ARMY JOURNAL

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COVER: “The 26th Brigade Attack on Tarakan May 1945”, by war artist Vernon Jones. At the Australian War Memorial.
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Army ship *Balikpapan*, first of the LCH (Landing Craft Heavy) class, in Sydney Harbour in August this year at the end of a maiden delivery voyage from Maryborough in Queensland. 148 feet in length it can carry 200 tons of cargo and is the largest of the army’s landing craft.
My purpose today is not to argue a case for the defence of Australia. This is a separate issue. My argument is based on the premise that a sound defence system is essential to national security. This being so, there is a requirement for a Navy, an Army and an Air Force. My contribution to this discussion centres on the army, the kind of army we need and the manner in which it can best be provided. And please let me state at the outset that nothing that I will be saying has any official blessing, either from the Minister for the Army or any of my erstwhile colleagues. It is more than a year since I retired so I speak to you as a private citizen on a subject on which I have strong feelings and on which I am reasonably well informed.

As I see it, the army has three roles:

- **The First**—to be ready at very short notice to provide a force able to meet regional commitments.
- **The Second**—to contribute to a credible military backing to our diplomacy and to our political initiatives.
- **And the Third**—to provide a nucleus or, better still, a framework on which a national army can be built in the event of our finding ourselves in a hostile environment or in danger of invasion.

We have had ample experience over the past twenty years of the kind of demands that might be made on us by regional commitments. Korea, Malaya and Vietnam have shown us the need for an organization which, in size and shape, will enable us to sustain a commitment over a protracted period.

To take the second role, I believe that few people would doubt the desirability of our seeking through political initiatives to influence the course of events in the region in which we live. In addition to the advantages which could accrue from such a policy, we have, because of our economic and industrial strength and because of the relatively advanced state of our technology, a responsibility to take a leading part...
in the development of South-East Asia. Nor should we, through neglect, ever allow a situation to develop in which we could be compelled, because of our weakness, to follow a course inimical to our national interests.

All of this requires a credible backing of strength—political, industrial, economic and military—because it is, almost without exception, an historical fact that the respect with which a country's voice is heard in the council of nations and the influence which it is able to wield is in proportion to its strength; and in this I do not overlook its moral strength.

And, finally, in the event of our finding ourselves, in the years ahead, an affluent but lonely island in a hostile environment—and let us not write this possibility off too lightly; today's friends may be tomorrow's enemies and it would be rash indeed to attempt to forecast the international line-up in 1990—we would draw great comfort from an inbuilt capacity to mobilize, at reasonably short notice, a substantial army. By 'substantial' I mean something of the order of ten well trained, well equipped and well led divisions and by 'short notice' I am thinking in terms of perhaps a year. We are unlikely to have to face this kind of situation overnight. It will develop as a result of a deterioration of international relations and the warning signs will be clearly visible to any with a desire to read them.

An examination of these three roles leads to a requirement for an army with three clearly defined components:

*First:* A highly professional standing army with first-rate leadership at all levels and which, through continuing intellectual inquiry and research in those fields—social, strategic, political, tactical and technological—from which the art of war evolves, and through carefully directed research and development in the fields of weapons and equipment suited to the environment in which it will operate, is more than a match for any comparable force which may be brought against it.

This component must be capable of meeting our requirements for regional defence. It should, as an integral part of the overall defence effort, help provide this country with a credible military capability; it must be able to provide a readily available balanced force capable of operating effectively in the early stages of a national emergency and,
at the same time, provide the initial training and administrative organization which will be needed for general mobilization.

The second component is an efficient citizen army with a numerically high proportion of officers, NCOs and specialists, trained to the highest level consistent with the limitations imposed by part-time service and designed to provide the organizational framework of a national army; and the third, a substantial trained reserve with which to clad this framework and so provide, in a relatively short time, a viable force which, in due course, can be further expanded by the absorption of untrained manpower.

These components must be kept continuously in a state of near readiness. The days of instant armies are long since past.

But what, you may well ask, has all this to do with National Service? It is simply this: That I believe that without National Service the kind of army I have outlined above is not a practical possibility. It is sometimes argued that, given attractive pay and conditions, a volunteer standing or regular army could be raised which would be adequate to the nation’s needs. The size of such an army is stated variously at figures down to as low as 30,000. This figure has no military significance and is, I believe, related more to the realistic possibilities of voluntary enlistment rather than to the requirements of security.

But the whole question of the practicability and desirability of raising a volunteer army of the necessary size in time of peace is a complex one and needs thorough examination, and I do not profess to have studied every relevant angle, but I spent more than three years of my service as Adjutant General, an appointment in which I was responsible—among other things—for recruiting and conditions of service. I learned from hard experience in this job that there is in the community—any community—a percentage of young men with a vocation to pursue a service career. From this group come the more dedicated of the officers, warrant officers and NCOs who provide the backbone of a regular army, the kind of people who made up the training team in Vietnam and who, in a number of ways, made our Vietnam contribution so effective. To add to this group there is a percentage of young men who are attracted by the possibilities of adventure or travel and a few who, while having no military ambitions, look to the army to provide
security. By and large, these fill the lower ranks and their number may be varied substantially by the influence of extraneous factors such as the general employment situation, pay and conditions of service, the international climate, the availability of overseas positions and the opportunity for operational service.

I have found that improved pay and conditions provide an instant stimulus to recruiting which tends to wear off with the passing of time. It has, perhaps, a more significant effect on re-engagement, which can be advantageous in so far as it affects officers, warrant officers and NCOs, but which if not kept within reasonable bounds can have a deleterious effect on the vitality of the army. A professional army, with its emphasis on mobility, its advancing technology, and the strains imposed by protracted operations in a harsh environment, is no place for old men, certainly not for old private soldiers, except for a relatively few skilled specialists and certain administrative duties for which experience is of greater importance than youth. I would say that if after five or six years service a regular soldier has not achieved a specialist skill or qualified to become an officer or an NCO, it is time for him to move on and for a younger man to be recruited to take his place. This is part of the continuing wastage which absorbs a substantial proportion of the numbers of men being recruited and which must be made good before any growth can eventuate. Furthermore, there are today, for the first time in twenty years, no opportunities for active service; no Koreas, no Malayas, no Borneos, no Vietnams and, if the Opposition’s proposal to withdraw those few army units remaining overseas should come to fruition, little opportunity for overseas service. With a developing economy, even at the present level of unemployment, there is little enough to attract the non-dedicated to the service except for improved pay and conditions.

But even if it were possible to raise a regular army of adequate size and quality by voluntary means, I believe it would still be wrong. Defence is everyone’s responsibility; it is a burden which should be shared by the entire community. Instead it is proposed that much of the load should be borne by those who have little alternative but to accept it. It is proposed, in effect, to substitute economic conscription for National Service. And, let there be no doubt, the burden will fall most heavily on those who are economically and educationally disadvantaged, while those born into comparative affluence will be exempt. It can be argued that, through taxation, everyone will make some contribution
but it really means that some will, in effect, be paying others to discharge their responsibilities for them. There is, of course, ample historical precedent for this. A less sophisticated though comparable system was in vogue during the later stages of the Roman Empire.

There are other reasons why an army should be drawn from the whole of society. There is a truism which states that the army equips men while the navy and the air force man equipment. Like other such platitudes, it over-simplifies the position but it goes far towards describing an army’s metabolism.

The army’s basic cell is the human being and in total it is composed of a very large number of human beings. Its unit is not a ship or an aircraft, each valued at many millions of dollars. It is a group of men; a battalion, a company, battery; quite priceless. In its activities it is representative of the nation from which it is drawn. Wherever it operates it is involved at close quarters with humanity; it is close to people of all kinds whether in Australia or New Guinea or Malaysia or Vietnam. Often it operates in a harsh and unfriendly environment, in circumstances of danger and discomfort. It will operate at its maximum capacity only if its morale is high and an important ingredient of morale is the support of the people which it represents—not just a small segment of them, but all of them. To a nation, the army must be ‘we’ and not ‘they’. To achieve this state it must be representative of all strata of society. It should be, literally, of the people.

At the present time, the army enjoys a close relationship with the community. Because of World War II, the Citizen Military Forces and National Service, there can be few people in Australia who either have not served in the armed forces or who have not had, vicariously, through a husband, a father, a brother, a son, a friend or a relative, some association with the services. Because of its greater numbers, most people would have had some association with the army. This has induced a familiarity, a respect and, in some quarters, an affection which has been nourished by the part the army has played in the life of the community in time of peace, in assistance to people in adversity, such as in bushfires and floods. The recent Townsville cyclone is an example. The army is expected to make a contribution to community activities—social, sporting, welfare, and so on and it does so, although its activities in these fields are not greatly publicised. It would indeed be a setback if the close relationship between the army and the civil population
which has developed over the past thirty years should be destroyed; if the army ceased to be an integral part of the community and reverted to being a little known, almost alien group on the outskirts of society. The attrition of the World War II generation means the gradual but inevitable passing of a greater number of people who have had close ties with the army. The abolition of National Service would, over a period, complete the process, leaving the army a small close-knit professional group efficient, no doubt, within the limits imposed by its reduced capabilities but unfitted to undertake almost any operational task which could be envisaged.

I doubt very much if there is, anywhere, a more proficient, more professional group of soldiers than those in the regular component of the Australian Army today. This is due to a number of reasons, of which I have singled out two as being of over-riding importance. The first is the fact that the regular army has been engaged in operations, practically non-stop, since 1950. The second is that the army has been steadily growing in magnitude over the same period.

The army has today young officers and NCOs of a quality unequalled—certainly during my service and, I suspect, at any time in the army's history. This is to a large extent a function of the size and quality of the organization to which they belong. The two things are complementary. There is a level below which the army ceases to be able to provide an incentive to highly intelligent young men or to provide realistic training for commanders and staff. There is a level below which it ceases to be either feasible or economical to develop the weapons and equipment and the tactics and techniques appropriate to the environment in which it will be required to operate. There is a level below which it becomes impossible to sustain a balanced force in the field or, if we look at it realistically, to undertake almost any type of operation. There is a level below which the profession of arms ceases to be a credible profession and there is a level below which the army, in the eyes of our neighbours, who in terms of defence are largely army oriented, ceases to be a factor in international relations.

This level is something not less than one division. I have specified a division because it is the smallest formation that meets what I would regard as the essential criteria. It is the smallest formation in which all the fighting arms and the principal logistic services are represented; it is the internationally recognized unit of military power and it is
basically the smallest viable military grouping in which the military art can be properly practised and developed.

In addition to this fundamental formation there is a requirement for certain other units. These are non-divisional troops, units which do not normally form an organic part of a division but which would be needed for its support in differing types of operations. They would include certain types of armoured units, heavy artillery, long-range signals units, specialized engineer units, heavy transportation units, and so on. There is also a continuing requirement for the essential headquarters, training and logistic organization which an army must have. All of these elements require a great deal of manpower. To provide an organization of the type I have outlined, at something less than full strength, would require something of the order of 50,000 men.

The army has never in the past been able to achieve a strength such as this, although it is a modest figure when compared with the armies of our neighbours. It has been unable to do so because, quite apart from finance and government policy, it would never have been able to raise the necessary regular element by the traditional voluntary means and there is a definite limit to the number of national servicemen that an army can absorb without sacrificing the level of performance that is essential in order to attain the maximum of success at the lowest cost. The Australian Army reached this limit before the recent reduction in the National Service intake. It follows that the National Service component can be effectively increased only if there is a proportionate increase in the regular element.

You perhaps wonder how, in these circumstances, the army was able to meet its commitments in Vietnam. There are a number of reasons. Our contribution was not, numerically, a large one. If I remember correctly, the peak figure in Vietnam was about 7,700. Additionally, most of our logistic support, an operation extremely demanding in manpower, was provided by the United States Army as were some of the supporting operational units to which I have just referred. Many regulars returned to Vietnam for second tours of duty, some for a third and a few even for a fourth. The regular element of the army carried a burden quite disproportionate to its numbers but the key to our being able to sustain our effort was the continuing infusion of high quality young National Servicemen which enabled much of the lower rank structure to be turned over periodically, keeping it fresh and vital.
What I am saying is, in effect, that to sustain a viable, high quality army in Australia in time of peace we need to maintain and, indeed increase the current regular element of the army and to retain National Service as well.

The present strength of the regular army, including national servicemen is about 41,000. This will provide, in addition to the essential command and administrative structure, a skeletal division with even more skeletal logistic backing.* I suppose that if it has to the army can live with this figure in time of peace with most units undermanned—and this is a fairly normal situation in time of peace—so long as provision exists for an immediate extension of the National Service commitment in an emergency.

Of course, the National Service system has certain inbuilt weaknesses. The comparatively short time which a national serviceman spends in the army is certainly a disadvantage; the turnover in manpower is greater than is desirable and requires a larger administrative and training effort than would be the case if the service were composed entirely of high quality volunteers. As against this, the National Service system draws on a cross section of the community for the number of men required and, being a cross section, it includes potential officers, NCOs and ready-made specialists. Nor is it entirely a one way process. To some it gives a technical skill or a wider experience in an existing skill. Some find during their service a stimulus to education which never before existed. To some, it provides a much needed degree of healthy physical development. But, more importantly, it provides these young men, or a great many of them, with certain attributes which are not as common as one would wish and which are eagerly sought after in the world to which they will return, attributes such as leadership, loyalty and integrity, respect for lawful authority, unselfishness and the willingness to subordinate individual desires in the common interest or the ability to work as a loyal member of a group, self-reliance and responsibility, courtesy and consideration—in short, self-discipline.

I believe that one of the most significant social advantages of National Service is the manner in which it brings together young men

*Even with a strength in excess of 44,000, it was never possible to maintain more than six of the army's nine battalions at full strength. The remaining three were usually on little more than a cadre basis.
of all walks of life, from all quarters of society, on an equal footing. After a year of living together in a hut, eating together in a mess and sharing common pleasures, common triumphs, common disappointments, common hardships and, perhaps, common dangers, there can be no room for the fear, the mistrust or the plain dislike, the product of ignorance which so frequently bedevil class relationships. This, perhaps more than anything else, makes me regret that the call-up is not universal.

But, these are a spin-off, by-products of the system, and do not in themselves constitute an argument for National Service.

Let us consider briefly what the effect on the army would be if National Service were to be abolished: The army’s strength would immediately drop to about 29,000 and, as I assess it, this would require the disbandment of five infantry battalions out of a total of nine, as well as those units which support them—artillery, engineers, signals and so on. Some 4,000 officers and NCOs could become redundant. Some, perhaps all of these, would be found other employment but many of the best officers and NCOs, being more enterprising, having greater confidence in their ability to compete in civil life and being disillusioned at seeing their prospects of a satisfying and fruitful military career so seriously reduced, would go first. Having experienced service in a world class organization, they would find something less than complete satisfaction in what would be left, a rump which would, no doubt, be skilfully reorganized but which would no longer command the international respect which it now engenders, not for itself but for the country from which it springs.

I have not brought the CMF into my discussion because National Service has a less important bearing on its existence. There was a time when it received a large infusion of young men who preferred, for various reasons, a CMF commitment of six years to a National Service commitment of two years. These numbers have now fallen away, though there is still a substantial number serving in the CMF. The abolition of National Service would remove this element, resulting in a drop in CMF strength to perhaps 19,000 and leaving it dependent on its traditional volunteers.

In a major conflict the task of the CMF would be, as I mentioned earlier, to provide much of the framework on which a national army would be developed. Its initial growth would come from the mobil-
ization of the third component of the army, the Reserve. Men completing their service in the regular army provide a nucleus of this reserve but, by far, its greatest source of strength lies in the constant infusion of national servicemen who have completed their full-time obligation but have a residual reserve obligation. These provide, at any given time, some 31,000 trained reservists. There is, in addition, a growing reservoir of ex-national servicemen within the community, many of whom would be available for service in a national emergency. This is an invaluable by-product of the system. The abolition of National Service would see the Reserve reduced to something under 10,000.

I have been at a loss to understand the basic motives of many of those who oppose National Service. I can understand that a young man may resent the interference with his career or with his chosen manner of life, although I have encountered remarkably little bitterness among those actually serving. Their attitude, by and large, has been that while they would not have chosen to serve voluntarily in the army, they are in whether they like it or not; they are prepared to give it a go, to make the best of it and get all they can out of it. In all but a very, very few cases they give of their best and blend into the service, indistinguishable from the regulars with whom they often perform identical duties. In the past many have extended their service in order to go on active operations with their units. Some have elected to make the army a career. Of 1,664 young national servicemen who have gained commissions through the Officer Training Unit at Scheyville, some 15% have applied for and have been granted regular commissions.

May I digress for a moment to tell of an experience which is pertinent to this discussion. I was playing golf one day and after my round I noticed four young men at another table in the bar in high spirits. On enquiring the reason for the celebration, I was informed that one of them had just received his National Service call-up. I was, of course, interested in his reaction so I asked if I might join them for a little while. The young man in question was, in fact, rather excited at the prospect of a new life. He said that he certainly would not have volunteered as he had a good position in a commercial organization; none of his colleagues were volunteering and, in fact, to do so had never entered his head. If the government wanted him in the army, it was up to the government to say so and not leave him to
make such a far-reaching decision. At is was, now that the die was cast, he was rather looking forward to it.

I believe that this touches on a vital aspect of service. If the government does need young men to serve in the armed forces it should say so and make the necessary provisions and not pass the responsibility for a decision of such national importance to the individual citizen.

I have heard all sorts of objections; that conscription—as the opponents of National Service choose to call it, summoning up emotional overtones of 1916—is a gross infringement of human liberty. Some cleric referred to it as 'this inhuman system'; others find it a useful ball to kick around in the game of party politics.

I can understand and sympathize with the genuine conscientious objector, so long as he can reconcile his conscience with the fact that his exemption requires someone else to carry his share of the burden, someone who otherwise would not have been called up.

On the other hand, the emotional hangover of the 1916 conscription issue gives rise to a number of misconceptions assiduously cultivated by some of the opponents of National Service, for example, the canard that the people voted overwhelmingly against conscription, when in fact the majority against conscription was marginal. It should be remembered that the issues of 1916 and 1917 involved the conscription of Australian men to fight in what many genuinely believed to be an imperialist war being fought on the far side of the globe and being in no way the business of Australia. There was also the influence of the Irish question which was to the forefront at that time.

These arguments are no longer relevant, although many efforts have been made—and are still being made—to link National Service with Vietnam. Many people of goodwill believe that National Service was introduced to enable Australia to meet its commitments in Vietnam. This is just not so. The truth is that the decision was taken to introduce National Service because an army adequate to meet the needs of Australian security could not be raised by voluntary means. This is still the case; there is no question of imperialist wars or any other red herring. National Service is a system whereby young men from every quarter of society are summoned to serve in the army in the number deemed necessary to provide for national security.

It is also argued that it is an undemocratic system and an infringement of individual liberty. Many things happen in our everyday life
which could be interpreted as infringements of individual liberty. It depends on how extreme one's views are but there can be no real freedom without some degree of restraint or without concomitant obligations. As for democracy, is it undemocratic for every young man in the community to be liable for National Service? It is argued that it is unfair that some should have to serve while others do not. I admit quite freely that the ballot system is open to criticism but no one has yet produced a fairer, realistic alternative. To call up numbers far greater than the army needs, or indeed can absorb, at a crippling cost to the nation, is to pursue fairness to the limit of absurdity.

But, by far the greater number of the opponents of National Service would argue that any form of compulsion is undemocratic. This, of course, is a question of the definition of democracy. The so-called 'people's democracies' for which many of them have such a high regard have no such qualms about compulsion. I would, however, prefer to take as an example the cradle of democracy, the city states of Hellas where the obligation to serve under arms at need—and usually to furnish them as well—was an essential element in a man's standing as a free citizen and where it was not uncommon as, for instance, in Athens, for young men to be required to establish their capacity to bear arms as a condition of full citizenship.

I suspect that some of the opposition to National Service is triggered, quite understandably, by self-interest; a number of its more vociferous opponents are within the age group liable for call-up.

However, most are not in that age group. Some are men of undoubted goodwill; some are professional agitators with a vested interest in undermining established authority and yet others have a political axe to grind. Perhaps the greatest number are people who have not studied the question with any degree of objectivity but who have been emotionally swayed by sections of the media which invariably give enormous publicity to any anti-National Service protest.

To sum up, I must say again that I believe National Service to be an essential component of the kind of army this country needs. National Service is a democratic system which makes every male, as he passes through a given age group, liable for service and spreads the burden across society, requiring each stratum to bear a part of the load proportionate to its numbers.
NATIONAL SERVICE

It can provide the numbers needed by the army at any given time, subject to the army's capacity to absorb them, and this capacity depends on the maintenance of a healthy, voluntary component. And, finally, it produces an army of the people, truly representative of the people.

I have not discussed the social or economic advantages or disadvantages of National Service at any great length. There are others far better qualified than I to do so. But the system has been extraordinarily successful. It has produced a large number of able young soldiers with a quite remarkable dedication to their task. It is now firmly established and, given the opportunity to learn about it and to observe it fairly and objectively, free from the influence of emotional red herrings and the endless stream of anti-conscription propaganda, the great majority of the people would continue to support it as they have in the past. Those who would dismantle it carry a heavy responsibility.

MONTHLY AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded prizes for the best original articles published in the August and September 1972 issues of the journal to:

August: Staff Cadet C. D. Clark ('The "Invasion" of New Caledonia') $10.

September: Group Captain K. Isaacs ('Sixty Years of Australian Military Aviation') $10.
The opportunity to present, to a forum such as this, the problems encountered by the Australian Army in facing the new technological era has been welcomed by the army. It is welcomed since it is one of the few occasions when it is possible to expose to a critical and potentially very helpful audience some of the army's singularly peculiar difficulties in meeting a human challenge. I refer to the challenge presented by the increased technical sophistication in means of waging war and defending the peace.

The accent of the paper is on the exposure of problems, not the solutions, (although if we knew all the solutions there would be fewer problems) but some reference will be made to efforts by the army to mitigate or avoid the adverse human consequences inherent in rapid technical change. This stratagem of problem presentation is being deliberately indulged in because it is realized that the first step in the solution of a problem is the successful isolation of its nature and its essential ingredients. 'First define the problem' is probably an apt way of putting it.

This paper was presented at a Sydney University symposium, 'The Human Consequences of Technological Change', in August this year. Much of the information contained therein was contributed by the Directorates of Combat Development, PS(B) (Welfare) and Education, and by EDP Coord within Personnel Branch. Since the presentation of this paper, Lt Col van Gelder has resigned his appointment in the Australian Regular Army and has taken up an appointment in the Commonwealth Public Service as Assistant Secretary, Administrative Planning and Development Branch of A.C.T. Government Division, Department of the Interior. He has also been appointed to the Active Citizen Military Forces as SO1 in the Directorate of Engineers AHQ.
Although it may become obvious as the paper progresses, it is necessary to mention at this stage that I shall be referring not only to the increasing application of technology on the battlefield—new and more devastating weapons, increased battlefield mobility through use of helicopters and tracked vehicles, advanced methods of surveillance, rapid medical evacuation—but also to advances in the field of personnel management through the use of electronic data processing, personnel simulator models and systems approach to training.

The army is and has been traditionally manpower oriented, whereas the other two services, the navy and the air force, are equipment oriented. By this we mean that the present operations and future activity of the navy and the air force revolve around their major equipments such as ships and aircraft. They deploy into battleships and aircraft which they man with sailors and airmen; the army deploys men and equips these men with weapons.

It is for this reason that the army has more men and, because the human factor is more pronounced, the army is in a good position to speak for the other two services. For the reason, however, that the equipment-oriented services expose their fewer men to greater contact with the machine and electronic environment, the army’s perspective of the problems may be insufficiently representative. Time has prevented any co-ordination of the writing of this paper with the other two services, an unfortunate but not necessarily detracting omission.

The initiative in gathering material for this paper has been taken (or ‘fallen to’ if you believe that a consideration by the services of human consequences was eventually inevitable as with all other sectors of the community) by the Directorate of Personnel Plans within Army Headquarters because of the continuing responsibility of that directorate in the personnel planning field. As with all large organizations there is a need for some person or agency to look carefully at the quantity and quality of the men recruited into the organization.

Input decisions are based on historical precedent and on a knowledge of behavioural patterns of men within the organization. The two major parameters operating upon the manning system in the army are recruit input and wastage—these help to determine the numbers of men involved and their age (or maturity) distribution within the service. Quality considerations of input are not so neatly dealt with and there is a requirement for extensive job analysis in a variety of operational and
non-operational situations. The army’s job, in the recruiting area, is to attract recruits who by selection and training can cope with the demands and stresses of both operational service and peacetime soldiering.

The army, like the other services, is often given the impossible task of attaining functional efficiency in its peacetime role (to give value for money) and yet be operationally effective in combat or wartime situations. The men who by virtue of their psychological make-up and educational and social background are most efficient in peacetime—who satisfy the community’s demand for educated, i.e., management-oriented, services—may not necessarily be the men who can withstand the stressful pressures imposed by combat. In a democratic state where the elected government is presumed to act upon the will of the majority of the people it is the people who, perhaps unwittingly, make these dual demands on the services.

Even before the accelerating demands of technology widened the gap between the human demands of peacetime and wartime soldiering, the duality of the ‘prescription’ for a good officer was evident. I shall borrow from an address by a senior British Army officer, Major General E. J. H. Bates. To him, these texts were appropriate.

The first was from the writings of von Scharnhorst:

In times of peace, knowledge and education only, and in times of war outstanding bravery and the capacity for comprehensive understanding shall constitute claims for the position of officers.

The second was from the introduction to H. G. Wells’s Outline of History:

...the professional military mind is by necessity an inferior and unimaginative mind; no man of high intellectual quality would willingly imprison his gifts in such a calling.

The third text is rather different; it is in the form of an extract of a discussion at Sandhurst on student gradings. The intellectual achievement of one of the cadets was so minimal that one of the academics was advocating drastic treatment. ‘Oh, you couldn’t do that,’ said the military spokesman, ‘he has fine, officer-like qualities and his men would follow him anywhere.’ ‘Yes’, replied the academic, ‘but only once.’

The following paragraphs may throw more light on the problem of selection, training and employment of the men and women the services need today.
The Military Environment

This extract sums up the military technological environment of the present day:

Advances in medicine, aviation, rocketry, communications, plastics, textiles, computers, energy conversion and nutrition, as well as more recent discoveries in laser techniques have created whole new occupations and skills within the armed forces. These new skills require more instructional programmes of increasing length and sophistication. The magnitude, complexity and cost of these programmes have become a matter of major concern to the services—senior service officers have been unanimous in identifying the need for trained people as their most serious problem. Weapon systems have become so complex that, in some instances, from five to seven years are required to introduce a new system into the active defence forces. While these new weapons are being developed, it is necessary to train the men who will use and maintain them. Thus part of the training problem is to be able to forecast—and foresee—what training will be necessary. A break-through in weapon technology means that certain other weapons will become obsolete. This rate of obsolescence calls for a degree of flexibility in training programmes that military men have never faced before.

I will pursue the problem of training later in the paper. For a moment, I shall drop from the lofty heights of complex weapon systems to the grass-roots problems of the impact of technological change on servicemen and their families. A few only are mentioned:

• Consequent upon the introduction of the mechanized pay system, pay delays and artificial pay restrictions can occur—impersonally called 'no changes in allotment for X weeks' or 'allocation arising from backdated pay rises will be paid later', 'the computer rejects the variation' and so on. To many soldiers and their families it appears that they are being penalized for the convenience of the machine. (The service's pay system is of necessity a complex business—involving large numbers of men, large numbers of paying points, shifting military populations and a complicated range of allowances.)

• In the army, as in certain areas of civilian life, technology, when it intrudes into the life of the individual has a depersonalizing effect. The soldier, his family and his unit tend to degenerate into a series of letters, figures and symbols of immense interest to the EDP system but meaningless to the individual. In other words, to the system the soldier ceases to be an individual, a unique individual with unique problems, and becomes a cipher. This depersonalization is corrosive and infectious; not only does the machine treat the man as a cipher, so does the system—and, before long, so do some of his superiors.
Greater facility to move a soldier, or his unit, or both, at short notice over considerable distances (through advances in transport) tends to increase periods of separation. The same facility, when applicable to the family, results in a greater frequency of moves with adverse social effects on the individual concerned. The increased use of complex equipments calls for greater specialized expertise in individuals. Since these men are often in short supply—and it is now easier to move them—their separation ratio (time spent away from with respect to time spent with their families) is often raised to an unacceptable level. A different sort of separation consequent on increased sophistication in weapons and equipments is also worthy of mention. The more technically skilled the soldier gets, particularly if the skills are in a security-classified field, the greater the intellectual separation from his wife and family.

The whole process of depersonalization resulting from the above factors gives rise to a state of feeling known as anomie—a feeling affecting both the individual and their families, described as one of isolation and disorientation. It is said to be particularly common amongst the lower echelons of bureaucratic hierarchies.

Recognition of the above grass-roots problems obviously calls for a future emphasis on preventative welfare. A small beginning has been made in this area. In 1967 the army established the Family Liaison Organization, originally to look after the families of soldiers in Vietnam, but more recently to assist all members and families with their problems. The emphasis is to be on the identification and dealing with problems before they become major difficulties and the plan is for more community work, developing clubs, community activities, self-help and to help members and their families to have a sense of 'belonging', and ultimately to counteract the more adverse side effects of increased use of technology.

The pitfalls of Electronic Data Processing (EDP) management in the army has not, however, been lost on the computer managers. It is realized that EDP in management of men is a two-edged weapon. Systems poorly designed and unintelligently used tend to depersonalize management and encourage commanders and staffs to abrogate this responsibility to deal with each man, as far as practicable, as a unique
individual. (The problem of each man simply becoming ‘an aggregation of binary bits’).

EDP is well aware that systems well designed and intelligently used can greatly enhance the effectiveness of personnel management, restoring the personal treatment which tends to be lost in the rush and pace of modern operations. Techniques of job analysis, largely EDP dependent, should help to prevent square pegs getting into round holes. EDP can help the commander and staff officers to have better data more readily available on each man to supplement personal knowledge, or to provide a better basis for decision if personal knowledge is not possessed. An EDP system containing comprehensive and reliable data, and capable of producing the relevant information in readily comprehensible form, will allow the time available to an executive to be concentrated on informed decision on matters affecting individual people, rather than having much of it expended in gathering scrappy data. (As one EDP manager put it, the use of EDP in military personnel management, as in other areas of human relations, may hasten the approach of the Orwellian 1984, or the golden era of consideration for the individual man).

Work has in fact been started on a computer-based job analysis programme which could have application in many military fields such as recruiting, training, organizations and establishments, career planning and pay and allowances. The army has recently become involved in the new (to the services) field of industrial relations, particularly in the areas of work value and wage fixation. Whilst this is not directly related necessarily to technological change, it does show that the services are, to a certain extent, changing to meet what are considered to be normal community standards and also the changing requirements of society.

One of the latest applications of EDP is in the field of army manning or personnel planning where ‘manning’ encompasses the provision of men to meet the needs of the operational and administrative planners. Whilst there is a danger of forcing men to fit mathematical models, ‘balanced structures’ and previously determined career patterns, the ready availability of comprehensive information about soldiers and the subsequent analysis enables manning planners to react more quickly to trends in manpower procurement and wastage and to operational commitments. One of the irritating but necessary side effects in the newly-developed art of manning is the development of a new language—
terms such as 'mannaability', 'career employment group', 'vertical and horizontal flexibility', 'expansion capability' are now freely mentioned in the defence corridors.

Combat Development

Within the army headquarters there is a directorate which concerns itself with the development of future concepts of operations and conceptual studies on which to base weapons, tactics, logistics and force structure for the army in the field, and the formulation of guide lines for the preparation of future training doctrine. This directorate is vitally concerned with the pace of technological change and the place of man in combat development.

As an example of the problem area, equipment technology has provided for tanks and similar heavy vehicles to have an endurance that far outstrips that of the crews of those vehicles. Short of attempting complete automation, the alternatives become firstly providing relief crews (but where are they carried? Can the manpower bill be met?) or secondly not using the vehicles at full capacity (and therefore overdesign). Apart from this 'concept of use' problem, there are more human problems, for example, how do you keep a soldier physically and mentally alert in a dark confined space with attendant heat and fumes?

Operator-guided weapons—whether optically sighted or guided—at release or during travel depend on human identification, co-ordination and steadiness at some stage. That they have not become the 'final weapon' points to the existence of difficulties either in the technical development of the weapon or in the inherent ability of the firer to control the weapon. All brochures readily point to the finer technical points of a new weapon, but do not describe, say, the feelings of the lonely soldier chosen to fire a guided weapon against a terrifying target in the shape of a tank.

In the field of small arms development, no matter how efficient a rifle is, its effectiveness in battle depends on the stability of the firing platform and the skill and coolness of the firer. The soldier must not only be able to use it (light, robust, etc.), but he must have confidence in it.

It is problematical that in the past, development of equipments has occurred with little thought being given to the men who will operate
or maintain them. Whilst the designers may have given some attention to the physical requirements of the operators, they have often neglected the demands made by the whole system. An approach of this type normally leads to men being superimposed on the system after its development instead of their incorporation within the system from the outset. This approach often forces men into adapting to new machines or concepts with not only detrimental effects to themselves but a downgrading of the operational efficiency of the system. To prevent the accommodation of men to the equipment (instead of vice versa) a designer must consider the men as an integral part of the system, that is, create a single man-machine system. This consideration must commence at the design concept stage, continue, keep pace and be monitored throughout the complete development cycle. Such an approach to military concepts and equipment would ensure that soldiers are capable of operating and maintaining the system at operational efficiency at project completion. The designer should consider the manner in which the weapon or equipment will be employed, the environment of employment, whether or not it may be used by different levels of skills, or whether it requires a specific skill. Other factors are the intelligence level, manual dexterity, reaction times, stress tolerance, or the amount of training of the final users.

**Generalism versus Professional Expertise**

It is recognized that technology has created a new aristocracy of talent—the extent to which this should be applicable in the army is of course debatable. Put more bluntly, high professional expertise and know-how are in or on the way in, and generalism is out or on the way out. This alters the power structure of society and its influence cannot be kept from penetrating the power structure of the services. If this latter circumstance arises, then the foundation of efficiency in the services moves away from traditional disciplines to forms of knowledge. It would be futile therefore for the tank squadron commander to order all his tanks to be ready by a certain hour if the maintenance men, who know what has to be done and how long it takes, say that they cannot be ready for many hours after the stipulated time. This new class of military technicians works within the framework of feasibilities based on specialized know-how rather than that of military authority; their expertise breeds a sense of superiority and of independence; they know that their knowledge and therefore their judgement cannot be gainsaid
by those without their knowledge. The movement of the services towards greater and greater dependence upon highly specialized equipment necessarily makes them more and more dependent upon the technocrats and their skilled men who alone can keep modern equipments in functioning order.

This ‘generalist versus specialist’ argument has, to my knowledge, been raging in both the British and German armies for some time. It was thought by them that as long as ‘attitude of mind’ (career pre-occupation orientation based on an attitude of mind) is more important in the officer corps than performance, the only candidates who will be attracted are those who are governed primarily by an attitude of mind. Since orientation based on attitude of mind and performance orientation are seldom found together in the same person (subject to dispute), and since attitude of mind is the more important factor amongst candidates for a commission in the regular forces of the UK and West Germany, the officer corps is becoming increasingly estranged from the performance-oriented section of the population.5

It is recognized that the degree of performance orientation required in the military forces is determined by the rank and place occupied by technology in those forces. A secondary schoolboy educated in the liberal arts does not possess the best requisites for an officer candidate preparing to do a satisfactory job in a world of highly-complicated technological processes. One result of having a ‘wrongly schooled’ army is the continual temptation to become involved in ancillary activities (training courses, educational programmes) rather than act responsibly over a lengthy period of time in a specialized activity.

With respect to the larger problem of job continuity, H. W. Atcherley,* remarked that this is one of the many areas where the armed forces are clearly facing the same problem that faces a number of large international industries—how to keep managers and executives long enough in a job to ensure:

- that the job will be done effectively; and
- that the man himself has gained experience and achieved something which he considers worthwhile.

(The problem goes right down into the lower levels of the military hierarchy where too much effort is probably put into training men to
work on different types of machines as opposed to their being trained and developed to become experts on one particular type.)

Another thing which militates against developing a greater measure of performance orientation is a system of praise and punishment which is biased towards the officer with career preoccupation. Officers with the urge to do something, expressed by durable and objective actions in a technological field calling for manual and technical skill, lag behind their mobile comrades in the field of promotion. 'In the armed forces the definition of efficiency is very different from that in a performance-oriented society.'

We think it would be true to say that in the Australian Army there needs to be greater concentration on developing functional experience and less on flexibility (less 'generalism'). This is a largely unexplored area involving considerations of army size, expansion capability, future commitments and cost-effectiveness.

Training

The more widespread implementation of technology in the army inevitably repercusses upon training. The training now needs to be relevant, efficient and effective across a much broader and more specialized field of knowledge and skill. This logically leads to a systems approach to training as embodied in:

- **Job Analysis.** New jobs arising from technological development must be analysed and quantified in exact and human terms.
- **Selection.** Individuals must then be selected in terms of intelligence, personality, motivation and other relevant criteria.
- **Training Objectives.** Precise and unambiguous training objectives arising out of job analysis must be formulated.
- **Criterion Testing.** At the end of training the performance of trainees must be assessed through reliable, valid and objective tests.
- **Quality Control.** A formal system of constantly appraising the effectiveness of the trained soldier must be set up to ensure that standards are maintained.

(As more complex technical equipment is introduced into service, so the training systems must expand to cater.)
The army’s special problem in the area of training, and inherent in the nature of the military mission, is the necessity for the man at arms to be capable of discharging a variety of duties, regardless of speciality. The army demands of its soldiers not only quality of intellect and capacity to use skills but also personal qualities of leadership, courage, fortitude. The soldier has to be trained (and in selecting him you have to judge of his capacity for training) to perform under combat conditions of great stress. This makes for mental, emotional and physical demands of a special character which have no counterpart in civilian life. In the situations in which we find ourselves (post-World War II) where captured servicemen are subjected to so-called ‘brain-washing’ and to ideological pressures, an additional dimension of stress and uncertainty is added. There are the great problems posed by the complexity of weapons systems. ‘This began to emerge in the last quarter of the last century, but the scientific and technological development during and since World War II had revolutionized not only weapons, but also the associated communication and logistic support system.’

The advocates of the meshing of the military system into the general life at large tend sometimes to ignore the unique stresses of the battlefield. They suggest dovetailing service technical and vocational training with industry and civilian colleges. They suggest also that it would be possible to standardize civilian and military technical qualifications, and perhaps in some cases equipment, so that specialists could be easily transferred between army and industry.

These advocates may be right, but the total demand made on soldiers must not be ignored—the educational needs and goals and therefore the army’s training programme must be ‘articulated and defined within the framework of a long hard unsentimental estimate of where the Services are going’.

Selection and Recruiting

We have already touched upon some of the problems in this area—for example, the problem of attracting into the service genuinely performance-oriented young officers, or of recruiting the men who are capable of undertaking the intellectually rigorous training courses.

We think that the major problem can be simply put in this way. Traditionally we have recruited or attempted to recruit into the officer
ranks the best physical specimens, the academically bright, the most emotionally stable, the ambitious, the highly motivated, the extroverts—the 'school captain' type of person. What we do not know is if this is the sort of person who is best able to withstand the stresses of the modern battlefield, or indeed the not inconsiderable stresses of peacetime soldiering. We are certain that technology changes the combat environment and more technology always increases, not decreases, stress, and yet we continue to recruit the sort of person who was most satisfactory in a previously far less technically-oriented army. We may be pursuing persons who are most vulnerable to the stresses of the modern battlefield with all its electronic and mechanical paraphernalia. Just as we are often accused of planning to fight the next war with the last war's weapons and concepts, so we may be in danger of producing men for the next war who are completely unsuitable.

On another note, apart from geographical distribution, the labour force is changing in terms of gross supply, age, education and sex. Thus the population from which the services draw their men and women is continually changing.

The influx into the labour market of young workers with more education is being accompanied by the attrition, through death or retirement, of the older less-educated workers. Technological evolution has led, and will continue to lead, to an increased demand for more educated workers. For example, the expected growth in process computer utilization will probably affect manpower requirements. Demand for systems analysts, control and process engineers, and other technical personnel skilled in these areas is expected to grow, with a corresponding decline in the need for less skilled operating workers.8

The army is little different from the community in its increasing demand for skilled workers. Increasingly, military manpower requirements are being stated in terms of technical skills. Increasingly the army's requirements for men and women is being thought of not only in terms of totals but in numbers within specialized trades or employments. Despite decreasing military manpower levels, Western armed forces are suffering from a shortage of NCOs in trades particularly attractive to civilian industry. After service tradesmen have had long and expensive training, there is a one-way traffic out of the services towards industry—nothing comes back from the industrial training establishments. The services compete with industry for the young men and women with the latent ability to be trained to increasingly exacting technical standards.
Exposure of the Battlefield

Modern communication technology, using as it does artificial earth satellites, has meant that the drama of the battlefield and the horrors of war can be brought via television right into the homes of the public. The viewing public can in certain circumstances see the action as it develops, can watch whilst commanders on the spot make life and death tactical decisions. Advances in this and other forms of communication—the rapid transit of film and tape by jet aircraft, the uninhibited movement of journalists throughout the battle area—has meant the imposition of tremendous stress upon the combat commanders. With every action and almost every word recorded for the subsequent (and sometimes immediate) criticism of people sitting in armchairs, there is great pressure placed upon the commander to make the right decisions, certainly those which will meet with popular approval. Even the skilful tactical deployment of his own soldiers to save lives and inflict casualties upon the enemy may be submerged in the emotional upheaval following a television shot of an injured Vietnamese child.

Improved communications has also meant the intrusion of political direction right down to the platoon commander level. Even during the Suez War (a technologically ancient affair) one was confronted with the spectacle of the British Prime Minister directly influencing the actions of the leading British platoon commander as he moved along the canal. The United States President had a ‘hot line’ to the captains of shadowing warships during the Cuban missile crisis.

This ‘exposure of the battlefield’ as the result of improved communications may well be the most important consequence of advanced military technology. The morale of United States troops in Vietnam is alleged to have been severely eroded by eye-witness accounts of their actions being sent home, and the immediate transmission to the battlefield of the views of anti-war (either in the particular or the general) elements of the community. It was too much to expect them to fight in an unpopular war without evidence of strong support from their home country, continually looking over their shoulders as it were. It has always been true that, once a political decision to commit troops is made by the elected government, the troops need the wholehearted moral and physical support of their own people; advances in communication technology have now made this factor that much more vital.
At the commander level, rapid communications undoubtedly impose stresses on the individuals. On the one hand, their freedom of action is now heavily constrained because of the immediate availability of political advice, and the improved communication could have an inhibiting and disruptive effect on their decision-making ability; on the other hand, the transmission of political urgency might precipitate ill-timed tactical decisions, decisions which might not have been made after cool and deliberate professional study of the situation.

When all is said and done, however, and we are not going to debate the point here, the bringing home to the public at large the realities of war and the consequences of political action or public pressure in committing troops may be an educational service of great ultimate benefits. This educational process may hopefully lead to the abolition of all war because of war's hopeless inefficiency in attaining desired ends.

Conclusions

In periods of war, military technology tends to be very close to the frontiers of applied knowledge. World War II hastened the development of jet engines, radar, television, the harnessing of atomic energy. The 'cold war' hastened research into warlike and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and promoted the active exploration of outer space, culminating in the landing on the moon. In times of real peace, military technology, particularly in the realm of the less spectacular items of hardware, tends to fall behind.

The latter occurs of course because of the decreasing portion of a nation's budget which the people and the government are prepared to spend on defence.

If the services cannot get the hardware or the necessary funds to devote to research and development in the military equipment field, the least which can be done is to ensure that Regular servicemen are sufficiently educated to face greater technological, organization and deployment changes (come a war—and, based on history, there is little doubt that there is one in the historical pipeline) than have to be faced by any other profession.

This paper has sought to describe the modern military environment, and to isolate the problem areas within that environment where technological change has resulted in the greatest effects on the individual.
It has described in a little more detail the implications of such change in the fields of combat development, training, recruiting and communications. It has sought to expose areas of concern to a wider audience than the immediate defence establishment can provide.

Despite any tendency in this paper towards emphasizing the intrusion of technology into present-day means of waging war, there is little doubt that the soldier as a person, and his fighting qualities, will remain the dominant factors on the battlefield. The success which the labour-intensive armies of underdeveloped countries have had against the capital-intensive armies of advanced countries is ample evidence of this. But given equality of individual fighting prowess, and given a battleground which permits proper use of sophisticated weapons, the individual fighting qualities will not remain dominant if the soldiers are not led by NCOs and officers who are able to exploit fully the advances in military technology.

REFERENCES


2 Zelman Cowen, ‘The Impact of Changing Social Conditions on Service Training and Administration’. This was the text of an address made to an RAN Seminar on Training Administration held at HMAS Watson in May, 1969. Professor Cowen was then Vice-Chancellor, University of New England.


EVERY person is called upon sometime in his life to use all forms of written communication. It is well for him to know something of the different techniques needed. Then he can, without difficulty or distress, write a piece for a newspaper, a report for a club, an advertisement or a letter.

Seeking a topic to illustrate the various ways of writing about the same event in different forms, an ancient masterpiece has been chosen: the *Odyssey*, by Homer.

As Homer wrote it, the *Odyssey* runs to 11,000 lines but here is a digest of it by Aristotle several centuries later, only 79 words long:

*A certain man is away from home for a number of years, being closely watched by Poseidon and stripped of all his companions, while his affairs at home are in such shape that his money is being squandered by wooers of his wife, and his son is being plotted against. After being shipwrecked by a storm, he arrives home, makes himself known to some, and attacks the wooers, with the result that he is saved and his enemies destroyed.*

'That,' says Aristotle, 'is the real story of the *Odyssey*. The rest is episodes.' But what an array of episodes, so cleverly told!

The subject of the poem is the return of Ulysses from Troy to his home in Ithaca. He is the classic symbol of man's endurance and man's ingenuity. What saves the story from being merely the yarn of an unprincipled adventurer is the fact that Ulysses' guile was employed, like Robin Hood's, in the pursuit of heroic goals. What saves it from being merely a travel tale is Homer's skill in writing it.

Some people get paralysed when they think of taking up a pen to write a letter or an article. They picture the job as a huge one with innumerable small details, and frighten themselves into doing nothing. What they should do is think of the person to whom they want to write, or should write; think of a story to tell, and go to work.

**See what is going on**

The first point about Homer that will strike the novice writer is the evidence of his powers of observation. This gives to his similes their profusion, their vividness and their appearance of truth, thus leading the reader through scenes as if he were there in person. Homer had obviously developed a mood of mental expectancy, being always on the look-out for unusual aspects of events. The writer of today needs to approach everyday living in the same wide-eyed way, looking for and detecting vivid interest in little things.

To observe is to become informed. Writers are forever students; they never stop learning. To them, nothing is useless.

If the job at hand is the preparation of a brief on urban renewal the writer needs to know the facts about housing and land use, he needs to study what has already been written, and he needs to have observed personally the conditions about which he is writing.

Facility in thinking, organizing of thoughts, skill in expression: these may be derived from reading. No one who hopes to write well can afford not to read. This goes as much for the writer of business letters as for the author of novels. It is not enough to skim through or refer to encyclopedias and the like. True reading consists in imbibing the best of what has been written until it becomes part of your unconscious self, your guide, counsellor and friend in whatever situation you find yourself.
Know your purpose

Above the level of mere mechanics, writing cannot be reduced to rules. Every piece of writing has its distinctive character, and requires that you answer certain questions.

For whom are you writing? For what purpose is this piece of writing intended? Have you the necessary facts? What have you to contribute that is new, or are you going to bring together the existing knowledge in a novel or attractive way?

Anything you write should have as one of its purposes to make intelligible some part of society, or brighten some fragment of life. It may inform, instruct, or amuse.

The person who wishes to write well should write often, for it is practice that makes for good performance.

Ulysses was never in greater danger from aggressive antagonists than from the charmers who tempted him to a life of ease: Circe with her voluptuous hospitality; the Lotus-eaters, in whose land there was nothing to do but relax on the beach, eating honey-sweet plants; the Sirens, against whose enchanting voices he stopped his sailors' ears with wax and had himself tied to the mast; and Calypso, divinely fairer than his wife.

Parallel charms lie in wait for all writers, enticing them to skimp the conscientious workmanship that is the secret of good writing and to lose sight of their purpose. Even if what you are writing is not of the magnitude of an epic, pride in your craftsmanship will prevent your writing it with a slack hand, thus leaving your readers to take the strain of making something of it.

Whatever you write must have substance so as to be seen, and limitation, so that it can be all seen. This means saying what you have to say, covering the necessary facts of your subject in an understandable way, in the fewest possible words.

Brevity does not consist in using few words but in covering the subject effectively in the fewest possible number. Lincoln's Gettysburg Address is sometimes used as an example of brevity. More important is the fact that it said all that needed to be said. That address illustrates another point. You do not need a specially-furnished, sound-proof room in which to do your writing: Lincoln perfected his address on a train.
Having written, read your composition with care. Everything a writer produces looks around it with timorous feelings, like a newly-hatched chicken unsteady on its feet and apprehensive about how it will be received. Give some solicitous attention to this new-born progeny of yours.

**Do not be ordinary**

The function of diction is (1) to make clear what is said, and (2) to lift it above the level of the ordinary.

In telling a story you have three choices: you can relate events so that they seem twice as big as they were; or about half as big as they were; or just as big as they were. It is a mistake to adorn a simple story. To push emotion and drama into a piece of writing which does not properly admit them is just as fatal as to leave sentiment out of a letter or a poem or an article where it properly belongs.

Some guile is needed in writing articles or letters designed to give information or help. But do not cut up your precepts too small in the effort to make them easy to swallow. A piece of writing that does not compel us to chew mentally is hardly worth bothering about.

In whatever writing you do, use fitting words. French and English are ancient languages, but they have the freshness of youth. They are as ready to hand for your use today as they were to Balzac and Shakespeare. They leave no excuse for drabness or cloudiness.

Often quoted is a maxim attributed to the Chinese: 'A picture is worth a thousand words.' But descriptive words fittingly used can conjure up a thousand pictures. Use action words and not passive. Use adjectives that appeal to the senses, including common sense. If they are put into the mix too liberally the result is a fruity and indigestible concoction.

**Think of your reader**

Your first and most important obligation is to consider your reader. What are his interests, what is his index of comprehension, and what meaning will he read into what you write?

Writing involves feeling as well as thinking, and both writer and reader have emotional needs which sometimes transcend the intellectual.
Writers of good judgement who wish to move readers to action or fear or laughter or love know that they must appeal to the instincts, men's strongest driving forces.

If we wish to arouse attention and stir up interest we shall seldom use simple logic. We need to bounce the reader, to jog him into taking notice of what we say, and then to give him something that will satisfy the desire we have aroused.

Only an executive dictating a memo to his staff can be sure that what he writes will be read. Others have to win an audience, to catch, hold, impress and convince.

Do not start with general observations but with a concrete, easily visualized and interesting situation. Homer, after a few lines of introduction, immediately brings in a man or a woman with definite characteristics. Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice* (which has been called 'the finest work of sheer art in all fiction') opens with a single sentence stating the theme and then goes immediately into the famous introductory scene. One instructor in writing used to recommend as a perfect opening line: 'Mr Perkins opened the lid of the dust bin and looked out.' This catches attention and raises questions which can only be answered by reading on: 'What is he doing in the dust bin? What is he afraid of? What does he see when he looks out?'

Do not be ashamed of simplicity. It goes with naturalness of tone and freshness of viewpoint to make readable writing. But simplicity in writing is not gained by being simple in your thinking. To write an article or a letter that is easy to understand entails work and ingenuity. How cunning Homer is in his apparent simplicity!

Avoid the temptation to overstate or over-emphasize. Singers who add a great amount of body action, squirming, face-making and such-like, are compensating for their incapacity to transmit feeling and meaning through vocal ability. The writer, too, is displaying inferior skill who strains to incorporate big or unusual words, winds his phrases into performing snakes, or drags in unfitting scenes.

Writing requires a lively and controlled imagination. Nothing written is conjured out of thin air. The genius of Einstein does not consist in his creating something out of nothing, but in his associating a new thought with old knowledge and thus bringing forth a new idea.
Imagination is not a diversion, but a tool, for the writing craftsman. In great writing, such as that of Homer, there is hardly an idea or an event that is not commonplace, but the writer uses lively imagination and sprightly language. He takes an ordinary episode, say of how some mariners beached their ship, stowed sail, walked ashore and cooked their dinner, and makes it so graphically poetical that we linger over the tale.

By colourful writing you change a mere happening into news. ‘Colour’ in the newspaper sense means something that gives a story originality, drama, romance, quaintness, humour, or a sense of the unique. The writer of distinction is true to the facts, but he adds spirit in telling them.

Reports

A formal report written by Ulysses would have been, like most modern reports, made up of the results of research. The infallible starting guide is this: what does the receiver need to know? Then give it to him in such form that he can use it easily.

Like so many other things often disliked, report writing is not particularly difficult if we break it down into small jobs. You define your objective: my purpose in writing this report is to tell so-and-so about the survey made of such-and-such. Then you determine the form: chronological or episodic. You search your sources: observe, experiment, read books and preceding reports. Finally, you do the writing, paying attention to completeness, conciseness, clarity and readability.

About winning readers

When you write a letter or an article or a report you are claiming kinship with every writer who ever lived. All of them learned the same lesson: to be a successful writer you have to win readers and give them something that will make them glad that they read what you wrote.

Welcome every opportunity for self-expression. It is beneficial in two ways: it conveys your ideas to others, and it clarifies your thinking. When you start to write with some interest prompting you,
incidents and episodes and illustrative anecdotes and references are uncovered in the recesses of your consciousness.

Like Ulysses himself, Homer was a smooth talker, 'a man nimble with words.' His freshness and naturalness make us feel that he lived in a young and unjaded world, to which every sensation was a novelty, and melancholy and boredom were unknown. Really, he lived in a troubled world, as we do. He made the best of it by writing about it understandingly, vividly, and as accurately as his information allowed.

If all that could be said about writing for various occasions has not been said in this essay, recall the wise saying added by an executive to a memo to one of his staff: 'Probably this does not exhaust the subject, but it will suggest materials for your consideration.'

A WARTIME ACHIEVEMENT

The establishment of an aircraft industry in Australia would have been difficult enough under normal peacetime conditions. Under the adverse conditions of war, when demands were far in excess of supply not only for manpower and materials but for equipment of all kinds, the difficulties were infinitely greater. Nevertheless the aircraft industry became one of Australia's major undertakings, employing at the height of its activity (in June 1944) some 44,000 men and women. Women did a magnificent job for the industry: they worked lathes and milling machines, presses and drills; they worked as electric welders, riveters, assemblers, laboratory assistants, inspectors and tracers. In some Beaufort plants, for instance, as many as 57 per cent of the workers were women; over the whole organization they made up about one-third of the total number of employees. More than 80 per cent of the men and women working in the Beaufort organization had had no previous factory experience; less than 10 per cent of factory employees were skilled men. One factor responsible for much of the success achieved in producing aircraft and other munitions whose manufacture had not previously been attempted here, was the adaptability of Australian workers.

To have produced 3,500 aircraft of nine different types and nearly 3,000 aircraft engines of three types, must, notwithstanding the mistakes and miscalculations that occurred, be ranked among the great achievements of Australian industry, especially when it is remembered that the fighter aircraft was one of the most highly complicated examples of precision engineering.

A fairly complete and well-balanced industry had been built up with parallel development of research, with the result that after the war Australia was capable of building aircraft and aero-engines of the most advanced jet-propelled types, such as the Avon-Sabre fighter, the Canberra bomber and the Rolls-Royce Nene engine, thereby establishing herself firmly as a strong link in the chain of air bases protecting the British Commonwealth.

—D. P. Mellor, The Role of Science and Industry.
The Active Citizen Air Force In The 1970s

Flying Officer R. J. Bluck

Weekend fliers, Boom? Never.
—Winston Churchill to Lord Trenchard.

If you do not think about the future you cannot have one.
—John Galsworthy.

Introduction

This essay contends that the role and activities of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in the 1970s must be resolved before any meaningful discussion of the aims, organization and employment of the Active Citizen Air Force (ACAF) can take place. The new attitudes of the young generation, and the attitudes of Australians, towards the permanent services and citizen forces are examined in detail—for it is in this context that both the RAAF and ACAF will be operating. The financial stringencies of the defence problem are noted, and the value and relevance of the continued existence of the ACAF is questioned. It is concluded that the future of the ACAF may lie in more effective management and supervision rather than in any radical reorganization of the existing structure.

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New Attitudes in the 1970s

I see no hope for the future of our people if they are dependent on the frivolous youth of today but certainly all youth are reckless beyond word.... When I was a boy we were taught to be discreet and respectful of elders but the present youth are exceedingly wise and impatient of restraint.—Hesiod (Greek poet, 8th Century B.C.)

The 1970s often are proclaimed as the era of the young. The post-World War II birthrate boom is working its way through the nation's age structure. The 1960s were the age of the teenager and these young people are now maturing into adulthood. By 1981, the nation's population will be over fifteen million, of whom nearly half will be under twenty-five years of age. Currently over five million Australians are under twenty-five. The RAAF and ACAF will be operating in and dependent upon a youthful environment; hence an understanding of the new attitudes of the young is essential.

The young adults of the 1970s will have more formal education than their predecessors—an education which is significantly different in three ways: they have remained longer at school, the curriculum has increasingly emphasized conceptual thinking and problem-solving rather than rote-learning; and there has been a 21-inch electronic encyclopedia in the living-room throughout this new generation's lifetime. Modern education also has emphasized the quality of personal life as well as vocational training—an emphasis of critical importance to the RAAF and ACAF if recruiting effectiveness is to be maximised in the 1970s.

As the pioneers of new ideas and life style behaviours, the young often are criticized for their departures from tradition and viewed as radicals. However, their ways are generally followed at varying distances by other youth and later by older members of society. Youth always has been a time for idealism and for optimism concerning the ability of the new generation to solve the problems inherited from the previous generation.

Relative to youth's unprecedented awareness of mankind's problems—the capacity of an institutionalized, technological society to cope with these problems seems to many to be breaking down or at least faltering. The growing feeling of loss of individual identity—of being a number in a computer's memory bank; the lessening of traditional family life; the high mobility rates and the loneliness of the urban conglomerations all have contributed to a questioning of the traditional Australian decision making processes.
‘Environment’ with its emphasis on pollution control and resource conservation in the public interest, together with the growth of ‘consumerism’ are seen as the new ‘isms’ for the coming decade. The new attitudes of the young are likely to be centred upon the social significance of their work and the satisfaction derived from it, rather than merely the economic return — the adequacy of which is assumed.

Materialistic acquisitions to display status are likely to be increasingly replaced by involvement with the quality of life, social experiences and leisure activities. Given these different attitudes and concerns the diversion of funds for public rather than private goods and services may have a better reception with this generation — however this may not include defence!

Those professionally concerned in communicating with modern youth and coping with their new values have diagnosed their changing attitudes, and a jaundiced, cynical reception to communication attempts which overtly tried to manipulate these attitudes:

... speaking to youth in its own jargon can bring about resentment, for that jargon is youth's own and its use by others can be suspect.¹

With more than $400 million invested annually in the five principal Australian media the danger of costly mistakes has led to extensive research and testing in the search for the 'right formula' to communicate to particular segments of the community. Honesty and sincerity are the new order of talking to the young and it is increasingly realized that any hint of hypocrisy is likely to produce a strong negative response.

A reasoned factual communication, emphasizing job satisfaction and more importantly the contribution to a better society, would seem to be implied for future recruiting and public relations efforts. How much knowledge the existing recruiting and public relations operations have of the results of private enterprise research and what use they make of it is not known. Perhaps the time has come to evaluate the advantages of employing professional consultants to handle these vital areas for the RAAF in the 1970s. A similar move began recently — the Commonwealth Advertising Council, via its administering authority the Australian Government Publishing Service,

is widening the opportunities for professional advertising agencies seeking government work, offering five year contracts to those selected.²

The world is a new world, in which the unity of knowledge, the nature of human communities, the order of society, the order of ideas, the very notions of culture and society have changed, and will not return to what they have been in the past. — Robert Oppenheimer, physicist.³

The pace of change is increasing with the prospect that it will become even faster, affecting every part of life, in particular the use of leisure. Youth, leisure and change of environment are powerful forces in the process of change. The use of leisure time will be one of the greatest problems and challenges to be faced in the coming decade — a problem of direct relevance for the citizen forces in Australia — if the ingredients are analysed and a suitable solution prepared to capitalize on the potential of the situation. One of the most important defence ingredients of the 1970s is the Australian attitude towards the armed services and the citizen forces — both the traditional attitudes and the Vietnam-intensified attitudes of the young.

The Services in Australia

The same cast of mind can be seen in the anti-authoritarianism of many Australians who regard the police as enemies, army officers as traitors to democracy, the boss as a barely necessary evil and anyone who gives an order as deeply suspect. — Craig McGregor⁴

The new social patterns of the late twentieth century involve a number of changes in the traditional relations between the armed services and the rest of the community, the latter often having regarded the former as repellent or alien. Indeed, the attitude towards the permanent armed services by both the government and Australian public has been to regard them as a 'necessary evil'.⁵

Militarism and the armed services are seen by the modern young liberals as representing four threats to democratic society: threat to freedom; threat to democracy; threat to prosperity (economic burden of armaments) and a threat to peace. Hence, whilst they may be prepared to accept larger public expenditures in keeping with their new

³ The Australian, 14 October 1970, p. 15.
⁴ Craig McGregor, Profile of Australia.
⁵ J. Hetherington, Australians — Nine Profiles, p. 4.
social attitudes, there can be expected a growing pressure on Australian
governments to cut back defence expenditures from the 3.2 to 3.5 per
cent of Gross National Product of recent years.

The contribution of the citizen military effort in two world wars
has added to the relatively poor esteem enjoyed by the professional
soldier in Australia. The fact that the nation's greatest military
commander, Sir John Monash, was a citizen soldier with a distinguished
civilian career both before and after his service in the 1914-18 war is
another factor of great and lingering psychological importance.6 The
popular attitude to military glory is summed up in the private soldier's
wisecrack: 'The only kind of soldier I want to be is a returned soldier.'

Defence has always been regarded in Australia as a civic
responsibility, not the province of a clique, and thus is held as a topic
requiring maximum public discussion and participation; unfortunately
this has not always been forthcoming. There has been a feeling that
the armed services should have some practical use in peacetime, for
example, army engineers, and this feeling may have to be acknowledged
when considering the future of the RAAF and ACAF public relations.

These attitudes, together with the smallness of the permanent
military establishment, could lead to an under-evaluation of the
influence of the armed forces in the Australian way of life. The
traditions established by the armed forces come partly from everyday
culture and partly from accepted myths about the 'national character'.
The historian K. S. Inglis, writing in Meanjin, observed that the Anzac
tradition is in many ways co-existent with an older Australian national-
istic tradition and the legend of the 'Digger' has military as well as
civilian aspects.7

The strength of the citizen tradition in the Australian military
is reflected by the emphasis on the military characteristics of hierarchy,
loyalty, order and patriotism in many civilian activities and in particular
on public occasions. Further reflection is evidenced in the extensive
re-establishment, rehabilitation schemes, preference in employment,
housing, farm settlement, etc. given to the ex-serviceman. The Aus-
tralian attitude towards military service pervades much of the written
military history which is usually concerned with the stories and

6 S. Ence, Equality and Authority, p. 431. (Also chapters 23, 24, 25 and 26).
exploits of the individual soldier and fighting men rather than matters of strategy and politics.

The military establishment of the 1970s will differ considerably from that of the past, although it will continue to operate within the framework set by history and in particular the strong public feeling in favour of voluntary enlistment and voluntary service. The increasing professionalism of military life has accentuated the shift from traditional discipline to authority based on persuasion, explanation and expertise. The challenge confronting the services is to maintain the level of professionalism and self-confidence existing during the Vietnam conflict. In an environment comparable to that which almost certainly faces the country in any future military action, Australians proved beyond doubt that they had evolved their own individual and highly effective military answers.8

Vietnam represents the first time this country has been involved in a war divorced from British participation, or indeed, even tacit British support. Vietnam has had considerable impact on the young generation of the 1970s, many of whom see the loss of nearly 500 lives, the wounding of some 2,400 men and the expenditure of over $200 million as a tragic waste. This war was transmitted to every home daily via the news media; the resultant domestic divisiveness remained on an understandable and manageable scale and there was no war glorification which had obscured the real meaning of the Anzacs' action at Gallipoli. The strengthening of the traditional anti-authority, anti-military feelings by the Vietnam conflict, and indeed their broadening and modification, must be taken into account in any policy planning for the 1970s. The attitudes of the young to the military are not new — they are an intensification of long standing ideas. The importance of the public opinion in defence matters is that the problem of balancing defence spending and other national needs cannot be solved by the defence planners and government alone — ultimately the public set the context in which defence decisions are made.

The Defence Problem

The characteristics of the military establishment in any state are determined by the dominant political characteristics of that state. The size and nature of the components of the RAAF depend on com-

parable decisions in the Army and Navy and the national policy on
limited war contingencies to be prepared for by the services.

‘Australia has no defence problem,’ claims Professor Michael
Howard (Higher Defence Studies, Oxford), ‘There is not a cloud on the
horizon.’ The then Defence Minister Mr John Gorton said in July
1971 that ‘Mainland Australia was not likely to be attacked in the next
ten years.’ Whilst there is no obvious threat to Australia at this moment
it is clear beyond doubt that we live in a region which could become the
Balkans of the 1970s and 1980s.9

The astronomical cost and continuing rise of defence expenditures
necessary for maintaining modern effective armed services exceeds
normal cost inflation rates. The traditional Australian defence philosophy
of tailoring its forces and its defence spending along lines which were
basically complementary to the support provided by large allies is no
longer seen as viable. If any defence credibility is to be main-
tained Australian services should be capable of mounting independent
operations.10

With increasing demands for other national needs (education,
health, housing, overseas aid) on the government’s financial resources
it is doubtful whether the contradiction of having no evident threat and
of spending increased amounts on more powerful forces will escape
criticism. Only two per cent of voters saw defence as a national
problem in a survey conducted in March 1971.11 Those who oppose
militarism for any reason will find growing support for their case—
particularly among voters who have in the past accepted a relatively
high level of defence spending. There are few historical examples of
military budgets pursuing an upward spiral in the absence of any
threat of urgency or any fear of potential danger.12

In the government’s anti-inflationary drive the defence budget
suffered the same paring as other government projects, particularly
equipment. This highlights the RAAF dilemma of the future—man-
power or equipment. Service pay and allowances are the growth
component of the defence budget, rising from 40 per cent to almost 50
per cent of the total defence appropriations in the last three years and

10 ibid.
further growth is predicted. If National Service is abolished then the pay component will be under further pressure as the services compete with civilian employers to attract skilled young men.

Of the three services, the RAAF probably faces the most serious equipment problems. It has been suggested that the RAAF will need some if not all of the following in the next decade:¹³

- Replacement for the Mirage interceptor.
- Replacement for the Macchi jet trainer.
- Replacement for the Neptune maritime reconnaissance aircraft (highlighted by the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean).
- A ground attack aircraft.
- Replacement for the Winjeel primary trainer.
- New communications equipment.
- New missiles (air to air, air to ground).
- Tanker aircraft.

It is important in the 1970s and 1980s to have the right balance of equipment and men in the defence forces as a whole—1971 Defence Report. In the continuing conflict for finance between pay and allowances (manpower) and equipment there would appear to be three choices: first, and most unlikely, increase the defence budget to accommodate both increased pay and more equipment; secondly, increase pay at equipment’s expense, and thirdly increase equipment and cut back pay by decreasing manpower or curtailing growth. Whilst there have been pay increases and equipment cancellations in the short run—given the government’s struggle with inflation and continuing economy drive, a decrease or limit in manpower would appear more likely as a long term solution. If this analysis is accurate, added impetus is given to the examination of service pay, conditions and postings etc. to identify and remove ‘job turbulence’ and allied dissatisfactions with service careers. This potential manpower situation has important implications for the ACAF of the 1970s.

The Citizen Air Force

An Australian who made the militia a hobby was likely to be regarded by his acquaintances as a peculiar fellow with an eccentric taste for uniforms and the exercise of petty authority.—Gavin Long.¹⁴

¹⁴ Gavin Long, To Benghazi, Official History of the 1939-45 War, Vol. 1, Series 1, pp. 11-12.
If the services are not compelled to plan and justify their forces systematically on the basis of explicit criteria of the national interest they, like any bureaucracy, will tend to perpetuate existing missions and capabilities. This is a fact of bureaucratic life in any organization, hence an examination of the nature of the ACAF in the 1970s should first establish whether in fact the ACAF needs to exist and then define explicitly its aim. No discussion detailed or otherwise about organization and employment of ACAF squadrons is valid until the questions of existence and aim are resolved. The horse cavalry and the battleship took a long time to die after they had outlived their usefulness. It could be argued that it is a grossly wasteful misuse of resources to spend a million dollars a year on maintaining defence forces which may never be called into action and which may be ill-suited for their task if ever they are required.

Before any definitive task description for the ACAF can be constructed, the RAAF must resolve where it is going, how, why and when, over the next decade. The ACAF is an appendage to the RAAF—they must both come to grips with the social environment and community attitudes they will face in the coming decade. It seems extraordinary that no real examination has been made of the defence forces training activities, particularly when the post-Vietnam situation of standing forces in peacetime is considered.

Calling for review are the value of training, the character of training, training methods and techniques ... the resources devoted to training and so on. The needed review called for the aid of educationalists and others outside the services. — Sir Henry Bland

Unfortunately, in both training and other matters it is still possible for influential observers to comment:

The *ad hoc* decision taken in reaction to an immediate situation rather than as part of a long term plan still seems to be very much the RAAF way of doing things.

Despite the less sympathetic environment, community attitudes, the stringent financial situation and the lack of planning and effective guidance—it is felt that there is a place for the ACAF in the 1970s. An ACAF making a positive contribution to the RAAF in terms of technical skills, managerial and training experience, and providing an


important link with the civilian community whose hardening attitudes towards defence have already been noted. As the public sets the climate for the defence appropriation debate, the importance of ‘taking the pulse of the public’ and providing an informed flow of information about the service via ACAF personnel—who are drawn from a wide cross-section of the community—and the use of a modern effective public relations consultant, cannot be underestimated. It is vital that the standing permanent forces in the 1970s avoid becoming a new kind of military ghetto and thus further polarizing anti-military feeling: the ACAF forms a necessary link between the RAAF and the civilian environment on a broader basis but in a similar fashion as the university squadrons provide a link with the traditionally antipathetic academic world.

Assessing the contribution and effectiveness of the ACAF in its ‘link’ role is a subjective process. What of the more objective contributions the ACAF can make to the RAAF? Any attacks on the ACAF on financial effectiveness are surely ignoring the difference between peacetime and wartime economic considerations. What is reasonably economic to produce under peacetime conditions and what must be found at all costs in an emergency are two different situations. It is essential to ensure that the RAAF has the necessary technology and skills in its immediate reserves. The definition of ‘necessary’ is the crux of the question and until the RAAF decides and precisely states what it expects from the ACAF any discussion of organization and employment is superfluous. This assumes of course that the relevance of a nation in arms responding to an emergency in a world of continual crisis has been resolved in favour of the continuance of the ACAF.

The service in the 1970s will increasingly need highly developed management skills in addition to and distinct from professional military competence. There will be a need for greater recruitment of graduates as officers and the use of the normal civilian establishments—universities and technical colleges for professional and sub-professional training. This trend will strengthen the two-way flow of information between the civilian and military environments and relieve the service from the necessity to maintain duplicative training establishments which are expensive in manpower and facilities.

During the seventies most senior war-experienced ACAF officers will have retired and officers with war service will be found in the
permanent rather than citizen forces—this experience being gained in post World War II conflicts. However, the ACAF officers have much to offer the RAAF—being drawn from civil management, engineering and academic environments they form a reservoir of knowledge which can be most useful by virtue of their backgrounds in both civil and military areas. General Monash, in describing his work methods, said he dealt with every military task and situation on the basis of simple business propositions, as they differed in no way from the problems of civil life except that they were governed by a special technique. ‘The main thing,’ Monash said, ‘is always to have a plan; if it is not the best plan it is at least better than no plan at all.’

...citizen officers have a far wider range of experience and contacts and the isolation of the regular officer should be minimized by better academic training and the opportunity to pursue civilian occupations.—Major-General Drake-Brockman.18

Whilst the political value and utilization of managerial skills of the ACAF may be resolved relatively easily the raison d’être of the ACAF is that of a technical reserve and it is here that more exact policies need to be formed in the context of the foregoing discussion of the 1970s environment. The importance of establishing the aim is clearly established in the functional leadership concepts of John Adair.19

What are the existing aims of the ACAF? There appear to be as many interpretations as there are auxiliary squadrons. Flexibility and freedom to adapt to local conditions always has been and should remain one of the major characteristics of the ACAF—the inherent problems of improvisation, selection and training probably would have caused a less flexible system to crumble. ‘You are running your own show. If you don’t like the regulations, rewrite them,’20 said Lord Trenchard to an Auxiliary Squadron CO. However, an imprecise approach towards the auxiliary squadrons by command could produce frustrations and the expenditure of much energy and effort in pursuit of some nebulously defined objectives.

More positive direction and effective support both administratively and technically may be required. Three interpretations of the ACAF’s

19 Dr J. Adair, Training for Leadership, 1968.
20 A. Boyle, Trenchard, p. 518.
role appear to be current within the auxiliary squadrons themselves. First, that they are to provide immediate technical support units at a high state of operational readiness. Secondly, that they are to orientate civil training technicians in RAAF skills and build up the RAAF Reserve with personnel needing minimal additional training to become effective. Thirdly, the performance of both objectives concurrently. The resolution of priorities here has many implications—recruiting preference policy, re-engagement policy, proportion of ex-PAF personnel. If the first interpretation is paramount then a maximum of ex-PAF technicians may be sought and multiple re-engagements encouraged. Whilst the specific achievement levels for training are indicated, however, if the second interpretation is correct then the emphasis may be only to hold a standing training cadre of ex-PAF senior NCOs and encourage a high turnover of civilian recruits training to a somewhat different achievement level.

Also unresolved is the question of how ACAF squadrons and personnel would be utilized in the event of mobilization. Two conflicting theories are advanced—the first that the squadrons would operate integrated with their affiliate PAF unit as in the annual continuous training exercise; the second that the personnel would be scattered to plug any gaps in the RAAF. This is a matter of some concern, in its effect on morale, because of the nature of auxiliary squadrons and their identification with a particular city. To the usual squadron loyalty has been added a further stabilizing element; attachment to one place of which men are proud because they live there and represent the local volunteer enthusiasts.

If the peacetime role of the ACAF is to attract bright, technically trained volunteers then citizen service must offer a challenge, a broadening of technical knowledge, and be seen as a worthwhile activity, given the new social attitudes of the 1970s. Hence the concept of mere orientation training and high turnover of personnel would be unsatisfactory. The priority should be to produce a technical back-up force of operational capability to support the RAAF in whatever activities are decided as relevant for the service in the 1970s with the absence of any known specific threat. Should the financial pressures of limited defence budgets have repercussions on PAF manpower then the value of some 800-1,000 technically trained operational airmen, either ex-PAF or civilian, whose basic training is a cost written off in the past or
borne by civilian institutions becomes obvious, especially when they cost less than $1 million each year to maintain.

One of the main economic counter-arguments on RAAF expenditure is that it is the major training institution for the nation's aviation industry—both providing aircrew for civil operations and skilled technicians for the construction and maintenance industry. Hence what appears to be large 'unproductive' defence expenditure should be discounted as social investment. The ACAF plays a role in maintaining service access to some of this training investment once men have left the RAAF and also provides an inexpensive way of adapting new manpower to service needs drawing on the technical and managerial investment of private industry.

In the event of mobilization, the swift integration of the citizen forces, logically, with the units, facilities and men with whom they have trained, depends upon their active participation in RAAF operations and exercises and the realism of their continuation training. This predisposes that control of the ACAF should remain with operational command which is able to plan policies and programs to ensure that a measure of continuity pervades the activities and goals of the ACAF, and that this activity is in keeping with the overall concept of RAAF operations in the 1970s—which, as mentioned earlier, needs to be resolved before any ACAF role clarifies. It is possible that certain problems and frustrations of existing ACAF operations may be removed with more positive supervision, co-ordination and support at the command level.

The activities of over 800 men scattered in five squadrons, each with local problems, differing affiliations and equipment requirements, and meeting only once each three weeks requires closer contact and familiarization than is possible from an additional secondary duty allocated to an existing staff officer. Required is a full-time command staff officer (auxiliary squadrons) who combines the functions of inspecting, directing and administrating because, in the special context of auxiliary squadrons, they are inseparable. This officer would have the time to come to grips with the nature of ACAF operations and their problems and to assist in preparing solutions compatible with operational command requirements. He would provide an immediately accessible and informed liaison facility for all parties involved—operational command, PAF units and the auxiliary squadrons—and would provide
the cross-fertilization of ideas and procedures essential for the promotion of efficiency and innovation. This could be achieved without encroaching upon the traditional flexibility of auxiliary squadrons to adapt to the local situation. Once abandoned a military tradition cannot be rebuilt overnight.

...there is little doubt in my mind that 'scrounging' is a characteristic only of a Service which has been or is starved of adequate supplies for all its requirements.
—Air Marshal Scherger.  

Although talking of the RAAF in World War II, Scherger could be talking of the ACAF which at present appears to be very much on the ‘fringe of things’ in terms of policy and planning. The ACAF should not be forced to ‘scrounge’ training policies, programs and equipment in an ad hoc fashion or on the ‘old boy’ network. Full utilization of the unique potential contribution ACAF personnel can give the RAAF will assist the service in the austere financial future for the defence forces. The ACAF should be included in policy and planning at all levels and adequate management liaison provided to ensure effective operation of the existing ACAF concept which, although basically sound, appears not to be operating at capacity.

The aims, organization and employment of the ACAF in the 1970s are entirely dependent upon the activities of the RAAF in that decade—a period which will involve significantly different community attitudes towards defence; and a curtailment of defence spending in the absence of a specific threat. It is the responsibility of the RAAF to resolve its future activities and then give the lead as to what it expects of the ACAF.

AIRCRAFT PIONEER, by Lawrence James Wackett. (Angus and Robertson, 1972, $6.95).

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Argent. AHQ Canberra

It was early 1915 and third intake at RMC were told that they would graduate on 28 June, eighteen months early. Because their first two years of training were concentrated on infantry and cavalry they were given the choice of volunteering for a battalion or a light horse regiment. Only one cadet held out for a technical arm. This surprised and rather perplexed the college authorities and eventually his case was reported to AHQ. As luck would have it, at that time the AIF had sufficient infantry and light horse officers but there was a shortage of artillery officers. Again the class was paraded but this time a call was made for volunteers for artillery. Now all told, twelve stepped forward.

The lone cadet who started it all was Lawrence James Wackett and it was a good thing for the future Australian aviation industry that he took the line that he did. Years later his armorial bearings had this motto which translated, 'Success, not without opposition'. This pretty well sums up his life.

In the event Wackett did very little artillery training with the permanent battery at Maribyrnong as he began flying training with No. 3 Course at Point Cook in August 1915. A fellow student was Frank McNamara. They trained on dual Bristol Boxkites and the solo B.E.2A. Incidentally, of the twelve pilots trained in the first three courses at Point Cook only six became genuine service pilots; the remaining six had no intention of going to the wars as pilots. In addition a number of
permanent artillery officers used 1 Squadron AFC as a convenient way, by means of an observer’s badge, to get safe staff jobs overseas.

Overseas in 1 Squadron Wackett flew grossly underpowered aircraft over the Sinai Peninsula on reconnaissances. For a short time his observer was Ross Smith. His engineering bent which had developed at Duntroon where he had designed an automatic fuse setter (and where, 35 years later, some of the older staff could still recall his aptitude) led him to develop a synchronized machine-gun and an elementary type of gun turret. Later, he was given a few hangars full of crashed aircraft and was told to make up serviceable ones from airworthy components. He produced twelve aircraft — he was the only officer and did the test flying himself — in time to equip a second squadron for Gaza. This was a big break as the RFC commander was so pleased that he sent Wackett to the United Kingdom to work in the technical establishments of the Royal Flying Corps.

In the UK, Wackett was posted to the Orfordness Experimental Station in Suffolk where he flew many types of aircraft connected with armament trials. Two of the men he worked with were Tizard and Lindeman, both of whom were to be prominent in World War II scientific circles. (Lindeman is reputed to be the man who first discovered how to recover from a spin, but there is argument about this).

From experimental work, Wackett rejoined the AFC and became a flight commander in 3 Squadron, flying R.E.8s, in mid-1918, on counter battery work. A radio transmitter was used air-ground. 3 Squadron supported the ANZAC Corps under General Monash in a unique way during the Battle of Hamel — resupply of machine-gun ammunition by air. Although Wackett doesn’t mention it, the idea came from a captured German message. During an advance it would take two men to carry 1,000 machine-gun rounds which would be fired in about five minutes. The captured German message led the British to try the scheme of air dropping. Initially, boxes of ammunition and their parachutes were dropped over the side. However, after the wing commander and CO 3 Squadron (Major D. V. J. Blake, later major general in 2nd AIF) were nearly killed while observing the trials when the parachutes failed, Blake suggested using the wing bomb racks and Wackett was told to invent something. He did it successfully using the 25 lb and then the 112 lb racks, 12 feet diameter parachutes and ammunition boxes weighing 40 lb. 200,000 rounds were dropped in 24
hours. Wackett received an inventor’s award of £300 for this — a little more than half his year’s pay as a captain in the AFC.

The end of the war saw Wackett with a DFC, AFC and a mention, but not the end of his service flying in the UK. He did some useful courses up to late 1919. When he returned to Australia he was posted as Area Officer Townsville — a lieutenant on £250 a year, a drop from his £600 as a flying corps major. Of course, this reduction was not unique to Wackett — it happened to most staff corps officers.

In fact Wackett was perhaps luckier than most of his contemporaries — he was one of the first twelve officers of the Air Force which was formed in 1921. He had the spare time and ability to complete his Bachelor of Science degree in one year and then, almost single-handed, set up the RAAF Experimental Station at Randwick where he designed, constructed and flew a single-engined, wooden-hulled flying boat — the Widgeon I and later, the Widgeon II, an amphibian. He flew Widgeon II around Australia.

Wackett, then a wing commander, resigned from the RAAF in 1930 when the experimental station was closed down, partly for reasons of ‘economy’ (£25,000 per year) and partly because of Salmond’s Report which said, amongst other things, ‘It is uneconomic to attempt to build aircraft in Australia.’ What was left unsaid was that aircraft should be bought from Britain. Wackett then formed the Tugan Aircraft Company where over the lean years of the depression he built three twin-engined monoplanes and had three more under construction.

All that had gone on before in Wackett’s life seems to have been preparation for what was to occur in October 1935. Luckily for the country there were some far-sighted men in Australia, such as Hartnett (GMH) — Wackett had worked with him during World War I — Essington Lewis and Darling (BHP); Fraser and Baillieu (Broken Hill Associated Smelters); the Minister for Defence, Sir Archdale Parkhill and the Chief of the Air Staff, Group Captain Williams. From the ideas of these men and from Wackett, and money from their companies, and later from ICI and the Orient Steam Navigation Company, the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC) was formed at Fishermen’s Bend, Melbourne. They had their difficulties, not so much on the technical side but from the doubters at home and abroad. For example, the Australian High Commissioner in London could not believe that aircraft would be built in Australia and he threw Wackett’s
credentials onto the floor; the Air Ministry were sceptical; the British Trade Commissioner, when the decision was made to build the North American NA 33 and the Pratt and Whitney Wasp engine, tried very hard to have the decision changed. It is perhaps ironic that the Society of British Aircraft Constructors, that so strongly opposed the building of aircraft in Australia then and who now put on the Farnborough Air Show, should this year feature an Australian built aircraft.

Under Wackett as managing director of CAC the NA 33 became the Wirraway and the percentage of Australian content of the machines rose as more and more came off the line, a procedure somewhat similar to the manufacture of the OH-58 helicopter by CAC 35 years later.

Up to 1949, CAC produced 757 Wirraways, 200 Wackett trainers, 2 bomber prototypes, 1 fighter prototype, 170 Mustangs and 250 Boomerangs. The Boomerang was born out of the desperate days following the fall of Singapore. There were no fighters in Australia and while it was realized that anything produced could not match the Spitfire or the Zero, something was needed to tackle the Japanese bomber. The Boomerang prototype flew only 13 weeks after the go-ahead decision was made — a most remarkable achievement by any standard. The rapidity was due to the quantity of engines available (spare 1,200 H.P. Twin Wasps bought for the Hudson); use of Beaufort engine installation parts; and using the maximum parts of the Wirraway. The first RAAF Boomerang Squadron was formed six months later.

After the war CAC turned their hands from the sword to making ploughshares, in the form of aluminium kettles, pressure cookers, bodies for buses, pre-fabricated houses, sanitary ware and enamelled bath tubs. Petty politics of the day forced both CAC and their neighbours, the Government Aircraft Factory, out of the pre-fabricated housing business. All these extra-mural measures were designed to keep a highly skilled work force in being. Despite their best efforts, both CAC and GAF failed in their endeavours and the expertise drained away. Soon, however, it was needed again.

The engine division of CAC started building Nene jet engines for the GAF built Vampire, and Avons for the Canberra bomber. Now a replacement fighter for the aging Mustang was required. The RAAF selected a British aircraft — a Hawker model — but it was soon discovered that no production drawings had been done and that Hawker had had no experience in licencing. By dint of persuasion, energy and
travel Wackett had the North American Sabre accepted by the Minister for Air. The Sabre had been doing well in Korea but the Australian model had one great improvement over its US counterpart—its Rolls Royce Avon could develop 2,000 lb more thrust. The Avon Sabre first flew in Australia on 3 August 1953 and sonic booms were here to stay. The RAAF had a squadron of 12 by December 1954. About the same time CAC also started producing the Winjeel trainer, the Wirraway replacement.

On these high notes Wackett retired as managing director in December 1959.

His life has not been without its suffering and tragedy. His only son, a pilot, died on operations with the RAAF during the war. Then, in 1971, Wackett fractured his spine and is paralysed from the waist downwards. Now from his wheel chair, he has spent some time devising improvements to the equipment used by quadriplegics.

His book is intensely readable and helps to fill some of the large gaps in our aviation history. The concluding chapter gives some of his thoughts and beliefs. The F-111 doesn’t escape. Wackett wrote evidently for a wide audience and therefore he gives little technical detail and doesn’t really say much about people who, over the years, made names for themselves. For example, he flew many types of aircraft in the Great War, but rarely mentions them by name; he presumably met Oswald Watt but he is not described; he was in the same class as Vasey and Beavis and many years later his chairman at CAC was General Rowell but, unfortunately for service readers, Wackett doesn’t tell us about them. There is little really about his first flight commander in 1 Squadron, good friend and the man who was the father of the RAAF — Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams.

Finally, the sharpest of axes to those concerned who allowed the dust jacket to go on to the market with a photograph printed back to front. □
Brigadier Thomson, in dealing with ‘The Australian Army Today’, (Army Journal, September 1972) has sought ‘to provide a background for more detailed study and discussion of the Army in Australia’, and has ‘posed some problems, without suggesting solutions’ (p. 23). In approaching his subject he has given brief consideration to British history prior to 1788, and our own experiences since that date.

No doubt governed by the necessity for keeping his general introductory paragraphs brief, I feel that Brigadier Thomson over-simplified and over-generalized the events of the first 150 years of our history. It is on these events that his main conclusions are based, and consequently it is of some importance that they should, I believe, be critically examined. It is therefore with some diffidence that I draw your attention to page 5.

The New South Wales Corps did not become the notorious ‘Rum Corps’ until the 20th Century, when the term appears to have been coined by Evatt; certainly no evidence has ever been produced that it was known to its contemporaries by that name.

When Bligh was deposed on 26 January 1808, Grose was a major general in Europe, having left Sydney in December 1794; Paterson (whose widow Grose was to marry in 1814) was in Launceston, and under one excuse or another did not re-assume command of the corps until January 1809, spending the 12 months before Macquarie’s arrival in ill health, ineffectual command, and heavy drinking.

I would question whether there was any real difference between the ‘military dictatorship’ during the two-year Bligh-Macquarie interregnum, and the form of government which preceded, or followed it to 1824.

From the point of view of the Secretaries of State in London, and from our own point of view with hindsight, there appears to have been no external threat to the colonies. The contemporary colonial view,
spasmodically it is true, throughout the 19th Century was quite different. America, Russia, France and Germany at one time or another loomed large as external threats, and produced appropriate reactions in coast defences and volunteer forces.

It may also come as some surprise to learn just how small were the numbers of British soldiers in the Australian colonies. On 1 January 1840 there were 2,685 of them; at the end of the decade they had increased to 3,066. In 1846-47 the British troop strength hovered about the 5,300 mark — a level which was not even approached during the 'golden' fifties.

Our military adventures started somewhat earlier than the Sudan, and while it was Australian salt meat rather than troops which went to the First Opium War in 1840, it is not impossible for Australian born recruits to have served in the First, as well as the Second Maori Wars.

I accept with caution the statement on page 10 that 'For the first 150 years of our history there was little to change our traditional view of the role of the army as something needed only in emergencies.' In at least half of those 150 years the colonies were subjected to the 'Tyranny of Distance'. In terms of communications, in its broadest sense, the various colonies could well have been separate countries located in different continents. The effects can still be seen today in the many fields of state activities.

Consequently, 'the point of view of the convicts or the miners in Victoria, the army was an instrument of oppression, not a force for protection and survival' is only one of many factors which produced a possible traditional view of the army. The numbers, political and religious outlook of emigrants in the 19th Century; the different methods of colonizing South and West Australia; the cessation of transportation (in some states long before the British regulars left); the gold discoveries, and the rise of secondary industries; the development of trade unionism, the rise of the major political parties and the development of the urban proletariat, have all contributed much to the Australian ethos.

If the New South Wales Corps had any great direct effect it would only be in NSW. Indirectly, however, its effects on Australian attitudes towards the army have been great. Its greatest crime I fear has been to provide a convenient peg on which some of its more vociferous critics could hang particular historical interpretations. Fortunately in modern times the rum sodden trading syndrome is being approached more objectively.
In essence I believe that our national history is far too complex to lend itself to simplification and generalization. The issues are far more diverse than is generally supposed. The ‘traditional view’ given by Brigadier Thomson perhaps took some fifty years to develop, but its philosophy has been somewhat eroded since September 1939. There could well be further changes in direction and emphasis in the next few years. National attitudes to the army and defence generally, perhaps evolve rather than become ossified in tradition.

Army Headquarters
Canberra

Brigadier M. Austin

Problems of CMF Training

The article ‘Towards a CMF Revival’ (Army Journal, August 1972) once again brings out into the open the problem of CMF training: however I would like to expand on some points raised by the authors.

First, discontinuing geographic affiliation in both city and country is a must, as it would appear that recruits are not greatly influenced by area loyalty. This is evident by the increased mobility of youth today and the current lack of response in geographic locations (particularly the cities) which have had previous strong army affiliations. Rationalization of depots could be given priority and the savings achieved should be directed into improving and enlarging operative depots.

Secondly, the differentiation of obligatory and alternative parades serves no useful purpose and creates an administrative burden. Surely the average CMF soldier would like to consider his commitment as a basic one night parade each week, one week-end bivouac each month and the annual camp. The additional specialist courses and training would be integrated as part of the yearly or half yearly training program.

Finally, there is the problem of administrative training of CMF members. Should the overall administrative burden be solely in the hands of ARA cadre staff I feel that one of the greatest benefits to the CMF soldier is lost. The training received in administration within a CMF unit is something that assists a person in both his army and civilian careers and although I agree that there are many areas that can receive a greater level of cadre support, military administration in the practical sense is a must for every officer and senior NCO.
The CMF can provide a reasonably well trained and efficient soldier within the restrictions of time and money that will always exist; however, removal of cobwebs from certain existing administrative procedures and the recognition that geographic affiliation is not as strong a reason as it once was to local recruiting will, I feel, greatly improve CMF efficiency and ultimately morale and numbers.

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Lieutenant F. R. Harvey

I refer to the article ‘Towards a CMF Revival’ (Army Journal, August 1972), in which I agree with the authors’ basic premise that there is a place for the CMF in Australia’s defence, and also that perhaps resources could be used more efficiently for its training. However, there are several points which I believe could be the subject of further examination.

First, it has been the experience of my unit over an extensive trial of bivouac type training, that there is a loss of continuity, as well as less opportunity to foster the troop and crew spirit and identity favourable to the efficient working of armour.

Secondly, I do not deny that probably a majority of CMF soldiers do, and would continue to, serve some periods unpaid, but this is usually for some specific and limited purpose. I feel that the voluntary unpaid basis, as outlined in the article, could ultimately prove unsatisfactory for a number of reasons.

- The soldiers who paraded initially would be given the tasks of arranging the lectures etc. for a demanding audience. If it is not good, for whatever reason, ‘volunteers’ could exercise their option and stay away from similar future activities. They could be difficult to get back. Human nature being what it is, the lecturers will ultimately have a failure. I feel that the solution lies partly, at least, in paid parades.

- The CMF is a hobby which, unlike most others, cannot be indulged in at the whim of the devotee if it is to succeed. Since it imposes disciplines of timing and conduct, it can become inconvenient at times, but we accept this. I submit that one of the reasons for acceptance is the knowledge that at least we won’t be out of pocket.
• Cherchez la femme. The pay which is received in lump sums can be the ‘decider’, when wives, fiancées, girl friends complain of being ‘army widows’. If he is saving for a specific goal, a man may feel it is his duty to take a paid job elsewhere if his CMF service is unpaid.

While I would hope that no CMF soldier would be so mercenary as to insist on pay for every minute’s duty, I feel that the principle of the above is valid.

Thirdly, the inference that cadre staff would do all Adm and Q for the week-end activities will delight many CMF members, but what battle training for WOs, Staff Sgts or Adm elements would be given? I suggest that their only major practice would be in camp. Surely this is not enough?

However, the question most needing an answer concerns NCO and officer training.

The following graph is drawn from information in the ‘Proposed Training Cycle’. It indicates that a new recruit who passes exams and is otherwise acceptable can:

- be a 2nd Lieutenant after five years
- be a Sergeant after six years
- be a Lieutenant after seven years
- be a WO2 or a Captain after eleven years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NCO</th>
<th>Recruit</th>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Cpl</th>
<th>Sgt</th>
<th>WO2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFR</td>
<td>Recruit</td>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>2 Lt</td>
<td>Lt</td>
</tr>
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YEARS

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Is it therefore intended that a Sergeant’s rate of pay (after six years training) should be higher than a 2nd Lieutenant (five years training)? If not, what incentive is there for senior NCOs.

Is it further intended that a WO2’s rate should be equal to a Captain?

Conclusions

(1) The monetary aspect of CMF service is not the most important, but it should not be overlooked.
(2) Some units would find the bivouac type training a disadvantage.

(3) For all units the prospect of extensive unpaid training may affect adversely continuity between bivouacs.

(4) An incentive should be provided for prospective NCOs, since under the proposed scheme a higher rank can be gained with less service.

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Sergeant R. J. Stenhouse.

Defence on the Cheap: A Comment

I wish to make some observations upon Major T. H. Holland’s article ‘The Fallacy of Defence on the Cheap’ published in the Army Journal in May and June 1972. First, there were a number of factual errors which should be corrected, for although I am in agreement with Major Holland that much can be learnt by studying historical experience, it is important that the accuracy of that experience be preserved by all who wish to use it. Secondly, I wish to question Major Holland’s argument at certain points.

In the first part of the article (p. 48, Army Journal, May 1972), mention is made of compulsory military training in Australia. This part-time training was compulsory for all males from the ages of 12 to 26 years. It was intended that the trainee would spend his first two years in Junior Cadets (150 hours per year); from 14 to 18 years he trained with the Senior Cadets (4 whole-day drills, 12 half-day drills and 24 night drills), and from his eighteenth year he became a member of the Citizen Force battalion. He was required to train in an annual camp of 8 days, and complete 8 days home training. He remained a member of the Citizen Forces until he was 26, although in the last year his attendance was restricted to one muster parade. The system was instituted progressively from July 1911 but was interrupted by war, and functioned on a restricted basis after 1918 until it was suspended in 1929.

Mention is made of the Monash Report, but this title is incorrect. The conference of senior AIF officers which met at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne on 22 January 1920 to consider the problem of the defence of Australia was chaired by Lt-Gen Sir Harry Chauvel. Monash was one
of the five other members. In later Defence Department records this report was always referred to as the 'Senior Officers' Report', and was not associated with any one individual. The only case of such personal usage appears to be in Colonel E. G. Keogh's book *South West Pacific 1941-45* which is clearly a major source for Major Holland.

In the same section of the article, reference is made to the Washington Conference. This important conference met from November 1921 to February 1922. Australian defence retrenchments following this conference are explained by Major Holland as resulting from the security provided by the Naval Treaty signed on 6 February 1922. This treaty fixed a 5:5:3 ratio between the navies of the UK, USA and Japan respectively. However the Quadruple Treaty, signed on 13 December 1921, was seen to be of much greater importance to Australians at the time. By this treaty Japan, the USA, the British Empire and France undertook to respect 'the rights of the others to their territorial possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean'. This treaty was to remain in force for ten years and thereafter until terminated by one power giving twelve months' notice. Japan did this in 1934. Senator George Pearce, Australia's representative at Washington, concluded his report to the Prime Minister so:

> The Quadruple Treaty, ensuring as it almost certainly does, peace in the Pacific Ocean for ten years at least, is, in my opinion, from the Australian point of view, the most valuable of the agreements conducted at Washington.

This guarantee of peace precipitated the heavy reductions in the Defence Department in May 1922.

Another point concerns the institution of the divisional organization of the AMF recommended by the Senior Officers' Conference. They suggested the AMF be reorganized to correspond to the first AIF, and this would include the AMF taking on the designation and traditions of the formations and units of the AIF. This organization was established by MBI X/G 1, dated 15 October 1920, so it could not be said that this recommendation of the Senior Officers' Report was deferred until after the Washington Conference.

I also wish to point out that by only considering the army in Great Britain and Australia, Major Holland has overlooked some important points. He criticizes the organization of the British Army in the late Victorian era (1870-99). The British Army could be kept small at that time for Britain was secure behind the protection of the largest navy.
in the world. The British army did not have a continental role until August 1911, and then it was envisaged that only a small expeditionary force would be used on the continent. The second oversight is that of neglecting to consider the question of the Singapore base and Australian defence planning between the world wars. This guarantee, although questioned, was always officially accepted and so explains the paucity of the Australian armed services in that period. The Quadruple Treaty signed at the Washington Conference and the continuing reassurances of British Conservative Governments that the Singapore base would be completed were important influences retarding independent action in Australia. The unresolved debate as to whether Australia should contribute to Empire defence, or concentrate on local defence, further clouded the defence discussion and served to retard positive action. These criticisms point to the fact that defence preparedness should be an overall concept, and not based only on consideration of one branch of the armed services.

In the second part of his article Major Holland comments that '...it is a fact of life that wars occur. They cannot be prevented by burying one's head in the sand and hoping that they will go away'. His alternative to burying one's head in the sand is contained in the quotation at the beginning of his article: 'He, therefore, who desires peace should prepare for war.' However, when Vegetius uttered these words in the fourth century he was living in a world very different from that of today. Today countries have available other methods than the development of force to preserve their security. The involved diplomacy of the Cold War period culminating in the visits of President Nixon to Peking and Moscow demonstrate this point, as does the complexity of world trade. Preparation for war is not the only way to gain peace. Also, it may not be the best way. Statesmanship has become a much more complex business than in the fourth century and much more is to be lost by going to war than was the case in Vegetius's time. For these reasons national defence problems cannot be separated from questions of diplomacy, trade and other forms of international relations. Thus defence forces need to be organised against the background of national policy. If this occurs then they should not be neglected, nor developed for their own sake, but developed most effectively with purpose and true economy.