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Motivation and Military Manpower Planning

Major P. J. F. Tuckett
Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

ONE of the problems confronting a military planner in an industrialized Western nation is the difficulty of harmonizing long term manpower objectives with the short term requirements of political, economic and strategic considerations. This difficulty can be simply expressed by recognizing that it takes in the order of fourteen to twenty years to groom an individual for a senior managerial position in the military, yet other considerations (political and strategic in particular) demand that the actual force structure and size be capable of expansions and contractions within a three to five year period.

This requirement is shared with some non-military establishments but the problem for the Services is exacerbated by the unique demands of the military in that:

- There is limited lateral entry into the military, especially at the senior levels where it is not feasible to directly recruit from the external labour supply.

Major Tuckett graduated from the RMC Duntroon in 1963 and was allotted to RAASC. During the reorganization of the Army Logistic Corps he was reallocated to RAAOC in 1973. Whilst serving with HQ CRAASC S Comd he graduated B Commerce from the University of Melbourne in 1965 and served as OC 21 Sup Pl, Vietnam in 1966-67. After serving as an instructor in the Operations Wing RAASC Centre 1967-68 he attended the Army Long Technical Supplies Course at the University of Reading (UK) in 1968-69 and then completed the Army Work Study Practitioners Course and the Joint Services ADP Course before returning to Australia to take up duty at HQ CRAASC E Comd in late 1969. This was followed by a period of duty as SC (Sups), AHQ (ST), Canberra and then from 1971 to 1973 he was the Army Inspector of Foodstuffs at CASA. From June 1973 to December 1974 he studied for his MSc with emphasis on Manpower Planning at the US Naval Post Graduate School (NPS), Monterey, California. After graduating from NPS he returned to Department of Defence (Army Office) Canberra where he is currently SO2 Officer Planning in DPP.
Both in peace and war time the force must contain a high proportion of young and vigorous individuals who can supply the necessary physical stamina as well as the essential enthusiasm and adaptability.

Long term service in the military requires a special commitment to it as a way of life.

A Possible Solution

One approach to dealing with this problem is to decide on a blending of the force structure between career (long term) and non-career (short-term) people. The rationale being that career people will provide the long term (twenty years) force nucleus and the required short term (two to five years) responsiveness will be achieved primarily by manipulating the flow of non-career people.

Figure 1 provides a hypothetical model of how such a system would work. Here, the approach is to establish upper and lower level...
bounds beyond which (excluding general mobilization) it is felt the Government policies and their requirements will never require the system to operate. It is assumed a 1:2 low to high level force ratio exists and that a total force concept is employed whereby a major rapid expansion would be accomplished in the most part by the use of Reserve forces.

The force is composed of fifty per cent people under the age of twenty-five years, thirty per cent from the age group twenty-five to thirty-eight and twenty per cent in the over thirty-eight group, with a possible upper limit of sixty years old. The determination of force structure by age group is important because studies have shown age and employment pattern (including retention rates) to be highly correlated. Based on knowledge of retention rates Figure 1 also shows how the force will be composed of varying amounts of career people. The junior career group will be the smallest percentage (in absolute terms it will be the biggest) when compared to the senior career group which will be the largest percentage and the middle career group will lie between these
two. This relationship shows how the problem will mainly be one of assuring supply of short term people into the junior and middle segments.

The system would be operated by having the career force structured so as to approach as closely as possible the low level bound which would usually be below the actual authorized strength permitted by the Government policies existing at that time. In practice it is assumed that the authorized force strength would show fluctuation with a time span of three to five years. Figure 2 is a hypothetical representation of how the system may function. Whilst ideally the actual force size would agree with that authorized, practical considerations, not the least being that the military has to react to Government decisions and not usurp their prerogative to determine defence posture, will require the actual level to lag somewhat behind the authorized level. The management of this lag will then be achieved mainly by controlling the supply of short term people and hopefully the career prospects of the long term members will not be disturbed to an unacceptable extent.

**Approach**

Against the background of this need for short term people, the aim of this paper is to briefly examine the behavioural aspects associated with an individual's decision to enter into a short term of military service, and then to offer some suggestions as to how the military could enhance the attractiveness of such a period of service.

Throughout the discussion it will be assumed an all volunteer force is being considered, the nation is at peace and no unusually strong economic factors are operating; e.g., depression or boom.

**THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS**

An understanding of the motivational factors influencing occupational choice requires exposure to such classical works as those of Maslow, Herzberg and Vroom. From those it is possible to grasp the importance of a hierarchy of needs, that people will need more than attention to matters of pay to experience 'job satisfaction' and that some form of goal congruence will be sought between the potential employee and the organization. It is also necessary to recall that in popular stereotype, or more accurately caricature, the military image is not consistent with many of the more highly prized dimensions of the work place. In
particular many people are unaware of the potential for self development and the high order training in technical skills that military service can offer. There is also a strong tendency to believe that military service will deprive the individual of much of his personal liberty and so deny him the feeling of fate control, which surveys show as being of great importance. It is strange that this impression should still retain as much currency at a time when the military itself is being subjected to a form of demilitarization; e.g., one report claims that only one military person in five currently performs a purely service related job which has no close equivalent in civilian life [Beam 1973].

An appreciation of the considerations surrounding people at the various stages of their life is also essential. There is evidence [Super and Bohn 1970] that an individual passes through up to five vocational stages in his life time ranging from his early childhood days of developing self concepts through to the period of ultimate decline. Passage through these stages is affected by personal (psychological and social) characteristics as well as by the intervention of teachers, counsellors and employers. Socio-economic differences are also apparent. Experiences such as marriage, greater awareness of one’s self and the environment and a fuller appreciation of one’s potential all mean that individuals in the different age groups will perceive of themselves as possessing different needs. Thus they will evaluate the wisdom of a period of military service from different frames of reference. Surveys suggest potential junior enlisted men will look closely at opportunities to travel, to receive paid college education, or some form of skills training and will want a say in the choice of assignment. Junior officers will probably be more interested in the provision of advanced education, self development opportunities and the idea that by serving in the military they will not put themselves at a competitive disadvantage with their peers in civilian employment. Members of the middle age groups will show special interest in matters relating to the welfare of their families and will be especially concerned with conditions of service. Many will also have interests, either professional/technical or social, outside of the military which will give them their main source of satisfaction. They will look to the Service mainly to provide security or some form of experience they value.

In attempting to develop an overall profile of the non-career type compared to the career military person, it is interesting to note the work of Kaplan (1962) who used seven characteristics to distinguish them:
### Characteristic

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greater confidence about civilian employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Feels constrained by military life style, greater desire for independence of action.</td>
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<tr>
<th>2. Independence of action.</th>
<th>Career</th>
<th>Non Career</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Either lacks desire for independent action or shows ability to formulate independent action within the military.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Feels constrained by military life style, greater desire for independence of action.</td>
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<tr>
<th>3. Confidence in occupational self sufficiency.</th>
<th>Career</th>
<th>Non Career</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less confident about civilian expectations. More confident about expectations with the service.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Greater expectations with civilian employment.</td>
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<tr>
<th>4. Military and civilian status symbols.</th>
<th>Career</th>
<th>Non Career</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly valued.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Little value in reacting to status symbols.</td>
</tr>
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<th>5. Desire for individual recognition of effort.</th>
<th>Career</th>
<th>Non Career</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low. Group recognition more important.</td>
<td></td>
<td>High.</td>
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<th>6. Own supervisory ability.</th>
<th>Career</th>
<th>Non Career</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confident of own ability especially in large groups.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not as confident, more confident with small groups.</td>
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<th>7. Acceptance of authority.</th>
<th>Career</th>
<th>Non Career</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does not perceive service regulations as hampering initiative. Willing to accept any assignment.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sees regulations as a limitation on actions. Objects to assignment under adverse conditions.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

This comparison does in some ways seem a little superficial as it concentrates more on the immediate job environment rather than the overall feeling of self fulfilment an individual may be experiencing. It neglects such important issues as the immediate family's attitudes and the individual's feeling of the relevance of the military profession. However it has merit in that it highlights some essential differences in attitude between the career and non career types. It would seem that the career person finds the military way of life agreeable albeit for a
MOTIVATION AND MILITARY MANPOWER PLANNING

variety of reasons, whereas the non career type does not. However, for his own reasons the non career person may find it acceptable to serve in the organization for a limited time. Braunstein (1974) in studying the attitudes of non career physicians found they complained of a lack of job satisfaction, had a dislike of the job context and really only enlisted (excluding draft motivations) to take advantage of an opportunity to receive income whilst contemplating their future and also to obtain the advantages of the available educational and training facilities.

Research by Broedling (1974) on the presence of ‘internals’ (i.e. people who see themselves as acting on the world) and ‘externals’ (i.e. people who see the world acting on them) in the Navy found that according to her sample results Navy people were generally more internal than the population and certainly more so than college students in particular. Broedling’s Navy sample consisted primarily of career people and her results tended to support Kaplan’s view that some people can accept and learn to live within the military system and simultaneously feel an exercise of personal initiative and influence. Broedling suggests those that cannot usually leave after one tour of duty. For the career people it is also interesting to note Broedling’s observation that the service concepts of a clear chain of command, accountability and responsibility actually stimulate in those individuals a greater sense of personal growth and satisfaction than they might feel in a more loosely structured situation.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

It is fairly clear that people who decide to make the services a career are motivated by a variety of reasons and will have just as varied hopes for the future. However, it does seem valid to generalize and claim this group will be characterized by a feeling of satisfaction with the military life style and a general conviction that the military as such fulfils a meaningful role in society. However, the group of particular interest to this discussion is that which has been described as non career. They also have a variety of motivations for joining the services but in general they will feel less satisfaction with the overall experience of service life and in many cases they accord the profession of arms less prestige. For them the services will be merely an opportunity to move towards some personal long term goal or to provide a holding position until they go on to something else.
As previously discussed the military can make use of both groups of people and it is now proposed to offer some suggestions as to how the supply of non career individuals can be managed to the mutual benefit of both parties.

**Attitudes**

Initially both to increase the supply of available manpower and to introduce more responsiveness into the system there must be some attitude changes in various areas.

The nation as a whole must be shown that the military forces have more than the most rudimentary skills training to offer. They must be acquainted with the ability of the services to offer rewards beyond the low level needs fulfilment. Whilst many people appreciate the services can offer training, all too often the training being offered and considered is pseudo technical and the ability of the services to offer higher level skills and personal development is not appreciated.

The higher level policy makers in Government must realize that defence does not come cheaply now. Calls to patriotism and self sacrifice for the good of the nation are either heard by a few or are unable to be answered because of other commitments. It must be recognized that one of the biggest drawcards, for those who are aware of it, is the services' potential to increase an individual's human worth by training him and giving him an opportunity to find self development whilst at the same time providing for his security needs. Besides attempting to widen the general knowledge of this incentive the policy makers must allow the military to maximize their use of it by offering training courses in a more generous fashion. By this I mean it has been traditional to demand a payoff for any valuable training given and to restrict training to certain areas where a clear correlation with military duties is seen. As previously discussed military and civilian occupational skills are showing a tendency to fuse and at the same time people are feeling a need for more fate control and an opportunity to achieve self determination. Against this background the Government should recognize it may be self defeating to demand periods of payback service for training and to deny individuals the opportunities to develop their talents in one area because it has no apparent military application. Whilst this is not a call for the transformation of the military into a wholesale purveyor of education, it is suggested a more liberal policy should be adopted, consistent with the operational and financial con-
constraints that must be considered. It should also be recognized that skills and personal development training by the services benefits the nation as a whole as once the serviceman re-enters the civilian work force he is a more valuable human asset to any organization.

The military itself must also recognize the need to closely examine its own attitudes. As mentioned previously it must strive to show the nation what it really has to offer and ensure that the highest possible standards are maintained to attract people of the desired calibre.

 Probably more attention must be given to the 'whole man' concept. Instead of seeing an individual as one extra serviceman it should think of the person in both his domestic and work role. It must take more account of the difficulties service life can create for the family unit and offer the individual a sympathetic hand in times of difficulties. The impact of the women's movement and the increasing number of career women may mean even further problems for individuals in the military. Possibly more flexibility should be introduced into job assignments to allow members to spend an increased amount of time in a given geographic area.

Another aspect worthy of consideration is the military's tendency to insist on contracts of service. These may be based on valid reasons, but the suggestion is they are relics of an era of unique military skills and a sense of social values inconsistent with today's attitudes.

As many individuals stress the need for fate control and at the same time express ignorance of the service it is feasible to suggest some worthy people reject a period of military service because they see the 'service contract' locking them in. If the service contract is considered essential then possibly it should be reduced to the minimum feasible length and potential enlistees should be allowed an experience tour (a probationary period for both parties) before being required to sign on.

The military should also re-examine the policy towards termination of service and subsequent re-entry. There is a tendency to firstly project some hostility towards the individual who decided to exit. Then, if at a later time, he should apply for re-entry he is treated somewhat like the recalcitrant child in need of punishment. Obviously the rights of those who stayed in the employ of the military must be given equitable safeguards but it should not be treated as an unusual or threatening act for someone to try his fortunes elsewhere for a time. In fact there is a lot to be said for allowing employees to graze in other
pastures if they so desire. For some it will be a chastening experience as they realize they have less potential than they had anticipated and for others it will strengthen their conviction that the military way of life suits them best.

The military has always paid attention to the welfare of its members but as history reveals frequently this attention was motivated by pragmatic considerations which, whilst entirely consistent with the social norms of the time, are no longer valid. The 1970s have been heralded as the decade of people (Beam 1973), and as already suggested, the military will have to pay more attention to the 'whole man' concept. Further to this it is recommended that consideration be given to ways of allowing individual attitudes and opinions to be heard up the chain of command. Use of surveys, discussion groups and an open door policy are helpful, but deeper approaches such as a military industrial relations organization need consideration. Possibilities such as an Ombudsman, a Trade Union organization, or a Military Association spring to mind as ways of giving an individual a voice in the conditions under which he serves. Probably an Ombudsman would not be able to react promptly enough to local issues and as Trade Unions are tainted with the image of unreasonable militancy, a military association may prove most effective. There is no suggestion here of eroding or debasing the essential chain of command, but merely of supporting it by offering individuals an accepted method of ensuring their views are being taken into consideration when decisions affecting them are being made. It should also be noted such a system would provide policy makers with a means of determining the attitudes and morale at the various levels within the organization.

Decentralization

As revealed by surveys, one of the persistent criticisms of the military organization is the feeling of a lack of an opportunity to exercise independent action. This feeling is probably best described by the saying of having to 'do things by the book'. Whilst many career people would not agree a number apparently do and the evidence suggests that the majority of non-career individuals apparently perceive this as a major disadvantage to service employment. Understandably a complex structure such as the military must have a number of instructions guiding members in their duties, but there does seem to be a tendency for these instructions to be overly restrictive and in many instances it is
not so much the instructions *per se* that are at fault but rather their implementation. Senior officials become unduly anxious about deviations from their interpretations of policy guidelines and either refuse to delegate responsibility to others or insist on exercising the most critical supervision of their subordinates. The system is also being driven to centralization because of the use of complex data processing equipment and the advent of highly sophisticated communications systems which elevates virtually all the non-routine decision making to the higher levels of command.

The incompatibility of these developments with current social and personal values is obvious and steps must be taken to reverse the trend. Commanders must be trained to become more skilful in the art of delegation and they should be encouraged to see their role as more of a tutor than critic. Within reason they must be prepared to give their subordinates 'a chance to fail'.

Ironically the group who can suffer most from being oversupervised are the middle managers, who as junior leaders, were given a fair degree of independence because the tasks they were assigned had relatively short-term impacts and so their superiors were willing to let them experiment. However, further up the ladder the tasks have a longer gestation period and failures in this stage are seen as having potentially more serious repercussions. Thus the tendency is to centralize decision making to a greater extent and to weaken the official's power of independent action. The net result is to doubly frustrate the person who feels he has by now acquired the necessary skills and experience to successfully solve the problems given to him, or to know when they are beyond him, and yet he is not allowed to test himself. A greater trust of subordinates is needed (less theory X) and this should be coupled with rewards for those who succeed and equitable losses for those who do not. It should also be appreciated that it is at the middle management level (both officer and enlisted) that a form of plateauing in the services' demand for expertise occurs as the middle of the structural pyramid is reached. More job discretion at this level would thus permit an additional ongoing process of selection to assist in identifying those for promotion, retention or separation.

**Commercial Linkages**

One of the practical key points in the use of short term personnel is to ensure that they do not suffer material hardships. Whilst this
discussion has placed great emphasis on the intrinsic factors involved in service employment it would be remiss if no attention were paid to the mechanics of how to avoid workers feeling 'job dissatisfaction'.

Probably a fundamental requirement would be to ensure workers would not sacrifice pension or retirement benefits if they moved between military and civilian employment. They should be guaranteed a retirement benefit at least equal to the one civilian employment would have ensured them and if necessary the benefit should be adjusted to compensate them for military service where such service results in a contracted career span.

A scheme of salary stabilization would be most desirable. By this I mean if an individual were asked to leave the service because of force reduction he should be given a reasonable period in which to find a new job and during this period his salary should be continued. If because of service connected reasons he is unable to find a job at the level he would be entitled to expect the military should subsidize his salary for an appropriate period of time — probably based on the length of his service.

To facilitate movements of individuals both into and out of the military and to act as an additional enlistment incentive arrangements could be made with major commercial organizations and other Government departments for people to be guaranteed employment with them once their period of military service is over. This has obvious appeals to the military and for the other departments and organizations; it offers them a supply of trained and relatively experienced people who possess certain personal traits which they would find agreeable. If necessary, representatives of these organizations could participate in the military selection process and only accept people for the scheme who fulfilled both their and the military's entrance requirements.

**Rank Structure**

Whilst surveys have shown that a clear rank structure is supported by career members of the force it has been suggested that for short term people it can be a source of irritation (Braunstein 1974). It can also be argued that having to place non career people in certain rank categories is at variance with the logic of the military pay system. Traditionally, and I believe for career people it still applies, individuals were remunerated on the pure pay method of time spent. This was
necessary to allow for the exigencies of the service and still seems to be valid. However, for short term people the intention is to hire them to fill a given need in the organization, i.e. virtually to do a specific job and therefore they should be paid based on that job. Under these conditions it would seem they should obtain their ‘rank’ from the particular job they hold and to avoid conflicting with the career force it is suggested consideration be given to an ostensibly rankless non career force who derive their status from the particular job they hold at any one time. This arrangement would also provide increased flexibility in employing non career people as they could be more easily deployed into areas where their skills seemed most appropriate at any one time, as well as giving them an increased opportunity to remain longer in a geographic area by job transfer if they so desired.

CONCLUSION

This discussion has attempted to develop the argument that, provided certain steps are taken, it is realistic to believe that a viable military force can be established and maintained on the basis of a mixture of career and non career people.

Space constraints have prevented the discussion of related issues such as the relative proportion of career and non career people and the place of civilians and reserve forces in the scheme. However, the basic point is that use of non career personnel is feasible provided it is recognized they will be looking more for an opportunity to develop themselves and to fulfil personal goals rather than to find long term self fulfilment in the services. Their association will be more on a mutual aid basis as opposed to the career individuals who find in the military per se a sense of satisfaction. Thus the incentives needed to attract the short term individual must have a slightly different bias to those aimed at the career person. For the non career individual he must feel he has nothing to lose by going into the service but a whole lot to gain.

MONTHLY AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded prizes for the best original articles published in the December 1974 and January 1975 issues of the journal to:


January: Major J. C. Gordon ('Disaster Relief by the Armed Forces') $10.
THE 15 December 1974 marked the 25th anniversary of the death in Melbourne in 1949 of Major General W. A. Coxen, CB, CMG, DSO (1870-1949) who was Australia’s 12th Chief of the General Staff from 1 May 1930 to 30 September 1931. He occupied this position during the great depression of that time when the Australian Army’s Estimates and its Establishments were drastically reduced and the morale of all ranks had fallen to a very low level.

I knew General Coxen in the Army by sight only. I first saw him at the artillery range at Green Hills in New South Wales probably in March 1929 which was the last calendar year of Universal Training. On this occasion he had come to Green Hills to witness the annual shooting of one of the batteries of my artillery brigade, as regiments of artillery were called in those times. He was then the Quartermaster-General and he had succeeded Major General V. C. M. Sellheim (1866-1928) in that appointment four years earlier in January 1925.

Like many of his contemporaries in the higher ranks of the Australian Staff Corps, General Coxen had begun his army career as a Militia officer when he was working, probably as a civil engineer, in the Department of Railways of Queensland. He was first commissioned in the Militia Garrison Artillery of the Colony of Queensland in February 1893 when that colony’s land forces were commanded by Major General

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Major E. W. O. Perry, ED, MA, BEc, FRHSV, RL. Military Historian. Editor of The Victorian Historical Magazine; and contributor to the Army Journal, Canberra and The Australian Dictionary of Biography.
Later in June 1895, Coxen became a lieutenant in Queensland’s permanent artillery. At that time the Queensland Regiment of the Royal Australian Artillery, as it was later designated, was distributed in three areas — in Brisbane, in Townsville and in Thursday Island. Its headquarters had been established in Brisbane since February 1885. Since December 1889 a detachment had been stationed at Townsville; and since October 1892 another detachment had been stationed on Thursday Island.\(^2\)

In 1897 Coxen had the good fortune to be sent to England for training. He attended a Long Course at the British Army’s School of Gunnery at Shoeburyness\(^3\) where he gained a 1st Class Certificate with Honours. This course, which presumably specialized in coast defence and siege artillery work, was followed by another course in Field Artillery at Aldershot from January 1898 to March 1898.

At the time of Federation in January 1901 Coxen had been the officer commanding Queensland’s garrison troops at Thursday Island since November 1898 and he had attained the rank of captain there in August 1899.

In the course of General Hutton’s post-Federation re-organization of the Australian Army,\(^4\) Captain Coxen became, in July 1902, the Chief Instructor at the School of Gunnery in Sydney in succession to Major (later Major General Sir) W. T. Bridges. At the time he took up duty in this post the School of Gunnery had been located at South Head since 1895. He resided at the school and he was to remain in that post for the next eight years. During that period three things of importance to him occurred. First, he was granted the temporary rank of major in January 1904; second, he conducted in that same year, according

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\(^1\) Mrs Coxen informed me on 31 October 1974 that her husband, Major General Coxen, qualified at a technical college in Brisbane as a civil engineer before he became a permanent officer. Author.

\(^2\) The Official Quarterly List of Officers of the Queensland Land Forces. No. 45 for 1899, p. 6.


to Lieutenant-Colonel A. D. Watt, RAA\(^5\) what was probably the School's first 'mobile wing' when, with the assistance of his Assistant Instructor in Gunnery, he ran a course of instruction at Queenscliff in Victoria;\(^6\) and third, he conducted Long Courses at the School in 1905 and again in 1907. Major Coxen took the Long Course of 1907 to National Park on the South Coast of New South Wales where it conducted the first practice shoot in New South Wales with 18-pdr field guns.

Later in that year he went to England for further training. He sailed from Sydney on Saturday 9 November 1907 — the birthday of King Edward VII — in the RMS China. Another passenger who boarded this ship in Sydney for London was Colonel (later Brigadier General) H. J. Foster of the Royal Engineers (1855-1919).\(^7\) In the previous year, on 19 October 1906, he had landed in Sydney from London to take up duty as Director of Military Science in the University of Sydney. Foster was presumably returning to England on a brief visit during the University's long vacation and it is reasonable to presume that when Coxen and Foster met on board the China on this occasion\(^8\) they had already become well acquainted in Sydney during the course of that year. Major Coxen arrived in London on or about 23 December 1907 and it is probable that he took a short period of leave before beginning his first course of training at Woolwich. During the years 1908 and 1909 he attended the Ordnance College at Woolwich where he passed the Ordnance Course and obtained an 'O' Certificate.\(^9\) At this same college he also attended an Advanced Course at the completion of which he obtained a certificate to become an Inspector of Warlike Stores. During his attendance at the Ordnance College at Woolwich he became, in June 1908, a substantive major.

When Major Coxen returned to Australia he disembarked at Port Melbourne from the RMS Malwa on Sunday 6 February 1910 — six days before Field Marshal Lord Kitchener had completed his

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\(^5\) For an authoritative history of this school see Lt-Col. A. D. Watt, 'The School of Artillery'. *Australian Army Journal*, No. 92, January 1957, pp. 5-32.

\(^6\) Major (later Colonel) Robert Wallace, RAGA was the CO of the RAA in Victoria, with headquarters at Fort Queenscliff, from 21 November 1902 to 31 January 1905.


\(^8\) For passenger list see *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 November 1907, p. 14.

\(^9\) Military Order No. 151, dated 20 April 1909.
inspection of the Australian Army and sailed from Port Melbourne for New Zealand. Major Coxen did not return to duty at the School of Gunnery. Instead he went on leave in Melbourne and during this leave he made a private visit to Sydney and to the School of Gunnery at South Head. There he was succeeded officially on 1 April 1910 in the post of Chief Instructor by Major (later Colonel) H. J. Cox Taylor, RAGA (1872-1936) who had occupied it in an acting capacity during Major Coxen’s absence overseas.

Major Coxen’s new posting, to date 1 April 1910, was to Company Officer in the RAA in Victoria. This new allotment for duty took him to Queenscliff where he resided with his family. His commanding officer there was Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier General) John Walter Clark, RAGA (1859-1943). Then, after less than two months in Queenscliff, Major Coxen was posted to Army Headquarters in Melbourne — called merely Headquarters before the War of 1914-18 — to fill the appointment of Inspector of Ordnance and Ammunition, to date 16 May 1910, at a consolidated salary of £450 per annum. In this posting he worked under the Chief of Ordnance and 4th Military Member of the Military Board who, in 1910, was Lieutenant Colonel (later Colonel) Robert Wallace, RAGA (1864-1915).

When the War of 1914-18 began, on 4 August 1914, Major Coxen had been the Director of Artillery in the Department of the Chief of Ordnance at Army Headquarters since January 1911 — the year in which Universal Training came into operation. On 14 August 1914 he was given the additional posting, temporarily, of Inspector of Coast Defences and promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel. He vacated these two postings in May 1915 to take up duty in the AIF, the main part of which was then serving in the Gallipoli campaign.

II

Lieutenant Colonel Coxen’s first appointment in the A.I.F. was to raise and command the 36th Heavy Artillery Group commonly known as ‘The Siege Brigade.’ This was a unique unit in the AIF for at least two reasons. First, its members continued to wear in the AIF, I believe, their RAGA uniforms; and second the unit was originally

11 The late Brigadier G. E. Manchester was the author of an unpublished history of the Siege Brigade. The manuscript is held in the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. See also Official History of Australia in the War 1914-18, vol. 3, p. 491, footnote 83.
recruited exclusively from the Permanent Military Forces of Australia and so from the outset it was a highly trained unit.

The drafts from the various States for the brigade concentrated in Melbourne on or about 21 May 1915. There the brigade remained for the next two months. Then, with a strength of 450 all ranks, organized into a headquarters and two batteries plus first reinforcements, it sailed from Melbourne on 17 July 1915 in HMA Transport A.67 (i.e., RMS Orsava). The brigade went to England where Coxen disembarked it at Devonport. From there it moved by train to Lydd in South Kent where it went into camp for training and organization. In December 1915 Coxen had completed the training of the brigade and he was ordered to move it to Taunton in Somerset where he completed its mobilization. Then, on 26 February 1916, the first details of Brigade Headquarters and the 54th Battery, armed with 8-inch howitzers, proceeded to France via Folkestone and Boulogne. The 55th Battery, armed with 9.2-inch howitzers, crossed, presumably by the same route, to France on 2 March 1916.

The Siege Brigade was the first unit of the AIF to arrive in France with the exception of a small MT unit. Major General B. M. Morris, an original officer of the brigade, said: 'The brigade's first positions in action were in the British XVII Corps area, covering the line just north of Arras, immediately west of Vimy Ridge.'

In January 1917 Coxen left the brigade. After handing over the command to Major (later Colonel) J. H. Hurst (1869-1953) he took up duty as CRA of the 1st Australian Division on the Western Front with the temporary rank of brigadier general. He held this command for the next nine months and his divisional commander during that time was Major General (later Lieutenant General Sir) H. B. Walker (1862-1934) of the British Army.

As part of a plan of the Australian Government to replace British officers in the AIF by Australian officers, General Coxen became a CCRA in the AIF in October 1917 vice Brigadier General W. J. Napier, RA. At this time the AIF on the Western Front was organized

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13 The Australian Army List, dated 1 March 1928, shows on page 279 that General Coxen was 'GOC, RA, Australian Army Corps, AIF from 8 October 1917 to 15 November 1918'. But this entry 'covers up' the re-organization of two corps into one corps, known as 'The Australian Army Corps', to date 1 January 1918.
into two corps — Lieutenant General Birdwood’s I ANZAC and Lieutenant General Godley’s II ANZAC. General Coxen probably took up duty at Headquarters, I ANZAC. Later, to date officially 1 January 1918, the I ANZAC and the II ANZAC were reorganized into the Australian Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Birdwood of the Indian Army. In this re-organization General Coxen went to the Australian Corps and remained with it until after the cessation of hostilities. The Australian Corps had two artillery commanders. Brigadier General Coxen commanded the Field Artillery and Brigadier General Lyons David Fraser, RA (1868-1926) commanded the Heavy Artillery. Lieutenant General Monash assumed command of the Australian Corps to date officially 1 June 1918 vice General Birdwood who left to take over the command of the Fifth British Army. Birdwood took with him to the Fifth British Army, as its MGGS, Coxen’s friend of long standing, Brudenell White, who in this way became a major general.

The coming of the Armistice on 11 November 1918 presented, in the words of Monash, ‘an entirely new set of problems which it had fallen to the lot of no man, in previous recorded history, to grapple with and attempt to solve’. But as far as Coxen and Monash were concerned, these problems were related mainly to the tasks of repatriation and demobilization. Monash was appointed, on 1 December 1918, to be Director General of the Department of Repatriation and Demobilisation with headquarters in London at 54 Victoria Street. General Coxen joined Monash’s staff there as Director of the Ordnance Department — an appointment he held officially from November 1918 to June 1919. This was one of five departments each responsible to the Director General. General Coxen was responsible for proposals and negotiations for equipment to be taken to Australia; for the collection, inspection and care of equipment prior to embarkation; for the loading and care of equipment during transport by sea; for the unloading and distribution of equipment in Australia; and for the disposal of surplus equipment, stores and salvage.14

General Coxen’s work in England had finished when he embarked at Devonport, on 12 June 1919, to return to Australia in the Themistocles.

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14 The History of the Department of Repatriation and Demobilisation. Issued by the Department of Repatriation and Demobilisation, AIF, London. Dated 1 October 1919, p. 109.
III

When General Coxen returned to Australia from the War of 1914-18 he had been absent from home for more than four years. He disembarked in Melbourne on Friday 8 August 1919. For him it was an important date for it was the first anniversary of the opening of the Battle of Amiens. It was said he: 'commanded the greatest aggregation of artillery in the whole history of war in battle commencing on August 8, 1918.' But as time passes and other events crowd in on the stage of life performances of this kind tend to be forgotten unless attention is drawn to them from time to time by historians.

At the time of General Coxen's homecoming he was 49 years of age and his reputation as Australia's pre-eminent gunner officer rested firmly on past achievements in peace and in war. Those officers, like Coxen, who remained with artillery did not have the same opportunities for promotion in the AIF that those had who, like Rosenthal, left artillery for infantry or those who, like White, served on the Staff. Nevertheless, it can be fairly said that General Coxen became in the AIF one of its most distinguished senior officers from Australia's Permanent Military Forces. For his services in the War of 1914-18 he was created a Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George, and a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order. In addition he was Mentioned in Despatches four times and was awarded the Belgian Croix de Guerre.

The remainder of General Coxen's career in the Australian Army was to be spent in appointments located in Melbourne. His first post-war posting was to the dual appointment of Chief of Ordnance and 4th Military Member of the Military Board. Much of his work in this post could probably be described as the finishing off of work he had initiated in London after the Armistice. He occupied this appointment at Army Headquarters from August 1919 to March 1920 and during that time Major General (later Lieutenant General) J. G. Legge (1863-1947), the original commander of the 2nd Division, AIF, was the Chief of the General Staff and 1st Military Member of the Military Board.

General Coxen's next appointment was to the post of Deputy Quartermaster General—a post which he held from April 1920 to April

16 An inspection of subsequent Australian Army Lists indicates that the post of Chief of Ordnance, after Coxen vacated it on 31 March 1920, was abolished and its functions transferred to the Department of the QMG.
MAJOR GENERAL WALTER ADAMS COXEN

1921. Then from May 1921 to December 1924 he was a Colonel of the General Staff and Chief of Artillery; and during this period from November 1923 to December 1924 he officiated in addition as ‘2nd Chief of the General Staff’ which meant presumably that he officiated as the Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In June 1923 Major General Sir Brudenell White had relinquished the appointment of Chief of the General Staff at his own request and been transferred to the Unattached List. As a consequence of this change the Inspector-General, Lieutenant General (later General) Sir Harry Chauvel was reposted from Inspector-General to Chief of the General Staff and was given the additional duty of ‘Exercising the duties of Inspector General’. This was an era when the idea of providing training and experience for senior officers in important appointments was subordinated to the idea of saving salaries wherever possible by giving one officer two or more jobs.

On 1 January 1925 General Coxen became the Quartermaster General and 3rd Military Member of the Military Board vice Major General V. C. M. Sellheim. In this appointment, which he was to hold for the next five years, he was ex-officio President of the War Railway Council. The duties of this Council in peace time were to furnish advice to the Minister for Defence on such matters as he referred to it. Two years later General Coxen was given an additional duty temporarily. It was that of Adjutant General — an appointment he held from the 1 January 1927 to the 31 May 1927. Major General Sellheim had vacated this post and been transferred to the Unattached List to enable him to take up duty in the civil appointment of Administrator and Chief Magistrate of Norfolk Island.17

After 34 years commissioned service Coxen was promoted, on 7 March 1927, while occupying the dual appointment of Adjutant General and Quartermaster General, to the substantive rank of major general in the Australian Staff Corps. On the previous day he had relinquished the appointment of Aide-de-camp to King George V which he had held since 2 February 1920.

Consequent on the retirement of General Sir Harry Chauvel in April 1930, General Coxen relinquished the post of Quartermaster General to succeed him in the post of Chief of the General Staff.18 General Coxen had solid and indisputable claims for the post of Chief of

18 With the departure of General Chauvel the impossible task, for any CGS, of concurrently ‘Exercising the duties of Inspector General’ lapsed.
the General Staff and, at the time of his appointment, it was said: 'if he had not been a captain in arms he would have made a captain of industry. Good temper and a vivid sense of humour characterises this man of action. At the front he was known as “the boss gunner”. Gifted with keen insight, and an outsize memory, he never forgets a face or a fact. Efficiency is his watchword and his business acumen will be invaluable to the Government during its enforced economy campaign."

Two of General Coxen's colleagues on the Military Board had also begun their careers in the Military Forces of the Colony of Queensland. They were Major General T. H. Dodds who was the Adjutant General and 2nd Military Member and Brigadier General C. H. Brand who had succeeded General Coxen as Quartermaster General and 3rd Military Member of the Military Board at a salary of £1,100 per annum to date 1 May 1930.

But fortune did not smile on General Coxen during this last stage of his career. His tenure of office as Chief of the General Staff was to be a relatively short and an unusually difficult one. When he became Chief of the General Staff in 1930 he was close to the retiring age which was then fixed at 62 years of age for major generals; and the Army was suffering severely from financial restrictions which were being imposed on it by the Government because of the economic depression which had settled on Australia and brought its industrial and commercial life almost to a standstill. General Coxen was obliged to cope with another difficulty too. During the first year of office he served under three different Ministers for Defence. The first was Mr A. E. Green who relinquished the portfolio in February 1931 and was succeeded by Mr J. J. Daly. But Mr Daly's term of office, as Minister for Defence, lasted for only one month when, in March 1931, he was succeeded by Mr J. B. Chifley, who, although not looked upon then as a future prime minister, was the last minister of state under whom General Coxen was to serve before his retirement.

Because of Australia's economic condition at that time expenditure on the Army was being cut down continually in a variety of new ways, one of which affected General Coxen disadvantageously. He would not normally have retired until he had attained his 62nd year on 22 June 1932 but the Scullin Government laid down a policy that all furlough had

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to be taken during an officer's service. The result was that he was obliged to relinquish the appointment of Chief of the General Staff at Army Headquarters in Melbourne on Wednesday 30 September 1931. To mark the occasion General Coxen issued the following Farewell Message to the Army:

In relinquishing the appointment of Chief of the General Staff and Chairman of the Military Board upon retirement from the Service, I desire to take this opportunity of placing on record an acknowledgment of my indebtedness for the loyal assistance and co-operation that I have received at all times from all ranks of the Australian Military Forces.

I greatly appreciate the untiring energy and enthusiasm displayed by all ranks of the Staff Corps and the Australian Instructional Corps in the arduous work of reconstituting a Militia Force from the Compulsory system — a task which they have efficiently accomplished.

At the same time I wish to express to all ranks of the Militia Force equal appreciation of their magnificent voluntary effort, through which it has been possible to bring the Militia Force to that satisfactory standard both in regard to efficiency and numbers that they possess to-day.

Field marshals alone remain on the Active List till death; general officers must go, when they reach the prescribed ages for retirement, to the Retired List. Major General Coxen, who had been a commissioned officer since February 1893, was placed on the Retired List to date 1 October 1931.

The following day, Friday 2 October 1931, General Coxen was entertained at a luncheon at the Oriental Hotel — then in Collins Street but since demolished — by officers of Army Headquarters, Melbourne. It was announced at this luncheon by the Secretary of the Department of Defence, Mr Malcolm Lindsay Shepherd (1873-1960), that General Coxen had been appointed Honorary Colonel of the Royal Australian Artillery regiment to date 1 October 1931 and that he was the first officer to have this particular honour conferred on him. A tribute was also paid to General Coxen by the Minister for Defence, Mr J. B. Chifley, in the following letter which was read out at the luncheon by Mr Shepherd:

I desire to take this opportunity on the occasion of your retirement from the Australian Military Forces of placing on record my high appreciation of the very

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20 The Prime Minister, Mr J. H. Scullin, announced on 31 October 1929 the Federal Cabinet's decision to suspend Universal Training throughout Australia. See The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 November 1929, p. 13.

21 Australian Army Order No. 306, dated 31 October, 1931.

22 The due date for the retirement of General Coxen, normally, was 22 June 1932. It seems that the difference between that date and the actual date of his retirement, namely 1 October 1931, was the period of his furlough.
able manner in which you have carried out the various duties allotted to you from time to time during your thirty-eight years of commissioned service in the forces.

The exceedingly valuable service rendered by you to the military forces generally — both in Australia and in the Australian Imperial Force and to the artillery arm in particular — are keenly appreciated, and it must indeed be a source of much satisfaction to you to look back upon the fact that during your service you had the honour of carrying out the duties of the highest appointment in the Service, that of Chief of the General Staff and Chairman of the Military Board.

I particularly regret that the policy recently decided upon by the Government that all furlough must be taken during the period of an officer’s service should have resulted in your retirement on furlough some months earlier than you would normally have retired. I feel sure, however, that although you are severing your active association with the forces you will still maintain that keen interest in all matters connected with defence and the welfare of the forces generally that has been characteristic of your service for many years past.

So in this hurried and unspectacular way General Coxen’s career closed and he passed from the Army into official retirement.

IV

General Coxen did not keep a diary; he did not write his autobiography; and he was not the author of any published books. But I have traced a few of his published papers which may be of interest to readers. On Friday evening 17 November 1905 he delivered a lecture on ‘Field Artillery’ at the United Service Institution in Sydney, which was then located in Queen’s Square, and it is probable that it was subsequently published in the Journal and Proceedings of the United Service Institution of New South Wales. At least three papers by him were published in The Commonwealth Military Journal. There appeared in the August 1911 issue a paper entitled ‘The General Object of Coast Artillery Practices’; in the July 1912 issue there appeared a paper entitled ‘The Attack of Armour-Plate Defences’; and in the April 1914 issue there was another paper entitled ‘Electricity and Coastal Defences’. In the journal of the United Service Institution in Sydney for May 1929 his

23 At the time of General Coxen’s retirement in October 1931 the superannuation scheme of the Permanent Military Forces had been in operation for only 7 years. The scheme was first authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 45 — Superannuation Act 1924. This Act was assented to on 20 October 1924 and was proclaimed to commence on the 23 October 1924.

24 The Argus, Melbourne, 3 October 1931, p. 18.

25 This journal was not available to me in Melbourne to consult at the time of writing this paper. Author.

26 This paper is largely a reprint of a paper published in the Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, dated October 1862.
paper entitled 'The Army Ration and the Use and Value of Food' was published; and in the same journal for April 1930 — June 1930 his paper entitled 'Fuel: A Vital Necessity in the Life of every Nation' was published.

V

General Coxen, known throughout the Army in his time as 'Wacky' Coxen, was a tall and impressive personality; he was about 6 feet 2 inches in height with strong features and a self-possessed and dignified manner. He was born in England at Egham in Surrey and, at 7 years of age, he came to Australia with his parents who settled in Queensland. He never lost his English accent; he spoke concisely and positively and with a pleasing and well modulated voice; unlike General Chauvel but like General Rosenthal, he was a good public speaker; and after his retirement from the Army he sometimes gave radio talks in Melbourne on the ABC network. His professional life had been spent in scientific branches of the Army and so his training and experience were reflected in his systematic approach to problems, in his demands for completeness and exactitude and in his practical tastes.

Although he was exacting in his demands on subordinates he usually stated his requirements explicitly. When on inspections he had a quick eye for irregularities in drill and in dress and for 'eye-wash' in its many forms. Another disconcerting habit he had on inspections was to ask for a trumpeter (or bugler) to accompany him and during the inspection he would order the trumpeter to sound a call which would not always be correctly recognized by those who had to take action on it. One story is told of an inspection of an establishment in Sydney — long since swept away by the changes of time. On this occasion he ordered the bugler to sound the call 'Officers'. But alas all ranks took the call to be 'Alarm' and doubled to their posts. Thereupon, General Coxen turned to the CO and said: 'I had wished to meet your officers but I see they have gone to other duties.' But the spirit in which he did this kind of thing left no lasting sting. In criticisms at training exercises he was both constructive and instructive and he displayed a good grasp of detail, especially in matters appertaining to artillery training. Although

27 General Coxen's father, Henry William Coxen, had been a cadet at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst. But having been accidentally shot in the wrist there he was discharged as medically unfit.
a formidable person he was towards subordinates neither aggressive nor sarcastic. Indeed, when in gatherings of officers he would encourage the more junior ones to come forward so that he could talk with them. Efficiency was ever his aim and, as his work as Director of the Centenary Celebrations in Victoria in 1934 illustrated, he had 'no capacity for looking on and seeing other people mismanaging things'.

General Coxen's recreations were gardening and cabinet-making; and like most officers of his time he loved horses and dogs. Although in adult life he manifested no special interest in music, as did for example Generals Monash and Rosenthal, he did enjoy bagpipe music and as a young man he had played the cornet. He enjoyed the social life of military society in which he moved with ease and unpretentiousness; and in this society he was an attractive conversationalist and a master of repartee.

In General Coxen's time, as in other times, limitations could usually be found in the general training and overall experience of individual officers. General Coxen was himself an example. He was essentially a specialist in all branches of artillery and in army ordnance stores with higher level experience also in staff and instructional duties. Throughout his service in Australia's Permanent Military Forces he never served officially, at least after Federation, with Militia units or with Militia formations; and while he served in 'G' and 'Q' staff appointments he never served in any 'A' appointments, except temporarily in the post of Adjutant General for a period of four months.

After the War of 1914-18 his closest friends in the Army were probably Generals Monash, Chauvel, Brudenell White and Brigadier Harold Edward Cohen — all gunner officers except Chauvel. Chauvel and White he had known in Queensland before Federation. Both Coxen and Chauvel were 'old boys' of Toowoomba Grammar School although Chauvel was five years older than Coxen. It has been said too that Coxen prevailed on White to leave his stool in a Bank to join Queensland’s Permanent Artillery in 1899.

This attempt to paint a word picture of the personality of General Coxen should leave the reader with a mental picture of a soldier and that is how General Coxen regarded himself. He was a regular officer with thoughts and interests centred almost exclusively in the Army in which he played many important parts with distinction during his career which spanned a period of almost forty years.
VI

During the War of 1939-45 General Coxen was of course far beyond the age when he could serve again in any military capacity; but he did serve in the Department of Supply in Melbourne in work for which his professional training and experience fitted him. After the war his health declined further and on Thursday 15 December 1949, at the age of 79 years, he died in Melbourne at the Repatriation Hospital in Heidelberg. It was not then the custom to give retired officers military funerals; but in General Coxen’s case precedent was waived and so on Friday morning 16 December 1949 his remains were borne on their last journey with military honours.

It is pleasing to report by way of conclusion that twenty-five years after General Coxen’s death a wall plaque, made of polished wood, to commemorate his name and deeds was unveiled at the Artillery Training Depot in Batman Avenue, Melbourne on Anzac Day of 1974 by the Secretary of Melbourne’s Australian Siege Brigade Association.28

28 For information about Major General Coxen, of a kind not normally found in official records, I am indebted to: Mrs W. A. Coxen of South Yarra in Victoria who, at 91 years of age, is still active and alert; to her son, Mr W. F. W. Coxen of East Brighton, Victoria; and to Major A. A. C. Carter, DSO, RAA (Rtd) of Heathmont, Victoria. I am also indebted to Lt-Col W. T. Myers of the 2nd Field Regiment, RAA for permitting me to inspect the Coxen Memorial Plaque at the Artillery Training Depot in Melbourne. Author.
AN EXPERIENCE

Lieutenant Colonel M. M. van Gelder RAE
Australian Army Reserve

Introduction

A UNIQUE opportunity presented itself for a Reserve Officer to utilize his fourteen days' continuous military training in Canada. This was achieved through his being attached to the Director General of Manpower Utilization (DGMU) within the Office of the Chief of Personnel Management (CPM) at the Headquarters of the Department of National Defence in Ottawa. Highlights of the attachment were insight gained into the personnel planning activities of a unified force, participation in the deliberations of the Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society in Toronto, and visits to Canadian Forces Bases at Esquimalt, Kingston and St. Hubert (Montreal).

The attachment was sponsored by the Directorate of Personnel Plans, approved by the Department of Defence (Army Office) and arranged through Australian Army Staff, Washington. The period of the attachment was 17 August to 1 September 1974. Co-ordination was important to enable the attachment to occur during the time the author would be in Canada and when he could be released from civilian employment.

This paper will outline briefly the author's impressions of the proceedings of the Toronto conference, and describe some of the more

Biographical details are contained in previous editions of Army Journal. Lt Col van Gelder resigned from the Regular Army in October 1972 after twenty years service. His last Regular Army posting was in the Directorate of Personnel Plans in Army Office. He joined the CMF in the appointment of SO1 D Engrs and has been detached to DPP. As co-winner of the 1973 Peter Stuckey Mitchell Commonwealth Armies Essay Competition he was able to finance a visit to Canada, and this article is a résumé of experiences in Canada.
interesting developments in personnel planning. Additional reference will be made to mobilization planning, use of Reserves, defence programming and evaluation, and military engineering. It is difficult not to be drawn into the debate over unification, so some opinions are offered on this subject.

**Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society**

This Research Committee was but one committee of a number deliberating in Toronto during the Eighth World Congress of Sociology. The Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society, chaired until 1974 by Professor Morris Janowitz, concerned itself with the sociological analysis of military institutions and militarism; with the role of the military in industrial and developing countries; and with international tensions, disarmament and peacekeeping.

One might well ask what is the relevance of this Committee to the work of the Directorate of Personnel Plans in the Australian Army. The answer lies in the fact that the Directorate (previously called the Directorate of Manning) is responsible, *inter alia*, for researching the social, economic and political influences on military manpower, and for examining the personnel implications of defence planning. It is very interested from many aspects — recruiting, wastage, career progression, manpower quality, expansion potential — in the interaction of armed forces and society at large. It has to be able to answer the ‘what if…’ questions.

Apart from academic sociologists, serving officers from Canada, the United States and Denmark participated, and there was an unknown military component in the heavy contingent from Russia and East Europe. The Canadian and United States officers belonged to their respective personnel applied research units.

When the author arrived in Toronto for the conference he was therefore confronted by two interesting facts — first, there were other serving or Reserve officers at the conference, and the conference was not exclusively civilian; secondly, there was such large representation from Eastern Bloc countries. These two circumstances could represent a slight indictment of the lack of interest of Australia in this conference, bearing in mind that the author’s attendance was privately and not officially motivated in the first instance.

Some of the more important and relevant papers presented and discussed were:
a. The Military and the Crisis of Legitimacy (Jacques van Doorn).


c. Measurement of Attitudes within the Danish Armed Forces (Borup-Nielsen).

d. Structural Linkages between Civilian and Military Sectors of American Society (David Segal).

e. Comparative Trends in the Utilisation of Women in the Armed Forces of Industrialised Nations (Nancy Goldman).

f. Various papers — Scientific and Technological Revolution and Armed Forces (USSR etc.).

g. Analysis of Factors contributing to the Dominance of Military and Para-Military Forces (Horowitz).

The research committee proceedings were very informal, dominated by the frankness, humour and enthusiasm of Morris Janowitz, the noted military sociologist. Sometimes specialist papers on Cuba and Africa attracted hostile and blatantly political elements and at other times the Eastern Bloc solidarity severely strained the friendliness of the chairman.

The author found that the greatest impact of the conference was not so much the detail of the papers presented but the realization that all armed forces — whether they belong to developed or under-developed countries, either socialist or capitalist — are grappling with similar personnel problems. The acceptance of the armed forces in the community or society (or ‘legitimacy’), changing attitudes of people, the influence of technology, were problems debated or discussed with similar intensity by East and West. The immediate impression is that whilst Australia has developed military personnel planning philosophies which are equal to the best of other countries, she has not explored sufficiently the interaction of armed forces and society. As a generalization Australian Army officers would lack appreciation of the wide range of possible relationships between armed forces and the community or government, and the Australian people have a restricted (stereotyped on the Anglo-Saxon tradition) attitude towards armed forces.

Any allegation of restricted outlook does not indicate a necessity to change the status quo in Australia. All it means is that a better understanding of the diversity of relationships which can exist between people, armed forces and government will assist Australians in appreci-
ating events and reactions in other countries. All military regimes would not be automatically condemned; torture and apparent liberal attitudes to use of the death penalty, whilst not condoned, could at least be understood. Varying community attitudes to recruiting into a volunteer army, conscription, national service, employment of women, military government, status of armed forces become evident and can be understood. Israeli, Swiss, Canadian, Nigerian military experiences become meaningful and cease to be automatic models for adoption or rejection.

The word 'legitimacy' is the new key word. The 'legitimacy' of a country's armed forces (or any other institution) describes its community acceptance and standing. In the United States, the armed forces have relatively high legitimacy (or acceptance) and the police forces relatively low legitimacy. In Australia and Canada the reverse is possibly the case.

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins of the UK postulated three models of military legitimacy; first the militocratic model where legitimacy is based on symbolisation of the state; secondly, the democratic model where the existence of armed forces depends upon popular consent; and thirdly, the anarchistic model in which the armed forces never have legitimacy.

Jerzy Wiatr of Poland made the contribution that the greater the legitimacy of the armed forces the greater the possibility of a coup d'état by the military. In this circumstance the civilian alternative has low relative credibility. David Segal of the US referred to the 'permeability' of the boundary between the military and civilian sectors.

The analysis of Charles Moskos of the attitudes and performance of United Nations peacekeeping forces was very interesting. He deduced that peacekeeping forces of whatever political and social origin become internationally motivated constabulary. In other words military professionalism is consistent with the constabulary function. If this analysis is correct it matters very little what forces — British, Russian, Chinese or South African — are used in the peacekeeping role because the international spirit overshadows narrow nationalistic attitudes.

**Visits to Canadian Forces Bases**

Whilst this article is mainly concerned with the proceedings of the Toronto conference and various personnel planning aspects of the Canadian Forces, an indication is given of the bases visited by the
author to indicate that the impressions gained were not restricted to academic or headquarters influences.

Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Esquimalt in British Columbia was an example of an ex-naval base catering for maritime and land elements. The wardroom atmosphere still predominated.

Whilst in Toronto, the author took the opportunity of visiting the Canadian Forces Staff College which occupies the facilities of the old RCAF Staff College. The Australian member of the directing staff provided a briefing on the operation of the network of staff colleges in a unified armed force.

The Royal Canadian Military Institute (a club providing residential facilities) in University Avenue in Toronto was the venue for meetings with Canadian militia and regular officers. The presence of the tradition-oriented Royal Regiment of Canada was very marked.

Militia contacts provided passage from CFB Downsview in Toronto to CFB Kingston which is approximately midway between Toronto and Ottawa. Kingston is the location of the signals training school, the Royal Military College, the National Defence College and the junior staff college. The latter two institutions are co-located in historic Fort Frontenac at the entrance to the Rideau Canal.

The Canadian Department of National Defence headquarters buildings are located in ‘downtown’ Ottawa on the Rideau Canal and only 400-500 metres from Parliament House. The headquarters is split by the canal between a new multi-storied building and older ‘temporary’ accommodation.

CFB St. Hubert in Montreal is an ex-RCAF base and provides a base for Headquarters Force Mobile Command. Time prevented a visit to CFB Petawawa in Ontario, the counterpart of Australia’s Puckapunyal, and CFB Valcartier in Quebec the most modern of Canada’s bases.

Canadian Reserves

The title ‘Reserves’ covers all three environments — maritime, air and land — and the term ‘militia’ refers specifically to the land element. The terms tend to be a little interchangeable because of the numerical dominance of land reserves.

The visit to Canada was made in an atmosphere where her forces are moving from a ‘forces-in-being’ concept to a ‘nucleus for expansion’ concept. In other words, Canada no longer believes that the size and
nature of the threat (external or internal) is such that it could be contained by forces in being. A combination of the unforeseeability of future threat and financial limitations required the formation of forces which could be expanded to meet defence emergencies. This concept makes greater demands on a reserve or militia system, and as a result major reviews or studies have been mounted on the subjects of mobilization, reserve forces and cadets.

What became quickly evident to the author was that the Canadian Forces were already utilizing Reserves in two modes contemplated by the recent Committee of Inquiry Report into the Citizen Military Forces of Australia. First, they had a ‘real’ reserve supporting the Regular Force in overseas commitments (notably Germany and Egypt). Secondly, the Reserves were giving active support to Regular Force training commitments, particularly through extended employment of Reserves during the summer training period.

The target figure for inclusion of Reserves in overseas forces is ten per cent, and at the time of the visit, 360 were in Germany helping to fulfil NATO commitments and 80 were in Egypt on peacekeeping operations. It was hoped that the ten per cent target figure could be extended to Cyprus.

Reserves for overseas duty are called out for eight to nine months full-time service. This period consists of three weeks of on the job training in the soldier’s speciality, five to six weeks’ administration, leave and travelling and 24 weeks overseas tour of duty.

There apparently was little difficulty in obtaining reserve volunteers. A ‘data bank’ maintains the names of volunteers, processed medically and signed to serve overseas. Force Mobile Command (FMC) attempts to spread the call-out over all provinces, particularly as reserve service overseas is considered by many to be a ‘plum’. Most volunteers happen to be young (‘12th year’ students).

FMC has identified the problem of militia standards and the obvious comparison with regular standards. From the latter have been identified the ‘must knows’ for battle service, the ‘should knows’ and the ‘could knows’. During six months full-time training it is considered that the soldier will accumulate the ‘should’ and ‘could knows’; it is expected that militia training will give him the ‘must knows’.

Reserves under this eight-month call-out system have not been tried in combat but the possibility of operational duty is ever present in
Germany, Egypt and Cyprus. Korea was in fact the last occasion reserves were used in combat and it is interesting to note that whilst the Korean commitment commenced with militia quotas (from established militia units), an off-the-street reinforcement and build-up system quickly developed.

There are some professional ‘augmentees’ who serve for longer periods, such as in the Arctic projects and on exercises in Germany. There is augmentation of up to one year in Germany (originally three months) but the aim remains to have a high turnover of reservists to spread experience.

Sub-unit augmentation has occurred in Germany where there has been a militia mechanised platoon operating for three months.

An interesting statistical fact is that 5000 militia men have completed up to ten weeks of summer training in area, rank and grade schools, and in augmenting regular army training. Because of the severe winter most training (except on the West Coast) has to be conducted during the summer.

Located at National Defence Headquarters was a Director General of Reserves and Cadets (DGRC) in the rank of brigadier-general working to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS). Because of the greater numbers and significance of the land element reserve, there existed a separate Director of Militia (D Mil) under the Director General of Land Operations (DGLO). The militia was effectively commanded and trained however by FMC through militia areas and districts. (The structure and organization of the Canadian militia is outlined in the Millar Committee of Enquiry Report).

A major aim of the Canadian Forces is to cut down on the high wastage of reserves (‘a fifty per cent turnover’) — similar to the problem which afflicts Australian Forces. This they intended to do by increasing Regular Force support staff and introducing new training programs.

The Millar Committee looked at the Canadian Reserve Forces and, whilst admiring the effort and enthusiasm displayed by Canadian reservists, did not draw any worthwhile conclusions for Australia. They did not mention the peacetime role of the militia in supporting Canada’s NATO commitment, (and presumably the ability to extend this to other commitments). The author was more impressed with the Canadian Reserve system particularly in the determination to use reserves to service overseas commitments and to dovetail reserve and regular
training and administration. The concentration of training in the northern summer season and the absence of the disruptive influence of a large Christmas-New Year break appeared to contribute to the success of the latter.

**Cadets**

A philosophical study had apparently just been completed by the Director of Cadets. The author has not sighted this study but he found an opinion expressed at the implementation level that the cadet corps had almost been killed off by the lessening of military objectives in cadet training.

This is an important relevant point in the Australian scene, because the Committee of Enquiry (Millar) into the School Cadet Scheme envisages a diminution in the military emphasis on training.

**Mobilization and Augmentation Planning**

The Canadian Forces are apparently not very advanced in their mobilization thinking, mainly because of the legacy and previous strong reliance on the forces-in-being concept. It is only recently that the word 'mobilization' has become respectable, with preference being given to the euphemistic expression 'augmentation'. The shift to mobilization planning has probably come about through lessening of dependence on the nuclear 'umbrella' and the high cost of maintaining conventional forces.

Personnel planners appeared to be giving the lead in mobilization planning through default. This is due in part to the pre-occupation of operational planners with day-to-day urgent affairs and the need for personnel planners to plan so many years in advance.

One aim is to revitalize the militia to enable the latter to go straight into the ranks of the Regulars. There are, however, major problems with compensation, legal considerations and job protection — problems which are common to all Western countries.

As previously indicated, volunteer Reservists are not difficult to obtain for the present peacekeeping and observer nature of overseas duty. Without detracting from the motivation of most volunteers, this situation could possibly change if combat operations developed or Canada became embroiled in an 'unpopular' war or confrontation.
The development of levels of personnel augmentation or mobilization has been pursued by planners and it is noteworthy that personnel management becomes decentralized as mobilization intensifies. This raises the question of whether unification is merely a peacetime phenomenon and not translatable into a major war setting.

**Personnel Planning Research and Development**

The author had the opportunity of spending some time with the Personnel R & D Section. The interesting thing about the 'ideas' man in the section was that he was an exchange officer from the United States Adjutant General Corps, interesting because neither the Canadian nor Australian forces possess a corps or military classification which specializes in personnel management. The temptation is too great to point out that an Australian equivalent of the US AG Corps and a school of personnel management have been urged unsuccessfully in the past by a former Australian Director of Manning.

Two major studies were in progress, one on an officer career system and one on operational/non-operational ('ship/shore') ratios. (In Australian terminology this would be 'teeth/tail' ratio). Coincidentally, but not remarkably, a paper was presented at the Toronto conference on historical trends in military management overhead.

The Section was striving to develop a greater measure of confidence in officer career planning by introducing more flexibility, providing some control over the age structure of various officer classifications, offering individuals more promising careers (particularly for 'those who stay'), and finally offering equity. With apologies for the jargon, this involves balancing organizational objectives (including age and experience distribution and full utilization of the personnel asset) with career goals of individuals. Thinking was along the lines of a three-tier officer career system which includes nine and twenty year service options, and also allowance for retirement at fifty-five years of age.

A selective accelerated promotion system was being refined. This involved a primary zone of promotion over a span of three years with carefully calculated 'early' and 'late' promotion quotas. The resulting distribution could be 'skewed' differently for combat and non-combat classifications.

These concepts and ideas are well known to Australian personnel planners and administrators but the Canadians appear to be pursuing
them more vigorously. This could be one result of the unification process which has forced a re-look at traditional procedures.

Personnel Requirement and Control

It became evident that at the 'personnel' implementation level also, the Canadian Forces were more advanced than Australian Forces. There was a more readily observed interconnection between:

a. the personnel targets as produced by the Chief of Programs — 'numbers by rank' constrained by fiscal considerations;
b. the work of the personnel managers who put names to the numbers game;
c. models and concepts produced by personnel planning, research development; and
d. the co-ordinating efforts of the Directorate of Personnel Requirement and Control.

Further evidence was the existence of strict control being exerted on promotion quotas (by rank by classification), of a system of manpower/financial control (MFCP) with its input/output patterns and of the clear annotation of establishment positions.

Promotion boards appeared to work a little more scientifically and under more controlled conditions than their Australian counterparts. What appeared impressive was the monitoring system established to check the quality and consistency of 'merit reports'. The reports can be returned to assessors for re-evaluation (particularly when there are frequent departures from the 'normal distribution').

Promotion chances are ideally one-is-to-three, but there is considerable variation from classification to classification depending on establishment. The Canadians suffer from a similar 'hang-up' over the importance of establishments as many Australians, but even more so because of the high pay differentials between high and low ranks. Forecasting and monitoring of numbers by rank was important to them because of the financial repercussions of establishing or filling highly paid senior positions in lieu of comparatively lowly paid junior positions. In Australia the pay differential is not as marked, and forecasts in numbers only are generally adequate.

Women in the Canadian Forces

One of the current projects of the Director General of Manpower Utilization was that relating to the employment of women in the forces.
It was coincidental that whilst DPP in Australia was beginning to take further initiatives in the employment of women (expansion of employment areas, lessening of differentials in personnel management), the Canadian Forces were at the same time also actively investigating the same matters.

There was a difference in motivation however. The Canadian investigation stemmed from a political direction in which the Armed Forces were to be seen to be giving a lead in a nationwide endeavour to improve the employment opportunities of women. The Australian initiatives appear to be derived from a personnel planning recognition of the potential of female recruiting especially as a means of making up chronic and historical deficiencies in male recruiting. There is however an increasing recognition that women are able to be employed in many more modes than previously contemplated (and to the Services' advantage).

The subject was quite topical as Nancy Goldman had presented a paper at the Toronto conference the previous week on 'Comparative Trends in the Utilization of Women in the Armed Forces of Industrialized Nations'.

A preliminary Canadian study recommended a new approach by which future establishment positions be annotated 'male only' instead of 'female only', a reversal of the traditional stance. Many more classifications were considered suitable to be open to women, and recruiting by classification and trade would be on the basis of the best applicant available (male or female). Rigid recruiting quotas by sex would not be employed.

It was stressed that any change must ensure the maintenance of a viable armed force but cannot disregard the existing political climate or the changes which are occurring in society. Any restrictions made to the universal employment of women in the Canadian Forces would have to be justified (such as, for example, in combat or direct support units).

Women are presently 3.2% of the Canadian Forces. If their current recruiting target of 800 women per year is met and present attrition prevails, women would represent 5% of the Canadian Forces by 1980. This percentage could be increased by recruiting in direct competition with males for open positions.

The disadvantageous features of employment of women (from a personnel planning viewpoint) were recognized and these included
the factor of marriage, absences due to pregnancy, increased wastage of males resulting from the wider employment of women, and the traditional high attrition rate from the ranks of women. Nancy Goldman points out in her paper the problem of protocol between the sexes.

**Defence Programming and Evaluation**

Canada is experiencing the same problem as Australia in trying to restrain rapidly rising personnel costs, and to keep some semblance of respectability in its expenditure on capital items. A formula was approved in July 1973 to allow for an increase in the proportion devoted to capital, and this meant imposing constraints on personnel expenditure. In the event, personnel costs ‘escalated’ and made adherence to the constraints almost impossible.

It was interesting that attempts were being made to completely revise the Defence Services Program in its activity and sub-activity structure. The revised structure is aimed at removing overlaps and ambiguities, showing military and civilian elements in integrated programs, making commanders at all levels more ‘responsible’, and having the activities relate more to organized and financial activity.

The strides made in developing evaluation procedures were particularly noteworthy. All departments, not only Defence, are required to develop a performance measurement system in presenting their programs, guidance being given by the Canadian Treasury Board. It was quite a revelation to see serving officers actually engaged in formal evaluation activity and the development of explicit performance parameters.

Not unexpectedly, reaction at the grass roots level to evaluation procedures is not good and people are sceptical of controls and management innovation particularly when their resources are already stretched. As with the introduction of all new systems there has to be visible and continuous commitment from the top.

**Military Engineering**

It would be unnatural for a sapper, even on a personnel planning mission, not to be interested in the development of military engineering in a unified force. The Royal Canadian Engineers as a Corps have ceased to exist, although there are still a number of R.C.E. badges being worn, particularly by the militia.
The equivalent of the Australian ‘Director of Engineers’ is the Director General of Military Engineering Operations (DGMEO) established in the rank of brigadier-general. The DGMEO works directly to the DCDS and not through the Chief of Land Operations. The equivalent of the Engineer-in-Chief is a three star officer (ex air environment) occupying the position of Chief of Construction and Properties. It must be remembered that there is only one military engineering classification (or corps) in the whole of the unified force.

Apparently in the unification process, Engineers and Signals suffered ‘Corps-wise’, whereas Infantry, Armoured and Artillery retained basic corps status. Attempts are being made to remedy this.

As with the land element generally, there is another battle and that is to prevent Air and Maritime elements forcing Land into the same ‘mould’ — presumably a reference to the fixation of those elements with bases and the resultant logistic dependence. Many Land officers also fear the erosion of the motivation to fight ‘face to face’.

Generally ex-RCAF works officers welcomed unification because of increased promotional (and responsibility) opportunities. They did not appear however to relish or aspire to the realities of combat engineering.

**Unification Generally**

After a decade of the unification process there are still remnants of the tri-Service system. DGMU was a Commodore instead of a Brigadier. When a sea environment officer is on the land he is a ‘captain’, when he is at sea he is a ‘lieutenant’. RCE badges still adorn the caps of militia engineer officers. Rear guard actions are still being fought on issues of kilts, bear-skins, and mess kits.

Unification has however achieved a true integration of the Headquarters of the Department of National Defence. One cynic remarked that unification was necessary to achieve this, and that the forces can now revert to a tri-Service system.

In any case, second stage mobilization requires a decentralization of personnel management of mobilized reserves and recruits and this almost amounts to the reinstatement of the three Services.

The author has advocated in the past that the likely nature of Australia’s internal and overseas commitments calls for a unified defence
organization. It is ironic that Canada with great justification for remaining on a tri-Service organizational basis, because of its alliances with great conventional powers, chose to unify. Australia chose to remain tri-Service in the face of overwhelming evidence that its future commitments are of such a nature that they can be met with unified forces.

One can only conclude that integration and unification are not matters which can be discussed logically or objectively. Organizational change in defence forces is too emotive a subject, and apparently depends so much on the persuasive power of individuals be they Mountbattens or Helyers. In any case, as a justification for retaining the status quo in Australia, one could always argue that there is a possibility, however remote, of Australia becoming involved in a major war requiring national mobilization. In this case the retention of three Services can be quite justified.

Conclusion

The attachment was very valuable, particularly as it gave the officer a good insight into personnel planning philosophy and techniques of comparable defence forces. Problems associated with integration and unification were revealed. Valuable information was obtained on the peacetime use of reserves.

Bearing in mind the more active use of reserves to support Canadian regular army commitment, the Australian Army should be more vigorous in providing interesting employment of its reserves if the total army concept is to be meaningful.

The greatest value will stem hopefully from input into the Directorate of Personnel Plans as the result of the officer's contact with comparable elements in Canadian Defence HQ. Significant areas of interest were in modelling, career structuring, merit ratings, augmentation policies, regular/reserve interaction and manpower forecasting.

As a result of the visit the author is a less willing advocate of the unification process, not through any diffusion of the logic of unification but through face to face contact with the practical realities. Certainly unification is more defensible in the Australia scenario than that of Canada, and certainly a tri-Service organizational framework is a viable alternative to unification. The cost effectiveness aspects pale beside the political and personnel (and personal).
Know Your Men . . .
Know Your Business . . .
Know Yourself

Major C. A. Bach
U.S. Army

In a short time each of you men will control the lives of a certain number of other men. You will have in your charge loyal but untrained citizens, who look to you for instruction and guidance.

Your word will be their law. Your most casual remark will be remembered. Your mannerism will be aped. Your clothing, your carriage, your vocabulary, your manner of command will be imitated.

When you join your organization you will find there a willing body of men who ask from you nothing more than the qualities that will command their respect, their loyalty, and their obedience.

Editor of Proceedings Note: In the November 1973 issue of the Proceedings, Captain Alexander W. Moffat, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired), quoted extracts from an address on leadership that had been given by a Major C. A. Bach in 1917. Captain Moffat indicated that he had no information about Major Bach other than his name and rank.

Shortly after publication, another captain in the Naval Reserve, R. C. Gilardi, sent us a copy of the complete address, together with the following letter:

‘C. A. Bach enlisted in the Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry of the National Guard and served as a sergeant with the regiment in the Philippines. Promoted to a lieutenancy in the Thirty-sixth U.S. Volunteer Infantry, he transferred in the Regular Establishment as a first lieutenant in the Seventh Cavalry and advanced therein to his majority.

‘His analysis of how to be a leader — an address delivered to the graduating officers of the Second Training Camp at Fort Sheridan — so moved the Reserve officers of his battalion, that they besieged him for copies. The Waco (Texas) Daily Times Herald, learning of the great interest the speech had aroused, obtained a copy and printed it verbatim on Sunday, 27 January 1918.

‘A copy of the speech was inserted in the Congressional Record by Senator Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota in November 1942, and printed as Congressional Document 289. All of us who were NROTC students at the University of Washington in 1943 were given copies and, since the document is no longer in print, may I urge you to reprint, in its entirety, what is generally regarded as the best composition on “Leadership” ever recorded.’

They are perfectly ready and eager to follow you so long as you can convince them that you have those qualities. When the time comes that they are satisfied you do not possess them you might as well kiss yourself good-bye. Your usefulness in that organization is at an end.

From the standpoint of society, the world may be divided into leaders and followers. The professions have their leaders, the financial world has its leaders. We have religious leaders, and political leaders, and society leaders. In all this leadership it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate from the element of pure leadership that selfish element of personal gain or advantage to the individual, without which such leadership would lose its value.

It is in the military service only where men freely sacrifice their lives for a faith, where men are willing to suffer and die for the right or the prevention of a great wrong, that we can hope to realize leadership in its most exalted and disinterested sense. Therefore, when I say leadership, I mean military leadership.

In a few days the great mass of you men will receive commissions as officers. These commissions will not make you leaders; they will merely make you officers. They will place you in a position where you can become leaders if you possess the proper attributes. But you must make good — not so much with the men over you as with the men under you.

Men must and will follow into battle officers who are not leaders, but the driving power behind these men is not enthusiasm but discipline. They go with doubt and trembling, and with an awful fear tugging at their heartstrings that prompts the unspoken question, 'What will he do next?'

Such men obey the letter of their orders but no more. Of devotion to their commander, of exalted enthusiasm which scorns personal risk, of their self-sacrifice to ensure his personal safety, they know nothing. Their legs carry them forward because their brain and their training tell them they must go. Their spirit does not go with them.

Great results are not achieved by cold, passive, unresponsive soldiers. They don't go very far and they stop as soon as they can. Leadership not only demands but receives the willing, unhesitating, unfaltering obedience and loyalty of other men; and a devotion that
will cause them, when the time comes, to follow their uncrowned king to hell and back again if necessary.

You will ask yourselves: 'Of just what, then, does leadership consist? What must I do to become a leader? What are the attributes of leadership, and how can I cultivate them?'

Leadership is a composite of a number of qualities. Among the most important I would list self-confidence, moral ascendancy, self-sacrifice, paternalism, fairness, initiative, decision, dignity, courage.

Let me discuss these with you in detail.

Self-confidence results, first, from exact knowledge; second, the ability to impart that knowledge; and, third, the feeling of superiority over others that naturally follows. All these give the officer poise.

To lead, you must know — you may bluff all your men some of the time, but you can't do it all the time. Men will not have confidence in an officer unless he knows his business, and he must know it from the ground up.

The officer should know more about paper work than his first sergeant and company clerk put together; he should know more about messing than his mess sergeant; more about diseases of the horse than his troop farrier. He should be at least as good a shot as any man in his company.

If the officer does not know, and demonstrates the fact that he does not know, it is entirely human for the soldier to say to himself, 'To hell with him. He doesn't know as much about this as I do,' and calmly disregard the instructions received.

There is no substitute for accurate knowledge. Become so well informed that men will hunt you up to ask questions — that your brother officers will say to one another, 'Ask Smith — he knows.'

And not only should each officer know thoroughly the duties of his own grade, but he should study those of the two grades next above him. A twofold benefit attaches to this. He prepares himself for duties which may fall to his lot at any time during battle; he further gains a broader viewpoint which enables him to appreciate the necessity for the issuance of orders and join more intelligently in their execution.

Not only must the officer know, but he must be able to put what he knows into grammatical, interesting, forceful English. He must learn to stand on his feet and speak without embarrassment.
I am told that in British training camps student officers are required to deliver ten-minute talks on any subject they may choose. That is excellent practice. For to speak clearly one must think clearly, and clear, logical, thinking expresses itself in definite, positive orders.

While self-confidence is the result of knowing more than your men, moral ascendancy over them is based upon your belief that you are the better man. To gain and maintain this ascendancy you must have self-control, physical vitality and endurance and moral force.

You must have yourself so well in hand that, even though in battle you be scared stiff, you will never show fear. For if you by so much as a hurried movement or a trembling of the hand, or a change of expression, or a hasty order hastily revoked, indicate your mental condition it will be reflected in your men in a far greater degree.

In garrison or camp many instances will arise to try your temper and wreck the sweetness of your disposition. If at such times you ‘fly off the handle’ you have no business to be in charge of men. For men in anger say and do things that they almost invariably regret afterward.

An officer should never apologize to his men; also an officer should never be guilty of an act for which his sense of justice tells him he should apologize.

Another element in gaining moral ascendancy lies in the possession of enough physical vitality and endurance to withstand the hardships to which you and your men are subjected, and a dauntless spirit that enables you not only to accept them cheerfully but to minimize their magnitude.

Make light of your troubles, belittle your trials, and you will help vitally to build up within your organization an esprit whose value in time of stress cannot be measured.

Moral force is the third element in gaining moral ascendancy. To exert moral force you must live clean, you must have sufficient brain power to see the right and the will to do right.

Be an example to your men. An officer can be a power for good or a power for evil. Don’t preach to them — that will be worse than useless. Live the kind of life you would have them lead, and you will be surprised to see the number that will imitate you.

A loud-mouthed, profane captain who is careless of his personal appearance will have a loud-mouthed, profane, dirty company. Remember what I tell you. Your company will be the reflection of yourself. If you have a rotten company it will be because you are a rotten captain.
Self-sacrifice is essential to leadership. You will give, give all the time. You will give of yourself physically, for the longest hours, the hardest work and the greatest responsibility is the lot of the captain. He is the first man up in the morning and the last man in at night. He works while others sleep.

You will give of yourself mentally, in sympathy and appreciation for the troubles of men in your charge. This one's mother has died, and that one has lost all his savings in a bank failure. They may desire help, but more than anything else they desire sympathy.

Don't make the mistake of turning such men down with the statement that you have troubles of your own, for every time that you do you knock a stone out of the foundation of your house.

Your men are your foundation, and your house leadership will tumble about your ears unless it rests securely upon them.

Finally, you will give of your own slender financial resources. You will frequently spend your money to conserve the health and well-being of your men or to assist them when in trouble. Generally you get your money back. Very infrequently you must charge it to profit and loss.

When I say that paternalism is essential to leadership I use the term in its better sense. I do not now refer to that form of paternalism which robs men of initiative, self-reliance, and self-respect. I refer to the paternalism that manifests itself in a watchful care for the comfort and welfare of those in your charge.

Soldiers are much like children. You must see that they have shelter, food, and clothing, the best that your utmost efforts can provide. You must be far more solicitous of their comfort than of your own. You must see that they have food to eat before you think of your own; that they have each as good a bed as can be provided before you consider where you will sleep. You must look after their health. You must conserve their strength by not demanding needless exertion or useless labor.

And by doing all these things you are breathing life into what would be otherwise a mere machine. You are creating a soul in your organization that will make the mass respond to you as though it were one man. And that is esprit.

And when your organization has this esprit you will wake up some morning and discover that the tables have been turned; that
instead of your constantly looking out for them, they have, without
even a hint from you, taken up the task of looking out for you. You
will find that a detail is always there to see that your tent, if you have
one, is promptly pitched; that the most and the cleanest bedding is
brought to your tent; that from some mysterious source two eggs have
been added to your supper, when no one else has any; that an extra
man is helping your men give your horse a supergrooming; that your
wishes are anticipated; that every man is Johnny-on-the-spot. And
then you have arrived.

Fairness is another element without which leadership can neither
be built up nor maintained. There must be first that fairness which
treats all men justly. I do not say alike, for you cannot treat all men
alike — that would be assuming that all men are cut from the same
piece; that there is no such thing as individuality or a personal
equation.

You cannot treat all men alike; a punishment that would be
dismissed by one man with a shrug of the shoulders is mental anguish
for another. A company commander who for a given offense has a
standard punishment that applies to all is either too indolent or too
stupid to study the personality of his men. In his case justice is
certainly blind.

Study your men as carefully as a surgeon studies a difficult case.
And when you are sure of your diagnosis apply the remedy. And
remember that you apply the remedy to effect a cure, not merely to see
the victim squirm. It may be necessary to cut deep, but when you are
satisfied as to your diagnosis don’t be diverted from your purpose by any
false sympathy for the patient.

Hand in hand with fairness in awarding punishment walks fairness
in giving credit. Everybody hates a human hog.

When one of your men has accomplished an especially creditable
piece of work, see that he gets the proper reward. Turn heaven and
earth upside down to get it for him. Don’t try to take it away from
him and hog it for yourself. You may do this and get away with it,
but you have lost the respect and loyalty of your men. Sooner or
later your brother officers will hear of it and shun you like a leper. In
war there is glory enough for all. Give the man under you his due.
The man who always takes and never gives is not a leader. He is a
parasite.
There is another kind of fairness — that which will prevent an
officer from abusing the privileges of his rank. When you exact respect
from soldiers be sure you treat them with equal respect. Build up their
manhood and self-respect. Don’t try to pull it down.

For an officer to be overbearing and insulting in the treatment
of enlisted men is the act of a coward. He ties the man to a tree
with the ropes of discipline and then strikes him in the face, knowing
full well that the man cannot strike back.

Consideration, courtesy, and respect from officers toward enlisted
men are not incompatible with discipline. They are parts of our
discipline. Without initiative and decision no man can expect to lead.

In manoeuvres you will frequently see, when an emergency arises,
certain men calmly give instant orders which later, on analysis, prove
to be, if not exactly the right thing, very nearly the right thing to have
done. You will see other men in emergency become badly rattled; their
brains refuse to work, or they give a hasty order, revoke it; give
another, revoke that; in short, show every indication of being in a
blue funk.

Regarding the first man you may say: ‘That man is a genius.
He hasn’t had time to reason this thing out. He acts intuitively.’ Forget
it. ‘Genius is merely the capacity for taking infinite pains.’ The man
who was ready is the man who has prepared himself. He has studied
beforehand the possible situation that might arise, he has made tentative
plans covering such situations. When he is confronted by the emergency
he is ready to meet it.

He must have sufficient mental alertness to appreciate the problem
that confronts him and the power of quick reasoning to determine what
changes are necessary in his already formulated plan. He must have
also the decision to order the execution and stick to his orders.

Any reasonable order in an emergency is better than no order.
The situation is there. Meet it. It is better to do something and do
the wrong thing than to hesitate, hunt around for the right thing to do
and wind up by doing nothing at all. And, having decided on a line of
action, stick to it. Don’t vacillate. Men have no confidence in an
officer who doesn’t know his own mind.

Occasionally you will be called upon to meet a situation which
no reasonable human being could anticipate. If you have prepared
yourself to meet other emergencies which you could anticipate the mental training you have thereby gained will enable you to act promptly and with calmness.

You must frequently act without orders from higher authority. Time will not permit you to wait for them. Here again enters the importance of studying the work of officers above you. If you have a comprehensive grasp of the entire situation and can form an idea of the general plan of your superiors, that and your previous emergency training will enable you to determine that the responsibility is yours and to issue the necessary orders without delay.

The element of personal dignity is important in military leadership. Be the friend of your men, but do not become their intimate. Your men should stand in awe of you — not fear. If your men presume to become familiar it is your fault, not theirs. Your actions have encouraged them to do so.

And, above all things, don't cheapen yourself by courting their friendship or currying their favor. They will despise you for it. If you are worthy of their loyalty and respect and devotion they will surely give all these without asking. If you are not, nothing that you can do will win them.

And then I would mention courage. Moral courage you need as well as physical courage — that kind of moral courage which enables you to adhere without faltering to a determined course of action which your judgment has indicated as the one best suited to secure the desired results.

Every time you change your orders without obvious reason you weaken your authority and impair the confidence of your men. Have the moral courage to stand by your order and see it through.

Moral courage further demands that you assume the responsibility for your own acts. If your subordinates have loyally carried out your orders and the movement you directed is a failure, the failure is yours, not theirs. Yours would have been the honor had it been successful. Take the blame if it results in disaster. Don't try to shift it to a subordinate and make him the goat. That is a cowardly act.

Furthermore, you will need moral courage to determine the fate of those under you. You will frequently be called upon for recommendations for the promotion or demotion of officers and non-commissioned officers in your immediate command.
Keep clearly in mind your personal integrity and the duty you owe your country. Do not let yourself be deflected from a strict sense of justice by feeling of personal friendship. If your own brother is your second lieutenant, and you find him unfit to hold his commission, eliminate him. If you don't, your lack of moral courage may result in the loss of valuable lives.

If, on the other hand, you are called upon for a recommendation concerning a man whom, for personal reasons you thoroughly dislike, do not fail to do him full justice. Remember that your aim is the general good, not the satisfaction of an individual grudge.

I am taking it for granted that you have physical courage. I need not tell you how necessary that is. Courage is more than bravery. Bravery is fearlessness — the absence of fear. The merest dolt may be brave, because he lacks the mentality to appreciate his danger; he doesn't know enough to be afraid.

Courage, however, is that firmness of spirit, that moral backbone, which, while fully appreciating the danger involved, nevertheless goes on with the undertaking. Bravery is physical; courage is mental and moral. You may be cold all over; your hands may tremble; your legs may quake; your knees be ready to give way — that is fear. If, nevertheless, you go forward; if in spite of this physical defection you continue to lead your men against the enemy, you have courage. The physical manifestations of fear will pass away. You may never experience them but once. They are the 'buck fever' of the hunter who tries to shoot his first deer. You must not give way to them.

A number of years ago, while taking a course in demolitions, the class of which I was a member was handling dynamite. The instructor said regarding its manipulation: 'I must caution you gentlemen to be careful in the use of these explosives. One man has but one accident.' And so I would caution you. If you give way to the fear that will doubtless beset you in your first action, if you show the white feather, if you let your men go forward while you hunt a shell crater, you will never again have the opportunity of leading those men.

Use judgment in calling on your men for display of physical courage or bravery. Don't ask any man to go where you would not go yourself. If your common sense tells you that the place is too dangerous for you to venture into, then it is too dangerous for him. You know his life is as valuable to him as yours is to you.
Occasionally some of your men must be exposed to danger which you cannot share. A message must be taken across a fire-swept zone. You call for volunteers. If your men know you and know that you are 'right' you will never lack volunteers, for they will know your heart is in your work, that you are giving your country the best you have, that you would willingly carry the message yourself if you could. Your example and enthusiasm will have inspired them.

And, lastly, if you aspire to leadership, I would urge you to study men.

Get under their skins and find out what is inside. Some men are quite different from what they appear to be on the surface. Determine the workings of their minds.

Much of General Robert E. Lee's success as a leader may be ascribed to his ability as a psychologist. He knew most of his opponents from West Point days, knew the workings of their minds, and he believed that they would do certain things under certain circumstances. In nearly every case he was able to anticipate their movements and block the execution.

You do not know your opponent in this war in the same way. But you can know your own men. You can study each to determine wherein lies his strength and his weakness; which man can be relied upon to the last gasp and which cannot.

Know your men, know your business, know yourself.
The aim of this article is to show the extent of the German tank production in the First World War, the scope of their operations on the Western Front, and to what extent this experience may have attributed to the development of the Blitzkrieg concept as employed by their armies in the Second World War. Yet before we discuss these topics I think it would be of interest to the general reader to know how tracked AFVs received the name of 'tank', and to appreciate their origin.

Origins of the Tank

The word ‘tank’ first came into use in 1916, to describe a new armoured machine. To begin with their prototypes were referred to as ‘land-ships’; however, for security purposes, the name ‘water-carrier’ was proposed. It was later abbreviated to ‘tank’.

Much literature has been produced as to its origin. It all depended on what role was assigned to it on the field of battle. Historiographically the line of argument can be divided into two camps. Researchers with the experience of ‘blitzkrieg’ still fresh in their minds, consider the tank to be an armoured weapon that utilized the characteristics of high-speed mobility and shock. On the other hand most of the inter-war writers, with the experience of the Great War behind them, considered it to be
merely a defensive armoured shield, a crusher of barbed wire and destroyer of machine-gun nests. These men attributed its origins to such persons as Leonardo da Vinci who wrote in 1484:

I am building secure and covered chariots which are invulnerable, and when they advance with their guns into the midst of the foe, even the largest enemy masses must retreat; and behind them the infantry can follow in safety and without opposition.¹

the Hussite Chief, Zizka’s wagonlaager (1558), Voltaire (1770) and the Englishman James Cowan (1850) of whose invention Lord Palmerston commented ‘it was barbarous and uncivilized’. All writers agree, however, that the South Australian de Mole’s² design, produced in 1911, bore the closest relationship to the First World War tank. Yet before the war these drawings were rejected by the War Office, ending up as K. Macksey so eloquently depicts in some ‘frigid pigeon hole’.³

No one will dispute that it was Britain who pioneered tracked AFVs as a means of saving life on the battlefield in the First World War. Captain Wegner of the German Transport Corps had this to say: ‘The German War Department was in no way prepared to meet an entirely new situation when the English attacked with tanks, on September 15, 1916’.⁴ He attributed this to the negligence of the German High Command — that it:

is to blame for our failure in tank building...the high level in mechanical engineering that we had attained in Germany would undoubtedly have enabled us to develop the tank to perfection, provided that at the beginning of the War we had been familiar with the caterpillar traction system...in the fall of 1916 it was already too late to start building such a complicated weapon and reach mass production.⁵

The A7V

The genesis of German tank production is easy to trace. At an emergency meeting in Berlin on 23 October 1916, the A7V⁶ Committee was formed, a direct reaction to the demoralizing effects of the British tanks on the Somme in September. Captain Wegner was the Army’s liaison officer and Vollmer their chief design engineer. Within two months the committee had finalized on the design of their first tank — the A7V.

¹ War on Wheels, C. R. Kutz, p. 30.
² He lived in North Adelaide.
³ Tanks, K. Macksey, p. 16.
⁴ Fighting Tanks since 1916, Jones, Rarey and Icks, p. 104.
⁵ Ibd, p. 105.
⁶ A7V — Allgemeines Kriegsdepartement, 7 Abteilung Verkehrswesen — General War Department, 7 Traffic Section.
The A7V model was the only German designed combat tank to see action in the First World War. Prototypes such as the A7V/U and the proposed U2 and U3 which were modelled on the British Mark IVs, remained undeveloped because of material shortages in 1917-18: aero engines had a higher priority. The light tank prototypes the LK 1 and 2, which were copies of the British Tritton Chasers (Whippets), met a similar fate. The two 140-ton monster tanks (the K Wagens), which were being constructed at the Riebe-Kugellager factory in Berlin, were never completed. ⁷

Orders

An order for 100 A7Vs was agreed to on 1 December 1917. H. J. Nowarra in his book German Tanks, 1914-1968, considers the order was increased to 200. However, J. Foley in AFV 1914-'19, believes that whilst there was much discussion as to the increasing of the quota at the end of the month, the original order stood firm. As it happened the quota was never realized, only twenty of the original order for 100 were completed and used as tanks before the cessation of hostilities. ⁸

Limitations

From the specifications given to the engineers it seemed clear that the A7V would be a ‘mobile fortress — a heavily protected mobile gun to act in support of the infantry’. ⁹ Yet it was inevitable that such a hasty design — seven months from conception to prototype — would have its drawbacks. For instance, as the first tank v tank battle showed, the A7V was inclined to be top-heavy and had poor cross-country performance in comparison with the British Mark IVs, although not as bad as their French counterpart, the St. Chamond. Overall, in terms of performance it appears that the German tank crews infinitely preferred to operate captured British tanks when these were available. ¹⁰

Thus the A7V’s limitations are directly attributable to the components used. Its chassis was basically a crude improvisation of the American Holt agricultural tractor. The Germans freely acquired complete tractor units from this American company’s subsidiary in

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⁷ Tanks of World War I, Chamberlain and Ellis.
⁸ ibid, p. 64.
¹⁰ ibid, p. 58.
Austria. Originally the A7V was to have captured Russian Sokol 57 mm guns mounted front and rear; however shortage of this weapon meant that the design had to be modified to one gun apiece, mounted in the front.

Growth

Let us now view the growth of the German tank force. On 16 January 1917, a prototype with a wooden superstructure was ordered, and the first five production models built by the Bremmer Wagen Company were to be available on the 15th of July. In fact the first one was demonstrated to the German General Staff at Mainz on the 14th May. The first two tank companies were established on 29th September 1917, each with a planned establishment of five tanks. However, because of shortages of industrial resources 'it was not until December 1917 that enough armour plate became available to complete the first ten vehicles to equip these companies'.

Comparisons

Unlike the British, the Germans did not form a tanks corps. They were ad hoc specialists drawn from all services. Rather unjustly, I feel, Chamberlain and Ellis conclude from this that 'they thus lacked the fighting spirit and self-esteem of the Allied tank men'. Nowhere in Volkheim's account is there evidence of this; to the contrary, when they did sally forth they gave a good account of themselves.

Such a reading I suggest comes from Frank Mitchell's much publicized victory in the first tank v tank battle in history at Villers Bretonneux. In truth Mitchell did not knock the A7V out, it simply turned on its side, having reversed on to a steep bank. I submit that the first real tank battle was fought several hours later at Cachy. This battle the Germans convincingly won. Here an A7V knocked out one 'female' Mark IV and badly damaged another before its Sokol recoil mechanism jammed; by that time the British tanks had had enough, and with two of their vehicles set on fire 'left the field, being followed by machine-gun fire to within 200 yards of Cachy'. No more need

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11 Tanks of World War I, p. 63.
12 ibid, p. 66.
13 AFV 1914'19, p. 55.
be said about Chamberlain and Ellis's assumption that the German
tank men lacked morale simply because they were not formed into a
corps.

**Parallel Developments**

Parallel with the A7V development programme after Cambrai in
November 1917, captured British Mark IVs were towed off by the
Germans to Charleroi in Belgium where a large tank plant was erected.
Those which were serviceable were made up into *Beute Abteilungen*.15

On July the 7th, 1916, the Germans had either in the field or in training a total
of 8 *Abteilungen*, each of five tanks. Of these however, only three detachments
were equipped with the German A7V tank: of the remaining five, four were
using captured British Mk IVs, and one was using captured Whippets.16

Chamberlain and Ellis in *Tanks of World War I* not only agree
with such a reading but conclude, it is 'ironic British tanks played a more
important part in German tank actions than the A7V itself'.17

**False Assumption**

I submit that such a sweeping conclusion is erroneous, for when
we closely analyse the actual operations themselves an entirely different
appreciation evolves. Captured British Mark IVs did not play a more
substantial part in German mechanized operations than did the A7V
itself. I stumbled across this fact because two seemingly authoritative
sources on German tanks in the First World War, Lt Volkheim in
*Die Deutschen Kampfwagen im Weltkrieg*, and J. Foley in his work
‘AFV Sturmpanzerwagen’ *AFV 1914-19* are, at first glance, irreconcil-
able. I was only to resolve this dilemma by drawing up the chart below.

CHART 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>A7V Br Total</th>
<th>A7V Br Unspec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St Quentin</td>
<td>21 Mar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31 Mar</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villers Br.</td>
<td>24 Apr</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anine</td>
<td>24 May</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solissons</td>
<td>1 Jun</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rheims</td>
<td>1 Jun</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Metz</td>
<td>9 Jun</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rheims</td>
<td>9 Jun</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rheims</td>
<td>15 Jul</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baupaume</td>
<td>31 Aug</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fermencourt</td>
<td>La Sep</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambrai</td>
<td>8 Oct</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nth Cambrai</td>
<td>11 Oct</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Aubert</td>
<td>11 Oct</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* These five Mk IVs were soon immobilized. I have therefore discounted them from the
'actual sorties undertaken' column.)

15 *Beute Abteilungen* — captured tank sections.
16 *AFV 1914-19*, p. 59.
17 *Tanks of World War I*, p. 66.
From this chart it would appear that the Germans had undertaken fourteen tank operations. Of these fourteen the experts can only agree on the dates and locations of two. Yet of these two operations they still cannot agree on the number of A7Vs involved. Having closely read Volkheim’s combat history — the authenticity of which I do not doubt — and having consulted maps and Foley’s account, I find that Foley’s Aisne is the same as Volkheim’s Soisson, as are Foley’s Baupaume and Volkheim’s Fermincourt. Thirdly, Foley’s St Aubert and Volkheim’s North Cambrai are the same. Thus there are only eleven probable operations of which both men recognize eight. Of these eleven operations they indirectly agree on five.

**Corroborated Actions**

The five on which they indirectly agreed are:

1. *St Quentin, 21 March*: this operation, as can be seen from the later chart, comprised of 5 A7Vs (Abt 1) and 5 Mk IVs (Bte Abt 11). The total number of tanks engaged was 10, not Foley’s ‘approximately 20’.

2. *Villers-Bretonneux, 24 April*: this was the largest action fought by A7Vs. Abteilung 1, 2 and 3 were involved. Apparently only 13 out of the 14 made the start line. (Volkheim tells they only lost 1 A7V in that action: presumably the one that turned on its side after being engaged by No 1 Tank of A Coy 1 Bn Royal Tank Corps, commanded by 2Lt. Frank Mitchell.) Foley considered there were 14.

3. *Aisne/Soissons, 1st June*: Foley tells us that 12 unspecified armoured vehicles were seen in action at Aisne on the 24th of May. In actual fact this operation took place on 1st June, exactly one week later. Three A7Vs and eight Mk IVs were involved (elements from Abts 1, 11, 12, 13 and 14). Two A7Vs and two Mk IVs had failed to reach the start line. Furthermore tank No. 3 of Abteilung 1 — an A7V — did not get far from the start line before developing engine trouble, which was not rectified before the others returned; only 10 were effectively employed.

4. *Baupaume/Fermincourt, late September*: Foley tells us, on the 31st August 3 A7Vs were seen in action and 2 were captured later in the subsequent advance. Yet, as can be seen from Volkheim’s account ‘an unsuccessful attack was made

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18 These are St Quentin, 21 March 1918, and Villers-Bretonneux, 24 April 1918.
19 For St Quentin Foley considers there were approximately 20 whilst Volkheim tells us there were 10.
20 24 May 1918.
21 1st June 1918: The Allies were at Soissons, the Germans at Aisne.
22 31 August 1918 and 1 September 1918 respectively.
23 This argument is taken up later.
24 Foley mentions that these tanks were unable to cross a wide trench in the French sector (Dardanelles trench). Volkheim tells us that on 1st June — talking about Abteilung 1 ‘Tanks No. 1 and 2 became ditched in a tank trap in the French front line and could not move forward. These tanks were in plain view, and the enemy artillery became very active so the detachment commander ordered the tanks to turn back’.
25 Tanks No. 4 and 5 of Abt 1 and Tanks No. 2 and 3 of Bte Abt.
26 This tank was taken in tow by the others on their return.
with A7V tanks towards the end of September in the Cambrai-Baupaume region. Orders were received at 11 p.m. for the attack which was to start at 5.35 a.m. An approach march of 20 kilometres had to be made and only 3 of the 5 tanks used succeeded in entering the action. The German infantry was evidently not notified in time.... Two of the tanks were disabled by fire from their own troops.27

5. North Cambrail/St Aubert, 11th October: Foley tells us that on that day at St Aubert, 4 A7Vs were all hit by artillery fire. To this Volkheim would agree, except that there were initially 10 tanks involved in the action, 5 A7Vs and 5 captured Mk IVs. The fate of the MK IVs being they 'were unable to make much progress due partly to the terrain and were all immobilized within a short time'.28

Uncorroborated Actions

To the list of corroborated actions above we can safely add

(a) Volkheim's Rheims and Metz operations on the 1st and 9th of June respectively: both actions are well documented.

(b) Foley's 3 tanks being seen in action 'without marked effect'29 on the 9th of June.

This leaves us with only Foley's 20 'unspecified' at Rheims on the 15th of July, and his 11 A7Vs and 4 German Mk IVs at Cambrai on the 8th of October, to be accounted for.

If we discount these two operations (i.e., use Volkheim's statistics in Chart 1) it can be seen that out of a total of 68 sorties forty-eight were undertaken by German A7Vs. If we include these operations on our list and use Foley's statistics30 we can see that thirty-eight sorties were undertaken by the A7Vs, seventeen by captured Mk IVs and twenty-three unspecified. Either way such figures tend to show Chamberlain an Ellis's assumption that British tanks 'played a more important part in German tank actions than the A7V itself'31 to be erroneous.

Nowarra's Statement

In the light of my findings with respect to Chart 1, I began to suspect the authenticity of H. J. Nowarra's statement in German Tanks 1914-1968 that 'by the end of April 1918 seventy-five captured tanks were in service with German units'.32 As a consequence I drew up a second chart (Chart No. 2). This was taken directly from data contained in Volkheim's combat tank history.33

As can be seen from Chart 2, the recovery rate of German tank sections was quite high until October 1918.

27 Fighting Tanks since 1916, p. 104.
28 ibid, p. 104.
29 AFV 1914'19 'A7V Sturmpanzerwagen', J. Foley, p. 64.
30 Foley's actions that are not mentioned by Volkheim, i.e. footnote (5) and the corrected statistics -- where indirectly they both agree. Loc cit., p. 95.
31 Tanks of World War I, p. 66.
32 German Tanks 1914-68, p. 4.
33 Fighting Tanks since 1916, p. 95.
If we add to this the fact that the Mk IVs met an uncertain fate at Charleroi, it was impossible to protect the tanks against theft and wanton destruction at the hands of our own troops: and at the time prize money was given in order to obtain and protect the valuable and unreplaceable parts of the instruments. Transmissions were blown up and motors broken in order to obtain an insignificant piece of brass. Owing to the need for manpower the Armee Ober Kommand was disinclined to furnish guards for the tanks. Then it seems quite reasonable to presume — from Chart 1 we see that the numbers taking part in the operations were quite small — that the few Mark IV tanks that were reconditioned were used over and over again in these operations. If this assumption is to hold then H. J. Nowarra’s statement in German Tanks 1914-68 that ‘by the end of April 1918, 75 captured tanks were in service with German units’ is highly spurious. My charts show that the Germans never had more than 30 operational tanks — captured British or German — at any one time in the field.

Experience

What experience then did the Germans gain from their Mechanized Operations 1917-18? Captain Wegner makes it clear:

**Experience**

 Tanks to ensure success must be used in large numbers and this in turn demands mass production. But with the abnormal shortage and labour this could not be done without curtailing production of other important war materials. Hence, the tank was a field in which we were forced, with heavy hearts but through necessity, to let the enemy take the lead.

**Conclusion**

We must conclude that it was left to the Allies to develop the tactical deployment of tanks in the First World War, as was instanced by Cambrai, Hamel, and the 8th October — Aisne. The origins of the phenomena that would be ‘Blitzkreig 1940’ could only be a development of post-World War One Germany.

**Notes**

54 Lt Volkheim’s statistics take the form of a tank combat history, in which he comprehensively details the actions and fortunes of each tank. From such an account I was able to make up Chart 2.

55 Fighting Tanks since 1916, p. 105 (Captain Wegner).
Female Officers and Soldiers

I have no wish to quarrel with the views expressed by Lance Corporal M. L. J. Smith in his article 'Where have all the young girls gone?' published in the December 1974 issue of the Army Journal. Indeed, I heartily support them.

However, despite this general agreement, I consider that in referring throughout his article to 'WRAAC' he has inadvertently obscured the real problem.

How much more impressive his arguments would have been had he referred in all cases to 'female officers and soldiers' or even to 'female members'. Use of this terminology would probably have led him then to question why the WRAAC exists at all.

WRAAC is the only non-task-oriented Corps in the Army. By far the greatest numbers of its members are of it but are employed outside it. As a result, employment opportunities are severely limited, as are promotion prospects, particularly for officers. (It is not widely known that officers of the WRAAC are promoted to the rank of major by selection against a fixed establishment, not automatically on time and qualification as are male officers).

There would appear to be no logical reason why female members should not be enlisted directly into Corps of employment in the same way as males, or why female officers should not be included in the General List and be allocated to Corps of employment. Specious arguments concerning 'male' or 'female' postings would be overcome by common sense and normal selection procedures.
Finally I suggest we should abandon once and for all the self-deluding myth of an all-male ‘Profession of Arms’. Like any other profession it is open equally to both sexes.

Lieutenant Colonel W. F. Sorsby

Community Services Research Team
DPS-A, Army Office
Canberra

Role of the ATS

Lance Corporal Smith’s ‘Where have all the young girls gone?’ (Army Journal, December 1974) outlines a case that will attract some considerable support ... and a deal of opposition from the traditionalists.

His case could have been made stronger had he researched in even modest depth, the role of the ATS in the United Kingdom during the 1939-45 war, particularly the activities of those who served in the Anti-Aircraft Regiments defending the country.

HQ DSG NQ
Townsville, Queensland

Major E. J. Patterson
THE LATEST IMPROVEMENTS IN ARTILLERY

By invitation of a well-known official, I visited the Navy-Yard yesterday, and witnessed the trial of some newly-invented rifled cannon. The trial was of short duration, and the jury brought in a verdict of 'innocent of any intent to kill'.

The first gun tried was similar to those used in the Revolution, except that it had a larger touch-hole, and the carriage was painted green, instead of blue. This novel and ingenious weapon was pointed at a target about sixty yards distant. It didn't hit it, and as nobody saw any ball, there was much perplexity expressed. A midshipman did say that he thought the ball must have run out of the touch-hole when they loaded up — for which comment he was instantly expelled from the Service. After a long search without finding the ball, there was some thought of summoning the Naval Retiring Board to decide on the matter, when somebody happened to look into the mouth of the cannon, and discovered that the ball hadn't gone out at all. The inventor said this would happen sometimes, especially if you didn't put a brick over the touch-hole when you fired the gun. The government was so pleased with this explanation, that it ordered forty guns on the spot, at two hundred thousand dollars apiece. The guns to be furnished as soon as the war was over.

The next weapon tried was Jink's double-action revolving cannon for ferry-boats. It consisted of a heavy bronze tube, revolving on a pivot, with both ends open, and touch-hole in the middle. While one gunner puts a load in at one end, another puts a load in at the other end, and one touch-hole serves for both. Upon applying the match, the gun is whirled swiftly around on its pivot, and both balls fly out in circles, causing great slaughter on both sides. This terrible engine was aimed at the target with great accuracy; but as the gunner has a large family dependent on him for support, he refused to apply the match. The government was satisfied without firing, and ordered six of the guns at a million dollars apiece. The guns to be furnished in time for the next war.

The last weapon subject to trial was a mountain howitzer of a new pattern. The inventor explained that its great advantage was, that it required no powder. In battle it is placed on a high mountain, and a ball is slipped loosely into it. As the enemy passes the foot of the mountain, the gunner in charge tips over the howitzer, and the ball rolls down the side of the mountain into the midst of the doomed foe.

The range of this terrible weapon depends greatly on the height of the mountain, and the distance to its base. The government ordered forty of the mountain howitzers at a hundred thousand dollars apiece, to be delivered and planted on the first mountain discovered in the enemy's country.

These are great times for gunsmiths my boy; and if you find any old cannon around the junk shops, just send them along . . . .