.

The particular year that I attended my intermediate level Army schooling was the time of the Cuban missile crisis. I remember the tension as members of the school’s faculty quietly slipped away to form the planning headquarters for the tactical operations that, fortunately, never took place. I remember the combination of pride and concern that was evoked by President John F. Kennedy’s television address. The pride stemmed from the dynamic decisiveness of his actions; the concern stemmed from knowing that if the opposition did not back down, we would be the company commanders who would have to carry out the national objective.

That kind of concern grows in you as you remain in service and become more familiar with the realities of your chosen profession. It is not a debilitating concern, but it does erase in most the early thoughts of glory. It grows as you become intimate with the awesome power of high explosives and the ponderously impersonal ability of big machines to kill casually. It grows as you lose your youthful belief in your own
immortality and become aware that family responsibilities cannot be passed off lightly. But we, who had not yet earned any battle decorations, still did not understand the full potential of our concern.

For the time being, it was another crisis that passed without ground combat. As with the previous crises, however, this one also left some questions. The people filtering back from the disbanded emergency planning headquarters brought some worrisome stories about insufficient boat transport and insufficient expertise for amphibious operations on the scale that had been contemplated. It seemed that the Establishment, having decided that nuclear weapons had eliminated the possibility of major amphibious operations, had decided to economize by not procuring the equipment or training the troops on the scale that would have been required. Neither deficiency, however, had prevented the Establishment from offering to commit us. Circumstances made the offer a national necessity, but it seemed that somebody might have foreseen the possibility while they were eliminating ‘unnecessary’ expenses. And so again we pondered how it would have gone had our companies really been committed. The musing did nothing to allay our uneasiness with the Establishment.

When I went from Army schooling to civilian schooling I found that the differences in outlook between me and civilian graduate students had not changed since my undergraduate days. They were not in the least militant in 1963, but they were blissfully aware of the military, and generally uninterested in world affairs. I was an enigma to them and they never tired of asking why an Army officer should be attending graduate school. But the attitude was one of indifference rather than the resentment of more recent years. The occasional anti-war attitudes that crept into the lectures I attended had a purely intellectual base, and nobody even commented when we officer students chose to wear our uniforms during the national mourning for President Kennedy and General Douglas MacArthur.

Meanwhile, our commitment in Vietnam was expanding. I watched the growing number of classmates who were ordered to Vietnam, and for the first time experienced the loss of friends
in combat. Still, nobody discussed Vietnam very much. My fellow graduate students weren't concerned with the troubles of that faraway country. There was a light flurry of interest when the local veterans' post withdrew scholarship support from a student who had been busily collecting medical supplies for the North Vietnamese, but that was all.

Then came the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the resolution that followed it. These events caught the interest of my fellow students for the same reason that I had been interested in world affairs as an undergraduate: it was personal. Quite frequently we talked about the situation before class, and the most common objective voiced against the government's actions was that they might lead to men being killed. I pointed out that there were men being killed already. Yes, they admitted, but those men were volunteers in the Regular Army—and that was different. That this attitude was not a new one did nothing to lessen my bitterness at my first personal contact with it. It seemed that these intelligent graduate students were unable to link themselves with those 'volunteers' who were being killed in South-East Asia. That place was in another world, an alien world, which was no concern of their intellectual community. It might be part of the real world, but they could not identify with it nor with the 'volunteers' involved.

I spent the next three years teaching English at West Point while my contemporaries who were not engaged in some specialty made their way to Vietnam in ever-growing numbers. We, who remained behind, talked incessantly about the situation in Vietnam and questioned endlessly the people who had been there; we buried the men who were sent home. More and more frequently, the flag overlooking Hudson River was at half-staff, and more and more frequently we were asked to be members of a guard of honour for some departed friend.

Yet the Establishment still showed very little interest in our activities in South-East Asia. Toward the end of my stay at West Point, opposition to the war had admittedly grown, but as late as the second year of my tour, I can remember civilian guests at football games being amazed and appalled at the casual conversation that passed between the members of the garrison
about this friend or that friend who was going over or coming back or had been wounded. These guests still hadn’t connected our ‘involvement’ with people going to war and being maimed or killed. That realization would come later, and with it an unreasoning resentment against the volunteers who had so long suffered their deaths and woundings in silence: the members of the professional military.

The volunteers from the class of 1958, and from many other classes, are veterans now. A handful of our contemporaries are about to go on their first tour in Vietnam, but most of us have been there once and many have been there two or three times. Though there are still some volunteers for Vietnam — there always will be — most of us just grit our teeth when our turn comes again.

We have our ribbons and our decorations now, but the concern during the pre-Vietnam years for the potential cost of combat has been traded for the hard knowledge of what those decorations cost in terms of separation from family, closeness to death, fatigue, and the awesome responsibility of trying to preserve the lives of your men. Some of our number have been found wanting and some have been heroes for a day in the newspapers, but most of us did only what we had been trained to do in the best way we knew how and breathed a huge sigh of relief when we climbed aboard the plane that would take us back to families and a world where there are lights at night and you don’t have to jump at every loud, unexpected noise.

We came back to a world that had changed our place in society. In the 12 years since we had first volunteered, we have gone from the ‘shield of democracy’ to ‘lifers’. We are now told that as a group we are responsible for a conflict that the Establishment directed us to participate in long before the current dissenters even knew there was a Vietnam; that as a group we are responsible for depriving the poor and the sick of federal funds; and that as a group we are responsible for the whole series of alleged atrocities in Vietnam.

Ironically, when we were merely cold and uncomfortable while doing our jobs in Europe and elsewhere, the Establishment
respected us. Now, when the very real prospect of death has been added to the job description, the Establishment demeans us as unmoral and unbelievably culpable. Our fidelity to our oath and to our apolitical tradition is characterized as the mindless obedience to orders that is associated with totalitarian armies. And through it all, no high-ranking representative of the Establishment has stepped forward to refute these allegations; no elected spokesman of the Establishment has pointed out that the Establishment itself, not only its military arm, must bear the responsibility. Certainly there has been the usual scattering of 'gallant men' in various speeches, but there has been no concerted attempt to make clear that in our country only the elected government enters and conducts a war in the name of the Establishment. Instead, the military, which according to the Constitution must fight the conflicts that the Establishment directs it to, has been held up as the arch villain in our commitment in Vietnam.

The volunteer professional military once again has been sacrificed to expediency. In this instance, the expediency is the diversion of emotional and very vocal criticism from the Establishment to the instrument that must execute its policies. And as if being used as a scapegoat weren't enough in itself to make us volunteers question the sanity of our chosen way, we learn that we are to face some lean years as the Establishment tries to prove its newly found good intentions by cutting military spending. To us volunteers, these cutbacks simply evoke once again the spectre of our inadequately supported battalions committed to combat in some future conflict that the temporarily popular economy-minded planners have not foreseen, but cannot avoid.

We volunteers from the class of 1958 know war far more vividly than the dissenters do from their visions and far more clearly than the Establishment does from its memories. We know war in terms of disengaging a four-year-old daughter's arm from our neck as we board a plane headed west; in terms of packing up the belongings of a friend of ten years for shipment to his widow and four children; in terms of unloading from a helicopter the bodies of the 19-year-olds we couldn't save; and
in terms of a wife who has spent a year with moments of unexplained terror because it seemed that we wouldn't come back.

We know, too, that war makes neither heroes nor villains; it merely builds the stage on which latent human impulses work themselves out. So, we volunteers from the class of 1958 know the risks of our profession and the reality of war.

What we don't know is how much longer we will be willing to voluntarily face the risks and the sacrifices in behalf of an Establishment that has used us badly in the past when it was expedient to do so in domestic or international affairs. We wonder who, in this age of dissent, is going to volunteer to join our ranks or take our places in a volunteer army when we, ourselves, no longer think in terms of a 30-year career.

We still aspire to those goals our civilian classmates of 1958 are well on their way to achieving: a respected place in the community, appreciation for a job well done, and the implicit understanding that our work contributes in some small measure to the world we all live in. Once we thought that our chosen profession held out those goals to us and that only the most naive and most idealistic would deny the place of the volunteer professional military in an imperfect world that insists on waging war against all reason. But despite 12 years of tension and concern, bitterness and discomfort, family separation and sacrifice, we seem to be very far from those goals. Until the Establishment makes those goals possible for us, the idea of a volunteer army just doesn't sound very rational to us old volunteers from the silent generation. Somehow we don't think there are very many around today who are as innocent of the ways of the Establishment as we were.

Captain William J. Shugrue

Captain Killebrew's article, 'Volunteer Army: How It Looks to a Company Commander' [Army, March], brought to mind many familiar problems and views. During 12 months as commander of a 220-man headquarters company of a tank battalion in Germany, I encountered many of the personnel problems that a company commander will experience in peace-
Although I sympathize with Captain Killebrew, I find it hard to agree with all of his proposals.

As I see it, we face the problems of instituting a volunteer army in an 'immediately if not sooner' atmosphere. This has brought a rash of plans to be instituted Army-wide without the benefit of tests to see if these changes will produce the result desired: an increase in high-quality re-enlistments. Keeping in mind the fact that now is when the Army must strive to become a volunteer force and there is no time for research and development, let us attack the problem where it lies—in company-size units.

The main reason why good men do not re-enlist is poor personnel management in the unit on the part of disinterested or inexperienced leaders. Those most likely to influence the young soldier and help him decide to stay in the Army are the closest links in his chain of command: squad leader, platoon sergeant, platoon leader, and finally his company commander. These are the professionals the young soldier observes every day. He watches these leaders and bases his opinion of the Army on their attitude, performance and standards. With this in mind, it is imperative that the Army strive to pick only the best to serve as small-unit leaders. Having gone through a period of five to 10 years when it had to settle for less because of the demands of combat, the Army must now strive to clean house of its substandard leaders.

The Army must spot the young leader early in his service and groom him for duties as a leader, be it as a non-commissioned officer or officer. Graduation from an NCO academy should be mandatory before pinning on sergeant stripes. Personnel management should be heavily stressed in all NCO and officer courses.

Captain Killebrew points out that many soldiers are unaware of many benefits of the service such as CHAMPUS (the plan which pays part of civilian-hospital charges, even for retired people), the GI Bill, and others. How true! But the real trouble is that many junior leaders know as little about these things as their men. I can recall many command informa-
tion classes on these subjects where platoon sergeants with 15 years of service have asked questions that they should have been able to answer themselves.

Young NCOs and platoon leaders must be taught how to correct personnel problems quickly and what means are available to help their men. Formal refresher courses for small-unit leaders should be held at division which teach these leaders what tools are available to help solve their men's problems. Meanwhile, all leaders should be encouraged to read service-related material to improve their knowledge of their jobs.

The next major step to retain the quality soldier is to instil in him pride in his profession. I agree with Captain Killebrew that good men are leaving the Army because they find neither tradition nor pride in their work. The main fault here is that a good man can spend two years in a combat MOS and never attain the degree of efficiency or confidence in himself to enable him to 'hold his own' in combat. Why must a third of his service be spent on details such as guard, kitchen police, courtesy patrol, and the like? These duties serve no useful purpose except to show that the soldier is disciplined and will do menial tasks because he is told to. Release him from these drudging details. Expand his training so that he knows he can 'put the steel on the target' and you will realize a unit with pride and one that can fight.

My next proposal ties in with the last one. Once you have put the soldier in training, give him the proper equipment to train with. You can't expect to realize much training when you give the soldier a piece of equipment that is probably as old or older than he is. He is going to spend another third of his training time keeping his equipment in shape. Three days of knuckle-busting maintenance in order to be able to train for a day or so is not going to engender a favourable view of the Army. The soldier will probably doubt that his unit could even get out the gate much less reach the battlefield and fight. The soldier must have confidence in his gear before he can develop confidence in his ability to use that equipment to fight successfully. Once he has that confidence he will develop pride in himself, his unit, and the Army.
In my opinion, pride in one's self is the key to convincing the soldier to stay in the Army. If he feels that his superiors neither respect him as a person nor appreciate his efforts he will not stay.

I disagree with Captain Killebrew on an income-tax discount or exemption. Any man who thinks he will get rich in the Army is either grossly misinformed or a fool. The Army has taken steps to raise the pay of the lower enlisted grades and this, in my opinion, is what is needed. Any additional hidden benefit such as a tax exemption would only add to the 'unknown' benefits of the service we mentioned earlier. The soldier wants to see those extra greenbacks monthly, not just once a year. Even with the higher pay the good soldier will stay only if he is convinced he is going to be respected for his choice of profession.

During 18 months in Germany I had a chance to observe types, colours and designs of uniforms of various European armies. Although naturally my judgment is biased by service and national pride, I think we have one of the sharpest and most military uniforms among all I have seen. Our uniform is functional and comfortable: What more could be asked? I have observed, though, that there is a direct relation between a sharp, starched uniform and a soldier with that all-important pride. As a member of a battalion that stresses high standards in personal appearance, I have observed our troops taking a sense of pride in doing everything better than other outfits, including out-dressing them.

Even were we plagued with a shoddy uniform, the cost to the soldier would hardly help his financial condition. Every time there is a change in uniform the GI must shell out of his own pocket.

I firmly believe that our system of military justice needs no revision. However, the education of small-unit leaders in the system must be improved. Once a company commander has been properly educated on courts-martial, Article 15 punishment and bars to re-enlistment, there seems to be no need to revise the manual. The paper load is heavy and might require a clerk
for every 75 men or so assigned to a unit, but once the company commander learns to quickly spot a potential bad apple, he should be able to push the necessary paperwork quickly enough to avoid one man tying up all of his time.

So far as a bad actor influencing other young troops, it is sometimes forgotten that this soldier remains subject to UCMJ until he is discharged. Too many commanders give up using courts-martial and Article 15 authority. Correctional custody is valuable for eliminating the poor soldier who is 'contaminating' your good ones, but this takes no more than a battalion commander's action.

I have learned that Article 15 authority is enough for handling most company problems. Sound leadership and fair use of non-judicial punishment will keep a good unit from developing the idea that the goof-offs are 'getting over'. The more serious cases require that the most experienced commander decide the punishment: thus the battalion commander's use of Article 15.

As for physical punishment, I think a five-hour forced march will leave just as bitter a taste in the soldier's mouth as extra duty for 14 days. Article 15 allows a good way to let a soldier know he is going to be treated with respect as a person and with justice. He can ask the JAG to help if he feels the accusation is unjust or if he is unaware of the consequences. Article 15 forces the commander to think seriously about the offence and to investigate it within his own unit. He may become more certain that the soldier should be punished or he may find that the transgression resulted from poor personnel management on his part or on the part of a junior leader.

The problems that go with establishing an all-volunteer Army are enormous. The cost is already staggering. The attempts to attain an all-volunteer Army can only help our profession. We are finally taking a hard look at how we handle our soldiers. While we in the company-size units await the results of the expenditures on desks, lamps, rugs, and other comforts, we can rise off our duffs and improve our profession by educating ourselves as well as our junior officers and NCOs.
ARMOURED FORCES, by Richard M. Ogorkiewicz. (Arms and Armour Press).

Reviewed by Major B. R. Sullivan, a candidate at the Australian Staff College, Queenscliff in 1971. The other reviews are by fellow officers attending the Staff College during the year.

As a weapon of war the tank has had a comparatively short history, highlighted by controversy over employment, design and effect on tactics and strategy. In Armoured Forces Richard M. Ogorkiewicz presents a concise account of the development of tanks in countries around the world and examines tank employment by the major armies. This 'updates' his earlier book Armour.

The author deals with his subject in four parts: a broad survey; organizations and methods of major European and American formations; tank development by various countries, each in chronological order; and, problems associated with tank construction and other armoured equipments. An interesting history of mobile warfare from the time of the Sumerians to Leonardo Da Vinci is included as an Appendix.

Ogorkiewicz shows how the logical evolution of the tank was checked at times by military conservatism and his interplay of theory and practice provides glimpses of strengths and weaknesses of the great protagonists of armoured warfare — Fuller, Guderian, Liddell Hart and Christie.
His examination of tank/infantry ratios and employment highlights the derogatory effects of World War I traditional military thinking in Britain, France and America up to and even after the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. Imaginative employment and sound understanding of tank/infantry relationships contributed much to early German successes against superior Allied tank strengths which Ogorkiewicz believes was sapped by lack of understanding of mobile warfare, and fragmented employment of tanks.

A lecturer at the Imperial College of Science in London and an internationally recognized exponent of armoured warfare, Ogorkiewicz writes in simple terms, yet provides a wealth of detail. Australian readers may be offended by the omission of the Australian cruiser tank, but the author writes primarily for students of European warfare.

It is a pity that in updating Armour (which was printed in 1960) Ogorkiewicz has only rewritten the introduction and provided some new photographs of modern tanks. Armoured Forces would have greater impact if the information on Leopard, Chieftain, MBT 70 and the Swedish S tanks contained in the introduction was included in the relative chapters in Part Three; and more modern information on diesel engine development and application, if included in the body of the book, would possibly preclude the statement on page 356 that ‘there are good prospects that the reciprocating spark ignition engine will maintain its position in the tank field for some time’.

In the chapter on tank armament, omission of High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) ammunition is somewhat surprising, and a chapter on special armoured equipments such as bridge layers, ARCs, tank dozers and flails would be of benefit, particularly in the light of American problems on the Normandy beaches when such equipments were not used.

These criticisms aside, this book is strongly recommended to those Army officers who are interested in the history and development of mobile warfare.

Reviewed by Major M. C. Webster

The United Nations Organization has many roles, but it is perhaps in the role of peacekeeper that it has achieved its greatest successes. The UN force in the Middle East maintained peace for eleven years and it was only after it left that hostilities flared up again. In the Congo the UN by its presence contained the conflict from spreading throughout the African continent. But it is in Cyprus that the UN has probably achieved its greatest peacekeeping success and it is about this achievement that The Impartial Soldier was written.

The author, Brigadier Michael Harbottle, served as Chief of Staff of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) from June 1966 to August 1968. He had served before in Cyprus in 1950 and during the EOKA emergency in 1956-59 and is therefore well qualified to write on both Cyprus and the UN forces stationed there. He is a firm believer in the UN and his enthusiasm with the task given to UNFICYP is obvious throughout the book.

Brigadier Harbottle does not attempt to delve too deeply into the political situation that created the need for UNFICYP, but deals mainly with the concept of peacekeeping and the lessons to be drawn from it. He lays out quite clearly the organization and deployment of the force and describes, in some detail, a number of important actions in which the force was involved.

With a philosophy that a peacekeeper's primary task must be to negotiate a settled and peaceful solution, Brigadier Harbottle deals at length with the importance of the right training and the attitude of the members of the force. He points out that professional soldiers are not used to turning their 'swords into ploughshares', nor are they particularly enthusiastic about doing so; it is so foreign to their training and their purpose in joining the army. In his chapter on UNFICYP and the United Kingdom, the author is very critical of the lack of teaching of the international peacekeeping role by the British Army. He
reports that the subject is briefly touched on at the various staff colleges and no detailed study of the problems of military peacekeeping has been made. Canada and Sweden, however, are praised by him for the studies they conduct, in great detail, on every aspect of the peacekeeping role.

The dominant theme running throughout the book is one of co-operation between the multi-national force of soldiers and civilians. They include Canadians, Swedes, Finns, British, Danes, Austrians and Australians. Brigadier Harbottle expresses great enthusiasm for the way that so many nations, often with opposite extremes of outlook and ideology, can work together in harmony in an international force dedicated to maintaining peace between states and communities.

The brigadier has tackled the subject well. His book is written in a down to earth no-nonsense style to be expected of a professional soldier. He manages to impart to the reader the feeling that service with a UN peacekeeping force can present enormous job satisfaction. He certainly leaves the Australian reader with the thought that here could be a role for Australia to play, post-Vietnam, as a worthwhile contribution to world peace. The book makes enjoyable reading and is recommended to the service reader for general interest. It would, no doubt, make an excellent reference book for the reader contemplating service with the UN.

One quote from the book is considered pertinent. In his summing up, Brigadier Harbottle quotes Dr Ralph Bunche (a UN Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs) as once saying: 'If we in the UN could be as successful at peacemaking as we are at peacekeeping, our problems would be greatly reduced.'


Reviewed by Major M. T. Weaver

This book reveals intimately and in some detail the character of Field Marshal Montgomery from the time of his appointment to command the land forces in the Normandy landing, and
subsequently as commander of the 21st Army Group under the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, up to his final triumph, when at Luneberg Heath on 5 May 1945 he accepted the unconditional surrender of large German forces. The author apparently intended to dispel the controversy about Montgomery's military ability and relative worth as a general.

The author writes from intimate knowledge gained through close personal association with the Field Marshal during the period and from detailed study of all available documents concerning Allied operations in France and Germany. He insists that Montgomery should be judged solely on his military merit and sets out a reasonably unbiased argument. While he claims that Montgomery was a great general he readily acknowledges the faults and errors of manner and action which caused such friction with the US command and promoted controversy. In each case the US view is appreciated and clearly stated.

Initially the book lacks chronological continuity due to the author's tendency to regress for the purpose of illustrating connections and similarities between highlights in the Field Marshal's career. The effect on the reader, except one completely familiar with Monty's campaigns, would be confusion. The absence of maps in the early chapters contributes to the confusion and reduces the impact of the work. However, after the early confusion the treatment follows a clear understandable pattern.

The author explains briefly the events leading to Monty being acclaimed by the British people as their champion. He is shown as a highly professional soldier whose sole aim was to win the war quickly with the means at hand. Unlike his American counterparts he paid little heed to public opinion. Nor did he indulge in self-aggrandizement or international gamesmanship. His tactics frequently involved British forces taking unglamorous but vital roles to permit the Allies flexibility and success in other directions. This tactic was misunderstood by his own country and his allies. Montgomery did not understand this and persisted to the end in thinking that his allies were similarly motivated and sufficiently disinterested to understand his purely military motives.
Much of Monty’s unpopularity is attributed to misinformed editorial speculation which swayed public opinion so much that field commanders, who should have known better, were adversely influenced. The author is adamant that much of the criticism levelled at Monty might have been avoided and the war brought to a more speedy conclusion had Eisenhower taken a more firm grip of operations instead of mediating between two army commanders who held opposing views.

This book has several valuable lessons. Perhaps the first is the complex nature of combined operations. The incidents related highlight the great need for mutual understanding and respect between allies and the importance of aligned objectives. Another lesson involves public opinion. The demonstrated ability of misinformed public opinion to dictate tactics, to alienate allies and finally bring an army to the verge of destruction should shock the military reader and convince him that at this level operations cannot be divorced from public opinion.

Considerable emphasis is placed on morale of the fighting forces. During the pursuit the troops were exalted and advanced almost beyond endurance. At other times morale was low and gains were made slowly. Comparison is made between the gains made by the US forces through free rein and audacity and the missed opportunities and lowering of morale in the British forces imposed by Monty’s tight rein. The lesson would appear to lie in the importance of a commander being able to assess morale in terms of how much his troops can be expected to achieve.

The book is excellently written and should prove interesting reading to anyone. The military reader who aspires to command at any level must find it extremely rewarding.


Reviewed by Major T. H. Holland

CORRELLI Barnett is an historian with a talent for writing which earned him the 1964 Screen Writer’s Guild Award for his scripts in the BBC television ‘Great War’ series. In his book, Britain and Her Army, he has shown such a pleasing style, and
such a depth of knowledge, that he must surely become 'every-
mans' military historian.

_Britain and Her Army_ takes the reader on an historical
march with the British Army from 1509, in the time of Henry
VIII, to the present nuclear age. While on this long and exciting
march, Mr Barnett provides succinct pictures of the major
battles. He provides not only the tactical highlights of the
battles, but also, when applicable, the subsequent strategic
results.

Correlli Barnett shows how by the end of the 16th century
the immunity from invasion conferred by the English Channel
had established a pattern of military amateurism and of peace-
time military neglect followed by hasty wartime improvisation.
By his tracing of the various schools of thought on Britain's
place in grand strategy, Mr Barnett has clearly indicated the
impact the widely held, and often misplaced, belief in Britain's
seapower has had on her preparations for war. He has clearly
shown how far this belief has led the English to under-rate their
army's importance.

_Britain and Her Army_ presents a felicitous picture of the
British Army with pithy comments on such aspects of the
service as recruiting, higher administration, pay, the social
origins of the officers and the men, supply and equipment: The
reader is treated to fresh and personal introductions to such
military leaders as Cromwell, Marlborough, Wellington and
Wolseley, as well as the politicians of their times. As the saga
unfolds, one can clearly see forming the embryo of the army
which was to be born in India and Africa, and reach maturity
in the early 20th century. Were it not for the careful mainten-
ance of this historical perspective, such a long book may well
have become tedious to read.

As an epilogue, the army's part in the post-1945 retreat
from Empire is noted, and its new European role placed in the
broad context of British strategic history.

A pleasing feature of the book is Correlli Barnett's ability
to clearly illustrate military and political blunders which
occurred over the years. Unlike many authors, who tend to be
partisan in their views, he places the blame squarely on the shoulders of soldier or politician—whoever is deserving.

The book would be a good primer for the study of military history. Tracing as it does, the tactical, administrative and social progress of the British Army, it forms a sound base for a more detailed study of any period from 1509 to today. The comparisons made with continental armies—and their commanders—of the various times, gives the work a depth and a perspective which is of great value.

Where desirable, Mr Barnett has referenced his text. This has been done in a manner which does not interrupt the flow of reading, yet provides the scholarly reader with a quick reference.

The excellent index provides quick access to facts in the book and adds value to the work as a book of reference. It is well provided with easy-to-read maps of battles, illustrations (dating from 1575), and photographs. All of these add to its excellent entertainment, as well as instructive value.

*Britain and Her Army* is a work which can be read and re-read with profit. It may be read fruitfully in part, or it may be used as a reference book. It provides a bibliography of engaging titles. *Britain and Her Army* is a worthwhile book, not only for the keen student of military history, but also for the interested dabbler.


Reviewed by Major C. J. Akeroyd

**JOB** evaluation is a management technique for comparing reliably and systematically the value of one job in relation to others. For example, have you ever wondered how the hygiene dutyman's job can be compared in terms of wages with a fitter and turner's job? Are the unpleasant duties of the hygiene dutyman worth as much as the skills of the fitter and turner? Questions such as these can be examined using job evaluation techniques described in this book.

Written by a panel of experts for the British Institute of
Management, the book has been designed to meet a growing interest in the subject. Raw material, not covered in an earlier publication from the institute, is included.

The introduction, aimed at senior management, lists the symptoms of the need for job evaluation and the benefits to be obtained from its use. Brief descriptions of five common methods of job evaluation follow. These are: Ranking, Grading, Factor Comparison, Points Rating and Profiling. The first two methods do not quantify job differences. The other three, by further detailed analysis do evaluate the differences mathematically. All methods build up the basis for a pay structure which reflects different levels of job demands in any organization. The authors also chronologically trace the stages in developing a job evaluated wage structure for an organization. They conclude with some advice on use of consultants and co-operation with trade unions.

Many practical problems are used as examples in the text and often points are amplified by reference to diagrams and tables. Inclusion of a glossary ensures that technical terms are well understood. These terms are used widely but they do not spoil the clear and direct style of the authors. Extensive use is made of sub-headings and paragraph headings. These guide the reader from principles down to more detailed considerations. The omission of an index from a book of this nature is, however, to be deplored.

Job evaluation is a large subject. In this book it receives an introductory treatment only. One wonders why the relationship between job analysis and job evaluation is not established. Disregard for this point tends to make the book parochial. Despite these criticisms sufficient background is included to ensure that the philosophy can be understood by busy executives. A 'Reading List' of mainly British publications is included for serious readers.

Officers concerned with submissions on pay to Defence and Treasury will read the book with interest. For the wider service audience a thought provoking solution is suggested to problems associated with pay. One has no hesitation in recommending the book for use in both industry and government.
THE MIND OF THE METRICATED MAN

Jack Jones—not that he ever thinks about it—is a thoroughly metricated man. Ambling down the pathway of his home this autumn morning in 1984, he is happily eyeing his gleaming new car. What a relief to have a family sedan at last.

He and Betty economised willingly to be able to pay for their 700-square-metre block—all the others in the court are 600—and to build their 150-square-metre home. Then they had to meet the cost of installing that 14-kilowatt oil central heating system, not a luxury out in the shadow of the hills where the temperature always seemed to be a few degrees lower than in the city of an evening and early morning. Even today, although the radio says the temperature is a mild 15 Celsius in the city, Jack doubts if it is much above 12 degrees here.

Sliding in behind the wheel of the new sedan, he thinks how much more satisfying it is to have a bigger car. Their previous small car got them where they wanted to go, but it was pretty cramped for two adults, two children and their gear. Especially two children growing as fast as Johnny and Jenny.

He had measured them again last night—extraordinary, Johnny is just seven and is now 124 centimetres, while Jenny, 15 months younger, is now 111 cm. The kids had dashed off to weigh themselves on Betty's bathroom scales and Jenny was delighted to have topped 20 kilograms at last. Johnny is now 26.3 kg—and so he should be the way he eats!

Wheeling out in to the highway traffic, Jack Jones enjoys the surge of power from the six cylinder, 105-kilowatt engine. That's nearly double the 57.5 kW of their previous two-door runabout. He will have to watch it, however. Last week he picked up a speeding ticket on only his third day in the new car—doing 65 in a 60-kilometres-per-hour zone. Pointless to speed, really. With all the traffic on the 15-kilometre route into the city, it takes the same time to get to and from work in a big or small car.

Pulling into a service station, Jack reflects ruefully that this is the main disadvantage of running a bigger car—greater fuel consumption. The old car gave a steady 9.5 litres per 100 kilometres consumption, but the new one is averaging a little under 14.3.

‘Fill her up, please,’ he calls to the driveway hand, jumping out to look to the tyres himself. The little car took 180 kilopascals pressure. The new one needs 165. The petrol tank is much bigger, too—the new sedan has a capacity of 70 litres compared to the smaller model's 50.

Waiting for a break in the traffic to set off again, Jack has a sudden thought: Has he remembered the shopping list?

Betty will shoot him if he forgets to collect her supplies on the way home. But all's well; here it is in his shirt pocket—two 500-gram packets of butter, two 250g packets of tea, two 600 millilitres of milk (those kids love milk), a big tube of toothpaste (that's the 150-millilitre tube, he supposes) and a 900g loaf of bread.

What's this she has scribbled at the bottom? 'Better get them a packet of sweeties, but 100g is enough!'

Oh well, better get on to work. Can't afford to be late if you want to keep the office girls arriving on time. Give them an inch and they'll take a mile. Can't fathom the way these kids think today.

A mile, a mile, muses Jack. Now let me see, just how long was a mile anyway?

Yes, a thoroughly metricated man is Jack Jones!