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Slogans decorate this armoured truck used by the AIF in Malaya in 1941.
MILITARY HISTORY: ITS PLACE IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

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We cannot escape our past. Our whole culture — the way we think, the way we look at ourselves and others, our institutions — are the product of our national experience.

— Colonel E. G. Keogh

Introduction

MILITARY History is the study of military experience and therefore is an essential part of the education of a professional officer, for it is the former experiences of an army which condition the professional outlook of its officers. In order to make sound military judgements in the future, officers must benefit from the lessons learned in the past.

One can easily establish that military history is worth studying, hence the question becomes not whether a professional soldier should study military history, but how best to do so.

The aim of this paper is to consider the purpose, and the most appropriate method of study, of military history in the professional education of officers in the Australian Army.

Objectives for the Study of Military History

Having accepted that the study of military history is both relevant and useful to the professional officer, it is necessary to determine the objectives of the study before one can consider basic course organization,

2 'With 2,000 years of examples behind us we have no excuse, when fighting, for not fighting well.' — T. E. Lawrence.
the selection of resource materials and course content, the methods of study and the assessment. These objectives I would enumerate as being:

- To develop in students an appreciation of and a desire to study military history.
- To provide for students a basis for further individual, independent study.
- To develop an understanding, through critical analysis and evaluation, of military decisions and events of the past.
- To stimulate students to examine their own standards, attitudes and beliefs on the conduct of war, so that they may make the wisest decision possible in future military situations in which they may become involved.

**Critique of Present Course**

If the study is to accomplish its objectives, military events, situations and decisions must be considered within a broad historical context. It is impossible to evaluate campaigns of the past if one is unaware of the social, economic, political and ideological environment in which they were fought. Imagine the difficulty of comprehending the campaigns of the American Civil War without some understanding of the political and economic conditions which precipitated it, or of understanding the actions, the strategy and the high morale of the North Vietnamese without some knowledge of the ideological motivation which drives them.

To evaluate the tactics and decisions of earlier commanders one must appreciate fully the circumstances in which those decisions were made, and this means being aware not only of the aim of the campaign, the national strategy which determined it, and the features of the theatre of operations, but also of external factors such as the relative economic situations of countries or states concerned, the values and ideology and politics of the nation to which the army belongs, the technological sophistication of the nation and the psychological pressures operating on both the commander and his soldiers.

Present syllabuses and assessment procedures, particularly at promotion to Major level, too often encourage students to confine themselves to a mere learning of tactics and strategy — to a study of 'the campaign' — and consequently students have often failed to analyse and evaluate military experience. They have only considered what
happened and when, instead of why it happened and how. The all important pass or fail examinations have produced students whose attitude is one of cramming as many facts as possible in as short a time as possible. As a result their appreciation and enjoyment of military history has been destroyed, and they have failed to develop the motivation to continue their study and reading. This exam-orientated system has produced the stereotyped results which are constantly complained of in examiners' reports.

Let us then consider how the objectives outlined above might be achieved.

**Basic Course Organization**

The present organization provides for the formal study of military history at three stages of officer education: RMC, examination for promotion to major, and at staff college; and this structure would seem reasonable in view of the objectives outlined. Each of these objectives is relevant to all three levels of study, however the degree of emphasis given to each will vary. At RMC the emphasis must be on the first two objectives; the development of an interest in military history and the provision of a basis for further study. If these are achieved then they need only be reinforced in later periods of study when the other two objectives become more applicable, as the students have by then acquired some experience and expertise as officers.

I propose therefore to consider separately the details of courses; their content, resources, methods and assessment at each level of study.

**Royal Military College**

The present arrangements at RMC are such that military history is treated not as a separate subject but as an integral part of the history courses which are conducted at university undergraduate level. (The RMC history courses are granted equality of status by leading universities, and by reputation they match the best of university standards.)

The intention at RMC is to provide the student with a knowledge of modern political and social history and give intellectual training in the evolution of modern war. Within this context, consideration is given to the causes and consequences of wars, the significance of war in international affairs and the impact of armed forces on society.

The military section of the library at RMC meets most requirements, and the courses include a programme of visiting lecturers of national and international standing.
Throughout their studies, students are required to take part in tutorials at which one student gives a presentation on some aspect, followed by open discussion of that presentation. The assessment system is continual, through performance in tutorials and written exercises as well as by formal end-of-year examination.

This system seems excellent in terms of achieving the second objective — the provision of a basis for individual study. It would seem too, judging by the spate of unsolicited articles and papers prepared by Duntroon cadets in recent years, that it has achieved some success in the first objective — the stimulation of an appreciation and interest in the subject.

The lecture/tutorial/examination organization has the advantages of being efficient, relatively simple to conduct, and a system with which students are familiar and in which, therefore, they feel secure.

While this programme seems generally successful, I would argue that, with the third and fourth objectives in mind, it could be improved.

First the teaching methods. Lectures are most useful as a way of disseminating information quickly, assuming the competence of the lecturer. However, they do not encourage student involvement or participation which are prerequisite to the development of real motivation. Tutorials, if they are well led, are better able to achieve participation and interaction of students. Both these methods have their uses, but they should be supplemented by other methods for variety and so that the needs of individuals are met by the provision of a wide range of learning situations.

Some of the possibilities are:

- Seminars and panel discussions in which experts, with differing interpretations of a particular campaign or period, each present their own views, and then encourage the questioning and discussion of these views by the student audience so that students can develop some awareness of the interpretative nature of military history.

- The inviting of guest speakers, other than academics, who are able to tell of their own experiences so that students are given some knowledge of the value, and limitations, of first hand anecdotal history and so that they can develop some sense of human and social atmosphere of a given military event.
• The conduct of organized debates which would encourage students to research thoroughly a period or event and then analyse, forming a well argued opinion.

• The preparation and delivery of a series of student lectures. As with the debates, this encourages thorough research, organization of a logical presentation, and in addition helps students develop their public speaking abilities.

• The setting of assignments to be prepared by individuals or groups of students. The assignment should present the student with a problem to which, through research, he is able to find a solution. If the research material is secondary sources, the assignment should be designed not only to give the student knowledge, but also to make him aware of the existence of various historical interpretations. If primary sources are used, for example, official documents, diaries, personal journals, newspaper reports etc., the student should, in an elementary way, be encouraged to make his own interpretation on the basis of the evidence available. Hence with the assignment method the student is introduced to the skills of analysis and evaluation rather than mere learning and acceptance of facts. The advantage of group assignments is that they encourage student interaction and exchange of ideas.

If these methods were employed it would not be necessary to change the assessment system. Both students and examiners are familiar with and trust exams as a means of assessing and grading, and because it is the present system, it may be unwise to abolish them completely. Hence I would propose continuing the existing composite form of assessment so that student's performance in tutorials, seminars, debates and in assignments was considered together with performance in an examination.

This form of course organization, I believe, would still achieve both the first two objectives and would also introduce students to the skills of the third and fourth. These will then be developed more fully in his later education.

**Promotion to Major and Entrance to Staff College**

By contrast to the success of the RMC course, the following stage — studies leading to examination for promotion to major — positively inhibits initiative, restricts research and evaluation and encourages the
cramming of a store of facts which are then unburdened onto an examination paper — representing the body of knowledge a student can remember and reproduce under pressure and within a time limit. One suspects that those students who maintain a lasting interest in military history develop this interest in spite of, rather than because of, the existing examination system.

The present course, which involves the study of a particular campaign, theoretically encourages students to read widely. In practice, students restrict themselves to one or two secondary sources. They are usually exam-orientated and the nature of the exam allows an unimaginative cramming of the facts to act as a substitute for reasoned analysis and evaluation. Hence many students regard this stage of the study of military history as an onerous burden rather than as a useful, enjoyable, intellectually stimulating phase of their education.

In designing a suitable course for these students one must keep in mind not only the objectives of the study, but also the level of education which the students have already attained. For them it is equivalent to a post-graduate study.

Having argued that the present examination is inadequate and undesirable, one must consider the viable alternatives. There would appear to be two major alternatives:

- A series of assignments.
- The writing of a thesis.

First, a series of assignments on one or more periods of military history could be set. These assignments should be designed to encourage students to research thoroughly, to read widely, to use a variety of source materials both secondary and primary, and to then make a critical analysis and evaluation of their findings — to consider 'how and why' rather than merely 'what and when'.

The assignments would be designed and assessed by a central examination board. Students would work on the assignments individually, having access to source materials in or through the libraries at their Military District Headquarters.

The advantages of such a course are that it is relatively simple to conduct, it relieves some of the pressure on the student while maintaining some continuity in his studies, and it improves knowledge and written skills with each assignment.
Its disadvantages are that it necessitates a change in the present system, it increases the burden (in quantity) of correction on the examiners, and unless care is taken variations in standards of requirements and assessment could creep in. However, I would argue that the benefits to the student in increased motivation, the greater development of his skills of analysis and evaluation, and the greater intellectual stimulation of such a course, outweigh its administrative disadvantages.

The second alternative requires each candidate to write a thesis on a topic or area of military history of his own choosing. Should candidates require it, a list of suggested topics would be prepared. In the year prior to presentation, each student would be required to forward the subject of his thesis to the board of examiners for approval, and a supervisor would be assigned.

The supervisor would be responsible for assisting the student in the organization of his work, for aiding him in his quest for research materials, and for helping him in the presentation of his findings by considering his early drafts. The examination board would assess the completed thesis.

The student would be expected to undertake in-depth research. Having selected his subject he would then seek and use a wide range of resources which would include official war histories, official documents, diaries, letters, journals, literature, for example, novels, poetry, newspapers, biographies, parliamentary records, documentaries (both films and written), as well as secondary sources. Where applicable he would also, through interview or correspondence, seek the opinions and interpretation of people with first hand knowledge or expertise in the subject of his research, for example, retired officers, soldiers, historians, psychologists, economists, technologists and politicians. The student would have access to research material from Military District libraries, in the Australian War Memorial, and State and university libraries.

Having collected his raw material the student would then begin the more important part of his work, the analysis, synthesis and evaluation of his findings, and finally the organization of his ideas and decisions for presentation in his thesis.

It may be argued that such a study would unduly raise the status of military history above that of other subjects for promotion; certainly it would mean a significant increase in the time and intellectual effort required for the subject. Less importantly, some would argue
that there was a danger of plagiarism and that the student, instead of engaging in thorough research, would merely consider a selection of others' writings on his subject. My answer would be that at the very least, this would involve the student in analysis and synthesis of various interpretations, and that this is superior to the form of plagiarism used in the present examination system which only involves recall and reproduction of ideas and facts learned by the student.

The writing of a thesis has many advantages in terms of fulfilling the aims of studying military history. It allows for an in-depth study of a subject of interest to the individual, it promotes not only the acquisition of knowledge, but of research techniques and written skills, and it is a demanding intellectual exercise appropriate to the level of education (i.e., promotion to Major). It is also good preparation for Staff College, and it encourages research outside the strictly military field through valuable liaison with civilians.

Finally, such an organization would be administratively convenient because it would avoid the situation of many students making demands on the same facilities. Students would be able to work without pressure in a flexible organizational framework which suited their individual needs.

**Staff College**

On entrance to Staff College the officer has, it can be assumed, developed an appreciation of military history as a relevant study, acquired an understanding of basic concepts and research methods and developed the capacity to critically evaluate past military experiences. He will have also developed a set of standards and attitudes and ideas on the conduct of war, and perhaps he will have had an opportunity to make military judgements of his own.

At this stage assessment is no longer necessary. The purpose of his Staff College study should be to stimulate him to examine his standards and values and to consider carefully his attitudes, so that in any future military situation in which he may become involved he is able to make the wisest decisions possible.

Perhaps the best method of achieving this aim is to involve the student in a critical analysis and re-evaluation of one or two recent military campaigns, preferably ones which have occurred in the last decade and in which Australian forces have been involved.
The syndicate organization of the present Staff College course is probably the most suitable one for such a study.

Initially, each student would make himself conversant with the circumstances of the war, through research into the political and economic conditions which precipitated it, the national strategy, the aim of the campaign and the features of the theatre of operations. He must then become informed about the social and ideological background of the war, and finally he must acquire some understanding of the relevant human and psychological factors.

Having acquired this information, he must examine the strategy, tactics and decisions made by commanders. He may be assisted in this by reading reports and by discussing the campaign with actual commanders and others involved. This could be facilitated by having such people as guest lecturers.

The analysis and evaluation of the campaign, the discussion of its strengths and weaknesses, the consideration of its lessons for future operations could be facilitated by student debates. However, as debates tend to force students to polarize their views, syndicate discussions are probably a more useful method.

Finally, the students could be given, as an exercise, the problem of deciding the strategy and tactics they would employ if confronted with the task of conducting a campaign under similar conditions.

The initial research, the discussions with fellow officers, and finally the exercise, would thus oblige students to examine their own ideas on the conduct of war, and hopefully such an evaluation would prepare them to make sound military judgements in the future.

Recommendations

It is recommended that military history should continue to be part of the professional education of officers in the Australian Army.

The aim of the study of military history should be:

- To develop in students an appreciation of and a desire to study military history.
- To provide for students a basis for further individual, independent study.
- To develop an understanding, through critical analysis and evaluation, of military decisions and events of the past.
To stimulate students to examine their own standards, attitudes and beliefs on the conduct of war, so that they make the wisest decision possible in future military situations in which they may become involved (i.e., to develop military judgement).

The methods employed to accomplish the aim should be:

- **At RMC**
  A programme of lectures, tutorials, seminars, guest speakers, student lectures and individual and group research assignments. Assessment should be both by formal examination and by consideration of student performance in the above activities.

- **For promotion to Major and entrance to Staff College**
  The writing of a thesis on some aspect of military history chosen by the student.
  Assessment should be by an examination board.

- **At Staff College**
  A programme of research, syndicate discussion, lectures and exercises.
  Formal assessment is not applicable.
MOST democracies have regularly faced the problem of maintaining peacetime armies, both financially and to an adequate standard. Britain and Australia in the 1930s are obvious examples. In Australia the lack of tradition of standing armies in time of peace exacerbates the problem. War, it is now widely accepted, is too complicated and too imminent for reliance on conscript armies, as France did in 1939.

In recent times the electorates, led especially by the young, have called into question the purpose and value of standing defence forces without an obvious threat. This has led to an erosion, not only of the defence capability, but also to the feeling of relevance on the part of many soldiers.

It may not be possible to identify a specific immediate threat; nevertheless we are on the edge of an inherently unstable region, with strong disruptive forces at work. In the longer term, therefore, defence can hardly be deemed irrelevant, as we cannot easily separate ourselves from our geographical neighbours. This does not imply that we seek war; on the contrary, we can use as a guide the wisdom of the ancients. Vegetius in the 4th Century suggested, ‘Let him who desires peace, prepare for war’. It is safe to assume that very few do not desire peace.
Standing armies are not inherently dangerous, and if correctly oriented — that is, representing the true interests of the people — they can be a symbol of national unity. ‘Without a people’s army the people have nothing’, declared Mao Tse-Tung.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the need for a People’s Army in Australia, Regular and Reserve, as being the best way to ensure peacetime efficiency and morale, whilst being prepared for defence.

**ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM**

**The Problem Areas — External**

Public apathy, or even antipathy, towards defence has immediate and extensive effect. If the media and social discourse reflect this, then recruiting must be the first casualty; the second will be the morale of those already serving.

If the serving member feels unwanted, or at least regarded as unnecessary, however good his conditions of service and his training, he is going to find it hard to give of his best. According to Napoleon ‘morale is to the physical as four is to one’. The contemporary historian Toynbee supports this.1

At this time our government and our nation as a whole are going through a painful post-adolescence, a crisis of identity. The imperial connections are severed, our independent first steps in Vietnam were not overwhelmingly supported by the population, and we are not sure where to go next. Our current strategic concept rejects foreign adventure as a defence role. This new orientation to home defence may well strike a chord of sympathy in the electorate, but it is not yet widely understood. The resulting lack of direction is a most serious adverse effect on our Defence Forces. It is evident in both the Regular and Reserve elements of the Army.

It will be seen that many a soldier feels himself operating in a vacuum, without support or sense of purpose. He cannot even see a potential testing situation, such as overseas garrisoning can provide as in Malaysia until recently. These problems, once identified, can and must be solved in the peacetime context, or our desire for peace will be frustrated by our lack of preparation for war.

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1 Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Oxford 1972). Toynbee’s whole thesis is that measurable efficiency does not of itself produce results; the human factor is all important.
The Problem Areas — Internal

The Army in peacetime has to recruit in competition with other professions and trades in a generally tight labour market. To do this successfully the same criteria must be applied to a military career as for any other, and the complementary theories of Herzberg and Maslow can be applied as useful test guidelines.

Herzberg states that employment provides two streams of causes affecting the well-being of the individual, the ‘dissatisfiers’ and the ‘satisfiers’. In the first category are the areas which cause trouble when poor or wrong, such as conditions of service, man management and so on. The second category consists of the positive encouragements, such as promotion prospects and sense of achievement.

Maslow lists the needs of a man for ideal job satisfaction in ascending order: physiological, safety (security), social (peer group acceptance), ego and self fulfilment. It can be seen that the external influences on a soldier’s morale are closely inter-related with his own job satisfaction, and that any effort to maintain efficiency and morale must take into consideration both aspects.

Specific factors affecting a man’s performance and that of the Army can be summarized briefly:

- The loss of skills established in wartime, by attrition, reduces efficiency and confidence.
- The need for skills without civilian equivalent and the lack of union acceptance of parallel trades, intensifies the separation from the outside world.
- The need for expensive equipment to be renewed, or, in default, continuous, tedious maintenance of items reduces the soldier’s confidence in his service.
- Conditions of service will usually lag behind those of civilian counterparts, especially as regards family turbulence.
- The shortage of manpower, inevitable in the environment described, increases the administrative load for all ranks, especially the private soldier. ‘Duties’ are not appreciably reduced, therefore they come round all the more often.

• The reduced order of battle lends an air of unreality to most levels of training, with phantom guns, simulated battalions and the like. Mutterings of 'cloud cuckoo land' can be heard, echoing Britain's Army of the Rhine.

• The tendency to copy business and civil service techniques of management, training and bureaucracy brings, perhaps, efficiency, but undoubtedly reduces the personal contact and the sense of belonging.

The incorrect attitudes of members of the Army, particularly in the Officer and Warrant Officer grades, also contributes to the feeling of isolation. Too many cannot relate to civilians; too many consider themselves separate, even superior. Such attitudes may be a hangover from Imperialist days, the Raj in India or the Rum Corps in New South Wales. Suspicion of Army motives by civilians is therefore only to be expected.

THE APPROACH FOR THE FUTURE

The People's Army

'We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun' — so spoke Chairman Mao in 1938 and again in 1945: 'Without a people's army the people have nothing'. Such texts suggest a justification for a democratic Army, no less applicable in peace than in war, which could appeal to most elements of the political spectrum. The emphasis is, however, on a 'People's Army'. Unless our Army is seen and accepted by the great majority of our population it will never get adequate support, even in war, let alone peace. Traditionally, Western standing armies have been seen as defenders of the establishment, of the ruling classes; memories of the use of troops against the Eureka Stockade are still revived. Even the spirit of Anzac was established in an imperial cause, and it was not until the Japanese threat that support for the Defence Forces cut right across all political divisions. There is now the opportunity to establish a new Anzac tradition: democratic, Digger armies supported by the People: 'The first and decisive condition precedent for a successful defence is a definite determination with the people

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Footnote:

a 'The Little Red Book' (Peking 1967) of Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. These are amongst numerous quotes suggesting that peace in our time is a pipe dream.
to defend the country and its national values at all costs'. The Army must now represent all the people, not just Authority.

There is, therefore, a need to conduct a three dimensional attack, with the aim of producing the climate of opinion in which the soldier is motivated by the ideal of representing the people in the military extension of national political aspirations. Truly motivated, the 'satisfying' and 'social' elements of our stated employment theories will be largely achieved; other aspects are relatively easy to improve and fulfil.

First, the Government must state clearly the national political aims. This has often been done, of course, but rarely have they reflected truly the aspirations of all classes. With the return to concentration on home defence and of the immediate perimeter this should be easier. The lack of an immediate threat should be put publicly in its historical perspective: how many decades in history have known peace? How many strong influences in our region have shown a continuous devotion to peace and consideration of others? Why should we be lucky? How long does it take to mobilize?

Secondly, as an item of national policy, the public should be educated, not with war scares, but with the hard facts as indicated above. Defence public relations have not always been successful in their contact with the masses. The people in the main have little idea of the nature or purpose of their forces, but rather some pictures of overpaid and overgrown Boy Scouts. The Press is not always kept well informed, according to comments received from some senior journalists, and has difficulty in producing good copy to counteract this.

The third dimension is the education of the soldier. Few officers, let alone other ranks, could rationalize the existence of a peacetime army, as surely they should be able to. Far too many do their jobs because they are there, rather than with insight and motivation, or worse, because it is a class right. 'The political work in its ranks [the army's] is of the first importance. It is the soul of the Army' — Giap 1969.

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5 A Sydney Sunday paper assistant editor has briefed me on how the Press sees the Army and on the uphill struggle they endure to get information.
The Army as a Career

Ideally, the soldier should be offered prospects fulfilling the criteria of our employment theories. We can itemise aspects, which if good, will get and keep the right man in the Army:

- Conditions of service are not the most important, but the most obvious problem. Australia has recently made great progress in their improvement and in the machinery to regularly review their compatibility with the civilian field. Provided they are comparable, soldiers will be attracted.

- Family life must suffer some turbulence, but this should be kept to a minimum and compensated. The frequency of postings presently suffered is quite unnecessary.

- Opportunities for advancement both within the Army and in preparation for civil life must be improved. Access to civil schooling should be greatly increased for all ranks.

- Opportunities for individual excitement, interest and challenge must be real and frequent. Overseas travel for courses, attachments, and visits should be widely available, together with far more adventure training in Australia.

- The individual must have confidence in his hardness, his ability to cope mentally and physically with a demanding job. This is the result of much tougher training than many soldiers get.

- Man management must improve to counteract the depersonalization of modern life, with its bureaucracy and computers. The relationship of officer, NCO and private soldier is one of concern and responsibility; this is unique to the services and must be maintained and developed, and it is possibly worth emphasizing in our publicity. The Army should be an example of personal contact.

Training

The tendency throughout society is to raise the level of efficiency through greater professionalism, with more specialization. The Army has followed this trend with the formalization of training systems, making the training fit the job and fit the man. The development should be encouraged, but with reservations; the personal element
must always be maintained.7 By contrast, a Naval establishment has abolished passing out parades for technical trainees because the job analysis did not show a requirement!

The restoration of pride in non-commissioned rank is of great importance. This has been eroded by rapid expansion in the Australian Army, and the introduction of an NCO academy could do a lot to improve their professionalism and status.

Unit and formation training must be made more realistic to fit the role chosen for the Army. This will be easier when that role is clearly defined. The recent habit of writing exercises round a Vietnam situation, when none can be envisaged, is counter-productive. For example, if Australia is planning homeland defence, there should be exercises designed for just that, against a beach-head or raid, in the Northern Territory or Newcastle.

Far greater use should be made of Australia's space for training. Apart from familiarization there is the value of the adventure and change; very few soldiers have ever been 'back o' Bourke'. The enemy threat in the Simpson Desert may be slight, but the force that could operate there would really be tested in every aspect. Regarding expense, Australia already sends units to New Zealand and Hawaii, which is good, but that tests very little except cameraderie and capacity. The lack of excitement and novelty in training does little to test, challenge or harden the Army.

As regards technological training, both individual and collective, every use must be made of civilian facilities; where that is impossible at least education must be stepped up. Lt Col M. van Gelder said in 1972: 'The least which can be done is to ensure that Regular Servicemen are sufficiently educated to face greater technological, organization and deployment changes come a war, than have to be faced by any other profession'.8

The Army as a Way of Life

The quality of Army life must be examined. What is good from the traditional should be preserved, that which detracts from efficiency

7 I. W. Masland and L. I. Rodway Soldiers and Scholars (Princeton 1957) demonstrate the US Army's over dependence on 'Things' rather than 'People', or 'technique' rather than 'motivation'.

8 Lieutenant Colonel M. M. van Gelder, Royal Australian Engineers, in a paper presented at a Sydney University symposium 'The Impact of Technology on Military Manpower', (August 1972).
should be amended. Ceremonial, and pride of unit or uniform is valid, as they enhance a man’s self-respect and reinforce *esprit de corps* when reasonable. A guard on an unfenced barracks gate is usually not reasonable; money would be better spent on fences. An Officers’ Mess may also improve the status of the profession, but when it absorbs valuable military staff it should be re-examined — perhaps a Garrison Club, professionally run to the best mess standards, is the answer.

When units are in the field, the tedious duties involving messing, hygiene and the like must be practised and efficient. In camp these duties should be provided by civil labour for, whilst expensive, the country is getting more soldier for its money, releasing him for training in the purely military arts and more likely getting him to re-engage for the life he elected. Labour can be conserved, as we have noted, by central messes in a garrison or area, with perhaps snacks and breakfast being self-prepared in kitchenettes attached to accommodation.

By such a critical re-appraisal we should develop an Army which in many day to day aspects corresponds to civil life at least, but also have adventure, *esprit de corps* and pride of professionalism added.

**The Army’s Contribution to Australian Society**

Too much has been said already about ‘the Army giving young lads a taste of discipline’. That is not the Army’s job in a free society, but there are many contributions it can make.

In science and technology, working on independent projects and in conjunction with civilian experts, much new impetus can and has been given. This includes computer technology, although the Army is a late starter in some areas.

In behavioural science, management and training systems, the Army has often led the way and has practised for years what has only recently been preached in colleges.

Very importantly, in an increasingly diverse society, the Army has a major role to play in assimilation of members of minority groups. The language training, cultural conditioning and sense of belonging given to migrants, their sons, and to our indigenous minorities are invaluable. How un-Australian can you feel after a few years of Army barracks life?

**Civil Aid**

The essence of a People’s Army is that it should remain part of the mainstream of public life and be seen and recognized as belonging
to the people. The attachments currently made for technical training should be vastly expanded. Soldiers should participate on secondment, in every aspect of life and, with the Public Service taking over so many roles, this should now be easier. If the Army is recognized as of the people, union objections could be overcome; payment of dues, maintenance of differentials, these and other minor requirements could be observed.

On the larger scale, again with the active co-operation of the unions, even with their initiative, public works could be undertaken. If special jobs normally earn penalty rates, such as the Snowy River Scheme, then why not?

Civil emergency situations are already allowed for and well publicized. Greater co-operation in planning with Civil Defence, Police and others should be initiated. Every effort must be made for the Army to be seen, accepted, understood and appreciated. 'The war organization of the [Swedish] Psychological Defence is today fully developed with eminent leaders from the press and the publicity system, from the national movements and from science'. A country with a similar political climate has found the answer.

**Financing**

The measures discussed do not involve great expenditure. If the Army is seen as a truly 'popular' service, allocation of reasonable funds will not be grudged. Repayment to the community in the form of material assistance, technology and the setting of standards can more than compensate for the share of the tax cake allotted, besides contributing to the people's security.

**CONCLUSION**

Nothing in this paper is claimed as revolutionary, in spite of borrowing terms from the 'other side'. Lieutenant General Sir Mervyn Brogan said recently: 'It is hard to put the Army's point of view to the public, conditioned as it is to the denigration of all manifestations of the established order, including the Army'. This seems to be the crux of the problem, now that we have not got a convenient small war in which to brush up our techniques.

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In searching for a solution it is significant that it is the Army Education Service that has as one of its two aims: 'To make better soldiers by building and sustaining morale'.

Nothing short of a completely fresh approach as to whom an Army is for, and the education of the People about their Army, will bring about the support — financial, moral and social — which is vital for morale. Then, the environment having been created and morale having been raised, our civilian and military staffs will have little trouble instituting and developing the material reforms suggested, with others, to achieve efficiency in the People's Army.

It is recommended that a massive education programme be launched, aimed primarily at the general public. This programme should be with an aim to convince the People that it is their Army, historically and politically relevant, that they are required to support. Concurrent with this programme, a deep re-appraisal should be made of the nature of the Army and its relevance to and contact with the People.

MONTHLY AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded prizes for the best original articles published in the May and June 1974 issues of the journal to:

May: Brigadier A. J. F. McDonald ('The Indonesian Army'), $10.
June: Lieutenant Colonel O. J. O'Brien ('The Projector and Other Barriers to Successful Instruction'), $10.

Ivor Hele* - A chameleon at war

John Reid

A chameleon, Websters Dictionary tells us, is:
‘Any group (Rhiodtonglossa) of old world lizards with granular skin, prehensile tail, independently movable eyeballs, universal ability to change the colour of the skin.’

This article in no way wants to be libellous in comparing Australia’s greatest war artist with the poor little vacillating reptile — but the simile is there.

Ivor Hele has been an official war artist of two major wars and many campaigns. His work is never dull — always dynamic, simply because he is able to quickly attune himself to the mood of the soldiers at the time, and the environments in which they fought. It is for this facility and attribute that we can liken him to a chameleon.

Consider the brilliant high-keyed canvases painted in Cairo soon after Wavell’s first successful desert thrust that included the capture of Bardia and Tobruk. The dazzling light of the Middle East is depicted in crystal clarity, as are the characteristic, imper turbable attitudes of a few of these early second generation Anzacs, as they herd endless streams of Italian prisoners along the dusty roads into captivity.

After training at the Melbourne Teachers College in arts and crafts the author was a secondary and tertiary teacher with the Victorian Education Dept for twenty years. He served in the CMF (Victorian Scottish Regt) and has had a number of one-man exhibitions in Australia, UK and Canada. He attended the Universities of Melbourne, Alberta (Edmonton), Oxford (Magdalen College) and Calgary. A graduate in Arts, Fine Arts and Education — with majors in History and Sociology; a Diplomate of the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, he is now the Curator of Art at the Australian War Memorial. He is also a part-time lecturer at the Australian National University and an art critic for the Canberra Times. This article is the first of a series of profiles on war artists for Army Journal.
The mood of the times is also set by a portrait sketch of an *Afrika Korps* man now held in the Australian War Memorial collection. It is a superb head-study executed in sanguine crayon — a favourite medium of the artist. In it Hele brings out all the arrogance of Aryanism found in the halcyon days of Nazism. He is also capable of depicting our own troops in the dejection of defeat and evacuation having just returned from Greece. There is a fine painting by Hele of these men waiting in

*Encyclopedia of Australian Art.*

*(b. Edwardstown, South Australia, 1912.) Painter; mainly a portrait painter; trustee of the National Gallery of South Australia from 1956. Studies: South Australian School of Arts and Crafts (under James Ashton); Heyman School, Munich, Biloul School, Paris. During the Second World War, Hele was appointed official war artist while serving as a private soldier with the 9th Australian Division in the Middle East. Promoted to the rank of captain, he remained and worked with his division, which was later transferred to New Guinea. Hele's grimly realistic paintings of the actions in which he participated as artist-soldier were outstandingly the most impressive of any work produced by Australian official war artists during the Second World War. In 1952, after a prolonged period of work at his home at Aldinga, South Australia, he was appointed an official artist to the Australia forces in Korea. He was commissioned to paint the opening of Federal Parliament by the Queen in 1954. — Encyclopedia of Australian Art.*
the dreary shunting yards of Alexandria to be reassigned to yet another protracted campaign of attrition.

Ivor Hele's portraits are well known to all, and quite deserve the accolades they won for him. One or two show the pomp and circumstance of the general staff, suggesting that the sittings took place after heavy gourmet meals. In contrast to them there is a rather worried and furtive looking oil sketch of Sir Leslie Morshead painted during the siege of Tobruk. One appreciates the penetration of this portrait when one considers that at the time the General had a battle to win. Few would class Ivor Hele as being a social realist painter, but this form of expression did creep into his work after his Mediterranean campaigns.

Hele rejoined the veteran troops in New Guinea, and shared their sodden fatalism as they slogged it out in the green hell. The bright palette of the desert is replaced with an almost monochromatic colour scheme of khaki-green. Yellows that once had the freshness of butter, seem to have degenerated into the jaundiced colours of the atebrin
takers of the fetid jungles. Sun-bronzed warriors of olympian dimension
give way to zombie-like wraiths either clawing their way up endless
trails, helping to bring in wounded comrades, sadly burying dead mates
or clearing an enemy foxhole of the decomposed dead.

After a brief respite from war after 1945, Hele was commissioned
to record the conflict in Korea. In this early United Nations action his
style altered drastically. At some stage the artist had come under
the influence of Felix Topolski, even to the point of adapting that
artist’s writhing serpentine technique of drawing.

Hele’s painting too, freed itself from the Melanesian gloom, and
took on a distinctly brassy sheen. These pictures show the artist at the
height of his power, and the works resemble the painterly style of the
nineteenth century master Daumier in texture and freedom.

Today, Ivor Hele still paints on in quiet recluse, only breaking
his self-imposed exile to immortalise another prominent Australian or
win yet another Archibald Prize in the process. In this, he is sometimes
dismissed by critics as merely a very able portrait painter. They of
course, are unaware of the chameleon at war. They would also be
insensitive to the fact that the artist can penetrate behind the mere facade of battle, or sum up the crashing boredom that seems to be the soldiers lot. One must however regard Hele’s large battle-pieces as great works of art. They are monumental in scale and proportion as well as being heroic in import. The taking of Post Eleven at Bardia, is perhaps the greatest battle picture ever painted. Not even Benjamin West’s famous ‘Death of Wolfe at Quebec’, can rival the Hele masterpiece in drama and poignancy.

Ivor Hele is not a mere recorder of equipment or events. He gets into the very soul of Australia’s fighting man. He is almost unique amongst his country’s war artists. The exceptions are Will Dyson and Donald Friend — the other great commentators of soldiers wit and emotions. Whereas Hele’s work emphasises what is current in military fetish (and thus identified by servicemen) in contrast the art of the other two is often regarded as little better than cartooning.

General Blamey employed Ivor Hele as his own ‘court painter’ taking him out of the ranks in the Middle East. The Australian War Memorial has many examples of the South Australian’s work.

A draughtsman supreme is always admired by his fellow artists and Ivor Hele is no exception. For example, Joshua Smith recently said that he regarded Hele as the finest artist living in Australia. Military establishments are always keen to display his works in their offices and messes. This also tends to suggest that Ivor Hele is and always has been — the soldiers’ painter. ☺
ON 3 August 1914, sixty years ago and on the eve of the Great War, Australia followed the example of Canada and New Zealand by offering help to Britain. Australia promised 20,000 volunteer troops to be fully maintained by the Commonwealth and to serve wherever the British authorities desired. Brigadier General W. T. Bridges was appointed to the command of this force, which was designated the Australian Imperial Force. Recruiting opened on 10th August and within six weeks the contingent — organized as one infantry division and a light horse brigade — was ready to embark in twenty-eight ships which had been requisitioned and converted to troop carriers.

The ANMEF

Meanwhile it had become necessary for Australia to assist in the seizing of German island territory in the Pacific. For this task a force of two infantry battalions, known as the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force, was hastily recruited under Colonel William Holmes and despatched to German New Guinea. Escorted by the battle-cruiser HMAS Australia, the force reached Rabaul (New Britain) on 11th September, made landings and overcame resistance to capture a powerful radio station which had been communicating with German warships. A few days later the German Governor agreed that all resistance in the islands of German New Guinea should cease, and Australian troops remained in occupation of these territories until after the war, when the League of Nations gave Australia a mandate over them.

The Middle East

Back in Australia, on 1st November, the first great convoy carrying Australian and New Zealand troops sailed from Albany (W.A.) and set off across the Indian Ocean. It was known at the time that the German cruiser Emden (which had been capturing and sinking merchant ships on the trade routes to Ceylon and India) constituted a danger to
the convoy, and two Australian cruisers and a Japanese battle-cruiser had been sent with the troopships as protection. At dawn on 9th November, when the ships were passing the Cocos Islands about fifty miles distant, a wireless message was received from the cable station there reporting the approach of an unidentified cruiser. HMAS Sydney was immediately detached and proceeded to Cocos where, after a sharp fight, she destroyed the other ship, which proved to be the elusive Emden. This was the first naval victory achieved by the Royal Australian Navy.

Continuing their voyage with this threat removed, the convoy received orders that instead of training in England during winter, the troops were to disembark in Egypt and to proceed to France from there after training. In the four succeeding months of intense instruction the AIF and New Zealand troops were made ready to meet the enemy on the Western Front.

By this time, however, Turkey had joined Germany against the Allies and had begun to threaten Russia’s military operations in the Caucasus. In order to relieve this pressure Russia requested Britain to undertake operations in some area which may cause the Turks to withdraw troops and material from the Caucasus. The result of this request was the attempt to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula. Thus, instead of going to the Western Front, the AIF and their New Zealand comrades went to Gallipoli where, from the historic landing on 25 April 1915 until the evacuation the following December, they fought with great gallantry and forged the precious tradition of ANZAC.

During the Gallipoli campaign, recruiting had continued keenly in Australia and thousands of eager reinforcements had reached Egypt by the time the Gallipoli veterans of the 1st, and the more recently formed 2nd Division, returned here from the Peninsula. From these seasoned troops and the newcomers, two more Australian divisions were now formed — the 4th and 5th — while yet another, the 3rd, was formed in Australia, and sent direct to England. By the end of March 1916, the I Anzac Corps (1st, 2nd and N.Z. Divisions) commenced its movement to France, to be followed in May by the 4th and 5th Divisions as II Anzac Corps.

**Sinai and Palestine**

The Australian Light Horse and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles (most of whom had served as infantry on Gallipoli) were, upon their
return to Egypt, mounted again and formed into the Anzac Mounted Division under Major General H. G. Chauvel. This division remained in Egypt with British Yeomanry and a brigade of Camel troops formed mainly from Australian volunteers. Thus it was that, after the departure of the infantry in 1916, the Turks tried to strike across North Sinai to capture the Suez Canal. They were held and beaten by the Mounted Division at Romani (4 August 1916), and the British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Archibald Murray, obtained permission to follow them up in Sinai and continue the thrust into Palestine. This was the beginning of a campaign that lasted until the Turks, decisively beaten, sought an armistice on 30 October 1918.

Advancing to El Arish by December 1916, the mounted troops struck the Turks two sharp blows at Maghdaba (23rd December), and Rafa (9 January 1917), after which the enemy retired to Gaza and Beersheba, in southern Palestine, where they had established a defence line about thirty miles long. On 26 March 1917, Murray attacked the Gaza end of these defences using mounted troops to thrust around the line to the rear of Gaza itself. A second mounted division (of Australian
and British brigades) assisted in this, but although they succeeded in
their role, they were forced to withdraw because of the absence of water
for the horses. A second attempt, on 19th April, to roll back the
defences also failed. The British Government now placed General Sir
Edmund Allenby in command and provided extra troops, aircraft and
material. Then, on 31st October, Allenby attacked again, this time with
infantry around Gaza, and mounted troops inland about Beersheba.
The 4th Light Horse Brigade made a magnificent cavalry charge at
Beersheba and swept through the Turkish positions. A few days later
the whole enemy front collapsed, and the Turks withdrew beyond Jaffa
to positions in the hills defending Jerusalem, which was taken on 9th
December, mainly by British infantry.

Beyond Jerusalem the Turks held on until September 1918. Mean-
while mounted troops, including the Australians, had occupied portion
of the Jordan Valley and, in March and May, conducted two powerful
and audacious raids into heights to the east, at Amman and Es Salt.
On 19th September Allenby launched a full-scale offensive. Leaving the
Anzac Mounted Division to keep up the appearance of activity at the
eastern end of his line, he struck strongly with infantry (including Indian)
on the coastal end, near Tul Keram. The Turkish defences were pene-
trated, and the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions and the Australian
Mounted Division moved through to the Turkish rear. The whole
Turkish front crumbled then, while the Australians on the inland
sector struck at and captured the enemy base of Amman. Pressure on
the enemy increased as they withdrew in disorder, and the pursuit
continued to Homs and Aleppo, when the Turks surrendered. Thus
ended the campaign in Sinai and Palestine; a campaign in which the
Australian Light Horse and the New Zealand mounted troops were
regarded as the most effective and active cavalry used by the Western
allies during the war.

The Western Front 1916-18

Upon its arrival in France early in 1916, the I Anzac Corps gained
experience of the Western Front in a ‘quiet’ sector near the French
town of Armentieres. Here they learned the art of raiding enemy
trenches and patrolling in the no-man’s-land that reached from the
North Sea to the Swiss border. They also learned how to counter
German raids and to withstand German artillery bombardments of their
own trenches.
A large British and French offensive had been planned but the enemy struck first and the French at Verdun were severely battered. But on 1 July 1916, the British Commander-in-Chief, General Haig, attacked near Amiens and the French commander General Foch started a thrust on the British right flank. This attack drove the enemy back at various points for several miles, and the Allies, despite heavy losses, maintained their pressure. In mid-July, I Anzac was brought up from Armentieres, and their positions were occupied by II Anzac, fresh from Egypt. One of these new divisions — the 5th — was thrown in to make a feint near the village of Fromelles, and although it seized and held part of the enemy line for a night, it was driven back next morning with heavy losses.

Meanwhile, on the Somme, the 1st Division captured Pozieres on 23rd July and, in the next seven weeks, the Australian 1st, 2nd and 4th Divisions were involved in extremely heavy fighting around Pozieres Heights and Moquet Farm, which cost them 23,000 casualties, but which also secured the vital ridge around these two places.
The next two months saw I Anzac (with the 5th Division from II Anzac) occupying the fairly quiet sector around Ypres. It was then brought back to the Somme to help in the capture of high ground near Bapaume. But the weather intervened, the advance literally bogged down in an unbelievable morass of mud, and the British, French and Australians endured their most difficult months of the war.

In February 1917, the Germans suddenly withdrew 10-30 miles from the Somme battlefield to an excellently prepared line known as the Siegfried (or Hindenburg) Line. I Anzac and other corps pressed on after them, fighting at strong-points and villages on the way. On 9th April, British and Canadian troops struck a telling blow at Arras, and two days later the 4th Australian Division, with tanks, attacked the Hindenburg Line at Bullecourt. The tanks failed in this operation and, although the Australians occupied part of the Line, they were driven out with severe losses. On 15th April near Lagnicourt, the 1st Division withstood an assault by parts of four German divisions and, on 3rd May, the 2nd Division again seized the Hindenburg Line at Bullecourt. The Germans launched no less than seven large counter-attacks here, but the 2nd, 1st and 5th Divisions, successively, defeated them.

But there were other troubles now. The French offensive had failed, and French commanders felt that their armies could make no further large-scale efforts that year. A revolution had occurred in Russia, and her support dwindled. Thus, it became clear that any further offensives in 1917 would have to be carried on by the British. For his part Haig was anxious to clear the Belgian coast of Germans and, on 7th June, he launched an offensive in Flanders with the object of achieving this. This offensive opened with the capture of Messines Ridge, in which Australian tunnellers played a part. The II Anzac (now with the newly-arrived 3rd Division under General Monash, 4th Australian, New Zealand and 25th British) undertook the southern third of this new thrust. On 31st July Haig delivered his main stroke at Ypres in which both I and II Anzac participated by driving the enemy from their positions in fierce battles at Menin Road (20th September), Polygon Wood (26th September) and Broodseinde (4th October). This was a severe loss to the enemy, but heavy rain now began to fall, and the first attempt to capture Passchendaele in the sea of mud that was the battlefield failed. It was later taken by the Canadians.

During November 1917 the Australians were withdrawn. They were battle-weary and much depleted. They had sustained over 50,000
battle casualties. During the winter of 1917-18 they were rested and reinforced around Messines, and the five divisions were concentrated into an Australian Corps under General Birdwood.

By spring 1918, Russia had withdrawn completely from the war, but the severity of the German U-boat campaign had brought America in on the side of the Allies. Germany, knowing the potential of American participation, now hastened to beat the British and French before United States troops and supplies could arrive. Thus, on 21st March, General Ludendorff threw in every available reserve against the British, driving back the 3rd and 5th British Armies, and penetrating almost to Amiens. The Australians were immediately brought up, arriving when the enemy were only 15 miles from the city. The 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions stopped the advance here and saved Amiens. The Germans twice attacked at Villers Bretonneux and, on each occasion, the attacks were thwarted, mainly by Australian infantry. The Germans also attacked in Flanders, and the 1st Division, despatched northwards to the scene, was instrumental in stopping an advance on Hazebrouck.
The enemy now engaged the French and the sectors in which Australians were stationed became fairly quiet. The Americans were now also arriving in large numbers. On 18th July the first stage of a new offensive was ordered by the Allied commander General Foch and the Australian sector around Amiens was chosen to launch it. General Monash now commanded the Australian Corps and, at Hamel on 4th July, had tried out new tactics for the attack. On 8 August 1918 the 4th British Army (comprising Australian, Canadian and III British Corps) struck at the enemy before Amiens. The French 1st Army joined in. By the end of that day, General Ludendorff declared he knew that the war was lost. For Germany it was, indeed, the beginning of the end.

Relentlessly the Allied offensive continued. With the British, the AIF next struck at Chuignes (23rd August) and, at Mont St. Quentin on the 31st, they burst through enemy defences at Peronne. This, together with British and Canadian successes elsewhere, now caused the enemy to withdraw to the main defences of their Hindenburg Line. On 18th September the Australian Corps fought its way into the Line’s outer defences after which, during the period 29th September to 5th October, with two American divisions, they penetrated the main line itself.

Tired and depleted the AIF was now withdrawn for rest but even then Germany had taken the initial steps to secure an armistice. Fighting continued, however, with Germany’s position growing worse by the hour. Clearly the enemy was finished.

Thus, at 11 a.m. on the morning of 11 November 1918, just as the refreshed Australians were moving up to the front again, Germany surrendered and the long years of war came to an end.

The end of the war found Australian soldiers in almost every theatre of operations; besides 92,000 in France and 60,000 in England there were about 17,000 in Egypt, Palestine and Syria; others were in Mesopotamia, Persia and Kurdistan with wireless squadrons and with ‘Dunsterforce’.

**Australian Flying Corps**

Less than a fortnight after the outbreak of war, four pupils began a course of flying instruction at Point Cook (Victoria). This event marked the beginning of military aviation in Australia, and led to the
establishment of the Australian Flying Corps, which served during the war as part of the AIF. Australia was, in fact, the only Dominion with its own air force on active service in the war.

In April 1915 the British Government asked whether Australia could supply flying personnel for service in India, and this request was met in the following month by the despatch of three officers and 45 other ranks, comprising a unit known as the First Half Flight. The men proceeded to India, thence to Mesopotamia (now Iraq), where they served against the Turks until the latter part of 1916.

Meanwhile, at the end of 1915, it had been suggested that Australia, Canada and South Africa should contribute personnel to form a Dominion squadron of the Royal Flying Corps. The Commonwealth Government, however, decided to form independently a complete squadron for service overseas. This unit, which left Australia in March 1916 and went to Egypt to join the 5th Wing, RFC, was the first squadron of the Australian Flying Corps. In September 1916 No. 2 Squadron AFC was formed in Egypt from some members of No. 1 Squadron, volunteers from the Light Horse and members of the Half Flight who had returned from Mesopotamia. It arrived in England in January 1917. No. 3 Squadron was formed in Australia near the end of 1916 and arrived in England in December, while No. 4 Squadron, also formed in Australia, arrived in the United Kingdom in March 1917. Thus organized, Nos. 2, 3 and 4 Squadrons flew in France against the Germans, while No. 1 Squadron remained with the Allied forces in Egypt and Palestine in support of the operations in that theatre. Four training squadrons were also formed in England to reinforce the operational squadrons, which worked throughout their service within the organization of the Royal Flying Corps.

All four Australian squadrons acquitted themselves nobly from the war; many members were decorated; many were later to become famous in the world of aviation for record-breaking flights, aircraft designing and pioneering commercial flying. But, most of all, these men established traditions of skill and courage which were inherited by the Royal Australian Air Force when it came into existence as a separate Service in 1921.

Nursing Service

During 1914-18 the only Australian women's service which was closely associated with the AIF was the Army Nursing Service. Nurses
to staff the medical units were obtained from the Australian Army Nursing Service Reserve and from the nursing profession. All members had previously received at least three years hospital training and were between the ages of 20 and 45 years, single or widows. Although members of the Service did not hold military rank, nor were they enlisted in the AIF, they nevertheless received all courtesies normally extended to officers. All were, of course, volunteers.

The first draft of Sisters left Australia in the first convoy and by the end of the war a total of 2,139 had served abroad, while another 423 served in Australia. Other Australian nurses served in the Queen Alexandra Imperial Military Nursing Service. Twenty-one members of the AANS died overseas, and 385 were decorated. In addition to their service on the Western Front, in the Middle East and in England, Australian nurses staffed four British hospitals in Salonica, ten in India and another in Italy. Hospital trains and ships also carried Australian nurses on their staffs.

Some Statistics

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Percentage of battle casualties to troops on active service — 64.8%

Enlistments by States (round figures)

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AUSTRALIA AT WAR — 1939-45

On 3 September 1939, thirty-five years ago, when the Second World War began, Australia possessed a home-service army of volunteers. This force consisted of five infantry and two cavalry divisions, below-strength and poorly-equipped, organized on the lines of the AIF of 1914-18. On 15th September Australia offered to raise 20,000 men for service anywhere in the world, this force being called the Second AIF. Although the word ‘second’ was later dropped, the battalions again used the 1914-18 system of unit numbering, with each number
prefixed by ‘2/’, e.g. 2/1st Battalion. The new AIF’s first division was the 6th, comprising the 16th, 17th and 18th Brigades, under Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Blamey. In January 1940 the volunteers began to sail for the Middle East where they were to train in southern Palestine before going to France. In March 1940 Australia decided to expand this division to an Army Corps. The 7th Division was at once formed, and General Blamey was selected to command the Corps and the AIF.

It was at this stage that Hitler began an offensive which overran Norway, Holland, Belgium and France, and forced the British Army to evacuate the Continent. Italy then entered the war on the side of Germany, and a convoy of Australian troops had to be diverted from Egypt to England via the Cape of Good Hope. In England these men were formed into the nucleus of the 9th Division and reshipped to Egypt, where the organization was completed.

The Middle East

In September 1940 a large Italian force advanced inside the Egyptian border to Sidi Barrani. Here, on 9th December, British and Indian troops struck and drove the enemy to Bardia, in Libya, taking 35,000 prisoners. The 6th Australian Division now replaced the Indians and, in conjunction with the 7th (British) Armoured Division, began a brilliant campaign which drove the Italians from Bardia (3rd-5th January 1941), Tobruk (21st-22nd January), Derna (30th January) and on to Benghazi (6th February).

Meanwhile, towards the end of 1940, Italy invaded Greece from Albania. With a small but determined army Greece began to defend herself, and requested assistance from Britain. On 6th April the Germans struck simultaneously at Greece and Yugoslavia. By this time troops had arrived in Greece from the Middle East. In addition to British troops, the force also consisted of New Zealanders and the 6th Australian Division. The complete force had not arrived when the oncoming Germans were encountered in the mountain passes of northern Greece. Outflanked and outnumbered, the Allies had to commence a fighting withdrawal, until most of them were evacuated by sea to Crete and Egypt late in April. Then, on 20th May, the Germans invaded the important island of Crete in the first full-scale air invasion in history. The ill-equipped defenders fought for ten days before the British and Anzacs were forced to evacuate the island. Many Australians became prisoners of war in these two short campaigns.
In June 1941, following unofficial German penetration of Syria, the Allies decided to seize the initiative and invade the country. This took place on 7th June and the invading force consisted of the 7th Australian Division, together with British, Indian and Free French forces. Heavy fighting ensued until the capture of Damour on 9th July, after which the pro-German Vichy Command capitulated. The victory was important because Hitler had invaded Russia on 22nd June, and it would have been advantageous to him to have been able to extend his control over Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran.

Back in North Africa, German infantry, artillery and armour had begun to assist the Italian forces. The Axis now heavily counter-attacked and forced British and Australian forces to retreat some 270 miles to Tobruk. The old Italian perimeter was developed and manned, largely by the 9th Division, plus the 18th Brigade (now part of 7th Division). The Axis by-passed Tobruk, and isolated the garrison by cutting the Bardia road to the East. Tobruk refused to be overwhelmed, and in battles of April and May the defenders decisively defeated two
determined German attempts
to break in. During the period
August-November 1941, at the
request of the Australian Gov-
ernment, the 9th was relieved
by sea, but one Australian
battalion was still there in
December when British, New
Zealanders and Indians again pushed the enemy across Libya and
Cyrenaica. The siege of Tobruk, which lasted 242 days, then came to
an end.

The last action by Australian troops in the Middle East was fought
by the 9th Division after the 6th and 7th had returned to Australia.
After training and garrison duties in Syria, the 9th was brought down
to Egypt in June 1942 and joined General Montgomery’s Eighth Army.
Axis forces by this time had achieved much success in their reconquest
of Cyrenaica and advance into Egypt. Tobruk was taken by the enemy
in June. The Australians were involved in fierce fighting at Tel el Eisa
and Miteiriya Ridge during July as part of Montgomery’s moves to
establish a holding line against the enemy. On 23rd October, after this
series of actions, the Eighth Army launched a full-scale offensive, which
culminated in a break-through at El Alemein early in November. The
9th Division played a significant part in this great battle, which opened
the way for an Allied advance to Tunisia and led to the defeat of the
Axis in Africa.

The Pacific

On 7 December 1941 there occurred an event which completely
changed Australia’s position in the war. Japan attacked the American
base at Pearl Harbour (Hawaii), and followed this blow with attacks on
Malaya — the first step in a tremendous sweep southwards. Two
brigades of the 8th Australian Division were then in Malaya with
British and Indian troops, while the third brigade was disposed on the
islands of Ambon and Timor to augment the Dutch garrisons. Another
unit of the division, the 2/22nd Battalion, had been sent to Rabaul on
New Britain.

The Australians in Malaya were disposed in the Mersing area,
about 100 miles north of Singapore when the Japanese struck but
despite some brilliant actions, especially near Gemas and Bakri in
January, the defenders were gradually forced back down the mainland and across the narrow Johore Strait to Singapore Island. The Japanese increased the intensity of their attacks, and the congested island was forced to capitulate on 15 February 1942. The Australian survivors of the campaign, along with their British and Indian comrades, passed into captivity and, until the end of the war, endured particularly harsh conditions which resulted in many more deaths.

The early days of 1942 saw Japan in command of the western Pacific and threatening Java, New Guinea and Australia. The 6th and 7th Divisions were despatched home. On 23rd January the enemy invaded Rabaul, and overcame the small garrison there. Darwin was heavily bombed on 19th February and, on 8th March, the Japanese gained a foothold in Papua. Meanwhile, most of the 6th Division was detained to help garrison Ceylon, and another composite force from the Middle East, including two Australian battalions, had been landed in Java but forced to surrender early in March. In Timor the enemy had also gained a victory, but Australian commandos refused to capitulate and carried on a guerilla war until embarked secretly in 1943. Ambon had fallen and the Australian force was captured after a gallant and effective resistance.

In New Guinea the Japanese began to consolidate their positions and in July landed large forces at Buna and Gona, and commenced a drive across the tangled Owen Stanley Mountains towards Port Moresby. On 26th August they made another landing at Milne Bay, but were here met and forced to withdraw by a mixed AIF and militia force. This, in fact, was the first complete defeat suffered by the Japanese since their offensive began. In the Owen Stanleys the enemy was met gallantly by the small militia garrison, assisted by an AIF brigade. These troops were, however, pushed back to within 35 air miles of Port Moresby to Ioribaiwa, where a fresh AIF brigade joined the defenders and held up the enemy's advance.

In Australia, General Douglas MacArthur had, upon the invitation of the Australian Government, assumed command of the South-West Pacific Area, and Australia became a base from which it was intended to strike back at the Japanese. All the Australian militia battalions had been placed on full time duty in December 1941; men were called up to serve in the Army in Australia and its territories under provisions of the Defence Act; and General Sir Thomas Blamey became Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces, which comprised both militia
and AIF elements. In other directions also, Australia was placed on a war footing for the first time in its history, air raid precautions organization was introduced, the civilian population was subject to manpower regulations, and food, clothing and travel rationing was introduced. United States troops and supplies began to pour into the country.

(Australian War Memorial)

Wounded Australians from the Oivi-Gorari battle at the MDS Kokoda, November 1942.
In December 1942 a small Australian force was sent to defend Merauke (Dutch New Guinea) in conjunction with Netherlands-East Indies forces. There were some clashes with Japanese patrols in this area, but no large-scale actions developed. Another Australian force was made responsible for the defence of the islands of Torres Strait.

Although Japan had hitherto held virtual control of the air, as the months of 1942 passed this position changed. Australian squadrons, now equipped with American aircraft, assumed an aggressive role in the north, the American Fifth Air Force added tremendous impetus to the offensive, and the air menace was steadily lessening. On 28 September 1942, General Blarney struck back at the Japanese in the Owen Stanleys. In weeks of fierce struggle and fanatical resistance the Japanese were driven back through Kokoda, then Wairopi and on to Gona. Then began what became known as the Battle of the Beaches, in which Australian troops of the 7th Division, a brigade of the 6th and militia brigades, together with United States regiments, carried the campaign through to its end, with the capture of Cape Endaiadere (19th December), Buna (2 January 1943), and Sanananda (18th January). During this vital campaign, fought in almost indescribable conditions of terrain, mud and rain, the cost in casualties from diseases such as malaria, scrub typhus and dysentery was extremely high.

With this threat to Port Moresby removed there was only a brief breathing space before a new threat on this important base developed. The Japanese, already in occupation of Lae and Salamaua, realized the importance of Wau in the highlands and, from Salamaua, began operations for its capture. They were, in fact, almost in the act of overwhelming the small garrison there at the end of January 1943 when the 17th Brigade was flown in by air to prevent the threatened disaster and foil the Japanese plan. For the 3rd Division this was the beginning of an arduous seven months’ campaign in tangled mountain jungle, during which the Japanese were driven back until Salamaua was recaptured on 11th September.

In September 1943 the Allies commenced a series of operations to seize from the Japanese the whole of the Huon Gulf area. The large airstrip complex at Nadzab was first seized by United States paratroops (with whom there were some Australian artillerymen), the 7th Division was then flown in and began an advance on Lae, while at the same time the 9th Division, (now back from the Middle East after participating in the Battle of El Alamein), was landed by sea east of Lae and also began
advancing on the base. Under this two-pronged assault Lae was taken on 16th September. The 9th then made an amphibious landing near Finschhafen which fell on 2nd October. By November the enemy had been cleared from the hills around Sattelberg and Wareo and the advance continued along the coast to Sio. Here the 5th Division took over from the 9th and pushed on to Saidor, where they linked up with an American force which had landed on 2 January 1944 to cut the Japanese line of retreat.

Meanwhile the 7th Division had undertaken a thrust up the Ramu Valley from Lae, capturing the airfield at Dumpu and clearing the enemy from the Finisterre Ranges. The 7th was relieved by the 11th, which pressed on through Bogadjiim to capture Madang on 24th April. Two days later Alexishafen fell. The division reached Hansa Bay on 12th June and the mouth of the Sepik River early in July.

With the fall of Hansa Bay and Allied penetration to the Sepik the enemy had lost Papua. Except for patrolling and consolidation tasks, the Australians were now rested and re-equipped. An extensive training area was established on the Atherton Tablelands of North Queensland for this purpose, and the AIF divisions were concentrated there.

Meanwhile American forces had been busily engaged elsewhere in a series of airborne-waterborne operations. The large enemy base of Rabaul was neutralized from the air, and successful landings were made on New Britain and on Bougainville. Los Negros, in the Admiralties was seized. In April 1944 Americans landed at Aitape (New Guinea) and Hollandia (Dutch New Guinea) and followed this with a landing at Wakde Island. An advance by Admiral Nimitz's Central Pacific forces had also succeeded and the Americans established themselves on Japanese territories at Kwajalein and Eniwetok, in the Marshall Islands. Biak Island and Noemfoor Island next fell to the Americans. In June an offensive against the Marianas Islands was mounted by Admiral Nimitz, aimed at Saipan, Tinian and Guam. All tasks were completed here by August, and the final thrust for 1944 resulted in the seizure of Morotai by MacArthur's forces, and the Palaus by Nimitz's III Marine
Corps. Thus, during 1944, the American line had advanced half way to Tokyo.

At the end of 1944, just after the Americans began their initial assault on the Philippines, Australian forces took over their positions at Torokina, on Bougainville (an augmented 3rd Division), the 5th Division (later the 11th) became responsible for New Britain, and the 6th Division came up from the tablelands to relieve Americans in the Aitape area. The United States troops now withdrew, and the Australians resumed their operations against the still-tenacious enemy. In the ensuing months the 6th Division conducted a two-pronged drive from Aitape on the last remaining enemy coastal base of Wewak, which was taken on 11 May 1945. The 3rd Division pursued an active campaign on Bougainville, gradually clearing the island, but although by-passed by MacArthur’s ‘island-hopping’ strategy, the Japanese bitterly contested every advance. On the island of New Britain, no attempt was made to assault the base of Rabaul which, although neutralized and cut off, still teemed with thousands of fit and fanatical enemy. The Australians here therefore concentrated on patrolling and holding a line across the island at the neck of the Gazelle Peninsula from Open Bay to Wide Bay.

Although it had originally been intended that there would be an Australian ground component in MacArthur’s operations in the Philippines, this venture — while by no means easy — went well, and it was decided to use the 7th and 9th Divisions to seize the oil-rich territory of Borneo. There was also the possibility that they may be used afterwards in projected attacks on Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, to be undertaken by Anglo-Indian forces under Lord Mountbatten. Thus, on 1 May 1945, the 26th Brigade (9th Division) after rehearsals at Morotai, landed on the island of Tarakan to seize it and the airfield which it contained. Resistance was light at first but grew progressively stronger, and it was not until 29th June that aircraft were able to use the strip. The rest of the division had landed at Brunei Bay and Labuan Island on 10th June, while the 7th Division seized Balikpapan and the surrounding area on 1st July and the weeks that followed.

By July, although operations were continuing in both the American and the Australian areas, Japan itself was crumbling under the weight of constant attacks by United States Air Forces. Then came the dropping of the first atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, preceded by Russia’s intervention in the East. The Japanese
leaders now sued for peace, and hostilities ceased on 15 August 1945. The surrender of Japan was formalized aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2nd September, General Sir Thomas Blamey signing on behalf of Australia. This was followed by individual surrenders in the various Pacific areas, and it was necessary for Australian troops to remain in the islands to disarm, administer and repatriate 250,000 Japanese personnel to their battered homeland.

(Australian War Memorial)
Australian sappers searching for mines, Balikpapan, July 1945.

Women's Services

At the outbreak of war the only women’s service in existence was the Australian Army Nursing Service, and the first contingent of AANS members left for Palestine early in 1940. Subsequently they served with the Australian Army in all theatres — England, Palestine, Libya, Egypt, Greece and Crete, Eritrea, Syria, Malaya, Ceylon, Papua and New Guinea, Solomons, New Britain and Borneo, in addition to staffing Army hospitals throughout Australia and serving on hospital ships. About 3,857 served as members of the AANS.

On 13 August 1941 War Cabinet approved the formation of the
Australian Women's Army Service, and enlistment began in January 1942. Service was limited to Australia and the object of the AWAS was to release men for posting to combatant units. On 15 November 1944, however, War Cabinet gave approval for the posting of up to 500 volunteers to New Guinea, and nearly 400 officers and other ranks subsequently served at Headquarters First Australian Army at Lae from May 1945. Total enlistments in the AWAS were 23,988.

In December 1942 the Australian Army Medical Women’s Service was formed to replace Voluntary Aid Detachments on full-time duty. Former members of the VAD formed the nucleus of this service, and they served with hospitals overseas as well as on the mainland. Enlistments totalled 7,917.

**Some Statistics**

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<tr>
<td>Number who served outside mainland Australia</td>
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<td>Non-battle casualty deaths (all causes)</td>
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**Enlistments by States to 29/9/45**

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<td>Northern Territory</td>
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_C.F.C._


Reviewed by Mr A. J. Hill, Senior Lecturer in History, Faculty of Military Studies, R.M.C. Duntroon.

WHAT has been the place and the role of the military profession in Australian society since 1945 — or indeed at any time since 1788 — and what do we understand by the expression military professionalism? Answers to these and cognate questions are not readily available if only because the academic community, like the military professionals themselves, has scarcely begun to define the problems let alone provide answers. The literature does not exist. One of the most persuasive short discussions of the profession of arms is, indeed, by an Australian, General Sir John Hackett, but his argument is derived from a lifetime in the British Army and his scholarship springs from the School of Modern History at Oxford. In Canada, however, such questions are being posed and in these two collections of papers Canadian soldiers and scholars are suggesting answers.

The Canadian Military: A Profile is a pioneer in its field. Of the nine chapters, eight examine topics such as the Canadian military tradition, military influence on the development of Canada, the military as an instrument of Canadian foreign policy, defence in the economic
life of Canada, the social and cultural composition of the Canadian forces. Of special interest to Australians are the chapters on military education in Canada, 1867-1970, civil-military relations and the reorganization of the forces (with the suggestive sub-title ‘whither civilian control?’) and a study of committees as a management technique in the Department of National Defence. A conservative and sharply critical conclusion is contributed by Canada’s most distinguished leader in World War II, Lieutenant General G. G. Simonds who, at the age of 41, commanded a corps in N.W. Europe. The book has no index but six of the chapters have copious references and notes; almost all of the authors, who include historians, sociologists and a ‘military economist’ have served in the armed forces.

In 1970, the Chief of the Defence Staff initiated a study of professionalism in the Canadian forces. It included an important seminar held at Kingston the following year. Four of the papers given there have been revised for inclusion in Wellesley Paper No. 2 on military professionalism, the theme of which is explained by the editors: ‘... it seemed to us that a large shift in the emphasis of Canada’s defence policy from collective security to domestic tasks... must entail some redefinition by the armed forces of their very nature and raison d’être. In the process of reassessment some members of the officer corps have been aware of a need to develop a more distinctive military ethos to parallel the search for identity in other areas of Canadian life. If the armed forces successfully develop a Canadian military philosophy, changes in the nature of professionalism will be required’. Some of this has a familiar ring but it must be remembered that the Canadian forces have been obliged to undergo integration as a traumatic preliminary to adapting to new roles. The latter were sketched in broad strokes by Mr Trudeau in April 1969 as the defence of the country, supplementing the civil power and contributing to national development. The last vague notion is strongly attacked by Colin Gray, a sociologist who found when examining in detail potential tasks of the Forces such as pollution control, fisheries protection, etc., that the more closely he studied these matters ‘the further the roles of the Canadian Armed Forces receded’. His conclusion is that the ‘health and pride of the military profession may best be aided not by a requirement that the armed forces join Canadian society... but rather by all interested parties taking a long, hard look at the sense behind Canada’s defence policies’.
In aid to the civil power, the Canadians have gained experience as recently as 1970 when, at the request of the Quebec government, troops were deployed in Montreal taking over normal police work to enable the Quebec police to handle the crisis. No violence was used but the presence of troops had its effect. This situation had not been anticipated by the Government or the Forces; a reminder that it is not only in war that the unexpected always happens.

The fifteen papers included in these two books make no claim to being definitive but for Australians their interest lies first in the fact that they exist; we have as yet no comparable books. In the second place, they examine problems some of which are by no means unique to Canada. Moreover, having made due allowance for certain profound differences in the Canadian situation, e.g., the two languages and cultures, the Americans breathing down their neck, the commitment to North American defence and to NATO, the Canadian armed forces have sufficient in common with our own, especially through the British connection and, after 1945, the growth of American influence, to make these studies useful reading. To look into this Canadian mirror is to discern forms and features remarkably like our own.


Reviewed by Colonel P. C. Grifioti, Army Office, Canberra.

If an Army exists to apply controlled violence on behalf of the government it serves, then here is a book advocating the very antithesis of the military method. For Sharp’s book is concerned with non-violent action as a credible and effective means of achieving political ends without the destruction and violence inevitably accompanying violent struggle.

The basic contention is that the exercise of political power by a ruler or a government depends on the consent of the governed, and that by withdrawing this consent, the governed can exert much greater political power than they generally realize. In this massive, almost encyclopedic work, Sharp has produced by far the most complete study to date on the nature, capacities, and requirements of non-violent struggle. Each chapter is supported by voluminous footnotes, and there is a most comprehensive index and bibliography.
The immediate pressures to produce such a work probably came from the years of the Vietnam protest movements, when, for better or worse, a considerable segment of the community felt the need to explore more effective methods of protest and non-violent action leading to political change. But the roots of Sharp's study go far deeper, and he draws on a great many historical examples to develop and illustrate his general propositions. The main historical source is probably Gandhi, whose method of satyagraha or soul-force was used in the Indian independence struggles of the 1920s and the 1930s. The many others cited include the early independence struggles of the American colonists, the 1905 and 1917 Russian revolutions, struggles against the Nazis during World War Two, and the American civil rights struggles of the 1950s.

The historical record shows that non-violent action has a mixed record of success and failure, and Sharp feels that this is partly due to the fact that it has never been subject to the same intense scrutiny and study as has violent military action. If he is right, he has gone a long way towards correcting the deficiency, for his work is a pioneering achievement in the field, not only drawing together and synthesizing a mass of disconnected historical material, but injecting new conceptual developments that go well beyond Gandhi's techniques.

Inevitably non-violent action carries connotations of weakness, passivity, and non-resistance, but not for Sharp. He stresses that there is no question of weakness or pacifism, but rather one of an active conflict and struggle requiring considerable physical and moral courage from the participants. There is nothing inherently good or bad about the technique, and while it may well appeal to religious and pacifist groups, its chief attraction is that it works.

Some 300 pages are devoted to an exhaustive cataloguing of 198 techniques of non-violent action, grouped broadly into non-violent protest, social, economic, and political non-co-operation, and intervention, including the whole gamut of protest meetings, boycotts, strikes, refusal to pay taxes, civil disobedience and so on. The dynamics of the process are then considered to determine the correct strategy and tactics, which not surprisingly are discussed in military jargon.

Although tactics are in the main discussed in the familiar terms of revolutionary war, the special characteristics of a non-violent campaign produce some notable departures. For example, ideological consistency requires secrecy and deception to be rejected in favour of openness. Sharp argues the case for this as well as possible, but it is unconvincing.
Openness inevitably means that a security force worth its salt can disrupt the organization at will by removing the leaders. This in turn points to a requirement for the movement to be able to function without leadership, and hence on to some wishful thinking about spontaneity. Discipline then becomes a serious problem, since non-violent action demands very tight discipline to prevent mobs turning to violence in the face of repression, in which case the whole point of the non-violent action is lost. Yet this will be difficult to achieve in a mass non-violent movement, since the participants will include not only the idealists to whom the whole idea of discipline is repugnant, but ordinary louts only too ready to indulge in violence.

The processes by which non-violence works are thoroughly analysed, and include the interesting concept of political jiu-jitsu. Repressive violence used against non-violent actionists in time produces a back-lash of repulsion amongst those doing the repression, and eventually causes a shift of power in the actionists' favour. The opponent can thus never bring full force to bear, since progressive attempts to do so result in his progressively losing his political balance — rather like attacking a pile of feathers with a sledge-hammer.

Having said all that, one should see the book for what it is — a scholarly and thorough exposition on an apparently effective way of defying, defeating, and even overthrowing entrenched authority. And lest military authority feels invulnerable, one of the historical cases cited is the French Army mutiny of 1917. Some interesting questions must occur to the reader, and the first is probably whether non-violent action is to be taken seriously. The reader must make up his own mind on this, but from the mass of evidence produced by Sharp, the answer seems to be a fairly clear affirmative where the movement has limited aims in the limited context of internal political struggle. However as a method of total overthrow of a regime it is rather less convincing, and when compared to violent revolutionary warfare, leaves one with a persistent if vague feeling of lack of credibility.

Granted that it is an effective means of bringing about political change, what should be the reaction of the police and the professional military, and indeed of governments themselves? What counter strategies should governments use, and is there any role for security forces in combating non-violent action? History has shown that repressive violence is generally ineffective, and indeed provides the non-violent movement with an essential element in producing the jiu-jitsu effect.
Questions of this type and the lack of any obviously satisfactory answers can only underline the potential of non-violent action as a form of struggle.

In summary, not a book for light general reading, but certainly the best available reference on the whole subject.


Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel P. J. Cameron, Department of Defence, Canberra

It would be no bad thing if Lt Col Barker’s Behind Barbed Wire were to be made compulsory reading for all ranks in the Australian Services. Not that it gives many answers — quite the contrary — it does no more than tell the story and pose the questions. In a quietly methodical fashion the bookcatalogues ways in which, during the wars of the present century, prisoners of war have been treated. In doing so the author estimates that during World War II between six and ten million of these unfortunates perished and, if we are to judge from his narrative, more often than not death was an easy release from starvation, disease and hardship. He ends by predicting that the lot of prisoners in new wars is not likely to be better.

The book begins with a brief historical outline of practices in dealing with prisoners of war from early times onward and then comments upon the categories of persons who, in terms of Article 4 of the third Geneva Convention of 1949, are to be given the status of prisoner of war. Thereafter the book consists of a series of chapters, each dealing separately with the successive stages of a prisoner’s captivity from the day he falls into the hands of the enemy until his repatriation, unless he has died meanwhile. Interspersed are chapters treating such topics as the relevance of religious practice, work, guards and disciplinary attitudes, as well as the psychology and techniques of escapers.

The style is entertaining, with emphasis on first hand and biographical accounts of men’s experiences. These accounts are well edited and are put together so as to add up to a convincing picture of the privations and difficulties suffered by those who survived as well as those
who succumbed. Horror and cruelty are portrayed without being overdone, and the book relies upon reports of wry soldier wit, some minor obscenity and countless examples of stoicism, fortitude, ingenuity and devotion to explain how men can survive and remain sane under conditions too hideous to contemplate. It is worth reading the book for the sake of the entertainment which these stories provide.

However, the aim clearly is more than merely to entertain or to record the deeds of otherwise ordinary men, and in this respect the significance of the book is intensely depressing. Lt Col Barker is concerned only with the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 ‘Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War’, and diagnoses correctly many of its shortcomings. These, incidentally, are shared by the other three Geneva Conventions of the same date, for the protection of war victims. It is surely no coincidence that publication of this book was timed to coincide with the first of a series of Diplomatic Conferences aimed at up-dating the Geneva Conventions and amending the law of land warfare to meet the conditions of modern conflicts.

There are no explicit conclusions, but in the final chapter ‘A Code for Survival’, after remarking that the third Geneva Convention, for all its defects, probably marks the limits to which States will agree, the author quotes verbatim the six paragraphs of the Code of Conduct for Members of the US Armed Forces (adopted post-Korea) of which he observes:

As guides to both collective and individual survival these are principles which could be adopted by anybody who faces the possibility of becoming a POW. The clear implication is that the lot of prisoners of war will not improve but may well deteriorate, so that soldiers must be trained to face death not only in the heat of battle, but in filth and squalor in the loneliness of a cell after suffering all manner of deprivation, harassment and even torture..

According to this book, designed cruelty did not always mark the handling of prisoners; indifference and the conflict of cultural values, as well as the pre-occupation of war often led to prisoners being ignored or regarded as if no more than semi-human. Despite the drain of their maintenance, prisoners of war represent a vast pool of labour, in war a very considerable asset, and this aspect of the matter is discussed at some depth.

At the same time, in areas where the use of prisoners’ labour represents no benefit to a captor, as will often be the case in Asia, or
where immense political capital can be made of forced confessions and
the inculcation of the captor’s ideologies into captives, the lot of prisoners
will be hard. In particular, the use of advanced psychology and drugs
loom as spectres against which a hapless prisoner will be defenceless
and against which no man can fight successfully.

There are some criticisms which can be levelled at this work,
particularly that it seems too much as if written by a European for a
wholly European audience. At times it does not seem to hang well
together, almost as if it were a collection of essays, written separately
and each modified slightly so as to be put together to form a whole.
There are a few minor inaccuracies (for example, the Swiss Henri
Dunant was a banker, not a writer, although he did write one book,
the historical A Memory of Solferino).

At times there are conclusions which smack of jingoism, and the
judgment of Asian motives seems to be based only on Western ideals,
but these are minor matters. The book is thought provoking and, even
if it is not an in-depth study for the expert, it will point up to all readers
a host of issues which have never previously been given full thought.

Of particular interest is the first Appendix, in which the author
surveys the third Geneva Convention, commenting upon specific Articles
and explaining their origins as well as their deficiencies and the limita-
tions which are used to avoid the protections they are otherwise intended
to provide. For the seriously interested the excellent bibliography
contains a long list of other reading and source material.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR AN INDEPENDENT PAPUA NEW
GUINEA. Edited with an Introduction by James Griffin, Angus and
Robertson, in association with the Australian Institute of International
Affairs, 1974, pp., 163.

Reviewed by Major P. A. Mench, RMC Duntroon

PAPUA New Guinea is soon to become independent. It will then
assume control over defence and foreign affairs and take its place
in the comity of nations as a sovereign state. PNG’s policies in
these areas, whatever they are, will be of considerable interest and
importance to Australia. This book provides some useful indicators to
PNG’s future foreign and defence policies and an understanding of
the environment in which they will be made.
Whether true or apocryphal, in the Victorian era, unexpected political crises at the far-flung corners of Empire sometimes found the British Cabinet huddled over a map of the world searching for the long-forgotten colony! In this century one thinks of a Foreign Office clerk (after the Peter Sellers film, *Carlton Browne of the FO*) searching the mice-infested archives for the dossier on *Artemesia* (or whatever the place might have been called).

The moral of this, of course, is that international problems have a habit of arising before politicians and policy-makers have adequate information on which to base decisions. In relation to the future of PNG, however, Australia could hardly justify such a measure of ignorance. PNG is too close and too important. For this reason this book on PNG’s future international relations is timely and worth the attention of Australians whose responsibilities might be connected with PNG.

This book about foreign policy calls to mind the fact that policy-makers in this field often take into account all the conceivable contingencies except that of the next crisis — somewhat similar to the manner in which the military notoriously prepare for the last war. It might perhaps be argued, however, that a lack of foreign policy ‘preparedness’, unlike a lack of military preparedness, may not always be a bad thing, avoiding reliance on inflexible, preconceived options. For example, the USA did not expect the 1962 Soviet missile build-up in Cuba and yet it handled the crisis effectively: such a Cuban scenario had previously been officially dismissed in the USA as too implausible. The point remains that both foreign and defence planners face an expertise lag. There are always ‘experts’ in relation to the last set of problems; it is more difficult to be an expert on the ‘unknowable’ future. Speculation about PNG’s future is similarly clouded by uncertainties.

*A Foreign Policy for an Independent Papua New Guinea* is a collection of papers delivered at a seminar at the University of PNG held as long ago as June 1972. (If a week is a long time in British politics, the last two years in PNG almost amount to a political age). This delay, whilst regrettable, has been mitigated by Jim Griffin’s scene-setting 60-page introduction. In it he canvasses most of the current issues concerning PNG’s future political stability — ethnic diversity, lack of unity, separatist pressures, the role of the military, and the Torres Strait border question.

Even though the papers and discussion bear the mark of the editor’s pen, some startling and revealing examples of naiveté still
survive. The papers are interesting because they represent some of the first excursions by PNG ministers into foreign policy questions. (There are papers by Ministers: Somare, Olewale and Kiki, as well as academics: T. B. Millar and U. Sundhaussen). Indeed, the Seminar seems to have been a search for Papua New Guinean solutions, not the restatement of old cliches which foreign policy statements sometimes are.

The central point to be gained from this book is the exposé of the illusion that foreign policy for a new state like PNG starts from a clean slate. Professor Owen Harris effectively debunked this so-called 'Arm Chair fallacy'. He reminded the Seminar that ‘foreign policy is politics’ — another aspect of domestic politics, often messy, in which decisions are made in a hurry by busy men on the basis of inadequate information (page 59). This lesson may need to be re-learned in both Canberra and Port Moresby in the future.

This book indicates that PNG’s foreign policies will reflect inheritances, as well as new initiatives. PNG might move closer to Indonesia, become more active in the Pacific and be heard in the councils of the UN and the Third World. It will at the same time remain closely tied to Australia, and economically dependent on Australia and Japan. Whilst the language of foreign relations may change, much of the substance of the pre-independence relationships will persist.

The Australian Institute of International Affairs is to be commended for having the book published, so adding to public understanding of PNG’s future problems and opportunities. It is well worth a thoughtful browse.\%
Spelling of Indonesian Place Names

I have found the article by Brigadier A. J. F. McDonald ‘The Indonesian Army — A Brief History Of Its Role in Indonesian Society’ in the April and May 1974 issues of Army Journal most interesting.

There is however a point which I would like to raise in regard to the spelling of place names.

The following extract from A National Report to the 7th U.N. Regional Cartographic Conference for Asia and the Far East, Tokyo October 15-27, 1973 submitted by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia is self explanatory:

VII GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES

Since January 1973 the Governments of Indonesia and Malaysia have agreed upon the simplification of the spellings of Indonesian and Malaysian languages. Consequently, Indonesian old spellings have to be changed into a common Indonesian-Malaysian system. This change affects also all geographical names, e.g.,

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<tr>
<th>Old Spelling</th>
<th>New Spelling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djakarta</td>
<td>Jakarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djajapura</td>
<td>Jayapura</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be announced also that some geographical names were changed into new names. They are—

Kutaraja in Aceh becomes Banda Aceh.
The city of Makassar becomes Ujung Pandang.
Irian Barat, the former West New Guinea becomes Irian Jaya.
Sukarnopura, the former Hollandia becomes Jayapura.

We would like to draw attention that some Indonesian islands named after Dutch tongue have been changed into Indonesian names and are expected to be printed in all new atlases or maps produced by any country. To name a few:

Kalimantan for the Indonesian Borneo.
Sulawesi for Celebes
Nusa Tenggara for Lesser Sunda Isles.
Irian Jaya for West Irian or West New Guinea.
Maluku for Molukken or Moluccas
Sumatera for Sumatra.
Jawa for Java.
I am uncertain of the responsible authority for place names appearing in the Army Journal and for promulgation within the Department of Defence, but perhaps Army Journal, with a wide circulation, could be an appropriate vehicle for dissemination of the above to a large Defence Department group of readers.

Survey (Tech. Advisor) 
Lieutenant Colonel N. R. J. Hillier
SURTA ABRI
(Armed Forces Survey and
Mapping Indonesia)

Romantic Colonial Aventures?

In his Review Article ‘Biography of a Political General’ (June 1974 issue) Major Mench links Napoleon and Wellington as having been ‘Involved in romantic colonial adventures’. As I understand the phrase Wellington would qualify but Napoleon would not. Major Mench is too sound a scholar to have written as he did without good reason or unless we are the victims of an unintended compression. Perhaps other readers of your Journal would be as interested as I to know the reason or have an expansion of his views,

Canberra 
Brigadier G. D. Solomon, RL
ACT

Operations of the Eighth Army in North Africa

If you have not been an eyewitness or experienced the events you are writing about, then as an historian you are at the mercy of others who were there. Your information is of necessity secondhand. It becomes, in the case of controversy, a matter of whom to believe.

On these grounds then, I feel it somewhat of a duty to register my dissent as to the validity of Colonel Varma’s appreciation of Montgomery’s overall performance as a military commander in the Western Desert 1942-43.

Colonel Varma’s article (Army Journal, June 1974) is certainly well written, and the layout and presentation is a credit to your journal. However, since a military historian’s task is not an easy one, it being only physically possible to discuss a mere handful of a myriad of facts, I would like to make the following comments:

1. On paper, as they appear on pages six and seven of the June Army Journal, the achievements of Montgomery’s Eighth Army appear
impressive. Were they? I think Colonel Varma has failed to adequately stress, and this I find surprising for an article of such length, one of the major salient points that rests on the tongue of every critic of Montgomery, namely, were all the post El Alamein battles necessary?1

2. Nowhere does Colonel Varma bring out what I consider to be the heart of the argument as to Montgomery’s skill as a general, i.e., that in fact the Afrika Korps’ comparatively orderly retreat to Tunisia2 was a mock to British arms.

(a) With pitiful equipment they had delayed the British advance for six months.

(b) They remained intact to fight the German rearguard action in Tunisia.

(c) Montgomery had failed in his objective to destroy the Afrika Korps. Was this not the order given to him by General Alexander and Churchill?

Colonel Varma does mention on page 22 that ‘Rommel’s aim was to extricate as many as possible of his Afrika Korps along with the Italian force’, but then never clearly states that that was exactly what Rommel achieved — a most important point since it directly reflects on Montgomery’s generalship. Instead Colonel Varma slides off onto a side issue: Rommel refraining from bitterly criticizing his Italian ally!3

3. What perhaps is more surprising for an article of such depth, is that there is hardly a whisper of the more telling points made by respected military historians who have criticized Montgomery. We hear nothing of substance of what Liddell Hart, Fuller, Thompson, Carver, Collier and Howard have to say on the matter. Such is a pity since they give a different ‘dimension’ to that of Colonel Varma as to Mont-

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2 It was not a ‘rout’ comparative to that of the Eighth Army’s retreat under Ritchie as implied by Colonel Varma — top line, Army Journal June 1974, page 23.

3 Army Journal, page 22.
gomery’s leadership and field commander qualities. For instance Thompson, one of the leading critics of Montgomery, had this to say about Alma el Halfa:

Now appeared a situation which seemed to make his [Rommel’s] defeat within the next forty-eight hours almost certain. But Montgomery’s eyes were fixed on an offensive he hoped to launch in October... thus Rommel wound up an operation which had exposed his mobile forces to great risks, but had cost him fewer than 3,000 German and Italian casualties from start to finish.4

As Rommel himself said of the Second Battle of El Alamein (Montgomery’s Alamein): ‘for several days the British actually undertook no operations but relied simply and solely on the effect of their Artillery and Airforce’.6 Von Stumme was initially in charge of the Axis forces for that battle, until he died of a heart attack:

...his supplies of ammunition were such that he decided not to break up British attacks in their assembly area, saving his shot and shell until his troops saw the ‘whites of the British eyes’. Even so, there were times in the battle when it was estimated that his gunners could only return one shell for 500 from the British side.7

The critics show us a more vivid appreciation of what actually happened. Such statements as the following from Caccia-Dominioni would have been constructive.

...the Italian and German Air Forces could hardly have been expected to play any significant part in the great battle. They often had insufficient petrol to fly away when air-fields were abandoned, and many planes had to be destroyed where they stood. Not only were the Afrika Korps practically devoid of air power but also their German Panzers had in most instances but an hour’s gasoline in their tanks. Rommel certainly did not mince words when he said:

...we simply did what we could with our very meagre resources to come to terms with the unalterable disadvantages under which we suffered. It was a matter of getting the best out of a hopeless situation.8

Such factors I think should have been more fully traversed by Colonel Varma; that is, if he wanted to give a balanced account of the type of risks Montgomery had to face as a military commander.

4. Colonel Varma talks of the 52 German tanks knocked out without casualty at Medenine on 6 March 1943 when Rommel was still sick.

4 B. Collier, p. 374.
5 First battle of El Alamein was fought in July by Auchinleck. For Rommel’s praise of General Auchinleck’s handling of that battle see The Rommel Papers, p. 260.
6 ibid., p. 329.
7 Thompson, p. 138.
8 The Rommel Papers, p. 323.
It certainly was one ‘huge tank death trap’ and German Intelligence without ‘eyes in the air’ made the mistake; however the fact that such a tank trap was considered necessary by Montgomery epitomises his defence mentality in an era of blitzkrieg. As one of Montgomery’s field subordinates was to comment later in the course of an interview: ‘my opinion then was and still is, that Monty was living in 1918 and never left it’.

Fuller in his work *The Second World War* also makes this clear: Montgomery is pre-eminently a general of material… it is difficult to imagine him fighting a Sidi Barrani or a Beda Fomm.  

5. On page eighteen Colonel Varma considers that ‘Montgomery’s attack terminology — preparatory, break-in, dog-fight, break-out and pursuit stages — were subsequently incorporated into official War Office tactical doctrine’. This is quite probable since, after all, Montgomery did become CGS after the war. However, if one reads between the lines of Liddell Hart’s work, one can see that this was a contradiction in terms. It is one thing to preach, quite another to carry it out. Rommel after a while, when retreating to Tunisia, became quite used to Montgomery’s preparatory bombardment, frontal assault and single hook. Nothing is more damning than the following from *Rommel Papers*:

The British Commander risked nothing in any way doubtful, and bold solutions were completely foreign to him…I was quite satisfied that Montgomery would never take the risk of following up boldly and over-running us as he could have done without any danger to himself. Indeed such a course would have cost him far fewer losses in the long run…

Why, if Colonel Varma claims that his article ‘has been written after a study of the authoritative statements and writings by commanders on either side’ was such a key statement left out of his appreciation? To the enemy, Montgomery had become as dependable as a clock: they were given *time to fully exploit* their line of retreat and the ghost of Rommel’s words ‘far fewer losses in the long run’ would echo and re-echo across the lifeless wadis.

6. My final point is this. I do not think Colonel Varma has properly analysed what lessons we can learn from the desert campaigns of the Eighth Army in 1942-43. He has not put us in touch with the ‘flesh and blood’ of the situation.

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9 Thompson, p. 105.  
10 Fuller, p. 235.  
11 *The Rommel Papers*, p. 360.
For the first time in that war we had adequate equipment, logistics, manpower superiority and most important, command of the air. Colonel Varma does not ask the most fundamental question of them all in such a situation: were the battles after Alma el Halfa necessary?

The fact that ‘Montgomery was at his best as Commander, Eighth Army’ is not in issue, the question is, and this is where the lessons are learnt, was he skilled enough, and if not why not? Such lessons or suggested lessons are to be seen in the texts of critics — these were not fully discussed: for a thirty-page article they should have been.

How many armoured corps officers would agree with Colonel Varma’s final conclusion?

... but we should turn to Rommel for a proper understanding of the handling of Armour and the power of manoeuvre in the years ahead of us.

Time and weapons change — principles become modified. Surely it is to the Israelis — the grandsons of blitzkrieg — as against the original dicta of Rommel that the Australian Army must look, for the ‘handling of Armour and the power of manoeuvre in the years ahead of us’. It is a missile age.

St Ann’s College

Alexander Graeme-Evans, Lt RCMF

North Adelaide, SA

12 *Army Journal*, p. 11.

13 *ibid*, p. 30.
The Sanitary Advantages of the Moustache to the Private Soldier

MR. EDITOR.—Exclusively of the ornament of moustachios to the face, and especially to the large upper-lip and ill-formed mouth, they afford important physical advantages. In civil society an individual has the power to act more under the dictates of nature, and to consult his convenience and comfort as to how and when to brave the vicissitudes of the weather, than the soldier, whose exposure to intemperatures of the seasons and changes of climate is arbitrary and compulsory; and to modify these extremes, nature would appear to point out the cultivation of moustachios to shelter the lips and preserve the teeth, until, at least, habitual exposure had enabled him, in some measure, better to resist the influence of excessive heat and cold. Hair being a non-conductor, the heat of the sun is prevented passing inwards, and the heat of the lips and mouth outwards; thereby preserving a more equable temperature about the skin of the lips and enamel of the teeth, which are saved from injury. In hot weather and in tropical climates, the skin of the lips is often prone to vesicate and ulcerate; in cold it is apt to shrivel and break into sores. The lips and teeth are consequently in better order for biting the cartridge in all climates and seasons. Again, the period of preparation for parade is curtailed, and the soldier is quicker under arms on all occasions, in war and peace, to say nothing of the pain and trouble of shaving in cold weather.

On numerous occasions, on active service, by land and sea, the moustachios have been allowed to grow by soldiers and sailors, and the whole face even has been long left unshaved; a circumstance which teaches the propriety of shortening and simplifying the warrior's toilette.

FREDERIC ROBERTS, Staff-Surgeon, 2nd Class.

Edinburgh Castle,
2nd January, 1847.

(Reprinted from Colburn's United Services Journal, and Naval and Military Magazine, February 1847.)