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GRADUATION, whether it be from a University or from a Military College is an unforgettable day in the life of a young man about to launch out into his chosen profession. That the graduates of the Royal Military College, Duntroon received not only the Queen’s Commission but also their degrees, emphasises the increasing complexity of the Profession of Arms and the required intellectual capacity required of its members. With that intellect comes a growing awareness and critical analysis by young soldiers of the processes of State, of which they are a part.

A questioning by the young of those conventions which they believe should be explored and possibly changed is a healthy and natural circumstance, particularly if it is done in a constructive way. There is, however, a special responsibility imposed on the military officer which requires him to show certain constraints in his attitude towards established authority. The Military Profession is, of necessity, hierarchical. The young platoon commander expects instant obedience from his soldiers and in turn his superiors must expect an equal response from him. As a Royal Marines Gunnery Instructor once put it, “When I say jump, you jump—and you ask ‘How high?’ on the way up!”

An army is trained for war, and there is no place in the heat of battle to question orders. The young officer, or soldier, of today is on the horns of a dilemma: On the one hand he is taught, through his education and imaginative training, to think for himself; on the other that he is to obey orders unquestioningly. How then is he to react? By self-discipline, by being able to master his own feelings, whatever the provocation.

Pride in oneself that is engendered by self-discipline is enhanced by pride in one’s Corps, one’s Service and one’s Country. Tradition still has an important place in the modern Army. Organisations which
have pride in their past achievements generally set a standard in which each member has a spirit of proud subordination. As the Commander-in-Chief said in his speech at Duntroon "... the degree of discipline within the military forces is something upon which, as history has shown, effective military forces are built." *

* * * * *

Playing at Soldiers

The fact is, if military duty must be performed — and in the present state of the world it would seem indispensable that there should be some fighting men — it is better at once to make a profession of arms, and let it have all the advantage that discipline, custom, and undivided attention can impart to it. A tradesman or a clerk turning soldier for a fortnight every year, or spending a weekly half holiday on parade, will never be worth anything, we may safely predict, as a soldier ... No, if we really are to have soldiers, let us have real ones — let the standing army be increased to meet our wants. We shall then know what we hazard for the defence of our homes; and when we find the soldiers no longer needed to protect us from foreign invasion, we may, by disbanding them, restore a useful body of men to the pleasures and comforts of civil life.

29 November 1854

*Part of an Editorial in "The Age" as quoted in "The Australian Thunderer". The Age after the Gold Rush 1854-59 (Heritage Publications).*
ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE HONOURABLE
SIR JOHN KERR, A.C., K.C.M.G., K. St.J., Q.C.,
GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF AUSTRALIA AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
AT THE GRADUATION PARADE OF THE
ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE, DUNTRROON, CANBERRA
TUESDAY, 9 DECEMBER 1975

MAJOR-GENERAL Hay, Your Majesty, The Honourable the Prime Minister, members of the Corps of Staff Cadets, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I should like to congratulate those who are graduating from the Royal Military College today after having completed their training and study. It is always a big moment in a professional career when the academic and practical work which has to be done to get professional qualifications is over. Graduation ceremonies are generally very splendid. They are certainly ceremonies which have existed in the universities and in professions for a long time. This graduation parade is perhaps as splendid as any in any profession — or more so — and I should like to congratulate all who have participated in it.

It is customary for the Governor-General, when present at this parade, to make a few remarks not only to those who are graduating but to all of those who have taken part in the parade and who are students at the Royal Military College preparing for their ultimate entry into the profession of arms. In British communities the profession of arms has been a respected one. It is, of course, highly disciplined and the codes of conduct imposed upon members of the profession are strict. Those of you who move out today to join the profession actively will have been taught this here as are all who enter this place.

But the profession of arms is a neutral one. It will be your duty to carry out orders which come to you from above and to give orders to those below you. It will be your duty frequently to offer advice to those above you and to carry out policies handed down to you. Orders, of course, have to be obeyed. Advice should be objective, impartial and based upon the best knowledge and skill which your professional qualifications have given you. Policies must be carried out once they are decided upon and handed down, irrespective of the views and opinions of those whose duty it is to make them effective. The military forces of Australia are under the control of the civil power. Ultimately
defence policies in all of their ramifications are for Governments to
decide and for the members of the forces to carry out although the
senior officers, by way of advice, help to have them formulated.

It is not only the military forces, which under our system of
Government, are expected to be neutral. The Public Service is in a very
similar situation, with principles of ethics to guide it in the offering of
advice and in the execution of policies. The Public Service as an
institution is in some respects similar to the defence forces so far as
neutrality is concerned.

You will also appreciate that another element in the structure of
Government under the British system is the judicial branch of Govern-
ment which is a neutral institution which provides the apparatus for
settling disputes not only between citizens, but between Government and
the citizens.

Those of you who are graduating today and indeed all who study
here, I know, receive tertiary level education in the area of academic
study dealing with governmental processes.

It has been a matter of great pride to those from whom we inherited
our institutions, and to us the beneficiaries, that we have first, an
independent and impartial judiciary and second, a public service which
is committed to serve impartially and, third, defence forces which accept
as axiomatic civilian control of defence policy.

It may be of some interest to you to reflect upon the proposition
that commitment to neutrality in one’s professional work, whether it be
in the profession of arms, in public administration or in the adminis-
tration of justice, really results from the adoption by those involved of a
system of political morality or ethics. The professional commitment of
all concerned is such as to produce committed but impartial servants of
the people.

A system of political ethics of morality underlies our whole system
of public service to the State and to the Government administering the
State under the Constitution. It includes concepts of duty and respons-
bility, of following the pathway of honour.

It is, I think, always appropriate when talking to newly graduating
professional people, whatever may be their calling, to draw their attention
to the ideals which should guide their work.

This is, therefore, a suitable time, I think, for me to draw to
your attention that as members of the profession of arms you have a
special commitment to a particular approach to our fundamental processes of government. We know that in some countries the armed forces play a different role from what is expected of them in British communities.

Fortunately, our institutions are stable and of long standing and the career upon which you are entering is an established, honourable and long existing career. You join an institution whose current and past leaders have been great men. You carry with you, at the moment of entry into this profession, the opportunity of rising to its pinnacle. In the meantime you have challenging prospects of working with men and with equipment and with ideas of great importance to Australia today and in the years to come.

I am glad that you will be able to receive your Commissions today as well as your testamurs. The handing of those Commissions to you is to be done on my behalf by Professor Myers. This has been for administrative convenience. I have signed them personally and I hope that the Commissions are more than pieces of paper to you. They are the evidence of your entry upon your military career. It is your Commission which makes you an officer. You will notice that it draws your attention to your obligation to obey the orders of those above you. This is the element in your profession which is not to be found so strongly in others but the degree of discipline within the military forces is something upon which, as history has shown, effective military forces are built. I wish you well as you march out, those of you who are graduating today, and I also express my hope that the rest of those on parade who are still pursuing their studies and training will find the coming year challenging and interesting here at Duntroon, just as those passing out will find it challenging and interesting in the Army outside.

Congratulations and good luck. ☺
The Nature and Consequence of the Relationship between the Regular and Reserve Soldier

Captain M. D. O'Neill
Royal Australian Infantry

In his famous “Hawthorne” studies at the Western Electric company in the United States in the 1930s, Elton Mayo discovered that organizations have two functions in management: firstly, the economic goal of production, and secondly the social goal of providing social satisfaction for their members. Both, he maintained, are closely interdependent for success. The first may be related to the Army, not in the monetary sense of economics as would be the case for an industrial firm, but in the sense that the aims of the Army should be achieved in as high a standard as possible with the given resources of personnel and equipment. Various organizational systems are available to co-ordinate the activities of members towards those standards, the most typical of which for large organizations, including the Army, is Max Weber’s bureaucracy. But Mayo also pointed to the interdependent need for social satisfaction, that is, the satisfaction derived from the interpersonal relationships individuals experience with other members of the organization. These relationships are, in fact, connections between individuals in the organization independent of the formal connections indicated by the line diagram. Because of them he said, people fall into groups — informal groups of people in social relationships — which collectively constitute the social structure of an organization, as distinct from the formal structure shown by the line diagram: That is to say, “beneath the cloak of formal relationships in every institution [including the Army] there exists a more complex system of social relationships called the informal organization.”

Captain O’Neill was commissioned into the ARA in 1969 after four years service in the CMF. His initial posting was to 3 TB and in 1970 he was transferred to 4 RAR for regimental duties which included the battalion’s tour of duty in South Vietnam in 1971. In 1973, he was engaged on recruiting duties in the North Queensland area followed in January 1974 by those of Adjutant, 11 RWAR, Perth, WA. He is currently studying Economics and Industrial Relations at the University of Western Australia under Civil Schooling sponsorship.
This essay is concerned with one specific informal group — that which develops within the ARA cadre of an Army Reserve unit — and its relationship to the formal structure of the unit. Initially, the concept of the informal group will be discussed to establish a theoretical framework for the essay's argument. Secondly, it will be shown that because of a contradiction in the values of the regular and reserve soldier, some degree of indifference can generally be expected in the work of a cadre soldier. Thirdly, relating the theoretical framework outlined above to the cadre, it will be shown that an informal group is established which, in general, can be expected to have different goals to those of the reserve personnel, introducing a cause of inefficiency and a limitation on the standards which may be achieved. In other words, because of the inherent characteristics of the system, it inexorably develops its own inefficiency. Finally, solutions will be suggested to correct the problem.
In general terms, informal groups form where people have face to face interaction, meet for a specific purpose, and in a common place. They arise out of the needs, interests and feelings of ordinary daily living and follow the establishment of strong interpersonal relations. They represent "the whole pattern of actual behaviour — the way members of the organization really do behave — in so far as these actual behaviours do not coincide with the formal plans". There is no conscious effort in their formation — they arise spontaneously upon individuals meeting and personalities interacting and where a common goal or purpose is shared. They are subsequent to the intrinsic social needs of individuals and are permanent in concept although their members may change. "The informal group is a basic reaction of the working man [or any employee] to the social and physical environment of production [work]; it is not a transitory phenomenon which can be abolished by an order of management".

Their functions are as follows:

1. They provide the individual with the opportunity for acquiring status or prestige not available from the formal structure. Each individual is able to compete for prestige in an informal environment independent of the criteria for status within the formal organization. Each member can achieve status by being what he wants to be — what he is good at — rather than what the organization defines he must be.

2. They provide the opportunity for an increased flow of emotional response between individuals and they are an alternative outlet for aspects of the individual's personality for which there is no formal need. There are increased opportunities for the individual to be emotionally rewarded which would be necessary if he fails to receive such responses from work experiences in the formal structure.

3. They provide the opportunity for a degree of independence and autonomy — independence (even if it is illusionary) from the constraints imposed by the system and autonomy in the sense that he is able to perform according to his knowledge and experience rather than that of others.

4. They provide the individual with increased security. In the informal group, all share common and accepted values which would not be the case in the formal organization if the goals of the individual and of his superiors did not correlate.
The informal group at work, therefore, provides the individual with many of the satisfactions he is unable to achieve in the formal performance of his work. "Without consciousness of the social means he is using, he strives ... to overcome those aspects of the situation which threaten or deprive him" of those intrinsic satisfactions without which he would rebel.11

With each member of the group seeking these same satisfactions, the group tends to perpetuate the established values of individual members; that is, it protects the individual against outside interference and tends to preserve the status quo.12 In consequence, there is a resistance to change or innovation and there emerges a degree of social control within the group which leads to conformity with established practices.13 Opinions and attitudes within the group are unconsciously channelled towards a common consensus and if strong enough, the group will tend to believe in its own righteousness — the more the members need to look to the group for satisfactions they cannot find in their formal work, the more strongly (and sincerely) will develop their common conviction that their aims and methods are correct and those of their managers wrong. In such a circumstance, the bonds between individual members of the group will be strong, and their loyalty will be directed accordingly. The individual's bonds to the organization however, are determined by factors influencing his morale and when the organization does not bestow all the rewards that it can, his morale will be low and his allegiance to the organization weak. Therefore, when the organization fails to reward the individual, either intrinsically and/or extrinsically and his job satisfaction is consequently poor, so too will be his morale and so too the group's allegiance to the organization. In the converse, when the morale of individual members is high, the informal group's allegiance to the organization will be strong and their aims will correlate. As will be shown below however, this probably will not be the case for the ARA cadre in an Army Reserve unit. There, the cadre, already an informal group by definition of face to face interaction, common purpose and a common meeting place, unconsciously at first but consciously and righteously later, is likely to engender an attitude, which exacerbates any dissatisfaction in cadre members, and a goal which does not correlate with those of the reserve personnel.

Although the cadre is distinct from the remainder of the unit in certain aspects, e.g. discipline and personal administration, its members
have specific formal functions to perform which may be found in the formal structure of the unit’s organization, e.g. supply, administrative and training duties. Its informal role however, originates in the inter-relations each cadre member has with reserve personnel, particularly their superiors in rank. From these relationships will be determined attitudes to their work and subsequently the attitudes and goals of the informal group they collectively form.

The cadre consists of individuals who have been internalized to the values of bureaucracy — more specifically, a bureaucracy which is rigid in certain characteristics by virtue of its military goals. Two characteristics of a bureaucracy which cadre soldiers have been trained to accept are: firstly, that the holder of the higher office is always more qualified to make a decision than the holder of the lower office; and secondly, that each facet of the organization is controlled by a set of rules so that each incumbent of an office follows standard and defined procedures to fulfil his duties¹⁶ (e.g. MBIs, AROs, defined administrative procedures, Standing Orders, etc.). In addition, the regular soldier is trained to accept obedience of orders. This characteristic significantly increases the importance of the need for the holder of the higher office to be more highly qualified than the holder of the lower; and it also enhances his acceptance of his office’s defined procedures and duties, for failure to follow them would be inconsistent with obedience. Therefore, the (regular) cadre soldier learns to expect clarity of direction from a credible source and predictability of behaviour as characteristics of the personnel in his organization;¹⁷ and he does so more stringently than does the civilian bureaucrat. Reserve personnel however, are not internalized to the values of the bureaucracy. Although they undergo an element of introductory military training, they do not live constantly on a daily basis with the particular methodological provisions made by the Army bureaucratic structure for the performance of duties and the exercise of authority. Rather, they are a heterogeneous group assembled from all walks of life, many never having been in contact with a bureaucratic model and many (generally officers) used to exercising authority in other organizations less hierarchical than a bureaucracy and where rigid defined procedures do not exist. Such personnel are more reliant on flexible methods and are less reliant on the ladder of authority for action. Intuitively then, it would be expected that the relationship between a reserve and cadre soldier would be coloured by a conflict of values.
The nature of the relationship between them has two principal aspects: In the first aspect, the cadre soldier experiences a contradiction between what he really considers he is and what he is defined as being. While being internalized to the value that the holder of a higher office is always more qualified to make a decision than the holder of a lower office, he finds himself in a position where his superiors in rank have considerably inferior knowledge than himself, certainly in practical and perhaps also in theoretical terms. Therefore, he knows he has the capacity to advise, and will tend to do so, consistent with the above value, to ensure that the superior officer is qualified in terms of knowledge to make a decision. In addition, he will note that his superiors disregard on some occasions the necessity to follow (or even appreciate the need for) defined and standard practices, e.g. administrative practices. Such action conflicts with the second value to which he is internalized and on witnessing such disregard, his desire to advise becomes even stronger.

In the second aspect, when a reserve officer is in such a situation he inevitably will make some decisions not in accordance with the advice given by a cadre member. In addition he may experience some insecurity with being advised constantly by one considerably lower in the formal hierarchy of rank than himself, (e.g. a rifle company commander (major) receiving advice from a warrant officer Training adviser) and on occasion, decide that it is necessary to overrule his adviser regardless of the content of the advice. In either situation when he makes an independent decision which does not comply with advice and subsequently issues an order accordingly, the cadre soldier in obeying does so in contravention of his internalized expectation that orders he has to obey will originate in a higher office occupied by one more qualified than he. In addition he tends to become marginal as his sincere advice has been ignored and he himself bypassed. If this occurs often and the cadre soldier becomes marginal, he will become dissatisfied and indifferent. He loses the status which his values indicate his knowledge should give him, and he fails to receive the intrinsic rewards which he needs for high morale. Indeed, this is likely to be the general case, because, as indicated above, it is highly likely that most reserve officers are not civilly employed in bureaucratic institutions, and therefore it is highly unlikely that most reserve officers will readily adapt to the values and norms of the bureaucratic model confronting them at periodic unit parades. Rather they will introduce procedures and other
practices to their military duties reflective of their own internalized values — values which will conflict with those of the cadre adviser. The cadre soldier, therefore, will inevitably experience some dissatisfaction with his job. Therefore, he can be expected to become indifferent, the degree of indifference depending upon the proportion of times his advice is ignored.

It is apparent, therefore, how the social relations within the cadre satisfy the individual's social needs:

1. In the formal ranks of the cadre his status is defined and stable. It is not in contradiction between what his knowledge indicates it should be and what the formal rank structure defines it to be.

2. He experiences rewarding responses from his fellow professionals when he describes (sometimes cynically) how his advice should have been accepted and was not. He is pleased by his professional contemporaries agreeing with him that he was right and "they" were wrong.

3. He is independent of the constraint of having to obey orders given by a superior he knows is of inferior knowledge.

4. He is secure in an environment where his internalized norms and values are accepted and practised — in an environment of fellow professionals.

Therefore, the social environment of the cadre is a sub-culture where the cadre member can exercise his own work-style and reap some intrinsic satisfaction without which he would rebel. In this sub-culture the established and accepted values are maintained and the status quo is preserved. This may be good or bad for the reserve unit. It is good in that it provides an environment where the cadre member can "let off steam". On the other hand, it is bad if the indifference of cadre members and their dependence upon the informal group develop to such a degree that each individual experiences role conflict; that is, a situation where he is faced with the psychological choice of conforming with the norms of the group (his informal role) or pursuing the interests of his reserve superior (his formal role). Individuals who experience role conflict inevitably experience dissatisfaction and loss of morale. His dependence upon the informal group becomes stronger; his loyalty to its members deepens; and his conformity with the group's norms and values increases. In short, he, as does every other member, adopts a new goal — the protection of each other from outside interference.
through maintenance of the status quo. From the above analysis it is clear that such a situation would only occur when his advice is so often ignored that he becomes marginal and is forced to feel subordinate to one who according to his internalized values, has inferior status. Therefore, the degree of indifference and the subsequent divergence in the goals of the cadre and the goals of the unit will depend upon the degree of mutual confidence shared by them, for it is the degree of confidence which will determine how often the reserve officer is to reject or accept advice on procedures which should be followed or action which should be taken.

Having analysed the relationship between the cadre and the reserve soldier and the subsequent formation of the informal group, it is worth while noting that prominent industrial psychologists and/or sociologists, e.g. Viteles and Faunce, agree that when the goals of the informal group do not correlate with those of management, it is invariably found that production operates at less than maximum efficiency. In this analysis, that means that when the goals of the cadre do not correlate with those of the reserve commander, the unit’s efficiency and performance will be less than of the highest possible standards. However, the analysis also indicated that some indifference was inevitable in the cadre soldier, except where the relationship between cadre and reserve soldier is one of complete confidence. Such a situation requires of the cadre and reserve member considerable flexibility in approach and broadness in thinking so as to be able to positively appreciate each other’s point of view. However, these qualities are not generally characteristic of an internalized individual such as the regular soldier. Hence, it may be expected that high levels of mutual confidence are not normal in the relationships between cadre and reserve soldiers; and therefore, the development of indifference in the cadre soldier, a hostile informal group, and the subsequent achievement of only mediocre standards, can be expected on a general basis, that is, throughout the Army Reserve. In short, the nature of the system itself generates its own inefficiency.

Innate, inexorable inefficiency is to be expected as the general state of the Army Reserve, hence, cases where there has not been inefficiency, that is, where morale and standards have been high, are the exception rather than the rule. In these situations, there must have been a factor present — a vital ingredient in the recipe for success — which is absent in the general case. What is this missing factor with the countervailing power to offset the general tendency for both soldiers not to share mutual
confidence and not to coalesce in a common aim? What human factor is missing which could offset the psychological and sociological reactions which lead to inefficiency — inefficiency in which the Army Reserve not only now lies but also in which it has been perpetuated for some considerable time? Is its absence reflected in the number of "professional" soldiers who, upon posting to an Army Reserve unit, become disgruntled, indifferent and give up when they find that those, whom they consider inferior in knowledge, fail to acquiesce to their thinking; or is the Regular Army's training so defined and so effective on the individual that cadre members, while genuinely trying to do their duty, are unable to appreciate other than the values and practices in which they have been trained? Even if this is so in cadre soldiers, surely the intelligence of the officer corps is such that a sufficient proportion of its representatives on reserve unit cadres could interpret the indifference and react accordingly to offset the developing diverging aims of cadre and unit; or are they themselves so mentally lazy that they would not bother with analysing the problem before them, but would rather take the easier course of succumbing to membership in their own informal groups? On the other hand, is its absence reflected in the number of reserve personnel, particularly officers, who are not intently interested in adapting to new techniques and adopt the easier approach, the lazy attitude of ignoring the problem or accepting that the solution lies elsewhere and then, accepting the state of the reserve for what it is, using it as an agency for gratifying their self-interest — for tax free income, for social status or just useful social connections? In either case, that countervailing power, that common cause which would drive a man through potential indifference, or force him to want to adapt, as it did in those exceptional cases, is not there, while inefficiency is.

It is time, therefore, that both regular and reserve personnel ask themselves what motive is common to both soldiers in the exceptional case, that is not in the general. Consequently, it is time that both soldiers, particularly those who are senior NCOs and officers, examine in depth their personal motives for their own service. Are they motives primarily of a defence consciousness, a firm belief in the job they are doing, or a belief in the life style of soldiering; or are they primarily concerned with good pay, the status and social value of rank, or even just security. Which is predominant? The latter motives have no countervailing power for they are the essence of individual material self-interest. The former clearly would, for they are the essence of a
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REGULAR AND RESERVE

Spiritual, intellectual consensus — a plausible, strong belief. Perhaps they collectively constitute the missing human factor. From the current condition of the Army Reserve, it would seem that this is the case as the significant self-discipline required for the flexibility and breadth of thinking prerequisite to mutual confidence, is absent, and therefore the motives which would initiate that self-discipline — those former motives — are either not there or are not predominant. Rather, acquisitive motives (which of course are present in every individual to some degree) are here so predominantly themselves, or are in concert with such intent internalization that, they render his psychological and sociological reactions inevitable, and thereby condone the mental laziness in the failure to analyse, the lazy attitude reflected in the failure to adapt or the intolerance and lack of effort in the one who gives up.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the institution of a common cause or a firm belief in what one is doing, to dominate the individual’s self-interest and internalization — indeed, that may not be possible in the current social and communal environment — but rather, it is here accepted that this common cause will be absent for some time yet. The state of inefficiency, however, requires some immediate remedy and therefore, following from the foregoing analysis of the general case, suggestions are offered on methods which, when applied collectively, will allow both the regular and reserve soldier to reap more intrinsic satisfaction and thereby reduce their interpersonal conflict.

Firstly, the senior officer of the unit’s cadre can mediate between individuals, taking a strong stand in leading and advising reserve officers towards the standard practices of the system and his own cadre personnel towards greater flexibility and tolerance. This, however, is a short-term solution only. Secondly, as a long-term solution, the removal of the source of the conflict would be logical. Two methods suggest themselves:

1. the careful selection of ARA personnel for postings to Army Reserve unit, and

2. the re-examination of the necessity for Army Reserve units to have to practise most of the same standard procedures that ARA units do.

Specific procedures for the selection of individuals to be posted to Army Reserve units could be used to ensure that those personnel meet the following criteria:
1. That their behaviour has not become so rigid in reflecting the internalized values discussed above, that they are incapable of viewing other than what they have learnt or what is laid down, as valid. Personnel who can be flexible in appreciating a totally different approach are needed to skirt situations which would otherwise lead to their own indifference and subsequent dependence upon the informal group.

2. That their predisposed views on their ability to advise do not prejudice the evenhandedness their advisory position must possess, if the respect and confidence of the reserve officers are to be earned.

3. That their ability to communicate be not limited to the ability to converse and instruct but include the ability to negotiate. This criterion is most important for senior NCOs and officers on the cadre for according to the above analysis, instructional communication is of essence in the conflict, characteristic of the reserve/cadre soldier relationship. Instructional communication implies righteousness, which is unacceptable to reserve officers, and rigidity, which would exacerbate the conflicting views already apparent. The ability to appreciate and assess the other person’s viewpoint is paramount for co-operation.

It is considered that totally insufficient cognizance has been given to these three aspects in the past.

It is not proposed here to examine in detail which military bureaucratic practices and procedures may be re-examined, in terms of their necessity for the Army Reserve. It is recognized that some of the practices and procedures of the ARA must be rehearsed to facilitate integration of Army Reserve units and formations into the nation's defences in the event of an emergency; however, it is questionable as to whether much of the bureaucratic procedures are necessary. It has been shown above that reserve personnel transfer into their military duties many of the norms, and habits, they use in their civilian life and that when doing so, they conflict with the Army's procedures. The administrative area is a good example. The only communication in a bureaucracy is written communication while in other less hierarchical, less ordered and less authoritative forms of organization, verbal communication and arrangements are the norm. Therefore, it is a considerable feat for an individual, not used to bureaucratic administrative procedures to
adapt for the few short hours of a parade. His failure to adapt, to complete the detailed laid-down procedures before action is taken and even to display disregard for them, is one cause of the conflict which permeates the relationship between the cadre and reserve soldier, and therefore, one cause of the indifference in the cadre soldier, and the subsequent low standards achieved by the unit. It is considered highly questionable whether many of the current administrative procedures are necessary. Indeed, they are considered misplaced habits which regretfully have spilled over from the infinitely more complex organization of the Regular Army to the simple organizational requirements of the Army Reserve.

However, administrative procedures are only an example of the overall problem which has been described in broader terms, as the difficulty and perhaps inability of the reserve member to adapt from his own to the Army's values and procedures periodically at parades. The re-examination of the procedures currently required of reserve personnel, particularly officers, with a view to their considerable reduction and in many cases reconstruction into more flexible forms, is expected to ease the burden on the reserve member. For example, it has been found in industry that firms that undergo little environmental change have mechanistic structures, e.g. bureaucratic structures which are fairly rigid, while firms which are undergoing rapid change find that for maximum efficiency, structures which are more flexible, less hierarchical and with less role specialization, are needed. Individuals contribute on the basis of their knowledge and status differences are minimized. While there has to be a formal structure to prevent anarchy developing, more use is made of informal links for cooperation. Relative to the Regular Army the Army Reserve continuously undergoes rapid change because of the non-internalized heterogeneous group occupying its ranks and the variety of values they unconsciously transfer into their military roles. Such organization in the Army Reserve would not preclude the teaching of the military skills and practices which must be taught, e.g. the use of a chain of command to control a rifle company in the field or the tactical functioning of a platoon on the ground; but for everyday functions of the unit, it would facilitate the assignment of jobs to personnel and an environment of cooperation, far more commensurate with the variety of values and norms of reserve personnel, than the relatively rigid and unco-operative bureaucratic structure into which they are currently being definitively placed. In addition, the cadre
soldier would be forced to learn new practices himself, being forced to adapt through his living with them on a daily basis. In such circumstances the reserve officer would be in a more apt environment, and the cadre soldier would advise according to the understanding in his knowledge rather than the rigid practices and values with which he had been internalized. Therefore, it would be expected that conflict between them, previously inevitable and obvious, would subside and be far less apparent.

Each of these suggestions concentrates on a different element of the problem. To remedy it completely each must be implemented for the problem itself does not involve only one party — it is two-sided, the reactions of one side being dependent upon the actions of the other. The two suggestions for the long term would take considerable time to implement but the first, while only a short-term measure, can begin if in only a small way, to improve immediately the reserve/cadre soldier relationship.

In summary the cadre soldier in an Army Reserve unit is prone to advise because he recognizes his superior knowledge and wishes to ensure the officer superior to him is qualified for decision. He confronts a reserve officer of inferior military knowledge who attempts to transfer to his military duties, norms and practices learnt in his civilian field. One attempts to advise the other and when a decision is made on a course of action which does not correlate with the advice given, the prerogative for which rests with the reserve officer, indifference in the cadre member results. It is inevitable that each cadre member experiences indifference to some degree, hence the informal group bound by the social structure in the cadre itself is formed and provides the context within which each of them can reap the intrinsic satisfactions denied in his formal work. Yet their indifference also encourages the acceptance of a new goal by the informal group — the protection of each other, through the maintenance of the status quo; their accepted values and practices. In addition, because few reserve officers are bureaucratically trained and all regular soldiers are internalized to the Army’s values and systems, the problem described above is general, to the Army Reserve, and is not merely a local peculiarity pertaining to the odd few individual units. Therefore, it must be tackled on an Army, and not local basis.

The solution, however, is difficult. Exceptions to the general rule clearly show the presence of a cause, a belief common to both regular
and reserve soldier which would ultimately lead to the mutual confidence necessary for high standards. But such a belief is not present in the general case, in which, it can only be concluded, the motives directing the human action of both regular and reserve soldiers are predominantly acquisitive, (particularly for officers where the internalization process would be expected to be interpreted and action taken accordingly to offset the diverging aims). In the general case, therefore, it can only be accepted that a force of sufficient strength to offset the interpersonal conflict of values is not present. That conflict, therefore, becomes the dominating feature of their relationship — a dominance which can only be reduced, by changing the circumstances in which it develops. Therefore, it is imperative for improvement that those circumstances be changed; that is to say, that the assumptions held within the formal structure, that regular soldiers can be subordinate to reserve officers in the same context in which they are subordinate to regular officers, and that reserve officers can adequately cope with all of their tasks with the relatively little knowledge that they have and in an entirely different environment to that in which they daily work, be immediately revoked. Neither is realistic. It is suggested that the circumstances in which the two soldiers meet, be restructured as indicated above, in the light of the foregoing analysis which is an appraisal of the actual behaviour of members rather than the defined behaviour detailed by the formal structure. It would seem logical that the management of members accordingly, that is according to the realistic and not the defined situation, would significantly contribute to the upgrading of standards, and therefore, to the deceleration if not the halting, of the demise of the Army Reserve. For the longer term however, it would do well to remember that the prime prerequisite for victory in battle is morale — the will to fight, the desire for rigorous pursuance of a strong belief in a common cause. The institution of such a belief is the only longer-term answer to innate, inexorable, inefficiency. In the interim however, those answers suggested above will have to do.

NOTES
5 Schneider, op. cit.
6 ibid, p. 242.
7 ibid.
8 ibid.
9 Katz, op. cit.
10 Schneider, op. cit.
11 ibid, p. 242, (see footnote 20).
12 Viteles, op. cit.
13 Davis, op. cit.
14 ibid.
15 Katz, op. cit.
18 Davis, op. cit.
19 Katz, op. cit. In the Army, rebel in this sense means insubordination to or disobedience of reserve superiors; applying for transfer or discharge.
20 Davis, op. cit.
22 Weber, op. cit. Notations are normally made of telephone conversations so that even they are written. It should be remembered that, in bureaucracies, communication occurs between offices not individuals.
23 e.g. the duplication (and trebling when additional training is considered) of roll books; and indeed whether they are the best system for recording attendance; the necessity for applications for leave. Such practices are unimportant to the individual not internalized to bureaucratic values, hence they tend to be often disregarded.
24 Another example is the use of a chain of command to expedite action. Less hierarchical organizations do not rigidly use a chain of command.
25 Argyle, op. cit.
26 It is recognized that there will be individuals who are exceptions.

CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS
Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which the articles appear are available through the Defence Library Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District libraries.

DOD sets substantial dollar shift. (5 year program calls for significant change in emphasis from strategic to general purpose forces, tighter cost guides.) Aviation Week & Space Technology (U.S.), 1 September, pp. 12-13.
Special report: Laser weapons — 2. Pentagon seeks to channel research. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 1 September, pp. 50-56. (The first part of this report was indexed in CDR 18. Officers who requested this will be sent the above and concluding parts.)
TOO often in the Services it is found that those of us who should be able to advise on the effects of marihuana, are not always well prepared for this task. To remedy this state of affairs and to explain the increased use of marihuana, the following information on the drug and its effects is offered.

All marihuana comes from the Cannabis Sativa plant, which is more frequently called Indian Hemp, or simply Hemp. The plant grows throughout mild climates of the world, especially in Mexico, Africa, India, and the Middle East. It also grows in Australia and in the United States where the term marihuana embraces all the fancy vernacular names — ‘Hashish’, ‘Chang’, ‘Ganga’, ‘Charas’, ‘Cannabinol’, ‘Tetra-hydrol-Cannabinol’, ‘Pot’, ‘Tea’, ‘Weed’, ‘Grass’ and ‘Mary Jane’ — for the various preparations made from parts of the cannabis plant excluding the stalks and sterilised seeds.

The potency of the drug ranges from the limited effects of poorly harvested marihuana to the severe effects of ‘Hashish’ or ‘Charas’. Its strength differs from place to place, depending on where it is grown, how it is prepared for use and how it is stored.

Uses of Marihuana

Although known to man for nearly 5,000 years, marihuana is one of the least understood of all natural drugs. Its fibres have been used to manufacture twine, rope, bags, clothing and paper. The sterilised seeds are occasionally used in various feed mixtures, particularly for bird seed.
In the past, marihuana has also been used in the treatment of a variety of clinical disorders. Very early in China’s history it was used to relieve pain during surgery. In India it was used as medicine. In the United States it was used as an analgesic and a poultice for corns. However, marihuana no longer has any acceptable medical use in the world.

Effects of Marihuana

When smoked, marihuana quickly enters the bloodstream and acts on the brain and nervous system. The effects on the user’s mood and senses vary widely, depending on the amount and strength of the marihuana used. The social setting in which it is taken and the effects anticipated by the user also influence the individual’s reaction to the drug.

Usually the drug’s effect is felt quickly in approximately 15 minutes after inhaling the smoke of the cigarette. Its effects can last from two to four hours. The immediate physical effects of marihuana intoxication include some loss of co-ordination of the limbs. There is an increase in pulse rate; an abnormal lowering of body temperature; an insatiable hunger and an inflammation of the mucous membranes and bronchial tubes. Other effects include fantasy, exhilaration of mood, the feeling of being above reality, a partial loss of reasoning, a loss of co-ordination of movement and an often uncontrollable hilarity over something which is not particularly amusing to a normal person.

When larger doses are used, extremely vivid hallucinations often occur. There may be panic and an inordinate fear of death, illusions and periods of paranoia. A sufficiently large dose may result in toxic psychosis. A person under the influence of marihuana finds it harder to make decisions that require clear thinking. He finds himself more easily open to other people’s suggestions. Tasks which require good reflexes and thinking are affected and this makes it dangerous while under the influence of the drug. Marihuana does not cause the same level of physical dependence like heroin or other narcotics. This means that the body does not become dependent on the continuing use of the drug. However, recent studies in England and the United States have uncovered the development of tolerance levels and the need to increase the dose in order to obtain the desired effects.

Withdrawal from marihuana does not produce physical sickness as withdrawal from certain other narcotics does, though continued use of the drug causes the build-up of a psychological dependence.
Long-term Effects of Marihuana

In the United States scientists have found that use of marihuana points to massive damage or potential damage to the entire cellular process and to the respiratory system. The evidence also points to the serious possibility of irreversible brain damage and genetic damage. Other factors found are: first, marihuana tends to accumulate in the fatty tissues including the brain and the gonads, in the manner of D.D.T.; second, chronic smoking of marihuana and hashish damage the lungs and respiratory system much faster, almost ten times faster, than cigarette smoking; and third, it severely damages the body cells, including their ability to synthesize D.N.A. and to reproduce new cells. Marihuana used at a three times a week level results in a 41 per cent reduction in cell birth.

There is also a growing body of evidence that indicates that marihuana adversely affects the reproductive process in a number of ways, and that it poses a serious danger of genetic damage and even of genetic mutation:

1. Male hormone level was reduced by 44 per cent in young males who had used marihuana at least four days a week for a minimum of six months. (Dr Robert Koladney, Reproductive Biology Research Foundation, St Louis U.S.A.)

2. Sperm count was dramatically reduced in the same group of marihuana smokers, falling to zero with heavy smokers, so they had to be considered sterile (Dr R. Koladney).

3. Very heavy smoking in a number of cases resulted in impotence. Potency was recovered when marihuana was given up (Dr R. Koladney).

4. Regular marihuana use, even down to the once a week level results in roughly three times as many broken chromosomes as are found in non-users. While further research is necessary, this suggests the possibility of genetic abnormalities. (Professor Marton Stencheur, Chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology at the University of Utah School.)

5. In a number of animal experiments, marihuana was found to cause a very high rate of fetal deaths and fetal abnormalities including runting and lack of limbs. (The Thalidomide Effect, Professor W. D. M. Paton, Head of Pharmacology at Oxford University.)

6. Professor Paton pointed out that emphysema which is normally
a condition of later life, is now cropping up with increasing frequency in young people, opening up the prospect of ‘A new crop of respiratory cripples’ early in life.

7. Cannabis smoke, or Cannabis smoke mixed with cigarette smoke, is far more damaging to lung tissues than tobacco smoke alone. The damage done was described as ‘pre-cancerous’. Researchers have detected indications which suggest that marihuana may be a far more potent carcinogen than tobacco. (Dr Foster S. Tennet Jr, Officer in charge of the drug abuse programme of the U.S. Army in Europe, 1970-72. Dr C. Leuchtenberger, Switzerland, Head of Department of Cell Chemistry at the Institute for Experimental Cancer Research in Lausanne.)

8. Describing the zombie-like appearance of chronic cannabis users Dr Tennet said “Major manifestations were apathy, dullness and lethargy with mild to severe impairment of judgement, concentration and memory. Physical appearance was stereotyped in that all patients appeared dull, exhibited poor hygiene and slowed speech...” The psychological impact of marihuana is just as frightening as its effects on the body.

a. Marihuana and Hashish... produce a brain syndrome marked by distortions of perception and reality. This leads to an easy impairment of judgement. (Dr Kolansky and Dr Moore, Psychiatrists U.S.A.)

b. After one to three years of continuous use, the ability to think has become so impaired that pathological forms of thinking begin to take over the entire thought process. (Dr Harvey Pawelson, Research Psychiatrist; Berkeley University; Chief of the Psychiatric Division of the Student Health Service of Berkeley from 1964-1973.)

c. There is no doubt that a single dose of marihuana can cause an acute psychotic reaction in mentally healthy individuals. (Dr Zeidenbery — Professor of Psychiatry at Columbia University; Chairman of the Drug Dependence Committee of the New York State Psychiatric Institute.)

It is hoped that these facts about marihuana will alert to the dangers of this drug those needing to be alerted. The physical and mental effects of drug taking can be so devastating that no effort must be spared to overcome the insidious blandishments of this social evil. ☹
OVERSEAS purchase of defence equipment is not a readily reversible procurement option. If a nation persists with it, national defence equipment production capacity is destroyed.

People must become more aware of the national value of available options for defence equipment procurement. The options are:

a. importation — with or without local off-set production;

b. licensed production; and

c. independent development and production.

Long-term factors favour independent development and production, but immediate needs can best be met by a mixture of the three options. Provided the long-term goal of self-reliance is at the forefront of defence policy such a mixture can be accepted in the short term. Independent development and production is a readily reversible long-term option. If "caught short" the purchase of specific equipment on the international arms market remains an available option. Overseas purchase of defence equipment is not a readily reversible procurement option. If a nation persists with it, national defence equipment production capacity is destroyed.

A geographically and ethnically isolated nation aspiring to independent defence and foreign policies must possess visible deterrent forces. The backbone of such a nation’s defence structure should be an independent ability to produce most of the equipment used by the Services.

Wing Commander Frank Pederick joined the RAAF in 1948 as a member of No. 1 Radio Apprentices Course. He qualified for an Associate Diploma of Radio Engineering, RMTC (now RMIT), on completion of this training. After a period of service as a radio technician he was selected for a Fellowship Diploma of Communication Engineering. Wing Commander Pederick graduated from this course and was commissioned in the RAAF Engineering Branch Radio Category in December 1954. In 1967 he completed the RAAF Staff College Course and was posted to the staff of the Air Attache, Washington, for two years. This was followed by a staff appointment in Air Office involving R&D, standardisation, quality assurance and matrication policies. From May 1972 to December 1974 Wing Commander Pederick served with No. 478 (M) Squadron at Butterworth, Malaysia, and is currently in a Defence (Central) post in Canberra.
FORMULATING DEFENCE PROCUREMENT POLICY

National Will

The basis of national defence policy must be the free recognition by voters of the need for and value of defence forces to maintain the national way of life. This national will should gain expression in the budget of the Government of the day. Voters need to understand that defence expenditure will limit funds available for other and less basic forms of social services.

Government Policy

The main need is for clear long-term aims and continuity of policy. Modern defence forces can only be developed relatively slowly and require long periods of training, hence the need for continuity. Defence policy is so basic to national well-being it should ideally be above party politics and be created by an all-party group. Policies could then be changed to meet impending threats but remain unchanged by changes of Governments.

Defence Procurement Policy

Assuming Government defence policy includes guide lines for procurement of defence equipment, administrative machinery is needed to devise procurement strategies. This machinery should bring together people who could authoritatively discuss Services operational requirements, national manufacturing capability and financial and economic aspects. To obtain the detailed knowledge needed would mean using large numbers of sub-committees. But by this means the Services, industry and Government could establish the best mix of options available for the procurement of various types of defence equipment.

ASSESSING PROCUREMENT OPTIONS

The broad factors to be considered when assessing procurement options are an amalgam of strategic, technological and financial factors.

Strategic Factors

Deterrent Effect. A nation's minimum defence requirements are best met by deterrent power. This power must be visible, demonstrated to be effective and combat ready at short notice.

Industrial Infrastructure. Except in short war situations, existing defence production capacity is needed to maintain the Services. Latent industrial capacity is too slow to develop to be of any value to modern defence systems. Industry must be geared to the effective rear support of the equipment used by the Services. Ideally, industry should manu-
facture as well as maintain this equipment. Overseas purchases tend to reduce industry's ability to provide support.

**Logistics.** Overseas purchases often have the advantages of quick delivery and reduced direct cost of equipment. But it has disadvantages. One is large stocks of spares or reserve equipment must be held. Otherwise, the loss of deterrent effect during delays in obtaining spares must be tolerated. Also during emergencies the source of spares may "dry up" for any of many possible reasons. Without spares the defence equipment systems would be soon rendered inoperable and the war capacity of the Services destroyed.

**Security.** Some equipment must be independently developed and manufactured because the security of the Services is affected. The capacity to develop and modify electronic warfare systems to meet specific threats is one example, another is communications security equipment. Much equipment should be designed to meet national environmental and geographical conditions, and should be locally made. Lifesaving and survival equipment is essential for many military activities. To maintain supplies and ensure it meets national needs such equipment should be independently developed and produced.

**Co-operation with Allies.** Partners in co-operative defence agreements expect each other to be as self-reliant as possible. Provided agreements exist on operating procedures, communications techniques, and the form, fit and function of equipment at the inter-face with foreign systems there is no need for allies to use identical equipment.

**Technological Factors**

**Accumulation of Technology.** The objectives of research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), in commerce is to produce saleable items at the lowest possible cost of production. The resources invested in RDT&E for complex military systems cannot be compared with the commercial resources in quality or quantity. However, the knowledge gained through defence RDT&E and production is of inestimable value in commerce. Development of defence systems usually involves breaking new ground in several areas of technology. The benefits of this new knowledge flow into commercial production.

**Innovative Technology.** Innovative technology is needed by all industrialized nations to compete successfully in international markets. National RDT&E and production of defence equipment is the best means of maintaining the innovative process and the means of production. The sources of innovative technology are often in small privately-owned
industrial units which would have the capacity to sub-contract for parts of defence systems but are mainly reliant on commercial enterprise.

**Expanding Technology.** In a healthy industry, technology expands both horizontally and vertically. For example, in a healthy military aircraft industry the spectrum of technology is expanded horizontally into the fields of metallurgy, machining techniques, elastomers, air-conditioning, hydraulics, communications-electronics and ordnance. Within each of these fields there is a vertical expansion in RDT&E, production engineering, quality assurance, production of publications, training and logistics.

Both vertical and horizontal expansion need to be considered in any cost-effect analysis. Although new expanding technology is vital to economic growth its effects are immeasurable and cannot be included in any cost analysis. However, its effects must be considered before reaching any final decision.

**The Role of Standardization.** A high degree of standardization is needed if independent defence production in a small nation is to be economic. If standard materials, components or modules can be used in many applications, production funds are increased and the economies of scale apply. If the same national standards apply for commercial and defence equipment further opportunities for standardization will exist and further economies are possible.

**Finance**

**Budgetary Limits.** A certain amount of the national budget is allocated to maintain the power of the Services. Some sacrifice accompanies defence expenditure since that amount is not available for other government programmes. However, a successful defence policy enables the nation to retain its heritage and evolve as most of its people wish.

Another positive factor is that expenditure on independently developed and produced equipment remains within the nation and creates a wide variety of possible opportunities. Experience gained in this work is readily transferred to commercial areas.

**National Income.** Independently developed equipment creates increased national income even in the short term. This income is in the form of wages and company profit. Wages are injected into the economy as personal spending, savings and taxes. Company profit is expended as taxes, dividend payments and investment in new plant. The long-term effect of government investment in independent development of defence equipment is multiplicative.
**Balancing International Debts.** Importation of defence equipment may create a large debit balance with trading partners when the nation has little to offer in exchange. Besides the initial cost, advisory services, spares and modifications are a continuing drain on overseas reserve funds. The purchaser often has no control over price rises in these essential items. Sometimes defence equipment procurement is used as a means of balancing large credits with trading partners. If this device is used often:

a. equipment is acquired without due regard for national operational requirements; and

b. from a variety of sources complicating logistics and maintenance; and also

c. local development and production facilities are adversely affected.

Offset production is another device for balancing international debts incurred by defence equipment procurement. Offset production contributes little towards a stable, nationally useful defence production capacity.

**Cost-effectiveness Studies.** Except for pervasive requirements mentioned in the paragraph on Security (page 29) the decision on the means of acquiring defence equipment should be made from a long-term economic view. This means a maximum effect from a set expenditure or a set effect from a minimum expenditure. To be accurate the assessment should consider the quantifiable costs and effects over the full life cycle of the equipment on the national defence system. All of the strategic and technological factors previously mentioned need to be considered. Long-term expenses should be calculated using current monetary values to obtain a valid comparison of various courses of action. Within the period between the conception of a defence equipment project and its fruition, there will be escalation in costs. Although such increases should be forecast for funding purposes they do not negate the validity of a proper cost-effectiveness study. The study must place most emphasis on the operational value of the system as assessed by the Services. The Services are ultimately responsible for implementing a defence policy and are the first to suffer if it is an ineffective policy. Therefore they must have a powerful role in any decision-making process on the tools of war. However, financial realities intrude limiting the type and amount of equipment available. Enlightened financial support for national self-development and production of defence
equipment would be needed if the full long-term benefits of such a procurement policy were to be obtained.

**QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PROCUREMENT OPTIONS**

Table 1 quantifies a comparison between importation, licensed production and independent development and production. The factors considered are ones which directly affect the effectiveness of the Services. No attempt has been made to numerate important effects on the national economy of each of these options.

The factors have been weighted to give a total value of nine points. The effectiveness of each option has been scored up to 10 points for each factor. Five points indicate neutral effect, more than five points a positive effect, and less than five negative.

Within each factor there are several other considerations. For example, “Deterrent Effect” includes quality and quantity of arms, readiness and mobility. “Flexibility of Response” implies an ability to utilize equipment over the full spectrum of warfare. Often this means redesign or modification of systems and development of new tactics for employment.

The quantitative analysis shows the independent development and production option leads to greater national security in the long term. Although effects on the national economy have not been quantified, the factors previously discussed shows the local development and production option is also more beneficial to the national economy than the other options.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Relative Importance</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Licensed Prod</th>
<th>Indep Prod</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Weighted Effectiveness</th>
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<td>Deterrent effect</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
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<td>Flexibility of response</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
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<td>Ability to sustain independent operations</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Services morale and confidence in equipment</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Co-operation between Services and with allies</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<td>Promoting national awareness of defence matters</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
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The First Battle
Of The Next War

Major General Donn A. Starry
Commandant
US Army Armor School

THE United States is currently in the midst of a difficult reassessment of its position in the world. Related to that assessment is the question of how big a military establishment we should maintain. While this phenomenon occurs after every war, the debate today is perhaps more vocal and acrimonious than in times past, and its questions in some ways more difficult to answer. There are those who question why we need an army at all; others accept the need but would argue widely divergent views about how much money, men and materiel we should provide for our Armed Forces.

Look back for a moment. Twenty-five years ago the United States was recovering from World War II. The active Army stood at 600,000 men in ten divisions. Then, as now, there was debate about its purpose, size and shape. The debate was cut short by war in Korea, and we did not return to it for over four years. When it resumed, the Army stood at 19 divisions, its strength was just short of a million-and-a-half men. Despite some domestic dissatisfaction with the conduct and outcome of the Korean War, we were clearly the most powerful nation on earth. We enjoyed a virtual monopoly of nuclear weapons systems. The economy was stable. We had a large, strong military establishment which had just demonstrated its tremendous ability in a war against the Chinese and North Koreans.

Now we find ourselves in quite a different circumstance. The war we have just fought is over. The economy is in trouble and no one seems to have a ready remedy for its ills that does not produce results unpopular with vocal minorities in public life and in the media.

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With 13 divisions and 785,000 men, the Army is the smallest it has been since June of 1950. The system of alliances around the periphery of the communist world empire so carefully contrived by Eisenhower and Foster Dulles is weakened, some say crumbling. Perhaps even crumbled. Our great power adversaries, while less intransigent in some ways than before, can afford that luxury — they are clearly stronger than they have been at any time since the close of World War II. We are a nation beset with many ills which make the familiar questions more difficult, if not impossible, to answer in the same old way.

*Why do we need an Army anyway?* A typical question from the growing liberal membership of Congress.

*What should we be training the soldiers to do?* A typical question from a lieutenant in a training center.

*What will the next battlefield look like?* A typical question from a service school instructor trying to decide what to teach about tactics.

*How should the Army — the Volunteer US Army — be organized, equipped and trained for its job in the last quarter of the 20th Century?* A typical question from a general officer trying to decide which way to go in equipment development, tactical evolution and organizational changes.

All these questions hinge on one ultimate question — *What is the purpose of the United States Army in the last 25 years of this century?*

As military men we are vitally interested in answers to all these questions; answers about which we can achieve some reasonable and logical consensus. We live in a time of change. In such times it is difficult to reach a consensus; it is more difficult to have the effects of a consensus percolate throughout the system in a short time.

The purpose of this commentary is to develop logical guidelines which might help answer questions about what we should be doing as we approach the year 2000.

The President’s 1972 foreign policy statement to the Congress signalled a change in the United States’ long standing strategy of containment.

“Our alliances are no longer addressed primarily to the containment of the Soviet Union and China behind an American shield. They are instead, addressed to the creation with those powers of a stable world peace. That task absolutely requires the maintenance of the
allied strength of the non-communist world. Within that framework we effect and welcome a greater diversity of policy.”


While many factors contributed to this change, there are three which might assist us in understanding what the change might mean to policies which govern how we organize and equip our military forces, how we teach our Army to fight.

First, possession of nuclear weapons systems by several nations, great and small, has made containment an impracticable strategy; remember, it was devised when the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly. Now the increased danger that a nuclear exchange could follow quickly the onset of hostilities makes it foolish to assume that while we might lose the first battles, mobilization would give us superiority and in the end we would win the last battles and so the war.

Second, the threat which containment sought to contain is no longer believable to many public officials. Some say the enemy is too large, too powerful, too awesome; others hold that the enemy, while stronger than ever before, is really quite benign; in any event there is no general consensus about what the threat is to our national security.

Third, there is a growing realization that we can no longer afford to buy the military forces necessary to make containment a realistic strategy. The enemy is simply too powerful, too numerous, and we no longer have a monopoly on any weapons system. This has probably been true for 15 years. Today, however, growing costs of military hardware and personnel, and strongly competing demands from the domestic sector, have combined to make acutely apparent our inability to afford the forces to make containment work.

Some have suggested that we seek a classic balance between the great powers — US, USSR, PRC, similar on a global scale to the balance achieved in Europe by the Congress of Vienna, and in order to achieve that balance it is necessary to soften the harsh outlines of containment. It matters not what brought on the change, in this period of getting over Vietnam: going volunteer, getting smaller, doing with fewer dollars; we must focus our attention clearly on what we as military men must do to meet the challenges that face our country in the years ahead.

Here, a look at the past is instructive. Historically, the United States has made use of two uniquely different military systems: we shall call them the volunteer system and the mobilization system.
Under the volunteer system, through the 19th century, behind the shield of first the British, and later the US Navy, a small regular ground force of token size was expanded in time of emergency by the raising of volunteer regiments. Following the Civil War, demonstrated shortcomings of the system caused military professionals, notably Emory Upton, to argue for reform. However, neither the political nor military climates in post-Civil War America were conducive to reform. It was not until the fiasco of the Spanish-American War resulted in appointment of a Secretary of War with a mandate for reform that a change could be made. And under Elihu Root the United States in the early 1900s created an officer education system, built a fledgling general staff, established the National Guard and US Army Reserve, and rid itself of the volunteer system. General staff studies of Upton's writings of 50 years earlier and of the experience of the recent war were the genesis of the new mobilization system. First set forth in 1915, shaped finally by the National Defense Act of 1920 the mobilization system has been the basis for Army strategy, organization, force and equipment development, training and education for over 50 years. Two facts about this change are worth noting. First, recognition of the need for change and the basic philosophy of the change itself were 50 years old before the change was made. Second, the change itself was initiated from outside the uniformed ranks of the establishment; it was literally forced on the Army at the outset by its civilian secretary.

Fundamental to the mobilization system is a logic which systematically sets forth a threat, postulates a strategy to counter the threat, establishes force requirements to carry out the strategy, and governs the way we train soldiers and units.

With the US separated until recently from its potential major adversaries by ocean distances and steaming times, almost any statement of force requirements was quite adequate; a political decision to deploy forces abroad had to be taken in the context of a threat so dramatized that requirements could be revised upward without serious challenge. Besides, there was time to mobilize; we could expand from a 190,000-man Army in 1939 to a million-and-a-half men in 1941, and to 8.3-million in 1945.

Now, the growing strength of the USSR and PRC make ridiculous any force requirements statement based on countering the threat they represent to the United States. There are simply not enough resources of any kind that could reasonably be made available to keep in being
forces required to contain that threat. Nor could we mobilize those resources; we are out-stripped materially and in manpower. Time is not available to mobilize, given the growing mutual nuclear threat and aircraft and missile flight times. We have striven mightily each year since Vietnam to structure increasingly constrained forces to somehow meet the threat, rationalizing threat, requirements, or both, to preserve the neat logic of our threat-strategy-requirements heritage. And so, finally, the strategy itself has been rationalized.

Fundamental to the mobilization system is basic rationale for Army training. Under this system, individual training, basic and advanced, has been conducted in training centers; in a mobilizing Army this is the most efficient way. Army unit training programs prescribe how newly activated units are to be trained prior to deployment overseas. BCT, AIT and ATP all are designed basically for mobilization.

In schools, officers learn to perform several grade levels above the rank they hold as students. The basic officer may graduate with a fair grasp of how to be a battalion commander, but he is an ill-prepared platoon leader, and he sallies forth to be assigned to the job for which he is least well-trained. The Leavenworth graduate may be a passable division or corps commander, but graduates less than completely prepared for the command and staff jobs he can expect to hold next. The whole system presumes that mobilization will suddenly require all ranks to serve at higher grades overnight.

And it has long been assumed that America’s great mass production capacity would soon flood battlefields with volumes of equipment that would overwhelm the enemy. If ten tanks weren’t enough, we would make a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand. The same logic pervaded our outlook on forces; if ten divisions were not enough, by mobilizing we could produce a hundred, and so overwhelm our adversaries. From a few scattered regiments in 1939 we could mobilize 89 divisions by war’s end in 1945.

At its inception, the mobilization system was a much needed change; and for many years there appeared no serious challenge to its basis or to military policies which followed logically from it.

Now we live in a changed world; the old system won’t answer today’s questions. We have adopted a new national strategy, now we must calculate what military policies would best support the strategy, and we haven’t fifty years to make up our minds.
Why do we need an Army anyway?
What should be the Army's size and shape to perform its new tasks?
How should the Army be equipped?
What should we train the soldiers to do?
What should we train the officers and NCOs to do?
Why do we need an Army?

The answer is simple — we need an Army to win the first battle of the next war. This is so because militarily the winning of the first battle or battles of the next war is a task that only a military force can accomplish, and there is no longer the time nor have we the resource potential to count on mobilizing to win the last battle and so the war.

There are two critical situations in which we must win the first battle.

The first is in Europe, and involves the US commitment to NATO. However, while war in Europe is still the most demanding requirement in terms of men and materiel, a prolonged war in Europe is probably a least likely circumstance. Fear of crossing the nuclear threshold early and the basic Soviet conviction that they can win without using nuclear weapons, will encourage very early negotiations to end any conflict. Therefore, a long war in Europe and mobilization of other than select, highly ready reserve component forces for that war are highly unlikely.

Secondly, and most likely, the Army must be ready to deploy a contingency force to some area of the world considered vital in the political context of the contemporary balance of power. This requires austere active Army contingency forces, highly ready, extremely mobile, capable of rapid deployment, short duration operations, and rapid re-deployment. Here again winning the first battle is essential.

What should be the size and shape of the Army?

The Army, especially the active Army, will be smaller than prudent military men think necessary, not because the tasks just set forth require a smaller Army, but because of increasing constraints on dollars, increasing costs of military and civilian manpower, and because we have elected to try to man our military establishment with volunteers. At the moment, the active Army is stabilized at 785,000 with the goal of manning 16 divisions within that manpower authorization. That's the smallest Army the United States has had since June of 1950, and the last time the Army had 16 divisions, it was made up of 970,000 men.
A smaller Army whose main purpose is to win the first battle of the next war must focus on survivability and sustainability; its training must insist on readiness to win the first battle(s) in order to increase the decision-makers' latitude in the making of the nuclear decision. At the same time, the long term sustainability of the force would be not so important as in the past. Sustainability is contingent upon an austere complement of the views of war — transport, ammunition, POL, medical evacuation. Survivability is contingent upon improved readiness of active and selected reserve component forces to fight and win the first battle outnumbered.

How should we equip the Army?

One significant lesson of the October War is that the equipment of either side, regardless of some differences in sophistication, is not the deciding factor in battle. What is clear is that while we might expect to improve our battle performance by 10 per cent by improving the equipment, we can improve our battle performance a hundredfold by improving training. Therefore, the emphasis in equipment development must be on simplicity, effectiveness, supportability and trainability. While this has always been important, it is now imperative, for in the first battle(s) of the next war we expect to fight outnumbered. Therefore we must insure that through training we can achieve exchange ratios of five or even 10 to one.

Unless sophistication can significantly improve the exchange ratio, the decision should be for simplicity in the interests of trainability.

Unless supportability — maintenance, supply, repair, recovery — is simpler, less complex and less costly than the current system, the decision should be against the less supportable system.

What should we train the soldiers to do?

The United States Army must train its soldiers to fight and win the first battle(s) of the next war, and to fight and win those battle(s) outnumbered.

As before, the first step in soldier training is achievement of a high state of excellence in individual soldier skills. The second step is to integrate him into an effective team. And now the third step — keeping the soldier and his unit at a high state of readiness — is essential. Now more than ever we must all understand the dimensions of the modern armor battlefield. For only if we do can we build in the soldiers the confidence and conviction that we can and will win. They must master
their weapons, understand their enemy, know tactics and master the clever use of terrain. All this, day and night, good weather and bad, rain, sleet, snow and cold. They must master the soldier’s environment.

One thing this suggests is that no longer should we expect the force we are most likely to employ to be raised by mobilization, followed by institutionalized training of individuals in centers.

A smaller Army probably cannot afford the manpower, instructors, school overhead and installations to conduct all individual training in training centers. Recognizing this, we are moving toward a reduced individual training cycle that will combine BCT and ATT. Additionally, we are devising a system that will enable us to tailor our training output to the needs of units in the field. As early as possible the soldier should know to what unit he will be assigned; and as much as possible he should train from the beginning with other soldiers of his own unit. Eventually this could move us closer to some sort of regimental system which would improve quality and motivation to our soldier training.

Unit training programs must be designed to sustain volunteer active Army forces at a high level of combat proficiency. We have already set aside the Army training program, replacing it with the Army Readiness Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) for unit training.

Finally, what should we train leaders to do?

The leaders should be trained to lead. They are not managers, although certain managerial skill is essential; they are not political scientists, although a certain understanding of the realities of the world in which they operate is important. How must we train the leaders to enable them to provide the kind of leadership we need?

First, we must insist on proficiency in grade. Basic NCO course graduates must be proficient squad, crew and section leaders; advanced NCO graduates must be proficient platoon sergeants. Basic officer course graduates must be proficient platoon leaders; career course graduates proficient company commanders and unit staff officers; Leavenworth graduates proficient battalion commanders, brigade or divisional staff officers. We have already moved in this direction in our service schools, and will move even further in the next few months.

Second, leaders must learn to train others to proficiency with limited resources. Education, particularly officer education, has concentrated on how to mobilize, train and deploy forces. The basic outlook of this approach is one of nearly unlimited resources. Everything is on the
increase; if there are shortages it's a matter of time only until they are satisfied. Our Vietnam experience did nothing to dispel this misapprehension. No service school teaches a course in how to reduce an Army, or how to operate with constrained resources. When resources are limited we tend to try to do everything a little less well instead of reordering priorities to see what we cannot afford to do at all any longer. Today's officers and NCOs have to learn how to achieve and maintain high standards of individual and unit proficiency with limited resources. It can be done. It requires determination, a certain cleverness, considerable skill and a conviction that it can and will be done.

Finally, leaders must understand the basic demands of leading soldiers in the first battle of the next war. It is not without cause that the majority of Israeli casualties in the October War were among officers and NCOs — in their army they lead. The clear lesson of war is that, in the end, the outcome of the battle depends on the excellence of training, the quality of leadership and the courage of soldiers. It is also quite certain that the side that thinks it will win usually does. Conversely, the side that thinks it may lose, or whose soldiers are not convinced that they can and will win regardless of the odds, usually loses. Therefore, the United States Army must enter the first battle of the next war with soldiers whose state of training, whose confidence in themselves and their leadership, and whose courage is such that they can fight successfully at odds of ten- or even 20-to-one and win. Win through excellence in the effective use of weapons, win by using clever, effective, sound, and carefully thought-out tactics. Win because they are better trained. Win because they are better led. Win because their courage and conviction tell them that they can enter a fight outnumbered, and come out a winner. ❧
CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which the articles appear are available through the Defence Library Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District libraries.


Helicopters meet new challenges (Civil, Military demands spur helicopter growth surge.) *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (US), 29 September, pp. 30-111. (This is a substantial feature from which articles of direct military application have been extracted.)

Avionics: after Loran? (This long-range navigation aid is soon to be phased out, and the Omega system is the main contender to succeed it.) *Flight International*, 6 November, p. 681.


Defence in the next decade: Part 2; Command and control in the armed services. *Pacific Defence Reporter*, November, pp. 16-18. (Will be sent to requesters of Part 1.)

The Opposition Defence Policy. (As tabled by Mr. Killen while Shadow Minister for Defence, on 8th October — and Mr. Morrison's reply.) *Pacific Defence Reporter*, November, pp. 11-14.


U.S. weighs new curbs on 'fees'. (The Defense Dept. issued a directive last month that $10,000 + commissions under the foreign military sales program must be disclosed to the purchasing country.) *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 22 September, pp. 12-13.

SALT agreement "Disparities" criticized. (Second part of article on SALT agreement—first part listed last week, and requesters will be sent Part 2.) *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 22 September, pp. 51-56.


HOW do women see their role in the military setting? Colonel K. M. Fowler’s article, “The Changing Role of Women in the Armed Forces” in the October 1975 issue of Army Journal, merely presumes that women in the Services want the opportunity for employment on an equal basis with men. There is no attempt to reconcile this attitude with current feeling amongst servicewomen. It is little wonder that some men in the Services are wary of such an attitude for after all, there is no real evidence that this is what most women in the Services want. In fact, very few women have been sufficiently confident to analyse their own feelings and communicate them to others. Unfortunately, the exceptions, such as Captain L. J. Gregson with her “Open letter to the female officers of the Australian Army” in the September 1973 issue of Army Journal, have tended to express the views of radicals. This may be why some women are so reluctant to speak out — for fear that they will be branded as “Women’s Libbers.” This article attempts to dispel the confusion and the delusions that have arisen because of the recent emphasis on the ever-growing role of women in the military environment.

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Role Conflict

Inevitably women in the Services will experience some degree of role conflict. The society in which we live still associates the task of defending the country with its male soldiers, sailors and airmen. As long as this is the case, any woman who wants to participate wholeheartedly and make a career in the Armed Forces is contravening the expectations of society. After the initial novelty of being “different” has worn away, such a woman in the long run is likely to react in one of two ways. She may be smitten with pangs of guilt that she is rebelling from the charters of womanhood (which are directed towards marriage and family, not the preparation for war) and hence may become anxious, or depressed and so disillusioned that she may eventually leave the Armed Forces, or she may identify herself more

On their 25th Anniversary parade, 420 members of the Women’s Royal Australian Army Corps await the arrival of their Colonel-in-Chief, Her Royal Highness, the Princess Margaret, at Victoria Barracks, Sydney.
and more with men, who are acceptable in the military role, and may adopt their attitudes and values until she is convinced that she is happier to think the same way as they do.

Naturally enough, this latter reaction is frowned upon as it does not conform with the tenets of the rest of society and the cry goes up for the maintenance of femininity in the Women’s Services. However, as long as women are needed to supplement manpower and supply a reserve to enable men to be released for active service, and as long as no provision is made to encourage the opposite category of women to remain, the use of women who are happy to identify with male ideals will probably be condoned by Defence chiefs. It has the advantage that their thinking usually acts as a deterrent to deep involvement with men and hence it helps to create a supply of women who are able to devote themselves to the Services, enjoy a continuous career, and who can check the wastage rate of the other females. These women have just about beaten any role conflict and they are usually pretty hardened cases. If they have committed themselves to the conviction that they can get by posing as men, all they have to do to feel self-fulfilled is to attempt to emulate their chosen ideals.

However, this is not true for the women in the other category — the women who feel inadequate or uncomfortable in the military setting because of the strong constraints imposed on them by their dedication to the traditional concept of femininity. This article aims at giving solace to those women who do experience such role conflict.

Femininity Up-dated

Expectations of marriage and family-raising will normally be inherent in most women’s ambitions, although they may lie dormant for a number of years. In the past and under vastly different circumstances, women were encouraged to be submissive and dependent, and self-assertiveness, achievement orientation and independence were discouraged, for they interfered with the smooth running of the household. Women consequently tended to suffer from low self-esteem.

However, these days most women realise that to prepare for marriage and motherhood, women need to develop strengths and skills never before expected of them. Today it is widely accepted that women who are overly dependent and passive, clinging vines, do not make effective and resourceful wives and mothers. They are vulnerable to helplessness and anxiety. To want to please too much by assuming a
subservient role can also harm women by inhibiting the development of their personalities or initiative and it may turn them into frustrated or neurotic housewives. Women are now expected to be much more versatile as there is much more emphasis on the sharing of responsibilities in marriage, and women are able to participate more fully in community affairs.

With all this in mind, it is argued that the techniques women can learn in the military environment are very much compatible with the skills required by the modern wife and mother.

**What Women Can Gain from the Services**

Above all, women need to learn to be more self-assertive and need to learn to place more emphasis on reason and logic to help them cope more competently and effectively. (Let us not be too proud to acknowledge that men could be our best mentors!) The Services as part of their leadership training are generally able to teach women how to be more self-confident and how to stand up for their rights without succumbing to embarrassment or depression. By setting challenges in work and training, they help women adopt a greater level of independence and achieve a greater capacity for organization and management. By proving in the Services that they can complete difficult undertakings, women can automatically reach a higher level of self-fulfilment and the end result is greater self-esteem. A wife with a high self-esteem is quite different from a domineering one, who is probably only acting out her inner frustrations and feelings of insecurity.

**Conclusion**

There is no need for women entering the Services to feel that they are abandoning their femininity. As long as they are not pushed into being treated as men by those who wish to use (or have been misled into using) the principles of the Women's Liberation Movement as an expedient excuse for utilising women in positions much better suited to men, women can continue to make a valuable contribution to the Services and at the same time feel that they are benefiting from their experiences.

So servicewomen who wish to uphold their ideals of femininity, and these appear to be in the majority, should not feel dismayed by the actions of their more radical sisters. They should rather be assured that their experiences in the Services will have far more constructive than destructive consequences.
BOOK REVIEWS


Reviewed by K. R. White
Military Historical Society of Australia

This book is both a history of Queensland's Defence Forces as well as a study of the conception and evolution of a citizen army. Lest this statement should suggest a learned but unreadable thesis dealing purely with the record of changes in organisation, government policy, statistics, etc, let it be clearly understood that, while all the above are included, the book is written in a most entertaining style which makes it most readable.

The academic will find all the details required for serious study, with most comprehensive references to source material and a wide ranging bibliography; the general student of military history will find all this plus regimental details, unit reorganisations and reference to weapons, uniforms and other such details.

The development of Queensland's Defence Forces was accompanied by all the reorganisation and financial ups and downs which have forever plagued the Australian Army. It is possible that this early experience, common to all the Colonies, has become ingrained into our twentieth Century defence administration, which surely must contain some kind of lesson for the present day.
The development of the Defence Forces, both military and naval, is very much coupled with the problems encountered by the various Imperial officers acting as advisers or commandants when dealing with the politicians of the day. Again history shows that our military leaders of today face much the same problems as those faced by such distinguished advisers as Jervois, Scratchley and French. The work of these officers is covered in some detail and the consequences of their actions continued to influence Australia's defence policy right through to the second World War.

The importance of defence in the development of the Federation of Australia is dealt with very completely. Defence provided one common basis for discussion between the Colonies and had much to do with settling the many differences in other spheres of interest.

The Queensland Navy is also included in the story and its development, along with those of the other Colonies, laid a firm basis for the ultimate evolution of the Royal Australian Navy.

In summary a most readable book which is recommended to all students of Australia's military history. It is published by University of Queensland Press, and is available from all good book stores, at the recommended retail price of $13.00.
Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which the articles appear are available through the Defence Library Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District libraries.

Moscow: drawing the Asian battle lines; the Kremlin's reliance on "blitz krieg". Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 October, pp. 26-34.


National Guard strength: the example of the Wisconsin Army National Guard. Military Review, September, pp. 58-68.

Soviet training for night warfare. Military Review, September, pp. 80-86.

The other Chinese army. (Former Chinese Nationalist soldiers based in Thailand could pose a threat to that country's incipient rapprochement with Communist China.) Military Review, September, pp. 87-92.

Is Soviet technology side-stepping SALT? (US DOD believes major changes taking place in Soviet nuclear strategy will move Russia towards a nuclear first strike and secure second strike capability.) New Scientist (UK), 21 August, p. 432.

Hovercraft for hunting submarines being developed by U.S. military. (Short article on characteristics.) New Scientist, 21 August, p. 435.


Defence equipment notes. Flight International (UK), 23 October, pp. 596-600.

Defence area brightens in promise. (Assessment of Budget and Defence Minister Morrison's supporting statements.) Aircraft (Royal Aeronautical Society, Australian Division.), October, pp. 12-18, 46.

Bombs for everybody? (Control over killing power becoming more difficult; the need for a plan for gwp.) Economist (London), 25 October, American Survey, pp. 27-28, 31.

The following articles are from Aviation Week & Space Technology, 15 September.

Broad weapons policy shift sets. (Draft directive would give control over major systems to Congress and Defense secretary instead of military.) pp. 14-15.

Navsat recommended for military, civil users. p. 21.

Planetary missions capabilities of upper stage in NASA concern — discussions with USAF. pp. 22-23.

Implications of SALT agreement detailed. pp. 52-54.

Bombing system emphasizes simplicity. (New angular rate bombing system developed at the Naval Weapons Center in California.) pp. 59-61.

South Vietnam under the Communists. China News Analysis (Hong Kong), 19 September.


USAF realigns basic research. *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 8 September, pp. 16-17.

The torpedo pointing at SALT. (Drive to make a new missile agreement between U.S. and Russia is reaching a critical point.) *Economist* (London), 1 November, pp. 43-44.


Soviet amphibious landing defenses. (The Soviets believe that the offensive momentum of the Warsaw Pact forces in the central European theater may well depend on the ability of motorized rifle units to prevent amphibious landings along maritime axes.) *Marine Corps Gazette* (US), September, pp. 20-26.


Hydrography needs new paymasters (Defence cuts make a reduction in the Royal Navy's hydrographic fleet inevitable unless alternative sources of funding are found.) *New Scientist*, 11 September, pp. 594-596.

The security of offshore resources. (A lecture given at R.U.S.I. on 19 February 1975, plus discussion, on the role of the British armed forces in this regard.) *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, September, pp. 3-9.


The terrible weapon that blocked the most important negotiation. (TERCOM, a guidance system devised by a Dallas firm called E systems for planes and missiles.) *The Observer* (London), 16 November, pp. 1 & 2.

The tragic story of Diego Garcia — Indian Ocean. ('Communication facility' or military base; tens of millions for armaments; Whitehall and State Dept. admissions; the islanders — chips in high-stake gambling.) *New Times* (Moscow), 44/75, October, pp. 12-13.

"Why be a general in a country that never goes to war?" (Major General Carl-Gustaf Stahl of Sweden). *Sweden now. No. 4 of 1975*, pp. 42-44.


Germany: no farewell to arms. (Years of embargo on arms sales outside NATO a disadvantage.). *Newsweek*, 24 November, pp. 25-26.

A DEFENCE OF MONTGOMERY

Sir,

The latest letter from A. L. Graeme-Evans (Army Journal, July 1975) in his campaign against Field Marshal Montgomery contains errors of fact and of interpretation which indicate that his knowledge of the theatre of operations and of the manner in which an army operates is inaccurate or inadequate. No history can present a balanced picture if it is written in haste on in heat, yet both of these are discernible in his letter. Varma, Graeme-Evans and I appear to have the same ultimate aim, though we do have different backgrounds. By debating the subject calmly and objectively, we ought to be able to present to the student material worthy of his study. I would like, therefore, to offer another contribution, a commentary on the points now raised by Evans — and I apologise for its length.

Evans persists in comparing the two retreats, Eighth Army’s from Gazala and Panzerarmee’s from El Alamein, in order to prove a case against Montgomery. A great weakness in such an exercise is that Montgomery was present at only one of them, and as the pursuer, not the pursued. If Evans wished to be, or to appear to be, unbiased in his criticism, he would employ the common denominator of the pursuer and compare Rommel’s advance from its starting point, El Agheila, to its finishing point at El Alamein with Montgomery’s, similarly, from El Alamein to Tunis, and the outcome in both cases. My starting point is Evans’ stand as to the Generalship of Montgomery (p. 32).

Evans’ stand is confused and exaggerated but I have extracted the following:

i. Ritchie’s retreat an “absolute disaster” — a disaster, yes, but not absolute because Eighth Army recovered and, in turn, defeated Panzer-
army for whom the disaster was completed at Tunis. I have conceded (Army Journal, April 1975) that Rommel's handling of the retreat was masterly.

ii. The truth was known in 1942 that the Desert Air Force had fought desperately, at considerable sacrifice in men and machines, to cover the disengagement and withdrawal from Gazala of Eighth Army who, from Auchinleck down, fully recognised the effort made and the benefits derived from it. But then, Navy, Army and Air Force are members of a 3-unit team and, to continue the simile, the bowlers saved the game when the batsmen had made a low score. The close co-operation of all arms and services is as vital in retreat as in blitzkrieg. In a letter to Ritchie, dated 17th June, Auchinleck wrote, "I think Mary Coningham's effort is perfectly magnificent and an inspiration to all of us, including myself." There is no mention of a rout here or wherever the RAF is mentioned during the withdrawal. Playfair decided that the Luftwaffe made no attempt to turn the defeat into a rout. Who did call it a rout? In my copy of Connell's book, page 210 is concerned with Iraq 1941, not with Gazala 1942.

iii. Evans — "A determined brigade, staked out sangarwise, etc... at Hellfire Pass could have stopped the Germans... as in 1941. Instead it was left undefended and the Germans streamed through". Put not your trust in sangars! Stout sangars might provide protection against small arms fire or grenades, but not against mortar bombs or HE or AP shot from artillery or tank guns. In the Desert, sangars were too obvious to ground and air observers and there was no adequate alternative to digging and blasting. At Halfaya and Sollum, the Germans sank the turrets and guns of captured Matilda tanks into concrete at ground level. In 1941, when preparing to investigate Tobruk, Rommel sent out a covering screen of 3 Recce Unit to Bardia and a mixed force under OC 15 MC Bn to Sollum-Capuzzo. 22 Gds Bde (Brig Gott) was in position at Halfaya Pass and south from there, with orders to gain time, to apply pressure when possible and to give ground if compelled by superior force. The offensive tactics employed by the Guards led Rommel to conclude that his forces in Capuzzo-Sollum-Bardia were in danger of being cut off and, if that happened, the investment of Tobruk would have to be abandoned. On 25/26 April, therefore, the Germans attacked Gott's Brigade and compelled it to fall back to the line Buq Buq-Sofafi. Rommel was not proposing, at that stage, to invade Egypt.
In 1942, the British positions prepared at the Egyptian frontier consisted of a number of defensive boxes, connected by minefields and stretching in a line from Sollum in the north to the ‘Kennels’ (El Hamra), forty miles away to the south. These boxes were to be held by infantry and artillery, while a strong armoured reserve stood ready to strike the enemy if he tried to penetrate or outflank the position. Work on the Kennels had been carried out by 4 Ind Div, whose commander, Sir Francis Tuker, likened it to Bir Hacheim, at the southern end of the Gazala line. “The Kennels hung like a rather less ripe pear at the end of a rather stronger stalk”. Its holding was of little purpose unless the armour existed to use it as a base of operations. General Dan Pienaar saw this when his 1 SA Div arrived from Gazala to occupy the Kennels and he did not dally. Another fighting general, Pete Rees, reported that his 10 Ind Div could not hold the northern end of the line for any length of time and he was promptly sacked. With the approval of the Commanders-in-Chief, Mideast, General Ritchie decided that, in the circumstances facing him, to delay the enemy on the frontier while the main body of Eighth Army withdrew to Matruh was preferable to making a stand on the frontier. Without the armoured reserve essential to its defence, the infantry localities could be defeated in detail. Connell wrote, “It was a tactically correct decision,” and Playfair, “In resisting the temptation to stand on the frontier, the British commanders were undoubtedly wise”. Rommel knew, as Evans ought to know, that whichever Army was retreating, the passes at Sollum and Halfaya were invariably blown. So, instead of streaming through Halfaya Pass on 23rd June 1942, the Panzerarmee’s advanced guards passed round the southern end of the frontier defences, which were abandoned by Eighth Army’s rearguards as a consequence of that move, not in anticipation of it, during the night 23/24th June.

iv. Evans — “The disorder was such that Coningham had to arrange his own tac recce…” This extract occurs on p. 311 in my copy and Evans has given the wrong reason for the ADC’s action. Tedder’s plaint concerns, not disorder in the Army, but the inadequacy of the cooperation between the staffs at the HQs of Army and DAF. It arose from the difficulty of obtaining a clear bomb-line from the Army staff. The defining of a good bomb-line to suit both Army and Air Force is a problem which, in a fluid battle, has not yet been solved satisfactorily. At Gazala, the Luftwaffe reported having to resort to guesswork. Montgomery saw the weakness and acted immediately to correct it.
putting co-operation with the Air Force first in priority. It was one reason for siting HQ Eighth Army alongside HQ DAF.

v. Evans — “Our troops extremely lucky”. It was not the Russian campaign which was beginning to weaken the Luftwaffe in the Middle East and, anyhow, the luck was overdue. Panzerarmee had had its share. “At Mateur, the luck was still with Rommel”. To what extent had the Russian campaign affected the Luftwaffe’s strength in relation to that of DAF?

“At no time during this battle had we enjoyed numerical superiority.” Yet, as Evans shows, Tedder could still report no serious attacks on our retiring columns. The reason for it was, I repeat, inefficiency on the part of the Luftwaffe, and of Rommel. (See my comment on Evans’ para 2.)

vi. Evans — “It was solely the tremendous energy of the around the clock bombing — for the initial 36 hours of the Axis breakthrough and the cool-headedness of Auchinleck who now took field command, that enabled Eighth Army to clear itself and create some semblance of order to face Rommel at El Alamein.” Evans has smudged the picture. This, the bombing and the change of commander, occurred at Mateur on 25th and 26th June, not at Gazala ten days earlier, where the breakthrough occurred. And it was the 36 hours before the Axis attack on Mateur, not after it. Certainly, the bombing aided the Army and fighter aircraft covered the withdrawal of X Corps from Mateur on 29th June, and certainly the decision not to stand at Mateur was Auchinleck’s, but it was the initiative and courage of the men in X and XIII Corps which, in the final analysis, enabled the two Corps to escape from Mateur and reassemble at El Alamein.

vii. Evans begins and ends this section with “the masterly retreat of Rommel’s Afrika Korps”. (Why will he so describe Panzerarmee? Rommel and DAK might be synonymous in newspaper reports. They ought not to be in the writing of military history.) The struggle was between Eighth Army and Panzerarmee. The picture of a battered corps, weakened further by the breakdown of its own administrative services, slowly followed up, not pushed, by a vastly superior Army, if painted deliberately, is dishonest. If painted in ignorance, it is careless work. Between El Alamein and the Tunisian frontier, the conflict was between corps and corps though, at the pointed end, it might be between
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patrols, such as that mentioned by Evans for a different purpose. Let us just compare “this prolonged advance” with the other major advances in 1940-1943.

1. Western Desert Force, Dec 40/Feb 41, Sidi Barrani to El Agheila, 62 days.
2. Axis Forces, March/April 1941, El Agheila to Egyptian Frontier, 27 days.
3. Eighth Army, Nov/Dec 1941, same course, in reverse, 38 days.
4. Panzerarmee, Jan/Jun 1942, same course again, 153 days.
5. Eighth Army, November 1942, again in reverse, 14 days.
6. Panzerarmee, Jan/Jul 1942, El Agheila to El Alamein, 161 days.
7. Eighth Army, Oct/Nov 1942, same, in reverse, 32 days.
8. Eighth Army, Oct 42/May 43, El Alamein to Tunis (2,000 miles approx.), 196 days.

Evans’ “stand” b. on page 33 — if he would indicate (a) when the opportunity for blitzkrieg occurred and (b) how Montgomery might have employed blitzkrieg, he might succeed in proving that “Montgomery never mastered the technique.” In the Army Quarterly of October 1974, when reminding Evans of Operation Market Garden, that is the airborne assault leading to Arnhem, General Goldsmith justified the operation by claiming that it was an attempt to finish the war in 1944. Chester Wilmot also justified it. “It was most unfortunate that... the British caution about casualties and the American reluctance to concentrate should both have exerted their baneful influence on this operation, which should, and could, have been the decisive blow of the campaign in the West. This was no time to count the cost... The prize at issue was no less than the chance of capturing the Ruhr and ending the war quickly, with all that meant for the future of Europe.” Montgomery, who considered the operation to have been 90% successful, wrote in his Memoirs, “In my prejudiced view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of II SS Pz Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market Garden’s unrepentant advocate.” So, it could be argued that the operation was neither a complete failure nor unduly costly in human life.
Evans' "stand" c, on page 34 — has deliberately misread the question? von Thoma said that tactics, i.e. maintenance of the momentum in this case, are not the main thing. The decisive factor is the organisation of one's resources — full stop. This was, I would say, having been present, Montgomery's greatest problem. The maintenance of the momentum depended entirely upon its solution. Evans placed his italics on the wrong clause. Then, he wishes to widen the definition of the word 'lose': An Army has won a battle when it drives its opponent from the battlefield. A country has won a war when it is able to impose its will on its enemy. Montgomery did the first several times and he played a large part in enabling his country to do the second. As to the cost, at least two generals of the Panzerarmee differ from Evans — the Chief of Staff, Westphal, "By his careful tactics and his slow advance, Montgomery undoubtedly saved the British a lot of blood." And General Lungershausen, GOC 164 Div, "Montgomery preferred to use his weight of material superiority to save lives rather than gain a quick victory." This provides ammunition for Evans, but we are for the moment discussing losses.

The use of the story of the Camerons to illustrate the predictability of Montgomery is a serious distortion and serves to illustrate my point that Evans has an inaccurate picture of the manner in which an Army operates. The incident is not difficult to identify. It occurred at El Agheila in December 1942 during the closing up process by 152 Bde, of 51 (H) Div. The Middlesex, the Div MG Bn, were described by a famous Highlander as "a magnificent battalion of English machine-gunners who had won the admiration of the Scottish infantrymen, whose fortunes they were to share until the end of the war." The author of that, Bernard Fergusson, described the tragedy in the same words and for the same reason as Purnell. To any experienced soldier it illustrates more — the courage of a small group of soldiers on their first acquaintance with a new and nauseating type of anti-personnel mine and the strong bond of loyalty between the units of the famous Division. The outflanking move by 2 NZ Div persuaded the enemy to abandon the position, but the road still had to be cleared. There was no choice in the matter. Evans ought to make a closer study of the defensive positions at El Agheila. Carver, who was quoted in my April letter, described how, ultimately, the outcome of a fight depends on the men physically engaged in it, not on the remote commander. Montgomery had arranged for all ranks to be trained in identifying and clearing
minefields. In no way could this incident be held to be an example of his predictability.

Evans' 2, p. 35 — it is Evans who has distorted the picture and missed the point, not I. More careful reading of my letter and of the reference in Clifford's book would have shown Evans that the occasion of the Luftwaffe's inefficiency was June 1942 and Eighth Army's retreat, not November and the Panzerarmee's retreat. The distorting occurs in his paraphrasing of extracts from his book of reference. One reason for the Luftwaffe's inefficiency in June, and Clifford could not have known this, was the sudden change of plans by Rommel from an attack on Malta to an invasion of Egypt, which caught the Luftwaffe unprepared. The enemy, including Rommel, were learning what the DAF already knew — that much preparation and ample transport were required if aircraft were to be able to reach out ahead of, or even keep pace with, a rapid advance by their own troops. Whom shall we blame? However, since the inefficiency of the Luftwaffe at Alamein has been linked with the supply problem, I propose to comment on this para 2.

Without the official records, it would be difficult to prove or disprove the statement that, when Panzerarmee's retreat began, the operational strength of the Luftwaffe was only 25% of that of the RAF. But there are good reasons for doubting the figure. Until July, the Axis Air Force enjoyed numerical supremacy, but its supremacy in the Mediterranean area was gradually crumbling away. In October, before the battle began, serviceable aircraft were — Axis 350, to the DAF's 530, or 66%. Losses during the battle were — Axis 84, Allies 97. Such figures would cause the opposing air strengths at the beginning of Eighth Army's advance to be Allied 433 and Axis to be 266, or 61%, a long way from the 25% quoted by Evans, and even that could be too small. One authority states that, in October, the Germans had reinforced their air forces in the Mediterranean area, mainly because of the critical situation in the Western Desert. The German Marshals' conference at Sidi Barrani included one Italian Marshal and was held on 26th June, not in July.

The following verdict on the logistics of maintaining the Axis forces in the Western Desert is borrowed from an article published in the RUSI Journal of September 1974, "Rommel's Supply Problem, 1941-43", by M. van Creveld, of the Department of History, in the University of Jerusalem:
i. At Gazala, Rommel's L of C was already over-extended. His advance to Alamein added 450 miles to his L of C and to his problems.

ii. The two basic problems afflicting Rommel were —
   a. the capacity of the ports,
   b. the distances to be covered inside Africa.

iii. With or without Malta in Axis hands, it is questionable whether an advance to Alexandria would have been practicable.

On page 36, Evans has misquoted Bartz. "Rommel was short of men, material and supplies, particularly petrol. In this situation, he called for reinforcements, although at that time every man Germany could muster was urgently needed in the East." Nevertheless, two parachute divisions were now sent off to join Rommel, together with an infantry division. 10 "By November, Rommel's retreating tanks had to be supplied with petrol from the air. This was about the time at which the battle for Stalingrad began. If Germany had used her fleet of transport planes there instead of in North Africa . . . it might have proved possible to relieve Stalingrad." 20 From this, it would appear that Rommel was reinforced and at the expense of the Russian front, rather than the reverse, which Evans implies.

Page 36 para 3 — my quotation "the British were allowed to advance too rapidly on Rommel's tail" comes from Foxes of the Desert (page 300) by Paul Carell, who does not indicate whether he agrees or not. Evans interprets 'to advance too rapidly' as 'to get too close' but that gives a different picture. In the first, both Armies would be moving. In the second, Panzerarmee could be stationary. Carell wrote (p. 312) that Rommel could see only one reasonable solution, which was to retire as fast as possible to Tripoli, or to Tunis, in order to rescue his Army by evacuation to the European mainland. This, Carell correctly called 'an African Dunkirk', but Evans, in his Army Quarterly article, applied the term 'German Dunkirk' to Rommel's retreat to Tunisia (a wrong use of the term) and was rebuked by General Goldsmith for using it to describe a victory. Hitler's plans differed from Rommel's. "North Africa will be defended as Stalingrad will be", said the Fuhrer at an interview with Rommel on 29th November. 21 Hitler had already ordered, on 10th November, that a bridgehead be gained and held in Tunisia. 22 Hitler and Mussolini together decided that the Agheila position must be defended as an eastern outwork of Tunisia. Rommel
informed them that he could defend Agheila and risk total destruction, or retreat at once and save something. He abandoned the position on 15/16 December without defending it. The Axis High Command then decreed that the Buerat line was to be held to the last. On 6th January 1943, after much argument from Rommel, he was given permission to withdraw to Tunisia, but was ordered to take at least six weeks to do it. His withdrawal began on 15/16 January. Six weeks would have taken him to 26th February. His rearmost troops were pushed into Tunisia on 13th February and to the Mareth Line on 20th, as Rommel admitted, "rather earlier than we had bargained for", which was one reason for his defeat at Medine.

Evans' para 4 — the LRDG and the Germans. Again Evans has an inaccurate picture, and one might ask what authority has he to speak for "historians of note"? Rommel's long range communication vehicles carried powerful radio sets employed, I feel sure, in intercepting traffic on British networks. The Long Range Desert Group penetrated hundreds of miles into enemy held territory to attack and to collect information. By its very nature, a blitzkrieg must at least begin in the forward areas. The figures given in Footnote 12 appear in the Military History also, but without the arithmetical error.

Evans' para 6 — Montgomery's task was "to destroy the Axis force in Africa". Those forces were not concentrated at El Alamein, but were spread across North Africa. They were cornered and destroyed in Tunisia, the end of the line.

Evans' para 7 — absurd or not, in his letter of August 1974, Evans does quote mainly from Rommel and Thompson, and I was replying to that, not to a paper published elsewhere. I read the article in the July 1974 Army Quarterly and the comments by General Goldsmith (handle him warily) in October 1974. Is it possible that Evans did not read my first letter, published in the Army Journal of January 1975?

Auchinleck and Montgomery, on page 38 — Montgomery did not assert that "all was chaos" when he took over command of Eighth Army. The argument revolved around the plans for a withdrawal from El Alamein and centres largely on what was said in the Auk's map room when he was briefing Montgomery after the latter's arrival from England. No record was made and the recollections of the two Field Marshals differ. Montgomery understood that, if the Panzerarmee attacked in strength, Eighth Army was to fall back to the Delta. The
extract from Auchinleck’s letter was republished as a footnote on page 716 of Connell’s book. Connell wrote that ‘no reply was ever offered’. Evans changes the ‘ever’ to ‘never’. Montgomery’s Memoirs were published in 1958, Connell’s book in 1959. Connell was premature, Evans inaccurate. I recall the argument and the amendment, though not its wording, which Montgomery caused to be inserted in subsequent editions of the Memoirs. Lewin confirms this. Later, after visiting El Alamein in its 25th anniversary year, Montgomery agreed that it was definitely right to plan the withdrawal, but the plans for it ought to have been kept in the utmost secrecy at GHQ. Instead, they were typed and kept at Army HQ, there was a leak and rumours spread.

Evans’ para 8 — Liddell Hart, Guderian and Rommel — I made no assertion and my statement should not be misleading. Guderian has been a hero of mine since, probably, my cadet days at Sandhurst, and I do not dispute what Evans has written about him. I studied L-Hart when preparing for promotion examinations and I am aware that he was an embittered man. When reading The Rommel Papers, I wondered why L-Hart should have been chosen to edit them, in preference to Desmond Young, with whom I had been associated when the War histories were being written. There were other well-known historians who might have qualified for the task.

In his introduction to the Papers, without mentioning his own name, L-Hart wrote: “In the history of war great ideas have been less numerous than great generals, but have had a more far-reaching effect. The distinction between the two is a reminder that there are two forms of military genius — the concepitive and the executive. In Rommel’s case they were combined. While the theory of Blitzkrieg had been conceived in England, long before he came on the stage, the quickness with which he grasped it and the way he developed it showed his fresh-mindedness and innate concepITIVE power. He became, next to Guderian, the leading exponent of the new idea.” (And, during one of his bouts of sickness, Rommel asked Hitler to send Guderian to take over Panzerarmee.) “In power of producing the unexpected move, acuteness of time-sense and capacity to develop a pitch of mobility that can paralyse opposition, it is hard to find a modern parallel to Rommel, except Guderian, the prime minister of Blitzkrieg.”

The reason for choosing L-Hart to edit the Papers is given on page 299. In the text, Rommel had written, “Although the tactical consequences of motorization and armour had been pre-eminently
demonstrated by British military critics (1), the responsible British leaders had not taken the risk...” The connected footnote (1) was inserted by the Publishers. “The following footnote was written by General Bayerlein for the German edition Krieg Ohne Hass (ie War Without Hate, which is Rommel’s narrative of the African campaign) and indicates why the Rommel family were particularly anxious that Captain Liddell Hart should write an Introduction to, and edit, the English edition — Note by General Bayerlein. Rommel was here referring to Captain L-Hart and General Fuller. In his opinion the British could have avoided most of their defeats if only they had paid more heed to the modern theories expounded by those two writers before the war. During the war, in many conferences and personal talks with F. M. Rommel, we discussed L-Hart’s military works, which won our admiration. Of all military writers, it was L-Hart who made the deepest impression on the Field Marshal and greatly influences his ‘tactical and strategical thinking. He, like Guderian, could in many respects be termed Liddell Hart’s ‘pupil’.” Flattering? I did write that it ought not to have affected L-Hart’s judgment, meaning that I would not expect it to.

Evans’ para 9 — he objected to my hinting that L-Hart’s judgment might have been affected by flattery, then attacks traditional reviewers on the grounds of bias and emotional involvement through personal experiences and beliefs. A man, experienced in battle, who has reached the status of ‘traditional reviewer’ can be as objective as the next man. My reviewer gave no name but, if he was the Honorary Review Editor (Brigadier John Stephenson) who has recently retired, he hardly fits Evans’ picture of a traditional reviewer. I estimate that he and R. W. Thompson would have been contemporaries and have had much the same background. The presumption in footnote 18 is correct, but it did not occur to me to mention the fact. However, I take Evans’ point. The publication on which (together with the Army Journal!) I rely a good deal for guidance in my reading on military subjects is the Journal of the R.U.S.I. Hence, ‘my reviewer’. If many would disagree with the statement that Montgomery did seize and maintain the initiative, perhaps just as many would say that he did. Who can tell? If Montgomery’s divisional commanders pleaded with him during the battle of El Alamein, it would have been through intermediaries — Corps Commanders — Chief of Staff. That is how the system works. For example, when, on the night 24/25 October, General Gatehouse (10 Armd Div) was
unhappy about the situation, he spoke to General Lumsden (X Corps), who reported the matter to de Guingand (C of S), who informed the Army Commander, who called in the two Corps Commanders concerned to give their reports and discuss them at first hand. The two 'divisional commanders' named in page 70 of de Guingand's book were, of course, the two senior-most commanders in the Air Force — Tedder and Coningham. In his own book, (p. 362) Tedder wrote, "I feel sure that unless we and the Army and Navy achieve impossibilities there is grave risk that we may reach Agheila late and be involved in another stalemate with its consequent risks of yet a third retreat from Benghazi." Evans, in his quotation from de Guingand on page 40, has omitted an important part of the paragraph. After "risk a reverse", came "in view of the defeats we had had in the past in this area against Rommel and in any case the units belonging to this task force had to a large extent been absorbed in the main battle before the actual breakout occurred." Montgomery was determined that there would be no third retreat from Benghazi. So, he and Tedder were agreed on the main danger, Agheila.

"Along O'Connor's tracks". Please look at the map. The major portion of the retreating Panzerarmee would have to move by the coast road, all the way to Agheila. The crucial and, for Panzerarmee, the most vulnerable stretch would be that where the road runs south from Benghazi to Agedabia. In 1941, O'Connor had trapped the Italian Army on that stretch by sending 7 Armd Div 150 miles across the desert from Mechili, via Msus and Antelat, to Beda Fomm. In November 1942, it was again 7 Armd Div which made the crossing from Mechili, but rain had made the going very bad. DAK and 90 Lt Div slipped through Beda Fomm on 19th February and withdrew into the Agheila position during the night 23/24 November. After the December rain, I was sent to reconnoitre a route across the desert for the follow-up XIII Corps, and the going really was bad. Crossing the Nullarbor after rain and before the road had been sealed resembled, by comparison, a Sunday afternoon drive in the park.

Of course, the ideal would have been to hold a suitable force, fresh and close up to the leading formations, ready to make the 150 miles dash to Beda Fomm. Since no fresh formation was available and since both congestion on the road and the maintenance problem limited the number of formations which could be held forward to those actually engaged in the immediate pursuit, and since the rain severely restricted cross-country movement, to achieve the ideal was one of those impos-
sibilities mentioned by Tedder. For these reasons, and possibly because of its experience and reputation, 7 Armd Div was in the van for the 800 miles from Alamein to Agheila — but there was not a third Benghazi Handicap.

Now, I have only one shot remaining in my magazine. Evans has rejected certain of my references on the grounds that they would not be accepted or shared by historians of note. Clifford, who made the comparison between the LRDG and German soldiers, lived with Eighth Army and knew the conditions well. If he does not qualify for the Club, perhaps Eric Linklater and Compton Mackenzie will. Both, to my knowledge, made a thorough tour of inspection of the theatre of operations about which they were to write, before embarking on the writing of their histories. If Evans intends to continue his attack on Montgomery’s reputation, perhaps he ought to visit North Africa. Until he does so, I have an advantage over him.

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1 Auchinleck, John Connell, p. 584.
3 Playfair III, p. 36.
4 The Pattern of War, F. I. S. Tuker, p. 89.
5 Connell, p. 610.
6 Playfair III, p. 280.
7 Crisis in the Desert, A. Hamilton & Turner.
8 Playfair III, p. 227.
9 With Prejudice, Lord Tedder.
10 Connell, p. 618.
11 Tedder, p. 291.
12 The Struggle for Europe, C. Wilmot, p. 298.
14 The Black & The King’s Enemies, Bernard Fergusson, p. 140.
15 Playfair III, p. 283.
16 Tedder, p. 293.
17 Playfair IV, pp. 3 and 78.
18 Playfair IV, p. 171.
19 Swastika in the Air, K. Bartz, pp. 125-6.
20 Bartz, p. 27.
21 Carell, p. 312.
Dear Sir,

In the otherwise excellent biography of General Hassett by Lt Col Hinds, (Army Journal, Issue 319, Dec 75), I think I detected a small error. I hope I am wrong.

In the necessarily broad outline of the General’s service we find he was ‘in at the beginning’ in Korea. Then service in Malaya in 1960.

Perusal of the DPR photograph of General Hassett seems to indicate the General wearing the GSM, Malaya before the Korea and United Nations medals.

Cpl G. Hepburn

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Cpl Hepburn has brought up an extremely interesting point here. I am grateful to Lt Col T. H. R. Jackson, SO I, Discipline and Ceremonial, for digging out the answer. General Hassett was a member of the Australian Military Mission in Malaya in 1950, that is just before the Korean War, so his GSM is in chronological order. Editor.