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The First Convoy: At sea, January 1940.
INTRODUCTION

That the frequency, severity and effects of disasters is on the increase is without question. Interest in all aspects of disaster relief has dramatically increased in recent years and many bodies, at both national and international level, are examining the nature of their possible involvement. Although Armed Forces have been traditionally involved it was not until 1972 that the first Staff College study was carried out. This was at Camberley, and then in 1973 an in depth study was carried out at the Indian Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, where it is to become a continuing part of the staff course curriculum.

Undoubtedly the most developed national system is that of the USA where the Defence Forces play a significant role. In many other countries the role of the Defence Forces is also significant as they provide a ready source of organized and disciplined manpower, and a management and communications system which is readily adaptable to fast moving situations as disasters tend to be. Only recently the Aus-
The Australian Government has established a National Disaster Organization in the Department of Defence headed by a serving Service officer, so it may well be that Defence Forces participation will increase and serving personnel will need to acquire a working knowledge of the overall disaster problem.

One of the outstanding features of most disasters in the past has been the lack of co-ordinated effort, both in the provision of and application of relief, particularly in the early stages. Regulation, if such is possible, of international aid donations also needs to be imposed to avoid unnecessary waste. The emphasis in recent years has been the establishment of bodies with a capability for the co-ordination of relief efforts. The United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO), the United States Office of Civil Defence (OCD) and the United States Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) are three such bodies. OCD and OEP are national organizations and the UNDRO is an international organization to which further reference will be made later. What follows is part of a paper prepared for presentation to the Indian Defence Services Staff College.

THE DISASTER PROBLEM

The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* defines a disaster as 'a sudden or great misfortune, a calamity'. It can equally be defined as an occurrence, due to natural causes or otherwise, which results in large scale death or imminent danger and extensive material damage. Disaster Relief, as distinct from coping with the aftermath of an accident, which should be within the capability of existing fire, rescue and relief services, requires considerably expanded effort and resources. Various classifications for the purpose of relief operations have been made, variations usually being of the order of factors of ten. One such classification is:

- **Accident** — 1 to 1000 people dead, or in imminent danger of death.
- **Disaster** — 1000 to 1,000,000 people dead or in imminent danger of death.
- **Catastrophe** — More than 1,000,000 dead or in imminent danger of death.

It will be noticed that all the above definitions are couched in terms of human casualties. While this is undoubtedly the most telling,
and indeed it could be argued the most graphic definition, it should not be considered the only definition. A definition in terms of material loss could be equally effective as losses in property and material national resources, while perhaps not requiring the same scale of immediate relief, are equally unaffordable.

**Special Features**

Although disasters are predictable to an extent, there remain many special features which may be categorized. These are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

*Lack of Early Warning.* This used to be, and still tends to be in some cases, a major problem. Present day surveillance and sensor systems are capable of giving early warning of nearly all types of natural disaster. While a comprehensive communications network may not yet exist to enable the likely victims to be warned, at least the state or national authorities likely to be concerned with relief operations should be alerted early. In addition, with the increasing awareness of the necessity for prior co-ordination and organization of relief effort, this particular lack should not have as serious consequences in future.

*Lack of Information.* This will always be a problem, as inherent in the nature of many disasters is disruption of normal communications so that the nature and extent of the damage and any likely further threats will be very sketchy indeed. Without adequate information it is impossible to mount effective relief operations, so top priority, initially, must be given to information gathering. In this modern technological age aerial reconnaissance is the obvious answer provided weather permits. Both photo-reconnaissance and visual reconnaissance are essential: engineer and command representation are also essential. The level of representation must of necessity be fairly senior at this early stage.

*Disruption of Communications.* All forms of communications in the disaster area are likely to be severely interrupted thus creating severe movement problems in the early stages of relief attempts. There will be a considerable effort required for road clearance in particular and extensive reliance will probably have to be placed on air movement. In addition vital telecommunications links will have to be re-established as early as possible.

*Relief Co-ordination.* In any disaster relief operation there will be many agencies involved and co-ordination at both national and inter-
national levels will be essential if effective relief operations are to be mounted. In some countries and at the United Nations level on the international front, bodies have been established to do just this, as discussed earlier. India at present has no such organization.

Varying Requirements. No two types of disaster are alike so that each requires separate consideration and separate planning. Thus one answer to the problem would not be sufficient and separate contingency plans need to be prepared for each separate type of disaster.

DISASTER RELIEF

The essence of dealing with any disaster or emergency is to bring the situation under control as quickly as possible. The essential first requirement is information as to what has happened and what relief is required and various means of obtaining this must be devised. Circumstances and conditions will vary widely; some of the problems that will arise include casualty collection and care, rescue of trapped persons, care and control of survivors, damage control, co-ordination of relief and application thereof for maximum benefit and restoration of community life.

In any disaster situation the primary responsibility for relief and restoration of normal activity must be with the civil authorities. In Australia, although a National Disaster Organization has been established within the Department of Defence, executive authority for the majority of relief efforts remains with State run and controlled Civil Defence bodies. In India no national co-ordinating body exists. Responsibility for the establishment of such a body must rest with the Indian Central Government; branches at State, District and Sub-District level etc. must also be set up. In case of need, such a national co-ordinating body could assume overall direction of operations and any military involvement would be within such a framework. Where such a framework does not exist and a military involvement is foreseen, it is up to the military to be prepared to establish such a framework should the need arise; necessary contacts should thus be made and contingency plans prepared.

Relief Operations

After any disaster three initial tasks can be enumerated, viz:

1. Establishment of guidelines for the kinds of materials and assistance required.
2. Establishment of a regulated flow of assistance from all sources.
3. Assistance must be timed to meet the various needs as they arise.

If international assistance is to be requested the particular assistance required must be specified. All too often only a general request for assistance has been sent out with the result that much useless material arrives and is subsequently wasted.

During the 1970 earthquake disaster the Peruvian Government formulated a three-part concept of disaster relief operations which can be used as a foundation on which to build. The three parts were:

1. *Emergency Phase.* This included rescue and evacuation, reduction of suffering, provision of medical and health care, including emergency sanitation arrangements, feeding of victims, burial of the dead and the establishment of temporary communications.

2. *Rehabilitation Phase.* This included the provision of temporary shelter, including the establishment where necessary of refugee camps; the provision of clothing, blankets etc; the provision of corrugated iron or other material for repairing damaged roofs and the provision of continuing medical aid with particular emphasis on hygiene and sanitation.

3. *Reconstruction Phase.* This included the rebuilding of permanent living structures, the restoration of essential services such as water supply and electricity, the repair of roads, highways and airfields and the provision of long term loans to the private and industrial sectors to facilitate the reconstruction effort.

Although not a part of relief operations or measures a fourth phase relating to pre-disaster measures such as early warning, disaster prediction, damage control and other preventive measures could well be added to the above three.

**Relief Organization and Services**

At national level and below, the Government departments or instrumentalities which are likely to be of particular importance to disaster relief operations are the Police Service, the Fire Service, the Medical and Health Services, Public Utilities — particularly those
concerned with water, gas and electricity supply, sanitation and sewerage and the telephone system, and the Engineering Services.

Other services which are necessary for effective relief operations are a Rescue Service, Signal or Communications Service, Welfare Service, Supply and Transport Service, Ambulance and First Aid Service and a Warden Service. These services should ideally be established at least at State level and preferably at lower levels still. As it would not be economic to have these established as full-time services, a permanent skeleton organization would be required. The personnel required to fully man each service should be trained and exercised on a part-time basis so that trained manpower would be readily available in terms of emergency.

At international level the United Nations has set up a Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) to co-ordinate assistance from both international donors and the United Nations system itself. United Nations organizations which may render assistance in times of disaster are:

- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
- World Food Programme.
- United Nations Development Programme.
- International Red Cross.
- League of Red Cross Societies.

The Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, who reports directly to the Secretary General, has been established in Geneva. Lists of his responsibilities and of actions expected to be taken by national governments are at Annexes A and B. His office is also establishing an Information Bank which will contain information on emergency assistance available from donor governments around the world and on facilities and services which might be able to be provided immediately.

At present a document titled *International Action in Cases of Natural Disaster: A Manual on the Resources and Procedures of the United Nations Family* is in the course of preparation. It will be a comprehensive document and will detail the responsibility of the various agencies in relation to disasters.
DISASTER RELIEF BY THE DEFENCE SERVICES

It should be remembered at all times that the Defence Services are not a group apart from the normal community, so their involvement could well be considered as assistance by just another part of the community at large. Viewed in another light from the Defence Services viewpoint it can be considered as an extension of or another form of aid to civil authority. As such it will be conducted under rules laid down, normally at central government level, specifically covering provisions of such aid.

In general terms the following principles should apply:

- Military assistance will complement, not substitute for, civil participation in disaster relief operations. All plans prepared by military authorities must recognize that civil resources will be the first to be used to support civil requirements and military resources will only be used when essential to supplement civil resources.
- Military support to civil authorities in disaster relief operations shall be considered as an emergency task within the operational directives issued to all service units and formations.
- Measures to ensure continuity of operations, troop survival and rehabilitation of essential military bases must take precedence over military support for civil disaster relief.
- Local disaster relief plans must develop full civil capability.

The following additional principles must also be applied to military support of disaster relief operations:

- Primary responsibility must remain with civil authorities.
- The military commander, while working in conjunction with and under operational direction of civil authority, is nevertheless still subject to the overall authority of his military superior.
- All forces of all services must be prepared to participate in disaster relief operations.
- Survival of troops and continuity of operations must remain paramount.
- Military support plans must complement local disaster relief plans.
- Provision of military assistance will normally be in response to a request from the appropriate civil authority although if the
gravity of the situation so dictates, a local commander may then act on his own initiative.

- Provision of assistance should not significantly increase the operating costs or inventory investment of the Defence Forces.

Military regions may not always coincide with State, District or other civil boundaries so precise areas of responsibility must always be laid down and promulgated to all concerned military and civil authorities. The appropriate military commander must always ensure that all necessary liaison channels are established on as permanent a basis as possible.

**Tasks for Military Forces Committed to Disaster Relief**

Some tasks which could readily be performed by military support forces are:

- Rescue and emergency treatment.
- Movement Control.
- Maintenance of law and order.
- Issue food and supplies and collect and secure essential items.
- Emergency and interim communications.
- Fire protection.
- Disposal of the dead.
- Damage assessment.
- Clear debris and rubble and EOD.
- Mass feeding.
- Assist civil authorities to restore civil operations.
- Restore facilities, utilities, transportation, power, communications, fuel, water and other essential facilities.

Of the suggested necessary services, the Defence Forces could easily merge into the Rescue Service, the Signals or Communications Service, the Supply and Transport Service, the Ambulance and First Aid Service and the Engineering Service. Forces so committed would operate within their own command structure as independent groups and would complement any civil involvement. They can also be of considerable assistance to the Police Service, the Fire Service and the Medical and Health Service.
Comments so far have been mainly applicable to the Army. The Air Force and Navy also have important contributions to make as listed below:

- **Navy.** Transport, mobile command post and evacuation facilities during coastal operations.

- **Air Force.**
  a. Extensive air movement of men and material into the disaster area.
  b. Air dropping and air landing of relief supplies.
  c. Helicopter support.
  d. Photo and visual reconnaissance of the disaster area, particularly in the early stages.

**Command and Control**

In the case of either domestic or international aid, once the necessary political decisions have been taken, executive orders are issued to those concerned by the Operations Directorates of the respective Service Headquarters. If the appropriate civil bodies are in existence little problem exists and the military efforts merge with the civil under civil direction to the military commander; if not it will be necessary to send off a senior officer or team to assess the situation and assist with control and co-ordination.

The liaison and co-ordination arrangements necessary for successful Defence Forces execution of Disaster Relief assistance will involve establishment of the following:

a. A senior army liaison officer at State Government level with Navy and Air Force representation if required.

b. Joint Control Centres at each administrative echelon.

Depending on the level a possible composition could be:

(1) District Commissioner or equivalent.
(2) Area/Sub-Area/Station or Force commander.
(3) Superintendent of Police.
(4) Chief Public Works Department engineer in area.
(5) Regional Health Officer.
(6) Representatives of Electricity Supply Authority, Telephone Authority, Water, Sewerage and Drainage Authorities as required.

As a Joint Control Centre is unlikely to be a permanently established body (though it should be) it must be activated immediately danger is imminent or on the occurrence of an unforeseen disaster. Initially this may be at national or State level and similar Control Centres should be established at each level of involvement. Following the recent formation of an Australian National Defence Organization a National Emergency Operations Centre has been established as a full time organization in Canberra. This is however, to be more of a co-ordination centre than a control centre but nevertheless it is a step in the right direction.

Planning Principles

Much seems to be made of the involvement and planning required of the Defence Forces for Disaster Relief operations. Viewed coldly and dispassionately there is no reason why the planning sequence or process should be any different or any more difficult than that for any other military operation. What probably is relevant is the fact of a general lack of awareness of the problem among those likely to be involved. The speed or urgency with which certain things must be done may be slightly more pressing but not necessarily so. Any officer or headquarters proficient in planning normal military operations should, with appropriate additional training, be able to adequately plan and execute any Disaster Relief Operation. The following points are considered worthy of mention:

- Joint Control and Co-ordination.
- Speed of action or implementation.
- Maintenance of effective liaison with appropriate civil bodies.

Organization

To implement effective relief plans there is a requirement for a task group type of operation with each task group being functionally organized to deal with a particular task or group of tasks. In each task group there will be a mixture of technical and non-technical personnel. A possible task group composition, depending on type and magnitude of task could be:

a. OC — Engineer Officer.
b. Engineer element.
c. Infantry element.
d. Supplies and Transport element.
e. Medical element.
f. Communications element.
g. Local officials, welfare workers, guides and interpreters.

Each task group can be further divided into Rescue Column(s), Ambulance and First Aid Column(s) and Restoration Column(s). Such a division is suggested in the Australian Civil Defence Handbook and examination of the overall task group composition shows fairly readily how the basic military organization could be grouped into the various columns.

**DART Teams.** While the Task Group organization discussed above represents what may be referred to as 'the steady state solution' the 'Transient solution' or injection of immediate aid while waiting for the overall situation to be assessed may well be met by the provision of small teams which can move at short notice to the disaster area and which are also capable of reaching areas which may be inaccessible from the ground. Such teams, if possible, should be based on parachutists but this requirement will not be so pressing if helicopter support is available. They should be able to handle small boats, be well trained in medical work, understand the local language or carry an interpreter and also have an assessment capability. Such teams could be called Disaster Area Relief Teams (DART).

A typical DART could include the following:

a. Team leader — junior officer or senior NCO.
b. Communicator using HF communications to National or Regional Headquarters.
c. Medical assistant equipped with appropriate drugs and equipment for the particular disaster situation.
d. Boat handler in charge of whatever craft is available, most probably an inflatable type of boat.
e. Linguist.
f. Engineer representative — may also be team leader.
g. Welfare representative — may not be immediately necessary but required at latest after one or two days so may as well form part of the initial team.
**DART Provision.** The skills required for DARTs should, with a few minor exceptions, be available within the Parachute units and formations. Some minor additional training on the peculiarities or characteristics of particular types of disaster may be necessary but this should merely be a minor addition to their normal training. Within India or on the Sub-Continent, language should not present any great problem. To be useful, such teams must be immediately available when a disaster strikes so some system would need to be devised where several teams were on stand-by continuously.

**Relief Centres**

In any given area it will be necessary to establish a network of Relief Centres to provide Supply and Distribution Points for rations and essential relief supplies, medical posts, emergency accommodation posts, boat points and helicopter landing zones.

**Relief Stores and Equipment.** For the smooth operation of relief operations it is essential that the correct stores and equipment are provided at the required places and times. Among what may be required are food and rations, medical stores, tentage, blankets and survival clothing, fire-fighting equipment, portable communications equipment, rescue boats, sandbags and tools, demolition stores and engineer equipment.

In some instances it may be desirable to establish stockpiles of equipment strategically located throughout the country, which are only to be used in time of need. Of necessity they can only consist of non-perishable items so certain medical items in particular would be excluded and appropriate pre-arrangements must be made for their supply in times of need. The type of equipment to be provided depends on climate, be it jungle, mountains or desert for example. This will further complicate the question of pre-positioning. Differentiation may also have to be made between the requirements of urban areas and agrarian or country areas; the country dweller being generally more hardy and self-reliant or self-sufficient than the urban dweller. Further, the type of stores provided, particularly tents for example, should not be of too good a quality or permanent refugee colonies may be encouraged. Thus commercial tents rather than military tents should be used as the latter normally have durability as one of their design requirements.

The number of stockpiles required will vary almost directly in proportion to the transport facilities available to move them to potential
areas of need. As this would require a much deeper analysis of the particular problems of India, or any other country for that matter, than has been made in this paper no precise recommendations are made. This would be one of the many problems to be faced by the National and/or State Control and Co-ordination bodies.

**Communications**

As in military so equally in Disaster Relief operations — effective communications are absolutely vital, both long range and short range. In the forward areas in particular radio will be the only useful means. Further back line may still be useful. As all manner of communications; Police, Fire Brigade and military to name but a few, will be involved a comprehensive control system is essential to allocate frequencies, Call Signs etc.

**Training**

As the success or failure of any Disaster Relief operation will depend as much as anything on the initial planning and general understanding of the problems involved it is essential that at least all officers be given some training on this subject. Drill and operating procedures require to be worked out with other relief agencies likely to be involved and then practised. There is a requirement for joint discussion and staff exercises at, at least, National and State levels. It is also desirable that these be conducted at every level of likely involvement. The aim of such training should be to familiarize all concerned with the overall organization and procedures for control and co-ordination, communications, the capabilities and limitations of the various relief agencies, report formulation and submission and financial procedures.

At unit level some training on particular rescue and evacuation techniques should be undertaken depending on the type of relief operation that they are expected to be involved in.

**Financial Considerations**

Considered in parochial terms from purely a Defence aspect it is important to ensure that involvement in Disaster Relief operations should not significantly increase the operating or inventory costs of the Defence Forces. From a national viewpoint a major disaster must be considered a national problem and whether the relief operations are funded
from the Defence vote or some other vote would appear to matter little as it is all government money. Being constrained by particular financial procedures, however, as is normally the case, a close watch and record of expenditure must be kept. Moreover if repayment is expected by civil bodies they must be advised well beforehand, in other words the conditions applying to assistance from the Defence Forces must be determined and all likely recipients of aid informed. A suggested policy is as follows:

a. **Mercy Missions.** Reimbursement of expenditure incurred should not be sought. Once the immediate emergency is passed, if assistance of a continuing nature is to be provided, recovery of actual costs (other than pay) could be effected.

b. **Other Civil Emergencies.** To be decided on a case by case basis.

c. Where Defence Stores or equipment is loaned to State authorities, the value of any loss or damage should be recovered unless otherwise approved by Department of Defence.

Notwithstanding all the above, wherever assistance is given, irrespective of the reason or nature of assistance, proper records should be kept to enable a statement of actual or estimated costs to be provided as part of the final report. To keep the necessary administrative effort involved in preparation of expenditure records to an absolute minimum, only broad groupings should be covered. In addition, to give an indication of the size of the effort involved, an estimate should be kept of the number of man-days for which Defence personnel were involved.

**CONCLUSION**

The general field of Disaster Relief has been reviewed in two parts:

a. The overall requirements and types of relief services which need to be provided.

b. The possible involvement of the Armed Forces.

At national level and below, a co-ordinated Disaster Relief Organization should be established which can assume responsibility for overall planning and co-ordination and would direct the actions of the armed forces. This organization would establish the necessary liaison channels
with both local bodies likely to assist and with international organizations such as the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization.

Armed forces involvement, except in dire emergency, should only come after requests from the civilian organization and after such requests have been considered and approved by the Directorate of Operations at both Department of Defence and Army Headquarters. Such involvement should take the form of both immediate and follow-up assistance. The forces should operate within their own command structure and their efforts should complement any civil involvement.

For immediate assistance, formation of Disaster Area Relief Teams which can be flown anywhere at a moment's notice is advocated. Such teams should be based on elements from parachute units and formations and such additional training as is necessary need merely be included as a small increment to the normal training syllabus.

For follow-up assistance once the situation has been assessed, only the general composition of a Task Group is suggested as the particular composition will vary with the type and intensity of the particular disaster.

As part of the establishment of any Disaster Relief Organization it will be necessary to establish a network of Relief Centres at strategic points throughout likely affected areas. While it is difficult to predict generally what each should hold, any stocking should be restricted to non-perishable items. If it is desired to stock some items of a perishable or semi-perishable nature, then appropriate arrangements must be made for regular turnover. It should not be necessary to stockpile expensive capital equipment provided the necessary arrangements are made for supply and operation of such equipment in times of need.

In any undertaking of this nature, particularly where government expenditure is involved, financial considerations will tend to loom large. While some financial records must be kept and control exercised such activities must be kept in proper perspective and only broad details need be covered.

Finally, as the success or failure of any Disaster Relief Operation will depend heavily on initial planning it is essential that all who are likely to be involved are given at least general background training on the subject. Thereafter, in the case of service officers, their general service training and knowledge should ensure adequate plans being evolved.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNITED NATIONS
DISASTER RELIEF CO-ORDINATOR

1. Establish and maintain closest co-operation with all concerned organizations and to make all feasible advance arrangements with them to ensure provision of the most effective assistance.

2. Mobilize, direct and co-ordinate the relief activities of the various UN organizations in response to particular requests for disaster.

3. Co-ordinate UN assistance with assistance from inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, in particular the International Red Cross.

4. Receive contributions from all donors and ensure their application as required.

5. Assist the Government of the stricken country to assess relief and other needs and evaluate priorities; disseminate information to prospective donors and serve as a clearing house for all aid received.

6. Promote the study, prevention, control and prediction of natural disasters including collection and dissemination of information on technological developments.

7. Assist with advice to Governments on pre-disaster planning.

8. Acquire and disseminate information relevant to planning and co-ordinating relief for disasters including implementation; establishment of stockpiles in disaster-prone areas and to prepare suggestions to ensure most effective use of available resources.

9. Phase out relief operations as the stricken country moves to the stage of rehabilitation and reconstruction but to continue interest.

10. Identify gaps in knowledge on disasters which require further work on the part of the international community.

11. Establish an information bank to include information on:
   a. Emergency assistance available from donor governments.
   b. Facilities and services which might be available immediately a disaster occurs.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

1. Establish disaster contingency plans with assistance from the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator.
2. Appoint a single national Disaster Relief Co-ordinator to facilitate receipt of international aid in times of emergency.
3. Establish stockpiles of emergency supplies such as tents, blankets, medicines and non-perishable foodstuffs.
4. Make necessary arrangements for the training of administrative and relief personnel.
5. Consider appropriate legislative or other measures to facilitate receipt of aid including overflight and landing rights and necessary privileges and immunities for relief units.
6. Improve national disaster warning systems.
7. Prepare contingency plans for the development of speedy communications systems.
8. Prepare contingency plans for earmarking of transport to include helicopters and logistic equipment.

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The 'Inspired Larrikin' of Australian Art


John Reid

Prime Minister Hughes told President Wilson bluntly, that Australia's right for separate representation at the Versailles Peace Conference was won by the sacrifice of 60,000 war dead. Will Dyson's name does not appear on those awesome casualty lists, but the war of 1914-18 destroyed him just as surely as if his life were terminated by a rifle's bullet. It is ironic that the same 'Great War for Civilization' made Dyson famous, but it deprived him of his beloved, and ultimately his health. Ruby Dyson was a sister of those gifted Lindsay brothers from Creswick in Victoria. For many years Norman Lindsay was Will Dyson's best friend and ardent admirer. Their two families had been brought up in adjacent townships located on the periphery of the larger Ballarat.

Will Dyson seemed to be held up as somewhat a mentor by the Lindsay boys. Lionel, Norman, Percy and Daryl all admired the Dyson wit and repartee, as well as his ability with his fists during their early Bohemian days. They belonged to that elite group of black and white artists who seemed to orbit around the dynamic personality of Jules Francois Archibald and his Bulletin.

The famous Dyson flare for draftsmanship seems to have come to fruition whilst attending life drawing classes in the studio of George Coates, and in company with Norman and Lionel Lindsay. It is speculative to argue which artist influenced which; but many critics think that it was Will Dyson who was the dominant personality.

The author is Curator of Art at the Australian War Memorial. His first article in this series of profiles on war artists appeared in the August issue of Army Journal.

* The inscription on the Victory Medal 1914-18.
For steady employment Will became a graphic artist in the field of journalism. In those first few years of this century Australia led the world in graphic illustration. Dyson was in good company with the Lindsays, Lambert, the New Zealander Low and the Englishman Phil May. There was a spate of newspaper tabloids too, and now defunct publications like Smiths Weekly and Table Talk competed actively for the services of these brilliant graphic artists. Dyson was king in this situation. His political cartoons reeked with venom and bile, and no prominent figure was immune from his savage pen.

He was indeed the most famous Australian artist of his time. With an international reputation established in both England and the United States, his position was unassailable. There is one highly controversial cartoon depicting an insolent American negro brandishing a saxophone challenging the spirit of Beethoven with the invective ‘Morning, white trash!’ The ethics of this drawing can be questioned in hindsight, but Dyson could never be neutral. He was unlike his erstwhile mate Norman Lindsay, and would never undertake a cartoon assignment unless he supported the fundamental issue underlying the
suggested theme in question. His political persuasion always appeared left of centre, and might not be out of step with that of today.

In 1910 Will Dyson married Ruby Lindsay and took her to Britain, where in spite of homeland scepticism he proved to be a stunning success. His scintillating drawings for the Daily Herald virtually saved that organ from extinction. Dyson was on its staff when the First World War broke out, and his subsequent anti-German 'Kultur' cartoons incised a democratic world against early Teutonic brutality. Had the Kaiser won his war, Will Dyson could have been one of his first victims. How could one forgive an artist who drew the German King-Emperor in league with a repulsive bloated devil, and the flower of German womanhood as a stereotyped Brunhilde.

Dyson felt so strongly about his wartime mission that he left the comparative safety of his Fleet Street drawing-board to become a social-realist commentator on the Western Front. He became Australia's first
official war artist, and joined the AIF in France. It was 1916 and battles were raging around Pozieres. Dyson closely identified himself with his fellow countrymen, and exposed himself to risks not demanded from such a non-combatant. Inevitably, he was severely wounded; first at Messines on 31 July 1917 and again at Zonnebeke some months later. It is interesting to note that Lieutenant Dyson’s batman at this time was his brother-in-law Daryl Lindsay — later a knight, and the director of the National Gallery of Victoria.

The Dyson drawings to come out of these campaigns are mostly in the form of lithographs. They are realist in style, and rarely resort to caricature. We are shown in these gems the day-to-day experiences of the trench life that the Australian soldier had to endure. There is a matter-of-factness in these visual commentaries, showing great poignancy and sympathy with his subjects.

They are not dramatic in the Goya idiom, and an antithesis of his previous ‘Kultur’ cartoons. He did paint a few oils during this period, but they have none of the punch of his black and whites nor lithographic greys. Outstanding in this latter medium are pictures titled ‘Compen
sation' and the 'Wine of Victory' — wounded German captured by Australians near Ypres. To be compassionate towards Germans in 1917 shows that a dramatic change had taken place in our artist, and one to have tragic consequences at a later date. ‘No other artist, British or Australian (says his friend Dr Bean) saw a tenth part as much as did Dyson; who shunned headquarters staff, in preference to the company of the lowly privates’. Bean added that for these reasons Dyson drawings of the winter campaigns of 1916-18 are quite unparalleled in British art.

The year 1919 not only saw peace in the world but a personal loss to Will Dyson. His wife Ruby died from the influenza plague that ravaged Europe during the closing years of the First World War. Mrs Dyson’s marriage to Will had been close and exhilarating. Their social contacts included most of the leading figures of London’s artistic and literary worlds. They were on friendly terms with people like Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, G. K. Chesterton and Arnold Bennett. Will was regarded as one of the wittiest after-dinner speakers in the United Kingdom. His services as an improptu entertainer were always in demand at the most aristocratic functions despite the fact that he worked for a socialist paper. Most contemporary writers believed that the artist never really recovered from the war and the premature death of his young wife. True, he did produce a memorable cartoon or two — like the prophetic one to commemorate the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty, but the spark of genius seemed to die within him. His power of perception slowly diminished, leaving only a husk by the late 1930s.

He returned to Australia after his war-time service, and joined the Melbourne Herald. He remained with this newspaper at a high salary until 1930. After being offered a more lucrative contract in the United States, he went there but finally ended up in his old job on the London Daily Herald. Will Dyson died in that city in 1938 just a year before that second great war that he had so accurately prophesied. After Dyson’s death his work lost its popularity, and has been in obscurity ever since. This is strange as Norman Lindsay’s work waxed strong in the meantime until it has reached the optimum of today.

Will Dyson is too good an artist to remain in the shadows. Perhaps the purpose of this article is to help restore this great artist to his rightful place in Australian art. This was a man of many talents who
could have exceeded in most — ‘a fine draftsman, an eloquent politician, a distinguished barrister, a poet, a novelist’ — but there was too much of the iconoclast in his make-up. He was James Cagneyesque in character and a precursor of Bazza MacKenzie. He was an ‘inspired larrikin’ in his day, and it is thought that he enjoyed the title.

What is not generally known is that Will Dyson had no small hand in creating the best of the dioramas of the Australian War Memorial. In his book *Gallipoli Mission*, Dr Bean attributes their inspiration to Dyson.
Authenticity here doesn't matter. What is important is to appreciate Will Dyson's love for his fellow man as seen in his drawings, and his definite statements towards a 'Dinkum Aussie':

To you who through the days on the Somme,
About you still the odours of the bush,
I saw come down with eyes like tired mares,
Along the jamming traffic of Mametz,
Creeping each man, detached among his kind,
Along a separate hell of memory.

—From *Australians at War*, by Will Dyson

**COMMUNICATIONS**

A Colonel issued the following directive to his Executive Officer:

Tomorrow evening at approximately 2000 hours Halley's Comet will be visible in this area, an event which occurs only once every 75 years. Have the men fall out in the battalion area in fatigues and I will explain this rare phenomenon to them. In case of rain, we will not be able to see anything, so assemble the men in the theater and I will show them films of it.

Executive Officer to Company Commander:

By order of the Colonel, tomorrow at 2000 hours, Halley's Comet will appear above the battalion area. If it rains, fall the men out in fatigues, then march to the theater where this rare phenomenon will take place, something which occurs once every 75 years.

Company Commander to Lieutenant:

*By order of the Colonel in fatigues at 2000 hours tomorrow evening, the phenomenal Halley's Comet will appear in the theater. In case of rain, in the battalion area, the Colonel will give another order, something which occurs once every 75 years.*

Lieutenant to Sergeant:

Tomorrow at 2000 hours, the Colonel will appear in the theater with Halley's Comet, something which happens every 75 years. If it rains, the Colonel will order the comet into the battalion area.

Sergeant to Squad:

When it rains tomorrow at 2000 hours, the phenomenal 75 year old General Halley, accompanied by the Colonel, will drive his comet through the battalion area theater in fatigues.”

Lessons from the Arab/Israeli War *

The Chairman

The subject for discussion this afternoon is ‘Lessons from the Arab-Israeli War’, a war that lasted only 18 days but in which there were many surprises. Some of the developments that occurred in that short time resulted not from planning the right strategies or adopting the right tactics but through force of circumstances, and it must, I think, be emphasised that only some of the lessons are obvious. It is much too soon after the event and we have too little detailed information to extract lessons covering all aspects of the war, and not all the lessons that do emerge are necessarily applicable to the European theatre. Some were peculiar to the conditions pertaining in the Middle East when the war was being fought. But at least it is true to say that for the first time we had the opportunity of observing two major forces, armed with modern weapons systems, including some which had not previously been used in combat, confronting each other in armed conflict in which there were no visible political restrictions — as, for example, in the Vietnam war, when the American forces were often asked to fight not with one hand tied behind their backs but sometimes with both.

It is true that there are all kinds of lessons to be learned from the Middle East war — political, economic and military — but we are today primarily concerned with the military lessons, and the areas we hope to cover are the strategy and tactics adopted by both sides, the equipment used, how it was handled, some comparisons in performance between weapons used by the Israelis and provided by the United States, and those used by the Arabs and provided by the Soviet Union. We also hope to compare not only weapons systems but manpower and morale. Two aspects of the war in particular stand out more than any others, and I hope we can examine them in the course of the discussion — aircraft versus anti-aircraft and tank versus anti-tank. We should also examine some of the more glaring deficiencies on both sides — for example, ECM equipment against the SAM sites; lack of lay-down bombs which compelled the Israeli Air Force to adopt tactics that I for

*Report of a seminar held at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies on Wednesday 30 January 1974. The discussion which followed is not included in this reprint, which is by kind permission of the RUSI.
one found quite extraordinary; Israeli lack of anti-tank missiles; and
the absence of weapons systems that one might have expected to see
operating in this type of war, the helicopter anti-tank weapons system.
Helicopters were not used in infantry movements to any great extent
apart from casualty evacuation, and getting the generals from one place
to another. Medium-lift helicopters were not used at all.

Although this was primarily a ground and air battle, it is important
to look at some of the action that took place at sea. I do not think
this aspect was ever fully reported or given quite the prominence that
perhaps it deserved. We might look, for example, at how fast patrol
boats were used; at comparisons between Egyptian ‘Styx’ (Soviet) and
Israeli ‘Gabriel’ surface-to-surface missiles.

We could dwell for a long time on other aspects such as the role of
the economic weapon oil, and how it might affect a future conflict in
Europe, but there won’t be time.

Let me now introduce the panel. On my right is Brigadier
Bidwell, Deputy Director of the Institute and the Editor of our Journal.
He retired from the Army as a brigadier and he was, of course, a gunner.

John Moore retired from the Navy as a Captain. He saw active
service in many theatres during the war and is now Editor of the world-
renowned Jane’s Fighting Ships.

Finally, we have David Bolton, who is a regular Air Force officer
serving on the Central Staff in the Ministry of Defence and who was the
1972 winner of this Institute’s Trench Gascoigne essay prize.

The one thing the four of us have in common is that we have all
served in the Middle East and know the territory over which this battle
was fought. We followed the war in our professional capacities day and
night throughout the 18 days that it lasted, but I do not for one moment
suggest that we have either all the answers or even all the information
we would like from the Middle East war. We will start with a look at
the Army side from Brigadier Bidwell.

**Brigadier R. G. S. Bidwell**

Conscious of the fact that there are people present who have been
on the ground during the actual operations, I feel a certain diffidence
about appearing as a desk or chair borne strategist. However, I have
had a lot of practice at it in my time, and I will offer a few opinions.
There are indeed many aspects of the war which are of very considerable contemporary relevance to our own problems.

The field is so large and so numerous that I found it difficult at first to decide what to exclude from a short introductory contribution which, I hope, will stimulate discussion in the body of the house, so I will concentrate on three things.

First, what is very interesting is the balance of power between tank and anti-tank. There is nothing new here. The pendulum has been swinging steadily back and forth almost from the time of Cambrai to the battle on the El Hafid Ridge, Kursk, and onwards.

Secondly, I will take a groundling’s look at the surface-to-air questions; the air defence battle and all its implications.

Thirdly, I will try to mention very briefly how far in my view the tactics revealed are indications of Soviet doctrine and Soviet attitudes.

It is really a kind of intelligence exercise. We have nothing but imperfect and incomplete information, so you will forgive me for using a certain amount of what the late Alfred Burne used to call 'inherent military probability' — a good term for a guess. A military commentator must be prepared to stick his neck out, and when current events turn into history things may well prove to be different.

First, I will sketch in very lightly two important background subjects which make the specific subjects fall into place.

What was the Arabs' aim? In real life aims are never as clear-cut as in staff college appreciations. Ideally, the conquest of Israel should be undertaken by an attack from east to west across its narrow waist and into the vitals of the country, but for topographical and political reasons, and lack of military skill, this had to be ruled out, so, whatever the arguments pro and con may be, these two virtually independent forces had to try to crack the Israeli nut lengthways — the hard way.

They may have decided to recover as much as possible of the territory lost in 1967. They may have thought it quite sufficient simply to make a lodgement in Sinai, so as to have a good post-bellum bargaining position. Thirdly, it was essential to give their troops, so often and so humiliatingly failing, a taste of victory for the sake of the morale of the army and for national morale.

Israel's position and aim is too obvious for me to stress here. May I mention what I consider to be the political similarities to our own
position rather closer to home. They were not able to pre-empt or have a preliminary or spoiling attack for political and other reasons. There were very heavy adverse numerical odds, especially in armour. There was relatively little room for manoeuvre especially on the Golan, and there was the need to inflict an early, violent repulse to cool off the aggressor.

The other preliminary point is that, more than any other wars, the Arab-Israeli wars are *morale* wars. The Israelis felt they could break any Arab attack within 24 hours by reason of their violent offensive tactics.

No one has suggested that there has been a reversal in the relative levels of morale, but all the reports indicate that the Egyptians attacked with great courage and persistently and defended, when they had to, with resolution and successfully. They certainly withstood, with their infantry, at least one major tank attack, and this is one of the most frightening things to face. All professionals will agree that the Canal crossing on the night of the 5th/6th was extraordinarily well done. Supposing one were in charge of any exercise in BAOR, with no enemy whatsoever, and had to go through all the business of assembling the engineer forces, carrying out the staff duties, and pulling it off without a mistake, this would have been difficult enough and a very satisfactory thing to achieve without a mistake. Nobody would have believed the Egyptians were capable of it 10 years ago, but they did it: they forced their assault troops across, with the results that you know. Somehow the fighting spirit of the Egyptians certainly has been aroused.

Now let us turn to weapons. First, tanks. I think the Israelis like tanks because they are robust simple, highly effective, and capital-intensive, and the whole secret of the Israeli armoured troops is that they are an élite, trained to the highest pitch of efficiency. The subject itself is vast and we could have a long debate merely about it, but the most interesting points are these. It is quite clear that the exchange value as between ATGW and armoured fighting vehicles makes the position of the tank quite different from what it was.

The corollary of this is not that the tank is obsolete, for the tank will be obsolete when the cannon is obsolete. It looks as if it has got to evolve into a different kind of weapon, and the important factors or parameters will be fire power and mobility. One must look very questioningly at the super-expensive, super-heavy, super-tank. I wonder
if we are absolutely sound in using, as we are, certainly in our doctrine, the tank primarily as a first line of anti-tank defence. It was first invented as a weapon of attack, of manoeuvre.

The next thing which comes out of all the reports I have heard of the first major Israeli armoured counter-attack, which was shot to pieces, is that the proper way to deal with the ATGW is not to invent a super-tank to defeat it but to use the most primitive but still the most important and skilled arm, the infantry, to deal with it. In other words, one must continue to use all arms acting in co-operation.

Next, we have air defence. I will not attempt to analyse this. This raises a new dimension in warfare, because again this is a profitable exchange rate. The figures are very hard to come by and we are handicapped by the fact that we do not know what categories of weapons impose what portion of casualties, so we can only guess. But the interesting thing is that the presence of this vast aerial barrage altered the entire Israeli strategy and presented some very difficult problems. Long after we were all told by the pundits that only the sophisticated weapons were of value, the Egyptians, under their Russian tutors, have a very large amount of small rapid-fire guns of various calibre.

Next, how far — allowing for the fact that the Russians had to modify their own war to suit the kind of army they were training — do the tactics used by the Arabs reflect tactical doctrine and training? I suggest that there is a very close resemblance.

The first is the use of very large numbers. This has always been essential in Russian ground tactics. It can be seen also in their surface-to-air tactics. They deal in mass. The Syrians are reported to have used over 1,000 tanks. The mere staff duties required to assemble such a number of tanks on the Golan Heights present a difficult problem. The Russian doctrine in World War II was that at the point of decision they had to have a 4:1 numerical superiority, and 100 pieces of artillery per kilometre of ground. They worked on a yardstick. They flooded the battlefield with weapons and missiles. This still seems to be so.

The next point is that Soviet troop handling and command, their control apparatus, depends on each man fulfilling his allotted 'norm', as it were. A divisional or brigade commander is supposed to fulfil his 'norm'. He is given his plan and objective and he has to go on until he has no further resources with which to carry it out, and it does appear, from what we have read in the many excellent reports, that the
Egyptians frequently pressed home their attacks in a rigid and mechanical way even when it was long past the time when any Western commander might have stopped and made a fresh appreciation.

The Russians are extremely methodical and thorough. They have adequate resources, detailed planning, meticulous execution, and no variation, and in this factor we may well find partly the explanation why the Egyptians halted for such a long time having crossed the Canal. The Russians do not allow their subordinate commanders any flexibility — any individual choice of altering the plan. This again was noticed by the Germans in the Second World War. To get the better of the Russians they had to do something unusual. In this campaign we know what the unusual thing was (i.e., the Israeli counter offensive across the Canal). Russian planning does not allow subordinate commanders to react to an emergency or to seize the fleeting opportunities which the actions of battle have given. I do not want to exaggerate this and it may well be that they have not brought the Egyptians or Syrians up to a sufficient pitch of skill in their higher leadership, but these are the things which seems significant.

Here I must stop. I have seen very little of the work of the engineers, which is of the utmost importance. As for the infantry, which has had very little reporting, it is interesting to see that neither the infantry nor their proper companions, the field artillery, have really been involved in this war as they should. But I think there are signs that the 'queen of the battlefield' is about to re-mont her throne — if she has ever descended from it.

The Chairman

Brigadier Bidwell made a comparison between the strategies adopted by the Egyptians and those of the Israelis in which he emphasised, I think quite correctly, the inflexibility or the tendency to inflexibility on the part of the Egyptians which is obvious in nearly all the Russian exercises that have taken place in recent years. We have printed an analysis of some of these exercises in the Journal; they make interesting reading. If we examine the last major exercise in Czechoslovakia, in which river-crossing operations were made with tank divisions supported by motor-borne rifle divisions, helicopter-borne infantry supported by mobile anti-aircraft defences and anti-tank weapons, we see that the Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal using very similar tactics and bridging techniques and the same methods of crossing, with one
notable exception, and that is that the Egyptians did not use helicopters in the same way that the Russian Army would use them in a similar river crossing.

One point not mentioned so far is the political lesson right at the beginning of the war, when it was widely claimed in some sections of the press and the media that Israel was taken completely by surprise. This is not true. Israel had not only good air photographic and radar intelligence services but extremely good intelligence on the ground. In addition, the Americans had alerted the Israeli Government several days before the war started that troop movements were taking place in Egypt and Syria. What really happened was that Israeli politicians, though well aware of Arab capabilities, misread Egyptian intentions. Convert that to the European theatre and you can see the danger of European politicians mis-interpreting the Soviet Union’s intentions, even though they know only too well the Soviet Union’s capability.

Now we will hear about the naval side from Captain Moore.

Captain J. E. Moore, R.N.

The navies of the three countries involved did not match up at all. The Egyptians, with a much stronger surface force of conventional ships, were backed up by the Syrians with a few of the more conventional variety. However, the balance of submarines was on the Egyptians’ side. The Israelis were primarily armed with missile craft. It is interesting to see that at the start of the war there were 32 or 33 missile craft on the Arab side, and the Israelis had only some 18. You must remember that these Israeli craft mounted home-produced missiles, the 12-mile range sea-skimmer, Gabriel, of which a new variant with a range of 22 miles is now under trial. The Israeli force consisted of the 12 Saar class built in France, whilst the six Saar 4’s were built in Israel. This allowed the Israelis to operate ships in which they had had a considerable amount of training and personal interest. The Arabs operated the Soviet OSA class with four Styx missiles or the Komars, with two of these missiles. The Komars provided the majority of the Syrian missile forces whilst the Egyptians retained their OSA’s in the Mediterranean, and by my understanding, transferred the majority of the Komars to the Red Sea. This is possibly because the Gabriel mountings in the Saars are much more numerous than in the OSA’s, or Komars — up to eight in the Saars, four in the OSA’s, and two in the Komars. Perhaps
the Egyptians thought that the Komars were not capable of taking on a craft with this number of missiles.

The form of action that resulted primarily concerned the missile boats. As far as I know, there were no submarine involvements, although the Egyptians have 12 submarines at their disposal and the Israelis two, of rather antique vintage, taken over from the Royal Navy. There was no flank for them to operate on in the north and what flank there was in the south was fairly nebulous. As a result of this, the whole of the action resulted merely in sporadic outbursts starting on the first night of the war, when there was an action between the Israelis and the Egyptians, and this resulted in the loss of the first Egyptian OSA. Two nights later, three more OSA’s went to their grave. Meanwhile, in the north, there were actions against the Syrians. A mine-sweeper and a couple of either OSA’s or Komars (at that time there were only two or three OSA’s in the Syrian Navy but I understand that the numbers were later increased) were lost. Then on the nights of the 10th and the 11th, another two were lost by the Syrians. The Syrians also lost a torpedo boat. So we have a probable loss of 13 vessels, while the Israelis had no losses.

In the Red Sea the Israelis had satisfactorily defended their main oil refinery, which is on a very vulnerable coast, against any incursions from the air or sea. The patrol boats had done their job in its protection. So the Israelis came out of this war with the balance at sea on their side, and until we have further details of the facts there is little than I can add.

What are the lessons of this? We have two different classes of missile boat opposed to each other, one is victorious and the other suffers severe losses. Why did the Gabriel turn out to be more satisfactory than the Styx, which had double the range? They are both similar in some respects, but the Gabriel is a sea-skimmer. Perhaps it was that the Israelis were more competent in the handling of the craft they had so lovingly watched during their construction. Perhaps the Egyptians and the Syrians — certainly the Syrians, because they were only recently provided with these ships — were not as efficient as they might have been.

Some people have said that this entirely reverses previous views as to the efficiency of the Styx (SSN2) missile. In the past, in previous conflicts, we have seen its success. It was successful on Trafalgar Day
in 1967 when the *Eilat* was sunk. It had considerable success in the Indo-Pakistan war. Yet in this war it had no success at all, though in fact, we do not know how many were fired. But it is very interesting to consider this aspect, and I shall be glad to hear what others have to say, who may be far better equipped than I am to discuss the rival efficacy of these two missiles.

**The Chairman**

Thank you very much. One particular point worth mentioning is that in few cases was a port or harbour which housed these ships bombed or otherwise attacked from the air. Similarly, at the opening of this war, unlike the 1967 war, no pre-emptive attacks were carried out by either side against the airfields of the other. This had an important bearing on what happened in the 18 days that followed. It would also, if translated into a European setting, have a very important bearing on what might happen in Europe if we found ourselves unable to attack the enemy's airfields in force immediately a major offensive was launched.

Now we are to hear from Wing Commander Bolton about the air side.

**Wing Commander D. Bolton**

I should like to begin with three caveats. The first is a personal disclaimer. As this subject does not fall within my professional compass in the Ministry of Defence, the views I express should be construed as being no more than those of an interested observer in military affairs. Secondly, as others have done, I should like to emphasise the dangers of drawing definitive conclusions from incomplete evidence largely drawn from press reports, magazines, and television coverage. Although the information we have may serve to emphasise certain areas of interest, this should not short-circuit the process of an objective evaluation of much more detailed information as this becomes available. My third warning concerns the danger of transposing tentative lessons from what was largely a desert war of open spaces and crystal-clear weather, to a European environment of restricted views and uncertain climate.

It is against this background that I should like to highlight for subsequent discussion, the diverse roles which the various air forces were called upon to play, and then to concentrate a little more on air defence.
It would appear that, for whatever reason, the mobilisation of the Israeli forces started only very shortly before the Arab attack. As the Syrian thrust threatened Israel's heartland, the Israeli Air Force, being immediately available, was thrown into the Golan Heights battle to hold up the armoured advance and gain time for other forces to be brought to bear. It was not possible to trade space for time in this area. The Israeli Air Force took on the Syrian Army regardless of its SAM and anti-aircraft artillery umbrella and bore the brunt of the initial onslaught. Although the Israelis may have had some knowledge of the SA-2 and SA-3 missile systems, they did not then have the electronic counter-measures (ECM), nor perhaps the best tactics, to deal with the SA-6 and the radar-directed, four-barrelled 23 mm guns. They succeeded in blunting the Syrian thrust, but not without cost. The A4 Skyhawks were the Israelis' primary ground attack aircraft and they seem to have taken the heaviest losses.

The Syrian Air Force was active from the start and the Israelis also had to contend with this problem. Using the Mirage 3 and their own Barak aircraft almost exclusively as top cover air superiority fighters, they accounted for most of the Arab Migs with air-to-air missiles; the Sidewinder and their own Shaffir missile.

The Syrians and the Iraqis used Mig-17 (Fresco) and the Su-7 (Fitter) fighter bombers against Israeli ground forces, under a top cover of Mig-21's (Fishbed) and our own Hunters in the hands of the Iraqis.

The Israeli F-4s, similar to our Phantoms, seem to have been used mainly for attacks against airfields, and strategic targets. It has been reported that they were particularly effective in their attacks on Syrian oil and port facilities as well as against radio and power stations.

With somewhat depleted resources after its early ground attack operations, the Israeli Air Force could have been restricted in its counter-air programme, and thus denied the full opportunity of repeating its 1967 successes. However, in this conflict the Israeli Air Force seems to have had little success against the Arab Air Forces on the ground, with the possible exception of some attacks around Damascus. The Egyptian Air Force was apparently well protected in aircraft shelters and temporary runway cratering was soon adjudged by the Israelis not to be worth even minimal losses.

After its support of the initial Egyptian Canal crossing, the concept of operations for the Egyptian Air Force seems to have been one of
being held back in reserve until the Israeli Air Force had been so degraded by losses to SAM and AAA that a favourable Arab air situation could readily be attained.

The Israeli break-through to the west bank of the Suez Canal at Deversoir forced the Egyptians to commit their air force to the battle. Su-7 fighter bombers, protected by Mig-21s, were engaged by Israeli Mirages and Phantoms and the Egyptians suffered severe losses. Most kills again were reported to have come from air-to-air missiles, and only a few from cannon fire.

With the Israelis having gained air superiority, and their spearhead across the Canal seeking to conserve armour and ammunition, the Skyhawks (A-4), with their British 30 mm Aden guns, were called in against the Egyptian tanks, apparently with devastating effect.

It was reported in the last days of the war that United States stand-off weapons were also used against Arab armour.

Reported figures for aircraft losses vary. However, a consensus seems to point to Israel losing some 100 aircraft, the vast majority to ground fire, and then in the early part of the war. Egypt lost approximately 180 aircraft, with a similar figure for Syria and Iraq combined. To put this into perspective, although the Israeli losses were of up to 20 per cent of their aircraft strength, when viewed against the vast number of sorties flown it represents a very low loss rate, something like 1 per cent. This compares favourably with the 1967 figures.

Most facets of air operations were seen in the recent conflict. However, the ability to switch aircraft to meet such a wide variety of tasks calls for a very effective command and control system, with excellent battlefield communications. It seems that the Israelis had these facilities.

Now a few words on air defence. The Arabs deployed their SA-2s and SA-3s for defence against medium and high altitude attacks, with the SA-6 and SA-7 supplemented by the ZSU-23-4, providing low-level protection. They had belt defences on the Canal, and on the Golan Heights, as well as point defences of key targets elsewhere. They also employed a large number of the low-level missiles and guns with their armoured columns and field troops. They seemed to be slow moving on the Canal front where the ground forces were reluctant to move forward after crossing the Canal, without their air defence umbrella.
As I have already mentioned, the Israelis seem to have had a limited electronic counter-measure (ECM) capability with which to deal with the SA-2 and SA-3, but not to counter the mobile SA-6. After suffering some losses to the SA-6, the Israelis were forced to fly very low, and this put them at risk from the ZSU-23-4 and SA-7.

The SA-7 seems to have been launched in salvoes and scored a number of hits but apparently the warhead was not sufficiently large to guarantee bringing the target aircraft down.

Effective SAM suppression sorties were apparently flown by the Israeli Air Force, after the initial Syrian thrust had been halted, and when the defences could not be skirted. There have also been reports of a modified ECM pod being used by Israel towards the end of the war which had some success against the SA-6. The use of radar-homing missiles (Shrike) was also reported. However, it seems that, in conditions of good visibility and with a clear field of view, the Arabs would switch to optically laying their low-level weapons if Israeli ECM was likely to be effective. On the Canal front the Israeli Air Forces seemingly went round the SAM belt at first and later flew anti-SAM sorties when the belt had been breached by ground forces.

It is difficult to determine the exact cause of the Arab air defences becoming less effective towards the end of the war or, put another way, why the Israelis progressively reduced their loss rate. The most likely causes stem from a combination of improved ECM, better tactics, and then the use of stand-off missiles on the part of the Israelis.

From a defensive viewpoint, a more closely integrated system of guns, missiles and fighters seems to have been required, and this once again raises the problem of the control of air space, particularly over the battle area. This was emphasised with the reported shooting down by the Arabs of some of their own aircraft and then denying air space to their own aircraft if there was SAM cover available.

In summary, the Yom Kippur war seems to have highlighted the inherent flexibility of air power and the need for balanced forces, be it in air defences or offensive support operations. Furthermore, a rapidly responsive command and control system, and one which cannot be seriously degraded by ECM, is essential if air forces are to be deployed effectively to meet a variety of battle situations. No doubt, we will now see a greatly increased development in ECM, ECCM, stand-off weapons, and improved weapon delivery, to keep pace with the advances in the SAM field.
The Chairman

I should like to raise two points on the air side. Wing Commander Bolton mentioned the attacks carried out by A-4 Skyhawks against Syrian tanks in the opening phases of the war. You will remember the highly significant fact that the Israelis appeared to possess very few anti-tank missiles by comparison with the Arabs whose Sagger and Snapper, provided by the Soviet Union to the Egyptians and Syrians, proved very effective. The Skyhawks were attacking tanks with 30 mm Aden guns and doing this in shallow dive attacks. I can think of no more appropriate way to commit suicide in the air than to attack formations of tanks on the ground which were heavily supported by a very modern anti-aircraft capability consisting of both guns and missiles. The majority of the aircraft losses that the Israelis suffered were inflicted during the Golan Heights encounter in the first three days of the war, and were caused by 23 mm and 37 mm anti-aircraft guns and SAM-6 and 7 missiles.

I think we should learn at least one lesson from the effectiveness of SAM sites against aircraft, and translate it to the European theatre, and it is that large aircraft like the Vulcan bomber used in the tactical role must surely be as obsolete as the dodo. I do not believe that an aircraft like the Vulcan at low level in a tactical role would survive for five minutes in a SAM missile and gun environment of the intensity we must expect to be deployed by the Soviet Union in Europe.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. J. Murphy (Australian Army)

The Israeli Army is said to have been surprised by the effectiveness of Arab anti-tank guided weapons and light, man-portable anti-tank rockets (especially the RPG-7). Anti-tank guided weapons such as Snapper and Sagger could be expected to be more effective in desert terrain than in almost any other part of the world, except perhaps tundra and prairie. They are not particularly modern or unusual weapon systems, however, and are probably much harder to operate than TOW, for example. The operators must therefore have been well trained and, above all, resolute and therein lay the surprise. Similarly, the characteristics of the RPG-7 are well known — rather too well known to those of us who served in Vietnam. It is, in effect, only a super-Panzerfaust or Bazooka. The surprise lay in the fact that Arab infantry would face tanks at close range and expose themselves to fire their RPG-7 weapons. The point is that the increased effectiveness depended not so much on
improvements in anti-tank weapons as on improvements in the morale of the users.

Several speakers also drew the lesson that because light, cheap anti-tank weapons have now been shown to be effective, the reliance on the tank as an anti-tank system is unsound. This is an attractive approach as tanks are becoming more and more expensive and can be best employed in other roles. There are, however, several problems which may make it difficult to avoid using tanks in the anti-tank role in Western Europe. First, terrain, and especially limitations to visibility, will reduce the effectiveness of anti-tank guided weapons. Secondly, it is generally agreed that a well-co-ordinated anti-tank defensive system is best attacked by a co-ordinated infantry/armoured assault with adequate supporting fire, including artillery. Unfortunately anti-tank guided weapons and light anti-tank rockets are not easy to use when the enemy is placing heavy covering fire on your position, whereas tanks are relatively unaffected. It would seem, therefore, that other anti-tank weapons should be used whenever possible but that in an 'all-in' fight tanks will still be necessary to destroy enemy armour.

Brigadier Bidwell

The difficulty about specific remarks about ATGW is that we as yet have no really good statistical breakdown of what caused the various tank losses, but I think we can say this about ATGW. If we simply take the question of an armoured fighting vehicle, we are in a position now, or have been, that we can have a very high probability from a relatively light and mobile weapon, which can be mounted in a variety of ways, and which will give a first-time hit.

The pitting of one weapon system against another is an oversimplification. As far as I can make out, it was the 190th Israeli Tank Brigade which on one particular occasion suffered severe casualties while at the same time acting very correctly. When making a counter-attack one has to choose between waiting to get everything right, all the orders out and making certain that one will strike a properly co-ordinated blow, or acting very rapidly: but the longer one waits the more the resistance hardens, particularly when facing an enemy who has crossed an obstacle and is therefore filtering forward his various weapons. This Israeli tank brigade attacked an Egyptian infantry division. It had left behind its infantry and above all its field artillery.
There is a naval game that people used to play for drinks which involves making certain finger gestures. The scissors cut the paper, the paper wraps up the stone, but of course the stone breaks the scissors. The correct answer, therefore, for infantry with ATGW is highly-skilled infantry using their battle craft and with the opposing fire suppressed by closely co-ordinated field artillery work. One does not bring up one’s tanks to commit suicide in front of ATGW. The relationship between ATGW and tanks now is very much as that between the constant fire machine-gun of 1916-17 and masses of unarmoured infantry presenting themselves on the targets. In a Russian type advance there are hundreds of ATGW of various kinds. Unsupported tanks simply provide a set of targets. Such attacks by unsupported armour are no longer possible in my view.

If I may now turn to what I imagine is the air defence problem, the whole secret of it, I think, is to combine two techniques. One is common to all artillery when there is a limited amount of air defence. You choose your VPs and distribute your pattern of defence so that only when there is air attack on a vital point or area is there a really high density. This is borne of having only a few and expensive air defence systems. If you have lots of cheap weapons you can use them more lavishly. By increasing the number of projectiles put into the sky the chances of a hit are raised. It is a straight probability question. The great advantage of guns, although they may not be anything like as lethal as an HE charge against aircraft, is that there is a possibility of damage. This means that there is a gradual erosion of the efficiency of your aircraft in the course of the attack. This is bound to have the effect of making even the most determined pilots more cautious in their approach. It is a deterrent. But the great thing to look at in regard to what one might call ‘unsophisticated’ artillery systems is that the balance in exchange value between a very sophisticated aircraft and having a large number of cheap missiles is such that the advantage is with the missiles. Therefore you have to re-fashion your air attack tactics in the manner the Director-General has already mentioned.

The Chairman

I saw an interesting figure two days ago in an American report which said that for one C-5 something like half a million SAM-7 (Strella) type anti-aircraft missiles, shoulder fired, could be purchased. They would be very effective against C-5s or AN-22.
The point has been made very forcibly that not only anti-aircraft, but also anti-tank missiles now available in quantity are relatively cheap and require very little training. The Israelis learned to use the TOW anti-tank missile, which the United States supplied at the end of the war, very effectively in a matter of hours. The technology in anti-tank missiles available now — ours and theirs — are wire-guided and therefore vulnerable. The ‘fire and forget’ anti-tank missile is just over the horizon. It will be very effective and add immeasurably to the tank’s problems, but it will be more sophisticated and more expensive. One other weapon not mentioned at all is the anti-tank mine that can be sown from the air. It cannot readily be detected, and if a tank goes over it its tracks are blown off. There is now a combination of new technologies building up that will be highly effective against tanks, and there can be little doubt that the balance is in favour of defensive systems.

Perhaps we could go on to the question of the sort of mobile anti-aircraft systems European armies ought to be equipped with to fulfil their mission. There are all kinds of systems available, some more sophisticated than others, but certainly armies will require large mobile anti-aircraft defence against an enemy who outnumbers the NATO forces by more than 2 to 1 in tactical aircraft.

Has Wing Commander Bolton any points to air?

**Wing Commander Bolton**

With a limited number of missiles available there is a danger that defences could be saturated by concentrated attacks on a narrow front. A possible counter is a SAM and gun mix, with air superiority fighters to guard against the threat of stand-off weapons and to take-on enemy fighters. What is required is a balanced force of aircraft, missiles and guns, with an effective control and reporting agency. Passive defence measures to minimise the effects of any successful attack should not be overlooked.

**The Chairman**

The fighter would also have to take care of things like airborne warning and control aircraft. Another aspect which we have not talked about, but which has a considerable future, is the RPV (remotely piloted vehicle). Why use manned aircraft if the task can be done better by remotely controlled aircraft? I believe we must press on with these ideas, which are not only manpower-saving but economically viable as well.
If you have read the title I hope I have achieved my first objective — to gain your attention. And I hope to hold it through the following stages of effective communication: awareness, comprehension, conviction, action.

The specific aim of this article is to provoke COs/OCs of Army Reserve units to take positive action on recruiting. Performance in recruiting, unit by unit, ranges from aggressive and successful to apathetic and pathetically unsuccessful, and regrettably, sometimes non-existent.

The responsibility for recruiting rests with the unit CO/OC but all Reserve Officers and Regular Cadre Officers must be aware of the necessity to recruit and to render as much help as possible to the unit recruiting team. A capable recruiting team can be effective despite a lack of interest or support from the CO/OC and unit officers — it can be many more times more effective with their support.

Recruiting is a specialized task: this does not mean that a common-sense approach to recruiting is the sole preserve of the specialist. It does indicate however that to get mileage out of the unit recruiting team, members should serve at least one year (preferably three) in the team,

Until recently, Major Makin held the posting of SO2 Recruiting HQ 2 Div. He has served for 19 years in the CMF, the last three years on the 2 Div recruiting staff. In civilian life, he is a Divisional General Manager with a publicly-listed diversified food company.
want to be in the team, are effectively trained, and continuously employed on recruiting activities. The career patterns of Reserve officers necessitate constant movement in officer postings. Hence, many a unit gets continuity in the leadership of the team by heading it up with a WO2/Sgt who does not aspire to commissioned rank.

To illustrate the vast waste inherent in changing the membership of unit recruiting teams; over the last twelve months 250 members have attended the 2 Div centralized Unit Recruiter Training Program. At best, some 15% will still be doing the same task 12 months after attending the programme. How does your unit rate: overwhelmingly the chances are — poorly.

Some COs/OCs who are expert and experienced soldiers fail dismally in recruiting because they do not grasp the essentials of the task. Instead they say, for example, 'unit equipment (though workable) is out-of-date, so how can we attract recruits?' or 'we can't offer overseas training, so how can we succeed?' etc. The facts are that Army Reserve units (at least in NSW) fail to enlist about half of the enquiries from prospective recruits, whatever prompted their enquiry — coupon response to newspaper ads, mates in the unit etc.

Performance of course varies from unit to unit. Some score 90% on converting enquiries to application — to enlistment; others fail dismally. Enlist the aid of your Regular cadre to make sure all enquiries are courteously, promptly and efficiently handled.

Most enquirers would not know on enquiry whether your unit has the same equipment as your counterpart Regular unit. The enquirer may be interested in handling military hardware — at enlistment stage, the model is not important.

More often than not the prospective recruit will be looking for a new experience; comradeship, a challenge, a new environment, social mixing, or one of many other benefits. The benefits one gains from soldiering spare-time in the Army Reserve change over the years. Test yourself — what benefits do you look for now? What did you look for three, six, nine years ago?

A car can be transport to one person, a status symbol to another, or a source of mechanical enjoyment: so it is that spare-time soldiering in the Army Reserve can mean so many different things to so many different people.
In 2 Division, we gather information from recruits on why they join at their centralized 2-week recruit course. This work is done by 12 Psych Unit in parallel with the application of the normal psych testing. Each unit CO/OC should make it his business to know why young men join the Army Reserve and his unit in particular. Do you know why?

Conviction that recruiting is an urgent necessity must stem from CO/OCs awareness of the effect of the implementation of the organizational recommendations of the recent Committee of Enquiry into the CMF. Strengths in the number of units must rise dramatically to prevent the 'viability test' relegating long-existing unit titles to the history books.

Convinced? Then Mr CO/OC what next? Might I suggest that, if you are not already doing so, you implement each of the following steps:

- Convince yourself that your unit should and can recruit.
- Carefully select your recruiting team and get its members trained.
- Work out with the team an initial three-month programme so that they can 'cut their teeth' on implementing what they have learned at their training programme — manning street/shopping centre stands, door-knocking, bring a buddy, etc.
- Make sure that the team leader evaluates with his men the results of the initial programme.
- Work out with the team leader the programme for the next six months.
- Motivate and support your team — and watch the recruits march in.

Wishful thinking? Not so! At your next inter-unit activity, ask the other CO/OCs and officers who their units are recruiting — some responses will depress you, some will excite you. Will your unit's record excite others? 😊
Dialogue, Persuasion and Common Sense

Of all the uses to which human speech may be put, one is more interesting, more useful, and more powerful than the others. It is the use of speech to influence behaviour, sell goods or inspire ideas.

Business and social life include every kind of interchange which proceeds by way of persuasion. The thrill of winning a new customer, the delight in gaining a friend, and the satisfaction of making a point in favour of some community advancement: these are not surpassed by any other experience.

Not everyone needs to be a professional salesman, but everyone who seeks to lead people to his way of thinking is engaged in selling.

The principles of persuasion apply in many circumstances: public speaking, debate, dialogue, conversation and salesmanship. There is a common illusion that the person who is silent in meetings and in social gatherings has something special in the way of intelligence, but the strong, silent person may be only dull. He will not accomplish much unless he becomes involved by joining the action.

Debate, which is one branch of persuasion, is a means of establishing the truth. Debate is give-and-take. If you want to speak your mind freely, you must let your opponents speak their minds freely, even when what they say collides with your vanity and violates your sense of what is fitting, or is violently opposed to your views and beliefs.

A debate is a clear-cut pro and con discussion of a question or assertion. In most public meetings the rules of parliamentary procedure are followed as a guide to fair play in the debates that arise. There must be some rules to hold the discussion to a definite point. This is also a requirement in private debates, but instead of a book of rules about sharing the time the participants rely upon a gentleman’s agreement, and the person who transgresses it will be unpopular. There are lonely debates, dialogues within our own minds. These are soliloquies in which we organize our thoughts and tot up the arguments for and against a course of action.

Dialogue is sharing

Dialogue is the participation of people in the search for common values and their sharing of ideas as they deal with problems of joint concern. It is a conversation between two or more persons with a view to reaching an amicable agreement. Tossing an idea around in dialogue gets rid of a lot of chaff and makes the seed visible.

The way to prepare yourself is to participate in question and answer, in proposal and counter-proposal, and so to find areas of agreement and build upon them. It seems to enlightened persons that this is a better way to solve problems than raising an argument or doing battle.

Dialogue offers full scope for both good sense and good personality. The notions you express should be intrinsically reasonable, subject to amendment and yielding to improvement. The smile with which you present your point of view should show your personality. It springs from knowledge of your subject, belief in the integrity of what you sponsor, and a feeling of pleasure in being given the opportunity to speak. Personality is made up of many qualities of the mind and spirit: sincerity, the Golden Rule, knowledge and developed skill.

Just as a little discomfort is accepted as one of the occupational hazards of almost every job, so there are difficult periods in any dialogue. All people have not bumped their heads against the same obstacles, so in a group there is bound to be diversity of experience described, variety of beliefs affirmed, and many opinions expressed. Some will be annoying and many of them may be infuriating. If, then, there is one virtue more than another that should be emphasized as an essential requirement in the person engaged in dialogue and persuasion, it is patient tact.

Persuasion: a wise man's argument

There are two forms of intercourse between individuals and between groups: force and persuasion. Compulsion is a brute thing, a disclosure of one of the still unrefined crudities of civilization. If one party compels another to do something instead of persuading him, this is despotism, and it transgresses the principle of proper conduct sanctioned by an intellectually and spiritually refined society. When we move from force to persuasion we take a step upward in intelligence and culture.
It is usually a weakling who runs away from persuasion. He does not want to risk being persuaded against his prejudices. A person with strength of character can listen to persuasion, weigh what is said, and arrive at informed conclusions. Before engaging in persuasion, take time to settle a few questions in your own mind: What do I wish to accomplish? What are the interests of the people to whom I shall be talking? What are the facts I wish to tell them?

When a speaker seeks to bring about a change in belief or conduct, the hearer must not only understand and approve; he must accept. The speaker needs to minimize misunderstandings and difficulties by giving adequate explanations. ‘Because I say so’ is not an acceptable or effective reason to give in dialogue, debate, or persuasion when recommending some action. In selling, the person who relies upon argument is leaning on a weak reed. Persuasion in the prospect’s interest is what wins sales.

Persuasion is based in large part upon knowing what makes people tick. This knowledge may be put to use through words or in pictures that appeal to one of the senses. Persuasion avoids a head-on collision about some doubtful point. It does not talk down to a person or a group.

A sense for human interest is a valuable asset to anyone indulging in persuasion. Human interest is what you notice that is of dominant interest in the person to whom you are presenting your case. Consider what will appeal to him. Whatever your objective, you must start with his present state of knowledge and belief.

A friendly attitude and the impression of being easy to talk with create an enormous amount of good will and predispose people to give you a sympathetic hearing. Two sayings from Mary Renault’s best-selling story of ancient Greece are fitting in this context: ‘It is no shame to make persuasion pleasing’, and ‘If you want clear water, don’t tease the squid.’

**Conciliation and compromise**

When speaking to an unfavourably-disposed audience or person the first task is to conciliate the people and break down prejudice. He is a clever person who, under these circumstances, succeeds in bringing a state of urbanity into a gathering that is marked by dissension.

When taking part in a committee or other meeting where diverging ideas have become evident, the person who believes in conciliation may
say something like this: ‘It seems to me that there are three (or whatever the number may be) main points developed at this meeting. Would it not be reasonable for us to adopt such-and-such of the solution proposed by Mr A and such-and-such a part from Mr B’s contribution, and work them in together with this proposal by Mr C. This will enable us to formulate a proposed course of action that can be made the basis of fruitful discussion.’

Such a procedure may be called ‘compromise’ by some who detest the word, but it can be at times the intelligent approach to settlement and the essence of courageous wisdom. The words compromise, conciliation, mediation, and accommodation, signify partial acceptance of both sides of a dilemma that has baffled wise people. The proposed alternatives are not mutually exclusive, and ground is yielded on each side. In Charles Lamb’s story of the invention of roast pork, people found that they did not have to burn down the cottage to roast the pig: they could have both cottage and savoury chops.

People have different reasons for opposing compromise. A fanatical person may object because he looks upon it as a sign of ignoble weakness. One who believes that he holds the key to truth and virtue can make no concessions to what he regards as vice or error. A romantic person does not object to compromise because it is ignoble, but because it is prosaic and undramatic: he wants to ride on to the stage like St George, conquering dragons.

**Desirable qualities**

There are some qualities that one should have before venturing upon debate, dialogue, or conciliation. They are: discrimination, preparation, factual knowledge, a wide view, belief in his cause, and honesty in presentation. It is advisable to be discriminating when deciding upon the ideal or objective you choose to support or lead. This involves making judgments.

Next is preparation. Planning will not take the place of inspiration and enterprise, but it is a necessary support of them. Before communicating, know your facts; before dialogue, know what the issue is; before persuading, know what the outcome entails; before co-operating, know that the combined effort is worth while.

It is vital to know what you are talking about, and to know why those with whom you are talking should be interested. You cannot rely
upon your native ability to negotiate complex problems with spur of the moment thoughts.

Go right to the heart of the matter and find out just what issues have to be decided. Tidy up your mind, lay out your chain of reasoning, anticipate the objections and have the answers ready. Make preparations that are suitable to your best hopes. In persuasion as in scientific research, fortune favours the prepared mind.

Do not be skimpy in presenting facts. Qualities that seem obvious to you need to be presented so that your listeners see and understand them. This presentation should be clear, adequate, and convincing. It should introduce into the mind of the listener some picture of himself as a central figure, furthering a good cause, using a service or being admired for having a part in it.

Facts form the basis of all debate, all discussion and all persuasion. There can be little reasoning done without them. When you are short of information, make a telephone call, visit a library, or write a letter. The sources of data you can tap are boundless. But make sure that your facts are correct and your statistics meaningful. There was a ninety-year-old patient who assured his doctor that he was unlikely to die, because 'statistics prove that few men die over ninety.'

Open to new ideas

A wide view is needed, taking into account not only the individual fragments of the course you are advocating, but everything that might affect its acceptance. Look for the consequences, the over-all effects of a change.

The conditions, influences and forces to which people are exposed are constantly changing. An appeal that might have been indisputably correct as your text a generation ago may have been made obsolete by new discoveries.

Being open to hearing a new idea is an intelligent approach to the affairs of life, even if we do not like the idea when we hear it. Be willing to listen to those who have prejudices. Nearly every prejudice started with a small truth. Separate the husk of prejudice from the truth it encloses and so get at the kernel within.

You will be encouraged and sustained in all these endeavours if you believe whole-heartedly in the cause you are originating or supporting. The first person you have to persuade is yourself. Then back up
what you say with high confidence in what you are saying. Be enthusiastic.

Be honest in all your persuasion. Do not overreach yourself in making promises. False promises made in the heat of debate or in the throes of selling a commodity are quickly revealed when the person you influence comes face to face with the reality.

Your listeners do not ask for perfection in the way you say things, but they do prefer the truth to fiction. It is painfully easy to widen the credibility gap. There is no one to be avoided with greater diligence than an eloquent man who does not speak the truth.

**Reaching the audience**

The offering of reasons and of facts to support them is necessary, but it is not enough. The choice of the reasons and facts, the way you arrange them, and the words in which you present them, must be tailored to the personalities and interests of the people you expect to be influenced by them.

People who live differently think differently. A message that would win applause at a meeting of suburbanites might fall flat in a meeting of a city society or club. Talents and desires and interests and speed of mental pick-up vary. The question to guide you is this: what does your idea offer to this particular gathering or this person in the way of advantage, prestige or happiness?

It is not enough to spread out your ideas in cafeteria style and stand back waiting for the prospect to decide what ones he wishes to accept, if any. Watch for opportunities to appeal to the impulses, instincts and emotions of those to whom you are talking. Among the powerful influences are: emotional motives like pride, innovation, emulation, or social prestige; rational motives like money gained or saved, economy, security, time-saving, and safety.

Reasonable people listen attentively to words that bear upon certain desires they have. It is not enough for human beings to enjoy the animal necessities, food, shelter and warmth. Humans have social needs and activities, produced in part by instinctive habit that is conditioned by good sense, in part by the compulsion exercised by other members of the community, and partly by persuasion. They replace old expectancies with new ones. One of these expectancies was voiced
by William James, the noted psychologist: ‘The deepest need in human nature is the craving to be appreciated’.

**Be an outgoing person**

Impersonally presented reasons are not strong enough to move people away from their accustomed routines into some new mode of living. Be an outgoing person: give the listener a sense of raised ego by making clear to him that you are thinking of him in his language, in terms of his interests, and along lines that will add to his satisfactions. When you have convinced a person that you are genuinely interested in him and in what he says, and are eager for understanding agreement, you have progressed a long way toward your objective.

Making things simple does not mean that the writer or speaker must follow the rule once popular in books for children: use only one-syllable words. The use of more complicated words occasionally, and the use of ideas and quotations slightly above the habitual level of listening and reading, are flattering to the hearer or reader. People have to be taken out of their depth now and again if we wish to entice them to swim.

Do not smother your message under synthetic sweetness, phoney sentiment, unbelievable morality and contrived folksiness. Make no secret about what you wish to achieve. Tell your objective and your purpose in seeking it: add facts; give examples; focus on what is important, and ask for the action you desire.

**Communication is needed**

We cannot succeed in persuading people unless we communicate clearly and accurately. Herein lies the skill or art of presenting ideas so as to convert neutral or negative attitudes toward them into positive agreement.

What is the best way to communicate knowledge? Here are some effective aids: (1) Use simple, correct, appropriate language; (2) Make the image you seek to convey clean-cut; (3) Place the image in the environment, not in some remote setting whence mental effort is needed to draw it into the picture.

As to how to attain all this, your style will help, though it is better to have something to say and to say it without literary polish.
than to say nothing beautifully. Your enthusiasm will turn apathy into interest. People respond to a person who is in earnest about a project.

Be courteous and tactful in dealing with people who disagree with you. Lots of sentimental things have been written and sung about a smile, but its plain, practical, value is easy to prove in the art of persuading. Even if you do not feel civil or cheerful, the mere fact that you assume the appearance helps you over troublesome periods. There is no more effective way to restore or raise your ego than by being courteous under difficulty.

Relax every once in a while to give your audience and yourself breathing space. Use ingenuity to release tension. When the United Nations was going through its critical fortnight in 1960, with the Assembly being harangued by political leaders from all over the world, and the delegates and workers needed relaxation, some genius had a bright idea. He brought the people, talking a score of different languages, into a hall to be entertained. And what language did the entertainers use? Not a spoken tongue, but a language common to all mankind. Red Skelton diverted his audience with pantomime, and brought them all together in laughter.

**Listen intelligently**

Persuasion is an intellectual process. With every advance in science and technology and management, the capacity for reasoning becomes more necessary.

Some persons shy away from the thought of intelligence and from people who have the reputation of being intelligent. Charles Kingsley wrote: 'Be good, sweet maid, and let who can be clever.' This is the shockingly simplistic alternative which is accepted by many as being a matter of course — the choice between goodness and intelligence. Everyone who listens with care to what is going on in the world knows that goodness and cleverness are not mutually exclusive.

Lots of would-be persuaders are like Marc Antony. They cry out 'Lend me your ears!' But in these days the people are shouting back: 'Now, you listen to me, I have an identity and I have intelligence, and I want to have my say.'

It is only by listening that we get the other person's arguments and viewpoint. There is a difference in thinking between the person who grows wheat on the prairies and the person who earns his living in a
factory in the east. It is not merely a difference of economic thought about what to work at, what to buy, what taxes one should pay, and the relative worth of equalization payments to the provinces. Different environments create differing philosophies of life.

No one will learn the art of dialogue by reading books or studying papers like this one, which are only guides, but there is one lesson to be learned no matter to what schoolmaster you go: use common sense. Looked at practically, common sense is seen to be the result of the sum total of unconscious impressions in the ordinary occurrences of life as they are treasured up in the memory and called out by the occasion.

Common sense enables us to judge the meaning and worth of a statement, a promise, a proposal or a plan by criteria that are too many and too refined to be all distinctly recollected, but which do not therefore operate the less powerfully upon the mind. By putting this past experience of ours to work we find that we feel and know much more than we can pin down with reasons or express in neatly-rounded statements.

Reasonable words, supported by facts and inspired by enthusiasm and bounded by common sense can solve problems and tranquilize quarrels. Dialogue replaces browbeating and storming, and wins by the use of methods that belong to a mature and intelligent person.

In selling goods or services or an idea through dialogue, one must arouse interest, establish confidence, create favourable reactions, meet and overcome objections, and close the sale. This path must be followed in any circumstance where you are proposing rational action.
Criticism of Rommel

If you could allow me the space, I would like to comment on the short study of 'Operations of the Eighth Army in North Africa, August 1942 to May 1943' by Colonel Varma (Army Journal, No. 301, June 1974). My comments are based on experience and on knowledge gained since the campaign ended. They will be supported, within the limits of my private library, by other participants or eyewitnesses.

Those of us who wrote and lectured on the campaign 'too soon after the event to be free of personal bias and of ignorance of what was happening on the other side of the hill' (an old, but valid, accusation), did have some advantages. We experienced the human, climatic, physical and material conditions under which the battles were fought. Some came face to face with the problems of the battlefield, just as all armies of the future will. If sufficiently interested, we could learn what was happening on our own side of the hill and both we and the enemy did know a good deal about what was happening on the other side of it. The war diaries and eyewitness accounts written by participants must surely be given some credence by historians and analysts.

My first concern is with 'Africa Corps' and 'Rommel'. Some readers could be confused as to the exact nature of the Africa Corps and of Rommel's relationship with it. At times, the Corps appears to cover all German and Italian Forces ('Axis' will be employed), at others, all German formations in North Africa, which was only occasionally true. The Deutsche Afrika Korps (DAK) came into being on 18 February 1941 as a deception plan for the 5th Light Division, the first German formation sent to North Africa to stiffen the Italian Forces there. Rommel, whose first appointment was Commander, German Troops, Tripoli, became GOC DAK, though 5 Lt Div had its own GOC. In June 1941, 5 Lt Div was converted to 21st Panzer Division, 15th Panzer Division had arrived from Europe and 90th Light Division was formed in North Africa. For most battles, DAK consisted of these three divisions and no more.
On 15 August 1941, DAK and two Italian Corps were combined to form Panzer Gruppe Afrika, with Rommel in command. General Cruewell was appointed to command DAK. So, Rommel commanded DAK for only six months. On 22 January 1942, the Gruppe was expanded to Panzer Armee Afrika, again with Rommel in command. Until 23 February 1943, when Rommel was appointed C-in-C Armee Gruppe Afrika, he was always subordinate to an Italian C-in-C and was remotely controlled from Italy by C-in-C South, Field Marshal Kesselring. Thus, Rommel was actively Supreme Commander of the Axis Forces in North Africa for only two weeks, though he continued to hold the appointment until 13 May 1943. (From Rommel's Record of Service in Rommel, by Desmond Young, Appx 1.)

Too much credit has been given to Rommel for the Axis successes in North Africa and he was not a perfect knight in shining armour, as he is portrayed, though Colonel Varma is more reserved than some on this point. I can claim to have originated (when a company commander facing Halfaya Pass during the lull between 'Battleaxe' and 'Crusader') the suggestion that we stop referring to the enemy as 'Rommel', so I might be accused of bias. Rommel's subordinate generals were good — he was quick to sack any who failed, e.g., General Streich, GOC 5 Lt Div, during the early attacks on Tobruk. Divisional and Corps commanders made their contributions to the successes of the Axis Forces and, if the number of casualties among them is any guide, they also believed in being in the forefront of the battle. Not a few of them objected to Rommel's interference with their running of a battle. 'Often, to the annoyance of the tactical staff, he would give orders in person on the spot, changing plans to meet the situation. His subordinate commanders found this a real thorn in the flesh and resented it bitterly'. (With Rommel in the Desert, by H. W. Schmidt, p. 40). Again, the ADC wrote of General von Ravenstein, GOC 21 Pz Div, 'I felt that here at least was a fighting General who was Rommel's equal and it was clear that Rommel thought highly of him'. (Schmidt, p. 103).

Field Marshal Montgomery has paid the highest tributes to his Chief of Staff at HQ Eighth Army. Rommel was no less well served. When the Panzer Gruppe was formed, Rommel 'was wrenched away from the front-line troops whom he loved even when he bullied them. Now, he was in a sense mastered by his subordinates'. (Schmidt, p. 92). He had two first rate staff officers as his immediate assistants, Maj-Gen Gause, Chief of Staff, and Lt Col Westphal, GSOI. The new staff
subtly persuaded Rommel that his value lay now not so much in personal contact with his frontline troops as in his diplomatic and supervisory activities. Nevertheless, Rommel's swanning continued and his C of S was required to make vital decisions, just as de Guingand was. The tank expert and writer General Fuller approved of Rommel's habit of taking personal command of his armour, but Liddell Hart criticised him for 'dashing about the battlefield' and being too often out of touch with his HQ (D. Young, p. 136). Montgomery saw the need for being well forward in the battle area and in immediate personal contact with the fighting formations, but he insisted that the immediate and continuous control and direction of the tactical battle was the responsibility of Corps HQ. The Commander of Eighth Army, in the books available to me, seldom mentions Rommel's faults. General Horrocks did though. 'While Rommel was leading his troops in person against the Alam Halfa ridge, Montgomery was planning the battle of Alamein. That was the difference between the two.' (A Full Life, p. 129).

After describing Rommel's good points, Horrocks continues, 'All this reads like the copy-book general but, in point of fact, this is not the best way to control a swift-moving, modern battle. Very often at a critical moment no one could find Rommel, because he was conducting personally a battalion attack. He tended to become so involved in some minor action that he failed to appreciate the general picture of the battlefield. I would say also, after reading a good deal about him, that Rommel worried too much. (In one of his letters to his wife during Alamein, Rommel wrote that he was unable to sleep.) Generals who fail to sleep seldom last long. Auchinleck had proved of sterner stuff during his period of trial.' (Horrocks, p. 127). There were Germans more scathing in their comments. In 1942, General Paulus, of Stalingrad, reported, 'Situation in North Africa unsatisfactory. Rommel is not capable of carrying out this task'. General Halder, Chief of the German Army Staff until 1942, wrote in his diary, 'The command situation in North Africa is clouded by the idiosyncrasies of General Rommel and the fact that he is pathologically ambitious. Rommel's faults of character show him as a particularly unpleasant type of person with whom no one wants to quarrel, because of his brutal methods and his support from above'. Rommel's ADC, 'Rommel never became intimate with anyone'. (Schmidt, p. 93) and, when 5 Lt Div failed in an attack on Tobruk, Rommel was furious with General Streich, impatient and unsympathetic to any explanations. He gave vent to his anger
openly and 'used blunt words such as presumably only one general may use to another'. (Schmidt, p. 41). Six months later, during Operation Crusader, 'many mistakes were made, the greatest by Rommel'. (History of 7 Armd Div, p. 94).

And now, for some comments on details:

1. p. 5, line 23, the Axis Forces were NORTH, not west, of the Qattara Depression.

2. Alam el Halfa — p. 6, 31 August, the first major defeat of Axis Forces in North Africa. How do we measure defeat? 'Crusader' brought far greater losses to the Axis Forces, and drove them out of Cyrenaica.

3. p. 8, line 27, 'It met with the same success....' Members of 9 Aust Div would not regard the Axis attacks on Tobruk in 1941 as successes. The first German defeat of the war occurred there on 14th April. After another failure on 30th April, the German Supreme Command reprimanded Rommel for his conduct of the campaign. (The Rats Remain by J. S. Cumpston). Even Rommel's admirer, Desmond Young, concedes that Rommel was twice defeated when General Auchinleck took over in the forward area. (Rommel, p. 136).

4. p. 8, IV, flatters Rommel. When the British minefields at Gazala were gapped, the Axis Forces were not advancing, but were retiring from the battlefield in confusion. 'It looked like headlong retreat and it was retreat.' (A. Clifford, Three against Rommel, p. 253). Alan Moorehead wrote, 'The British had a victory in their hands'. I overheard General Ritchie claim that Eighth Army had won the battle and an order came down to units that German tanks left on the field were not to be destroyed because they would be brought in by our recovery units in due course. A conference of Rommel, Nehring, Gause, Westphal and Bayerlein agreed that the position was serious. The German, Paul Carell, wrote, 'The battle was lost but perhaps a bold decision could avert a real disaster'. The bold decision was to break through the British minefields from the east. The screen of 88 mm guns was the idea of General Nehring and was organized by Col Wolz, OC 135 Flak Regt. Rommel was swanning and out of touch with his HQ. The lesson to be learned is that Eighth Army failed to exploit success.

5. p. 9, third para, de Guingand was Brig (GS) when he escorted Montgomery into the desert on the latter's arrival and Montgomery made him C of S, so he could not have been C of S to Auchinleck. The latter's C of S at GHQ was Lt Gen Thos Corbett, Indian Army.
6. p. 12, second para, the Staff in Cairo was Alexander’s not Monty’s. HQ Eighth Army was already in the desert, where the new Commander found the atmosphere ‘dismal and dreary’. He decided to move HQ to the sea-shore near Air Force HQ, which was ‘miles back near Burg-el-Arab’. (Memoirs, pp. 99 and 102). On the other hand, Auchinleck moved GHQ ‘out of the fleshpots of Cairo to a spot nearby in the desert’. (The Desert War, A. Moorehead, p. 192).

7. p. 12, second para, ‘the perfect, oft rehearsed orders for yet another withdrawal’. Naturally! ‘It was prudent to organize another position farther back in case we were defeated at Alamein.’ (Horrocks, p. 111). But there were also plans to stand and fight, drawn up by General Dorman-Smith and approved by Auchinleck, to whom General Horrocks (Ch VIII) is more generous than Monty.

8. p. 14, first and second paras, Italian formations took part in the ‘German’ attack — north, Trento; centre, Bologna; south, 20 Motorized Corps (Trieste, Ariete, Littorio Divisions). Rommel was still at HQ Panzer Army. Von Stumme did not arrive until mid-September and then it was to take over at Army HQ while Rommel returned to Europe for medical treatment. DAK was commanded by General Nehring. When he was wounded on 31st August, ‘his C of S, Colonel Bayerlein, took over. General von Thoma came from Europe, also in mid-September, to assume command of DAK.


10. p. 19, 2nd para and p. 28, 1st para, ‘the second important lesson...’ — Montgomery did plan for exploitation, as far ahead as El Agheila, but the difficulty lay, and will continue to lie, in recognizing the opportunity ‘immediately’. When two armies have been engaged in a slogging match for days, the weary soldiers and staffs on the battlefield are more likely to suspect a trap than a withdrawal. General Horrocks discusses the problem, ‘a familiar phenomenon of war’. (pp. 140-1). At Alamein, a large portion of the Axis Forces added to the difficulty by remaining in their forward positions until they were rounded up.

11. p. 20, 1st para, Rommel himself accepted that infantry alone were of little value against tanks. Thus, airborne units would have needed tanks, anti-tank guns and vehicles but, as I remember it, aircraft of those days were not yet capable of carrying them. In the desert, whichever side was retreating made quite certain that all landing strips were
rendered unserviceable. Further, rain which could bog vehicles would bog aircraft also. East of Sollum, blowing bridges and mining roads by paratroopers ahead of the retreating forces could have caused only brief delay. Farther west, blowing and mining, carried out liberally and with great cunning by German engineers, did impose lengthy delays on the pursuing columns, particularly when covered by a small rearguard. Alan Moorehead describes it well. (pp. 211-3).

12. p. 22, IX, 2nd para, 'Leclerc's Forces' were no more than a brigade group. One brigade of 4th Indian Division took over their positions.

13. p. 23, 3rd para, there were second thoughts. Rommel ordered General Zeigler, GOC DAK, to work out a plan of attack. In the course of its preparation, there were great differences of opinion as to how the attack should be staged. Zeigler wished to attack from the west and in a direction south of Medenine. Rommel accepted this, but with misgivings. At what was to have been the final briefing, he showed a preference for an attack from the north, directed on Metameur. He ordered another meeting for 2nd March and postponed the operation from the 4th to the 6th. He also appointed General Cramer to command DAK in place of Zeigler. (P. Carell, p. 351, The Foxes of the Desert).

14. p. 25, X, 1st para, his former ADC, Schmidt (p. 257) writes that Rommel left on 9th March 'on his own initiative'. Carell (p. 354) says that he flew to the Fuhrer's HQ in a final attempt to organize the evacuation of the two armies of the Army Group Africa. Desmond Young (p. 184) discusses the various theories:

The most implausible is that of General Eisenhower that Rommel escaped before the final debacle, apparently foreseeing the inevitable and earnestly desiring to save his own skin. He did indeed foresee the inevitable, but no one who has followed his career will believe that consideration for his own skin over influenced any action of Rommel's from the day that he became a soldier. It has been said that the Italians demanded his withdrawal, but I can find no evidence of this. More plausibly, ill-health and the need for further treatment have been given as the reasons for his return. It has been said that Hitler ordered him out because of the effect upon German morale if he were captured. Since Hitler had not yet begun to realise that all was lost in Tunisia, this is improbable. The explanation given by Rommel's family, which came first-hand from him, is that he flew out on his own initiative and without orders to beg Hitler again that he be allowed to save the German troops at the sacrifice of the material. He was again refused and again called a defeatist and a coward. When he then proposed to go back and see it through with them, permission was refused. I see no reason to doubt their story.

15. p. 27, last para, Administration — at the same time, also, Montgomery had two predecessors whose inability (for whatever reasons) to adhere to this principle led to failure. Rommel almost lost the battle at Gazala when separated from his supply echelons. His supply
problems and exhaustion helped stop the Axis Forces at Alamein. For Alam Halfa, on 27th August at a conference with the Italian Supreme Commanader, Marshal Cavallero, and Field Marshal Kesselring, Rommel demanded 6,000 tons of fuel as a minimum reserve. Cavallero and Kesselring promised that it would be available. Some would argue that from Europe to El Alamein was a far shorter supply line than from the UK and USA around the Cape to Egypt.

16. p. 28, 1st para, supply by air. Oddly enough, few writers mention aircraft other than fighters and bombers. Alexander Clifford did. ‘This time the supply problem has been faced and solved in advance.’ He outlined the methods employed on sea and land, then added, ‘In this campaign, for the first time, air transport was used on a serious scale.’ (Three Against Rommel, pp. 317-8).

17. p. 28, 2nd para, if, by ‘Balance’ Varma and I mean the same thing, Monty put it under Economy of Effort. As Colonel Varma has it, an objective of a given size will require a definite calculable quantum of troops to assault it — balance — economy of effort.

‘German Doctrine’ — surely conditions in France in 1940 cannot be compared with those in North Africa in 1942-43? After all, Montgomery had to learn the tactics of the desert. (Varma, p. 12, para 2, last sentence).

‘This dynamic concept’, in North Africa, Western Desert Force, and in Sinai, the Israelis, were operating against an enemy in clearly defined defences, amidst wide open spaces, not against a mobile enemy, in retreat but capable of hitting back and strewing mines behind him in large numbers and with great cunning. ‘The best thing Rommel did in North Africa was this retreat.’ (Gen Bayerlein, C of S DAK and Pz Armee and, after von Thoma’s capture, GOC DAK — quoted by D. Young, p. 188). He was still open to criticism. ‘Although he conducted the long retreat sufficiently well to evade each of Montgomery’s attempts to encircle his forces, he lost opportunities to administer a check.’ (The Other Side of the Hill, by Liddell Hart, p. 56).

18. p. 29, 1st para, Rommel superior to Montgomery as a strategical and tactical commander — Liddell Hart again. ‘As a strategist, Rommel’s defects were apt to be a serious offset to his subtlety and audacity. As a tactician, his qualities tended to eclipse his defects. As a commander, his exceptional combination of leading power and driving power was accompanied by a mercurial temperament, so that he was
apt to swing too violently between exaltation and depression’. (p. 58).
But, again the German view is more critical. A leading historian, Hans-
Adolf Jacobsen:

Modern historical research shows Rommel to have been neither a major
strategic planner nor to have had a real capacity for large-scale military op-
erations. Compared with a field-marshal like von Manstein, Rommel was just
a commander with an impressive manner and a capacity to carry his troops
with him by dramatic personal example. Given a good commander-in-chief and
placed in the right spot at the right time, Rommel had proved that he could win
battles. But he was no military genius with a capacity for strategic thinking
on a grand scale. If one looks at the North Africa campaign, Rommel actually
operated within the limited framework of an army. He never had to be part of a
grand concept of a real, large-scale military operation. The assessment of
Rommel as a dashing, adventurous commander is borne out by the fact that,
when Rommel reached the El Alamein line, he supported Hitler’s hairbrained
scheme for an immediate breakthrough to Alexandria. The idea was highly
suspect, even at Hitler’s HQ. Opinions among the generals were divided and
the controversy ranged from Rommel’s breakthrough plan to a proposal that
the Afrika Korps should stay put on the Egyptian border while the Germans
safeguarded their sea-borne supplies by first capturing Malta. Rommel’s mis-
judgment of the real situation caused him to influence Hitler in the belief that
the Germans were already storming their way through to be in Alexandria by
July, that they had overcome all British resistance and that Malta could wait.
In fact, failure to capture Malta was decisive and led eventually to Rommel’s
defeat since half of his supplies were destroyed en route. This decision was
Rommel’s biggest mistake. It showed that he was basically a dashing divisional
commander, and not much more, and was carried away by British losses and
his own previous success. It was not a balanced military appraisal.

(Quoted from an interview published in The Sunday Times Magazine of
17 September 1967). (I think that Monty could do better than that).

19. p. 29, final para — the Eighth Army fought in desert, occasionally
in hilly country and, in the final stages, in agricultural country, but not
in mountains, forests or snow.

I have commented on this article at such length because students
will refer to it in their studies. Others looking for a short cut will lap
it up and both could be unaware of its faults.

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The Role of the Army

The article ‘Secondary Roles for the Army’ by Major J. Jeans
published in the September 1974 issue of Army Journal deserves
comment. The article disturbs me, not so much for the writer’s pro-
posals, but for the reasons he gives to support them.
Major Jeans contends that the Army must undertake to assist the public, not only in emergency situations but also with 'non-emergency' community activities. He states that assistance of this nature can be provided because the Army is unlikely, under present assessments, to be actively committed for the next fifteen years. It will therefore have 'plenty of time on its hands'.

The best way of utilizing this spare time is, according to Major Jeans, to involve the Army with civilian community projects. Not only would this solve the problem of what to do with the troops, but in his opinion there is no other alternative if the Army is to both justify its existence and to improve its public image.

Major Jeans' assumption that a protracted period of peace will provide for spare time is both ill-founded and dangerous. It is ill-founded because it indicates a shallow appreciation of the task faced by the Army. It is dangerous as, coming from an officer, it lends credence to the arguments of those who, out of ignorance or intent, wish to discredit the Army and everything it stands for.

Next to its men the Army's most precious resource is time. Dollars can provide the men and the equipment but no amount of dollars can buy back a decade or even a day. In time of peace the Australian Army will always be numerically weak and for that reason alone its lack in size has to be offset by its excellence in quality. Whether the next hostile operation be 15 years or 20 years hence the Army must attain and continue to maintain superior standards in equipment and in training. To achieve such standards will allow for no spare time.

Major Jeans displays a very low opinion for 'the man in the street' and for the public when he claims that they need to see the Army doing something 'useful and constructive'. He suggests that the public would be impressed by seeing the troops employed in such useful and constructive tasks as selling programmes at horse shows. This does not seem to equate with his view that the public has a 'higher level of awareness'.

Of course the Army should be used in the event of a national disaster, such as flood or bushfire, but only when it is clear that civilian resources are inadequate for the task. To do otherwise would not only disrupt the Army's business of training, but would hinder the development of civil emergency organizations.

Military tattoos and presentations (which aid public understanding of the Army and assist with recruiting) and participation in sport are
hardly aids to the community. Major Jeans' other suggestions for 'non-emergency' aid would at best be a waste of manpower and time and at worst would demean the soldier. Participation in community activities by individuals in their own time is a different matter. This should be encouraged.

If there is a need to improve the Army's image the correct course is to ensure that the public is properly informed about the Army; what it is and what it does. The Army's public image would certainly suffer were it to attempt to pander to those elements of the community whose only interest in the Army amounts to what they can get out of it.

Major Jeans and those who would support his ideas ought to realize that the Army and its members are constantly providing community assistance of a very special and exacting nature. The measure of that assistance is the fitness of the Army for war.

There is one further point in the article with which I disagree. Major Jeans states that the forces involved in the Vietnam War gained little credit. Perhaps that opinion is held by some Australians but as far as the Australian Army is concerned there are certain North Vietnamese Regiments and Viet Cong units who know better.

Australian Army Staff

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