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EDITORIAL

AUGUST, the month of high summer in the Northern Hemisphere, has often been a time when great events have changed the course of world affairs. It was in August 1914 that, sparked by a pistol shot in a remote Serbian town in the previous June, there began, amid scenes of popular fervour, a holocaust which was to destroy forever the self-confident bonhomie that was the hallmark of the early years of the century.

It was also in August, a short thirty-one years later, that a single bomb, of terrifying effect and worse after-effect, was to set seal on another world war, in which this planet was again turned topsy-turvy. Such is progress.

The tragedy is that both conflicts were proclaimed by a weary world to be “the war to end wars.” Yet now mankind is no closer to finding an amicable solution to its problems than before. Greed, self-aggrandisement, revolutionary fervour — call it what you will; the desire to impose his will on others is still strong in the breast of Man.

It is not difficult to see how evil men, using the cover of religious or racial strife, the resolution of which they care not at all, have succeeded in keeping the pot of discord boiling. They are helped unwittingly by dupes who think that by espousing the cause of “freedom” — as explained to them by those same evil men — the world will be happy and at peace. They are blind to the millions of refugees who are prepared to give up their all, including their lives if necessary to escape that “freedom”. Those desperate people, when they have nowhere left to run, will turn and fight.

Whether we call them patriots, guerrillas or terrorists depends on our political affinities. What is indisputable is that their efforts to obtain what they consider are their “rights” will deprive someone else of their home, property, livelihood, loved-ones and possibly their lives. This is the constant tragedy of Man. The shadow of a nuclear Armageddon has done little to temper his cravings.
DEDICATED TO RECENT WRAAC CONTRIBUTORS

It's great to see you ladies*
Have such polished literary style;
But I must confess I'm getting bored
With the subjects you compile.

It seems to me that all you've said
Is hardly philanthropic,
Because you've only talked of you—
An egotistic topic!

You've such a lot to offer us,
So little need to show
How competent you all can be;
For this we surely know.

So come on girls*! You're soldiers too,
Don't fight amongst yourselves!
We'd like your views on other things
Upon our library shelves.

M.C.W.

* Women may be substituted. It spoils the metre, but it pleases the . . Women!

* * * *

MONTHLY AWARDS

The Board of Review has awarded the prizes for the best original articles published in the April and May 1976 issues of the Journal to:

April  Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Manley (Japanese Aims and Actions in the Pacific War December 1941-August 1942) $10.

May  Lieutenant Colonel J. Viksne (The Yom Kippur War — In Retrospect) $10.
The Role of Guerrilla Warfare in Defence of Continental Australia

Major S. F. McCullagh M.D., M.B., B.Sc., (MED)

"It is not an army we must train for war; it is a nation."

Woodrow Wilson

As Palmerston so clearly realised, and as Napoleon III did not, the foundations of a country's foreign policy are its interests — agricultural, industrial, mercantile and strategic. The quintessential ingredients of a country's foreign policy are derived from those of its interests which it sees to be vital. Australia is a remote outpost of European civilization and our survival is not vital to the survival of any of the civilizations of the European heartland, whether in Europe itself or in North America.

That some of these nations are our allies in no way alters this fact. Should they be threatened, we are exposed; their weakness will be our weakness, in much the same way as England's weakness has always been Ireland's opportunity. We are a few people occupying a vast continent rich in metalliferous minerals and in those that yield energy; we are not so great a granary as North America but we may seem a very cornucopia to peoples to our North, vastly more numerous and, many of them, desperately more hungry than are we.

In the light of the foregoing we must consider either our own defence of our country or its abandonment; the recently canvassed view that we face no threat for ten years is probably correct but no more than an economically determined political decision that is merely a transient irrelevance. Heretofore we have, after due preparation, gained our martial experience by helping Britain fight her wars, which practice

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stood us in good stead in 1942 as we awaited American help; hereafter we must consider the possibility of having to fight our own war.

In doing so we shall do well to consider the worst manageable case. Such a case, I suggest, is that in which a substantial enemy has landed upon our shores when world affairs are such that we can expect of our major allies no more than a trickle of uncertain aid for the present and entertain the hope of their decisive intervention in the uncertain future. In such a case our regular forces, however assisted by the reserve, will perhaps have been decisively defeated in the initial battles or may have broken off contact while still largely intact; in either case to continue to engage in conventional warfare would be to earn a reputation for valour but to forget that it is victory that matters. So placed, and we must recognise that we may be so placed, it will be wise of us to consider the uses of guerrilla warfare.

The History of Guerrilla Warfare

The history of guerrilla warfare is, no doubt, more ancient than our historical record; the essential idea of "revolutionary warfare" preceded Mao Tse Tung by at least a millennium. Perhaps the best synoptic treatment of the whole subject of guerrilla warfare is that of Taber, though, and in what seems to be one of those mindless consequences of ideological commitment, he makes the manifestly unwarranted assumption that guerrilla warfare is virtually synonymous with revolutionary warfare.

In considering the history of the subject particular interest attaches to those authors who wrote before guerrilla warfare became fashionable. The earliest record is from China, that of Sun Tzu who lived some 2500 years ago. He is quoted by Taber: "All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him in; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Anger his General and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under a strain and wear him down. When he is united, divide him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you. These are the strategist's keys to victory." That so ancient a summary should be so timely is truly remarkable; one almost feels that there is nothing more to be said.
One of the earliest masters of the art in the Western world was Quintus Fabius. The Second Punic War opened as Hannibal led his armies, and his memorable elephants, across the Alps and into Italy, after the long march from Carthage in Northern Africa through Spain and across Southern Gaul. The Roman arms were disastrously defeated at the battle of Lake Trasimene and their sorry remnants committed to Fabius' command. Appreciating that he could not engage the power of Carthage in conventional battle he withdrew to the hills where Hannibal's cavalry was useless, harassed his foraging parties and denied him supply, cut off his stragglers and did everything to diminish his strength while refusing to meet him in battle; wearying of this indecision the Romans dismissed him only to be decisively defeated at the Battle of Cannae. It was Fabius who ultimately brought Hannibal to his defeat and gave the victory to Rome. He who had once been mocked as Cunctator, the Delayer, was honoured with the title of Maximus. It was said of him, when he died in 203 BC, "Unus homo, nobis cunctando, restituit rem." "One man, by realising the need to restrain us, was our salvation" or, more literally if less elegantly, "restored the situation". Two lessons should be learnt from this passage. Restraint is an essential constituent of guerrilla warfare; this is the lesson that matters. Guerrilla warfare is not necessarily, nor indeed commonly, revolutionary; this for the instruction of those who, for their ideology's sake, are of the contrary opinion; idiosyncratic to the point of idiocy.

The next great practitioner of the guerrilla art, and the man who was beforehand with Mao Tse Tung, was Charlemagne. Toward the last quarter of the 8th Century the western boundary of his domain included, in the north the Frisians and, to the south, the Bavarians; between lay the unconquered Saxons whom he naturally wished to subdue that he might straighten and shorten his frontier. Robinson, writing in 1925, takes up the story, "The Saxons had no towns or roads and were consequently very difficult to conquer as they could retreat, with their few possessions, into the forests or swamps as soon as they found themselves unable to meet the invader in the open field... It was finally owing rather to the Church than to Charlemagne's military prowess that the great task was brought to a successful issue." Charlemagne faced an enemy that his conventional forces could not bring to battle and thus could not defeat. He turned therefore to his "political cadres" in those days headed by bishops and abbots with their attendant priests and friars together with sufficient troops to protect
the cadres and, perhaps, to lend some coercion to conversion. The converts made, and the intelligence network established, the army moved in and the Saxons were defeated; thereafter perfectly free to be either Christian or dead.

Another interesting episode is the War of American Independence. Higginbotham\(^6\) has lately displayed, in this conflict, all the essential ingredients of "revolutionary warfare" but even more convincing is the evidence of Robertson, writing in 1912, who, I think we may believe, had never even heard of the term. Authority was undermined by subversion before so much as a shot was fired. "Irritation in the colonies was steadily increasing, and defiance of law and Executive were more widespread. The cruel and lawless persecution of all suspected of being Royalists or 'Tories' by the 'Whigs' or Opposition, now virtually Separatists, was a further proof of the impotence of the Imperial Authority."\(^6\) As war approached Britain's overwhelming victory could scarcely be doubted, "The Loyalists in America, if badly organised, were numerous; Canada resisted all invitations to rebel. In wealth, therefore, numbers, prestige and organization, the superiority of the British Government in 1775 was unquestionable."\(^7\) An essential ingredient of revolutionary success is the leader and this the Americans found in George Washington. "No success could spoil his sound judgement, no adversity shake his indomitable will. His firm belief in, and noble devotion to the justice of resistance were an inspiration to himself and thousands of his countrymen... he stands in the history of the United States with (Hamilton and Lincoln) as one of the three master-builders to whom the American republic owes most."\(^8\)

Defeated at Brandy-Wine Creek and again at Germanstown, Washington led his shattered forces into winter quarters at Valley Forge, "where the disorganised colonial army must have gone to pieces but for the unconquerable determination of their commander."\(^9\) Meanwhile Howe, commanding the main British force, "was now comfortably quartered at Philadelphia. So far from containing the Americans, Howe had been contained by them."\(^9\) "The guerrilla character of the war rendered the British grip only effective where it was exerted in force."\(^9\) A guerrilla force will always benefit if it has sympathisers elsewhere, particularly if it has sympathisers among the leading figures of that great power whose forces it would defeat; this the Rebels enjoyed. Robertson says of the Opposition at Westminster, "Their sympathies were wholly with the colonial resistance to a policy they
held to be subversive of every valuable constitutional principle... so strongly did many of the Whigs abhor the course on which their country was embarked that Grafton cut himself off from the Government and many, including Chatham’s son, refuse to serve in the war.”

This whole story seems only too reminiscent of more recent events.

It was Wellington’s Iberian Campaign that gave rise to the word guerrilla, meaning little war, and the guerrilleros, the soldiers who fought in it. Again the most convincing evidence of the value of the guerrilla force is that provided by an author who had no particular interest in its activities — Gleig, writing in 1877. Pitt the Younger is said to have foretold the event as early as 1805, “I tell you that Spain is the first continental nation which will involve (Buonaparte) in a war of partisans. Her nobles are debased and her Government wretched, but the people still retain their sense of honour and their sobriety. Buonaparte will endeavour to tread out these feelings, because they are incompatible with his designs, and I look to that attempt for kindling the sort of war which will not cease till he is destroyed.”

In 1808 the armies of France crossed the Pyrenees into Spain, its feeble autocrat, Ferdinand VII, contemptibly and contumaciously handled by Napoleon, abdicated in favour of Joseph, Napoleon’s brother. The government they recognised thus failing, the Spanish people strove to establish their own, “Juntas* rose, no one could tell how in every province, which issued decrees in full assurance that they would be respected and obeyed by all, except the adherents of the usurper.” The Juntas proved ineffective but we should remember that a guerrilla force facing an invader should seek to establish a civil organisation and authority no less than a military power. The Spanish and the Portuguese, though Wellington found them of little use as regular troops, were of great value as guerrillas; the French, since it was their practice to live off the land through which they marched, were particularly vulnerable to such guerrilla forces as they scattered for food and forage.

As is usual in such warfare the French were hampered by lack of Intelligence; in 1809 Wellington ordered the construction of the famous Lines of Torres Vedras. In the campaign of the following year Masséna advanced upon them, “His astonishment, when he beheld the formidable chain of works which barred his onward progress, it would be difficult to describe. Till that moment he had never heard that works

* Ancient and honourable provincial assemblies, the word, as Gleig used it, had nothing of a perjorative connotation.
of any sort were begun." Slowly, Wellington converted the guerrillas into worthwhile regular soldiers, initially intermingled with British troops and under the command of British officers. In 1813 Spanish forces under the Spanish general Freyre received a French assault upon their defensive positions on the heights of San Martial; Wellington, confident they could not be dislodged, obliged them to develop some opinion of their military prowess by withholding the English reinforcements they requested. The Portuguese and Spanish troops accompanied Wellington into France the former, though not the latter, being remarked upon for their strict discipline. Gleig's testimony is confirmed by Longford, a more recent and more readily available authority.*

A major contribution to our understanding of guerrilla warfare was made by Lawrence as he mobilised the Arab Revolt of 1917-18 against the Turks. He appreciated the ability of a small guerrilla force to engage in war, if not in battle, a vastly superior enemy, "Armies (are) like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head... It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at." Lawrence determined that the Arab guerrilla must "develop a habit of never engaging the enemy... the corollary of such a rule was perfect 'intelligence', so that we could plan in certainty." Of the greatest value was the ability of his force to move rapidly and independent of supply for six weeks, if each man had a half-bag of flour, 45 lbs in weight, swung on his riding saddle... In summer the camels would do about 250 miles after a watering... our six weeks food gave us capacity for 1000 miles out and home. He speaks on the other hand of, "the obstacles in the way of the new Turkish army with its half-Germanised complexity of equipment, when, from a distant railhead with no made roads, it tried to advance through extremely rugged and hostile country." He later found the same fault in Allenby's conventional forces. His strategy was to occupy a superior force in war, but not in battle, "I explained my hope to leave the (railway) line just working, but only just, to Medina; where Fakhri's corps fed itself at less cost than in prison at Cairo." Given excellent intelligence, mobility and lengthy independence of re-supply, his essential tactic was "to be superior in some one tangible branch; gun-cotton or machine-guns or whatever could be made decisive".

greatest contribution to the success of the Arab Revolt was his realisation that its most important ingredient was what he called the Preaching. “My vision of the course of the Arab war was still purblind. I had not seen that the preaching was victory and the fighting a delusion.”

“As we had seldom to concern ourselves with what our men did, but always with what they thought, the diathetic (the encouragement of their natural inclination) for us would be more than half the command.”

He appreciated also that the Preaching must be designed not merely to arouse one’s own troops and their people, but to win the sympathy and support of other nations and to undermine the confidence of the enemy. “We had to arrange (our men’s) minds in order of battle just as carefully and as formally as other officers would arrange their bodies. And not only our own men’s minds, though naturally they came first. We must also arrange the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them;
then those other minds of the nation supporting us behind the firing line, since more than half the battle passed there in the back; then the minds of the enemy nation waiting the verdict; and of neutrals looking on; circle beyond circle.”

Mao Tse Tung, no doubt because he was concerned not only to drive out the Japanese but to establish a communist rather than the Nationalist China of the Kuomintang, particularly emphasised the importance of engaging popular support. “The (people) may be likened to water, the (guerrillas) to the fish who inhabit it”; or, more aptly to our idiom, the guerrilla force that lacks popular support has as much chance as a fish out of water. He recognised that in the face of a foreign invasion the national guerrilla force would receive the support of the people regardless of their personal class or interest but emphasised, as did Wellington, the imperative necessity of discipline within the force and courtesy towards the people if this goodwill were to be nurtured. He recognised the need for guerrilla forces progressively to obtain the organizations, equipment, skills and disciplines that would eventually convert them to regular units and formations. “There must be a gradual change from guerrilla formations to orthodox regimental organization...” He has much else to say but we might well conclude with his excellent description of the characteristics of a guerrilla force, “When the situation is serious, the guerrillas must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind. Their tactics must deceive, tempt, and confuse the enemy. They must lead the enemy to believe they will attack from the east and north, and they must then strike him from the west and the south. They must strike, then rapidly disperse. They must move at night.”

Preaching, Propaganda, Politicisation

It matters little what you call it, it all amounts to pretty much the same thing: in some guerrilla campaigns a primary aim of the commander is not merely victory but victory with the establishment of some new order, religious, political, socio-economic, or whatever — since the human mind resists the novel the new order must have advantages, whether apparent or real, over the old.

The Preaching, as Lawrence called it and as Charlemagne would have recognised it, was to both a vital pre-essential; and no less so to Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh. In the American War of Independence
a sense of national identity seems almost insensibly to have developed in the Colonies and to have united them. In the Peninsular campaign the French so brutally treated the Spanish and Portuguese people that Wellington had only to enforce discipline among his own troops and to ensure that acquisition, as far as possible, was by purchase and not requisition that popular support was his, even as he scorched the earth in his withdrawal to the lines of the Torres Vedras; the position of Quintus Fabius Maximus in the Second Punic War was, no doubt, similar.

In considering an enemy invasion of Australia it would appear, on the face of it, that our leaders would find themselves in essentially the same position, vis à vis the people, as Wellington and Fabius; however, there is reason to doubt that this would be so. Spain and Portugal had for so many centuries been fighting other nations, as well as each other, that their peoples were innured to the pain of war and well accustomed to its harsh imperatives; likewise were the Romans.

For us Australians the position is different. We have never fought a war of our own on our own. We have never had an invading enemy on our soil. We have never, as a people, known the force, the holocaust, of war. To bear the pain of lengthy war, of guerrilla action and enemy retribution, we will need to be more united, courageous and determined to survive as a people than I believe us now to be. It is not that we lack such qualities, but rather that the possible need for them has never occurred to us.

There will be a need for the Preaching, for the mobilisation of the national Will, and this is likely to be a more important matter than the mobilisation of our modest military means. How we go about it will largely be determined by the nature of the enemy's aim.

**Strategy**

The aim of the enemy may be limited to the capture of some remotely situated natural resource. This will make it hard to arouse an unmilitary people since few will be directly affected; the Preaching then will be turned to this end.

The enemy may aim to acquire living-space to accommodate his own starved and crowded millions. Some have dismissed such a possibility on the grounds that the physical geography of Australia so little resembles that of over-crowded neighbouring lands that their peoples
would find us an unattractive alternative homeland; they should remember that the Americas and Australia are occupied by peoples who came from very different climes, but who effectively established themselves in their new homelands, dispossessing the former owners and virtually annihilating them. We would be foolish not to consider that the enemy's aim may be similarly to dispossess us. Such an enemy aim will arouse our people readily enough but will call for great finesse in our application of guerrilla force; if it is not well organised and planned (and yet judiciously delayed) the whole issue will have been decided before the guerrilla force has made a move; and its first move is to come into being. In either case, a vital element of our activity will be Preaching and patience, patience and Preaching.

If our military effort is to be directed to the defence of continental Australia as such, our people must be mentally prepared, as most peoples have by long historical experience been prepared, to bear the pain of war as an imminent reality (soon, perhaps, to be immanent) and not as a remote unreality that occurs at the end of a television tube. Without this there can be no guerrilla war.

Local guerrilla cells, as Mao recognises, may form spontaneously among people aroused by the common hatred of an invading enemy and good use may be made of these. However, as with conventional warfare, we will be far better placed to fight guerrilla warfare if we have already established doctrinal principles, tactical and organizational, operational and logistic.

Presumably it is conceded that we have in our region some countries that lack mineral resources which we possess, some whose governments are yet immature and unstable, some whose peoples are overwhelmingly numerous and wretchedly poor and hungry. This granted, it must, I think, be acknowledged that one or several of them may at some time invade us and it is, I suggest, no more than a corollary that they are most likely to do so when our major allies are so circumstanced as to be unable to lend us any substantial assistance. In such a case, unless our enemy makes an utter botch of the whole business, our guerrilla arm will be a most important arm of our military force.

If the foregoing argument is granted it follows that we must prepare for guerrilla warfare no less than for conventional. The
preparation of the necessary doctrine and the practice of its operational and logistic corollaries is a relatively straightforward matter. No less important but much more difficult, and I am sure, much more distasteful is the need to make our people understand, emotionally no less than intellectually, their likely plight should they come to live in “occupied Australia”. There are among us those who ate the bitter bread of such humiliation in their own former homelands, there is much they could tell us but there are few among the rest of us who are much inclined to listen. The preparation of the civil population is no less important than that of our military forces.

There is a further move we cannot make until the enemy, with reasonable certainty, has declared himself. Once an imminent enemy threat has appeared we must seek to establish among other peoples overseas, and, ideally, in the enemy’s homeland itself, groups sympathetic to our cause which, by their attention to the enemy’s actions and the publicity they give them, force our enemy to fight with one hand tied
behind his back. Recent history gives numerous examples of the remarkable effectiveness in modern times, of this device. However, we should note that its effectiveness, so far, has been in restraining a great and wealthy power in its fight with a poorer people struggling to emerge from the subordination of colonialism. We are not so well placed to make use of this weapon.

In summary, it is clearly possible that Australia might be invaded, if she is it is highly probable that guerrilla warfare will become an important part of her defence. It follows that our military forces but, even more importantly, our civilian population must have an understanding of the realities of the situation. However effective such beforehand preparation, unwarlike and little disposed to military preparedness as we are, there will be need for continuing Preaching and for patience if our nation is to be welded into an effective military force.

Organisation

It is above all imperative that the Australian Government remain that authority acknowledged by the whole Australian people, whether they be in free or occupied Australia.

It is important that at least the frameworks of existing civilian organisations, governmental and constabular, of employers and of workers, should seek to remain intact, albeit clandestinely. Their position will be difficult, for they will be expected to act at least as a remembrance of a former social structure and, in so far as they can, they should strive to continue to carry out their former duties; this will probably be easier in the country than in the city. They will be expected to provide assistance, notably in the form of Intelligence, to the conventional and particularly the guerrilla forces; they may have the valuable opportunity, but grave additional difficulty, of acting as intermediaries between the invader and the Australian people.

If we are to bring a guerrilla force into being in anticipation of some as yet unforeseen circumstances, as we already have a Regular Army and its Reserve, how should this be done and of whom should it be formed? It may be argued that some new and separate body should be created for this purpose and the most likely ground for such an argument would seem to be that guerrilla war is not conventional war, that training for guerrilla war must necessarily differ from training for
conventional war, that the organizations suited to guerrilla war differ from those suited to conventional war and that therefore a separate guerrilla force should come into being. To argue thus is to misunderstand the nature of guerrilla war for it seems to see the guerrilla force as a somewhat amorphous mass of perpetual patriotic banditti harassing the enemy or helping our own conventional forces as the haphazard of chance might suggest. To use a guerrilla force thus is to use it wastefully, as I hope I shall show in discussing guerrilla tactics, and we are so few a people that we must use to the utmost the efforts of every man and woman. Guerrilla forces must see their co-operation with conventional forces as their most important role and recognise that their own formation into conventional units is their highest goal, for this, well-timed, is the prelude to ultimate victory. The Regular Army, its Reserve, and the guerrilla component must all be part of one organization and answerable to one commander, though the guerrilla component may well have a different organization and a different subordinate command structure, as indeed is already the case with the different arms and services within a division. It may be that the greater devolution of command and the greater independence of sub-units will attract to voluntary service in our military forces those young men and women who find the inevitably hierarchic organisation of the conventional army not to their taste.

The guerrilla force, like the conventional, will probably be based on sections of some ten to twelve members, not because this is about the size of the conventional military section but because experience has shown a group of about this size to be convenient for activities as diverse as military operations, playing cricket and spreading the Gospel. An essential difference however is that the conventional section, except in exceptional circumstances, has extremely limited freedom of independent action, and the battalion commander not much more. The guerrilla section, while no less subordinate to military authority, will have great freedom of independent action.

**Logistics**

The guerrilla force must, above all, be an uncluttered force.

As to rations, the staple of the guerrilla force, particularly outside the cities, may well be that staple diet of our forefathers, damper and sweet black tea but we would do well to learn simple methods of meat
preservation; if the Boers could benefit from biltong so, presumably, can we. Enemy supply columns and bases may seem an obvious source of rations but generally other items would be more worthy of the taking for rations are bulky to be moved. We are not a well-watered country and some operations may be limited by this factor; but Lawrence and his Arabs could operate effectively though far more limited by lack of water. We are not a desert people and cannot expect, in a few years, to acquire the skills that others have acquired over centuries but we can expect to improve our skills and if we can make better use of little water than can the enemy then the advantage lies with us.

Farming country, Great Dividing Range, NSW. Rural people have "a sense of obligation to their neighbours".

The weapons of the guerrilla force will initially be such military small arms as the conventional forces can spare and such civilian arms as the force can acquire. Explosives will be a most valuable guerrilla weapon and every effort should be made to acquire these and their
necessary fuses and detonators. Explosives are a guerrilla weapon of prime importance, both for demolition and for the manufacture of mines. The cross bow is an accurate, short range weapon with a low rate of fire, its silence recommends it for use at night — if the cross bow seems too unsophisticated we should remember that Mao saw guerrillas armed with lances and big swords.\textsuperscript{83} As the war develops and the guerrilla force progressively approaches the conventional force it must acquire man-pack artillery such as mortars and bazookas for these provide the greatest increase in firepower at least cost in mobility and simplicity. The enemy, in recent guerrilla campaigns, has been regarded as a prime source of weapons, but it is to be remembered that the capture of weapons is useful only in so far as one also captures the ammunition that permits one to use them.

Logistic movement, the movement of supplies, there must be, but in guerrilla warfare it cannot be as flexible as in conventional warfare and must be so contrived as not to limit tactical mobility. The tactical guerrilla force will, ideally carry sufficient food and ammunition for the duration of an operation. If the length of the operation does not permit this then supplies must be supplemented by cachés prepared beforehand or by the help of the local civilian population. Such moves obviously jeopardise security but, if the Preaching has served its purpose, this danger will be more apparent than real.

We may conveniently consider here how the wounded will be best handled. There will be no helicopters to whisk the casualties to the operating theatre of a sophisticated field hospital. Wounds to head and trunk will therefore be more frequently fatal; as to those of the limbs our surgeons may well be advised to return to the immediate amputation, carried out in seconds, that was one of the great surgical skills of pre-anaesthetic days.

In due course both conventional and guerrilla forces may look forward to supplies of weapons and ammunition from our allies overseas. Aerial delivery may be possible and certainly the length of our coast is such that no enemy can prevent the arrival of at least modest amounts by sea.

**Intelligence (or Information)**

An essential feature of guerrilla war is that the guerrilla force is well informed as to the enemy's strength, disposition and intentions, while the enemy is denied all such information of the guerrilla force.
This vital superiority over the enemy depends on a civilian population overwhelmingly sympathetic to the guerrilla force; this in turn depends on the Preaching which must be the first and the ever-continuing activity of the guerrilla. Guerrilla activity must never be such as to jeopardise this vital relationship with the people.

As already noted, so far as possible the existing civilian organisational structure must continue to exist in occupied Australia no less than in free Australia for its members will become a valuable source of Intelligence and their continued existence as a formal, even if clandestine, organization will facilitate the guerrilla task of obtaining Intelligence of the enemy. The guerrilla force will obviously require Intelligence of enemy tactical moves but also of strategic and logistic movements from those concerned with the various modes of transportation; having in mind demolitions it will wish to know where it can lay its hands on explosives, fuses and detonators; of great value will be the detailed knowledge of those who have been concerned with existing means of telecommunication, with the production and distribution of energy in its several forms, with water reticulation and with the collection and disposal of sewage.

Since we are overwhelmingly an urban people with a sparse rural population and since the enemy’s ground lines of communication will be one of his most vulnerable parts it is likely that the rural guerrilla force will consist in no small part of those whose origins have been urban. For these such people as timber-getters, drovers, stockmen, bushwalkers and the like will be invaluable leaders for they will have to learn a great deal about their new environment before they do anything about the enemy.

Collaboration is a distasteful subject but must be dealt with since collaborators there will be; there will be the willing, the unwilling and the deceptive. The willing, who from self-interest serve the enemy and betray their fellows, must die, as publicly as possible. The unwilling must be persuaded to join the ranks of the deceptive. The deceptive are those who, while appearing to serve the enemy, in fact serve us; these can be of great value and can tell us much of the enemy, while they must be content to be kept in ignorance of the strength, dispositions and intentions of the guerrilla force. Because of the need to conceal the true role of the deceptive collaborator and because of the need to ensure that he does not meet with what, on the face of it, are his just
deserts, decisions as to the disposal of collaborators must be reserved to the highest possible level; for the same reasons the execution of the judgment, in each region, should be left to a small squad having this particular duty.

**Tactics — General**

It is, perhaps, worth repeating that the quintessential aim of all war is to destroy the enemy’s will to fight; he must be persuaded that the game is not worth the candle.

It has come to be believed that a guerrilla force must fail if it lacks a physical area of sanctuary within which it is immune from the attacks of its enemy. This is false, Grivas had none on Cyprus, the Stern Gang none in Palestine and the Irish none in Ireland for centuries. The guerrilla force that has the goodwill and support of the people possesses the ingredient most vital to success and will find in this all the sanctuary it needs. It is, of course, an advantage to have an area in which one is immune from the enemy and we may hope that the very size of Australia might grant us some areas of sanctuary. Not uncommonly a conventional force facing a guerrilla enemy seeks to “contain” the guerrilla force, in doing so it has in effect granted it an area of sanctuary; this is merely the other side of the same coin. If our enemy seems to be moving in this direction we must seek so to manoeuvre as to ensure that we are “contained” in that area of ground that best suits our purposes.

It may well be that when the guerrilla force first comes to deal offensively with the enemy that different sections of the force, and initially such actions will usually be at section strength, should have defined areas of operations each well separated from those adjacent to it lest inexperience and lack of co-ordination result in the confusion of two quite independent operations overlapping.

Fairly obviously, as the guerrilla force’s combat skills develop, it must set about the capture of enemy arms and particularly ammunition; the capture of rations and other supplies; the harassment of enemy troops, particularly detached groups and small forces; the destruction of enemy lines of communication, roads, rail and airports; the destruction of essential equipments, e.g. those concerned with communications the production and distribution of energy in its various forms, water reticulation etc.
Destruction must be as thorough as possible. Both W. T. Sherman in the U.S. War Between the States, and T. E. Lawrence in the Arab Revolt, noted that to lift a few hundred metres of railway line was almost useless, for the attacking force could not remove the line and it was little more than a minor inconvenience to their enemy to come along and put it back again. Sherman adopted the practice of making a fire of the sleepers, bringing to red heat the centre of each length of line and then wrapping it round the nearest telegraph pole: Lawrence developed mines which, laid along a length of track and fired, would so twist the line that it was no longer useful. Except in certain situations, tactical or strategic the aim of destruction is not so much to deny the enemy use of some particular facility but rather to place the maximum strain upon his resources of material and manpower. These destructive intrusions of the guerrilla force should, therefore, not be at haphazard but be governed by a demolition or sabotage policy designed to ensure that the strain on the enemy’s materials and manpower will be greatest at that point at which it will hurt most. It follows from the foregoing that members of the guerrilla force must be most skilled in demolition and, since I suggest that there should be no marked distinction between the guerrilla and conventional forces, it follows that all their members should likewise acquire this skill. Members of both forces should at the same time learn how to make the simpler types of mines that they may be able, as the need arises, to demolish enemy soldiers, trucks and tanks.

Both the guerrilla and the conventional forces, particularly the former, must learn to navigate and operate by night. If the guerrilla dominates the night he can afford to leave the day to the enemy for, even in mid-summer, the enemy will find the nights formidably long.

To the guerrilla ground is not important, for we have much of it and may well yield ground to gain time; to the guerrilla time is not important, for he thinks of his war as lasting not years but decades, or even centuries. However, while ground, as such, is of little use to him, time he must put to good use, over time the Preaching must gain the goodwill and sympathy of the civil population and must build the national determination to continue the war until the victory is achieved and the Preaching must continue until this final victory. For this, national determination, having been created, must be maintained.

The guerrilla must be impeccable in his relations with civilians. A military operation that would do more hurt to the civilian population
than to the enemy must be abandoned. Before any military operations
are engaged in, it must be realised that the enemy, the guerrilla force
eluding him, is likely to vent his anger upon civilians and the Preaching
must have made them ready to accept this. If the guerrilla has not
the goodwill and support of the mass of the people any fighting is sheer
futility.

The guerrilla force will, as occasion may require, be engaged in
one or other of the classical four phases of war, the advance, the attack,
the withdrawal, the defence; it has, in addition, the four phases of
guerrilla war.

The first is the passive phase during which the primary activity
is the Preaching, an activity which continues unabated until the final
victory. The organisation is established, at least in sketched form, and
the troops trained for their future tasks; weapons, ammunition and
other supplies are secretly manufactured or inconspicuously acquired.
But above all it is the Preaching which is important, the sympathy and
support of the mass of the people must be gained. This is a phase of
great activity in which there must be the appearance of none lest the
enemy be alarmed and alerted. A suitable motto for this phase one
might adapt from Isaiah, “In quietness and in confidence shall be your
strength” 56

The next phase is that of hesitant hostility in which the guerrilla
force is primarily concerned to test and develop its own strength. This
is the phase of minor sabotage and modest demolition; of deceptive
action at one point which facilitates a more substantial raid at another.
Small isolated enemy units are harassed and attacked to damage their
morale and to gain from them their supplies. Punitive enemy columns
are invited that they may be lured to ambush. Those who have
willingly collaborated with the enemy and are easy of access are so
disposed of as to indicate the unwisdom of their action.

The third phase is that of the overt offensive; here, having
measured our own strength, we are concerned now to measure that of
the enemy. This phase is a continuation of the previous one but
operations are conducted on a larger scale. Operations are more
mobile and are conducted by larger forces over a wider area, but
conventional battle is most carefully avoided.

Finally comes the conclusive conventional campaign, meticulously
planned and, above all, meticulously timed for to move prematurely
into this phase is to risk disastrous consequences. This final conventional battle will be preceded by diversionary offensives designed to disperse the enemy while our own forces concentrate at one crucial point; meanwhile diplomatic manoeuvres and a propaganda offensive should seek to emphasise its critical importance. The aim is finally to destroy the enemy's will to fight; after Dien Bin Phu, though the bulk of the French Expeditionary Force remained intact, she had lost the war and the world knew it. In this phase victory is vital — if in doubt, don't.

During the third phase, that of the overt offensive, our guerrilla and conventional forces will increasingly act together, the former learning the *modus operandi* of the latter, while the latter add weight and firepower to the former. In the final conventional campaign the greater part of the guerrilla force will have come together in the units and formations of the conventional army and have become part of it.

The commander of our military forces must hesitate to advance from one phase of guerrilla war to the next and be ready to retreat to an earlier phase if necessary; above all, the fourth and final phase must not be entered upon prematurely.

**Tactics — Urban**

During the initial passive phase the greater density of urban populations will facilitate the organisation of the guerrilla forces, the spread of the Preaching and the passage of Intelligence. It is particularly important that, in all urban centres, the guerrilla force has a number of members among the staffs of telecommunications facilities for, though these will come under enemy control, their occasional clandestine use, when urgent matters warrant can be of the greatest value in acquiring or transmitting intelligence and in co-ordinating activities over substantial distances. It is to be noted, however, that while urban population densities will facilitate the organization of a guerrilla force, urban communities are far less homogeneous and their members have far less sense of identity with the community and far less sense of any obligations to their neighbours than is the case in the country; treachery is more likely in the cities than in the country and must be the more carefully watched for.

Once the organization has been established the guerrilla force can move to test its strength with acts of hesitant hostility. Secondary
industry should become the site of discrete industrial sabotage: telecommunications equipment should similarly be sabotaged to hamper the enemy; likewise computers, which the enemy may well use to assist him in his administration and control, should be assisted to malfunction. There are innumerable other ways in which the enemy can be hampered, for example water in petrol, the spreading of an oil slick on roads and so forth.

Passing to the phase of the overt offensive sabotage will become more extensive, being primarily guided by our own forces sabotage plan but also engaging such opportunity targets as present. It may well be useful, at this stage, to make use of the aquatic skill of so many of our young men; limpet mines attached to the hulls of vessels in a port will usually be most useful if they are so designed as to explode when the vessel is at sea, in response, perhaps, to temperature change or a given degree of turbulence for, being detonated thus, there will be
uncertainty as to whether the explosion was due to a limpet mine, a conventional mine or a torpedo and, further, the loss to the enemy will be the more certain. During this phase sentences passed on collaborators will be executed.

The final conventional battle is unlikely to be fought in the cities but the guerrilla forces in the main urban centres occupied by the enemy can greatly contribute to his difficulties by a co-ordinated climax of sabotage and demolition. It may be thought advisable to have frank urban insurrection coinciding as a diversion, with the main battle, but it must be remembered that the very density of urban populations greatly facilitates enemy retribution.

**Tactics — Rural**

Australia’s rural areas may be divided into the mountains (montagne), the plains (planitine) and the deserts (vastitine) and while each presents different operational opportunities and difficulties they share some similarities as to the organization of a guerrilla force. As population becomes increasingly sparse so the people have an increasingly intimate knowledge of the area, the ground, in which they live, an increasing sense of responsibility to their community and of an obligation to come together as a group in the face of adversity; such features will assist in the formation of a guerrilla force. On the other hand, as population becomes more sparse, so communication, essential to operational activity, becomes more difficult. In rural areas, therefore, it will be particularly important to enlist those who, in the course of their normal duties, move about the area; in the more closely settled parts, for instance, such people as truck drivers and PMG linesmen, and over greater distances, itinerant workers such as shearers and fruit-pickers, while in the more remote areas, people such as mail contractors would be invaluable.

**Tactics — Montagne**

The greater part of habitable Australia is its eastern third and to the guerrilla one of the country’s most valuable physical features is the Great Dividing Range since, for the length of the East Coast, this provides rugged country with dense tree cover eminently suitable for the establishment of operational and logistic bases. Such bases should be small and independent; all bases must be ready to move and
operational bases will be accustomed to doing so, while logistic bases should be sited as to minimise this need. Logistic bases and, perhaps, the higher operational headquarters will need to be deeply dug in to the mountains and to this end their geology must be considered; limestone, for example, will be better suited to such uses than sandstone.

The mountains offer unique opportunities for the disruption of the enemy lines of communication between east and west. In mountainous country an obstacle created cannot be easily by-passed and, more easily than elsewhere, such an obstacle, and the likely approaches to it, can be kept under observation and brought under fire should a target present.

As the war progresses it is not unlikely that much of the enemy's forces and the greater part of his resources will lie on the eastern seaboard, probably in the Newcastle-Sydney-Wollongong area. It may well be possible, as the final phase approaches and as the greater part of the guerrilla force coalesces into the units and formations of the regular army, to bring the enemy to conventional battle on the western plains; in such a case a guerrilla force in the mountains could play a vital role in blocking the enemy's lines of communication at the critical time.

**Tactics — Planitine**

Our sweeping plains offer difficulties both to us and our enemy. Their very extent is the enemy's problem for effective control over so great an area will make substantial demands upon his resources of manpower and materials. Our difficulties are that ranges and tree cover, though not non-existent, are sparse; water sources are not numerous and are well mapped.

A further difficulty existing in at least some of our plains country is that the motor car, as it has in the cities, favoured the supermarket against the corner store, has in the country favoured the larger towns at the expense of the smaller. A result of this is that we have many hamlets that could harbour a section or perhaps a platoon and a number of larger towns that could harbour a battalion but few villages that could so accommodate a company. If this situation persists it will make more difficult the transition from the phase of hesitant hostility to that of the overt offensive; it will also hinder the subsequent coalescence of guerrilla forces into regular units and formations. However,
it is not unlikely that, should the enemy occupy our plains, the very circumstance that gave rise to the situation will be reversed and the enemy will thus solve this problem for us.

A possibility that should be considered is that the enemy may seek to impose the solution imposed by the British in the Malayan Emergency, gathering our country people by night into secure compounds and ensuring most stringently the security of the harvest; however, because of our relatively poor carrying capacity, both pastorally and agriculturally, it is doubtful if such a solution would be practicable. Indeed, it is possible, that the circumstances of war, denying our country people their numerous mechanical aids to agriculture, might force a movement of people from the cities to our areas of primary production, the plains — this would, of course, tend to overcome the difficulties of organization, communication and tactical operation that we have already noted.

Our planitine, forces will be engaged in operating against small enemy detachments, in the interruption of enemy lines of supply by destruction of road and rail, in the interruption of communications by the destruction of repeater stations and of telephone lines, in the disruption of power supplies by demolition of the pylons of the electricity grid — all such operations must be guided by the army command’s sabotage plan and demolitions must always be so thorough as to place substantial demand upon the enemy’s manpower and material resources.

The ability to navigate and operate by night, important to any guerrilla fighters is particularly important to the planitine guerrilla since cover is sparse, distances great and our people few.

**Tactics — Vastitine**

Our deserts (vastitas in the Latin) are vast indeed and are most sparsely peopled. This will hinder our own operations but their very vastness will even more hinder those of the enemy. The possibility of aerial surveillance will make the ability to navigate and operate by night even more important than elsewhere. The mobility of our forces will be much improved if we can re-learn the use of the camel. This beast was the operational and logistic vehicle of Lawrence’s Arab Revolt and much may be learnt of its uses from his writings.39

Our operations in the desert will probably be confined to demolition of such ground lines of supply as the enemy may care to throw across it.
Here the thorough destruction, particularly of lengths of railway, could be of great value since repair will present greater difficulties than elsewhere.

**Command, Co-ordination and Communication**

Command of the whole of our military forces must, throughout the war, be centralised, and though, particularly in the early phases, it will in large part be delegated to unit and sub-unit commanders, the central authority must lay down a general policy to which the actions of subordinate commanders must conform. In the passive phase the command structure will merely be coming into being, in the phase of hesitant hostility tactical command will be local; as we pass to the overt offensive command will become regional and will be increasingly centralised as we approach the final phase of conventional warfare. In this last phase the whole of our military forces will be directly subject to the orders of a single commander.
As to co-ordination, in the passive phase this also will just be coming into being. In the phase of hesitant hostility co-ordination must be developed but, as we have suggested, it may be wise to allocate to local sections discontinuous operational areas that such sections may first establish their own operational capabilities before attempting the co-ordinated operations of one or more sections. During the phase of the overt offensive guerrilla units must work to perfect co-ordination among themselves and in association with our regular forces. The final phase of conventional warfare must not be contemplated until such co-ordination has been perfected.

We have already mentioned communications but more remains to be said for communications are the tool vital to co-ordination and command. In the passive phase communication will be word of mouth, by a silent hatred of the enemy which will serve to firm our national resolve; perhaps by the humming of a tune symbolic of our resistance (humming is very suitable since, in the face of a tight lipped crowd it is impossible to tell who is doing the humming and who isn’t — such a practice might even resolve the problem of finding a National Anthem). All these are part of the Preaching and the Preaching is likely to be the primary and continuing vital ingredient of our resistance. In the phase of hesitant hostility simple forms of reproducing manuscript or typescript will be of great importance and the need to possess these we must realise from the outset; by these means the supreme military command will advise subordinate commanders of its intentions, of the sabotage plan to be followed, and will issue, if not precise orders, at least instructions by which their actions may be guided; by these means also the Preaching may be continued, its ambit widened and the consistency of doctrine throughout the country ensured.

As the overt offensive develops we must acquire man-portable long-range radio served by rechargeable batteries and, if possible, radio communications to at least unit level.

This acquisition is essential to the communications, which are essential to the co-ordination, which is essential to that centralised command, which are all essential if the final phase of conventional war is to lead to victory — and this it must do.

**The Principles of Guerrilla Warfare**

The principles of guerrilla war resemble those of conventional war but the two are not identical. Guerrilla war will not be waged
THE ROLE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE IN AUSTRALIA

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successfully unless its principles are clearly stated and understood. Those here proposed may at least serve as a basis for discussion.

The national aim must not only be clearly defined and steadily maintained but must also be widely disseminated among our whole people.

All our armed forces, but particularly the guerrilla force, must seek and most carefully foster the active support of the civilian population; their support is a sine qua non. The people must fully realise that the war is likely to be long and bitter, lasting decades rather than years.

There must be established an intelligence network that permeates the whole population for the guerrilla relies on the superiority of his intelligence.

The military command, subordinate only to the civilian government, must at all times be centralised with increasingly centralised control as the final phase of conventional war approaches. There must be progressive acquisition of communications equipments to enable this progressive centralisation of control.

There must be flexibility of organisation, both in the tactical sense of combining those forces best suited to perform a particular task and in the strategic recognition that guerrilla forces must be designed and trained with their progressive combination into regular units and formations in mind; and having also in mind that, having so combined, they may need to revert to a guerrilla role and organization. Regular forces must also be prepared to fight a guerrilla war.

Fluidity of force is an essential characteristic of the guerrilla, equally the ability to concentrate and to disperse. In any engagement with the enemy the guerrilla must have superiority of force in some one critical department, mines, machine guns, mobility, or whatever might be critical to the issue. The guerrilla must have the ability to navigate and operate by night for night favours the guerrilla; the guerrilla is a nocturnal animal.

The logistic support of the guerrilla force must be uncluttered: there must be nothing that is not essential. Emphasis must be placed on man-portable weapons and equipments.
The nation that fights a guerrilla war is by definition weaker than its opponent; the sympathy of the world goes naturally to the weaker combatant and, in recent decades, has proved to be most valuable. This sympathy we must seek to arouse and maintain; but we must recognise that, in Australia's particular case, this might not be easy.

NOTES

2 ibid., p. 131.
7 ibid., p. 264.
8 ibid., p. 268.
9 ibid., p. 271.
10 ibid., p. 279.
11 ibid., p. 266.
13 ibid., p. 13.
14 ibid., p. 123.
15 ibid., p. 200.
16 ibid., p. 226.
17 ibid., p. 227.
19 ibid., p. 200.
20 ibid., p. 346.
21 ibid., p. 139.
22 ibid., p. 394.
23 ibid., p. 390.
24 ibid., p. 199.
25 ibid., p. 178.
26 ibid., p. 201.
28 ibid., p. 36.
29 ibid., p. 66.
30 ibid., p. 81.
31 ibid., p. 74.
32 ibid., p. 53.
33 ibid., p. 57.
35 Lawrence, sup. cit., p. 298 and pp. 614-6.
36 Isaiah, 30:15.
37 Taber, Sup. cit., p. 66.

ARMY JOURNAL — ANNUAL AWARD

The annual awards for 1974/75 for the best original articles published in the Army Journal went to the following:

First Prize $60: Foreign Policy and a Credible Defence
by Brigadier J. H. Thyer (May 1975).

Second Prize $20: The Development of Australia's Military Roles in
World War II by Major B. Dickey (Feb 1975).
HAVING agreed to start using our guns again, we should have a look at the question of command and control of artillery. A favourite subject for discussion at academic military institutions, it is discussed and argued at length, then swept behind the black-board until next time. Students can go away with an interpretation, tailored to suit their own level of command and thought; many of them also convinced that it is a very simple matter being hopelessly confused by gunners. The first part is true. It is a simple matter providing commanders at all levels are sufficiently flexible to acknowledge that their own particular battle is probably only a small part of a bigger situation and that their pressing life and death requirements for support may not be top priority in the overall picture. The confusion occurs with commanders thinking only at their own level, which after all, is a very human approach.

Unfortunately in our Army, this approach is becoming entrenched due to a fragmented command system in peacetime and a lack of opportunity to demonstrate and practise a proper artillery command and control system. Another complication is the search for an absolute guarantee of guns firing in support of a particular unit or formation. There is no such thing as an absolute guarantee. One could be obtained by a rigid allocation of guns before a battle and no interference with this allocation once the battle starts. We have done this in the past with the result of units being under-supported whilst guns are idle or being employed on low priority tasks.

Command and control of artillery is best considered at divisional level. This is the level at which we first see a complete artillery weapons system developed. It is also the level at which we can best exercise centralised control of our field guns with their current ranges. We could argue that if we had a field gun that fired 30,000 metres, it may be better to centralise the control at corps level. This, of course, must be weighed against communications and the span of command of any one artillery headquarters in action. In the end, it gets back to divisional level. A fact that is often overlooked by junior commanders is that any battle fought within a division, is a divisional battle. A company commander carrying out an operation within the divisional context, is entitled to expect the support of the full resources of the division, if necessary.

There are certain basic facts that should be borne in mind when considering command and control. If these are understood, all other discussion on the subject is largely a play on words. The first point is that the problems of command and control and lack of understanding usually disappear in wartime. Most of the problems exist in theoretical peace-time discussion, but we must guard against these ideas becoming entrenched and going to war in a situation where it takes undue time in battle to establish the proper system again.

Artillery is a resource available to a commander. He allot this resource as he sees the need. If circumstances change, he will alter this allotment. The thing which makes artillery different from other resources is the facility with which a change of allotment can be made effective. A change in allotment of armour or engineers during a battle, can be ordered quickly by radio, but it may be some time before it becomes effective. If the tanks or sappers are closely engaged, it may never become effective. A reallocation of artillery can be ordered and effected within a matter of minutes, providing command is at the correct level. It is this speed in effecting changes of allotment which worries junior commanders. They imagine that their guns may be taken away from them very quickly, and without warning. They will be if the circumstances are dire enough to warrant it. They must also remember that other guns can be put to their assistance with the same speed.

Contrary to the belief in some circles, there is only one person in charge of a battle. Within the division, it is the divisional commander. He is the person who allot priorities and resources, and any changes in these are made in his name. It is true that the changes are
often made by staff officers working within guidelines given to them by the commander, applied to a minute to minute situation. If artillery is reallocated during a battle, it is not the gunners who do it, it is the commander.

The main aspect of command of artillery is the authority to move guns. The person who says where guns deploy, what time they are to deploy and when they move somewhere else, dictates the amount of fire that can be brought to bear on the battlefield. It follows that the higher we keep this level of command, the greater the use we will get from our artillery.

There are certain terms we use in the allotment and control of artillery. They are defined in the Division in Battle pamphlets. Unfortunately, the presently accepted meaning of some of them is misleading. This is understandable as they are the result of a standardisation compromise and an attempt to rationalise different national ideas of the term “in support”. This compromise was accepted in the interests of standardisation, yet the major partners to the agreement continue to use their own terms or interpretation for domestic use. We are using the compromise for domestic use. A situation which could, unless watched closely, lead to a loss of much of our flexibility.

The problem gets back to subordinate commanders worrying about having guns guaranteed to them. This search for a guarantee leads to most of our problems in command and control of artillery. We used to say “in direct support” implied a guarantee. This fortunately has been dropped. We now hedge around the issue by saying guns “at priority call” are “only guaranteed to the formation or unit having the guns at priority call”. We also say that “Field artillery is frequently allotted at priority call to formations and units for certain tasks”.

These unfortunate sentences are resulting in guns being placed at “Priority Call” to units and formations at all levels with nothing more in mind than a guarantee. The main use of control terms is in planning, once a battle starts we must be prepared to play a tune on them as circumstances require. The provision of adequate artillery support stems from the flexibility of the system and minute to minute control — not from a rigid allocation before a battle starts.

There is also a certain amount of lack of faith in human nature in this exercise. If a CRA (acting on behalf of the Divisional Com-
mander), tells a CO of a field regiment that for a certain operation “you have nine field batteries at 100 rounds per gun” then the CO has them. Nobody is going to take them away during the operation unless the situation dictates it. If it is necessary, they will be re-allotted irrespective of what magic words were used in the initial allocation.

Having said a lot of this exercise is a play on words we have indulged in it. You could well say that if we continue with our present application of “at Priority Call”, there is no harm done. Probably not in our present small Army where it is difficult, if not impossible, to exercise a proper command and control system. If we persist with this interpretation, the use of the term will become more and more “frequent” with an inevitable loss of flexibility. This loss will be due more to a state of mind rather than a fault in the system.

Problems of command and control of artillery are aggravated by the fragmented organization of our Army. There is also a reluctance by many people to appreciate that the lowest formation at which the full potential of a force of all arms can be developed, is the division. We must get back to thinking of fighting a division as an entity and not as three loosely co-ordinated smaller formations. The name “Task Force” will probably disappear from our vocabulary, the sooner the better. The back-bone of a division is nine infantry battalions, grouped into three infantry brigades. They fight with the full co-ordinated support of all the supporting arms in the division. The term “Task Force” implies a smaller formation of one, two or three battalions with some supporting arms, organized for a specific task. On a lower, but equally important level, we have destroyed the value of certain key postings in our division. We are now calling a Brigade Major an SO2 (Operations). A Brigade Major, whether infantry, armoured or artillery was a person of some authority in a clearly defined position. SO2 (Operations) are found in almost every headquarters.

A pragmatic approach in peacetime has placed medium guns in the division. With only one division, this is inevitable. It is quite clear that if ever we become involved in a corps battle, these guns will go back to the command of corps. Their capabilities and range dictate this if we are to get the most use from them. They can be put with a division, if necessary, but it is always easier to sub-allot guns downwards, than to take them away from a junior commander. We should be calling our medium regiments “corps artillery” now.
Our system of command and control of artillery has developed over many years and been refined in battle. It is envied by many foreign countries, but they recoil from adopting it because it is not an easy philosophy and requires a high standard of training, and above all, a flexibility of approach. We are capable of this, providing we can establish a proper command system and educate people to think at a correct level in a flexible manner. ☀

CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which the articles appear are available through the Defence Library Information Services at Campbell Park Library and Military District libraries.


Encryption algorithms: key size is the thing. Datamation (US), March 1976: 164, 166. (Cryptography; Computer Security; Wire-tapping; Combination locks; Encryption Algorithms).


The West German aerospace industry: state control or free enterprise? Interavia, 4/1976: 315-319. (Gruner report; Aerospace industry — West Germany).


German aerospace electronics — the big four dominate. Interavia, 4/1976, 342-5. (Aerospace electronics — Germany).


THE DEFENCE OF PORT PHILLIP BAY IN 1858

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Sons of Australia, hear ye not
The sound of distant War —
Arise! prepare the sword and shield
While yet 'tis hear afar.
Australians! guard thy native land
E'er yet 'tis grasped by tyrant hand.
Let love of Gold be laid aside,
And love of Country rue!


Worry over the defence of Australia is no new thing. The leaders of the early colonies held many grave fears of invasion from some foreign power who perhaps would cast greedy eyes on the riches of the goldfields and the lucrative trade enjoyed by the new settlements.

In Melbourne there was great unease over the lack of defences for Port Phillip Bay which, according to many defence experts at the time, could be captured by a single enemy frigate. This unease was entirely justified. Until 1859 the total British naval strength in the area of the East coast consisted of four sailing ships and two small paddle-wheel steamers, all of which were based in Sydney. It was not until after 1859 that this "squadron" at Sydney was enlarged by the establishment of a Royal Navy station.

Lieutenant Jones graduated from RMC Duntroon in 1972 with a BA(Mil), majoring in English and History. He served with 4 Fd Regt RAA in Townsville as section commander and forward observer for two years. He is currently studying for an MA (Hons) in English Literature. He has previously contributed to the Army Journal, Military Review, (US Army), and Military Digest (Indian Army).
The Commission of 1858

The Victorian Government naturally was concerned that in the event of a hostile ship entering Port Phillip Bay it could hold Melbourne to ransom with impunity before any British ships could arrive from Sydney. This resulted in the Governor of Victoria, Henry Barkly, on the advice of his executive committee, establishing a commission in 1858 to enquire into and report on the naval and military defences of the Colony. Major General Edward MacArthur CB, was appointed President of the commission, with Charles Pasley RE as Vice-President and William Stokes of the Department of Works and Buildings as Secretary.

This was not the first defence commission which had been set up in Victoria, however. The Legislative Council of Victoria had, in January of 1854, appointed a similar committee to report, “as to the probable manner in which the Colony might be attacked by an enemy, and to devise the best means of meeting such a calamity”. This committee was to report in March of that year that in its opinion the Colony was defenceless, and in great danger of attack from the French who were newly established in New Caledonia. The committee went on to recommend that guns be sent out to the Colony from Woolwich arsenal, together with troops from India. Also a local militia was to be raised. Unfortunately, unknown to the committee, the Crimean War had begun in Europe at about this time so few of its recommendations, apart from the raising of a militia, were to reach maturity.

Effect of Crimean War Scare

News of the Crimean War, which reached the colonies in May 1854, was to cause a great deal of alarm amongst the new settlers. In Sydney a patriotic meeting was called on 22 May 1854 which was attended by some two thousand people. The leaders at this meeting, J. B. Darvall, a barrister educated at Eton, and Henry Parkes, called for monetary support for England and for the self defence of the colonies.

In Melbourne, response to the war news had an even greater effect and great interest was shown in the war by the local people who paid thousands of pounds to see the exhibition at Cremorne Gardens which depicted the siege of Sebastopol. Yet this interest did not merely reflect a disinterested loyalty. This was clearly proved by the high state of panic which resulted in 1855 from the rumours that Russian
ships had been seen in the vicinity of the Cape. Furthermore, Melbourne, because it received news from abroad well ahead of Sydney, was newly appointed the defence headquarters of the colonies, a responsibility the Victorian Colony was not going to take lightly.

To help counter the supposed threat from Russia the Australian colonies went about organising their respective militias (one of the recommendations of the 1854 Victorian Defence Committee). The volunteers of Melbourne were actually called out in the night of 7 September 1854, when gunfire was heard in Port Phillip Bay. The *Melbourne Morning Herald* was to report the next day: "the ascent of several rockets stimulated the prevailing excitement to a higher pitch, and the exclamation, "The Russians!" was passed from mouth to mouth.

The men of the Volunteer Rifle Regiment "mobilised", armed with sticks and pick-handles, to repel the invaders. Luckily, the gun-shots and rockets that were seen only came from the steamer, *Great Britain* which had just been released from three weeks quarantine for smallpox. The scare, however, was to have big effect by crystallising many hitherto unspoken fears of invasion.

**Naval Protection**

When the commission to look into the local defence of Port Phillip Bay was established in 1858, it noted that no British ship had been in the area since the sloop, *Electra*, in December of 1856, apart from casual visits from the frigate, *Iris*. The sole naval defence of the Bay rested, it was reported, on the sloop *Victoria*.

*Victoria* had cost the Victorian Government some £38,000 and was to be the first ever warship built to the order of a British colony. Sydney already had its own wooden ketch gunboat named *Spitfire*, so with the commissioning of Her Majesty's Colonial Ship *Victoria* of some 580 tons and 8 guns *The Times* was to report the event as "the foundation of a great navy in Southern Seas". The *Victoria* was eventually to reach Melbourne on 31 May 1856 where she was to remain half manned and half armed for much of her service life.

**Defence of the Heads**

Clearly, then, the commission of 1858 had little faith in the available naval defence of Port Phillip Bay. General Sir John Burgoyne in a memorandum forwarded to the commission on 6 May 1858 prompted
their thoughts further along the lines of land defence by his recommendation of the erection of batteries or forts at the Heads of the Bay. Sir John saw it as imperative to guard the entrance of the Bay which was some 35 miles in diameter. By preventing an enemy vessel from actually entering the Bay it would serve to deny such a vessel any safe anchorage or shelter and also prevent it from blockading the entire settlement from a rescuing force which itself would have to enter via the Heads.

But with the width of the channel at the entrance of the Bay being some 4,000 yards, Sir John recognised the difficulty of shore-based batteries achieving sufficient accuracy over such a range. Yet he set out to prove that because of the prevailing winds between Point Nepean, Point Lonsdale and Shortland's Bluff, it was impossible for a ship to
sail more than 2,000 yards from any battery for less than three or four miles. Furthermore, Sir John argued, the establishment of forts at the Heads would protect friendly ships that sought a safe harbour. Work on such forts, suggested Sir John, would not have to be large and only small garrisons would be required. Some protection, however, was necessary to guard against a landbased attack from the rear.

Rejection of Burgoyne’s Suggestions

The commission, accompanied by Captain Lovell of the Royal Artillery and Captain Ferguson, the Chief Harbour Master, thoroughly investigated Sir John’s suggestions. Their conclusion was to reject the idea of defending the Heads for a number of extremely valid reasons. The commission saw that owing to the deep water at the entrance to Port Phillip Bay it was possible for enemy ships to avoid the three battery emplacements that were recommended by Sir John and that it would be necessary to construct a fourth battery at Observatory Point. Even the fourth battery, it was realised, would only put an enemy vessel in range for the short period of a few minutes and always at long range. Furthermore, there was nothing to prevent enemy ships from entering the Bay at night by using the lights at Shortland’s Bluff. To extinguish these lights would mean a great inconvenience to local trade.

The cost of Sir John’s scheme would be enormous. Yet the commission did not necessarily see this as a final deterrent if some strong case could be made for the justification of such a vast expenditure by a small and only moderately wealthy colony. There was, however, small reason to spend money on defending the Heads if a ship could enter flying false British colours and have Melbourne at its mercy, protecting itself from the batteries at the Heads on its way out by making such protection an article of capitulation.

What use, the commission wondered, would be forts 60 miles from Melbourne in the event of a ship slipping by them to bombard the city? Such forts, surely, would have to be in a state of constant watchfulness and have extreme rapidity and accuracy of fire if they were to serve any useful purpose. All this would, by conservative estimate, involve the need for a garrison of some 600 gunners who would have to be shut up in isolated forts. In the event of a major war the Imperial Government would certainly withdraw such troops for more immediate purposes, thus leaving the Bay as defenceless as before.
Commission's Recommendations

All these drawbacks that the commission saw in Sir John Burgoyne's scheme did not lead it to stating that it would never be advisable to defend the Heads. Perhaps in the future when improvements in artillery removed distance objections it would be quite a feasible scheme. But at the present time, due to the Colony's small population and limited revenue, it was necessary to concentrate on more immediate objectives. The commission therefore recommended the completion of the construction of the battery sites on the north shore of Hobson's Bay and at Williamstown which had been started at the beginning of the Crimean War scare. These partially built sites, prior to the commission's investigation, did contain some light cannon but these were completely ineffective when it came to the long ranges that they would be required to cover.

It was recommended by the commission, then, that guns be stationed at intervals along the northern shores of Hobson's Bay for a quarter of a mile each side of the Government pier at Sandridge; also on the south shore one mile north-west of Gellibrand's Point. More guns should be located, if possible on the coast a quarter of a mile south of Gellibrand's Point. The commission also saw a need for St Kilda to have a protective Battery. A floating battery of 16 guns in the middle of the Bay would, the commission suggested, form a link between the northern and southern batteries.

To arm these proposed gun locations the commission regarded the 68 pounder gun and 32 pounder gun (for the firing of hot shot) to be the most suitable. Accordingly, sixty of the 68 pounders and ten of the 32 pounders were requested to be sent from England. Furthermore the commission requested that the Imperial Government supply the floating battery and complete the armament of the paddle-wheeled gunboat, Victoria. To support the heavy coastal guns and for the training of local gunners the commission recommended the acquisition of a four gun battery of 9 pounders, two 24 pounder Howitzers and six light 3 pounders.

Reduction of Imperial Forces

All these guns of course would require a substantial force to protect them from rear attack by land. The commission did not, however, consider it economically desirable for the Colony of Victoria to
have a standing army of its own. Instead they saw it as a great advantage to have British troops for the purpose. Unfortunately things were not to be quite that simple.

As colonial self-government approached, the colonies, whenever they asked for guns or troops, were increasingly being told by the Imperial Government to provide their own. The numbers of British soldiers in the colonies were constantly being reduced. In 1847, for example, the number of soldiers in NSW was reduced by some nine hundred men who were sent to New Zealand to help in the Maori Wars. This was to leave only nine hundred troops in NSW with the Imperial Government stating that both Sydney and Melbourne must provide their own defence since British troops were sent originally only to guard convicts.¹

The first step towards local defence in the colonies was to be the building of Victoria Barracks in 1848 at the cost of £60,000. This was a sensible step, for the Imperial Government in 1849, following the dubious logic that colonies rich enough to tempt invaders should be rich enough to defend themselves, further reduced the garrisons in both Sydney and Melbourne to the strength of a mere guard. In fact by the late 1860's the Gladstone ministry was to completely withdraw the last of the British soldiers from the self-governing colonies.

A scheme was later set up where the colonies could "rent" Imperial soldiers at £70 a head but this was regarded as inadvisable by the military leaders of the colonies since the British troops were always being withdrawn at the smallest notice as happened in 1858 when troops were removed to help subdue the Indian Mutiny.²

Yet despite all these problems the commission saw an absolute necessity to obtain troops to both man and defend the proposed battery sites. A chance was seen when the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent a despatch to the Governor, Henry Barkly, on 9 March 1858, stating that the Imperial Government would provide a force of 4 companies of infantry to help in the defence of the colonies.

**The Establishment of a Militia Force**

The proposed force, even if trained in gunnery, would be woefully inadequate for manning the batteries around Hobson's Bay. The four British companies, however, would be most useful as a nucleus of a militia force of which an estimated 3 to 4,000 were needed. Also, because any attack would probably be by a small force (a large one
would need lines of communications which could be cut by Britain’s seapower) who attacked with surprise, the militia would all have to come from the immediate Melbourne and Geelong areas.

The first step towards raising such a force the commission saw as the repeal of the inadequate “Volunteer Corps Acts”. The new militia requirements would enable the enrolment of males between the ages of 18 and 50. These men would be volunteers if possible and come under the direct control of the Governor. All recruits would come from a number of “military districts” which were to be formed. Any district that could not fill its quota must resort to conscription.

At the time of the proposal to raise this new militia force in the Melbourne area it must be remembered that a militia force, raised during the 1854 Crimean War scare, already existed. Numbers in this force had, however, with the conclusion of the war, fallen away. Sydney at this time was also attempting to raise its own new militia force and its attempts were to be roughly similar to those employed in Melbourne.

Both colonies in their efforts to raise volunteers appealed to the patriotic spirit of their settlers. Parkes published in his Empire (the rival paper in NSW to the Sydney Morning Herald) Henry Kendall’s “Australia War Song”, which was highly jingoistic and of little literary merit but which affectively put it to the colonists that by joining the volunteers they would be both thwarting any likely invader and making false the allegations that the colonies were not ready for war:

Men have said that ye were sleeping—
Hurl — Australians — back the lie;
Whet the swords you have in keeping,
Forward stand to do or die.
Hear ye not — across the ocean,
Echoes of the distant fray,
Sounds of loud fierce commotion,
Swiftly sweeping on the Way?
Patriot fires will scorch oppression
Should it draw too near;
And the tide of bold aggression
Must be stay’d from coming here.”

In Victoria the task of raising a militia as recommended by the commission was entered into very thoroughly. Militia forces from
Switzerland, the Channel Isles, the Colony of New Brunswick and the State of Massachusetts were all studied for similarities and strong points only to be discarded in turn. But New Brunswick, with its vigorous "uniform companies", probably provided the most stimulus towards finding a basis for Victoria’s new militia force and gave the Victorian Government the confidence that it could raise a wholly volunteer force.

Already, the commission had pointed out, in the existing Volunteer Artillery, Yeomanry Cavalry and Geelong Rifles, were many officers experienced enough to lead such a proposed new force. The commission also supplied the recommendation that the new force consist of independent companies, each of which was to be headed by a captain. This they thought would cut down on a surplus of the higher military ranks and thus simplify command problems and save on expenditure.

**Naval Militia and Naval Defence**

The naval side of the militia force the Victorian Commission regarded to be in a very poor state. An earlier despatch on 24 January 1858 from the Lords of the Admiralty to the Secretary of State for the Colonies had pointed out that after the recent war with Russia it was better to confine Russia’s fleet to its ports rather than to scatter the British fleet in order to protect different localities. The commission acknowledged the logic of this decision but also recognised the danger from other areas such as the United States and France. In fact it was even rumoured at the time that Napoleon III had his eyes set on the new settlements of Australia.

Despite pointing out tactfully that the present British naval force in Australian waters was completely insufficient and that the Australian colonies warranted protection far more than the West Indies, which had a protection its wealth could not justify, the commission failed to win its case for increased naval aid in the Port Phillip area.

All this manoeuvring in the field of naval politics in Victoria, however, was to result later, in 1865, in the “Colonial Naval Defence Act” being passed which was to allow the Victorian Government to obtain the building in 1866, of the Cerberus. Named after the monster of Classical antiquity, the Cerberus was nothing but a floating fort weighing some 2000 tons and possessing four 10 inch muzzle-loaders. The Cerberus was designed after the pattern of the American Civil War
ironclads and cost £125,000 of which the Victorian Government paid £25,000 and also the cost of the armament. The Cerberus was commissioned to protect Imperial as well as colonial interests. It was not to arrive, however, until 9 April 1871, after a very eventful trip from England through heavy seas and the newly opened Suez Canal.

Until the arrival of the Cerberus the Victorian Government had to make do with the organisation of its militia and it did not shrink from this important task. The commission in its report in December of 1858, had recommended the relative strengths of artillery, infantry, cavalry and naval companies. It also had suggested a minimum of three years of service for the militia with a compulsory seven days drill a year for the infantry and cavalry and ten days a year for the artillery and navy. The commission made a further suggestion that all schools receiving Government aid were to give military instruction of one hour a week to all boys over the age of ten.

**Immediate Result of Commission's Directives**

The Victorian Government in 1858 had put up £25,000 for the commission's directives to be put into operation. Captain Peter Scratchley was placed in charge of the construction of the battery positions and by his return to England in 1863 the two batteries' positions close to Melbourne and one at Queenscliff had been completed. Also a militia of nearly 4,000 men had been raised by the end of 1860 with the Government offering incentive of a thousand pounds for competitions in efficiency.

However, despite all the studious work by the commission, the great expenditure by the Victorian Government and the zealous training of the militia, when a Russian frigate, the Svetlana entered Port Phillip Bay on 4 January 1862, no greeting salute could be fired because there was no powder available for the guns and, as the Argus was tartly to report later, the only artillery heard "was the popping of champagne corks" when the officers of the Svetlana were entertained by the local gentry. A similar incident occurred in 1863 when the Russian corvette Bogatyrr entered the Bay and could have had the entire colony at its mercy. A young officer of the Bogatyrr was to sagaciously observe that the French began their settlements with batteries whereas the Australian colonists were too intent on material improvement to spend enough money on defence.
Long Term Defence Attitude of Victorian Government

It seems, then, that the attitude of the Victorian Government towards the defence of Port Phillip Bay during the 1850s depended largely on the meeting of an immediate threat, with little consideration being made of the time it would take to set up and train an adequate defence force. This attitude was first evident in 1856 when the direct threat of Russian invasion had passed and, rather predictably, the defences begun at the start of the Crimean War were sadly neglected. Not that it made much difference, since such defences would have been totally inadequate to have repelled even a single enemy raider. Similarly, this pattern was to repeat itself after the initial but brief enthusiasm for defence in the 1860s which followed the commission’s report in 1858. Almost all early expense and effort was wasted by the Victorian Government’s failure to complete the details of its defence scheme once the immediate threat had vanished.

Lesson Learnt?

Those who believe that there are some lessons to be learnt from history surely can see that it can be proved, even from our own brief past, that it is a fallacy to believe that a defence force can be raised, equipped and trained in time to face an immediate threat. The defence gamble of the Victorian Government regarding Port Phillip Bay paid off because luckily for them there was no “dark horse” of a raider sufficiently interested in invading the Colony. 

NOTES

2 Ibid., p. 222.
4 Ibid., p. 3.
5 *Defence of Hobson’s Bay: Resolutions Adopted by the Commission*, paras 2-3.
6 Ibid., paras 6-11.
8 Ibid., p. 232.
9 *Militia: Resolutions Adopted by the Commission*, para 40.
Letter to the Editor

In reading Lt Col Loughton’s article on Logistics in your June edition I feel that readers might be misled on certain points.

First of all let us be clear of the difference between Maintenance Areas and Administrative Areas. The generally accepted definition is that in Maintenance Areas stocks are held on the ground; in Administrative Areas stocks are held on wheels. It will be normal within the division for a divisional administrative area (DAA) and task force administrative areas (TFAA) to be established — not a DMA or TFMA. If task forces are operating under divisional control, forward task force administrative areas (Fwd TFAA) may be formed. In the DAA, TFAA (and Fwd TFAA) combat supplies are held on RACT second line transport, and their distribution is the responsibility of the Commander Divisional Transport with RAAOC Combat Supplies Platoons under his command. As stocks within the division are held on wheels, there is no engineer effort required as suggested by Lt Col Loughton — indeed the DAA and TFAA’s must be capable of rapid redeployment and should anticipate moving at least once every 24 hours. The first area in the Combat Zone where one can expect to see stocks grounded (and thus a Maintenance Area formed) is to the rear of the division where a Replenishment Park (RP) is established.

As Lt Col Loughton concludes ‘Don’t use maintenance areas unless you can’t guarantee daily delivery’. The key to daily delivery being the availability of transport resources. The transport organization and resupply cycle within the division are geared to daily replenishment and the drawbacks of Maintenance Areas outlined by Lt Col Loughton within the division are thus avoided.

D Mov T - Army
Canberra

Major D. M. Ivison, RCT
Canberra
The Improvement of Management Skills
Written and Verbal Communication

Captain A. J. Howe, M.A., B.Sc., Dip.Ed.
Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

"Excessive obscuration obliterates"
Anon.


Primitive First Generation Concepts and Implementation

The integrated monitoring and control centre, through the agency of the inbuilt dual optical data collection system of the reader of this optical software will no doubt be aware of a primitive first generation software package known as the instant terminological table (ITT). This package is included as an optional extra to this basic software.

The ITT as shown, though of nearly unique importance to modern management thought, suffers because it is of integrated non-transitional understandability.

The ITT, produced in the form of three balanced first generation contingency lists, each of ten functionally monitored items, did provide the modern manager with a functional though transitional capability. It does not however provide optional management flexibility because integrated organisational bias can occur in the choice of parallel policy options.

Captain Howe graduated from the Officer Training Unit, Scheyville in 1968 and was commissioned in RAEME. He attended the University of Western Australia from 1963 to 1967, graduating with a Bachelor of Science in Mathematics and a Diploma of Education. He was posted to RAEME Training Centre from 1968 to 1972. In 1972 he attended the Department of Occupational Therapy, Birkbeck College, London, graduating as a Master of Arts, (Manpower Planning). He was a Training Systems Advisor for a variety of schools in 3MD during 1974/75. He is currently the Production and Planning Officer at Puckapunyal Workshop Company, RAEME.
Optimal Second Generation Transitional Hardware Development

In the next total organisational time phase it is apparent that a second generation concept is required. The integrated non-optional specifications are that this second generation hardware should provide a random reciprocal mobility which will give a compatible logical parallel to modern management practice.

The hardware development is based on a systematised incremental projection of the familiar high risk random return facility popular at local fairs and jumble sales, sometimes referred to by its rather unfunctional nomenclature, ‘the chocolate wheel’.

Three of the items are mounted in parallel on a holding device. The mathematical symbols are replaced by the individual items of the aforementioned contingency lists.

The modern manager faced by a compatible management obscuration requirement imparts angular mobility to each hardware item and in the efflux of time, as the mobility so imparted ceases, the manager is presented with a functionally random determinant satisfactory to his contingency.

Such a procedure guarantees the manager optimal functionality by ensuring a random monitored option. It also relieves the manager of the need to make any responsive decision other than that required to impart digital directed angular mobility to the hardware system.

The advantages of this second generation hardware concept over the primitive first generation software concept are obvious. However dysfunctions do exist. The limited number of synchronised logical options present straight jacket restrictions on the modern manager; the software input is restricted.

Responsive Projections for Third Generation Capability

Only a systemised transitional projection can be made for the forthcoming time phase. Obviously sophisticated digital hardware options are most appropriate to provide compatible parallels to modern management thinking. With functionally balanced computer hardware, dimensional restrictions in the horizontal and vertical concepts will be removed.

It is even possible that a functional real-time programme can be developed that would supply the embattled manager with an automatic
integrated totally systematized non-transitional capability, leaving his primitive monitoring and control system free to face more pressing synchronised organisational contingencies.

One looks forward with interminable anticipation that the suspicious primordial proto-type of this field heralds an equally suspicious perdurable continuity.

* * * * *

OPTIONAL SOFTWARE ADDENDUM TO 856/65/G-217/3AB/6/711-76 OF 2910400376

The basic vocabulary of 30 words as listed below allows for the creation of up to 1000 impressive terms. All that is required is for the user to select one word anywhere from within each of the columns to form a three word phrase.

As an example of this the combination 4-0-5 would yield 'functional management concept' and 8-9-4 would give 'compatible policy programming'.

While the full meaning of these various terms may escape some individuals, there is little doubt as to their impact and full advantage of this effect should be taken by all those members of the service aspiring to higher positions.

With practice, members should be able to considerably extend the scope of these tables, by the addition of further words and terms, many of which can be readily gleaned from the abundance of text books on behavioural science or management/systems development.

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Reviewed by Captain C. D. Coulthard-Clark, Australian Intelligence Corps.

This book cannot really be judged by comparison with academic histories, for it was never intended as such. While it serves to commemorate a unit which has the unenviable record of losing more of its members than any other Australian battalion raised during World War II, the book's raison d'etre is as a permanent record for those who survived and members' relatives and friends. It is for this reason that the practice of referring to members by their nick-names cannot be fairly criticised, or the feeling that the story might have been told with equal effect at considerably less length.

The general reader and the student of military history will certainly find much of interest in this work, and while an index has evidently been judged impractical in a book of this size nonetheless there is a list of key dates and events and an explanation of the battalion's unique organization to assist the uninitiated. The 272 photographs are a useful supplement to the text and the maps are generally

* The book is available only from the Unit Association, Box 2664, GPO Sydney. and the price does not include postage.
excellent, though one or two are hard to read. The story is told in two parts: the first covers events from the raising of the unit in Australia to the fall of Singapore and the passing of the battalion into Japanese hands; the second part makes good use of personal accounts and diaries to tell of the years of captivity. When it is considered that members of the 2/19, when prisoners of war, were dispersed throughout Asia — from Japan, Manchuria and Formosa, to Burma, Thailand, Indo-China, Malaya, Sumatra, Java and Borneo — it can be appreciated why the writing of the book has been the work of more than just one person. It was probably the only way the history could have been written, although contrary to what one would expect of such a joint effort there is consistency of style which makes the book readable. There are, however, signs of the committee touch. For a start it is hard to be sure precisely what the correct title is meant to be. The spine-title on the dust jacket reads “The Grim Glory”, the front of the same jacket “The History of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.” and the title-page “The Grim Glory of the 2/19 Battalion A.I.F.”, all of which makes for unnecessary confusion. There is also a three-page list of errata which accompanies the volume. As the book has reportedly been some ten years in preparation it is a pity that more time could not have been spared for proof-reading; errors are perhaps inevitable but 87 of them appears somewhat excessive. It is to be hoped these can be incorporated into the text with future printings.*

These are small points, however, and do not detract from the significance of this book or the excellent standard achieved with off-set printing. Surely destined to be consulted by any reader or historian seeking the story of the 1941-42 Malayan Campaign as viewed at unit level, the book has attracted interest far beyond the readership for which it was originally intended and a second printing is already under way. **

*Reviewer's Note: The second printing of the book, now to hand, has incorporated these corrections. The title has been standardized.

Reviewed by T. J. Millane, Wargaming Section, Services Analytic Studies Group, Department of Defence.

This volume describes a set of selected papers from a conference on modelling land battle systems for military planning in Ottobrunn, West Germany in 1974, sponsored by the NATO Science Committee.

The models described in this volume cover a wide range of military situations related to land warfare. Some of the subjects which may be of particular interest to members of the Australian Army are:

- a description of wargaming methodology as practised in Canada, outlining the phases involved in the development of a war game, together with the Canadian experience in the employment of war games, which covers some twenty years;
- the importance of wargaming the night battle;
- intervisibility probabilities as a function of terrain characteristics, posture of target, relative height of target and observer and the exposure time of moving targets—the latter being important in the siting of guided anti-armour weapons;
- the application of quantitative factors to weapons based on the analysis of Second World War data;
- the determination of the rate of advance of a force based on relative strength of the opposing forces and their density (sub-units per km of frontage).

The models described in this volume are designed for, and are dependent on, a large amount of computer support. However, they are also of value to the manual wargamer, who can employ such quantitative factors as described in terrain, visibility and weapon models. This data is easily extracted from the studies. The importance of terrain in armoured warfare, including anti-armour aspects, is emphasised in the studies described together with the difficulties in gaming this aspect of warfare.

The book is of great value to the researcher employed on military analytic studies, and could also be of some value to the student of strategy and tactics with sufficient knowledge of modeling to understand the general approach of these studies.
BOOK REVIEWS


Reviewed by John McCarthy
Senior Lecturer in History, University of New South Wales, Faculty of Military Studies, RMC Duntroon.

Both in production and in editing this volume of documents on Australian foreign and defence policy covering the years 1937 and 1938 reaches a very high standard. Comparisons may be unwise, but it does stand very well against the United Kingdom and Canadian series. Nobody interested in the formulation of Australian foreign policy between the wars should fail to consult it. Those who seek an understanding of Australia’s faltering efforts to find a viable counter to Japanese power will find much to ponder upon. The Australian support for the policy of appeasement towards Germany obviously had much to do with it. From a reading of these documents, the view that Mr Menzies was the strongest advocate of German appeasement, is well demonstrated. It was Mr Lyons, as Prime Minister, who wished to come to terms with Japan over Manchuria in an effort to stem a possible southwards Japanese drive. The proposals he made for a Pacific Pact at the 1937 Imperial Conference point to this conclusion.

Possibly the support of appeasement policy was the best Australia could do in these years. The thought of having to fight a two-front war against Germany and Japan was enough to give nightmares to both United Kingdom and Australian defence planners. Certainly, the Royal Navy was not strong enough to provide for security both East and West of Suez. In fact, the Admiralty refused to give any definite assurance that a British fleet would be based at Singapore should a threat develop from Japan. British action, as these documents show, was entirely dependent upon any European situation.

From the British viewpoint, this was entirely as it should have been, but as the printed papers and minutes of the 1937 Imperial Conference indicate, Australia was well and truly tied to the United Kingdom diplomatic position. Her room for manouvre was thus almost non-existent. Partly, this was a result of not building up her own armed
forces in the inter-war period and of relying too heavily upon the Singa-
apore strategy. A diplomatic posture without power was to all intents
and feelings no diplomatic posture at all.

The next volume in the series will cover the year 1939 and the
following two volumes will be concerned with 1940. Both should be of
great value to the professional student and of much interest to anybody
else who is concerned with this crucial period in Australia’s past.

RIOT CONTROL, by Major General Anthony Deane-Drummond.
London. The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, and

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel C. F. Thomson, RA Inf, Department
of Defence, Canberra.

“A...forthright analysis of riots and how to control them,”... hard-
ly an unexpected tribute on the flyleaf of a work entitled Riot
Control, but don’t be misled into assuming that this implies an exclu-
sive dedication to the technicalities of riot control. Anthony Deane-
Drummond’s provocative examination of civil disorders embraces a
much wider study of the issue, including a very pointed but nonetheless
compelling allegation that the proponents of certain political ideologies
will continue to exploit the occasions of unrest for their own purposes.
No marks for guessing the ideologies concerned.

The predisposition of one human being towards imposing his or
her will upon another human being is a fundamental vice that trans-
cends cultures and national boundaries. Left alone it constitutes a
powerful but inert force. Harnessed by the clever and the unscrupulous,
this latent energy poses the most acute threat to peace, order and freedom
as we know them in western democracies. Compared with civil disorder,
the extreme manifestation of this latent force, outright war, is child’s
play. Civil disorder poses the special dilemma; those who remain on the
very threshold of lawlessness in order to provoke the forces of order
into violent retaliation and, once having engineered the disreputation of
the law and those people whose duties require them to enforce it, flaunt
the law on such a scale that it becomes impossible to enforce it by the
conventional means.
When you read *Riot Control*, as you must, you may become less concerned with the mechanics of physically dealing with the symptoms of civil disorder than with the causes. For example, you may draw the interesting conclusion that the techniques employed by revolutionary movements in gaining control of unions and confederations of unions in the United Kingdom are paralleled closer to home. On the other hand you may regard the discussion of *motivation*, in chapter 3, with the jaundiced eye of the realist; concluding that because the objectives of the ungodly have already been achieved, the methods used to achieve them assume only historical importance.

Deane-Drummond points out that of the 24 members of the National Executive of the British Labour Party, 17 are drawn from the Trades Union Movement and that the Communist Party of Great Britain is already in sight of controlling the most important of these unions. Hence, the author implies, the prospects that the Communist Party of Great Britain is close to shaping the national destiny through the back door of the Labour Party's National Executive is very real, notwithstanding the Communist Party's regular and humiliating defeats at the polls.

So, where is the connection between, on one hand, the methods employed by the ungodly to challenge the law and on the other, communist control of important unions? The answer in Deane-Drummond's book is more than mere opinion. There is chapter and verse, too. You will read of a concentration by the ungodly on those unions that most affect national economies; of the infiltration and election to governing councils by any device; of the exploitation of every opportunity to cause disaffection between management and workers. In fact, were it not for the book's imprimatur one could be forgiven for supposing that chapter 6, *The Revolutionary Background*, is a manual for the guidance of the ungodly. For the just man it is everything he always knew about the ungodly yet about which he always did nothing—which observation aptly introduced Deane-Drummond's new postulation; a dimension to civil disorders that may have been overlooked.

When a minority, a very small minority, whose political ideologies are positively repudiated at the polls, the shop floor and the board of directors, is identified as attempting to shape the destiny of a nation from a smoky, rat infested back room, the forces of law and order may be faced, not by those willingly subscribing to the ethics of the ungodly,
but by the hostility of the normally law abiding who have had enough of
the ungodly. So, infers Deane-Drummond, be prepared to fend off a
molotov cocktail thrown by your own granny who, as you know, has
floated through the crises of the past fifty years without exhibiting more
violence than occasional indignation verbally expressed, and who would
not normally dream of breaking the law.

Whatever you do, do not linger over any idea that dealing with
civil disorder is a laughing, simple matter. Riot Control exposes
any such notions as myth. Read it and you will appreciate that, when and
if the time comes, you may indeed be faced by your own kin. Gone are
the good days of being able to react confidently and with impunity to a
decent, old fashioned brick thrown by a decent old fashioned malevolent
foreigner. Now the likelihood is that you will cast the first brick —
provoked into doing so by the diabolical tactics of diabolical men and
women who are masters of the diabolical art of manipulating law abiding
people into unlawful behaviour.

MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN, by Alun Chalfont, Weidenfeld and

Reviewed by Professor L. C. F. Turner, Royal Military College, Dun-
troon.

This book has been violently attacked in British journals and the
author has been presented as a shallow critic and scurrilous scandal-
monger, who has wantonly defamed the reputation of one of Britain's
greatest soldiers.

However, Lord Chalfont must be taken seriously. He is not a mere
hack journalist but a man of considerable achievement and reputation.
He served as a regular officer between 1939 and 1961 and, on retiring
from the Army, was Defence Correspondent of The Times. Between
1964 and 1970, he was Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. He has in
fact written a very interesting and perceptive book and made a notable
contribution to military literature.

Chalfont finds the key to Montgomery’s personality in his early
childhood and parentage. His father was a quiet and scholarly man, who
became Bishop of Tasmania; his mother was a dominating and even ruthless woman, who treated him with great severity. He seems to have regarded his father with some affection, but developed a deep aversion towards his mother. When she died in 1949, he did not attend her funeral. His early years in Tasmania left their mark on Montgomery; at St Paul's School in England and later at Sandhurst he was an extremely aggressive and rather unpleasant young man.

In later life Montgomery found it impossible to establish a close friendship with men of his own age. He had his admirers and supporters like Wavell and Brooke, but the only persons for whom he had a deep regard were his wife Betty, who died in 1937, and his son David. As a general, he treated some of his subordinates with harshness and injustice; in particular his Chief of Staff, Major-General de Guingand, to whom he owed so much, was rewarded with shabby indifference after 1945.

There have been famous commanders who possessed fascination and great personal charm like Napoleon, Nelson and Lee. There have been others who were hard and aloof, like Wellington and "Stonewall" Jackson, while there have been a few who were positively unlikeable, such as Frederick the Great. Obviously Montgomery's temperament does not affect his place in history.

At the Ecole de Guerre in 1786, Napoleon passed out 42nd in a class of 54. Montgomery did rather better at Sandhurst and in 1908 graduated 36th in a class of 150. However, he did not do well enough to enter the Indian Army, which would have enabled him to live on his pay, and had to be content with a commission in the Royal Warwickshire Regiment with whom he went to France in 1914.

Montgomery's actual experience of infantry combat was very brief. He was severely wounded in October 1914 and was awarded the D.S.O. for "conspicuous gallantry". He returned to France as a Brigade Major in 1916 and held staff appointments as G.S.O. 2 and G.S.O. 1 until the end of the war. In 1920 he went to the Staff College, and was posted to Camberley as an Instructor in 1926 and to Quetta as Chief Instructor in 1934. By 1939 he was commanding 3 Infantry Division as a Major-General.

There is no doubt that Montgomery was heartily disliked by some of his distinguished contemporaries. In a letter to his sister in 1935 (not
quoted by Chalfont), Lord Gort wrote: “Your friend Pandit Montgomery Karnel Sahib is once more holding forth pontifically on the rostrum while the unfortunate students below catch an odd forty winks. He fancies himself more than ever now, I expect”. For his part, Montgomery’s attitude to many of his colleagues resembles the icy contempt with which Wellington regarded his brother officers.

Montgomery had no interest in literature, music, or art. He was not a man of wide reading and deep intellectual culture like Napoleon or Frederick the Great. He was not deeply religious although, as the son of a bishop, he had an ample stock of Biblical quotations at his disposal. He was the military technician, pure and simple, with all the hardness and narrowness associated with that type. It would not be inappropriate to describe him as a British Ludendorff although, fortunately for the Allied cause, he was not compelled like Ludendorff to take significant political decisions.

Chalfont does not attempt to describe Montgomery’s campaigns in detail, but makes perceptive comments on his generalship. Montgomery was a master of the detailed military plan and of the set-piece battle à la Alamein. He had an extraordinary acuteness in pointing out the fallacies in a military plan, such as the original proposals for Sicily and Normandy. He was instinctively a cautious general, but he could execute a bold enveloping manoeuvre as at the Mareth Line. He was careful of the lives of his men, but did not shrink from heavy casualties at Alamein and Normandy. In a crisis, he displayed an iron resolution and a sang-froid reminiscent of Wellington.

His weakness was a lack of imagination and an excessive belief in the importance of military planning. Moltke said that “no plan survives contact with the enemy”, a lesson which Montgomery learned at Caen and at Arnhem. As a colleague in an Allied Army, his behaviour was often intolerable and one marvels at the patience and forbearance of Eisenhower in dealing with such a man. On the issue of the “single thrust or broad front strategy” after Normandy, Chalfont comes down heavily in Eisenhower’s favour.

This discerning and well balanced book strengthens the view that Montgomery was the best general produced by the Western Allies. It also reveals the real man behind the mass of legend, and confirms Winston Churchill’s verdict: “Invincible in battle; insufferable in victory”.

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CURRENT DEFENCE READINGS

Readers may find the following articles of interest. The journals in which the articles appear are available through the Defence Library Information Services at Campbell Park Library and Military District libraries.


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