Cover: Detail from ‘Action in the vale of Tempe, Greece, April 1941’ by war artist W. A. Dargie. At the Australian War Memorial.
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Anzac Cove during Summer, 1915. The N.Z. & A. Division headquarters is half-way up the hill on the left and to the right is Anzac Gully.
The Challenge

SINCE the 1950s, Australian defence planners have been striving for an effective organization to discharge responsibility for formulation of a unified defence policy and the efficient execution of policy decisions. Various steps have been taken to ensure that the Department of Defence can provide the required support to the process of making decisions about the development of the forces required to support national security policies, and about the management of resources made available to meet military requirements. Emphasis has been given to ensuring an association of those who have the responsibility for carrying out approved policy in the executive departments — mainly servicemen — with the central staff responsible for advice on its formulation — mainly civilian. It has been accepted that the role of the Department of Defence must go beyond the mere fixing of priorities for a pre-determined expenditure. However, it has also been established that higher defence policy and the related budgetary decisions — as components of national policy and the allocation of resources — are essentially political concerns.

Now a further review of defence organization is under way. There is not inconsiderable support for the retention of the individual traditions, spirit and responsibilities of the Services, so that I would expect attention is likely to focus on the central arrangements necessary

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for the making of a unified defence policy and for supervision of the implementation of policy decisions. The core of the problem, I believe, is to ensure a proper orientation and guidance of the Australian defence community by the identification and communication of definite purposes and objectives.

Accordingly, this paper reviews aspects of the defence decision-making process, with emphasis on British and recent American experience to derive some guidelines for the development of an Australian organization for defence. These guidelines are offered in the hope that discussion at any level can be more than merely a confrontation of civilian control by a military thirst for power. They are not intended to be definitive but represent one view of how consideration of all factors affecting defence policy might be effectively conducted and directed. It is by understanding the nature and complexity of the tasks to be performed that the structure of the higher defence machinery can be assessed.

The Search for Method

Following the experiences of the First World War the suggestion was made that there might be advantage in recognizing definitely the need for investigation and thought as preliminaries to action in defence matters. This statement seems somewhat naive today but it stemmed from a situation in which there had been inadequate provision for the organized acquisition of facts and information, and the systematic application of thought as precursory measures to the settlement of defence policy and its subsequent administration. The traditional mode of analysis — politics first and then war, each according to its own modes — was outdated then, but it was not until the dark periods of the Second World War that full realization of the fact that politics and strategy merged at every point was achieved. The technological revolution introduced disturbing effects on traditional military roles and tasks. In the post-war years the reshaping of the world economy and the increasing number, complexity and cost of technological developments made it imperative that the economic aspects of grand strategies had also to be considered.

In coping with this developing situation, particularly where budgetary decisions became predominant, choices had to be made between a large number of technical alternatives. Each of these was vociferously championed by its adherents. The need arose for a decision-making
process which explored implications, provided flexibility (both political and military) and included economic assessment. Academic interest became attracted to problems of strategy and it was confirmed that the decision-making process was one of continual adjustment of knowledge, information and action. However, because of the complicated situations in which defence problems were set there arose the possibility that skill in quantitative analysis could downgrade factors which could not be quantified. A complex theory could become so intellectually satisfying that the difficulties likely to be experienced by human beings in applying it in conditions of tension and confusion would be overlooked. Persons in authority needed to develop a more scientific attitude to thought but had to recognize that action cannot be merely logical because emotion is an influence of prime importance. What was needed was a mixture of inventive intuition and logic.

A further critical problem arose. An ever-widening gap developed between the sophistication of technical studies or the range of operational possibilities and the capacity of the already over-worked leadership group to comprehend their import. There was increasingly insufficient time to devote to consideration of choices — decisions often had to be made under stress and were based on only approximate summaries of the content and implications of rival alternatives. Given that these strategic decisions must form part of national decisions and that political situations often display uncertainties there was a danger that decision-making could become impulsive and irrational. In these circumstances the selection and implementation of an appropriate strategic doctrine could become impossible.

Some organizational changes in defence planning and administrative structures were initiated prior to the 1960s in various countries. As a generalization it may be said that the implementors of these changes met with two major difficulties in trying to close the gap between the size of the task and the time available. First, in the establishment of appropriate confidence and competence in and between the successive levels of decision-making beneath the political head sources of friction arose (or had been there throughout) which led to diversion of effort and unnecessary controversy. Secondly, in the application of effort there was often too much attention paid to the implementation aspects of defence administration and too little time given to the anticipation of defence policy needs.
Two further organizational aspects became apparent. If the staffing arrangements were inadequate or the allocation of responsibilities not clear-cut, the resolution of problems or the making of decisions was forced up to a higher, even the highest, level of authority. This led to consideration of problems on a 'special case' basis which became known as 'crisis management'. Alternatively, if the organization was over-elaborate there was the danger of creating a smooth-running bureaucracy having the illusion of running itself. In striving to achieve a balance here it was important to appreciate that the formulation of policy was a task which required a proper combination of strategic assessment, military experience and judgement, and also economic, scientific and other analyses in a framework of commitments and capabilities. The necessary bureaucracy was an appropriate blend of military and civil personnel to form an 'expert' group to assist in the discharge of political responsibility.

The development and application of management techniques to the defence situation became an over-shadowing concern, as effort was directed to achieving more purposeful and balanced equipment programmes, saving money and using resources more economically. However it was eventually realized that it was important to avoid the reduction of all problems to administrative terms or the over-emphasis of the technical nature of problems. These tendencies had the effect of enhancing 'objective analysis' and reduced the need for 'judgement' and its uncertainties. Policy-making could not be considered as an exercise in rational decision-making as many countervailing interests had to be mutually adjusted to achieve a policy which could be tolerated by all concerned. The policy-maker was concerned with discovering alternative solutions to his problems, with making decisions to eliminate some of the alternatives, and with making value judgements to determine the preferred solution as a basis for policy.

The American Experience

The McNamara era is part of American history and it is now more relevant to review what was achieved in the years 1970-72 to answer President Nixon's problem:

We must know the alternatives; we must know what our real options are and not simply what has found bureaucratic acceptance. Every view and every alternative must have a fair hearing. Presidential leadership is not the same as ratifying bureaucratic consensus.¹

A new team in the Pentagon — Laird as Secretary and Packard as his principal deputy — set about the task of evolving a new strategy for peace. Laird concentrated on the top-level reappraisal of strategy while Packard tackled a review of the way the Pentagon was to go about executing its tasks.

At the higher level, Laird set his aim as the encouragement of an attitude of co-operative progress by all echelons of the defence community towards building a strong national security posture. He reiterated the principle that national security was not the concern of the Department of Defense alone and that that department should not be expected, indeed permitted, to determine its own responsibility. Rather, defence force structure and defence plans should conform with objectives set by the government. The defence budget should be decided after a balance between policies which could be supported or defended by armed force and the resources which could be provided by the economy had been made. This balance should be decided on the basis of recommendations made by the National Security Council at a level above the Department of Defense. The force levels thus selected govern strategy and the ability to fulfil commitments. Then missions and objectives for the Services to implement could be determined by Defense from the broad direction given by the President.

Packard had the job of ensuring that weapons or equipment proposals were properly devised, did measure up against strategic policy requirements, and did work when they were accepted and the items acquired. The corner-stone of the new approach was called participatory management — this was based on the belief that decisions were likely to be better, and would be implemented more enthusiastically if those responsible for implementation were allowed to participate in making them. Although McNamara had been striving for this participation, the concept was not followed to the extent it should have been. The McNamara Planning-Programming-Budget cycle was altered to give the Services and the Joint Staff in the Department of Defense a major responsibility for planning force structure and weapons development and procurement. The Secretary of Defense and his staff retained responsibility for programme and production decisions, while monitoring other phases of the overall cycle. The Systems-Analysis staff were now reviewers of military plans rather than initiators of military requirements as they had been in the McNamara years.
The important task of ensuring that the programme development planning so devised was meeting the national security requirement was given to a Committee subordinate to the National Security Council and called the Defense Programme Review Committee. This committee had representation from the State Department, the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers and the Central Intelligence Agency, and included Packard, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President's adviser on security affairs as chairman. It was to deal with strategic doctrine, the working of diplomacy and resource allocation for the whole of government. On the military side it was to be perhaps the final arbiter of how well thought out specific proposals were — not deciding what design a new weapon system should have but rather whether one of the type proposed was required.

The task of undertaking a major review of the whole defence policy system and the whole defence establishment is not a simple one and it remains to be seen whether the approach adopted by Laird and Packard will be confirmed. Some concern has been expressed about the change of force structure planning responsibility from a political/bureaucratic level to an essentially military level. An independent review committee, the 'Blue Ribbon Defense Panel' set up by President Nixon in 1969 apparently had some doubts on this score also; the report of this panel has not been given a wide distribution and it is not obvious that any major revisions of the Laird/Packard system have been accepted. It is perhaps too early to tell whether America has found a new and better, not merely different way to manage defence affairs.

Packard certainly developed a skill in presenting defence programme options for the President based on a number of budget proposals — this was very important when serving a President who dislikes his subordinates foreclosing decision on him. Together Laird and Packard retained the full support of the Service chiefs while managing a substantial cut in the budget without causing any serious downgrading of the strategic forces or of high-priority research and development. They recognized the mistake made earlier in the 1960s in not heeding military advice in weapon development. By providing the Joint Staff and the Services with both fiscal and broad strategic guidance early in the budget cycle and letting the Services make decisions within these guidelines, they should ensure the compilation of realistic and workable programmes and budgets. Another Packard change — division of management into policy and implementation — requires changes in the
workings of other government departments to be fully effective and tends to cut across the principle of participatory management if levels of authority and responsibility are not watched.

The most promising feature of the Laird/Packard revolution under President Nixon was undoubtedly the re-establishment of the National Security Council and the setting up of a Defense Programme Review Committee. Defence decisions were now made with full recognition of all important factors affecting a situation. The Joint Staff and the Services were brought more definitely into the process so that the benefit of professional military advice was available to help guide decisions, which in turn were based on broad strategic decisions of the President. Steps were taken to look more carefully at advanced development items and the requirements that lead to decisions that, in turn, lead to new weapons. Those decisions must be made with the assurance that the technology is in hand and the military requirement is properly assessed.

Running through any discussion of defence administration is a thread of ‘military versus civilian’. Much of the concern in America on these grounds derives from the position of the President as both head of the executive and Commander-in-Chief. In the latter role it is unexceptionable that military advice should be direct and continuous in view of the need to control and supervise current operations. However, this cannot exclude the Secretary of Defense in view of his statutory responsibilities; in any event, participation in the preliminary strategic planning and programme development stages would involve him in operational planning to some degree.

The President must have the information and analysis of options which his departments provide in order to anticipate problems and make educated choices. In most cases he must have the co-operation of those departments to convert decisions into actions. The finding of alternative sources of military as opposed to geostrategic/geopolitical advice presents problems. The Services are virtually a monopolistic source of information and judgement on capabilities and readiness of own, allied and foreign forces and on the likely effectiveness of combat operations. Even the Secretary of Defense must depend for his judgement on analysis based on information and evaluations provided by the Services. Additionally the Services have an influence in the agencies which produce ‘national’ as opposed to ‘service’ intelligence estimates.
This is not to suggest other departments present few or no problems, but it does indicate there are more limitations on freedom of action in the foreign policy field because of the intimate relationship with the defence policy and the nature of the Services organization and procedures.

No recent American president has been thoroughly content with his relationships with the Services group of departments; all have explored various techniques to get the information and advice they need, and the support for implementation they desire. Various possibilities for reorganization of the President’s immediate advisory group exist and several reforms have been made in recent years in the policy making processes.

The arrangements made by President Nixon included the appointment of a special assistant for security affairs, Dr Henry Kissinger, and a proper use of the National Security Council, supported by the Defense Programme Review Committee, as already described. The aim was to ensure balanced decisions and the setting of rational priorities so that there was a clear relationship between foreign policy, military posture and domestic compulsions. The system of working was to ensure, _inter alia_, that there was concentration first on basic purposes in the long term and then on the operational questions of how to proceed. Planning effort was to lay the groundwork for actions which could be required in the future. Analyses of alternative courses of action were to proceed from a common appreciation of the facts.

Within the Department of Defense, following the Laird/Packard reforms, there could be evolving a change in the composition, staffing and role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their supporting staff. What is required is a central joint staff to support the Chairman and separate Service staffs to support their Chiefs in their modified role. It will be essential to ensure all views are considered appropriately at the Secretary of Defense level as well as at the National Security Council level. Equally it will be important that the Services are assured that there has been orderly consideration of their views, particularly where specific recommendations cannot be accepted. The aim must be to have the Services participate whole-heartedly in the implementation of decisions which may not fully meet their views or requirements. The achievement of this aim will be assisted where it can be demonstrated that decisions are being based on wisdom and judgement.
British Development

Britain in the years after 1945 also recognized the enormous advances and changes in the capabilities of the armed forces through science and technology. She, too, had experienced changes in political structure and in her economy and had appreciated that developments in social aspects which affected concepts of command and discipline had occurred. It was appreciated that the introduction of any major innovation would require recognition of the need for change and also the availability of the framework of an effective solution. The problems which Britain faced in adjusting to new circumstances were achieving a better allocation of resources and coping with demands for the preservation of long-established traditions.

Initial post-war development of the armed forces proceeded along the traditional lines of three independent Services with a Ministry of Defence in a co-ordinating and financial controlling role. Late in the 1960s came a radical proposal — the Mountbatten model — for one central defence board with functional responsibilities for operations, personnel and logistics and one central staff. The three Services were to have separate identity but with their Chiefs as ‘assistant controllers’ responsible to the central staff. In the event a compromise somewhere between the two was adopted.

There was general agreement that policy decision-making must be a responsibility of politicians, with Service and civilian officers having the responsibility for producing in readily digestible form relevant facts and appropriate professional advice. The committee system, so characteristically British, had served the country well. Nevertheless Lord Ismay, who had seen the old Committee of Imperial Defence which served the British Cabinet develop into the Defence Committee in the late 1950s noted that:

The problems of defence are so many and so varied that no single man, and indeed no fixed body of men however numerous or however well-informed, can of themselves possess the knowledge to arrive at correct decisions unless they are provided with expert advice on the various aspects of each particular problem.2

To provide this expert advice three principles have been adopted to guide defence planning and organization. First, forward planning must be by integrated Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence teams within the Cabinet committee system. Secondly, the men who must

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bear responsibility for the operation of Services units in war must also train and equip them in peace. Thirdly, ministries must not pre-empt political decisions.

The Minister for Defence has the task of co-ordinating personnel and logistic policies and supervising operations in accordance with political requirements. His office is essentially an administrative organization however and the Services — who are not ends in themselves — must be capable of carrying out their allotted tasks. The military command system must be seen to be used, with identifiable Service heads exercising concern for the well-being and morale of their Services. These heads must have the confidence of their troops and they must give responsible professional advice about the principles and techniques involved in the employment of armed forces. The aspects of reorganization which have exercised British Service thought have been the avoidance of advisers without responsibility, the matching of Service roles and responsibilities and of military responsibility and administrative effectiveness.

Within the Ministry of Defence most discussion has centred on the role of the Chief of the Defence Staff and his relationship with the Minister and Cabinet on the one hand and with the Service chiefs and the field commanders on the other. The Chief of the Defence Staff is the principal military adviser to the Minister and he should give joint advice as there is a corporate responsibility in the Chiefs of Staff committee system. However, as the Chiefs separately have a single-Service responsibility, there may be bargaining and compromise. The approach to programme planning is akin to the American experience — strategic guidance from Cabinet leading to an orderly and timely arrangement of requirements over an extended and flexible period with avoidance of annual arguments based on budgetary grounds. A Policy Planning Staff and a Programme Development Staff — both integrated military and civilian teams — in liaison with the Foreign Office, make recommendations through the Defence Council to the Official Committee of Cabinet. This committee includes the permanent civil service heads of the Ministries of the Foreign Office, Defence and Treasury and the Chief of the Defence Staff. Thence recommendations co-ordinating foreign policy requirements, economic restraints and military capabilities can pass to the Defence Committee and Cabinet for consideration and decision.
**Australian Experiment**

As Australian defence responsibilities increased during the 1960s it was found necessary to introduce new joint planning arrangements to develop new strategic concepts and policies. There was need to raise a larger planning component with continuity of application and a welding of service expertise and civilian experience to give a greater capacity for examination of longer-term policy issues. The substitution of full-time staffs for the old committees aimed at more flexible and speedy decision-making and better consideration of political, technological and economic factors in military planning. In essence, the new arrangements were an import of the McNamara principles, introduced when those principles were beginning to be modified in America.

After some experience with the new arrangements some of their inadequacies were acknowledged, particularly in the programme development aspects of planning. It had always been accepted that there must be co-ordinated direction based on critical analysis to ensure that the Defence Forces as a whole derived maximum capability from the smallest use of resources. This economy and effectiveness was to be sought under Defence and joint-Service control. Increased attention was to be given to the need for a more effective way of responding to complex strategic problems and handling the large growth in the defence programme, to ensure sound decisions in respect of optimum force structures and associated equipment requirements. A revised rolling programme system was introduced as a management tool, to keep requirements continuously under review so that expenditure decisions made progressively did not prevent future needs being met as priorities are changed by strategic, technological or financial variations. Of particular importance was the decision that there was distinct value in preserving the individual traditions and spirit of the Services. Rationalization of responsibilities and complementary changes in departmental relations were to be achieved by evolutionary steps. This approach was deemed more appropriate at a time when the Australian Services were re-grouping after their withdrawal from Vietnam and the Army had commenced a major reorganization of its Command structure. Organizational change is of necessity a continuing process and an evolutionary approach should progressively improve efficiency as it interferes less with a working organization in which tradition plays an important role.
However, are we sure that the Australian defence organization can meet its obligations effectively in the future? Can we confidently charge one political head with the responsibility for developing an efficient team of sea, land and air forces under unified command and for providing more economic and effective logistic support? Co-ordinated direction will be difficult to achieve unless arrangements for the formulation, consideration and selection of appropriate strategic policies can meet the present day pressures. The comprehensive nature of modern national security operations demands the evolution of closely integrated command systems and complementary changes in departmental responsibilities and organizations. Heading the Australian defence machinery has been the Cabinet, or the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee of Cabinet which some prime ministers have chosen to use. But there has been no equivalent of the American National Security Council or the British Defence Committee with their attendant committees within the Presidential or Cabinet organization. How then has informed and comprehensive advice on defence matters been presented to the Government?内部 to the Department of Defence there were four major policy committees which advised the Minister for Defence and whose conclusions from time to time were presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and not infrequently to the Cabinet. The Permanent Head of the Department exercised a basic function of policy advice to the Minister (joining with the Chairman Chiefs of Staff in respect of certain matters) and also was responsible for overall administrative and financial control of defence policy implementation. Of the major committees over which he presided, one, the Defence Committee, included representation from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Treasury and the Office of the Prime Minister. This committee has responsibility for advice to the Minister for Defence on policy and for the co-ordination of military, strategic, economic and financial and external affairs aspects of defence policy.

However, the Australian Defence Committee was not a political forum. It suffered a possible disability in that foreign policy, economic and other views could be injected prematurely, to compromise what should have been principally 'Defence' recommendations or views, and to anticipate political decisions. Perhaps it mainly served to negotiate differences between Service advice, the civilian defence advice and other departmental views. The Australian system did not, on the face of it, appear to represent the best way of providing essential strategic planning
guidance from which the Department of Defence and the Services could effectively proceed to programme development and operational planning.

Guidelines for the Future

If effective planning advice is to be provided for the Australian defence community, then the management system must embrace the following tasks:

- Discovering or anticipating the security needs of the country.
- Developing in a systematic way the alternatives or choices of the different ways in which these security needs could be met, with indications of objectives and attainability.
- Suggesting a desirable choice and outlining a policy, or course of action within which specific decisions could be made, to achieve the desired objectives.
- Deciding upon the methods and instruments of implementation of the selected policy, remembering that the Services are only part of the measures for defence of a country.
- Applying the general policy to specific instances—the execution of operational functions including their associated logistic support.
- Reviewing the implementation of policy in the light of changing circumstances, to provide information and knowledge for future use.

The political heads who must bear responsibility for these tasks must be given expert advice on every aspect of each problem which will confront them. The planning process must have distinctly determined steps and be based on strategic guidance and military concepts. A scheduled annual planning cycle must integrate strategic requirements with the budgetary process. Full use should be made of all such management techniques as programme budgeting, functional costing and systems analysis, but these will be insufficient without a framework of direction—setting aims and subsidiary objectives. Planning requires knowledge and talent but also the leadership and judgement of experienced sailors, soldiers and airmen. While war may be too costly an activity to be trusted to servicemen, it is also too serious an affair to be left to a kaleidoscope of academic speculators and corporation accountants.
The organization which supports the government in making decisions about the development of forces and the management of resources should provide for:

a. At Cabinet level, a central strategic planning and decision centre with appropriate professional staff.

b. At Department of Defence level a central planning and analytical staff with responsibility for:

(1) strategic studies leading to policy proposals;
(2) force development programmes for manpower and equipment;
(3) control of operations through a military command system;
(4) formulation of ‘needs’ research to perceive problems, opportunities and requirements for the future.

c. At Service Headquarters level, staffs to carry out the allotted tasks of equipping, training and deploying the military forces.

The selected organizational framework must not be so rigid that it would require excessive effort to adapt it from expectation to reality. It must not be so complicated that it would break down in the stress of decision-making about operational commitments.

NATIONAL SENTIMENTS

The men who joined the Army were the type who stood up in trams and gave their seats to women. There are people who are constitutionally unable to resist when a call is made, or when they feel they are under some obligation. I doubt whether many of them could tell why they enlisted. The real cause was something deeper than they could fathom. We could not see ourselves as fitting the glowing words of Masefield about the Anzacs at Gallipoli, and, although we were born with a tradition to carry on, and were proud of it, we were only too willing to admit that we were a ragtime army — though woe betide the militia or the civilian who suggested that. There was, I believe, a large body of men — perhaps the majority — who were adventurers at heart but common citizens by force of circumstance — how many of us are not — who saw in this call a glorious combination — the life of an adventurer with the duties of a citizen.

—Gavin Long, To Benghazi.
The decision to launch an attack on the Dardanelles stemmed from an appeal by the Russian Government, whose troops were being hard pressed in the Caucasus by Turkish divisions. It was thought that a British demonstration in some other quarter might cause the Turks to withdraw some of their troops.

Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, was sympathetic to the request, but felt he could not spare any troops owing to the critical fighting in Flanders. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, became intensely attracted by the project and being a man of vigorous spirit was the force behind the naval attacks of February and March, 1915 — with the object of reducing the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles and the Narrows and clearing the minefields, thus allowing the naval force to enter the Sea of Marmora, go through to Constantinople and open the Black Sea ports. These attacks failed with British and French losses in men and ships, due largely to a newly-laid minefield far down the straits.

The British Cabinet now decided to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula. The force chosen for the task, known as the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, was commanded by General Sir Ian Hamilton. It was composed of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Lieutenant General W. R. Birdwood)—which would attempt a landing thirteen miles north of the toe of the peninsula; the 29th British Division (Major General A. G. Hunter-Weston)—to land at Cape Helles; the French Corps Expeditionnaire D'Orient (General d'Amade)—to land
troops south of the straits near Kum Kale; and the Royal Naval Division (Major General A. Paris). The force assembled in Mudros Harbour on the island of Lemnos.

The 1st Australian Division, under Major General W. T. Bridges, was to land on a beach one mile north of the promontory of Gaba Tepe, its 3rd Infantry Brigade being chosen as the covering force. Subsequently the composite New Zealand and Australian Division, under Major General A. J. Godley, coming ashore after the 1st, would push inland through it with the intention of advancing to a prominent hill, Mal Tepe, overlooking the Narrows.

The Turkish defence plan had been prepared by a German General, Liman von Sanders, who had at his disposal six infantry divisions. This astute leader concentrated his main force in rear areas, with outposts on or above the beaches. By calling in reinforcements, he could thus direct his forces against the main invasion points wherever they occurred.

In the early hours of Sunday, 25 April 1915, 4,000 Australian soldiers faced the initial test. Taken as closely as possible to the point of landing by three old battleships and transports, they transferred to rowing boats and destroyers. The rowing boats of the covering force were in twelve strings — three to each string (or ‘tow’) with a small steamboat towing them. Other rowing boats, collected in the dark from the transports, were towed by the destroyers.

The silent, crowded boats approached a black outline of land, high above and close ahead. There was no sign from the Turks. The tiny steamboats began to cast off the boats and the first of these, rowed independently ahead, had just grated on the shingle when a beacon flared to the south. On the skyline 300 feet above, a figure moved. A shot from there grew into sustained fire as more and more rifles and machine-guns joined in. The time was 4.29 a.m.

Men in the boats began to be hit, but for the survivors a short run across the beach brought them to the shelter of a bank where they fixed bayonets and caught their wind. The type of country ahead was hilly, almost precipitous, totally different from that which had been described to them. They were a mile north of the spot chosen for the landing. In the grey light they began to claw their way up a small knoll that jutted on to the beach. Turkish soldiers in their path ran back to a plateau behind. Successive waves of troops now landing
came under the fire of a Turkish battery, sheltered in a quarry at Gaba Tepe.

Despite the confusion that resulted from the current that had carried the boats too far northward and concentrated them in less than half the front intended, clear and cool thinking enabled the men to control the attack, and parties began to move up the rugged slopes, and along gullies and ridges in pursuit of the Turks.

At 10.45 a.m. General Birdwood signalled that he was continuing the landing by disembarking the New Zealanders. The first part of the Auckland Battalion had already landed about 9 a.m., immediately after the last of the 1st Australian Division. The remainder of the New Zealand Brigade got ashore during the afternoon and were followed by the leading elements of Brigadier General Monash’s 4th Australian Brigade.

Turkish reinforcements were pouring in and the invaders found their advance bitterly contested. Enfilading fire from an enemy they could not see, whose defences were well prepared and camouflaged, and having to hold on hour after hour to their exposed positions, with enemy artillery raining shrapnel over them, caused heavy casualties. At this stage there was no answering artillery fire.

This, then, was the position at the end of the first day: 16,000 men and large quantities of stores had been put ashore but our losses were in excess of 2,000. And instead of driving one mile and a half inland on a front of four miles, our troops were clinging to a bare foothold on the second ridge, little more than half a mile inland on a front of a mile. Both sides had fought each other to exhaustion and the Turks, although ordered to, were unable to counter-attack.

In the meantime, the 29th Division had managed to effect a series of landings at Cape Helles. Here, too, plans miscarried, and even on the third day the first objective, Achi Baba peak, was a long way off. Deciding to launch a large offensive in this area, using all available troops, Hamilton called on the New Zealand and 2nd Australian Brigades at Anzac to supplement his attacking force.

The offensive was opened by British and French troops on 6th May, the day the Anzac brigades arrived, and continued next day, with little result. On the morning of the 8th the New Zealanders were thrown in on the left, but again little ground was gained. In the late afternoon Sir Ian Hamilton put in the Australian brigade and ordered
the whole Allied line to move forward. The swift advance of the Australians, in the face of heavy fire, was the spectacle of the battlefield, but with men constantly falling the lines became so thin and the front so weak they could push on no further. The village of Krithia, at the foot of Achi Baba, was still 2,000 yards away. The losses of both Anzac brigades were heavy; nearly 800 New Zealanders and over 1,000 Australians. A week later they returned to Anzac.

At both Anzac and Helles the Allies were now faced by complete trench lines, strongly held. The Anzacs were clinging to a precarious foothold and Birdwood was instructed to hold on and attempt only minor attacks. Place names now famous in the history of both Dominions, such as The Nek, Baby 700, Dead Man’s Ridge, Walker’s Ridge, Quinn’s Post, Pope’s Hill, Courtney’s Post, German Officers’ Trench, Russell’s Top, Steele’s Post, Lone Pine, Johnston’s Jolly, became the centres of local attacks and sorties, bombing raids and incessant sniping. Disease, especially dysentry, began to attack thousands but only serious cases were evacuated — or were willing to be evacuated. The men held on.

Plans were made for a second great offensive to seize the peninsula. The British Government promised General Hamilton fresh divisions and it was decided to make the main effort from Anzac, in conjunction with a separate operation by the British IX Corps at Suvla Bay, four miles to the north. In the hope of drawing the Turkish reserves away from the north, diversionary attacks were made by the British at Helles and by the Australians at Lone Pine, German Officer’s Trench, Quinn’s Post, Pope’s Hill and The Nek.

At 5.30 p.m. on 6th August, men of the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade scrambled from their trenches and ran for the Turkish line at Lone Pine. The enemy trenches here were roofed with thick pine-logs covered with earth and our men could not at once get in. But by jumping over them and entering open communication trenches they succeeded, and after a bloody fight, took Lone Pine by 6 p.m. The Turks now threw in reserves and desperate fighting ensued from the night of the 6th to the night of the 9th: two other battalions, the 7th and 12th, reinforced the hard-pressed men of the 1st Brigade. It was a bitter battle with bomb fighting such as had never been known before at Anzac. The dead clogged the trenches and on 10th August, when the fighting ceased, six Australian battalions had lost 80 officers
and 2,197 men. The Turkish casualties numbered 5,000. Seven Victoria Crosses were awarded for valour in this fighting.

Two attacks by the 2nd Infantry Brigade against German Officers' Trench failed, as did those early next morning by the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades against Quinn's, Pope's and The Nek. At the Nek successive lines of the 8th and 10th Light Horse Regiments met such a torrent of fire from the packed Turkish trenches that most of the officers and men were simply swept away on their own parapet or shortly after leaving it.

Meanwhile the main thrust to the north had not been progressing as planned. Australians, New Zealanders, Indians and British were working up tangled gullies towards the main objectives — the ridge of Chunuk Bair; the last seaward spur of the range, Abdel Rahman Bair; Hill Q; and ultimately Hill 971, the most northerly and highest summit of the main range. For three days confused and closely contested fighting took place. At times the attackers were close to success — but the Turks were fighting desperately too, practically their
last reserves having been committed. On 9th August, although gains had been made, it became clear that the offensive at Anzac and Suvla had failed.

The last phase of the Gallipoli campaign was prefaced by political activity within the British and French Governments. Bulgaria had swung to the German side and Germany had decided to crush her way through to Constantinople which meant, in the first place, attacking Serbia. The Premier of Greece and the Serbian Government appealed to Britain and France for 150,000 troops, to land at Salonika. In order to make up the force promised for Serbia a British and a French division had to be taken from Gallipoli.

With the growing threat that German guns, trench mortars and troops might reach Gallipoli, there was the likelihood of the Allies being thrown from their narrow footholds — especially as during the coming winter rough seas would often prevent the landing of supplies. The advisability of evacuating Gallipoli now became a matter of general discussion in England. Sir Ian Hamilton was relieved of his command of the M.E.F., and a general from France, Sir Charles Monro, was sent out in his place to advise whether the Peninsula should be held. In a brief visit he was impressed by the fact that, ‘except for the Australian and New Zealand Corps’ the troops were not equal to a sustained effort, and for this and other reasons he recommended on 30th October that the Gallipoli expedition should be withdrawn. On 7th December, after Kitchener had visited the Peninsula to see the position for himself, the British Government, following weeks of hesitation, finally decided on evacuation.

The withdrawal at Anzac and Suvla was conducted in stages: (a) preliminary stage; reduction of the forces and their material to those required for a winter campaign; (b) intermediate stage, withdrawal of all men and material not required to hold the positions for the last two days; (c) final stage, withdrawal in two nights of the remainder (about 20,000 in each sector).

By the early hours of 20th December the operation was over, with negligible casualties — two at Anzac. On the night of 8 January 1916 the British troops at Cape Helles were safely withdrawn. The success of the whole evacuation went far to counteract the blow to British prestige.

‘The part of the Anzacs in the Dardanelles campaign’, wrote Dr C. E. W. Bean, ‘though a major one, was only a part. The French
casualties were nearly as great as theirs; and the British lost nearly three times as many. Yet for the withdrawing Anzacs Gallipoli had a special meaning. It was not merely that 7,600 Australians and nearly 2,500 New Zealanders had been killed or mortally wounded there, and 24,000 more had been wounded, while less than 100 were prisoners. But the standard set was already part of the tradition not only of Anzac but of the Australian and New Zealand peoples. Anzac stood, and still stands, for reckless valour in a good cause, for enterprise, resourcefulness, fidelity, comradeship, and endurance that will never own defeat.’

The New Zealand Official Historian, in concluding his story said: ‘Even as in the war we lost our insularity and found our national spirit, so at Anzac we found our brothers-in-arms, the gallant sons of Australia; and we did our work together — for if the initial A stands for Australia, New Zealand furnished the very necessary pivotal consonants.’ —C.F.C.

FIRST HOURS AT GALLIPOLI

‘Come on boys, by God I’m frightened!’ said Lieutenant J. H. Peck (then adjutant of the 11th, and later one of the outstanding battalion commanders of the AIF), as he, with the gallant commander of the 12th, 57-year-old Colonel L. F. Clarke, and a number of others headed straight for the sheer gravel cliffs north of the knoll. The 11th Battalion had been told by someone that bullets would sound like birds flying overhead. The Turkish bullets at short range were like anything but that, and at the point of Ari Burnu one of the hard cases of the Battalion, Private ‘Combo’ Smith, set a whole boat-load laughing by remarking to his neighbour, ‘Snowy’ Howe, as they touched the shingle, ‘Just like little birds, ain’t they, Snow?’ —Dr C. E. W. Bean, First Hours At Gallipoli.
ALTHOUGH Indonesia is beset with most of the characteristics of underdeveloped countries in South-East Asia, many of these can be grouped under two broad areas—population and capital.

With over 120 million people, Indonesia is in the top six countries in population size. When one considers that the total land area is only a little under 2 million square kilometres and that over 65% of the population live in Java and Madura, which represent less than 7% of the total land area, the density and distribution of the population of this region can be appreciated.

Census figures show that the annual population growth rate is a little under 2.3%, although there are wide regional variations. This lower than expected population growth rate could be attributed to low living standards, with their high infant mortalities and short life span.

Captain Sutton graduated Bachelor of Economics from the University of Sydney in 1968 and completed the Diploma of Education course at Sydney Teachers College. He taught Senior Economics and Geography in New South Wales high schools for a further three years. (During this time his article 'Second Thoughts on Inflation' was published in the journal Economics.) He joined the ARA in 1971 and served at the Eastern Command Education Section (Holsworthy). He has been the Services (Army, Navy and RAAF) Chief Examiner in Economics since December 1971 and wrote the Services General Certificate of Education economics syllabus and study guide. He is presently at HQ Murray Barracks Area, Port Moresby.
As family planning and the wide use of birth control has only fairly recently been generally accepted, it is difficult to attribute population growth to the government’s control measures. If one cares to consider the sex ratio, the massacres of 1965 could be propounded as an explanation.³

This growth rate could be temporary and unless the government actively persists with a population control programme, the growth rate could easily expand to over 2.5% per annum. The difference in growth rate of 0.2% appears negligible but in effect it means an extra 0.2 people for every 100 people, or 2 per thousand. With a population of over 120 million this means an extra increase of over 240,000 persons per year, which must become significant.

As agriculture employs over 70% of the labour force, the government very sensibly has devoted much of the First Five Year Plan (Repelita) to the development of agriculture in the archipelago both for food self sufficiency and maintenance of full employment. Agriculture consists of both smallholders growing food and cash crops and large estates growing industrial crops.

In the agricultural sphere, Indonesia’s chronic problem has been the growing of enough rice to feed her population. Although this crop has been given top priority in the Plan, the results more than lived up to the 1971 expectations. This year rice prices are rising due to shortages caused by many factors, including drought, administrative and marketing problems. Self sufficiency in rice, (which will probably not now be achieved in 1973), would plug the drain on foreign exchange reserves used for the importation of rice. The priority given to agriculture, and in particular rice, is on one hand a very wise move, but other crops have not fared so handsomely—though not through want of trying.

Indonesia is largely dependent on agricultural exports as foreign exchange earners. To this end she has done much to re-organize and expand estate farming. Ventures such as the BIMAS programme, geared to the co-operation among villages in the production, distribution, processing, etc., of crops have met with moderate success, but there is still no viable credit extension service for farmers. Although new

¹ Special Issue, Indonesia Magazine, February 1972.
³ ibid.
methods, machinery, fertilizers, seeds, etc., have been introduced, the lack of trained agriculturalists, combined with perhaps a lack of planning in the introduction of these innovations, has led to mediocre success, if not neglect, in many agricultural fields.

The export potential of many of Indonesia's crops is not favourable. Copra, tea, coffee, sugar, etc., suffer from intense competition from other producers on the world market, forcing prices to low levels. Many of these products tend to have low income elasticities, meaning that the demand for and consequently the price of these commodities does not rise in proportion to world incomes or standards of living. Thus, even if the government did devote time and funds to the development of these products, after domestic demand has been satisfied, little could be gained from world markets.

Production of some of these goods is limited by international organizations. Recently the International Coffee Organization lowered production quotas, leaving Indonesia with an expected surplus of coffee. She could perhaps attempt to sell coffee to countries outside the ICO, but many of these, such as Japan, have a very low consumption of coffee and consequently prices are much lower. Other countries would also be competing to sell their coffee surplus.

Farmers in this type of predicament could switch to producing crops that are in world demand, such as rubber, maize and palm oil. This could result in over production in these commodities. Perhaps consideration should be given to complete diversification into nuts, soybeans or fodder—if the development of livestock is successfully encouraged. Given that domestic demand is satisfied and the foreign exchange earning potential is not attractive, now might be a suitable time to retrain farmers in their attitudes and their way of life to take their place in industry, expected to take priority in the Second Five Year Plan.

At the moment, with the introduction of machinery, better farming methods, fertilizers, seeds, processing and marketing techniques, agricultural productivity, especially in rice, has risen tremendously. Once domestic demand for agricultural commodities is satisfied, given that the export market is grim, there is really little point in devoting valuable and scarce resources to further production.

When considering the export potential of Indonesian agriculture, it would be unwise to ignore the importance of rubber and timber.
Although rubber plantations are well established and can expect a secure future, the timber resources have only recently begun to be exploited and have become one of Indonesia's biggest export earners. When the timber industry becomes fully organized and rationalized to avoid soil depletion and maintain adequate replenishment, it too can expect a bright future, with Japan as its biggest customer.

Indonesia is labour abundant in relation to capital and machinery, and unfortunately many of the new innovations in agriculture have not been labour intensive. Consequently much of the once needed labour is no longer really required and pools of agriculturally unemployed and pockets of disguised unemployment should eventuate.

Disguised unemployment or under-employment here, refers to the prospect that whereas once many labour units were required and available to produce a given output, now much less labour, combined with machinery, new methods and other innovations, can produce even more than before. The remaining labour is not really required in the agricultural sector at all. The mere fact that this redundant labour remains in the agricultural sector disguises actual unemployment figures.

One would hope that the agriculturally unemployed and under-employed could move to where jobs were available, given that social and administrative impediments were overcome. Given the declining importance of the agricultural sector, Indonesia's reserves have been saved by the current mineral and mining boom. Perhaps the agriculturally unemployed could be successfully utilized here.

Only about 59% of Indonesia has been accurately geologically mapped, but extensive mineral surveys are presently being undertaken. Even with this lack of data many important mineral resources have been discovered and are being utilized. These products include petroleum, tin, bauxite, and nickel. Petroleum is by far the biggest foreign exchange earner and because of its low sulphur content is most attractive to Japan, which is becoming increasingly concerned about pollution problems.

Note that Japan is Indonesia's most important customer, accepting about 40% of Indonesia's exports, and that petroleum and timber stand alone as important primary export crops. With this in mind it is reasonable to expect that any Japanese aid to Indonesia would be to

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4 Central Bureau of Statistics, Djakarta.
assist these industries and that Japanese investment in Indonesia would probably focus on these two industries.

It appears that externally Indonesia is dependent on one country (Japan) and two products (petroleum and timber). This situation is quite acceptable whilst it is mutually beneficial. If Japan experiences a recession, Indonesia will feel the repercussions rather heavily, and conversely, while Japan is booming so will Indonesia. If Indonesia successfully diversifies agriculturally, Japan could become even further involved as a market for new products.

Although this dependence on one country should not be regarded as alarming it should not be overlooked. Indonesia is attempting to encourage light manufacturing locally. Many of Japan's exports are light manufactures and consequently trade problems could develop. At the moment it appears that Japan needs Indonesia's oil and timber as much as Indonesia needs Japan as a market. Improving relations between Japan and China could find Japan concentrating on expanding her operations, both manufacturing and marketing, in China at the expense of Indonesia. The next few years should give a clearer indication of Indonesian-Japanese-Chinese economic relationships.

Given that Indonesia intends developing industrially, once agriculture is firmly and satisfactorily stabilized, as indicated in the Second Five Year Plan, she faces the universal problem of how to pay for the required manufacturing facilities. It would be to Indonesia's advantage if these could be developed from domestic sources of capital, but the experiences of other countries have shown the need for overseas capital inflow with all its ancillary benefits and disadvantages.

Much domestic finance can be obtained by deficit financing. Simply, this means that the government's expenditure exceeds its revenue. Many South-East Asian countries have used this approach to some degree but there are pitfalls. Because more money is being pumped into the economy than there are goods and services being produced, the spectre of runaway inflation can quickly appear. The continued use of deficit financing can lead to a lack of confidence in the economy by potential investors. The borrowing of large funds for this form of financing generates expensive and long term interest payments to service the loans. Many of these disadvantages became evident pre-1966. If used wisely deficit financing can greatly aid governments of developing countries.
Indonesia has only recently appeared to curb inflation, which ran at over 300% in 1966, and is claimed to be about 2.5% at the last budget. This feat and the returning confidence in the economy are too important to be risked by any large scale deficit financing.

President Suharto is attempting to perform the unusual. The government is making every effort to balance the budget. This appears to have been successfully instigated but capital still has to be obtained for diversion to the priority sectors.

Confidence in the economy could be gauged by the rise in domestic saving over the last four years. Quite brilliantly the government has fostered this confidence and encouraged domestic saving by offering comparatively very high interest rates. For example, on one year term deposits 6% per month was offered by the State banks. This amounts to over 100% per annum if compounded. As the banks were offering high interest rates, one would expect them to have to charge even higher interest rates for loans. This of course would diminish the effectiveness of the government’s aim of encouraging domestic saving and channelling these savings, as investment, into various sectors of the economy.

With more monetary genius loans were made available from 4 to 12% per annum, as the government indirectly subsidized loans to certain sectors. Since the curbing of runaway inflation and the restoring of confidence, these interest rates and subsidies have been progressively lowered.

Indonesia’s monetary policy approach appears to have succeeded in restoring confidence in the banking sector of the economy. The government is now heading towards a budgetary surplus, which will probably be used as development funds. The balanced budget approach is in line with governmental intentions of encouraging domestic private enterprise to develop Indonesia, with direction and incentive from government bodies.

In the early years of the present government, overseas investment of almost any kind was regarded as better than none, and an open door policy was followed. With maturity came experience, advice and perhaps a strong show of nationalism. Now there are definite guidelines covering most forms of overseas capital inflow. The government has adopted a more selective approach to foreign investment. In the sector of light industry over forty industries have been banned from foreign investment. This has been done to enable domestic sources
to finance these industries and to control the number of competitors in industries where capacity is sufficient to meet demand, preventing overseas companies dominating these industries by their sheer size.

The mineral sector is still too risky for domestic capital, and foreign investment is encouraged. Even here there are regulations. At least 20% of the shareholding must be made available to Indonesians—but only after production of the minerals has commenced. In an effort to help decentralize from Java, at least 75% of mining employees must be Indonesian. As Indonesian industry is still in its infancy it is facing severe competition from overseas producers. Overseas manufactured textiles are selling up to 30% cheaper than the domestic product. Indonesia imports the vast majority of her raw cotton supplies and is establishing numerous modern spinning and weaving plants, which should reduce the demand for the imported commodity from countries like India, China and Japan, if they are efficiently and economically administered and maintained. While most of the funds for establishing these plants has been in the form of foreign aid, costs appear to be still too excessive, even with a sizeable subsidy to the industry. Indonesia is facing the prospect of having to reduce the import duties on raw cotton and perhaps raise the import duties on the finished textile. As Indonesia is presently in the throes of seeking export markets for its light manufactures she must consider the reaction of textile producing countries to any sizeable tariff increases. Also, if locals are compelled to purchase the domestic product at higher prices, the incidence of smuggling, already a problem, could become more frequent.

It appears that Indonesia will need still more foreign capital and technical knowledge to place her industries on a firm competitive footing internationally. Unless her industries can compete reasonably successfully shortly after inception, the drain on development funds through subsidies and the aggravation of high import duties could prove to be intolerable, thus the need for overseas investment in her heavier industries.

To suggest that nationalistic forces have pressured the government into discouraging foreign investment would be an exaggeration. Governmental policy appears to be an attempt to finance development from domestic sources, supplemented by overseas capital inflow.

The conditions of overseas entry are stiffer for many light manufacturing industries with a high import content, as well as simple
processing and packaging industries. The latter are expected to be financed from domestic sources. There are incentives for overseas investors in basic industries, export orientated industries, industries requiring a high local content and industries unsuitable for Indonesian entrepreneurs.

Domestic capital supplies are simply not sufficient to effectively develop Indonesia's commercial structure. Foreign investment and aid is necessary to pump sufficient funds around the business community. The more finance that is in the country's business the more effective and rapid should be industrialization. The accompanying know-how with foreign investment is desperately needed by the technically poorly trained Indonesians. The agglomerative effects of a large overseas firm in Indonesia are important, as many smaller related industries will appear to service and be serviced by the foreign investment.

As mentioned previously, employment prospects are much brighter in an industrializing country and foreign investment is necessary to perform this industrialization successfully.

The road to successful economic development is thwart with many problems. However, from an economist's point of view, it would be difficult to deny that, given a stable and wise government, the next few years look very favourable for the Indonesian economy. Even if the economy slips backwards slightly, it would be difficult to erase the economic infrastructure established under Suharto since the abortive communist coup of September 1965.

Wooden mask used by the Dyaks in ritual dances
LIKE all important phenomena, Australian nationalism is subtle and diverse. Most accounts over-stress the contribution of the outback and the bush worker. These are important strands, but others have played an equal part. Especially was this true in the early decades of the twentieth century. The achievement of political nationhood in 1901 both symbolised and fostered a variety of patriotic concerns: awareness of the outside world and its dangers, affection for the natural history and resources of Australia, and a yearning for power and prestige. In these years, too, there intensified a middle-class, entrepreneurial attachment to the national cause. The 1914-18 War brought such elements to a new pitch.

George Augustine Taylor illustrated all these trends: being a remarkable and talented man, he did so with rare, perhaps unique, force and flair. Born in Sydney, Taylor served an apprenticeship to

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a local architect-builder. As a young man, however, he developed not
these skills so much as his talent for drawing. He published cartoons
especially with the *Bulletin* but, always displaying fierce energy, he
succeeded in placing his work far and wide. One claim is that Taylor
was the first Australian to have a cartoon in *Punch*, then the supreme
comic paper of the world. Taylor launched his own publication, *Ha-Ha*,
in 1898, cherishing the fantasy that it would arouse Sydney to ecstasy.
Later he attempted more ambitious work, with the aim of inspiring man-
kind with high idealism.

When these efforts failed, Taylor accepted his limitations and
sought wealth and impact in other directions. He developed a new
kind of plaster for ceilings, using sugarcane refuse as raw material. An
historian of Australian nationalism cannot miss the significance of this
—the sugar industry was crucial to Australia, for it provided an eco-
nomic basis for occupation and development of the continent's tropical
north. Moreover, Taylor's artistic bent found satisfaction because his
plaster was used in some splendid ceilings depicting native faunal and
floral motifs.

The industry had limits, however, and from 1907 onwards Taylor
was chiefly active as editor of several building and engineering journals.
They have interest well beyond their immediate subject; Taylor's extra-
ordinarily busy pen provided much of the copy, and he was generous
with high quality illustrations. While developing this journalistic empire,
Taylor found time to develop an expert interest in wireless and aviation,
both at that time in their days of crucial growth. The Aerial League of
New South Wales, established in 1909, was among the first and most
interesting of the many societies he founded. At the end of that year he
manned a glider in a successful flight at Narrabeen, north of Sydney,
which was the pioneer heavier-than-air venture in Australia. Wireless
in those days presented an almost equally dramatic story for the public.
Taylor, brilliant publicist that he was, took the opportunity it offered.
He developed and demonstrated a fire alarm, an automatic foghorn,
long-distance communication and the firing of a gun by remote control.
A high spot came at the Lyceum Theatre, Sydney, in 1912 — when he
used wireless to direct a model airship from point to point — dropping
*en route* a bomb in the stalls.

These demonstrations were flamboyant, but not flippant: Taylor
was ardent in his concern to apply technology to arms. Like many of
his contemporaries, he believed that Australia must prepare itself against
a hostile world. During these years the Australian Army and Navy developed. Taylor took a commission in the infant Army Intelligence Service as an expert adviser. 'The airship will undoubtedly revolutionise warfare, since it will well-nigh destroy strategy and surprise movements', he forecast in 1910. Wireless would supply 'that military ideal sought through the ages — the power to strike from a distance', he said. Practice followed precept — Taylor advised the New South Wales Government about the establishment of an aviation training school, and designed the Army's first wireless station.

These interests prompted Taylor's most obvious contribution to Australia's strength, but were part of a larger context. He expounded a firm economic nationalism, aimed at the development of Australian resources for the nation's own benefit. Thus he supported protection of local industries by tariffs and berated foreign influence in vital sectors of the economy; for example, he campaigned against German interests securing dominance in wireless. Britain also suffered some condemnation, especially for espousing free trade, which to Taylor appeared to be a ploy to keep the world tied to John Bull's direction. Nor did he approve the development in Australia of American-type 'trusts'.

Another of his major interests was town planning, and this, too, indicated other aspects of his nationalism. He was convinced that organized towns must result in healthier and better people. Australians could give a lead to the world:

We feel inspired, as missionaries of sunlight, to preach the gospel of pure air and clean living; and, with a 'clean slate', we have the opportunity no other nation has today—the building of a capital city on virgin soil.

We can build our capital city better than any other city in history, for we, today, are the great masters of the ages. As before our mental vision the centuries pass laden with the fruits of human achievement, we can pick the plums of history and plant them in Australia.
We can watch the City of Canberra rise, a city well and truly built. A city beautiful to look upon, and a city beautiful to live within. A world's centre of civic beauty and health. A city typical of the virile race which is building a nation great in the Southern Seas.

So Taylor wrote in a book (*Town Planning for Australia*), dated May 1914. In his exposition of town planning, he made explicit other values he held. The technocrat — in this context the engineer and architect — he saw as the superman of modern civilisation, to whom society must pay heed, or perish. Experts must rule in all areas of life; party politicians and petty bureaucrats, on the other hand, were pernicious and self-seeking, obstacles to all progress. Thus the ideal city would be ruled by a commission of experts, free from parliamentary corruption. In their planning, the supermen would give utility and efficiency a far higher priority than old-fashioned concepts of aesthetic beauty or antiquarian sentimentality.

Taylor much admired the ‘functionalist’ architecture developed in the USA by L. H. Sullivan and others: this led him to be a vigorous champion of Walter Burley Griffin, who shared the same school of thought, when Australian bureaucrats threatened to destroy the American’s plan for Canberra.

Taylor incorporated these values into his nationalism. Energy, effort, efficiency — such were the virtues which might raise Australia to a pinnacle among the powers. He believed that Australians were rich in these qualities, and had the ability to develop the technocracy he esteemed so highly. Australia’s history had fostered attitudes especially favourable to this development, he argued. By necessity, the pioneers had had ‘to solve their own problems, free of any traditional restrictions with which the Older World had encompassed many subjects’. Accordingly, this ‘new land of problem-solvers developed a race of original thinkers’.

Taylor’s temple of national heroes — and he was a great worshipper — comprised not painters or writers but inventors and technocrats. Supreme among them was Lawrence Hargrave, whom Taylor recognized as a genius of aeronautics. He saw himself as having a modest place in Hargrave’s shadow.

As already suggested, Taylor was equipped not merely to accept the war in 1914, but to see it as potentially fulfilling Australia’s destiny. Age and deafness thwarted his wish to fight at the front, and journalism had to be his medium of service. While less dramatic and effective than
Toylor and a colleague send the first radio message for the Australian Army in 1910.

his work with wireless and radio, the results are very interesting for the historian of ideas.

In June 1915 Taylor published a novel, *The Sequel: What the Great War Will Mean to Australia*. It was his purest work of fiction, although he described his travels in several semi-documentaries. All these works suffer from haste and ill-organization, *The Sequel* as much as any. That matters less, however, than Taylor’s foreseeing that post-war Europe would explode into counter-acting revolutions of Left and Right.

Taylor envisaged that an ‘Army of Humanity’, comprising many ex-servicemen, assumed power in Germany. It spread widely, and disastrously:

This German-made Humanist creed has gripped Germany, England, France and Austria. It stands for the levelling of the human being. None can rise above the common level. They call it the gospel of the Common Good, but there is nothing good in anything that clips the wings of those who would dare to excel; that baulks the aspirations of those who would use the brains their God has given them that they may rise.
Radio being used by Australian troops at Gallipoli, only five years after the first Australian military message was transmitted. This wireless station was operated by 2nd Signal Troop, 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade, a few days after the landing on 25 April 1915.
To counter this evil, there developed from Belgium a movement led by a latter-day Joan of Arc and eventually backed by an heroic band of 'Scientific Militants'. As they attacked the Humanists, Taylor swung his focus back to Australia. There, the horrors of Europe had threatened, but not triumphed. Indeed, capitalist leaders organized a system of co-operative syndicates, and so carried the nation to new heights of strength and unity. The people cast aside Utopian impracticalities, and applied lessons learned in war. ‘The perfect organization that military training gave, and the intense co-operation the call of the blood demanded, instilled these two great principles into Australian character’. The pioneering heritage had found its apotheosis.

Taylor was, virtually, a Fascist. In retrospect this is an inevitable and proper judgement: his distrust of humanist and egalitarian doctrine, his exaltation of the martial virtues and of corporative capitalism, were precisely in the mode which Mussolini was soon to follow. Fascism has now become a dirty word — for good reason. This should not, however, conceal the fact that the doctrine grew naturally from the historical situation of the early twentieth century, that nationalism (Australian and otherwise) encouraged this growth, and that idealistic attitudes were at least compatible with it.

*The Sequel* taught Taylor’s world-view by way of futurist fiction; in May 1916 he founded a more orthodox medium, a periodical named *The Soldier*. At the outset this was the official organ of the Returned Soldiers’ Association of New South Wales. Its message was appropriate: the spiritual uplift of war, the right and duty of ex-soldiers to dominate civilian life so that it might reach a higher plane, the evil of pacifist and socialist war-critics, and so on.

Sir John Monash, an engineer in civilian life before becoming the leader of Australia’s army in France, now rose to a level almost equal to Hargrave’s in Taylor’s ranking. He was among those whom the editor held up from time to time as the possible leader of a nobler Australia. Article after article expounded the need for development of the country’s vast resources. The usual heading for these articles was ‘Empire and Australia First’ — interesting as an illustration of the way in which the war tightened the bonds of imperial loyalty: before 1914 Taylor had more interest in the USA than Britain, but not now.

Conservation of Australian forests became a major cause; the development of electric power another. ‘Here was a potent force that
could mean the salvation of a nation’, Taylor wrote enthusiastically about hydro-electric power in Tasmania. ‘It meant over 700,000 man power, a force over twice the man strength of Australia’s army of the Great War, and a force that lent itself to the discipline of one officer’.

*The Soldier* lasted until the end of 1924, but was increasingly repetitive and barren over the last few years. Taylor’s hopes that a brave new Australia might emerge from the war found little realization. In retrospect this seems to prove how much he was a man of that remarkable decade in world history, 1910-20.

Yet apart from abandoning dreams of political apocalypse, Taylor continued to act and think and argue in much the same way as before. In 1922 he travelled to Europe, there to enjoy technological wonders ranging from Rouen Cathedral to road-making machinery in Trafalgar Square. In Brussels Taylor joined a symposium which discussed the building of a ‘city of peace’; he urged that Australia, as the one continent which had never known war and which stood between East and West, would be the ideal choice. On a pilgrimage to a Munich museum which housed Hargrave material he recalled his vain efforts to keep these relics in Australia. Taylor’s visit to Rome coincided with Mussolini’s accession to power — concerning which he provided some interesting, possibly unique, photographs, but rather desultory comment. The book which described these travels, *The Ways of the World*, is at least as entertaining as his earlier work.

Back in Australia Taylor kept up his journals, except *Soldier*, and his hobbies. The development of commercial wireless prompted him, for example, to form ‘Listeners-In Leagues’, and to campaign against narrow interests gaining monopoly power. The encouragement of invention remained another cause close to Taylor’s heart, his last experiments being with a wireless device to aid the blind.

Taylor died as the result of an accident in January 1928. His widow, Florence, had always shared his interests, having trained as an engineer and possessing a flair for organization. She survived her husband by more than forty years, maintained the journalistic empire and fought her own causes — in particular a campaign for all Australians to have their own well designed houses.

After Taylor’s death, friends established a memorial lectureship in aeronautics at the University of Sydney. He deserves the good fortune that posterity should remember him at his most original and constructive.
BETWEEN 1815 and the death of the Duke of Wellington in 1852, the British Army basked confidently in the reflected glory won at the Battle of Waterloo and paid little attention to the declining standard of officer education. In this period it stagnated. In contrast, the more professional armies of Europe, particularly Prussia and France, were embarked on military educational programmes. Britain considered these to be unnecessary until the Crimean War disclosed serious weaknesses in military training for command and staff, and public ire was aroused. This resulted in the creation of a Staff College in 1858 to supersede the old Senior Department of the Royal Military College. The new institution opened at Camberley in 1862.

In *The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914*, Brian Bond of King’s College, London, traces the faltering beginnings of a British staff *corps d’élite* through to its embodiment in 1906 as ‘The General Staff’. He follows the products of the new ‘school of thought’ through to their ‘test of war’ on the battlefields of France in 1914 where, with few exceptions, the Camberley products performed well and conducted the retreat from Mons with acknowledged professional skill.

Like most innovations, including those modelled on successful overseas experiments, the development of the Staff College in the period under review was far from smooth. Its detractors were both powerful and numerous. The initial reluctance of commanding officers
to encourage suitable candidates was partly due to the questionable suitability of the syllabus, which was aimed mainly at the mechanics of soldiering. There was also a distinct lack of enthusiasm on the part of some senior commanders to accept the Camberley graduate in staff appointments. The Duke of Cambridge, the Commander-in-Chief to whom Camberley owes its foundation, remarked publicly in 1869: 'I have the best feelings towards those gentlemen who have been at the Staff College, and I have always considered that they have done remarkably well; but I prefer for the staff to have regimental officers. I am quite satisfied that the best staff officer is your regimental officer,...'. No doubt lack of acceptance was due in part to the inability of the amateur landed gentleman commanding officer to overcome his conservatism and social prejudice against the small but growing body of educated professionals. The Cardwell reforms, which abolished purchase, and the manifest contribution made by the Prussian general staff under the brilliant elder von Moltke to the victories over Austria in 1866 and France in 1870, helped to dispel these attitudes but, not surprisingly, they subsided slowly. The Egyptian campaign of 1882 and the numerous colonial campaigns of the late Victorian era demonstrated the importance of good staff work, but these were on too small a scale to reveal the limitations of British military education.

The South African War (1899-1902) administered the required shock. As a direct result, the prophetic Esher Committee Report of 1904 was quickly followed by the Haldane reforms and the formation of the General Staff which, although it got off to a shaky start, was reflected in positive developments at Camberley and a more healthy regard for its products. A series of three progressive commandants — Rawlinson, Wilson and Robertson — gave added emphasis to preparation for command, and paved the way for a continental strategy that prepared the BEF for its timely and efficient deployment into France.

The strong Camberley representation in the 'contemptible little Army' undoubtedly contributed greatly to its recognized professional competence. The performance of the Staff College graduates leads Bond to an assessment of Camberley's influence on the generals of the First World War and he questions the widely held view that British staff work was woefully incompetent. (He does not, however, distinguish clearly between the training required for staff and that needed for com-

\[1\] Page 105.
mand.) Kitchener, French and some of the other earlier commanders, who were responsible for the initial strategic direction of the war, lacked a Camberley background and an ‘intellectual approach’. Their lack of foresight is epitomized by the decision to close the Staff College on the basis that the war would be over by Christmas 1914. The acknowledged shortage of trained staff officers in the rapidly expanded army of 1915-1918 undoubtedly was a principal cause of much inefficiency, although it does not explain the lack of imagination in a commander such as Haig. In contrasting Haig with Allenby, when both were Camberley students, Mr Bond illustrates the lingering demise of social influence before Wavell, Montgomery and other true military scholars were to be accepted on their merits alone.

Brian Bond’s narrative is not entirely even. This would appear to be due mainly to a shortage of sources covering some stages of Camberley’s development. To judge by the manuscript notations, which are listed at the end of each chapter, the author, while fossicking for the historical contribution that a sound military education and an efficient staff system make for success in modern war, has researched thoroughly what is available. The book has a good index and some pertinent illustrations, which indicate that public attitudes to the Services in peace are relatively constant. Older Australian Army officers, brought up on a diet of Henderson’s ‘Stonewall Jackson’, will be interested to read of the part Henderson played in Camberley’s development. Others will appreciate the brief references to the formation of the Staff College at Quetta and to the early Australian students, such as Major General J. C. Hoad and Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey, at both institutions.

Although The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914 will not find its way into many personal libraries at the price of $17.10, it deserves to be read by practising and potential staff officers. In so doing, they will refresh themselves on some of the fundamentals of sound staff training and be reminded that the British staff system, from which the Australian is almost wholly descended, is of comparatively recent origin and uncertain development. The reader is left with the feeling that to ensure its future growth some careful nurturing is essential, particularly in this all important post-Vietnam period.

This book is a primer for all who are appointed to the forthcoming Committee of Enquiry into the Professional Development of Regular Officers. It is mandatory reading because it raises fundamental questions
such as the right balance in a Staff College course between learning staff skills and mental development, and between encouraging industry and stimulating imagination. It also poses the apparent choice of training adequately a visionary elite or of producing sufficient competent staff officers to meet the needs of mobilization rather than the peacetime army of the moment.

The historical lesson is that we need to train in peace both quality in the form of an imaginative elite as well as enough efficient military managers to fill all the key service appointments needed when the nation is at risk. The main problems facing the Committee are how to produce now a professional development programme that will achieve the required educational objectives, permit specialization and streaming into selected career divisions, and yet provide both for sufficient quality staff officers and superior commanders with the ability to keep all the elements of national security in perspective; and how to cater for the timely expansion necessary before a crisis develops. It should be quite a challenge. Those entrusted with the task will find Brian Bond’s scholarly work a useful source on which to draw. The more thoughtful of the public servants and politicians who will study their report could also read this book with profit.


The scope of the book is limited in that it reproduces only a selection of twelve of the Carl Jess plates on Australian military uniforms. The first eight pages are taken up with the title, contents and acknowledgements, followed by an introduction which gives the reader a vague coverage of Australia’s military background. A selection of colour plates together with notes on the units depicted constitute the bulk of the book. The last section of the book comprises extracts of Dress Regulations which in some cases have no relation to the plates.

The book is worth very little from a military historical point of view as it has a large number of errors. The brochure accompanying
the book describes the authors as military historians of note; hardly a fitting description when the many mistakes are noted. The brochure further points out the descriptions of uniforms are done with ‘marvellous accuracy, colour and finesse’, which is far from the truth. The title is misleading as it suggests a complete coverage of all uniforms of all colonies. West Australia is not covered and only a limited selection of those from other states.

There is a short biography of Lieutenant General Sir Carl Jess in which he is described as Australia’s youngest brigadier-general, a rank he achieved at 34 years of age. This is not so. Australia’s youngest brigadier-general was the 29-year-old Gordon Bennett. The paintings by Carl Jess are excellent but should not be described as ‘executed with meticulous accuracy.’ The colour in several plates does not match that of the actual uniforms, but this may be in the reproduction.

The most lasting impression of the book is its waste of space, as in addition to blank pages some have as little as eight lines of printing. This waste would no doubt be a major contributing factor to the excessively high cost of the book. The reviewers ask why the Dress Regulations are separated from the plates to which they refer, and why those not related to the illustrations are included? This could indicate a poor selection of paintings, as Regulations are available for a large part of the Jess Collection.

It may well be that the purposes of Australian military history would have been better served if the book had been published in a cheaper format, such as Penguin edition (1948) of British Military Uniforms, or more recently, the Hamlyn all-colour paperback of Rene North’s Military Uniforms, both of which sold for less than $1 and therefore would have appealed to a much wider range of readers. Even when one considers some of the more expensive publications of recent years, such as the Evelyn publications of British uniforms, which contained very similar material, it is hard to justify the recommended retail price.

In summary, there are many points that can be criticized in this book, though the authors should be commended for their interest. It is hoped that further publications of this nature will only be made after more careful research. The book is not recommended for the student or collector of military uniforms but may have some appeal to the more wealthy who have a general interest in militaria.
Dear Sir,

I read with interest the article written by Lt Col A. R. Howes in the February issue of your Journal, on the subject ‘Army Officers—Management Training and Education’.

I completely agree with the conclusions reached by the author, and believe that this type of training should be basic for officers in any modern army. During most of my life, apart from AIF service, I have been associated with some form of army activity, principally in the CMF.

This, combined with two decades of government administration, has resulted in a special personal interest in management training. To maintain this interest I was pleased to recently become associated with a company active in this field.

I merely refer to these matters to give some background of experience, which has resulted in a conviction that this form of training for army officers, is not only necessary but has become a matter of urgency, as the armed services more and more live with, as well as, in the community.

I feel that Lt Col Howes and your Journal are to be congratulated on an article which conveys a message, not only important, but timely.

Surfers Paradise
Queensland

Colonel the Hon. Sir Reginald Swartz

Attention is invited to an obviously incorrect statement which appeared in the Army Journal December 1972 (Book Review Section) concerning the Malayan campaign of World War II, with particular reference to the alleged wrangling between Generals Percival and
Bennett (respectively C-in-C Malaya Command and GOC 8 Aust Div). The statement read, in part, ‘...relations between Bennett and Percival were never cordial, and caused the CGS (Sturdee ...) to advise Blamey to replace Bennett’.

The Malayan fiasco (and therefore any Percival/Bennett differences) came to an inglorious end on 15 February 1942, with the fall of Singapore. For many months preceding these operations, the positions held by Generals Blamey and Sturdee were:

**Blamey**: Deputy Commander-in-Chief Middle East Forces (appointed May 1941). The creation of this post (as well as Blamey’s selection) was influenced by political considerations. Whilst endowed with a great deal of prestige, the appointment carried little, if any, responsibility. (It is significant that with the return from the Middle East to Australia in March 1942 of Blamey and the bulk of 1 Aust Corps, the appointment of Deputy C-in-C lapsed)

**Sturdee**: Chief of the General Staff and Chairman of the Military Board (appointed August 1940). As such, Sturdee was responsible only to the Minister of State for the Army.

Therefore, if any officer had the power to authorise Bennett’s replacement prior to the fall of Singapore it was Sturdee himself, and certainly not Blamey, whose sphere of influence (such as it was) did not extend east of the Red Sea.

Sturdee did not become subordinate to Blamey until March 1942 when in a (so-called) streamlining of Australia’s available land forces, the Military Board was disbanded as a wartime measure. Sturdee, who retained the post as Chief of the General Staff, became (in effect) Chief of Staff to Blamey, who had assumed a dual responsibility, namely, Commander Allied Land Forces South-West Pacific Area and Commander-in-Chief Australian Military Forces. (The status of Commander Allied Land Forces was yet another Blamey appointment influenced by politics. The position was, in itself, meaningless, as the degree of Blamey’s authority over American land forces in the South-West Pacific theatre was virtually nil.)

Belair

*Sth. Aust.*