ARMY JOURNAL
No. 313 JUNE 1975
Printed and published for the Australian Army by The Ruskin Press Pty. Ltd. and issued through Supply Battalions on the scale of one per officer, officer of cadets, and cadet under officer.

Contributions, which should be addressed to the Editor, Army Journal, Department of Defence (Army Office), Canberra A.C.T. 2600, are invited from all ranks of the Army, Cadet Corps and Reserve of Officers.

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General Adam, Adjutant General of The Forces (UK) with a veteran of World War I — 2nd Forestry Coy, Horsham,
Which way for tactical intelligence after Vietnam

Major Marc B. Powe, United States Army

With the conclusion of American participation in the Vietnam War, it is time to mothball the combat intelligence system again. The specialists can be put in salt caves so they will not deteriorate while awaiting the next war. A little research will maintain US Army tactical intelligence capabilities on a par with our adversaries and will also keep them compatible with our own field forces, eliminating a requirement to put intelligence into our training establishment. In an emergency, the system can be turned on instantly.

Ridiculous? Of course. But this has been the traditional approach in the American Army to tactical intelligence in peacetime. Until the Vietnam era, the Army always had to create a combat intelligence system, from scratch, under fire. There was a different approach employed in Vietnam, and it might be instructive to examine briefly circumstances leading up to that new approach. From that historical perspective, we should be able to draw some conclusions about postwar tactical intelligence and intelligence support to the echelons above division (EAD) concept.

After World War I, Army Chief of Staff Peyton C. March commented about the entire Army intelligence capability:

"... I found the Military Intelligence an unimportant section of another General Staff division. It is unbelievable, but when we entered the war it consisted of two officers and two clerks."

It was from that slender root that the successful intelligence service of the American Expeditionary Forces grew.

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Following World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote:

*Within the War Department, a shocking deficiency that impeded all constructive planning existed in the field of intelligence . . . during the years between the two World Wars no funds were provided with which to establish the basic requirement of an intelligence system—a far-flung organization of fact finders.*

In Korea, General Matthew B. Ridgway was pleased with the work of his intelligence specialists when he got them, but he bemoaned the fact that it took so long (almost a year) to get them. The reason, quite simply, was that, between the closing of the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, in 1945 and the re-establishment of intelligence courses at the Army Ground General School at Fort Riley, Kansas, in mid-1950, there was no training of combat intelligence personnel.

Interestingly, each of these leaders cited the American Army's lack of an intelligence organization at the start of the respective war, then lauded the intelligence system created by war's end. This is no coincidence. Combat intelligence has been practised in America since the Revolutionary War, but it was only given a structure in 1885 when the Bureau of Military Information was established in the War Department. In each of our wars until Vietnam, the Army had to create a field intelligence apparatus while at war. Beginning with nothing, those designated to do intelligence work (often combat arms officers and men) consistently have risen to the occasion. But it took valuable time in each war.

To be fair, it must also be noted that, after World War I, there was a skeletal intelligence organization in the Army, notably the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) (a forebearer of ASA, the Army Security Agency) and the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) (parent organization of the Counter-intelligence Corps and Intelligence Command (CIC)).

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Furthermore, intelligence officers were assigned to all tactical intelligence units from 1921 onward. But the SIS/ASA and CIP/CIC were specialist organizations, not aimed at the tactical intelligence service, and the S2/G2 position was frequently seen as a dumping ground for misfits.

What made Vietnam any different then? Or was it? The answer is that it was, for several reasons. First of all, a body of experience was carried forward by both Active duty soldiers and Reservists from World War II through Korea and into the post-Korean years. Next, some of the intelligence men who had experienced tactical intelligence problems in Korea made determined efforts to ensure that those problems would not be repeated. Out of their efforts came the Military Intelligence Organization (MIO) concept. Promulgated in 1958, the MIO was a milestone. It provided for the tailoring of intelligence specialists into units to support tactical units on a full-time basis. From separate regiment or brigade on up, it was intended that each tactical formation would have a dedicated Military Intelligence (MI) unit. The MI unit would contain at a minimum specialists in counter-intelligence, imagery intelligence, interrogation and order of battle analysis.

The US Army Intelligence School was established in 1954 at Fort Holabird, Maryland, (where the CIC school had existed separately since 1945), and personnel were trained for all the specialties from that time forward. While the school did not produce enough trained personnel at first, it was certainly a nucleus for tactical support.⁶

ASA, while not a part of the MIO concept, developed a parallel approach to tactical support. It was intended that every tactical unit would be supported by an ASA unit. The ASA Training Center and School at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, provided a steady flow of personnel for both tactical and strategic missions.

Another critical event was the establishment of the Army Intelligence and Security (AIS) branch in 1962, providing for the first time a Regular Army home for individuals who wished to be intelligence professionals. At one stroke, this provided the basis to develop experts in combat (and strategic) intelligence, and it did away with the unpleasant requirement of forcing officers to serve intelligence tours away from their assigned branch.

It was the combination of wartime experience, the MIO doctrine, the creation of a training base, and the birth of the AIS branch that prepared Army intelligence for Vietnam.

Perhaps it is not too surprising that the first American killed in the Vietnam War (in 1961), Specialist 4 James Davis, was an intelligence man. A member of the 3d Radio Research Unit, an ASA organization, he was assigned to advisory duty at the time of his death. In fact, American intelligence advisors had been working with the Vietnamese since about 1959. As the pace of assistance quickened, more soldiers were sent over to intelligence assignments: province intelligence advisors and the first Mohawk airplane unit went in 1962; in 1964, district advisory teams were established throughout Vietnam with a mission that included providing intelligence advice.7

As the American buildup began in 1965, MI units were deployed in significant numbers. Each separate tactical unit which deployed had with it an MI Detachment. If a supporting ASA organization did not deploy with the division, then it came right behind it. G2 and S2 shops had the full complement of MI specialists available to them from the outset.

Theater-level intelligence was handled by J2, MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam), which was manned by a large number of both MI specialist personnel, and officers with necessary skills from other branches. By the end of 1966, the J2, Major General Joseph A. McChristian, had created a group of combined intelligence centers in Saigon to specialize in document exploitation, interrogation of prisoners of war, technical intelligence, and intelligence analysis. Of significance to this discussion, the creation of these centers was a direct outgrowth of the cellular TOE concepts written into the MIO in 1958.8

From the foregoing, it can be seen that Army intelligence was clearly better prepared for this war than had been the case in any previous conflict. Organizationally speaking, Army intelligence appears to have been a success in the Vietnam War.

Based on a study of the history of the intelligence art, this writer concludes that Army intelligence was qualitatively better in Vietnam than in previous wars because there was a better intelligence system in support of the tactical forces. This by no means ignores the fact that

there were some serious shortcomings in the system. What it says is that improvements in both technology and intelligence concepts created a system more responsive to the tactical commander’s needs than in any previous war. Thus, for the future, we should concentrate on exploiting the success of the Vietnam-proven system and correcting the shortcomings.

To take a typical division as an example, we can see that there was an impressive number of intelligence resources available. First of all, the division had an organic Military Intelligence Detachment (later an MI company) which provided the majority of the collectors and analysts working full-time for the division G2. Intelligence came immediately from the direct support ASA unit; this unit supported theater and national requirements, too, and was not a full-time dedicated asset to the division. Information was provided also by Americans advising Vietnamese intelligence units and Vietnamese tactical units, provincial and district advisors, and the theater combined intelligence centers and J2, MACV. Frequently, information from nondivisional collectors was of background, rather than immediate, tactical value because of delay in its production and transmission, but this intelligence, too, has its place.

A variety of surveillance systems, including radar, unattended ground sensors, Mohawks, and long-range reconnaissance patrols reported to G2 and S2 with relatively timely information. Photography flown by the Air Force was provided by supporting Army MIBARS (MI battalion, air reconnaissance support) detachments.9

The key in Vietnam was response. By having dedicated intelligence specialists organic to the division from the outset, the divisional intelligence system was immediately capable of greater response to the commander. The creation of the MI branch had also provided by the late 1960s ample numbers of officers who wanted to do intelligence work; it was no longer necessary to depend exclusively on impressed combat arms officers for G2 and S2 positions. Beginning in 1968, most divisions had an MI officer as the G2. Furthermore, the ability to make a career in intelligence had made available a large body of NCOs who were both highly motivated and qualified to perform at division or brigade or battalion, as advisors to the Vietnamese or at J2, MACV.

What, then, of the shortcomings mentioned above? They existed, as anyone who used intelligence or helped produce it in Vietnam knows.

The problems were largely a factor of time — and that bugaboo, response. Communications had not kept pace with the ability to gather intelligence, so information was too often unreasonably delayed in reaching the consumer. Centralization of capabilities in Saigon, while helpful in conserving manpower, slowed down the handling of information. And the hierarchy of headquarters through which information flowed upward and intelligence flowed downward also slowed the process.

Credibility was also a problem at times. Some intelligence units and individuals persisted in the outmoded "cloak-and-dagger" approach to their service. Instead of saying simply to the commanders involved, "I believe the 273d VC Regiment is moving from here to there because I received this information from such and such a source which has been pretty reliable in the past . . .", they tried to be mysterious. While this kind of secrecy was sometimes required because of the sensitivity of the intelligence-gathering method, more often than not it could have been avoided.

Commanders who moved their units in response to these mysterious intelligence reports, but failed to find the enemy, sometimes became quite sceptical about both the source and the intelligence men who provided the data. A more straightforward description of the information and its origin might have prevented ill will.

Another problem was caused by some intelligence officers forgetting the basic lessons of their trade. They did not take the time to analyse. They did not try to put together a composite picture from multiple sources. Instead they let their affection for a particular agency or type of information trap them in the "single source syndrome." Even worse, some few tried to achieve a daily "scoop" for the commander by handing him raw and possibly untrue information under the guise of vital intelligence.

On the other hand, a few commanders became too concerned about the exact details of where intelligence was obtained. Instead of hiring an intelligence officer they trusted explicitly, they tried to run G2 operations too. While this may have worked occasionally, it more often led to unproductive animosity among the personalities involved.

Related to the credibility problem was the fact that relatively few MI officers served as brigade or battalion S2s. In part, this was because initially there were not enough qualified individuals to go around. Per-
haps the more important factor was that many combat arms commanders did not want an "unknown quantity" for their intelligence officer; they preferred to use infantrymen (or artillerymen or tankers) because of their presumably superior knowledge of tactics and field operations. A few MI officers who did have the opportunity to serve as S2s at that level failed because they did not understand their units, their commanders, or both. In short, the mere creation of a Regular Army branch for intelligence did not automatically put MI officers into the S2 billets at maneuver unit level.

While the battalion or brigade S2 might still have been a combat arms officer, he was glad to have the services of the intelligence system of the division and to employ MI sergeants and specialists. Typically, the S2 was assisted by a sergeant and an analyst trained at Fort Holabird; he received information from radars and unattended ground sensors; he got readouts from Mohawks or Air Force photography; he received ASA reports; and he worked harmoniously with an MI officer as division G2.

In short, if intelligence results were better in Vietnam, it was because of better integration of the component parts into a more responsive intelligence system. Where intelligence failed in Vietnam, it was often because of a lack of timeliness and responsiveness.

Without making excuses, it should also be noted that Vietnam presented particularly difficult problems for intelligence — the fluid situation that normally existed, the fleeting nature of engagements, and the fact that neither side was particularly concerned about physically holding terrain. By the time that an intelligence officer had come to understand some of what was going on, his 12 months were usually about over. In retrospect, perhaps it would have been better if at least a nucleus of intelligence personnel had been required to serve longer tours.

The war ended before some of the important questions about intelligence support to the tactical Army could be resolved. They must be addressed now. For example, what should be the relationship between the divisional MI unit and the division? (In Vietnam, they were organic, but the MIO had conceived of them as attached.) In a related area, should the new surveillance devices like unattended ground sensors and radar be incorporated into the divisional MI unit? (This was often done in the case of the ground sensors in Vietnam.) What
should be the basis of issue of the new surveillance devices? What about ASA? What should be its relationship to the tactical units it supports?

How are we to improve the management and dissemination of the highly perishable intelligence we can foresee in future wars? Should additional MI personnel be attached to maneuver battalions and brigades to aid in handling information and intelligence? Testing of this idea was done in Vietnam by the 1st Infantry Division in 1968, and the results indicated that there was much merit in having a battlefield information center (BIC) attached to each intelligence shop from division to battalion. The BIC was able to handle more data more rapidly because of additional personnel and dedicated communications — that is, a BIC net. It helped the commanders involved because it made possible centralized management of intelligence with rapid transmission of intelligence throughout the system from the decentralized collectors. Further testing of the BIC concept at Fort Hood, Texas, has validated the success it had in The Big Red One.\textsuperscript{10}

In short, there are plenty of questions to be answered. The proof that they need to be addressed immediately is all around us — as American military forces decrease in size, they must depend on better intelligence to meet situations before they reach crisis proportions. In fact, on any battlefield where we are likely to engage in the near future, we are likely to be outmanned; intelligence will be the key to survival in such circumstances. Furthermore, in the competition for manpower spaces and dollars in the Army of the 70s, it would be all too easy to shunt off intelligence as being "something we can pick up if we have to go to war." Such an attitude could be completely wrong, as Pearl Harbor, the North Korean attack against the South in 1950, and the October 1973 alert would seem to prove. To reiterate, these questions must be addressed now.

We are fortunate in that American military experience offers some sharp contrasts in "good" and "bad" intelligence work. From an analysis of this history, particularly in light of the Vietnam experience, some conclusions about what Army intelligence should do in the future seem obvious and are offered below. While they are oversimplified for brevity, it is hoped, nonetheless, that they will suffice to stimulate thought and discussion on this vital topic.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., pp. 118-19.
First, it is clear that the tactical intelligence system must remain viable in peacetime, both as a hedge against sudden war and to play a part in peacetime training of tactical units. We can all agree that “simulating” an attack on a hill is no substitute for actually doing the job; “simulating” tactical intelligence by having a handful of “canned” messages is no better. If our soldiers are to ever become intelligence conscious — if our G3s are to write realistic plans that are subject to being smashed by an uncooperative enemy then we must play tactical intelligence in peacetime exercises. Furthermore, if our G2s, S2s and their assistants are to be able to support their units effectively when the balloon goes up, they must practice with the unit beforehand. In short, each division’s intelligence team must support it in peacetime as nearly as possible as the way it will in war. Without that intelligence team, the division simply cannot be combat ready.

Next, intelligence officers — G2s and S2s — in our tactical units should be MI officers, just as the intelligence NCOs and specialists are already MI. There is sufficient evidence that the motivated MI officer can overcome any initial problems he may experience when assigned to a combat arms unit; what he lacks in knowledge of, for example, infantry operations should be more than overcome by his superior knowledge of intelligence work that is needed by the commander. Because he is MI, he will want to be in the S2 shop and will not seek constantly to get a company. Because he is trained in intelligence management, he can take a burden off the entire staff by anticipating their requirements for information about the enemy, the weather, lines of communication, landing zones and the like. This does not overlook the fact that some MI officers will do better than others — but that is a training and/or a personnel management problem. At present about 70 per cent of the Army’s combat arms brigades and maneuver battalions have MI officers as S2s. All of the division G2s are MI. Thus, it appears that the intelligence professional can do the job.11

Next, since there is no substitute for integrated intelligence, the Army of the 70s must plan to accept nothing less. This means that the BIC system (by whatever name) should be implemented throughout the Army. With the vast array of collection agencies and systems made available during and after the Vietnam War (unattended ground sensors, radar, night vision devices) added to the long-established systems (signal

11 Information provided by Military Intelligence Branch, Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., April 1974.
intelligence, prisoner interrogation, photo intelligence), it should be apparent that improvements in the traditional G2/S2 system of managing and disseminating intelligence are required. The division's intelligence/operations communications net, for example, will be completely overloaded by the data from ground sensors and radar alone. Furthermore, Vietnam demonstrated the need for collection management to be centralized at division, with tasking going to higher, adjacent and especially lower units who are collecting. The BIC concept can help solve these problems.

Finally, we must define the organization to provide intelligence support for the EAD. The MIO concept, as good as it was, was based on the field army and will not readily adapt to corps support. Fortunately, we have already identified in the preceding paragraphs some of the characteristics the EAD intelligence organization must have: it must provide at least semipermanent relationships between each tactical unit and its intelligence unit; it must provide for integrated intelligence, centralized management, and response to command; and it must take into account the full range of collection systems.

The EAD MI organization should be based on corps (rather than theater) because it is tactical. It should provide an umbrella over the existing specialist units as a means to eliminating redundant claims for personnel. Since these specialist units are of company and battalion size, it would appear that an MI group at corps would be logical. This group would then be the parent organization for the aerial surveillance company, ASA battalion, MI company (which contains the traditional counterintelligence, interrogation, and analysis personnel), any corps ground surveillance devices, and the Ranger company. Linking these units under the administration of a single group will give the corps commander (through the G2) better control and will result in improved intelligence.

At division, responsiveness to command must also dominate. Therefore, an organic MI battalion should be given to each division, incorporating the existing intelligence and surveillance organization of the division: the MI company, the ASA company, radars and ground sensors, and, if provided, any Ranger unit. The MI battalion would be well-suited to provide for the BICs, linking all intelligence collectors into the management and dissemination system. Additionally, the MI battalion could effectively administer any intelligence units attached to the division for a particular mission.
The proposed MI organizations for the EAD, providing an umbrella over the somewhat splintered intelligence support now existing, offers significant advantages over the MIO. It would improve intelligence management, improve the integration of the various kinds of information, and support the new concepts and systems developed in Vietnam. At the same time, it will reduce overhead by consolidating common functions like personnel administration, mess and maintenance.

The disadvantages of creating an umbrella-style MI group at corps and MI battalion at division are primarily technical in nature: for example, ASA units have unique reporting requirements and channels. It appears, however, that the problems associated with grouping these units are more tolerable than having several units, all collecting information, but not associated except in the G2 office.

In conclusion, the importance of the question of preparing our tactical intelligence system for the future cannot be overstated. Our experience has been that war comes like lightning; we cannot wait until it begins to determine how intelligence support will be rendered. The situation was prophesized by General Pershing's World War I intelligence officer, Major General Dennis E. Nolan in 1921:

*My fear is that in the pressure of many things, claiming time for training, our Army may lapse into the pre-war days in its attitude toward the whole question of combat intelligence and that information regarding the enemy for our tactical problems and in our maneuvers will be based on the old and easy assumption that all information needed of the enemy is obtained from an enemy inhabitant.)*

Let us move now to create a stream-lined, effective system which will, as far as possible, ensure that the commander has the intelligence he needs to survive a first blow and go on to mission accomplishment.

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HOW TO HIT THE BARN DOOR

OR

THE COMPETITIVE SIDE OF THE COIN

Lieutenant Colonel R. F. Stuart
Royal Australian Infantry

'It is to be understood that games and sports are an official form of training. As such they have a legitimate demand on time and resources and they are to receive adequate support.'

—Army Training Directive 1974

'... after all, it (shooting) is the basic military skill and we have never been good enough at it.'

—Army Training Directive 1972/73

I reckon that the average Australian Army rifleman could not hit the side of a barn with a sack of wheat. Oh rubbish! you say — Australians have always been able to shoot! You may go on to quote that frayed argument heard so many times in the pubs and RSL clubs of our fair land — down with the plough, up with the gun, and all that pre-1914 'jazz'.

But before you disagree with my conviction about that barn door, you had better first check your facts. Do you know how many bullets we used to inflict just one enemy casualty in Vietnam? You might be surprised if you took the trouble to find out; the information is available.

Lieutenant Colonel Stuart graduated from RMC in 1959. He has served with 2RAR, 3RAR, PIR and Infantry Centre, and attended Australian Staff College in 1971. Lieutenant Colonel Stuart has competed in eight eliminations for the Queen's Medal since 1958, and has won a place in the finals of that competition three times. He has represented 2 Military District in the Inter-services Shooting Cup, three times and top-scored in that competition in 1970.

Lieutenant Colonel Stuart is currently employed with the Directorate of Personnel Support, Personnel Branch (Army Office).
Or to bring it closer to home. 1974, October, and the 2 Military District Stage 1 elimination for the Queen's Medal at Holsworthy Range. Forty-three starters, including Infantry, Armour, RAEME, RAAOC and Signals. A highest attainable score of 300 points in 6 practices over 200 and 300 metres. The result — five shooters scored above 50 per cent of the highest possible score. The enemy would have been reasonably safe on that day!

The basic and unpalatable truth is that the marksmanship of the Australian Army is at a low ebb. We have a small band of dedicated shooters who achieve good results in each year's finals of the Queen's Medal competition. However, those twenty or so gravel-bellied experts are as far divorced from Mister 'Average Shooter' as the crew of the Southern Cross was separated from the family crew of a Corsair on Port Phillip Bay. I doubt if the rest of the Army is capable of consistently hitting a man-sized target at 300 metres — our generally accepted marksmanship aim.

The diagnosis is clear. What is the remedy?

This question — how to improve marksmanship — has been massaged, masticated and mused over for a number of years. Unfortunately, nothing constructive seems to me to come out of the proverbial sausage machine. I've heard about suggestions that we should gather teams of experts to explore the problem 'in depth' by touring the world and learning how other countries get on with the job. With a little imagination we can visualize the teams discussing techniques with Eskimo seal hunters, or Northern Territory croc shooters, and drawing on the expertise of the world's leading researchers and weapons engineers.

Deep down, we'll all agree that as an Army we have lost expertise in one of our most basic skills. We'll also concede that we should tap in on the widest advice available to correct this deficiency.

But this one approach will not solve the problem immediately; 'think-tanking' and research take an age to achieve results. Meanwhile, waiting in the wings, we have Mister 'Average Rifleman' to look after. What the research team is discovering by talking to that Eskimo seal hunter is of no immediate value to him on the Holsworthy Range today. What he needs now is the incentive to develop his skills. And one of the ways he'll get incentive is through competition.

Competition — the keyword in what is one of the main mill-stones around the neck of marksmanship improvement in this man's Army. As
the Baron de Coubertin said, in connection with the Olympic Games in 1908,

"The most important thing ... is not winning but taking part."

Competition is an essential component to improve performance in any worthwhile sport or skill — whether it be a team or individual effort.

Herein lies the deficiency — there is just not enough competition to go around — there is not enough activity to attract and hold the interest of the majority of our shooters. Apart from the Queen’s Medal, proposed visits to Bisley and a handful of competitions arranged within individual corps, there is nothing to satisfy the Army at large.

Our major shooting event — the Queen’s Medal — goes nowhere near the requirement for widespread competition. Admittedly, Stage 1 of the eliminations is theoretically open to all. In practice it attracts only about 400 of our shooters annually. It is held once a year. Over two or three days of eliminations — viewed collectively — some 400 shooters are reduced to about 20 final contestants for the finals. Sudden death to the ‘also-rans’!

Under its current rules the Queen’s Medal keeps the handful of specialist shooters motivated — indeed some of them will be happy to die of old age on the mound in the middle of the 300 metres rapid. But these are a special breed — self-motivated achievers, fanatics, or even freaks — call them what you will. Two minutes silence to think about the majority — those who failed to get to the finals. Will they return to try again in a year’s time? In my experience very few do. There is just not enough incentive to motivate them towards a grand competition one year away, and with no lead-up competition.

Even if we were to change the elimination rules for the Queen’s Medal, and allow for a more progressive elimination, we would still not be tackling the main problem — that of continuity of widespread competition throughout the year.

Clearly then we need a wider spread of competition. We need a programme of competitions which will attract the majority and also offer the opportunity and incentive to improve. I suggest that this should be done at three levels.

First. We need an organized programme of intra-unit and inter-unit competitive shooting — weekly. These meetings could be on either the open ranges or on our 25 metre ranges. With scaled down targets and a little imagination, we can achieve a lot at 25 metres. These weekly
competitions should be run on the same basis and priority as other Army sports. We move mountains to get our Rugby teams geared up. Why don’t we do the same with our shooters?

**Second.** Each military district should run monthly week-end prize competitions at ranges accessible to the majority of shooters in the district. More than one venue may be necessary in the wider spread military districts. These competitions would be open to all services — RAN, Army and RAAF, including the Reserve and School Cadets.

The meetings would be run by teams or cells nominated by the military district headquarters — we could use retired servicemen for the key positions such as butts and range officers. We would need proper financial backing so that civilian markers could be used. Then there would be no major imposition on units to press-gang range staff for the week-end.

Entry fees would be asked from individuals and unit teams competing. In return worthwhile prizes would be offered for both open and handicapped events. Competition would consist of both individual and teams events.

**Third.** The culmination of the military district monthly competitions would be an annual prize shoot — with bigger prizes and a wide variety of events — once again handicapped and open, individual and team.

These competition series would:

* provide continuity of competition;
* offer a venue for the keen shooter and unit team, requiring no more effort from the individual shooter than drawing his rifle from the unit armoury and organizing himself to the range;
* by an effective handicap system, give the beginner an even chance of winning;
* promote healthy inter-service rivalry and competition; and
* provide a training ground for the Queen’s Medal competition.

They are all the little things we would achieve. The big thing we would guarantee is an improvement in our shooting skills. By all means let research into the techniques go on. But in the meantime charity begins at home. Let’s get the ground swell going!
Without wishing to make this article reminiscent of correspondence between Montgomery and Eisenhower after D-Day, I suggest we have two alternatives. We can either:

- help translate the CGS’s training directive into a concrete means of achieving his aims — by doing what has been outlined; or

- we can continue to meander — with not much more competition and incentive in rifle shooting than a platoon throwing in 10 cents a head — winner take all — at a unit practice.

Some of you who have read this far may think — ‘that’s all good stuff!’ I must conclude however with the homily that ‘there is nothing new under the sun’. There’s nothing in my proposal that hasn’t been done before — by the Military Rifle Clubs Union (MRCU) in New South Wales in the 1950s and early 1960s. And there was more Army representation at one MRCU monthly meeting in those days than in the 2 Military District Queen’s Medal Elimination in 1974.

Grammar has fallen from the high esteem that it used to enjoy. A hundred and fifty years ago, William Cobbett said that “grammar perfectly understood enables us not only to express our meaning fully and clearly, but so to express it as to defy the ingenuity of man to give our words any other meaning than that which we intended to express.”

—GOWERS, The Complete Plain Words.
THE armed forces of a democracy such as Australia bear a special relationship to the community of which they form a part. They help decide the government and its policies, but only through the ballot box, and anonymously as a small heterogeneous section of the total electorate. They are not autonomous or self-perpetuating. The elected government decides their size, composition, and leadership, their conditions of service, equipment, and employment. Servicemen and women are citizens in most respects, but they have opted — or at times been required — to enter a system of discipline, training, and activity from which they may not easily withdraw, and designed primarily to protect the lives of other citizens at the risk of their own. The armed forces provide a special form of service to the community, unusual in that it may never be called upon; but if called upon, by decision of the government of the time, such service can involve a total sacrifice.

The Australian public is not unique in its capacity to honour its armed forces in war and subsequently their wartime sacrifices, while discounting the value of the same forces as a form of insurance in peace. It is many years since the armed forces in this country were generally identified with the authoritarianism of government. Rather, it seems, opposition or apathy towards servicemen has been based on:

a. the belief that in peace the country does not need an army, and any right-minded man should be earning an honest living in a civilian occupation;

b. the assumption that civilians can be turned into soldiers almost overnight;

Reproduced from Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces Report, March 1974 (Chairman: Dr T. B. Millar, M.A., Ph.D.) with the permission of the Australian Government Publishing Service.
c. the feeling that servicemen are economically unproductive, even wasteful of the taxpayers' money; or

d. the fact that servicemen appear to constitute a separate, identifiable, conservative, embellished, privileged, 'establishment' group, and therefore logical targets of social criticism.

Members of the Citizen Military Forces (Army Reserve) have been vulnerable to the additional suggestions that they are assuming a role and status they have not earned, and are only amateur soldiers, officers, even generals.

Some of these criticisms have had a measure of validity in the past. For the Army Reserve to fulfil its tasks effectively, it needs first to be militarily efficient. Secondly, both it and the Regular Army must see themselves as an integral part of their society, and be so recognized by the responsible elements of that society. The role and functions of the Reserve must be acknowledged by the majority of citizens as not only acceptable but desirable, or the Reserve will wither away.

The armed forces in Australia have traditionally suffered in their peace-time status by two facts of our political system:

a. governments have rarely been interested in actively encouraging young men to serve, and in providing the more sophisticated, less obvious incentives; and

b. the armed forces are restrained by law from explaining, justifying, or complaining about their situation.

We would not wish to change the established principle of government responsibility for the armed forces. But at whatever level the government wishes to have the Army Reserve, it must set the national tone by supporting the Reserve, publicly, unequivocally, and continuously. There is nothing more disheartening for a soldier than to feel that the government he serves is uninterested in him. The standard of the Army Reserve will reflect, above all, the degree of concern the government has for it.

Committee members visiting the United States were impressed with the impetus being given to the Army Reserve and National Guard by the clear direction and statements of government policy in this regard. Such expression of the need for and importance of the Reserve component not only directs attention to the matter and generally conditions public attitudes, but must affect attitudes within the Army as a whole.
The Committee strongly recommends that a comprehensive statement supporting the Reserve be made at the highest level, and that follow-up statements be issued from time to time as appropriate. There needs to be a climate of awareness and interest in the Army Reserve. The existence of this Committee has indicated Government interest in the subject and, we believe, has generated a degree of public awareness. It has certainly caused considerable interest within the Citizen Military Forces.

The Citizen Military Forces or Militia have traditionally been viewed as a ‘bridge’ or ‘interface’ between the Army and the community. There is an element of truth in this, although the Army ought to be already more a part of the community than the term implies. The value of the Army Reserve should be in both directions. It should bring to the Army as a whole the talents and enthusiasms of the civil community; and it should bring its acquired military skills, equipment and organization to the service of the community when and where needed. An appreciation of both sides of this equation would make the Reserve more acceptable to the two contexts in which it operates.

How can the civil community be persuaded to take an interest in the Reserve Army at a time of ‘no apparent threat’? The problem is not easy, but it is not insoluble. There is much latent sympathy for the armed forces among the public. There are many ex-servicemen, most of whom acknowledge the need for armed forces. Scores of thousands are former members of and friendly towards the Citizen Military Forces. The Reserve Army can also be demonstrably valuable to the community in ways discussed below. Yet there is still a need to establish within the whole nation the concept that armed forces are part of the price of sovereignty and of liberty. They are not something sent away to fight other people’s wars. They are designed and available to defend our own country and people and way of life, if necessary. They are as much a part of society as the police force or the fire brigades or the health services. They represent less the forces of authority than the forces of security.

To promote the acceptance of this truth is the responsibility of all citizens, of educational systems, the news media, and government, because all benefit from the security provided; all could suffer if it were not provided.

In a national public opinion survey conducted in January 1974, 40 per cent of respondents had no idea what the initials ‘C.M.F.’ stood
Yet when advised, 78 per cent considered it was important, very important, or extremely important in 1974 for Australia to have such forces. The term 'Army Reserve' could provide a much easier identification for a concept which clearly has substantial public support.

Civil Employment

An increasing problem in keeping Reserve units adequately manned is employers' resistance to their employees' membership in such part-time forces. In the Census of the Citizen Military Forces, 16.3 per cent of members said their employer was opposed to their service. Considering the number of self-employed, and the high proportion (nearly half) employed by government where release is almost obligatory, this figure represents a substantial proportion of the members who are employees in private industry. An almost identical result was obtained in the survey of former members of the Citizen Forces. There are almost certainly many men who never join the Reserve because of resistance by their employers.

We appreciate that in a small organization with few employees, the absence of one or more at Reserve training may pose considerable difficulties. We can see no way around this problem, except for the employee to do a maximum of home training, and perhaps go to camp during his annual leave.

We carried out a survey of some 50 of the largest employers in the country, as well as a number of smaller concerns, employing a total of about 530,000. Only six gave the employee full pay, in addition to leave, for his annual camp, which is the normal procedure for government employees in the Citizen Military Forces. More than half made up the difference between military pay and normal civilian pay. A few gave leave without pay. The remainder either discouraged members from joining, or required them to go to camp during their annual leave. Policies varied again for continuous training in excess of the annual camp, e.g. for Army courses. However, a number of firms effectively had no policy, and indicated they would welcome suggestions as to a suitable policy to adopt. In many firms, the policy is in fact made by the foreman or supervisor to whom the member applies for leave.

We sought also the views of the Central Industrial Secretariat, representing the Australian Council of Employers' Federations and the
Associated Chamber of Manufacturers of Australia. The Secretariat’s reply, which in our view represents a sympathetic and responsible approach, is attached at Annex Q.¹

' We believe that many firms could and should be encouraged, by personal representations from government or Army representatives, to adopt and declare policies sympathetic to employees serving in the Reserve. This is a national contribution by the employer to what is ultimately the security of his firm. We believe also that employers can be brought to see that service in the Reserve in many cases makes employees better members of the firm, adding new skills. Employers — and all other taxpayers — should be able to see that the Reserve saves money by reducing the amount spent on Regular forces.

The Committee also wrote to 21 of Australia’s largest unions, as well as to the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations. A few unions did not respond, but replies received indicated:

a. most unions support the principle of a Reserve force;

b. unions would support employees in any dispute with the employer about service in the Reserve; and

c. unions would oppose any active discrimination of employment rights and lowered opportunities for advancement due to service in the Reserve.

The view of the Australian Council of Trade Unions is attached at Annex R.¹ We believe this also represents a helpful and responsible attitude.

We considered the proposal that some form of financial inducement be given to firms to release personnel for Reserve training, but came to the conclusion that it would be cumbersome, costly, and in many cases unnecessary. We believe that many Australian employers will express their patriotic sentiments in releasing men for Reserve training, if suitable representations are made to them. These representations, with follow-up acknowledgements, could best be made by a special committee drawn from the Reserve, the community of employers, and trade unions, to be known as the Committee for Employer Support of the Army Reserve. We attach at Annex S¹ a model employer policy statement on this subject. An appropriate certificate and public

¹ Contained in the published Report.
acknowledgement could be given any employer who adopts such a
dolicy.

It is essential that employers in turn be given every consideration,
by keeping them informed well in advance about annual camps or other
claims on their employees’ working time.

The Defence Re-establishment Act 1965-1973 obliges employers
not to penalize employees for service in the Citizen Military Forces. In
the event of a call-up of Citizen Forces, it is essential that members’
civil employment be legally protected. For normal home and camp
training, we feel a policy of educating and encouraging employers would
be effective. It should at least be tried.

Help ‘During ‘Natural Disasters’

One of the stated roles of the Reserve is to be available to help
in civil emergencies, such as floods, bush-fires, or perhaps search and
rescue operations.

We repeat that this should not be a primary role. Men join the
Army to be soldiers, and to learn the military arts. The time allowable
for Reserve training is barely adequate, and to take some of it for civil
defence purposes would inevitably reduce military efficiency.

Nevertheless, we consider the Reserve is part of the Army, and
should be able to be called upon quickly to help with natural disasters
if other more regular means are inadequate. The main requirement is
to establish procedures for prompt appeal and response within a national
disaster plan, and to take some account of this role in Reserve training
programmes.

Relations with Other Organizations

Although the primary purpose of the Army Reserve is to train
for war, it must keep in mind that it is part of the civil community, and
both the Regular cadres and the Reserve itself should make every effort
to be accepted by that community. The training depot should not be
a slightly mysterious, frequently dilapidated, and geographically or
psychologically isolated building, but one of the places in and around
which, at appropriate times, social and cultural — as well as military —
functions take place. Cadres and Reservists should be involved in
useful civic activities and service organizations: they should be, and be
seen to be, good citizens.
Army Reserve Advisory Council

In operating as a Committee we found much value in debating issues and policies between us, and further in stimulating interest in and comment about the Army and Citizen Forces from others — private citizens, and members of the forces, full and part-time. Constructive and helpful advice came from many individuals, with different backgrounds, training and points of view.

Useful discussion between such apparently disparate interests does not occur automatically. Indeed, we observed rather less communication between members of the Regular Army, Army Reserve and the civilian community than we think desirable. The interactive bonds between these three elements could usefully be strengthened.

Qualities of objectivity and perception will be sought after in reviewing the Army Reserve, and in its continuing management. The task is complex, and much further work should follow the recommendations outlined here. Our prescriptions will need review and amendment as time passes and circumstances change.

We see merit in continuing oversight of Reserve matters by a small group of skilled men from different backgrounds. Such a group should be advisory, not executive, and it should be drawn from the Regular Army, the Army Reserve and the civilian community. We propose that the body be known as the 'Army Reserve Advisory Council', and we suggest the following as its composition:

The Chief of the General Staff (Chairman);

The Chief of Army Reserves — as the senior executive officer concerned with Reserve matters;

The Inspector-General — as the senior Reserve officer;

A senior business executive — ideally, the Chairman of the Committee for Employer Support of the Reserve;

A Department of Defence representative;

One additional Reserve officer nominated by the
Two additional civilians

The Army Reserve Advisory Council should not replace normal mechanisms for co-ordination and management within the Army. Rather it should provide an impartial review of policy, and initiate
thoughts and ideas which might not emerge through the normal Army command structure. Specifically, we suggest its role should be:

a. to advise the Chief of the General Staff on any changes necessary or proposed which affect the Army Reserve;

b. to review budget allocations and major planning decisions for the Reserve;

c. to review management and other practices in the Reserve in the light of changes in comparable civilian activities; and

d. to present an Annual Report to Parliament through the Minister for Defence on the state of the Army Reserve.

We would also see a transitional role for the Council in reviewing and assessing progress in the implementation of this Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces. The Army Reserve Advisory Council should meet at least once in each quarter.

It has been wisely said that the adjective is the enemy of the noun. If we make a habit of saying "The true facts are these", we shall come under suspicion when we profess to tell merely "the facts". If a crisis is always acute and an emergency always grave, what is left for those words to do by themselves? If active constantly accompanies consideration, we shall think we are being fobbed off when we are promised bare consideration. If a decision is always qualified by definite, a decision by itself becomes a poor filleted thing. If conditions are customarily described as prerequisite or essential, we shall doubt whether a condition without an adjective is really a condition at all. If a part is always an integral part there is nothing left for a mere part except to be a spare part.

—GOWERS, The Complete Plain Words.
ON 14 May, 1963, the U.S. Army Exhibit Unit premiered a striking exhibit in the Pentagon concourse, the first of its kind in Army history. Titled "Serving with Pride and Dignity," it featured the story of the Women's Army Corps. The date chosen was the 21st anniversary of the corps, an appropriate time to recognize the contributions of the thousands of women who had served so well since the inception of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps in 1942.

The decade that has passed since the fielding of that exhibit has been a challenging period for Army women, a time of change and transition. This has been especially true of the past five years which have seen more changes in laws, policies and regulations concerning Women's Army Corps members than had occurred during the preceding 27. Much of this has been due to social and cultural changes, but most has been prompted by a growing awareness of inequities that denied

Brig. Gen. Mildred C. Bailey became director of the US Women's Army Corps on 1 August, 1971, after having served as deputy CO of the WAC Center, Fort McClellan, Alabama. She was commissioned in the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (predecessor of the WAC) from OCS in 1942 and was integrated into the Regular Army in 1949. During World War II, Gen. Bailey was an instructor with the French Training Team at Craig Field, Alabama. She has been adjutant of and commanded WAC units in the United States and Europe, and served on intelligence staffs of U.S. European Command and the Military District of Washington. Other assignments include service as vocational and guidance officer, personal affairs officer, records control officer, WAC recruiting co-ordinator at Third Army headquarters and congressional liaison officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. From July, 1963, to October, 1968, she was in charge of the WAC Exhibit Unit whose displays travelled all over CONUS and Hawaii.

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Army women equal rights and resulted in their full potential never having been realized.

Women have participated in military activities for virtually thousands of years; however, it has been only in the 20th century that their participation has been as members of our armed forces. In the past, women were called to the colors in wartime emergencies to perform whatever jobs were needed, only to be relegated to the confines of their traditional work when a national emergency no longer existed.

Many theories explore the rationale for women being left out of the main-stream of the professional world in the past. Disregarding these theories as not germane to this report, it is nevertheless a fact that sex stereotyping continues to be widespread in U.S. society. Although attitudes toward women in the Army must be placed in the context of attitudes toward women in the larger society, it is also a fact that stereotype thinking continues to some degree.

The year 1974 seems to be a relevant time to assess the results of the past decade.

If we are to properly appraise the impact of the future of WAC members in the next decade, it is essential to highlight actions of recent years that will have far-reaching effect on their utilization and management.

A representative selection of such actions would include:

- Passage of a public law that removed restrictions on the promotion of women officers and eliminated a two per cent female-content ceiling.
- A Supreme Court ruling that declared unconstitutional the law that denied married servicewomen the same family entitlements as their male counterparts.
- Passage of legislation equalizing age and parental consent requirements for men and women.
- Increase in the number of military occupational specialties (MOS) open to women from 183 in fiscal 1972 to 430 in fiscal 1974, with only 37 close-combat specialties closed.
- Changes in law and policy to permit women's participation in Junior and Senior ROTC, to include scholarships.
- Greatly increased participation by women in the U.S. Army Reserve.
• Organization of the first WAC training battalion in the Army Reserve.
• For the first time in history, enlistment and commissioning of women, other than nurses, in the Army National Guard.
• Integration of skills training for women with similar skills training for men.
• Change of policy to permit women to command men, except in combat units.
• Opening Army aviation to women.
• Change of policy to permit women officers to attend the senior service schools.
• Integration of WAC officer training into male basic officer courses except infantry, field artillery, armor and air defense.
• Permanent detail of all WAC officers to other branches of the Army, except infantry, field artillery, armor and air defense.
• All enlistment and re-enlistment options opened to women, except combat options.
• Equalization of enlistment qualifications, except for justifiable or valid differences.
• All courses of instruction formerly closed to women opened, except combat arms and the U.S. Military Academy.
• Women made fully participating members of promotion and school selection boards.
• Increase in basic training capability of WAC Center and School from 6,000 to 12,000 annually.
• Activation of a WAC basic training brigade at a second location for the first time since World War II, thereby increasing the total annual training capability for women to about 24,000.
• Increase in the number of positions on manning documents eligible to be filled by women from 19,000 in June, 1972, to 160,800 in June, 1974.
• Implementation of a comprehensive program to improve and address needed additions to women's uniforms.
Elimination of policies that precluded married women from applying for enlistment or appointment and forced discharge of women who became pregnant or had minor children.

Adjustment of housing policies.

Adjustment of dependency policies.

Participation by women in Army athletics programs formerly closed, such as track and field.

Plan to increase the number of enlisted women in the Army from 12,400 in fiscal 1972 to 50,000 by the end of fiscal 1979, the first expansion of WAC utilization in a peacetime environment.

Organization of a WAC expansion steering committee to monitor the present program and changes for future years.

In reviewing the foregoing items, two fundamental issues become apparent. The Army needed more women and in preparing for their expanded role, provision was necessary for them to compete on an equal basis with their male counterparts. It now remains to evaluate results, refine methodology of implementation and plan for the future.

The decision to expand the Women's Army Corps resulted in part from the need to recruit qualified applicants in sufficient numbers to fill the ranks of a volunteer Army. The same applies to the expanded use of women in the Guard and Reserve. It is apparent that the female population provides a labor pool which has never been tapped to any great extent, except during a war.

When expansion plans first began in 1972, however, another element was introduced which guarantees that women will henceforth be a larger and more important part of the U.S. Army, regardless of the availability of manpower. That was the increased social awareness that women constitute another discriminated-against group of the population. The Army recognizes discrimination as morally wrong as well as a poor management practice.

The increase to 50,000 is a target and an open-ended figure. Future strength will be consistent with Army needs based upon the proper male-female mix still to be determined. The conceptual approach is to optimize the use of women in the Army with due regard for Army mission, equal rights of women and the practical considerations in
utilization to include military and cost-effectiveness — to do what is best for the Army and best for women.

At the present time, we are beyond mid-journey in attaining the numerical goal, with a fiscal 1974 end strength of 26,600. The fiscal 1974 end strength for women in the Army Reserve was 6,669, up from 483 in fiscal 1972 and 2,630 for the Army National Guard. The Guard, of course, started from zero in 1972. They also have additional expansion goals.

I have been singularly impressed with the members of the Women's Army Corps whom I have met during the past three years. This includes women in all phases and stages of training, on the job in all parts of the world and women of all ranks.

I have met women who refuse to be embittered by the absurdities of any remaining discrimination and intolerance. They exhibit the same courage and determination that permitted their predecessors to endure the prevailing injustices, skepticism, suspicion and hostility of their era.

I have observed capability, eagerness, dedication and a sense of excitement and anticipation among them. Anyone who believes that patriotic feelings are withering needs to attend a graduation of WAC basic trainees to witness the emotion born of their deep feelings for the U.S. Army and this land of ours.

I have seen that quality begets quality. The standards for the Women's Army Corps are high; however, we continue to meet and exceed every numerical goal assigned us. In 1974, we recruited 15,200 women — the largest number in 30 years. This was accomplished without lowering a single enlistment standard, and we expect to do the same in the future.

We have heard arguments that standards should be lowered in the interest of equal opportunity; however, I believe that lower standards would ultimately result in reduced recruiting and a lower retention rate. Past experience of the Women's Army Corps has proved that the realization of an expansion program is dependent upon a recruiting campaign that will increase numbers without lowering standards. At those times when lower caliber people were recruited in large numbers, many women with high qualifications and the best potential for learning acceptable skills did not volunteer. Self-image and the view in which women perceive they are held is just as important to them today as it was in the past. Entrance standards for men and
women are under constant review, the goal being to recruit the very best talent available among those applicants for whom we have requirements.

When we examine fiscal 1974 recruitment of women which almost tripled the number recruited in fiscal 1972, and we consider the fact that women are volunteering at a rate unprecedented since World War II and applying for commissions in six times the number of existing needs, there can be no doubt that we have the capability of meeting fiscal 1975 and 1976 accession goals of 17,200, and 19,000 for 1977. WAC retention rate is also up, a 21 per cent increase of first-term enlistees in only two fiscal years and about a ten per cent gain in careerists.

The Army has great reason to be proud of the positive accomplishments concerning women, but there are still areas that require attention.

There is an urgent need to encourage young women to take advantage of the new career fields open to them in today's Army. We must convince them that worthwhile careers are available in specialties other than those traditionally open to women. Success or failure in this area may finally determine accomplishment of numerical goals. At the end of fiscal 1974, about 81 per cent of enlisted women were utilized in only 30 of the 430 specialties available to them. It is imperative, in meeting long-range requirements, to make a significant shift in 1975 female accessions from the traditionally female career groups to the non-traditional fields which can absorb large numbers of women.

The number and rate of increase of women with minor dependants, the effect on their mobility and the subsequent ramifications on unit readiness must be determined and evaluated.

Another area of concern is the failure of some to remember that a woman in the Army is no less a woman the day after she dons the military uniform than she was the day before. I feel it imperative that we examine our attitudes on what constitutes a soldier. It is anachronistic to believe that a soldier is only someone in fatigues and a steel pot. More important to the composition of the soldier are individual capabilities and intangibles such as attitude and motivation. It must be accepted that women may not have the same reaction, attitude or approach to a particular situation as a male soldier, and that she may have comparable but different needs. For example, just as men react
strongly to any challenge to their manhood, so do women feel it imperative that their womanhood be recognized. To insist that the woman who chooses Army service abandon her identity as a woman is over-reaction and completely unacceptable. Women have a right to their identity, even though they are working in a predominantly male environment.

It is important to distinguish between equality and sameness. There seems to be a tendency to equate the two. Tradition and physiology have dictated differences in men and women. These differences are real and must be recognized.

These are not new attitudes. A quote from The Women's Army Corps, by Mattie E. Treadwell, a volume in the Army's history of World War II, reveals that they were a source of concern 32 years ago:

While parallel, the problems of the employment of men and women were by no means identical in nature or solution. At the time of the organization of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, the misapprehension was general that women would be treated exactly like men — in practice it was soon discovered, however, that while a soldier might wear the same design of clothing regardless of race or creed, the same could not be said regardless of sex. The same principle was shortly found true in the field of medicine, conduct, recreation, recruiting, physical capacity and others. While all authorities were agreed that equal treatment must be given to men and women in the Army, it was soon apparent that equal did not mean identical in every case.

The Army has been a progressive leader in the successful promotion of social causes. My overall assessment is that Army leadership has a tremendously positive attitude toward goals for women. That is not to say that every male officer, NCO and enlisted man agrees with the principles of equal opportunity for women. Fortunately, those who do not are in the minority and their views are being buried in the wake of positive new programs. The Army is committed to equal opportunity for all its members. It has required centuries of evolution in warfare and society to bring Army women where we are today, a position to be envied and emulated by all classes of society. We must eliminate any remnants of negative attitudes, for if not addressed, they water down our positive accomplishments and diminish our ability to meet future goals.

If the Army is to be successful in forming a fully professional volunteer force, meet manpower programs, procure and retain quality personnel and establish a satisfying atmosphere for all its members, the full potential of all available human resources must be realized. It is essential that prejudice, stereotypes and myths be discarded, for
brains, skill, talent, dedication and loyalty come in all types of packages — to include women.

As with any program which effects change, there will continue to be some resistance and turbulence. However, we will emerge a better Army as a result. I believe firmly that first consideration in any new program must always be how it will affect the ability of the Army to accomplish its mission. If we can upgrade that ability by adopting new methods and attitudes, then we would be remiss not to do so because of rigid, unyielding or erroneous concepts.

The United States Army is an old hand at dealing with challenge and change. After all, it has successfully made the transition from muskets to atoms and survived the loss of its horses. We will certainly make it possible for men and women to serve their country together, with equal status, equal opportunity, equal dignity and with mutual respect and understanding.

The opportunities for women to seek a rewarding productive career are more promising than ever before. For those qualified women who want to utilize their capabilities, the Army has opened its ranks.

A course has been charted that will permit Army women to realize their goals of self-fulfillment and, at the same time, make an increasingly important and even greater contribution to mission accomplishment.

Recognition of our heritage, past achievements and future potential will move us forward and result in our continuing to serve with pride and dignity.

MONTHLY AWARD

The Board of Review has awarded the prize for the best original article published in the February 1975 issue of the Journal to: Major B. Dickey ('The Development of Australia’s Military Roles in World War II').
The Aerial Steam Carriage

THE Machine represented by the Accompanying Wood Engraving attempts, with the strongest probability of success, the accomplishment of an object which has been long and often desired, but has hitherto baffled the skill of man. Contrivances intended to give him the power of flight have been by no means rare; their frequency, however, only showed how highly coveted was the faculty of rapid and unobstructed transit enjoyed by the denizens of the air, while their unvarying failure showed how insufficient for its attainment were the arts and knowledge of past times.

Nor does the value of aerial locomotion appear to have been overrated. Accustomed as we are to the physical difficulties and immense expenditure of labour incurred in moving over, among, and across, the materials and obstructions which compose the earth's wide and varied surface, we scarcely ever think of them: but quiet reflection soon brings us to the conclusion that they are really these difficulties and toils which hold the different parts of the human family in mutual estrangement, and perpetuate their mutual distrust.

To individual men, too, this part has even been a matter of desire. "O that I had wings like a dove," the pathetic wish of the afflicted Psalmist, has not less been the longing of toiling travellers of all ages when they have looked up at the swift and unwearied progress of the birds above them. Nor can it be doubted in matters of greater moment than the mere avoidance of bodily fatigue, every man would soon feel and recognise the influence of the unchecked and extended intercourse

This article appeared in the Liverpool Mail of 1st April 1843 and was reprinted in the Sydney Morning Herald of 14th August 1843.
which would follow immediately on the first successful effort. Enlarged commercial and philanthropic activity, followed by closer friendship and more intimate sympathy, would soon bring new degrees of security and enjoyment to every home.

These views are so obvious, that the mere announcement of Mr Henson's invention, some months ago, excited extraordinary interest, which has continued to increase; a period of reserve, as to the precise nature of the invention, was necessary for legal reasons; that period having expired, we hasten to present our readers with the accompanying engraving, and to complete the necessary information as to the principles of this extraordinary contrivance. To the spectator, the most striking part of the machine is the immense web which, in the most important respects, fulfils the office of wings. It consists of framework of great strength and extraordinary lightness, covered with silk or linen; its dimensions are not less than one hundred and fifty feet by thirty. It has neither joints nor the peculiar motion of wings; but is perfectly stiff from end to end. One of its long sides goes foremost, and is a little raised; to the middle of the other is jointed the tail, of fifty feet in length, beneath which is a rudder; a small vertical web, placed across the wings at their middle point, serves to check lateral oscillation. The several parts, like the main frame, are constructed with an especial view to the combination of the necessary strength, with extreme lightness; the contrivance employed for this purpose is that of upright posts, or standards, to the tops and bottoms of which various points in the horizontal frame are connected by metallic braces. Those parts are all sloped so as to pass through the air with the least resistance.

The car, and a very light and powerful steam-engine, described hereafter, are suspended from the middle of the wings, and are close to its under surface; the steam-engine actuates two sets of vanes, of twenty feet diameter, and six vanes each placed at the hinder edge of the wings, and as near to each as the joint of the tail will permit.

The weight of the machine, when loaded and prepared for flight, is estimated at 3,000 lbs; the area of the wings amounts to 4,500 square feet. The load is, therefore, two-thirds of a pound to each square foot, which is less than that of many birds.

This invention, however, differs most widely from all its predecessors in its mode of starting; a device by which the difficulties that have hitherto been found insuperable are avoided, and success brought within the range of a likelihood, amounting almost to certainty. The carriage
sets out from the top of an inclined plane, in descending which it acquires velocity so great that the resistance of the air admitted to its under face by the elevation of its front edge, suffices to sustain it. But this resistance, while its upward operation prevents the descent of the vehicle, opposes, though in a much smaller degree, its forward progress; and this opposition, if not counteracted, would soon so diminish the velocity of flight as to bring it below the degree at which the upward resistance of the air would sustain the carriage; it is therefore the office of the steam-engine and its vanes, or propellers, to counteract that opposition, and continually maintain, at its original amount, the velocity of flight.

The difficulty which this contrivance avoids is the following. No source of power at present will sustain in the air the materials and apparatus necessary to the production and application of the power; none is light enough in proportion to its effect. It is to this fact that all previous failures are to be attributed: but it is an axiom of mechanical science, which is well established by the coincidence of its consequences with the results of experience, wherever they can be compared, that a body once in motion will continue to move for ever, if opposing forces be taken away or balanced. Mr Henson, therefore, sets his machine in motion by its descent down the inclined plane, and keeps it in motion by balancing the resistance with the action of his steam-engine. Now as the resistance to flight, which alone the steam-engine has to counteract, is but a fraction of the upward resistance by which the vehicle is sustained, it follows that the machinery to be carried amounts, in weight, to but a small part of that required by all former inventions of the kind. To put the same in another view; the power by which the machine proceeds and is sustained, is over that which is acquired by its descent down the inclined plane, and the decay of that power is prevented by the action of the steam-engine, just as the pendulum of a clock continues to vibrate by virtue of the power which originally drew it out of the perpendicular, while the gradual destruction of that power is prevented by the gentle pressure of the weight on it through the wheels. The weight, too small to set the clock a-going, is fully able to keep it so.

With remarkable singularity to this procedure it may often be observed that a large bird will start from an eminence by first making a descent: when he has not this advantage, his first few strokes are much more violent than the rest, that he may be sustained while he
acquires the requisite velocity; afterwards the beats of the wings are slow and easy, and are sometimes intermitted altogether. Whoever watches the flight of various kinds of large birds, will observe many illustrations of the same principle.

Closely analogous, therefore, as parts of Mr Henson's invention are to the arrangements of nature, and strictly as they comply with the requisitions of established science, there seems, so far, little room to doubt his success. There remains, however, one question to which an answer is not so easily given, viz., will the steam-engine be sufficient to counteract the forward resistance?

The novelty of the steam-engine lies chiefly, if not entirely, in its boiler and condenser. The former consists of nearly fifty hollow truncated cones, averaging about three feet in length, and of four inches and a half in their greatest width: their blunted points, of about one inch in diameter, are downwards, and the whole are arranged above and about the fire, they present about fifty square feet to the action of radiating, and about as much more to that of communicative heat. The steam is worked in two cylinders in which it is cut off at one-fourth of the stroke. Computing the power of the boiler to generate steam, by data derived from the effects of those of railroad engines, we conclude that the engine will be found of nearly twenty-horsepower.

But the resistance which this power is destined to overcome, is not to be ascertained with correctness by any data which science or published experiments supply. The theory of the resistance of fluids to oblique surfaces, at small angles, is the most obscure part of the great system of mechanical philosophy; there is no traceable agreement between its results and the data derived from experiments, and the few experiments which have been made were undertaken with other views, and supply no facts which are applicable to the present question. Mr Henson has, therefore, done wisely in deriving his data from the best observations he could make on the proceedings of nature, and from these there is reason to conclude that the power of his steam-engine will be found sufficient. It is, however, satisfactory to know, that if his engine should need reinforcement, there are inventions, some of which are not yet published, by which its power may be much more than doubled, without materially adding to its weight.

The condenser is composed of a number of small tubes into which the steam is admitted, and which are exposed to the current of air produced by the rapid flight of the machine. The plan has been found
perfectly efficient, and it dispenses with the necessity of carrying water, either to supply the place of that which is discharged as steam when it has performed its work, as in high pressure engines, or to condense it that it may be returned to the boiler. The effect of these improve-
ments in the boiler and condenser, combined with extreme simplicity and lightness in the other parts of the engine, is such that, though the engine is of the power of twenty horses, it is worked with twenty gallons of water; and its entire weight, with its boiler filled, is not more than 600 lbs.

The velocity and length of flight depend upon the same considera-
tions as affect the sufficiency of the engine! They must, therefore, abide the test of experiment. There is good reason, however, to conclude, from the nature of the case, that high speeds and long flights will necessarily follow the attainment even of the lowest success.

The annals of mechanical invention prove that, whenever a step has been gained by which an important art has been prominently before the public mind, the thoughts of many able men have been immediately turned to it. In this most extraordinary matter it is impossible that the same concentration of attention and research should not take place; we may, therefore, safely anticipate that, ere long, men will have added a new element to their dominion; and having explored the recesses of the earth, and become familiar with the bottom of the sea, they will at length waft through the unobstructed tracts of air, and make their roads upon the winds. 

If language is not correct, then what is said is not what is meant; if what is said is not what is meant, then what ought to be done remains undone.

—Confucius
ON RUSSELL HILL

By Major Peter S. Sadler RAA

Sniping sprinklers hold at bay
The brown grass of encircling hills;
Blue-capped servants of the Federal law
Ensure that all who enter show
Something which resembles an
Official pass.

The multi-coloured raiments
Of civil staff, (and those who wish
To seem as such), outshine the khaki
Of the duty dog, visitors,
And new majors feeling out
The weight of crowns.

Ordered ranks of tinted glass
Refract in turn the rainbow's hues,
Or, at the lowest levels, throw back
The image of the passer by,
Concealing thus the secrets
Of those within.

Tea trollys, massive vault doors
And words from ponderous discussions,
Protrude into the corridors of
Illusioned power. Or, perhaps,
The moans of unanswered phones
Disturb the air.

The launchers and carriers
Of paper warfare, choosing arms
For whatever campaign that day brings,
Cull meaning and innuendo
From synep and rolling plans,
With guess divine.

Hey ho, the conference-oh!
Around in circles we will go;
Circumlocutions will abound,
Answers won't be easily found,
Problems up the path will lead,
And the hearts of those attending bleed.
Hey ho, the conferences-oh!
However quick, they're dammably slow!

Outside, the tall: monument
To Austral-Yankee phalanxes
Of yester-wars in far-off lands,
Separates the antagonists
And allies of present-day,
Bloodless conflicts.

Yet where are the combat arms,
Protagonists of warfare's art?
On air-conditioned sentinel, they
Watch out over the airport to
The western mountain pass, at
Divisions rear.

Reviewed by Professor B. D. Beddie, Head of Department of Government, Faculty of Military Studies of the University of New South Wales. RMC Duntroon.

The editorial article in the June, 1974, number of RUSI (Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies) noted that Kurt Lang’s recent book, Military Institutions and the Sociology of War, listed no fewer than 1,325 works in its bibliography. With a touch of modesty the editorial asked whether the military were worthy of such close scientific scrutiny but then found reassurance in the fact that not a few of the academic writers on military matters had only the faintest idea of what they were talking about.

British (and Australian) scepticism about the value of much contemporary academic research into defence does not extend to the United States. This is partly because in America there is a class of people virtually unknown in the former countries, namely, service officers who, by virtue of their positions in the Service Academies, are also professional academics. The present monumental volume on Comparative Defence Policy, with its 604 pages each divided into two columns and its commentaries and bibliographies for each of its six parts, is a testimony to the dedication of these soldier-scholars and, more specifically, to the staff of the Political Science Department of the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado.
The selection and arrangement of the articles which make up the volume have been determined, so it is claimed, by the teachings of 'behavioural science' which, as described by Major Lentz on page 296, embrace 'systems theory, functional analysis, game theory, decision-making theory, cybernetics, political culture analysis, survey research, political socialization and development studies, and political sociology'. As a first attempt to move towards the kind of increasingly exact 'conceptualization' that behaviouralism has made possible in the policy sciences, the work is divided into six divisions — 'the military profession', 'structure and process', 'military doctrine', 'force posture', 'weapons acquisition' and 'the use of force'. ('Structure and process', incidentally, means the policy making process, including defence organization; and 'force posture', though variously defined, appears generally to mean 'objective' force structure plus 'subjective' perceptions of the functions of that structure. It is significant that the word 'posture', first introduced into American defence writing for its literary resonance, should have been so rapidly and humourlessly 'behaviourized'.)

Each of the topics in the six main divisions is treated comparatively, i.e., as it is exemplified in the defence establishments or policies of at least six countries — the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, France, India and Israel. The United States, the two Germanies, Sweden, Japan, Pakistan and Egypt are sometimes included.

The comparative material in each division is supposed to be systematically arranged just as the six divisions are supposed to follow one another in a theoretically logical order. Generally the arrangement of the work has nothing of the theoretical significance that is claimed for it. In large part, it is no more than a book of readings arranged under convenient heads. Considered as such, the work, it should be emphasized, is highly successful. Many of the best contemporary writers on defence, e.g., Janowitz, Erickson, Huntington, Waltz and Howard are represented and there are other outstandingly good articles by less well known authors, e.g., Ingeman Dorfer on an aspect of Swedish weapons acquisition. In addition, the supplementary material provided by the editors is often of considerable value. Their bibliographies are extensive and useful and the commentaries that they have written or commissioned are often helpful. Occasionally, too, the way in which they have juxtaposed comparative material does produce interesting theoretical insights. Surprisingly, this is particularly true of the articles brought together in Part V under the apparently unpromising head
of 'Weapons Acquisition'. It is, then, possible to commend highly *Comparative Defence Policy* as a book of readings, and even more than that, while at the same time remaining sceptical of the scientific pretensions of its editors and promoters.


*Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Argent, Army Office Canberra.*

There is a strange fascination about the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915. Perhaps this fascination is due to the realisation of how close the Allies came to success, not once but a number of times and how 'defeat was snatched from the jaws of victory' by the incompetence of some of the senior leaders. The Suvla Bay debacles must still rank as the nadir of British arms notwithstanding the Crimea, Malaya and Singapore.

This author saw Gallipoli from the beginning to the end as a midshipman in HMS *Bacchante*, a four-funnelled cruiser.

Just before first light on Sunday 25 April 1915 at the age of 15, he was in command of *Bacchante's* picket boat, steering east over a glassy sea towards a beach later to be known as Anzac. With him, in line abreast, were 11 other picket boats or steam pinnaces each towing three boats. Each boat held between 30 and 40 Australians. Bush, in charge of Number 8 tow, was towing men of C Company 10th Battalion AIF from HMS *Prince of Wales*. The tows were supposed to be 150 yards apart but the darkness made accurate station keeping impossible.

However this was not the main reason, according to Bush, why the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Australian Division was landed in the wrong place. He is severe on his own Service. He believes that the fault began by the marking ship being in the wrong position, other battleships carrying the 3rd Brigade halting north of their appointed positions but mainly because the midshipman in command of Number 2 tow (ie, on the right flank) altering heading during his run in, 22 degrees to the north. The other tows conformed to his new headings.

Perhaps this fatal error may have been avoided if the suggestion of a Lieutenant Tom Phillips (later Admiral and to go down with his ship, the new *Prince of Wales*, off Kuantan, Malaya in December 1941) had been adopted. He urged that a submarine be positioned as a marking ship.
Almost 30 years later the author was responsible to put another covering force ashore at the correct time and place. This was at Normandy. He used a midget submarine and his force positioned themselves on it and made a perfect landing. One of his officers there was Phillips' son.

Such historical instances and asides as these are one of the many reasons why this book is so attractive. One recognises other names that were to become prominent later on — Cunningham, then commanding a destroyer; Slim, a company commander in 9th Warwicks; Savory, adjutant of a Sikh Battalion; Casey, an ADC to Bridges; Freyberg, a company commander.

The author covers the campaign in much the same way as North, Moorehead and James have done except that, perhaps understandably, he has written more about the naval side — our own and the enemy's, (ie, German) particularly submarines. He adds some more facts but leaves it to the reader to make up his own mind as to who fired the fateful HE — Army, Navy or Turk? — that caused the Gurkhas to leave the dearly won Hill Q on 9 August. Thus was lost a battle and perhaps the Campaign.

This book is strongly recommended, for apart from giving a neat and easily followed description of the Campaign, the author goes into the politics of why the Campaign was undertaken in the first place and how and why, later on, the people changed their minds and lost heart.

One final thought. In the study of Military History there is probably more to be gained in the examination of our failures rather than our successes. In the 1920s and 30s the Australian Army studied Gallipoli but since the end of the Second World War the emphasis has been on those Campaigns that ended in victory for the Allies. Recent events in South East Asia and what may happen in the next 10 years or so should focus our studies on the whys and wherefores of failures once more.
As an old gunner I was most interested in reading the article in the March issue of the *Army Journal* about Wacky Coxen. During his period as Chief of Artillery in the twenties, I was a member of 1 Bty BAFA (A Bty) and was present on many of his annual inspections of the unit. His visit used to really stir things up and for weeks before ‘polish and shine’ was the rule. He was very thorough and did not miss much.

A few stories came to mind: During his inspections he insisted on seeing into all buildings and it was common to leave one room on his tour locked. The inevitable result was a request for the door to be opened. The key always had to be collected at the QM Store and the inspecting party would patiently await its arrival. On opening the door, of course, everything was in immaculate order. I’m sure the General was fully aware of what was going on but it always seemed to be that one door was locked during his visits. Another of his favourite habits was to ask one of the junior NCOs to give a lecture on part of the gun, either 18 pounder MKII or 4.5 inch Howitzer in those days. It was usually the recuperator. The NCO would commence to talk about the gun, to be stopped by the General, who would then call out another soldier to carry out the lecture. I had been warned by someone of the procedure and was prepared when called upon and as soon as called produced a piece of chalk and drew a line diagram of the buffer and recuperator. The General stopped me and said ‘that’s what I wanted’. As an instructor later I taught my pupils that three essentials for an instructor were a penknife, a piece of string and most important of all a piece of chalk.

On my first parade as a recruit with the battery in 1921, I remember being on parade dressed in fatigue dress, new boots and white hat with the black tally with Royal Australian Field Artillery, when inspected by Wacky. The BSM pointed me out as ‘Gunner Hartnett, you’d remember his father sir,’ (my father had served in the Garrison
Artillery for twenty-nine years prior to World War I when he served as a Captain with 30th Infantry Battalion). The 'Boss' looked me up and down (5 ft 6 and about 8 stone 6 lbs) and said 'He'll never be the soldier his father was.'

He was a grand gunner and it was a pity he was never knighted.

*Lieutenant Colonel H. L. Hartnett, MBE (RL)*

Dear Sir,

I read with great interest Major B. Dickey's article 'The Development of Australia's Military Roles in World War II' in the February issue of the *Army Journal* and acknowledge his statement in the introduction that 'the paper does not pretend to present information otherwise unavailable'.

The statement that the sea-borne assaults in Borneo — in retrospect seem to have been unnecessary, 'the *product of American unwillingness to see Australian troops sharing the recapture of the Philippines*, etc, etc' the truth which states 'two Australian Imperial Forces divisions had been is quite fallacious. There is nothing in the passages quoted from Long's work to support such a remark. The quote from Liddell-Hart is nearer earmarked for the Philippines' campaign'.

There are still a few Australian officers living who, like myself, know that MacArthur wanted the Australian 6th, 7th and 9th Divisions to participate in the Philippines' operations.

After the 1 and 2 Beach Groups had been raised and their amphibious training in conjunction with the 6th, 7th and 9th Divisions had been completed at Trinity Beach outside Cairns, 1 Aust Corps ran a major exercise lasting several days at Trinity on amphibious operations which was attended by all Divisional Commanders, GSO1 and HQ, Brigade Commanders, Brigade Majors and Staff Captains and all Commanders, Adjutants and Quartermasters plus the Beach Group commanders and staff and commanders ancillary crews.

The joint allied doctrines and procedures in major sea-borne operations beach groups were demonstrated and explained in considerable detail.

The scope of the programme was such that it is extremely unlikely that a more comprehensive large scale 'setting up' exercise or rehearsal
has ever been held or is likely to be held in the foreseeable future of this country preparatory to launching operations against an actual enemy.

On the conclusion of the exercise I was reposted from GSO1 Amphibious Operations, 1 Aust Corps to a small planning section under General Berryman at Allied Land Headquarters which was co-located in MacArthur’s advanced HQ at Hollandia.

The planning team under General Berryman prepared a staff study and outline plan for the assault landing in the Gulf of Luzon of two divisions with a third as floating reserve — it was understood that it would be the 6th, 7th and 9th Divisions.

The overall concept worked out in conjunction with MacArthur’s planners was, that the Australian Force would secure the beach-head in Luzon and that the US forces would pass through the beach-head and drive straight on to Manila. One important result of the whole operation also was to be the forward concentration of major forces for future operations.

Looking back to that time there was little doubt in the minds of the joint planners at Hollandia that we were entering the preparatory phase of operations which foreshadowed the combined assault of all available forces in the Pacific theatre on Japan.

General Morshead, Commander 1 Aust Corps and his staff were flown up to Hollandia for briefing. General Morshead, however, rejected the outline plan on the grounds that the available intelligence concerning Luzon and the Japanese forces was inadequate for such a large scale operation involving Australia’s best troops. There was some temporizing whilst alternatives were considered but time and the availability of shipping were of vital importance and further delays were unacceptable.

1 US Corps commanded by General Innis P. Swift carried out the landing in Luzon. I was attached to General Swift’s staff and landed with the assault waves. I returned to Hollandia after Manila was reached some three weeks later.

My own impression of the episode following General Morshead’s arrival for briefing at Hollandia was that General Blamey was extremely disappointed by Morshead’s rejection of the operation.

Peter Ryan in his article ‘Thomas Blamey the Turbulent General’ states that ‘Blamey refused to send troops to the Philippines’. This I doubt as it is extremely unlikely that General Blamey would have given his many political enemies such an opening for them to attack him.
In retrospect I have often speculated as to whether or not senior commanders and staff had developed a kind of 'brigade group operation mentality' and the contemplation of plans involving the simultaneous deployment of two divisions in the assault, relying heavily on naval artillery and close air support in the initial phase of a sea-borne operation, was too far beyond the limits of their thinking and experience.

I endorse Major Dickey's hope that the readers of his article will turn to Long's volume in order to achieve a fuller understanding of Australia's part in the 1939-45 War and I would like to add a hope of my own, that some may be inspired to enquire into the training and preparation for sea-borne operations that was undertaken in this country and how a common doctrine was evolved embracing the Naval, Air and Land Forces of Australia and America.

My own feeling is that it is essential that official histories should be carefully read and that further research is often necessary for collateral sources of information. Liddell-Hart has a few words of warning about 'official' sources in his short but readable booklet 'Why Don't We Learn From History'.

G. N. Godsall
7 April 1975

P.S. The approach of Anzac Day is a reminder that the Dardanelles Campaign was the most recent amphibious operation available for study prior to Narvik and Dunkirk.

The manual of Combined Operations was based on the lessons of the Dardanelles. Regrettably it was a publication which received scant attention from senior staff officers of the services and was badly out of date.

Nevertheless the basic principles were still sound and provided some guide lines for the development of Port Stephens as the main allied training centre as well as the conversion by Australia of Manoora, Kanimbla and Westralia to LSIs and the construction of landing craft in Australia.

By that stage, however, we were also able to apply the lessons learnt from allied operations elsewhere in the world.

Although we achieved a great deal with Australia's own resources there are many of us who will recall with gratitude, untinged by envy, the generous assistance and co-operation rendered by our US allies without which very little would have been achieved at all against our enemies.