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An Army LARC amphibian during training on Sydney Harbour. The LARC is used for ship-to-shore work and has been
EDITORIAL

IT is a tried but nevertheless true cliche that the Australian National Identity was born on the beach at Ari Burnu, later to be known by its more famous name of Anzac Cove, on 25 April 1915. Certainly from that date in the eyes of the rest of the world Australians and New Zealanders became just that, and not those “sunburned colonials” of earlier years.

The Anzac Parades in the capital cities and the more modest ceremonies in country towns still go on; but outside those dwindling few veterans who still manage to march, their fellow Servicemen from the First and Second World Wars, the Korean, Malayan and Vietnamese campaigns and ex-servicemen from a dozen countries — reflecting the growth of migration since 1945 — few would spare a thought for what these ceremonies commemorate.

The landing, the first amphibious assault in modern times, was brilliant in conception and very nearly succeeded. It failed to achieve its aim, the capture of Constantinople and thereby the withdrawal of Turkey from the war, for several reasons. Security was appalling, communications were poor and forceful leadership from the top was wanting. Coupled with lack of proper weapons — Mills bombs for instance were reserved almost exclusively for the Western Front — all the courage of the front line soldier was of no avail. He gained an open admiration for his tough adversary, the German-trained Turk, and, by a supreme irony, withdrew without a casualty, in the one superbly planned and executed manoeuvre of the entire campaign. He regretfully left his fallen mates behind, feeling he had let them down. But far from that, it is to him the Anzac soldier, whether he is alive today, or whether he has joined his dead comrades in the intervening years, that we owe, far more than fancy flags or anthems, our right to stand up as a Nation. §
DEFENCE POLICY MAKING
IN AUSTRALIA

Text of Address to Summer School, University of Western Australia, by Sir Arthur Tange CBE, Secretary to Department of Defence, on Tuesday 13 January 1976.

Introduction

To decide how best to provide security for Australia is a serious matter for any Government and the advice that Governments receive embraces many types of professionalism. It involves the separate technical knowledge, judgement and interests of the sailor, the soldier, the airman, in all their different specialisations, the scientist, the financial administrator, the systems analyst, the engineer, the intelligence analyst, the diplomat, the production planner and manager, the computer programmer, industry adviser, cost accountant, the academic analyst and — not least for being mentioned last — the citizen who looks to government to provide him and the nation with security, and who pays for it all.

The inherently complex subject is exposed perhaps more than most to answers that come more emphatically than reasons.

The concerned citizen is entitled to know — and to be able to form his own judgement upon — the kind of people who advise Commonwealth Governments. That, I suppose, is a reason why your organizers have shown me what otherwise would be an unusual compliment by inviting me to be your first speaker. At the same time you will, I hope, forgive me if on some subjects — such as for example which countries might be able to offer military threat to Australia, and wish to do so — I remain obscure.

There are other speakers to come who are less inhibited than a government adviser must be in public discussion on definition of potential future sources of threat to Australia. Indeed “definition” is too ambitious a word — whatever they may say to you, and one of my purposes will be to draw to mind some of the ambiguities, some of the dilemmas and, perhaps, expose some of the less helpful simplicities that
befog understanding of Australia's future defence problems. The assessment of a threat to our security as a nation is a highly complex judgement requiring attention to far more than the military capability of a potential enemy to launch and sustain an attack — which is a difficult enough judgement — it is a judgement demanding a sober calculation of motives of the leadership of that country — as well as an estimate as to how other countries would react to his actions.

I shall be suggesting that this is one subject upon which Australian military history may be a distraction rather than — as history often is in other matters — a signpost to the future. My role will not be to talk about what our defence policy and effort ought to be — a subject I leave for members of Parliament who carry more responsibility than I and to the independent analysts to whom I concede nothing in responsibility but who enjoy more freedom in public debate than I. I shall try to contribute by offering some thoughts on how we ought to go about assessing the kind of defence capability (the forces, their operational orientation, their size, and their weapons and equipment) that government should create for the country.

It is perhaps sufficient for me to remind you that this financial year we will be spending, depending on decisions in the additional estimates, something between $1,800 m and $1,900 m on defence; that we are employing on full time some 102,000 personnel (of which 69,000 are in uniform and 33,000 are civilians in various production, research, repair and maintenance, and administrative services and management functions). There is another 23,000 in the Reserve Force with training obligations. The value of buildings and stores and stocks held is several thousand million dollars. Expenditure this year will be something less than three per cent of the expected gross domestic product.

Matters for Decision

There are no soft options for making Australians feel secure. Absolutist views about defence requirements are sometimes presented without posing and answering the question who is going to pay or, alternatively, what should be given up in order to find the resources to satisfy what is said to be a defence requirement. Moreover, voting more money for defence is not of itself a solution to anything. Australia's present and future task is to discern what kind of defence capabilities at the disposal of our Service Chiefs are more likely, and which less likely, to advance the security of the country — which would
throw up such questions as do we need to give emphasis now to maritime surveillance? what priority do we give now as against later to the land battle or to maritime defence or to air strike? and what civil industrial resources will need to be mobilised in various contingent situations? The requirement is wise choice of particular capabilities — not simply more of the weapons or trained manpower which we know and have become familiar with in the past.

I emphasise this because it is my opinion that Australia is still in an historical transition towards a defence policy in which the structure of the Australian Defence Force, and in which our contingency planning for deployment of the Force, are related more specifically than in the past to the defence of this country rather than to contributing Australian expeditionary forces. Those expeditionary forces usually served under major allies in international collective security where the interests of those allies were predominantly involved but the Australian Government decided to make common cause with them.

The consequences of the transition are far reaching. They have involved the questioning of many assumptions which have accumulated over the years about the kind of forces Australia should have, and about their location.

I am not intending to open an ideological debate between the two over-simplistic doctrines called “forward defence” or “fortress Australia”. Nor, I assure you, am I taking it upon myself to offer you a personal ideology. Nor are these matters of Australian party political choice or fancy. Changes have occurred in the rest of the world, and a transition of the kind described had to follow, whatever Australian domestic political opinion prevailed, although there may well be differing political judgements about the desirable speed and extent of the transition. Significant changes in the rest of the world have included the virtual disappearance east of Suez of British military power and the capacity to deploy it; the Guam Doctrine of limited commitment propounded in 1969 by the President of the United States; and subsequent American decisions to run down its resident forces and avoid new commitments in South East Asia; the new contacts of Western Powers with China; the growth of the capacity of countries in Australia’s north to defend themselves from outside interference and of a desire not to have any of the great powers (including the United States) extensively involved militarily in their affairs.
These changes suggest that the international circumstances no longer exist that took Australian forces to Europe, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Western desert, Korea, Malaya and Vietnam. If we were again engaged in war in any of these areas the circumstances would be different; and for my part large scale involvement in the places more remote from Australia seems to be highly improbable.

So far as South East Asia is concerned the trend of Australian policy now is towards defence co-operation of a kind not involving formal alliance or operational commitments; but including joint exercise of the forces, extensive training in Australia, and transfer of some Australian equipment.

For defence policy we need to assess the changes going on in the world with the best judgement we can bring to bear, debate the differing interpretations which there will always be about such matters, and plan and build in Australia now a structure for the Navy, Army, Air Force, and for their scientific, industrial, diplomatic and intelligence support, which is relevant to both the probabilities, and to the more improbable contingencies, of the last quarter of the 20th Century. We have to bypass some stereotypes which have a strong effect on Australian thinking.

**Two Determining Considerations**

The level and structure of Australia’s Defence Force should be principally determined by the strategic outlook (and I shall want to say more about this); but in addition the physical environment of Australia — independently of what is going on in the rest of the world — has enduring features which of themselves should be a determinant of the structure of our Defence Force. Under this I include our physical environment and national geography, the distribution of population, the distribution of the defence and industrial infrastructure of the country, and the distribution of the country’s resources.

The strategic outlook involves the recognition of and responsiveness to international situations and contingencies that, in either the short term or the longer term, are deemed likely to support our security interests or to endanger our security interests. When I say “our” security interests, I mean that — Australia’s and not those of other countries. Where we concern ourselves with the security interests of another country — be it in our neighbourhood or the security interest of a major ally like the United States — in the Pacific or Indian Oceans
at large — it is only rational that we should establish a convincing connection with our own security interests. I further suggest that the security interest of Australia involves primarily two freedoms which we must preserve — freedom of our territory from interference and freedom to pursue national and international policies without pressure or duress from a militarily superior power. These, I suggest, are the objectives of Australia's defence policy.

The origins of what I call a "neighbourhood" defence policy are not the sole creation of any single Australian political party. In 1971 the Strategic Basis Report by the Defence Committee advised that maintaining a capability for operations overseas should not dominate the development of Australia's defence force and that more emphasis than hitherto should be given to what was called "the continuing fundamental obligation of continental defence...". In 1972, before the election of the Labor Administration, various statements by the then Minister for Defence referred to the 'great changes occurring in Australia's external environment', and the need for "defence equipment and manning giving Australian Services an increasing measure of self-reliance and ability to act alone in certain situations". The run-down of British and American strength in Australia's area of strategic interest was recognised and government policy was to ensure "that we had the capability to pursue Australia's interest by our own defence efforts to a greater extent than in the past". Defence planning was being directed towards increasing self-reliance.

Moreover, when assessing the adequacy of our defence effort, it must not be supposed that it is only that policy which serves the objectives of freedom from external interference. The first and ever present instrument of Australian policy must be our diplomacy and the conduct of our relations with the rest of the world. Even in future conflict in which Australians are at war in defence of Australia's interests, the conduct of our relations and negotiations with powers not involved could prove to be of supreme importance in the outcome.

**Assessment of the Strategic Outlook**

It would not be credible to expect the Australian electorate to approve, in international circumstances such as we have at present, the financing and manning and equipping of a defence force, and industrial

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1 Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister's and Treasury.
backup for maintenance and new production, of the size that would be required were Australia defending itself against a significant military power.

If we start with that assumption, the security of the country demands three things:

- First, that the force in being, and the equipment under procurement, will enable us to deal with current and foreseeable tasks, and with low level contingencies that could arise at short notice;

- second, that governments in Canberra have the capacity and willingness to recognise larger adverse changes if and when they occur in the world, and to authorise in adequate time the build-up of relevant defence capabilities — i.e. without awaiting a specific threat of attack against Australia;

- third, that the core force that we maintain in low threat times contains the essential skills and doctrines, the volume and required technology of equipment, the industrial support, and adequate numbers of trained men that would permit expansion of the Force in consonance with the maturing threat.

These assumptions have been accepted in our present force structure. No doubt you will be examining them during this Summer School.

I cannot predict public opinion or political will in the uncertainty of the future. I do predict that we will have a generally adequate organization for informing and warning governments of the probabilities and contingencies in the world outside.

This starts with the functions of intelligence collection and intelligence estimating. The Australian intelligence function is to identify and analyse for Ministers, Service Chiefs and civilian defence advisers, the circumstances and the motivations which are at work upon other countries and which influence the course of action which their governments — or their alternative governments — may take.

Some lesser calls on the Services — e.g. intrusion into our territories by fishermen or a call for evacuation of citizens resident abroad — can occur at short notice, and the Defence Force contains the means of dealing with these demands that arise in peacetime circumstances.

If one rejects the view — as I do in present international circumstances — that a major threat threatening the whole security of
Australia (threatening the freedoms that I referred to) can arise at short notice, and if the country is to rely on its government acting in good time, the perceptiveness, integrity and persuasiveness of the intelligence and strategic analysis given to governments takes on very great importance.

We shall be a far cry from the past, when the War Book told us that a state of war would be announced to the Australian Government by a British Secretary of State. We shall be dependent on Australian resources of information and judgement supplemented with the highly valuable support of co-operating allies in the intelligence field.

To assess Australia’s strategic outlook for the purpose of defence decisions we must distinguish between tides and eddies. There are types of violent events which, like eddies, are sometimes not predictable. They may well be injurious to others but they will not necessarily be a threat to the security of this country. Events of this kind — outbreaks of religious violence, border disputes and the like — might contingently impose on Australia an obligation to contribute to a United Nations collective action but experience suggests that this uncertain prospect in itself should not be a determinant of this country’s defence effort.

It is sometimes argued that the unpredictability of violence demonstrates that Australia should not rest on the assumption that we will have sufficient time to develop our defence effort from a core force to a force capable of defending our country. Those who argue in this way do not always note the need to differentiate between those violent events which credibly have a bearing on Australia’s security interests and those which do not. But if we can ignore the eddies, or at least not over-react to them, we must study the tides of international movements and such things as the changes in the distribution of military and economic power in the world and in the political power of groups of countries, and in their objectives towards countries in Australia’s position. These I believe are the tides which in their ebb and flow increase or decrease the vulnerability of Australia to threats of real consequence. They do not flow regularly. Their movement is, however, discernible and their implications for our future security can, I believe, be estimated. This is what the periodic Strategic Surveys by the Defence Committee set out to do for the Government. Such measurement will never be precise. It does however help us to clarify our thinking on the direction and urgency of the national defence requirement.
There will inevitably be a diversity of interpretations. Thus events in and around the Indian Ocean seem to me to provide a mixture of tides and eddies calling for discriminating assessment of their varying importance to Australia's security.

I now comment on the role of intelligence gathering and estimating. There are those who disparage intelligence as an activity which is unworthy, whether because of methods assumed to be used, or perhaps because of a highly developed trust in the motives of other powers in the world. I need hardly tell you that other powers, possessing a present or latent capacity to act against Australia's interests, are not inhibited from using intelligence.

It is essential to gather information needed for planning of policy, the equipment of the Force and conduct of military operations. Moreover, we must look into the future where vision becomes clouded. We must foresee the more likely course that international events could take, and the political motivations at work in other countries (which is always as important as estimating and predicting its military capabilities—countries do not attack you just for the military experience they get). I make no apology for saying that we need to do more rather than less of this kind of forward estimating in the Department of Defence. Cabinet Ministers, when they decide the weapons fit for and performance of our next tactical air fighter or the degree of sophistication in our anti-submarine surveillance forces, or in electronic warfare equipment, are in fact making an assumption about the kind of enemy we may have, and the support he may get from others, at any time in the next twenty years. It seems to me logical to marshal all the various Service and civilian skills that will throw light on the orders of probability—nothing so ambitious as firm predictions.

Intelligence is an important component of peacetime policy judgement. Intelligence about the outside world, and advanced forms of external surveillance are required by Australia, applied to the areas of strategic importance to us, because of a combination of circumstances—our physical size, the extent of our territorial limits and of the key approaches to them, the impediments to and high cost of surface movement in and around the continent, and other considerations.

A significant part of the research in our Defence Science Laboratories is directed at the surveillance requirement and defence equipment
on order or being examined with a view to submission for consideration by the newly elected government, aims to improve our surveillance capability in our maritime environment — air, sea and sub-surface.

**Some Implications of a More Self-Reliant Defence Capability**

I have pointed out that Australia’s present defence posture assumes a capacity to expand adequately within a time of warning — preferably to deter attack rather than to defeat it when it occurs. Apart from lesser situations with which our present Defence Force could have to deal, it can be argued as of today, that we would have several years’ warning of an attack of such intensity as to threaten the physical security of freedom of Australia. The countries which now have or could acquire in the next five to ten years a credible capacity, combined with motivation, to attack and occupy Australian territory are very few in number. I would believe that all of them would be subject to restraints of one kind or another. There would be the restraints caused by the possible shifting of realignments against a country if it seriously threatened to carry out such an attack, the restraint of the dangers to which it would expose itself, the restraint of distance and logistic problems. In justification of these views I must add that I believe the United States and Soviet Union each have sufficient material interests and enough mutual understanding and fear of each other’s capacity for destruction to avoid war which would involve us all. While this relationship by no means excludes an outbreak of conflict between some other powers — as we see in the Middle East — I do not consider that at present any power becoming capable of successful attack on Australia could expect both super powers to stand aside. Doubtless you will hear other opinions on this; and on the vitally related question whether we are capable of recognising a deterioration in Australia’s strategic prospect; and whether our present force is so composed and trained and equipped as to retain an inherent capacity to expand adequately within that time frame.

**Relations with Allies**

We have had, since 1952, a valued alliance with the United States; we have had a long uncodified alliance with Britain; and we have international defence arrangements of various kinds with New Zealand and with countries in South East Asia.
I would not wish anything that I have said to suggest that I am predicting an Australia without alliances. What I think it is valuable to do is to discuss alliances in a practical way because that is very likely the way that our allies look at them. It is a disservice to discuss ANZUS as a kind of incantation. The defence relationship with the United States, which is embodied in the ANZUS contract to develop individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack in the Pacific area and to act to meet a common danger, is full of practical advantages in peacetime for our Navy, Army and Air Force, and the alliance is not to be measured only by the contingency of Americans going to war in defence of Australia. There is a substantial transfer of military technology and information to Australia of immeasurable value under the umbrella of this agreement. I do not wish to add anything to all the words that have been said about the potential value of this alliance to Australia under attack except to offer one comment. If we value the association it would be prudent to ask ourselves whether Australia is, consistently with other major national interests and objectives, sustaining American strategic interest in Australia. Perspectives in Washington and Canberra — the capitals of countries of immensely different power and international involvement — may differ and we should not take too much for granted.

A changing relationship with allies follows from decisions those allies made themselves — the British to run down their commitments, the United States to reduce its presence in Asia and to turn away from open-ended offers to police the world with such help as allies, such as Australia were prepared to offer.

We are re-thinking what further changes in our own forces will be required. In the circumstances of the 1950's and 1960's we were able to assume that our forces were engaged with allies who undertook to take the major shock of combat and who did not require Australian forces to be immediately present. If we are talking about the defence of Australia, neither of these conditions would apply. For that purpose we would need a logically composed and integrated Australian force balanced for defence against an enemy attacking a defined territory — namely our own. This may be different in some respects from having three forces capable of contributing — as Australian Services have on so many occasions — something worthwhile to principal allies operating in or in connection with the defence of a third country.
Issues and Dilemmas for the Future

I close these rather general remarks in the knowledge that others will speak with authority about more specific aspects of our defence capability.

I have sought to explain the issues upon which the Chiefs of Staff of our three Services and the Department of Defence — consulting at various levels and in various committees — set out to advise your government. I can see many perplexing problems arising for future discussion and decision. Without offering you answers, can I put in your mind the following list:

- In what particular military capabilities do we go for self-reliance as against relying on allied support?
- How much high weapons technology (at a cost) should we prefer as against numbers in the ships, aircraft, armour that we buy?
- How much expenditure do we put into longer term capital equipment and other enduring acquisitions rather than into recurrent and evanescent expenditure on exercising manpower?
- How much resources should we provide for mobility as an alternative to a dispersed local presence in various parts of Australia?
- How much specialist capability for fighting externally from Australia (with logistic support) do we need, and what do we give up to achieve it?
- How much public support can be expected for a function for the reserve forces enabling them to be called up in less than total national emergency?
- How much Australian production of military equipment should we accept at non-competitive prices as against being dependent on overseas supply?
- How much static infrastructure of roads, ports, airfields repair and maintenance facilities do we prefer as against manpower and equipment for the Service?
We Government advisers have questions such as these constantly in mind, and successive governments have taken decisions upon them. One of my purposes in this lecture has been to invite attention to the great changes occurring in the external environment of Australian defence and the need to keep re-examining policies on such matters as well as the suitability of defence priorities and organization. *

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Council of Defence

The first meeting of the Council of Defence under the Chairmanship of the Minister for Defence, Mr D. J. Killen, took place on 9 February 1976. The Council members are:

Mr John McLear — Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence.
Sir Arthur Tange — Secretary, Department of Defence.
General F. G. Hassett — Chief of Defence Force Staff.
Vice Admiral H. D. Stevenson — Chief of Naval Staff.
Lieutenant General A. L. MacDonald — Chief of the General Staff.
Air Marshal J. A. Rowland — Chief of the Air Staff.
CURRENT DEFENCE READINGs

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which the articles appear are available through the Defence Library Information Service at Campbell Park Library and Military District libraries.


Malaysia: the threat is from within. (Malaysia confident it will not become a domino, but communist infiltration a problem). *Economist* (London), 27 December, pp. 28-29.

West European communists: halfway to independence, but are they halfway to democracy too? *Economist* (London), 3 January, pp. 32-33.

Better Soviet budget evaluation sought. (Defence Dept. is launching a program to improve the comparative cost estimates between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. military budgets that have developed over the years under the direction of the CIA). *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (New York), 3 November, pp. 21-22.

Cabinet shifts may speed SALT. (Schlesinger opposition to U.S. concessions in arms talks only one of many conflicts leading toward his dismissal). *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 10 November, pp. 12-14.


NATO mine — countermeasures. (It will be necessary to replace them in the next five years). *Defence Attaché* (UK), October, pp. 8-10.

FFV — Swedish Defence Producer (an integrated system of defence with unique characteristics). *Defence Attaché*, October, pp. 49-52.

The Soviet Union and Italy. *International Affairs* (Moscow), December, pp. 96-101.


The role of deterrence in NATO Defence strategy: implications for doctrine and posture. *World Politics*, October, pp. 118-133.


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MONTHLY AWARD

The Board of Review has awarded the prize for the best original article published in the January 1976 issue of the Journal to:

BY October 1941, Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ), had completed the basic plan for the launching of southern operations to occupy the following regions: The Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, British Malaya, Burma, Java, Sumatra, the Celebes, Borneo, the Bismarck Islands and Timor.²

The overall aim of the Japanese Army and Navy was economic gain, and not purely military objectives. Their aim was to make Japan self-sufficient through the occupation of the rich region to the south. Once this region was occupied (see Map p. 19), the Japanese were to establish a defensive perimeter surrounding the occupied area and the Japanese mainland.³

At an Imperial Conference held on 1 December 1941, Japan’s leaders decided to go to war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, on the grounds that the crucial negotiations with the...
The conference decided that a declaration of war on the United States should precede the air attack on Pearl Harbor by such a brief period that it would not interfere with the advantage to be gained by surprise.

The original Basic Operational Plan for war, put into effect six days later by the Japanese naval air attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, consisted of the following three phases: "Phase I... The seizure of the Southern Areas which are rich in resources; the attack on the US Fleet in Hawaii; and the seizure of strategic areas and positions for the establishment of a perimeter for the defence of the Southern Resources Area and the Japanese mainland. The area to be seized was that within the line which joins the Kuriles, Marshalls (including Wake), Bismarcks, Timor, Java, Sumatra, Malaya and Burma [see Map p. 19]: Phase II... Consolidation and strengthening of the defensive perimeter: Phase III... The interception and destruction of any attacking strength [and]... the activation of plans to destroy the US will to fight."

By the successful accomplishment of the three phases of this plan, the Japanese hoped to attain the aim of this war, making Japan self-sufficient.

In addition to, but in support of the basic plan, the following operations were planned and executed with the aim of preventing the strengthening of Allied positions as operational bases: a. Air raid on Darwin — carried out on 19 February 1942. b. Air raids on Ceylon — carried out on 5 and 13 April 1942. c. Air raids on Hawaii — by seaplanes refuelling from submarines, and where possible by land based planes operating from Midway subsequent to its capture (the Japanese failed in their attempt to capture the Midway Island group). d. Raids on Diego Suarez, Madagascar, and Sydney, Australia, by midget submarines — carried out on 31 May 1942.

IGHQ also had plans for operations against Allied lines of communication, and for the protection of the Japanese lines of communication and the air defence of the Japanese home islands.

Together, these plans reflected Japan's strategic aim of achieving complete hegemony in Asia, and of unchallenged rule in the Western Pacific.

The main Japanese strategic objectives were the occupation of the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and Malaya.
The key to the Japanese plan was the capture of the Philippines, as these islands were the bulwark of the United States defences in South East Asia. Following the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China in July 1941, President Roosevelt appointed General Douglas Macarthur, who was then the military adviser to the Filipino Government, to be Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, and directed that the Filipino Army be incorporated into the United States Army.

Unfortunately, time and resources did not allow Macarthur to accomplish his ten year plan begun in 1935, to make the Philippines impregnable.
Lt Gen Torashiro Kawabe, Deputy Chief of the Japanese Army General Staff, stated that an important factor which swayed the Japanese to attack and occupy the Philippines in 1941, was the potential menace of Macarthur's work. The Japanese Army believed it had to pre-empt the build-up by Macarthur. Lt Gen Akira Muto, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry stated... "General Macarthur's program among the Filipinos was a potential obstacle to the Japanese plan of expansion in Asia... If the Philippines were fortified, and the defense strengthened by additional troops, Japan could not have undertaken war with the US."  

The Japanese aimed to occupy the Philippines in fifty days; however, dogged resistance by American and Filipino troops delayed a Japanese victory until 6 April 1942.  

Japan urgently needed the oil and rubber of the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya to support her military machine, and to achieve her aim of self-sufficiency. However, to be of real assistance to the Japanese military, these resources had to be captured quickly, and if possible, the oil producing plant in Borneo and Sumatra captured intact.  

The Japanese planned to isolate Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies through the destruction of Allied naval power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, thus cutting the British and American lines of communication with Asia.  

Their planning required that the Allied garrisons be quickly overwhelmed by amphibious assaults supported by naval aircraft, and aircraft operating from advanced airfields constructed in Indo-China. The Japanese appreciated that, from their new bases in Indo-China, operations could be mounted in almost any direction. To the west and north-west against Thailand and Burma. To the south against Malaya and Singapore, and to the south-east against Borneo and the Celebes. From the latter, the invasion of Java could be mounted.  

Operations could then be carried out on New Guinea, the Bismarcks, and the Solomon Islands, the capture of which could enable the bombing of Australia, and the conduct of naval operations to cut the lines of communication between Australia and the United States.  

Australia was not an objective in the Japanese plans prepared in October 1941. The original Basic Operational Plan called for the isola-
tion of Australia and New Zealand from any connection with the United States West Coast, but not their invasion. The Japanese reasoned that if isolated from the United States, Australia could be completely dominated, and the vast natural resources of the continent would be theirs.

In order to carry out the complex and difficult tasks required by the Basic Operational Plan, the Japanese joint Army and Navy planning had to be done in great detail. Each operation had to be carefully co-ordinated with, and was dependent upon, the success of the other. By using the principle of surprise, spearheaded by air power, the Japanese aimed to complete their operations in the shortest possible time, and then have their forces free to consolidate the newly won territories for defence against counter-attack, or for offensive action to exploit as the opportunity arose.

The Japanese considered that, even if the enormous industrial power of the United States was immediately switched to the manufacture of war materials, it would take her at least several months to complete the mobilization of her forces. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, in an informal talk to the High Commanders on the eve of war stated... "If we ensure our strategic supremacy at the very outset of the conflict, by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while America is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favour."

But, as Admiral Fukudome knew, Japanese planning for war in the Pacific hinged on two vital factors. Firstly, the Army had to continue its long drawn out war in China, and also be prepared to check any Soviet intrusion into Manchuria; therefore, it could not concentrate anywhere near its full strength for the Pacific operations. In effect, the Japanese could only spare eleven of their fifty-one Army divisions for southern operations and, this factor, coupled with a lack of shipping and logistic support, probably influenced them against occupying the prime US military bases in the Hawaiian and Midway Islands in Phase I. This meant that economic considerations were to override military considerations. In the military sense, the forces used to occupy Borneo and Sumatra could have been more profitably employed in occupying Midway and Hawaii. Secondly, weather conditions in the Pacific required that operations commence before the
north-east monsoon in the South China Sea, and before the winter gales in the North Pacific were at their full force.28

The likely Soviet threat required that operations in the southern region be completed by the end of the northern winter, as attack by the Red Army was considered unlikely during the winter months.29

For these reasons, the Japanese planners decided to launch their operations in early December, and to keep to a tight time-table. Planning required that the Philippines be occupied in fifty days, Malaya one hundred days, and the Netherlands East Indies in one hundred and fifty days.30

At first glance, the Japanese plans of striking simultaneously at Pearl Harbor, Midway, Wake, Guam, Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore and the Philippines seemed to ignore the military principle of concentration of force. The risk in the Japanese plan was obviously in the dispersion of their forces over many thousands of miles. Attacking at such widely scattered points of the Pacific could well result in defeat in detail.31 However, Japan’s very modest war potential compared to the United States and her Allies, and the crippling effects of the economic embargoes, meant that she must fight a quick limited war.32 Japan did not believe that she could defeat the Allies in a long drawn out war. Therefore, Japan had to carefully choose the time to strike; and then strike at all objectives, quickly and decisively, before the full strength of the Allies could be marshalled against her.

The Japanese appreciated that, through the judicious use of combined land, air and sea power, they could gain a quick victory. Through this combined blitzkrieg the occupation of the Philippines, Malaya, Java and Sumatra was completed in an incredibly short time.33 To paraphrase Churchill..., “Never before in military history was so much gained in exchange for so little.” The cost to Japan was only three destroyers sunk and a few score aircraft lost.34

The middle of March 1942 — less than one hundred days after Pearl Harbor — found the Japanese with their Empire enormously enlarged, their armies and fleets virtually unscathed and the morale of the Japanese soaring. But, the basic flaw in Japan’s strategic plan was that the areas she occupied were chosen mainly for economic benefit, rather than for sound military reasons.35

The economic reasons must account for Japan’s costly mistake in failing to occupy Midway Island, at the time of, or immediately
following, her devastating attack on Pearl Harbor. This was Japan's first serious planning error, and was to prove fatal to the Japanese Navy, for it was at Midway Island, six months later that, in attempting to occupy the island, Japan lost four of her six attack carriers.

Another, even more serious error, was the failure of the Japanese leaders to adhere to the original requirements of Phase II — the consolidation and strengthening of the perimeter.

On 7 March 1942, the Japanese leaders decided to enlarge the perimeter rather than consolidate and develop the newly won territories. This was done against the advice of the Operations Bureau of the Army General Staff, who wanted the Phase II operations to be confined to the original plan of strengthening the occupied territories, and building up the nation in preparation for Phase III, the expected counter-attack by the Allies.

The main proponent for enlarging the perimeter was the Navy, which, flushed with recent success, considered it should have the main say in operations in the Pacific.

This was to be the first of many clashes between the Army and the Navy as the war progressed, and reflected a basic flaw in the Japanese defence organization, in that the Army and Navy undertook operations only through mutual agreement. Unless an agreement was reached between the two services nothing could be accomplished.

Several of the senior Japanese naval officers interrogated after the surrender of Japan stated that, in retrospect, even the original defensive perimeter was perhaps too extended to be maintained with the available naval and military forces.

The Japanese also acknowledged that they underestimated the ability of the United States Navy to recover from Pearl Harbor. The fact that the Japanese did not attempt to destroy the naval repair facilities and oil installations at Pearl Harbor, and also that all the US aircraft carriers were absent from Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack, contributed greatly to the swift American recovery.

The Navy, led by Admiral Yamamoto, was also aided in its argument for expansion by the air raid on Tokyo on 18 April 1942, carried out by B25 "Mitchell" bombers from the carrier USS Hornet. This air raid had an important influence on the decision to expand, in that it tended to confirm the need for additional bases to the east. The
raid showed up a gap in the perimeter which lent weight to Yamamoto’s argument, and decided the Japanese to attack and occupy Midway and the Aleutians, and thus bring the US Pacific Fleet to battle before it could recover its strength.48

It wasn’t surprising that, having altered the Basic Operational Plan against the wishes of the Army, the Navy was barely able to reach agreement with the Army on the major objectives of the expanded outer perimeter of operations.49

The Navy was in favour of an invasion of Australia,50 as they took the correct view that Australia would be developed by the US as a spring-board for an Allied counter offensive.51

The Army strenuously opposed this proposal, having estimated that a minimum of ten combat divisions would be needed, and massive logistic support would have to be provided for such a venture.52 The Army stated flatly that, to attempt to take possession of Australia, was beyond its logistic resources.53

The argument between the Army and Navy planners was due mainly to the Navy’s apparent inability to comprehend the Army’s problem of the logistic support of ground operations.54

It appears that the lack of a unified joint staff55 to cohesively plan operations under the direction of a supreme commander, seriously inhibited the Japanese conduct of the war at this crucial period.

On the “other side of the hill,” the Allied commanders appreciated that the forces available in Australia were inadequate to meet the Japanese threat. The three battle-tried divisions of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) were outside Australia, although the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions were en route home, and scheduled to arrive in Australian ports in late March 1942.56

In the event, and fortunately for Australia, a compromise plan was reached by the Japanese Army and Navy staffs to forgo the invasion of Australia in favour of the simultaneous occupation of Midway and the Western Aleutians as a prerequisite to the invasion of Fiji and Samoa.57

In pursuance of their plan to capture Port Moresby, which would have denied the Allies a potential base within bombing range of the main Japanese base at Rabaul, the Japanese on 30 April 1942, dispatched a heavily escorted convoy of troops from Truk to occupy New Guinea.58
The Americans had broken the Japanese code in 1941, and consequently, US Naval Intelligence was aware of the convoy and its destination. Accordingly, a US Naval Task-Force was hastily gathered together and intercepted the leading elements of the convoy off Mima Island on 7 May 1942.

The ensuing engagement, known as the Battle of the Coral Sea, forced the Japanese Convoy to turn back, even though the US Task Force lost one of its two carriers, and sustained heavy damage to the other carrier USS Yorktown.

The Japanese erroneously concluded that all available US aircraft carriers had been in action on 7 May at the Coral Sea Battle, and that there would be little to oppose them if they moved to occupy Midway in the first week of June 1942.

It was assumed by the Japanese, that the Yorktown could not possibly be repaired by then, and that the other US carriers could not intervene.

On these assumptions, the Japanese Navy made the following intelligence estimate: "Relying on the line determined by our initial operational advance as his first line of defence, the enemy is growing desperate to check his decline as his outer shell crumbles under our successive blows, and as India, Australia and Hawaii become directly threatened. By strengthening and giving an active role to both his aircraft in the Australian theatre and his submarines, roaming under the seas which we command, he conducts guerilla operations against us... he is paying singular attention to the Australian Area, the time is ripe to strike at Midway and the Aleutians."

Again, United States Naval Intelligence was aware of the Japanese plans, and rapidly redeployed its three carriers, including the damaged Yorktown, to the Midway Area. On the way from the Coral Sea, the Yorktown stopped at Pearl Harbor, where the Naval Repair Yards, obligingly left undamaged by the Japanese six months before, with a Herculean effort, carried out the repairs in two days — repairs which normally would have taken ninety days. Having been forewarned of the Japanese plans, the US Army and Navy feverishly strengthened Midway Island and the Aleutians.

Constant air surveillance over the approaches to Midway was carried out by US planes and, on 3 June 1942, contact was made with the
Japanese invasion fleet some 700 miles west of Midway. As in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the main forces of the Japanese and American fleets never sighted each other. The battle was fought at long range between the carriers and their aircraft.

Although the US forces enjoyed the advantage of land based aircraft, their naval task force, which inflicted the most damage, was much smaller than the Japanese fleet which included four fleet attack carriers.

The Battle of Midway proved to be the turning point of the war. This strategic island which could have easily been occupied by the Japanese at the beginning of the war was now, six months later, to cost them dearly.

By 6 June 1942, the Japanese Navy had suffered a crushing defeat. Four of their six aircraft carriers had been sunk along with two cruisers and over 250 of their aircraft and one hundred experienced pilots lost. Their invasion transports, lacking air cover, had to turn back.

Yamamoto never again risked a naval action in waters outside the range of his land based aircraft.

Shortly after the Midway action, at Milne Bay, during the last week of August 1942, a Japanese amphibious landing was defeated by Australian troops of the 7th and 18th Brigades. This was a signal victory for the Australians, as it was the first decisive land defeat of the Japanese in the Pacific. After Milne Bay, the Japanese suffered a series of defeats which culminated in their complete destruction in Papua New Guinea. These defeats were inflicted mainly by Australian arms. In the two years from 1942 to 1944, the Japanese lost over 100,000 troops in combat against the AIF and Australian militia troops in Papua New Guinea.

The Japanese soldier was brave and competent, and more than willing to die in battle. However, after the first flush of success, gained mainly by surprise, the Japanese leadership, when put to the test was found wanting.

The distrust and rivalry between the Army and the Navy, coupled with the lack of a unified command, produced blunders and indecision.

The cardinal mistake of changing the original plans after the success of the initial operations, was exacerbated by lack of security,
incompetent staff planning, and a gross underestimation of the Allies’ ability to recover quickly.\textsuperscript{89}

These mistakes, and the inability of Japan’s industry to produce the logistic wherewithal to match the enormous industrial and military base of the United States,\textsuperscript{84} were the main factors that brought about an irreversible change to Japan’s fortunes in 1942, and laid the basis for her eventual defeat in 1945.

Despite the incredible victories achieved in the first phase of the war, the Japanese strategic plans were doomed to failure because of three fundamental miscalculations.

The biggest miscalculation was their assessment of the mood and spirit of the American people.\textsuperscript{82} The Japanese apparently believed that the American people would allow them to fight a limited war. Pearl Harbor galvanised (rather than demoralised) the American people into action. The surprise attack and the manner of its delivery enraged the Americans, and aroused them to an immense military and industrial effort. There is a lesson here for all those who contemplate fighting for limited objectives, that is, be sure of the mood and nature of your adversary.

The second miscalculation made by the Japanese was their poor evaluation of the industrial power of the United States. And, as the Japanese could not inflict any damage on the continental United States, the Americans were able to develop their enormous war machine unhindered.

The third miscalculation was that, throughout the war, more than half of the Japanese Army was tied down in China and on the borders of Manchuria, guarding against the ever likely Russian invasion. Thus Japan, when she could not achieve her planned quick victory in the Pacific, had to fight the war on two fronts. Japan could not concentrate the full strength of her Army in any one theatre of operations for a decisive battle.

When they had completed their conquests in the Pacific, conquests which were expressly chosen for economic and not military reasons, the Japanese found they had overreached themselves. The quick Allied recovery forced them into a further dangerous expansion in an attempt to destroy the US Pacific Fleet, and cut the sea lanes between the United States and Australia.
In changing their initial plans, and holding on obstinately to their extended outer perimeter, the Japanese laid themselves open to defeat in detail. Their perimeter in Asia and the Pacific traversed more than 20,000 miles, and they were unable to maintain sufficient strength in any sector of the southern part of the perimeter to repulse the Allied counter-attacks.

A major factor that contributed to the Japanese defeats in 1942, was their failure to keep their operational aims secret. The United States had broken the Japanese code in 1941, and this enabled them to receive warning of Japanese plans for the invasion of both Port Moresby and Midway. This lack of security by the Japanese proved to be fatal to the conduct of their operations.

On the eve of the first anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Yamamoto composed the following poem in honour of the thousands of Japanese servicemen who had made the supreme sacrifice in 1942:

"The year has gone
And so many friends
The lost, the uncounted,
The dead."

NOTES
4 International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) 1945, Exhibit 588, *Document 1652, Records of Imperial Conference*.
7 ibid., p. 4.
8 ibid.
10 ibid.
11 ibid.
13 ibid.
14 ibid., p. 29.
16 ibid., (footnote 4), Interrogation files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.
17 ibid.
IAPANESE AIMS AND ACTIONS IN THE PACIFIC WAR

20 MacArthur, op. cit., p. 2.
21 ibid.
22 United States Military Academy West Point (USMA), Department of Military Art and Engineering, *The War With Japan Pt. 1.*, 1945, p. 18.
23 Translation of Operation Order No. 1 — from Army — Navy Central HQ Agreement issued October 1941. Quoted in USSBS, op. cit., p. 43.
24 ibid., pp. 26-27.
25 Australia Army, General Staff (Intelligence), *The Japanese Army Preparations for War and Plans for Australia*, 1945, p. 4.
26 Bateson, op. cit., p. 46.
27 ibid.
28 ibid.
29 ibid.

30 USMA, op. cit., p. 20.
32 USSBS, op. cit., p. 32.
33 *ibid.*, Apart from the loss of 3 destroyers, 4 cruisers and 6 destroyers were damaged, and 44 merchant ships lost. See "Table of Japanese Losses", p. 40.
34 Bateson, op. cit., p. 46.
36 USSBS, op. cit., "Table of Detailed Losses", p. 77.
37 Hayashi, op. cit., p. 41.
38 ibid.
39 Hayashi, op. cit., p. 43.
40 ibid., p. 42.
41 USSBS, op. cit., p. 1.
42 ibid.
43 ibid., p. 4.
44 ibid., and Hayashi, op. cit., p. 42.
46 Hayashi, op. cit., p. 51.
48 Hayashi, op. cit., p. 43.
49 ibid.

51 Hayashi, op. cit., p. 43.
52 ibid.
53 ibid., p. 62.
54 Morton, op. cit., p. 75.
56 Hayashi, op. cit., p. 51.
57 USSBS, op. cit., p. 52.
58 Morton, op. cit., p. 68.
59 MacArthur, op. cit., p. 47.
60 Woodburn Kirby, op. cit., p. 228.
61 USSBS, op. cit., p. 58.
62 USMA, op. cit., p. 113.
63 USSBS, op. cit., translated from Japanese Naval Planning, NAV No. 43, p. 58.
64 USMA, op. cit., p. 114, and Woodburn Kirby, op. cit., p. 229
65 Woodburn Kirby, op. cit., p. 229.
66 ibid.
67 USMA, op. cit., p. 31.
MILITARY MUSEUM FOR VICTORIA BARRACKS

A military museum to house relics of colonial days will be established at Victoria Barracks Sydney.

Already a large number of items associated with soldiers of the last century have accumulated and are being catalogued and sorted ready for display.

Establishment of the museum will be the culmination of more than 10 years' effort to house relics at the Barracks.

Some of the donations have considerable personal interest. Descendants of New South Wales, first Permanent Force soldier, Henry Green, whose Regimental number was 1, have provided his pill-box dress hat and other items which help give a clear picture of last century's soldiers and the conditions in which he served.

Several of the early Commanders of 2nd Military District are featured by full dress uniforms and personal items which will provide an insight into a little-known military era.

The Commander of 2nd Military District, Colonel F. P. Scott, said that the main objective of the museum will be to display items from 1788 until the present day. However, particular emphasis would be given to the early eras of Australia's military history.

Uniforms of each period, medals, personal items or equipment and other relics of military significance would be welcomed for display.

Display of uniforms at present is being delayed by lack of models of a suitable type.

Opening of the museum in a section of the Barracks' old gaol complex is scheduled for later this year.

The Museum Committee is seeking suitable military relics to add to the collection.

Donors are requested to contact 2nd Military Headquarters at Victoria Barracks, Paddington.
PART I - OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

FROM the military point of view, the Yom Kippur War was the most significant conflict since the end of direct US involvement in the Vietnam war; if one considers the full application of technology across the whole spectrum of military activities, it can be regarded as the most significant conflict since the Second World War.

The impact of technology can only be judged some time after the conflict, firstly since much of the information becomes available only with passage of time, and secondly because the results of lessons learned become apparent some time after the event. It is proposed to discuss the effect of technology advances in this paper.

To place the discussion in perspective, it will be preceded by a short summary of events.

Lt Col Viksne graduated from RMC Duntroon in 1960. He attended Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology for a Fellowship Diploma in Communications Engineering. He has held a variety of regimental and staff appointments in Australia, and commanded a Signals Detachment in Vietnam. He attended the RAAF School of Languages in 1966 and was posted as Assistant Services Attaché to Cambodia in 1971-72. On his return he attended the Australian Staff College, served as an Instructor at RMC in 1974 and is currently in a post in Defence Central. He has previously contributed to the Army Journal.
Balance of Forces

The Israelis joined the battle considerably inferior both in men and material. The Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan summarized the balance of forces as follows: manning 1:2.5, armour 1:3 and aircraft 1:3. Arab superiority in anti-aircraft defence was even more marked. Several other Arab countries provided forces to either Egypt or Syria at various stages; Libya sent 48 Mirage 111’s to Egypt; Iraq provided two armoured divisions and several fighter squadrons; Jordan an armoured brigade and Morocco a brigade of 1,800 men, all to Syria. Apart from the Moroccans none of these forces were committed until the latter part of the conflict.

The Arab superiority in numbers was partly offset by superior Israeli training.

Arab Preparations for Operation Badr

The Arabs have never made secret of their intention to regain lost territory. The establishment of Israeli settlements on their territory only added some urgency to their preparations. Although the 1969-70 War of Attrition failed to gain any tangible results, it did enable the Arabs to perfect an air defence system which was to be of major significance in the coming conflict.

President Sadat had spent the first two years in office in trying to achieve his foreign policy objectives by diplomacy, but by April 1972 he had become convinced that there was no alternative to war. He asked the Russians for modern weapons and Russian refusal to supply modern offensive systems led to the expulsion of the majority of Russian advisers in July, 1972.

Early 1973 saw intense diplomatic activity aimed at reaching agreement with the Arab states on a common strategy in the coming conflict. Reconciliation with Jordan was reached in September, 1973. Her main task was to pose a threat to Israel’s flank. It took some six months in early 1973 to reach agreement with President Assad of Syria that the objective of the war was to be limited instead of the recovery of all lost lands. Translated in real terms, this meant a foothold for the Egyptians on the east bank of Suez, recapture of its limited losses on Golan Heights by Syria followed by negotiations through intervention of the major powers for further concessions by Israel.
By early 1973 both Syria and Egypt had secured Russian promise of further deliveries of equipment including MIG-21s, SAM systems with the new SA-6, T-62’s and PNP bridging.

Planning for the operation was entrusted to General Ahmad Ismail, Egyptian Minister for War, who with a small team set about as early as November, 1972 planning the operation in detail. He reasoned that since Israeli reaction would be rapid and fierce, the Arabs should attack on a wide front with the maximum force committed in the initial assault. It was to be backed by a strong air defence system.

Intensive training was carried out both for the crossing of the Suez Canal and deployment for the assault from the beginning of 1973. Whilst crossing training was carried out in areas away from the Canal but in every way similar to it, deployments were carried out on the Canal itself. Both the Arabs and the Israelis knew that another conflict was inevitable. Therefore the key to success was to disguise D-Day. Since it was impossible to conceal deployment of large forces, the deception plan called for training deployments to take place on the Canal itself. It was successful; after numerous similar deployments, the Israelis took little notice of the latest one.

Utter secrecy shrouded D-Day. Only the Heads of State and General Ismail knew the date of the commencement of the offensive. General Ismail described the four factors which led to the selection of 6 October as follows:

- It fell within Ramadan, the ninth month of the Muhammadan year, a sacred month during which a downed warrior if engaged in Jihad would be promised a place in heaven. This was to bolster Arab morale which had taken such a downturn in 1967.

- 6 October was Yom Kippur on which most Israeli soldiers would be on leave. Moreover, it would be difficult to make a decision to mobilize on such a day unless irrefutable evidence of planned attack existed.

- the moon would rise at sunset and set at sunrise giving enough light for a canal crossing.

- the canal current at this time was slow enough for amphibious crossings.
The Egyptians desired an H hour just before sunset to give them all night for the canal crossing. The Syrians demanded an early H hour so that the sun would be at their back. The finally agreed 1400 hours was a compromise which while it did not affect the Egyptians as much, was to have major consequences for the Syrians.

Israeli Defensive System

The small 94,000 standing Army dictated the defensive deployment Israel adopted. Israel picqueted her frontiers with Egypt and Syria with scattered frontier strong-points supported by small mobile reserves located nearby. These forces had to be strong enough to provide enough delay for Israel to mobilize her reserves; the mobilization would take 72 hours.

The most important consideration was that whereas on the Suez front the Israelis could trade time for space in the Sinai Desert, the Golan Heights on the Syrian front were right on her borders, and she would have to make a stand there. This factor was to determine her strategy in the forthcoming battle.

The lack of space to manoeuvre on the Golan front determined the type of defensive posture adopted. The ground between Mount Hermon in the north and River Yarmuk gorge generally favoured defence, being rocky and difficult to movement. The Israelis improved this 65 kilometre wide obstacle by digging a 2-3 metre deep anti-tank ditch the length of the defensive line backed by extensive minefields. The obstacle was covered by some 40-50 platoon-sized strong-points comprising well developed concrete bunker systems. To the rear was positioned an armoured reserve generally of brigade strength. The depth of the whole position was some 20-30 kilometres. The Israelis had excellent observations over most of the Syrian front from an observation post on Mount Hermon.

The Israeli garrison on Golan at the time of the Syrian attack consisted of two armoured brigades with a total of some 180 tanks. The second armoured brigade there at the time was on an exercise. The total Israeli strength amounted to some 4,500 men.

On the Suez front the 150 metre wide canal was the first obstacle in the 160 kilometre long Bar Lev line. The canal was bordered on both sides by enormous sand mounds, 10-15 metres high, 40-60 metres wide built during the ‘War of Attrition’ to provide some protection and
deny observation. The Bar Lev line consisted of 33 one to two platoon sized strong-points set in this parapet supported by observation posts. The strong-points were built of concrete, steel and sand, and were covered by wire and minefields. Provision was made to spread oil through hoses onto the canal and ignite it. Some 20 secondary bunker systems were located 10 kilometres to the rear on the so called ‘artillery’ road.

The Sinai Division deployed an under-strength brigade in the defensive perimeter but kept its two armoured brigades of a total of 300 M-48 tanks in reserve.

**Initial Israeli Reactions**

As early as 24 September the Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan was advised of Syrian build-up on Golan Heights. On 1 October Israeli intelligence became aware of an unusually heavy traffic on the west bank of Suez Canal; on 2 October Syrian reservists were called up; on 4 October the movement of bridging equipment to the canal; on the same day Russian advisers left both Cairo and Damascus; and on the eve of the attack Syrian armour and artillery re-deployed.

Although Israeli intelligence observed these events and faithfully reported them, the Cabinet only approved a higher state of readiness; not full scale mobilization. There were other important issues which preoccupied Israeli leaders; the campaign for a general election was entering its critical stages; on 28 September two ‘Eagles of the Palestine Revolution’ held up a train carrying Russian Jews to Vienna, took hostages and demanded closure of Jewish transit centre in Austria; and finally of course, the 6 October was one of the most important days in the Jewish calendar.

At 0400 hours 6 October Israeli intercept service picked up incontrovertible evidence of an imminent Arab attack. At 0600 hours the Cabinet gave General Elazar permission to mobilize. The mobilization was just getting under way when at 1405 hours the Egyptians and Syrians launched simultaneous attacks across the cease fire lines.

General Elazar was faced with the decision of how to meet the threat. He decided to deal first with the threat which posed the more immediate danger to Israeli territory at the Golan Heights whilst trying to delay the Egyptians. He would then apply the full force of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) against the Suez Front.
The Syrian assault was spearheaded by three reinforced infantry divisions in the first echelon with two armoured divisions in the second. After a 55 minute artillery preparation at 1400 hours with some 300 guns per division, each division attempted to open a corridor some 3 km wide at:

- Ahmadiye in the north;
- Khushniye in the centre; and
- Rafid in the south, with a simultaneous heliborne assault on Mt Hermon.

(Map 1)

The Syrian objective was the Bnot Yaakov Bridge over the River Jordan which would give them access to Israel.

The northern thrust succeeded in crossing the anti-tank ditch; when it had lost all its tanks the attack ground to a halt after covering only some 6 kilometres. After crossing the line of departure the division had split, one thrust moving to the north to capture Mount Hermon in conjunction with a helicopter assault, the other south to Qneitra.

The central and southern thrusts were more successful, penetrating some 20 kilometres into Israeli lines. On 7 October the Syrians committed the 5th Armoured Division in this area. Over the next two days, it progressed another 10 kilometres before losing some 80% of its tanks. At this stage the Syrians having lost altogether some 600-700 tanks decided to withdraw to their start positions.

The small Israeli outposts rapidly became isolated as the Syrian forces pushed on, by-passing strong-points. These same strong-points kept on sniping at the passing Syrian armour and infantry. The first Israeli mobilized reserves were thrown into the fighting on Golan front, but it was to take some 24 hours before they arrived there. In the meantime the Israeli Air Force (IAF) took heavy losses in trying to blunt the Syrian advance. It suffered its major losses in trying to punch a hole in the Syrian protective air defence cover consisting mainly of SA-6s. In the first 3 days, the IAF lost 23 of the 51 aircraft lost on the Syrian front.
On 12 October after a series of local counter attacks, the Israelis launched a major effort against the exhausted 7th Syrian Infantry Division in the north. Its success was immediate and the Israelis penetrated some 10 kilometres in the north and 20 in the south into Syrian territory. At this stage the Israeli thrust came up against the Syrian 1st Armoured Division in reserve in the north which slowed further advance to walking pace.

A counter attack by an Iraqi Armoured Brigade just arrived was beaten off with heavy losses to Iraqis. A similar attack by a Jordanian Armoured Brigade on 16 October was equally unsuccessful principally due to co-ordination problems with Iraqis.

*General Beaufre quotes 5th Armoured Division (see note 9).*
In the face of increasing losses and the necessity to divert its resources to the Egyptian front, the Israeli advance stalled just beyond Sas'a. An Arab counter attack with two Iraqi armoured divisions, two Syrian armoured brigades and two Jordanian armoured brigades set for 20 October was delayed to 23 October, but the cease-fire on 22 October intervened. (Map 2).

Just before the cease-fire, the Israelis recaptured parts of Mount Hermon at the cost of very heavy casualties.

It took until June, 1974 to separate the Israeli and Syrian forces by the insertion of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). (Map 2a).
The Egyptians crossed the canal with three infantry divisions in II Army in the north and two infantry divisions in III Army in the south in the first echelon. The second echelon consisted of an armoured and mechanized division per field Army. A number of divisions were held in general reserve east of Cairo. (Map 3).

Each infantry division in the first echelon initially established its own bridgehead:

- between Kantara and Ismailia in II Army area; and
- south of the Bitter Lakes in III Army area.

The separate bridgeheads were later to be joined.

The artillery preparation by some 2,000 guns lasted 53 minutes after H-hour at 1405 hours. Simultaneously small commando teams,
some 2,000 men in all, were airlanded behind the Bar Lev line to harass Israeli reinforcements. Egyptian sappers had plugged up or cut oil lines which were to feed oil on the surface of the canal to be ignited. Infantry crossed in assault boats and secured bridgeheads to protect engineer crossing operations. The infantry were equipped with Saggers and SA-7s for protection against tank and air attacks.

Egyptian engineers tore holes in sand banks on canal edges with water cannon used in mining operations. They used the Russian supplied PNP bridge which is capable of laying a pontoon bridge at something like 15 feet a minute. In fact, the Egyptians carved out some 60 holes, established ten floating bridges and constructed fifty ferries in six to nine hours. Only in the III Army area bridge construction took some 36 hours because of the more difficult terrain. The Israelis estimated that it would take the Egyptians at least 24 hours to cross the canal and their contingency plans were based on this figure. Altogether some 15,000 field engineers were used to prepare and assist in the assault crossing.

By nightfall some 8,000 troops in some 1,000 assault boats had crossed the canal, and by H+6 the armoured brigades of the second echelon began to cross the canal. Within 24 hours three Egyptian
assault divisions and some 500 tanks were across; they consolidated to a depth of some 10 kilometres, but left a major gap in the centre at the northern end of the Bitter Lakes.\textsuperscript{11}

Although the Egyptians supported the initial crossing with some 220 aircraft, these subsequently withdrew behind the air defence screen. Israeli aircraft took very heavy casualties in attacking the crossing sites losing some 33 aircraft in the first three days.\textsuperscript{12} Although they managed to destroy some bridges, these were quickly reconstructed and the Egyptian crossing operations were not substantially impeded. The Egyptian air defence system remained virtually intact until the Israeli counter-crossing operation.

In the period to 14 October the Egyptians consolidated their bridgehead whilst the Israelis mounted a series of unsuccessful piecemeal
attacks. In one of these on 9 October, the 170 Armoured Brigade was virtually destroyed losing 86 tanks in three minutes. Between 11 and 13 October, the Egyptian III Army brought across its reserves including some 500 tanks and on 14 October launched an assault towards the Mitla, Khatnia and Gidi passes from just north of the Great Bitter Lakes.

By any standards, this was the biggest tank battle since World War II. Some 1,000 Egyptian tanks faced about 600 Israeli tanks; in all some 2,500-3,000 armoured fighting vehicles manoeuvred in an area of not more than 1,300 square kilometres. Emerging from their air defence cover, the Egyptians suffered heavy casualties losing some 300 tanks in two days.

By this time, Israeli mobilization was complete. Israelis were in control of the situation on the Golan front and hence more resources could be devoted to the Suez front.

Taking advantage of the gap between II and III Egyptian Armies, and also the imbalance created by the transfer of five infantry or mechanized and three armoured divisions with some 1,200 tanks to the east bank of Suez, the Israelis launched a canal crossing in reverse on 15 October with a reinforced division comprising three armoured and two mechanized brigades. Egyptian II and III Armies launched heavy counter attacks against the flanks, but by 17 October an armoured brigade was across. By 22 October three to four brigades were across and fanned out to the south. The first units across overran the SAM sites in the sector giving Israeli aircraft greater freedom of action. (Map 3A).

Due to faulty intelligence and cumbersome staff structure, the Egyptians did not react strongly against the Israeli bridgehead. Ignoring the Security Council cease-fire resolution on 22 October and Israeli acceptance on 23 October, General Sharon pushed south until he cut the Suez-Cairo road at kilometre 101. The cease-fire finally came into effect on 24 October.

The Israelis subsequently withdrew their forces to a cease-fire line policed by United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on the east bank of the Suez canal. The disengagement operation was completed on 5 March, 1974. A further Israeli withdrawal was negotiated in August, 1975. (Map 4). ☞
NOTES

1 Armed Forces Journal International March 1974. Other sources put the aircraft ratio closer to 1:2.

2 Jihad — a holy war.

3 Yom Kippur — Jewish Day of Atonement.

4 It seems that only 16 were occupied by a total of 436 men on the day of the attack.

5 Egyptian reservists had partly been called up earlier; the remainder were to be called up immediately after launching the offensive.

6 Moving of this had been left to the last minute to preserve secrecy.

7 From the conspicuously defensive positions occupied on arrival to their lines of departure. This was part of the deception plan.

8 This incident preoccupied the Cabinet for eight days (if this was planned as a deceptive measure, and no one will probably ever know the truth, it succeeded).
General Beaufre, French Army, who visited Syria shortly after the war quotes 5th Armoured Division. Israeli sources quote 3rd Armoured Division. (See map 1).

Israelis claim to have destroyed some 50% of Syrian air-defence capability in this time period.

This weakness was to be later exploited by the Israelis.


Part II of this article “Technology" will appear in the May issue.
The Australian Defence Forces: Their Peace-time Roles—A Young Officer's Experience

Captain M. G. Smith
Australian Intelligence Corps

AN ADDRESS TO THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS — NSW BRANCH, OCTOBER 1975

Introduction

Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to preface my address to you today by making two statements. Firstly, the views expressed are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defence. Secondly, throughout the address I will use the terms “Army”, “defence forces” and/or “services” rather loosely and somewhat synonymously. I must confess, however, that I really know very little about my sister services. I only hope that my service colleagues here today will not object too strongly to the way I will categorise us from time to time.

RMC and Beyond

Military sociologists have seen fit to define the Service’s professional existence in functional terms, viz: “managers of violence”. During peace time — when the presence or threat of violence seems unlikely — our functional capacity is necessarily diluted. Analogy-wise, we become the architects of doctrine, unable to test new designs in practical situations. Consequently, as must be the case, we follow the principles and practices that have shown credibility in the past. This is not so much a “bad thing” as it is natural. Change in any institutionalised segment of society will only occur as quickly as the situation at hand demands (e.g., as might occur during economic depression, socio-

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economic upsets and, of course, war): but otherwise a built-in time lag is inherent where the design of new roles and tasks is out of step with the organisation’s own evolutionary process.

Let me illustrate this point by describing my own class’s situation upon graduation from RMC in ’71.

Four years had mentally prepared us for direct involvement in a continuing war. Despite the generalities that persist in all military curricula, our out-of-class association with military personalities and events was ALL Vietnam. Australian defence policy was actively supporting ANZUS: a containment policy using (what has become known in strategic terminology as) “flexible response”. In essence, one might say, “cordon sanitaire”. But the cordon didn’t last and during our final year we came to realise that we would miss out. Vietnam was a dead duck; our military future seemed dull and unexciting; and those who aspired to the “heroic commander” motif of military life had little chance of winning their spurs at the junior commander level in combat. It was a brand new ball game which was directly reflected in the class’s preferences for corps allocation. A definite swing from the arms to the services was evident; the general train of thought being, “if we have no violence to manage then one could at least study and learn organisational management”. In retrospect many of our reasons for then choosing as we did have been invalidated, but without the wisdom of hindsight (and one might add, years) we did at least react as naturally as possible. I would hasten to add that many of us probably over-reacted. We saw our own futures as being part of a new defence era: a peace-time coalition security policy where an officer’s time and effort could perhaps be more productively spent than it had hitherto on the parade ground and in the jungle. Big thoughts for small fish? Yes! But such was the in-built time gap between a sudden change in defence policy and the institutional framework required to cater for it.

Papua New Guinea and Kashmir

I do not wish to dwell too long on my time spent with the Papua New Guinea Defence Forces (PNGDF) or with the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in Kashmir. This is not the time for personal story-telling, and even if it was, there are far more interesting tales to be heard from those of whom I know, now sitting amongst us. What I will say is this: today we are considering peace-time roles for our defence forces. While
I believe that I have gained immeasurable benefit from my overseas postings, we must not lose sight of the fact that I represent one man, and in factual-statistical terms we cannot hope to actively employ our Army in this way. In fact, our commitment to PNG at the junior commander level has now ceased, and Kashmir is a very remote posting which tends to isolate the officer from the realities of military life back home. The best that these postings offer is incentive and interest within the officer corps and, hopefully, eventually provide a cadre of personnel who have learned something of active peace-time soldiering (if there is such an expression) who are able to impart some of this experience.

**Lessons Learnt — Some Considerations**

What I would like to do in the short time remaining is to raise a few issues concerning the Army’s peace-time employment — issues related to my own brief experience as a peace-time soldier.

Firstly, civic action. Both in PNG and Kashmir I witnessed, to varying degrees of success, the role played by the Army in nation building. I mention this because civic action is a term often bandied about by military pundits, some of whom advocate that more emphasis should be placed upon it than we do at present.

I believe, however, that it would be a misleading analogy to compare the Army’s role in under-developed countries (aspiring to and consolidating their new nationhood) with a developed country where the Army’s place in society is already established.

That is not to say that the experience gained from such ventures as Lord Howe’s airfield construction was not beneficial; it was, as was the PR back-swing from it. Similarly, disaster relief operations in Darwin this year illustrated the capability of the armed forces to be successfully utilised in this manner. Nevertheless, unless we are willing to significantly increase our forces we would be unable to compete in a laissez-faire environment against civilian firms. I am thinking more specifically here in terms of the role played by the US Engineering Corps.

In any case civic action does not satisfy the basic requirement for the existence of armed forces, viz, to prepare for war; to preserve the peace. To meet this requirement military training becomes a never-ending and economically wasteful burden on society. Although civic action programmes are far more productive, there comes a point where the Army’s employment in such roles must directly oppose the fighting
readiness of the forces. In an army of our size one could well argue, therefore, that a prolonged civic action programme (to be effective) might have to be at the expense of this readiness.

Another peace-time aspect of military life that should be discussed today is the development of internal security training. At unit level we have refrained from becoming actively involved in internal security training. Like it or lump it, however, I believe we will (sooner or later) have to accept internal security training as a reality of military life. We tend to somewhat down-play its importance in Australia at a time when evidence from other Western countries suggests we might do otherwise. That an apolitical army, larger and more effective in force than state police bodies, might one day be required to assist the civil power is no mythical concept. We must accept that it could happen and we must be capable of meeting the task if it arises. Indeed, with ever increasing speculation concerning the possible employment of Australian forces in UN peacekeeping roles it is essential that internal security training be conducted to equip them for this task.

My time in PNG and Kashmir also made me aware of some of the problems encountered whilst working with other nationalities — what I would like to term as multinational forces. Since Vietnam a more evident swing to the strategic concept of coalition security has occurred. This increases the possibility of multinational security forces being deployed to counter future contingencies — peacekeeping or otherwise. I would suggest that at present insufficient time is spent in grooming the officer for staff appointments in such forces. In UN observer missions, problems are overcome because the multinational observer body possesses no real executive authority — decision-making is minimal, command non-existent and therefore, troop deployment need not really be considered. However, the same would not apply either to peacekeeping forces or multinational forces actively operating in a particular theatre. Diplomacy and compromise do not necessarily come easy to the “military mind” (especially if lives are at stake). I believe, therefore, that more emphasis on multinational force training would not go astray: first introduced as theoretical studies at our officer establishments, secondly exercised at joint TF and Div HQ level, and thirdly passed down through the ranks to achieve greater international understanding at all levels.

Finally, what I would like to pay some attention to is the problem of peace-time professionalisation. If we accept that the officer corps
represents the professional element of the defence forces we must also accept that this professionalisation is placed under certain constraints during peace time. We have all heard those over-used analogies to trained surgeons whose hands are tied before operations, and dentists without teeth to fill. As absurd as these may seem it is, nevertheless, quite conceivable that under present conditions an officer may well complete his entire military service without ever having exercised his fundamental military knowledge. It follows then that under these conditions the professionalisation of the corporate body suffers from an endemic problem: viz, specialists unable to specialise.

The conditions of service, therefore, must be so attractive as to firstly appeal to the potential professional (matriculating school leaver, university under or post-graduate, the in-service commission candidate); next it must be able to provide interesting peace-time training; and lastly it should permit the officer (without restraint) to develop professional interests which will encourage him to further himself while still remaining an active serving member. In this respect I would like to add that it is my belief that much of our PR is misguided. PR themes should not emphasise on identifying the services with society, but society with the services — and the best way to achieve this is to maintain a highly professional image (an image which enables civilian Joe Bloggs to readily identify with the services through his acquaintance or contact with neighbour, Major Fred Nurk).

Synthetically, what I am getting at is this: that during prolonged periods of peace the professionalisation of the officer corps is more susceptible to decay from within. Unless incentive, interest and a social sense of need is maintained the defence establishment can too easily become myopic in outlook and mundane in deed. Once this occurs the establishment runs the risk of losing good men and women, and with them too so goes the professional base.

Conclusion

To conclude, and to some degree in contradiction with some of what I have already said, we must ensure that, in the final analysis, the services charter is not misplaced. Alternative peace-time roles must never affect the ability of the forces in providing a credible and responsive defence capability. At the same time we must reassess the nature of the defence establishment which will cater for the 1980s.
How does the establishment stand vis-a-vis the community and what priority will the community be prepared to place on defence?

Do we need to broaden our base by lateral recruitment; thereby lessening the importance hitherto placed upon our traditional officer establishments, but perhaps identifying the community more with the services?

Would it be economically feasible to distribute more equally the defence burden through the community — perhaps adopting a Swedish-type conscript system — and what would be the social impact on the Aussie character?

Does the Army Reserve adequately fulfil its role as part of the total Army, and what is its cost-effectiveness?

I don’t know the answers, but I do have some thoughts. Perhaps the services could devote more attention to, and assist with solving these types of problems. One thing I do believe: in times such as these disaffection too readily generates from within, and therein lies the real danger for Australian defence preparedness.

Editor's Note: Captain Smith's address to the Seminar of the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs was delivered on 25 October 1975. The guidelines of the Seminar which was entitled "The Australian Defence Forces; Their Peace-time Roles" were as follows:—

The Seminar was planned specifically to discuss the peace-time roles of the permanent Australian Defence Forces, Army, Navy and Air Force. During prolonged periods of peace, it is important that the members of the Defence Forces consider that they continue to fill valuable roles. The Seminar did not discuss the military aspects in relation to the defence of Australia or the organization of the Defence Services. The focus of the Seminar was rather to be "the soldier and the state" and the sociological significance of the Armed Forces. Various other roles of the Defence Forces such as training for and participating in United Nations Peace Keeping Forces, disaster relief and other matters were discussed.

In his opening address, the Past President, Professor Thomas Stapleton had this to say:
We are very fortunate in having Sir Thomas Daly here to preside over the first session of our seminar, which will consider the peace-time roles of the Defence Forces. Discussing the seminar with Sir Thomas we found that we had certain views in common. One was that there is immense benefit to each individual if every single young man participates in the national service of the country. I think we might have found ourselves differing if we had continued our conversation further. The reason is that I suspect that Sir Thomas would be more happy for that service to be of a military nature, whereas I, as an ideological pacifist, would prefer it to be of a productive nature, but under comparable discipline.

We must, however, be realists; and realists in two quite different ways.

It has to be recognised that it is not politically possible at the moment to set up a situation in this country where every single young man would be involved in national service, whether it were of a military nature or for the further development of the undeveloped parts of the country.

Secondly, however much we would like to have a world in which no country had an army, that is not going to happen.

Surely then, we must look to see in what ways armies, navies and air forces can be potent instruments of peace?

We must recognise that during a prolonged period of peace there are unlikely to be satisfied officers and other ranks in any of the Services unless they feel that they are doing a useful job. To a few, their customary military roles are sufficient. To many they are not, and I am sure that fulfilling the customary roles will not be considered adequate from the point of view of many of the civilian population, who are the taxpayers, who have to be convinced of their usefulness.

How is there to be continuing motivation for members of the Defence Forces, both for officers and other ranks?

For a long period of time, many have considered that if only the League of Nations had had or the United Nations had a really competent and strong force it could have been a most potent instrument for peace. The fact that this has not eventuated is no criticism of the idea. It is merely a realisation of the fact that no nation, and particularly no large nation, has indicated any willingness to surrender any of its sovereignty to such a force even if one were to exist.
Yet, often conflagrations grow out of little fires. It is here that the smaller countries may be able to make a most valuable contribution to United Nations Peace-keeping Forces.

As a layman, I can see that there are certain problems. Perhaps the biggest problem is that one must, in such a force, both whether considering the officers or the other ranks, have the most disciplined and the most competent persons. Yet such people can only be selected at present following a prolonged period of service in their national force. Are they going to be able to convert their allegiance to a higher ideal? Unless they are even better disciplined than the members of a national force they are going to fail, for it is infinitely more difficult to maintain self-control in a situation where one is not fighting or protesting directly for one’s own immediate advantage. As those who know about the Congo will recall, that was one of the causes of the failure of the U.N. Forces — the individual members did not behave in the sort of way that one would hope the members of any such force would behave, but too often did things for their own personal advantage or satisfaction.

Can the officers, particularly the senior ones, fully transfer their allegiance to an international body and not allow their advice or their attitudes to be influenced adversely by their background if what is required of them might not appear to be compatible with their own country’s advantage?

Colonel G. K. Murray of Canada, writing in the Canadian Defence Quarterly, has commented:* 


As a direct result of long periods of peacetime duty, the military’s role within society becomes more difficult to define. As public support begins to fail away, a search begins for other roles that would reflect utility and thus confirm their place within the nation’s daily life.

After listing a descending scale of expertise in military capability, from competence in nuclear war to ceremonial duties, he continues:

Forces equipped for one particular level are capable of being assigned with relatively little difficulty to any lower level of operations. Unfortunately, the reverse does not hold true. Descent down the scale is irreversible and capability lost at any particular level of involvement is regained only at great expense in time and money.
Thus in the search for utility, a trained and well-equipped military force faces the danger of dilution of operational capability with the corresponding loss of professional status.

He contrasts two schools of thought:

One holds that the forces are a distinct social order which exists solely for the application of force in the national interest. Misemployment is not only expensive but diverts the force from its essential purpose. The other school of thought associates the military with, and applies their training and experience to, para-military and quasi-military tasks. The Forces are looked upon as a possible instrument to strengthen national purpose and contribute to national development.

A relatively ineffective dialogue has been conducted between these two extremes which reflects the general lack of agreement on the appropriate use of military forces in peacetime.

But there are many other ways in which peacetime forces can fulfil valuable roles.

In countries as different as Iran and the People’s Republic of China we see serving soldiers carrying out vast civic responsibilities.

I visited, as their guest, the White Revolutionary Corps of Shah and People in Iran. It was fascinating to learn that as many as sixty or seventy per cent of the most intelligent conscripted men work for 18 months in the education corps, the health corps, the agricultural extension corps or one of the other corps rather than spending the whole two years of compulsory service carrying out customary military tasks.

In the People’s Republic of China, the PLA is truly a people’s army, and a man is a soldier one moment and a civilian another. The shift between these roles in the vast majority of instances seems to be very loose and easy. This, of course, is not to deny that there are certain units which are purely military in their role.

Should our services be providing technical expertise for the countries around Australia which are developing their technology and their huge areas of land and their many islands? Examples could be: surveying in Indonesia, bridge building in Thailand, opening up air strips in Papua New Guinea.
Finally, to quote again from Colonel Murray of Canada:

There is much to be said for a more active role in support of broad national aims. The standard of success for any profession is measured by its accomplishments in serving the needs of the nation. These needs are clearly evident in time of war and their fulfillment is strongly supported by the population as a whole. But the memory of the general population is very short. The profession is sometimes too reluctant to change. Para-military duties are not new to peacetime forces, but too often are looked upon as distractions from the primary mission of defence. It would be a good thing if the initiatives in searching out new, meaningful responsibilities would come more often from within the military organisation itself.

Letter to the Editor

In their article in the November issue of the Army Journal (A Calculator for the Mortar Fire Controller's Pocket) the authors have neglected the safety of the Base Plate in their concern for the safety of the MFC. They argue, quite rightly in their note 7, that the MFC compromises his location by transmitting the target grid reference and his direction to it. Their solution (that the MFC use his calculator and transmit the charge, elevation and bearing, from the Base Plate) means that the location of the Base Plate is compromised to a much greater degree than the MFC's. The enemy monitoring service need only convert the elevation to a range using the firing table he is sure to have and he has the bearing and distance to the Base Plate from the target location. This would very quickly be converted to a grid reference.

Directorate of Artillery

Major D. J. Reid, RAA
This year has seen the failure of the United States to preserve its influence in South East Asia, a dissolution of SEATO, a questioning of other regional security arrangements and a final end to anything more than a token British military presence east of Suez. Many observers predict that these circumstances augur well for a Soviet expansion in the region. While the Soviets may be tempted to see the absence of Western dominance as an encouraging factor in their expansion; it is possible that they have not gauged the temper of Asia and most particularly of indigenous Communist aspirations.

The aim of this paper is to briefly review the situation in eastern Asia in the wake of Vietnam with particular reference to the dilemma of China and the influence of North Vietnam.

Legacy

The first half of 1975 saw victory for the various forces backed by North Vietnam in Indo-China. These forces, a blend of Communism, Nationalism and North Vietnamese military/political influence and direction, are at present in the process of internal consolidation. They have a potential for exerting great pressure in their region; they know it but in the main have refrained from major external actions and manipulations. World attitudes were mixed but the main reactions were caution and a complete lack of surprise. The United States, uttering the conventional rhetoric of the situation, vowed it would and could...
fight another day. The South East Asian nations are attempting new or at least non-American policies in order to come to terms with the triumphant "infection" next door. The fall of American supported regimes in the area signalled the end of an American world view that has held sway since Pearl Harbor. For the present at least, American policies will be relatively short term in nature, a form of holding action designed to retain and maintain those policies and initiatives not tainted by the worst aspects of Cold War dogma. The world must await a new American world view, one formed by a generation shaped by the Vietnam experience. To some extent this will put in doubt the United States long-term commitments in the region. Current United States disadvantage in the area has not so far meant a corresponding rise in the fortunes of Russia or China. Amongst all these shifts and changes the North Vietnamese have made it quite clear that they have ambitions of their own.

The outstanding factor of the whole Vietnamese conflict is that North Vietnam undertook the conquest of American dominated Indo-China armed with Soviet and Chinese aid, weapons and equipment and preserved its own initiative in the process. North Vietnam is now the pre-eminent influence on the South East Asian littoral and is not a client state of Russia or China. It is still possible that the component parts of Indo-China will attempt some moves towards real independence from North Vietnam but it is unlikely that they will do so without drifting deeply into client status with one of the Communist Superpowers. It is unlikely that North Vietnam will tolerate any diminution of its power or influence.

North Vietnam now has one of the most potent veteran military forces in the world, a disciplined and motivated populace and an independent minded policy of national conduct. Vietnam at this time resembles in many ways the geopolitical position of Yugoslavia. Although in no way a federal entity as is Yugoslavia, it does have the potential to be a Yugoslavia in Asia. Some resemblances are for example, a similar geographical position in relation to their respective Communist heartlands, a similar ethnic animosity to those same heartlands, a strong sense of independence and nationalism, a fortunate absence of binding allegiances to either of the Communist Superpowers and sufficient military strength to positively ensure sovereignty. This adds up to a potential for a freedom of action beyond that which Yugoslavia has attained; a thorn in the side of Orthodoxy.
It is probable that the national war aim of Hanoi has always been, even if subconsciously, directed towards dominance or at least a position of major influence over the old French possessions of Laos and Cambodia as well as a united Vietnam. Certainly since the war broadened into its most recent extent this aim must have been consciously accepted, if only on the grounds of national and political security and integrity. Now that the shooting war is over North Vietnam faces other more subtle pressures from its allies and supporters. Laos and Cambodia want to chart their own course. South Vietnam has reservations about a union dominated by political muscle from the north. Russia and China would like tangible demonstrations of thanks for their efforts over the years. North Vietnam has been surprisingly flexible and reasonable and has been more tractable than was thought possible. The West has been approached to aid in the economic rehabilitation of the country. The Communist Superpowers have been treated with a certain amount of reserve considering the circumstances. This attitude appears to be bearing fruit. North Vietnam has made it quite clear that they will decide for themselves their stance on matters and this attitude will gain them better bargains when they will inevitably have to be struck with those such as Russia and China. Soviet Russia has not yet achieved its desire for a base in Vietnam and although its presence is strong in the country and in the area generally it has not made the giant gains that some observers half expected. China has fared little better but appears to be relying on a good relationship as a friendly neighbour to make gains slowly.

Thus, North Vietnam has so far managed to keep the two major Communist powers at virtual arms length and has yet to call in the debt of friendship and support from its Indo-Chinese allies. An echo of Yugoslavia?

**The Chinese Buffer**

Historically the Middle Kingdom has had client nations on its periphery and has used them as buffer states. This attitude to a buffer between them and outer barbarism is a part of the Chinese make-up and is as legitimate as an Englishman’s proprietorial view of Scotland and Wales. The limits to which this buffer could now extend if the Chinese were given a free hand is hard to determine. Buffer building is a hard habit to break and historical precedent (a rule of thumb they have used before) could conceivably take them to Singapore. Pure area and distance is probably no guide. Possible guide lines are: areas on the
immediate borders of China that contain ethnic Chinese, sufficient
territory to “hermetically seal” China from cross border influence,
“fighting room” especially against Superpower tactical airpower and,
room to outflank the Himalayas in the east with a concomitant potential
to exploit the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. This last factor
could be described as an historical and psychological imperative never
expressed as an objective of policy but a motivating force behind national
conduct. Russia has, since Tsarist times, displayed a similar imperative
in its drive to find an access to the southern oceans. This drive has
ignored internal ideology and externally the political shape of the world
at the time. To the Chinese the Soviet presence in India is but a
continuation of Tsarist policy.

India is a real, if secondary threat in the Chinese view and one
they feel they cannot afford in their strategic situation. India is a
nuclear power and Russia has made significant agreements with her.
The Soviet presence in India, in the Chinese view at least, makes her a
partner in an implicit threat against China. This threat must be
neutralised in ways other than merely spilling over the Himalayan
ramparts into India. It is possible that even now China could defeat
India in the north but this would only be a short-term solution and not
a wise course to follow. China must aim at achieving security through
position. More immediate pressures from the north and east make it
imperative that the southern boundaries are secured. The southern
buffers must afford reasonable security but must also offer options to
eventually threaten India from a new flank and the opportunity to
physically have a presence in the seas to the south of Asia, thus achieving
a strategic neutralising position.

Burma has an insurgency problem whose menace to the central
government grows daily. China is actively aiding, abetting and directing
the Communist and secessionist rebels. A successful outcome to this
insurgency would mean immense strategic gains for China and could
possibly result in a base or presence in the Bay of Bengal. The
importance the Chinese place on the Burmese insurgency may be
gauged by the fact that their direct participation in the insurgency is at
variance with their normal attitudes towards other insurrections in the
region. Rarely if ever do they offer more than aid, support and the
secure facilities available inside Chinese territory.

The North Vietnamese war against American power offered China
a bonanza of advantages, ideological, political, military and strategic.
As a result, a reliable if self-willed and independent buffer exists immediately to the south. At present Chinese and North Vietnamese policies are in apparent harmony despite increased Soviet influence in Vietnam. This could change. The Chinese, with North Vietnamese blessing, continue to improve and construct strategic communications in Laos. While both parties at this time appear satisfied about the arrangement it is not beyond the realms of possibility that the road building activity may become a source of tension. North Vietnam has tried to make it quite clear to China that they are there only as long as Hanoi wants them there and no longer. This factor may in the future be further complicated by a change of heart by the Pathet Lao. At present Soviet activity in Laos is expanding rapidly much to the chagrin of the Chinese. The Pathet Lao will eventually seek to exercise real control over the long ignored areas of northern Laos. What happens when the Chinese are asked to leave and they make it quite plain that they are reluctant to do so is not yet known.

The Chinese view with alarm any Soviet presence in Asia. While they had to accept as a “fait accompli” and a legacy of the previous century an American presence in the area, they cannot accept a new and possibly more effective encirclement. The Chinese have what might be termed a “justifiable paranoia” towards its peripheral regions. Nothing in their history and their cultural world view allows an acceptance of foreign power and influence on their borders. This attitude does not stop with a Communist ideology, it has the impetus of history. There is nothing new in this but what is new is that China now has the vigour and determination it has not had for centuries to be its own master. Soviet moves to consolidate gains in Asia, to try and set up regional security arrangements and to step up trade and other more insidious activities in the region can only be seen as a most plainly obvious threat. Chinese fears may be correct but they may also be a bit premature at this time; some countries in South East Asia have been quite adamant about maintaining their new-found neutrality and freedom of action, among them Thailand and Singapore. To support this, it is of interest to note that to date no base facility has been allowed the Soviets in the region despite some severe pressure in some quarters for this concession.

Further to the north the Japanese and the North Koreans have been caught in the Sino-Soviet struggle. In an attempt to pursue their own national economic objectives the Japanese have been put in the
uncomfortable position of trying to please both the Chinese and the Soviets. The North Koreans on other grounds have been torn between the two demanding loyalties. Everywhere, in every forum the Chinese are stressing the threat of the Soviets in Asia. To them there is no other reality.

**Nationalism and Revolution**

It has been contended that the most remarkable political phenomenon in the Twentieth Century is the burgeoning of small nation nationalism and the desire of even the smallest minority for a national identity of its own. This force has been most effectively utilised as a tool of manipulation by the Communists. The Communist revolutionary ethic and the nationalist drive have much in common, more often than not in recent years they have acted in concert with identical aims. This has occasionally resulted in a situation where the Marxism has had to be modified to suit the nationalist philosophy. There is no real monolithic Communist ideology, the schisms and deviations so eloquently evidenced by such countries as China and Yugoslavia are now highlighted by the individual determinations of North Vietnam and the other nations of Indo-China.

It is likely that the experience of Indo-China will confirm for many Asians that Communism and its material support is the best vehicle for fulfilling nationalist aims. Others not so sure of the benefits may be persuaded by the argument that the basic culture of the nation need not be destroyed in the transition; that Communism and the old continuity can coexist. In this regard there will be keen interest to see how the Laotians handle their new circumstances. Some choose the Marxist road with full knowledge of the consequences, others as a man who rides a tiger. In each case the result will likely be the same.

Thailand and Malaysia among others have their own indigenous Communist inspired insurgencies, recently they have grown in stature if not effectiveness and all are of concern to the central government. These insurgencies appear to be the responsibility of the home-grown parties with the tacit, if grudging support of Peking. Grudging because it is possible that the Chinese have found certain struggles counter-productive, for the time being at least. The North Vietnamese are an uncertainty at the moment for it is not yet known if they desire to don the mantle of revolutionary leadership in the region. Governments
from all the non-communist nations of the area have made overtures to the Chinese. They have had to try communication instead of confrontation obviously in the hope that among other things there would be a trade off reduction in internal security problems; to have "the dogs called to heel".

The fortunes of these local parties have fluctuated over the years but they have survived. In more recent times, the years of Asian independence, these local insurgencies and the success with which they operate have been in direct relation to the performance of the central government, its policies and military competence. There is one positive function these insurgencies can perform in the future and that is to act as a conscience. To a perceptive central government this could be the means of negating or destroying the forces of revolution.

As long as national administrations continue to alienate significant elements within a nation, as long as there are visible and exploitable blemishes in the national fabric, and there are those that believe that their aims can only be accomplished by replacing the present administration by extra constitutional means, these insurgencies will flourish. Political forces are like Matter, they can never be destroyed. Radical forces will exist wherever there are divisions and rifts in a society, they are at their best in a society that is in the process of establishing permanent political structures. For South East Asia the lessons for self-defence are obvious. They must realise that their salvation lies in having fair administrations, listening to the people, taking heed of them and making an honest effort at relieving "the running sores of life." If the attempt is a sustained and honest one, much will be forgiven. The West and particularly the United States must realise the forces of conservatism and reaction are not equal to the job and they must be prepared to help in some other solution. For them it may be of comfort to reflect that the World's most powerful anti-communist alliance is NATO, an organization whose member states in the overwhelming majority are basically socialistic.

The Future

The single most important question to be answered concerning the future shape of Asia is the problem of the Chinese Succession. No nation or alliance in the region can be considered stable until the uncertainties of this problem have worked themselves out. Nothing will be permanent or sure until the matter is settled.
The new leadership after the death of Mao Tse Tung will be a vintage one and possibly only a stopgap. There is no guarantee the hand-over of power will be an orderly one although it is more than likely that it will be so. It is also likely that there will be little difference in Sino-Soviet relations, if anything there will be a hardening of attitudes in Peking.

It has been contended that the Chinese tend when confronted with potential weakness within and threat from without to go on the offensive externally. Modern China when it has felt itself to be in this position has characteristically acted militarily. The pressure felt by the Chinese in regard to the threat posed by the Soviet Union will never be fully appreciated by Western observers. Potentially damaging power struggles at home on the death of Mao Tse Tung, a paranoid fear of geographical encirclement and a bitter, gnawing fear of the Soviet Union must be taken as realities governing Chinese conduct.

A moderate foreign policy posture has gained the Chinese many friends and advantages however, it is more than likely that they have decided that this is a very slow method of ensuring immediate and positive security. They may feel that the only valid instrument of self-protection left open to them in the circumstances is a military one. The ignominious incident at Damanski Island in 1969 prompted China to carry out a war preparations campaign, a programme of upgrading military forces and capabilities. It is likely that the PLA is still not as effective a force as is required. Recently, possibly in response to this, a campaign to increase the competence of the military was started in China. It is possible that some of the leadership in China regard the PLA overdue for a major overhaul and restructuring but at this time for many reasons it would not be prudent to be too ruthless with the military. Several senior military personnel have been rehabilitated in the last few months and it is of significance that many of them had been deposed during the Cultural Revolution for expounding professional competence before political expertness. It would seem the leadership in Peking want the military on their side, prepared and in position.

Ironically the Chinese probably wish to see a continued American presence in the area, for example Korea. Detente negates to a large extent what the Chinese regard as a safety brake on Soviet conduct, the United States. Soviet activity in Asia is potentially more effectively aggressive than the West ever was.
To judge possible Chinese actions by Western standards is folly, to condemn their motivations and fears is not wise. The Chinese must conduct themselves on the basis of what they feel are the requirements of national survival, no other yardstick is available or valid. W

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Reviewed by Captain L. E. J. Applebee, Royal Australian Infantry

In a book that must surely become a standard reference for all wishing to study the employment of airborne forces, Maurice Tugwell examines one of the British Army's proudest moments and yet one of its greater military failures: the tragedy of Arnhem.

In a crisp compact publication of 63 pages, Tugwell has neatly extracted from material about the Allied operation called “Market Garden”, the essentials of the battle by the 1st (BR) Airborne Division for the Arnhem bridge in September, 1944. The concept of Operation Market Garden is well known to airborne enthusiasts and our older officers. For those of us yet unaware of the significance of this operation, General Montgomery, then Commander 21st Army Group, planned an operation that would enable him to concentrate his resources for a single thrust into the heart of the enemy — to Berlin. The Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, disagreed with the enormous resources that such a tactic would demand, and favoured his plan which was to consolidate the Allied hold in Western Europe, and then to develop operations employing the full weight of the Allied force on a broad front into Germany.

It was with the background of these conflicting concepts that Operation “Market Garden” was conducted. From the very outset, “Market Garden” was a bold and calculated gamble. The ground force, called Operation “Garden”, was to thrust northward through Belgium into Germany. The Corps axis of this force lay across five large rivers including the Rhine. The airborne forces, Operation “Market”, were to capture the bridges intact to enable the Garden Forces to fight northward. The last bridge to be taken by the Market forces was across the Rhine at Arnhem. It is to the heroic endeavours
made by the 1st Airborne Division to achieve this mission against over-
whelming odds that Tugwell has devoted his book. Grossly outnumbered
and outgunned, the courageous remnants of those elements of the
Airborne Division who had reached the bridge tenaciously held their
objective far beyond the time anticipated for the link up with the
Garden Force.

Tugwell, who is considered by many a world authority on the
employment of airborne forces, also poses the question of why Operation
Market Garden failed. A partial explanation for this disaster which is
offered by Tugwell, has as much relevance in military operations today
and the future as it did 31 years ago. Tugwell's analysis is that:

- planning at all levels must be realistic and thorough;
- if joint service operations are contemplated, intimate mutual
  understanding and co-operation must exist between both ser-
  vices prior to the conduct of the operation;
- enormous advantages are to be achieved by the exploitation
  of surprise;
- the use of accurate, timely intelligence is vital to success;
- operations of this type must permit the employment of
  flexibility; viable alternate plans are essential;
- effective command and control at all levels is paramount
  (the bad radio communications at all levels throughout the
  battle for the Arnhem bridge, combined with the separation
  of the Divisional Commander from his headquarters during
  the most crucial 1 ½ days of the operation, are cited as two of
  the major factors that caused failure);
- the sensitivity of airborne operations to unknown factors
  dictates that the use of reserves must be carefully planned and
  exploited.

The lack of adherence to these principles and the results of this
both before and during the battle are made clear in the book.

The value of 'Arnhem — A Case Study' is that it is not only an
interesting account of the battle to be read by military historians or
proponents of the employment of airborne forces, but also because the
principles evolved from the analysis of this battle apply to all strategy
and tactics.

The book is well researched and is complete with adequate maps,
diagrams and photographs.