PREFACE

Aim

1. The aim of this publication is to describe counterinsurgency and the considerations for its planning and conduct in order to defeat an insurgency.

Level

2. This publication provides application level doctrine intended to guide commanders and staff officers involved in planning and conducting counterinsurgency in a joint, interagency and multinational force. The counterinsurgency doctrine contained in this publication is authoritative but requires judgment and common sense in application.

Scope

3. The publication deals with the challenge presented by contemporary insurgency and examines the multifaceted character of this type of warfare. The doctrinal requirements for comprehensive and successful counterinsurgency are explained. They are based on a combination of military practice, operational experience and knowledge of military theory. This publication should be read in conjunction with LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, 2008 and LWD 3-0-2 Peace Support, 2010.

4. This publication contains eight chapters. In Chapter 1, readers are introduced to the essential historical background of the Australian experience of counterinsurgency and the reasons why a new publication is now required by the Army. Chapter 2 examines the operational challenge presented by varieties of
contemporary insurgency with a focus on the chameleon-like characteristics and complexities that are often present in this kind of warfare. Chapter 3 analyses the requirements of modern counterinsurgency. It emphasises contemporary principles and the need for a comprehensive approach, where the Australian Army is likely to operate in a joint context and in conjunction with a range of national and international civilian agencies.

5. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 deal with critical features of the operating environment and the primacy of intelligence in counterinsurgency operations. Chapter 6 examines campaign design and planning in counterinsurgency, concentrating on the interaction between operational purpose and campaign problem-solving. Chapter 7 concentrates on the conduct of counterinsurgency according to lines of effort in the context of land operations. Finally, Chapter 8 outlines the requirements of sustainment in contemporary counterinsurgency operations.

6. This publication also includes three annexes relating to counterinsurgency. The first annex deals with the importance of legal factors in counterinsurgency. The remaining two annexes cover the roles played by air and maritime power in this form of warfare.

Associated Publications

7. This publication should be read in conjunction with the other publications and documents, in particular:

a. American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies Program, Publication Number 356 Edition 1 Selection, Appointment and Conduct of Intelligence Liaison Officers, 2007;

c. Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 5.0, Joint Planning (Provisional), 2006;

d. Australian Maritime Doctrine, Royal Australian Navy Doctrine 1, 2000;


f. Defence Force Discipline Act 1982;

g. Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, 2008;

h. Land Warfare Doctrine 2-2, Intelligence Activities, 2008;

i. Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0, Operations (Developing Doctrine), 2008;

j. Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Land Tactics (Developing Doctrine), 2009;

k. Land Warfare Doctrine 3-2-0, Information Actions (Developing Doctrine), 2008;

l. Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0, Combat Service Support, 2008;

m. Land Warfare Doctrine 9-1, Employment of Special Operations Forces (Developing Doctrine), 2005;

n. Land Warfare Procedures - General 0-1-7, Internment and Detention (Developing Doctrine), 2007;

o. Land Warfare Procedures - General 3-6-4, Physical Force Protection, 2007;

p. Land Warfare Procedures - Intelligence 1-0-2, Interrogator’s Handbook (Restricted Access), 2004; and
On-line Doctrine

8. This and other doctrine publications are available via the Army Doctrine Electronic Library website located at: http://adel.defence.gov.au. Paper copies may be out of date. The Army Doctrine Electronic Library is the authoritative source for current doctrine. Users are to ensure currency of all doctrine publications against the Army Doctrine Electronic Library.

Gender

9. This publication has been prepared with gender-neutral language.
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GLOSSARY

1. The principal source for Australian Defence Force terms and definitions is the Australian Defence Glossary located at http://dlms.dcb.defence.gov.au. Terms and definitions contained within a publication are to be in accordance with the business rules, guidelines and conventions for the Australian Defence Glossary. All terms and definitions not sourced from the Australian Defence Glossary are to be justified by the author, recommended by the Sponsor and forwarded to the Manager of the Land Glossary for subsequent approval. This process also includes terms already contained in the Australian Defence Glossary but which for the purposes of a publication require a different definition.

campaign
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces.

campaign plan
A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.

clear–hold–build
An approach to countering insurgency that involves:

1. clearing an area of insurgents without alienating the local population;
2. holding the cleared area to enhance population protection support, through activities such as, support to host nation policing and judicial processes; and
3. supporting activities that build indigenous capacity, such as governance and security.
comprehensive approach
The harnessing and coordination of all aspects and efforts of national and coalition power, including diplomatic, information, economic and, when specifically required, military force that will develop the greatest possible influence over the operational environment.

counterinsurgency
Those political, social, civic, economic, psychological, and military actions taken to defeat an insurgency.

dominant narrative
The fundamental story or perception that has been established as valid in the minds of members of one or more target audiences.

exploitation
Taking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical or strategic purposes.

human intelligence
A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.

improvised explosive device
A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from non-military components.

insurgency
An organised, violent and politically motivated activity conducted by non-state actors and sustained over a protracted period of time that typically utilises a number of methods; such as subversion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism in an attempt to achieve change within a state.
measure of effectiveness
A criterion used to assess changes in system behaviour, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an endstate, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

operation
A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

reachback
The ability for a deployed force to access military or non-military support from the most appropriate source outside its immediate battlespace, whether it be a neighbouring unit, deployed support, other support or the national or international support base.

synchronisation
The arrangement of military actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative fighting power at a given place and time.
ABBREVIATIONS

1. The principal source for Australian Defence Force abbreviations is the Australian Defence Glossary located at http://dlms.dcb.defence.gov.au. Abbreviations contained within a publication are to be in accordance with the business rules, guidelines and conventions for the Australian Defence Glossary. All abbreviations not sourced from the Australian Defence Glossary are to be justified by the author, recommended by the Sponsor and forwarded to the Manager of the Land Glossary for subsequent approval. This process also includes abbreviations already contained in the Australian Defence Glossary but which for the purposes of a publication require a different definition. Ranks, staff appointments, corps, units, commonly used measurements, publication titles and commonly used terms are used in their abbreviated format throughout the publication.

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<td>act, sense, decide and adapt</td>
</tr>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>close air support</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>DE</td>
<td>decisive event</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>IPMB</td>
<td>intelligence preparation and monitoring of the battlespace</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOAC</td>
<td>law of armed conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>OPESEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>signals intelligence</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status of forces agreement</td>
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2. The following abbreviations appear in tables and figures within this publication.

   **COE** contemporary operating environment
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

SECTION 1-1. PURPOSE

[Counterinsurgency operations] require a 'whole-of-government' response on the part of military and civilian agencies, extending beyond individual agency operations, and security and other objectives into comprehensive political-military strategies. The ADF’s capacity to deploy rapidly and a basic level of security at the outset of a crisis situation will often be an essential element of any comprehensive approach - but it will, in nearly all cases, not be a sufficient response in itself. In this context, it will be crucial to ensure that the ADF can work effectively alongside civilian agencies that specialise in law enforcement, development assistance, humanitarian relief, health, correctional services, municipal services (such as water and infrastructure), education, and political and administrative governance.1

1.1 In today’s 'War Amongst the People'2, counterinsurgency (COIN) has come to the forefront of military operations. Insurgency has existed throughout human history and will likely continue to be used as a means to seek political change. So, while a military must never abrogate its responsibility to train for conventional warfare, COIN represents a part of the spectrum of conflict that requires the Australian Army’s attention both now and into the foreseeable future. This doctrine will provide members of the Australian Army with a detailed explanation of insurgency and a framework for conducting COIN at the operational and tactical levels.

SECTION 1-2. DEFINING THE NATURE OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

Insurgency

1.3 An insurgency is a conflict between opposing parties where at least one is a state actor, in which the catalyst for conflict is a competition of wills. At the basis of an insurgency will be a central theme or idea, often called a narrative, which motivates and unites the insurgents. This narrative is then focused into an ideology. This empowers the insurgents and lends them legitimacy, providing justification for their ends and means.

1.4 Insurgencies tend to be political in objective, deriving their impetus from varying sources and ideology. Insurgents seek a change in political governance, the achievement of self-determination, regional autonomy or the release of political prisoners. Insurgencies are often characterised by violence (either the threat of or actual), subversion, propaganda and intimidation of the wider population. Legitimate grievances will be exploited by an insurgent force to generate additional support for their own cause while undermining the authority and legitimacy of the incumbent government and supporting forces. If an insurgency is to be defeated, solutions to grievances must address root causes and be structured to provide an enduring solution.

Counterinsurgency

1.5 The political nature of an insurgency dictates that COIN cannot be solely a military effort. Defeating an insurgency requires not only the neutralisation of insurgent military capabilities, but also the resolution of the root causes of the political and socio-economic grievances that were the catalyst for the insurgents’ activities.
Effective COIN involves the coordinated efforts of a wide range of government and non-government agencies, and elements of power and capabilities, including military, acting with a unity of purpose to defeat an insurgency. In general terms, insurgency and COIN are essentially governed by the battle to win and then retain popular support in not only the theatre of operations but also in insurgent countries of origin.

To win and hold the popular support of the people means it is necessary to break the link between the insurgent and the local people. This link is both physical in terms of material support and psychological in terms of moral support. Physical components require a physical response while the psychological nature of support is addressed by influence activities that undermine and directly attack the ideology, authority and legitimacy of the insurgents’ cause. Ultimately, the original grievances must be addressed and resolved in order to remove the support and credibility that the insurgents built upon to gain support for their initial actions.

An effective COIN should not have at its base a policy of attrition. This methodology may inadvertently strengthen the cause of the insurgents by providing a rationale for their continued support. A comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of an insurgency and attacks the legitimacy and authority of the insurgent forces thereby providing an enduring solution should form the framework upon which a COIN campaign is designed.

Principles of Counterinsurgency

The Australian military, in addition to its experiences in various conflicts, has drawn upon the writings of several authorities to produce a doctrine that forms the basis for an Australian approach to COIN. The works of authors such as the French military officer David Galula, British GEN Sir Frank Kitson and former Australian Army officer David Kilcullen are drawn upon for their practical experience and conceptual thoughts on COIN.
1.10 The combination of practical experience coupled with the writings of various experts has been used to formulate a series of 10 principles of COIN which are expanded upon and explained in Chapter 3.

SECTION 1-3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.11 Insurgency is not a new type of warfare; over time it has taken many forms. Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies have been common throughout history and have included struggles for independence against colonial powers and even resistance to foreign invaders.

1.12 Twentieth century events transformed the purpose and nature of most insurgencies. Whereas 19th century insurgencies were local movements to maintain the status quo, by the mid-20th century they had transformed into national and trans-national movements. Theorists after WWII realised that insurgency could be a decisive form of warfare, and this era spawned ideas such as the Maoist, Che-Guevara and Ho Chi Minh approaches to insurgency.

1.13 Many new insurgencies have appeared since the end of the Cold War, typically emerging from civil wars or collapse of states no longer supported by Cold War rivalries. Recently, ideologies based on extremist religious or ethnic identities have replaced secular revolutionary ideals and represent some of the most dangerous combatants in these new internal wars.

1.14 The diverse ideologies and methods of insurgency mean that there is no one model to describe it. At its core, it is a struggle for the population's support; their protection, welfare and way of life are vital to success. However, insurgents are also contending for this same support and are constrained neither by the laws of war nor the bounds of human decency as Western nations understand them.

Australian Involvement in Counterinsurgency

1.15 The Australian Army has a long history of involvement in insurgencies. Since Federation in 1901, the Army has served
in the Boer War, the Malayan Emergency, the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation in Borneo, the Vietnam War, and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. In each of these insurgencies, however, it is important to note that Australia played a contributory rather than a lead role. In each case, the Army sought to achieve specific tactical and operational objectives but was not responsible for overall operational or campaign design.

1.16 The Australian Army’s first attempt to define COIN doctrinally was the 1965 publication *Counter-Revolutionary Warfare*. This was informed by the experience in Malaya and by the British Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM) Manual, which was theatre specific. The *Counter-Revolutionary Warfare* pamphlet sought to provide a more holistic framework and played an important role in preparing the Australian Task Force for operations in South Vietnam between 1966 and 1972.

1.17 Following Australia’s withdrawal from Vietnam, strategic guidance saw the Army’s focus shift toward continental defence, a trend that continued for the next 30 years. As a result of this, and also due to limited overseas operational deployments in this period, revised Army COIN doctrine published in 1980 and 1999 lacked the sharp focus and depth of the *Counter-Revolutionary Warfare* pamphlet. Recent operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with a shift in strategic guidance has demanded more comprehensive and contemporary COIN doctrine.

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4. Director of Operations 1958, *Malaya, the conduct of anti-terrorist operations in Malaya*. 

LWD 3-0-1, Counterinsurgency, 2009
SECTION 1-4. COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN AND THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

General

1.18 Campaigns and subordinate operations to COIN require military forces to operate effectively across the full spectrum of conflict, conduct a wide range of military activities simultaneously and transition quickly from one type of operation to another in rapidly changing operational circumstances. Importantly, commanders must be able to visualise how a campaign or operation will likely evolve at the local, operational and strategic level.

Continuum of Operations Framework

1.19 Conditions of conflict and campaign themes provide a framework for commanders to understand the complexity of the operational environment and the manner in which missions contribute to a lasting peace or, at least, to an environment in which conflict is diminished. The continuum of operations consists of the following four aspects:

a. conditions of conflict;

b. operational campaign themes, including COIN;

c. types of tactical actions (offensive, defensive and stability); and

d. the simultaneous conduct of different types of tactical actions and information actions (IA).

Spectrum of Conflict

1.20 Understanding the spectrum of conflict forms the backdrop for designing operations. Conditions of conflict are described by the level of activity placed on an ascending scale spanning from stable peace, through a range of irregular activities to general war as shown in Figure 1–1. There are many instances where a range of activities and conditions occur in the same space and time. In these cases, the pre-dominant condition of conflict is used to clarify the general environment; however,
consideration must still be made in view of the whole environment and notably COIN encompasses all conditions as follows:

a. Stable peace is characterised by the absence of military significant levels of violence but may include environmental or economic hazards and/or disasters.

b. Irregular activities comprises the full range of activities associated with peacetime instability through increasing levels of violent conditions, including acts of terrorism, insurgency and guerrilla warfare.

c. War – the conflict is dominated by large-scale conventional warfare conditions but may include a range of guerrilla or irregular warfare activities.

Figure 1–1: Spectrum of Conflict

Campaign Themes

1.21 Military operations are conducted across the spectrum of conflict and can be described by a number of campaign themes. The broad operational campaign themes used in the Australian context are peacetime military engagement, peace support, irregular war and major combat, and these are related to the spectrum of conflict as shown in Figure 1–2.

1.22 Figure 1–2 describes the operational level campaign themes in relation to the spectrum of conflict. The spectrum shows the frequency of activities in relation to each campaign theme. Thus, like the conditions of conflict, the campaign themes do not in themselves define the type of operation to be conducted; rather they assist in informing the design for operations.
1.23 Irregular War. This includes a range of activities such as COIN, counterterrorism and the conduct of unconventional warfare. Operations are focused on setting the conditions for stabilising the operating environment and defeating the irregular threat. Concurrent peace support activities will typically be required to achieve stabilisation.

Types of Tactical Actions

1.24 During COIN, FE conduct a range of offensive, defensive, stability and enabling tactical actions and activities as shown in Table 1–1. These provide a range of tactics and techniques for responding to a dynamic and fluid operating environment. Enabling activities allow FE to transition between offensive, defensive and stabilising actions.
1.25 COIN campaigns and operational plans are realised at the tactical level through the simultaneous and sequential conduct of operations and their constituent actions. They are linked through enabling activities as shown in Figure 1–3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offensive</th>
<th>Defensive</th>
<th>Stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advance</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Retrograde</td>
<td>Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td></td>
<td>Restore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enabling activities include link-up, march, obstacle crossing and breaching, passage of lines, patrolling, reconnaissance, relief in place and surveillance.

**Figure 1–3: Operational Posture and Tactical Actions**
1.26 Figure 1–3 describes the relationship between operational posture, tactical actions and the campaign phases in relation to changing levels of violence. The posture is used to define a predominant state in which a force will undertake a range of tactical actions within the AO. In the figure, a force is adopting a stability posture in recognition that the predominant tactical actions required in transition are stability actions. All other tactical actions that occur are in support of the stability posture. A change of posture may occur if it becomes clear that the level of violence requires a shift back to predominantly offensive of defensive tactical actions.

1.27 The operational postures are described as follows:

   a. **Offensive.** A force adopts an offensive posture to engage in decisive physical manoeuvre to seize, retain or exploit the initiative.

   b. **Defensive.** A force adopts a defensive posture to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economise or preserve force, or develop conditions favourable for offensive action. A purely defensive posture normally cannot achieve decision and should be considered a prelude to the offence.

   c. **Stability.** A force adopts a stability posture to maintain or establish a secure environment in which conditions are created to provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief if necessary.

1.28 The tactical actions are describes as follows:

   a. **Offensive Actions.** These represent the broad options for physical offensive manoeuvre against an enemy force and including advance (to contact and in contact), attack (quick, deliberate and in defence) and pursuit.

   b. **Defensive Actions.** These represent the broad options for physical defensive manoeuvre against an opposing force and including area defence, mobile defence and retrograde (including delay and withdrawal).
c. **Stability Actions.** Tactical action is undertaken to secure and control the environment to enable the conduct of one or more of the other stability actions including reform of the security sector, restoration of services and assistance to ensure maintenance of the rule of law, freedom of electoral process and sustainability of indigenous capacity.

d. **Enabling Activities.** Enabling activities link, support offensive, defensive and stability actions. They are not unique to a given posture and include reconnaissance and surveillance, deployment and redeployment, and all forms of tactical movement.

**SECTION 1-5. OPERATING ENVIRONMENT**

1.29 The operating environment that the Army finds itself in today is that of the unconventional enemy. Due to the technological capability of the ADF and its allies, it is likely that any threat to Australia will not occur within the conventional sphere. Rather, the enemy will attempt to achieve their goals through a range of irregular activities that threaten authority and stability beyond the capabilities of normal law enforcement. These activities can range from criminality and civil disorder to an established insurgency.

1.30 Fundamentally, the insurgents seek to carry out their agenda through an insurrection against the established form of authority, normally the government, with the overall goal being that of destabilisation of this authority. By this method, insurgent groups hope to achieve their end-states, which in general are a desire for change sprung from dissatisfaction with a social structure or government policies. Of note is that insurgency is distinct in its aim in that it seeks a desired political effect.

1.31 The insurgent or insurgent group vary their tactics from situation to situation. These will encompass violence or the threat of violence, subversion and propaganda, external and internal support, organised and concealed fund raising,
Intimidation and coercion of the populace, terrorism, and all too often religiously motivated attacks. These activities are aimed at exhausting national will and aim to win by undermining and outlasting public support to opposing military actions.

1.32 Insurgencies can cross international borders and may establish bases in a sympathetic country or in states with weak governments. If they may have pan-national aims, attacks may be conducted in more than one geographic area in order to create results there or in other areas. For this reason the operational environment that Army may find itself in may differ even during the same campaign.

1.33 Today’s operational environment also includes an insurgency that seeks to impose revolutionary change worldwide. Al-Qaeda seeks to transform the Islamic world and reorder its relationships with other regions and cultures. It is notable for its members’ willingness to execute suicide attacks to achieve their ends. Such groups often feed on local grievances. Al-Qaeda-type revolutionaries are willing to support causes they view as compatible with their own goals through the provision of funds, volunteers and sympathetic and targeted propaganda.

1.34 While the communications and technology used are often new, the grievances and methods sustaining it are not. As in other insurgencies, terrorism, subversion, propaganda and open warfare are the tools of such movements. Today, these time-tested tools have been augmented by the precision munitions and extremists’ suicide attacks. Defeating such enemies requires a global, strategic response – one that addresses the array of linked resources and conflicts that sustain these movements while tactically addressing the local grievances that feed them.

To beat the guerrilla on his own ground, the first essential is knowledge. Knowledge about the enemy himself, his methods, strengths, weaknesses, tactics and techniques. More than that to beat the guerrilla means not to fight in the sharp black and white of formal combat, but in the gray fuzzy obscurity where politics
affects tactics and economics influence strategy. The soldier must fuse with the statesman, the private turn politician. To win, the soldier must think and understand, and his odds will improve to the extent that he has done his homework before he arrives on the battlefield.5

SECTION 1-6. AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC CONTEXT

1.35 Current strategic guidance6 outlines four principal tasks, and includes a requirement for the Australian Army to be capable of maintaining or restoring security both regionally and globally. The guidance also recognises that Australia must be capable of taking the lead, particularly in response to a regional crisis. While COIN is not identified specifically, it clearly fits within a requirement to be able to conduct stability actions as well as offensive and defensive actions.

1.36 In addition to the strategic guidance, the Australian approach to COIN must be understood within the context of LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, 2008. This doctrine recognises that the Army is not employed in isolation, and emphasises the existence and importance of both joint interdependence and cooperation with other government agencies, known as the ‘whole-of-government approach’. Joint interdependence reflects realisation of the Army’s combined arms approach, while whole-of-government reflects this approach taken to a whole-of-nation level.

1.37 It is within this context of whole-of-government, joint interdependence, and leader or contributor that the Australian Army must be prepared to conduct COIN. This doctrine is written for commanders and staff from the BG to joint task force level in order to enable tactical- and operational-level planning.

5. Greene, T. N. LTC 1962, The guerrilla and how to fight him, USMC.
CHAPTER 2

INSURGENCY

One of the very difficult things for a regular army to understand is that an undefeated army can lose a war. It is the cardinal aim of an insurgent movement, by using guerrilla techniques, tactics and strategy, to render a superior army incapable of saving the state. The basic winning formula for an insurgency is as follows: if an insurgent movement can, at a cost which is indefinitely acceptable, impose costs on a government which are not indefinitely acceptable then, while losing every battle it is winning the war.

Sir Robert Thompson¹

2.1 Insurgency is an organised, violent and politically-motivated movement and sustained over a protracted period of time that typically utilises subversion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism in an attempt to weaken the legitimacy of an established government in order to influence the population and bring about political change.

2.2 This chapter outlines the nature and characteristics of insurrections and contains four parts: insurgent strategies, conditions supporting insurrections, potential challenges and operating environment.

SECTION 2-1. INSURGENT STRATEGIES

2.3 Insurgent leaders are often well-informed, astute and aware of lessons from previous insurrections. Indeed, some insurgent leaders have spent years preparing for, designing and

constructing a campaign. Five common insurgent strategies are as follows:

a. *Protracted Popular War.* Devised by Mao Zedong, and often linked to Marxist ideology that is class-based, protracted popular war is based on the assumption that a popular cause will attract ever-increasing numbers of supporters. The strategy involves a mix of political activity, terrorism and guerrilla tactics in a rural environment. Protracted popular war evolves slowly across three stages: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and strategic counteroffensive.

b. *Military Focus.* Associated with the Cuban Revolution and Latin America, the military focus strategy gives primacy to military success over political action to sway the population. The insurgency seeks battle with security forces to achieve well-publicised military success, furthering popular support. It is effective when the government is weak, discredited and lacks reliable, effective armed forces.

c. *Urban Insurgency.* This approach emphasises the application of terror and organised crime in a systematic and ruthless manner. The intention is to force a repressive security response from the authorities that will alienate the local population. Media coverage generates panic and a sense that the government is losing control of law and order. Urban insurgencies adopt tactics designed to erode the will of politicians and the effectiveness of the judiciary, police and the military. Small groups and cells use the cover of a very large population and may be electronically networked.

d. *Identity-focused.* This approach mobilises support based on common identity, such as religious affiliation, clan, tribe or ethnic group. This approach is common among contemporary insurgencies and is sometimes combined with military focus. However, the insurgent may not have the dual military/political hierarchy evident in a protracted popular war. Communities often join the
insurgent movement as a whole, bringing their existing social/military hierarchy. For example, in the Australian-led mission to the Solomon Islands in 2003, while insurgency conditions did not develop fully, paramilitaries did form along tribal lines using traditional hierarchies of leadership.

e. Complex Composite Approach. Insurgents may use different and composite approaches, applying one or more strategies that take advantage of circumstances. Additionally, insurgents using different approaches may form loose alliances when it serves their interests and may also fight among themselves, even while engaging counterinsurgents. Multiple competing entities might exist within a single area, each seeking to maximise their own survivability and influence. This situation may be duplicated several times across the mission space.

SECTION 2-2. CONDITIONS SUPPORTING INSURGENCY

2.4 Most insurgencies require a number of conditions to start and be sustained. These are as follows:

a. a cause;
b. a political aim;
c. popular support;
d. leadership;
e. organisation;
f. complex terrain and sanctuary;
g. an external support base;
h. time, space and will;
i. resources; and
j. learning and adapting.
2.5 **Cause.** Insurgencies build around a perceived sense of deprivation. An insurgent’s cause will be political in nature, have a unity of purpose and focus on achieving change. The causal factors may include:

a. Separatist movements that may include nationalist, ethnic or tribal feelings of identity or marginalisation.

b. Religion, either as a separate identity or extremism.

c. Occupation or perceptions of neo-colonialism where an indigenous element seeks to expel or overthrow perceived foreign presence or control.

d. Governance failure, leading to failing and failed states. Lack of essential services or the breakdown of law and order sets the conditions for governance failure. Maladministration, corruption and repression are often associated factors, contributing to a loss of state legitimacy.

e. Economic failure, including extreme poverty, especially in countries where the upper and lower classes are of different ethnic origins.

f. Unfulfilled socio-political expectations among elements of the populace.

2.6 **Political Aim.** Insurgencies have political objectives. Military objectives are invariably subordinate and contributory.

[Vo Nguyen] Giap showed the benefits he had derived from his earlier political training in realising that military might was but one type of power amongst many others, and the basis of military strength was political strength. In a short war, military acts which erode the basis of political support—such as the failure to administer those civilians caught in the theatre of war—may be tolerable in terms of the overall result: in a protracted war, the ultimate strength is the political will of the entire nation, and any loss of political strength represents an equal or greater loss of military strength.²
2.7 **Popular Support.** Insurgencies are fragile in their infancy and elements of the population must be mobilised to provide practical support if an insurgency is to survive. There are primarily five means, as follows:

a. *Persuasion.* During insurgencies, people are attracted to political, social, economic and security benefits. Ideology and religion are means of persuasion. Leaders may have a motivation that is different from their followers. Many insurgencies see the emergence of a great orator or iconic figure with a gift for influencing followers; this may create a cult of personality. Ho Chi Minh and Xanana Gusmao are examples of strong personalities playing a persuasive role.

b. *Coercion.* Insurgents may use coercion to gain active or passive support of the population and undermine the legitimacy of the government. Violence, intimidation and terrorism against communities are common insurgency tactics. Insurgents sometimes use the promise of security, or the threat to remove it, in order to win control of the population.

c. *Human Rights Abuses.* Government abuses (actual or perceived), such as maltreatment or arbitrary detention, may galvanise popular support for the insurgency.

d. *Other Motivations.* Insurgencies provide opportunities for criminals and mercenaries; political solutions might not be sufficient to end insurgency participation. Some combatants join for money or because the violence fulfils their own personal criminal tendencies while giving them a cause. Many insurgents become common criminals once the fighting ends. For example, many Irish Republican Army members resorted to organised criminal activities after the end of the conflict in the late 1990s.

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2.8 Complex Terrain and Sanctuary. The conduct of insurgencies can be greatly assisted by complex terrain to the extent that problems of accessibility or weak governance may lead to incumbent government difficulties in controlling disaffected areas. Moreover, if such areas are located along a porous international border, then insurgents are likely to attempt to create sanctuaries on adjacent foreign soil. Such sanctuaries may be facilitated by trans-border ethnic, tribal and political connections and/or by the weakness or sympathy of the foreign government concerned.

2.9 External Support Base. Complex terrain and sanctuary may eventually combine to create an external support base for an insurgency. Many insurgencies have received some degree of support from foreign powers or non-state groups. Such support may involve training of cadre staff, the use of facilities, financial support, and the provision of overt and covert military assistance. Neighbouring states supporting insurgencies may provide rear bases resting, re-equipping and training. Furthermore, the Indonesian insurgency specialist, GEN Abdul Haris Nasution, argues that protracted conflict enables insurgents to develop an indigenous capability.3

2.10 Leadership. Insurgency leadership is a complex issue and can be centralised or decentralised. There may be transition from one form of leadership to another. Insurgency leadership has traditionally been perceived as centralised around a charismatic, persuasive and politically astute figure following a single narrative. Contemporary leadership in a globalised environment, with increased use of information technology, has enabled greater decentralised execution.

2.11 Organisation. Insurgencies seek to achieve resilience by deliberate division of responsibilities into cells that are networked to achieve a synchronised effect. Effective decentralisation means that compromise of one cell does not greatly affect the wider organisation. Specific actors include leaders, combatants, and political and support cadres. Such networks are often represented within the local, regional, national and even international spheres.

The nature of insurgent operations ..., unlike a war between sovereign states, is an internal struggle without fronts or frontiers to seize control of a government of country. The act of government ultimately depends on the acquiescence, if not the active support of the people. The aim of both sides is to secure this, and here the insurgents’ task is easier, because they are prepared to use brutality and terror, methods which we decline to use. The main part of the struggle is political.4

2.12 Time, Space and Will. Insurgencies are generally persistent, patient and often choose not to fight for or hold ground. They seek to achieve their political aims through the use of ‘time, space and will’. Time is a resource that insurgents often strategically manage, as evidenced in Mao’s classic protracted war strategy in which space was traded to buy time and build will. Sanctuary areas and porous border regions—the space element in the equation—offer insurgents transnational lines of communication, escape routes and havens to rest, refit and plan future operations.

2.13 In terms of will, the insurgents may not seek to defeat a superior force conventionally, but rather undermine the resolve of both incumbent and supporting governments and their domestic constituencies. The struggle becomes a ‘contest of wills’, where the insurgent uses propaganda to shape and influence the message that is communicated to national

capitals. Insurgents often rely on civilian casualties and terrorism as a means of degrading a counterinsurgent’s will.

2.14 Access to Materiel Resources. An armed insurgency requires access to a wide range of materiel resources. The most important are usually funds and weapons. Insurgencies will readily adapt weapons and explosives to increase lethal effects. Weapons can be obtained from existing caches, black markets or across porous borders.

Learning and Adapting

2.15 All successful insurgencies are adaptive. Insurgency invariably is not a tactic of choice but a compulsion of relative weakness. Insurgents must be agile in order to meet the many obstacles that their circumstances create. Since at some point they were not insurgents but average law-abiding citizens, the path to successful insurgency involves adaptation and learning. Insurgents who do not manage this perish. This means that the survivors have had demonstrated and reinforced to them, from a very early stage of their insurgency, the benefit of being adaptive. This leads to institutionalisation of adaptive behaviour in their organisational performance:

‘...[t]he old saying ‘live and learn’ must be reversed in war, for there we ‘learn and live’; otherwise we die.’

SECTION 2-3. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES

2.16 This section outlines potential insurgency challenges.

2.17 Failure to Politicise the Population. The previously outlined conditions of cause, political aim and popular support require direct engagement with the population. In the early stages of an insurgency, a movement may be tempted to go to almost any extremes to attract followers. To mobilise their base of support, insurgent groups use a combination of propaganda and

5. US War Department 1945, Washington, DC.
intimidation, and they may overreach in both. This overreach may manifest itself in the following ways:

a. *Failure to Appeal to the Population.* A reason for failure may be promulgation of an undesirable message. For example, communism failed to appeal to the population in Malaya.

b. *Alienating the Population.* For example, in 2007 significant numbers of the Sunni population turned against Al-Qaeda due to the use of indiscriminate methods of violence and intimidation.

c. *Inconsistent Narrative.* The core logic of the narrative must remain consistent. For example, if an insurgent movement continually changes its political objectives, the population will be less likely to be convinced.

2.18 **Bases.** Insurgents can experience serious difficulties finding a viable base of operations. A base too far from the major centres of activity may be secure but risks being out of touch with the populace. It may also be vulnerable to isolation. A base too near centres of government activity risks opening the insurgency to observation and perhaps infiltration. Bases close to national borders can be attractive when they are beyond the reach of counterinsurgents yet safe enough to avoid suspicions of the neighbouring authority or population.

2.19 **Maintaining Momentum.** Initially, insurgents have the advantage of time to politicise the population. Failure to capitalise on this advantage enables counterinsurgent forces to seize the initiative. This, in turn, may lead to an insurgent’s inability to generate continued support for the cause and maintain resources for a protracted conflict.

2.20 **Security.** Any group operating from a position of weakness that intends to use violence to pursue its political aims must initially adopt a covert approach for its planning and activities. This practice can become counterproductive once an active insurgency begins. Excessive secrecy can limit insurgent freedom of action, reduce or distort information about insurgent goals and ideals and restrict communication within the
insurgency. Furthermore, as an insurgency grows the number of potential informants increases. Nothing is more demoralising to insurgents than realising that people inside their movement or trusted supporters among the public are deserting or providing information to government authorities. There is an inherent tension between the need to grow popular support and maintain organisational security.

2.21 Reliance on External Support. Insurgencies usually cannot sustain themselves without substantial external support. Lines of communication which require freedom of movement are then vulnerable. In addition, finances are vulnerable to electronic interdiction or the source of the funds may be unreliable. Inability to gain external support may drive the insurgency to look inwardly which may impact on their ability to sustain the campaign.

2.22 Organisational Fracturing. Internal discontent may undermine the insurgency’s unity of effort leading to factionalism within the leadership. It is demoralising for insurgents to realise that people within their movement, or trusted supporters, are providing information to authorities.

SECTION 2-4. OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

2.23 Contemporary insurgencies are conducted in rural and urban environments and their interfaces. To achieve their political objectives insurgents must ultimately control the territory in which the target population resides. Insurgent strategies are often based on the specific features and intricacies found in specific environment.

2.24 The Rural Environment. Insurgencies based in a rural environment are invariably aimed at winning control over large peasant populations. Examples include the victories of communist forces in China in the 1930s and 1940s and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. In both struggles, methods of protracted popular war were employed to achieve strategic success. The traditional benefits derived from operating in a rural environment include the density of the rural population,
the availability of geographical space, a greater ability to establish bases to support freedom of movement and the capacity for insurgents to remain hidden for long periods in inaccessible terrain. Exploitation of space and terrain by an insurgency conducted in rural conditions exposes the peasantry to protracted subversion and politicisation.

2.25 The most widely used insurgent tactics in the rural environment are those of the classic guerrilla fighter: hit-and-run attack, ambush and avoidance of large-scale battles.

2.26 The main strategic aim of most rural insurgencies is ‘people’s war’: the winning over of popular support for the insurgent cause by protracted operations with a heavy focus upon the politicisation of the peasantry. This form of insurgency was the predominant pattern of activity during the Cold War era that featured both decolonisation and the clash between East and West. Since the Cold War, rural insurgency has been characterised less by Marxist-Leninist class-based ideas and nationalism and more by identity-based struggles revolving around ethno-religious divisions and separatism, as in many parts of Africa.

2.27 The Urban Environment. One of the most significant developments since the end of the Cold War is the urbanisation of the developing world. AO in insurgency have therefore increasingly expanded from the rural to the urban.

2.28 The type of urbanisation that is driven by global population growth and migration to cities creates a fertile operational environment for the conduct of insurgency. As demonstrated in Iraq since 2003, the increased complexity of human terrain in built-up areas facilitates both insurgent activity and organisation.

2.29 A large concentrated urban environment provides an interconnected population to prosecute an insurgency. In a urban environment, insurgents have access to more high-value targets and are better able to exploit the electronic media. Violent actions in urban terrain have more media impact than similar actions conducted in rural areas. The ability of
insurgents to obtain funds, weapons or equipment is increased by operating in an urban environment.

2.30 The Urban-Rural Interface. The urban-rural interface is inherently more complex because it can combine the key difficulties of both. These can include:

a. high population density,
b. complex physical terrain,
c. diverse cultural features, and
d. inadequate or developing infrastructure.

SECTION 2-5. SUMMARY

2.31 Insurgency is a protracted form of warfare conducted by non-state actors that combines subversion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism. It is a form of warfare in which local conditions and variations assume great strategic importance. Insurgency requires both a cause and an organisation to become effective. Insurgencies can occur in rural and urban environments and their interfaces. Historically, insurgencies have needed to meet as many of the conditions outlined in this chapter in order to be successful.
CHAPTER 3
COUNTERINSURGENCY

The very fact that a state of insurgency exists implies that violence is involved which will have to be countered to some extent at least by the use of force.¹

3.1 This chapter describes the principles underlying a successful COIN. It serves as a launch-point for the analysis of COIN, with subsequent chapters providing greater detail. The chapter begins by defining COIN and outlining the lessons of history in relation to this form of warfare. It then examines in turn the conceptual principles the Australian Army has derived from the history of COIN.

3.2 Contemporary history demonstrates that COIN remains a challenging form of conflict. Examples of failure range from the British in Ireland between 1919 and 1921, through the French in Algeria between 1954 and 1962 to the Americans in Vietnam in the 1960s and the Portuguese and Rhodesians in southern Africa between 1964 and 1980. In each of these cases, the COIN forces lost due to a fundamental inability to address the cause underlying the conflict, with a consequent failure to devise a successful COIN strategy.

SECTION 3-1. COUNTERINSURGENCY DEFINED

3.3 COIN is defined as ‘those political, social, civic, economic, psychological, paramilitary and military actions taken to defeat an insurgency’. The aim of COIN is to defeat the insurgents. All insurgencies are unique in their political, social and historical contexts, and they demand that the counterinsurgent adapt with skill, knowledge and attitude to meet specific socio-political and military conditions. COIN is a politically motivated, intelligence-led activity.

¹ Kitson, F. GEN Sir 1977, Bunch of five, Faber and Faber, London.
3.4 Generally, the strategic goal is the same for the insurgent as for the counterinsurgent – population control through some form of legitimate governance. Each side aims for the people to accept its governance and social control as legitimate by providing security and safety of the population and economic stability. Long-term success depends on the people acquiescing to the government’s rule and taking charge of their own affairs as a community group, including the maintenance and control of social services. To achieve this, a key goal of the government and COIN is to address the issue of the ‘cause’.

3.5 A comprehensive approach needs to be applied in order to coordinate all aspects of national and coalition power, including diplomatic, information, economic and, when specifically required, military force. Primacy should be given to addressing the political dimension of the insurgency, in particular the social control mechanism in which the military force of the counterinsurgent plays essentially a supporting role.

SECTION 3-2. WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

3.6 The solution to any insurgency fundamentally exists with the government’s ability to effectively deal with the cause at the political level. History has demonstrated that military forces alone cannot counter an insurgency. A whole-of-government multi-agency effort towards COIN is critical in order to achieve any measure of success. This will add to the complexity of the operation as the military will need to engage and work closely with other organisations pursuing the same ends. To do this effectively, the military structures at all levels should adapt to accommodate and facilitate civilian and host nation (HN) organisations. At the strategic level this will require a partnership between the national government; at the operational level this will involve close relations between the regional and local government and civilian agencies. At the tactical level it might mean the military undertaking many of the tasks that the civilian organisations are not prepared to do (within a non-permissive security situation).
SECTION 3-3. AUSTRALIAN PRINCIPLES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

The counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities and to his past, and for him, facts speak louder than words. He is judged on what he does, not on what he says. If he lies, cheats, exaggerates, and does not prove, he may achieve some temporary successes, but at the price of being discredited for good.2

3.7 Historically, the Australian Army has participated in COIN campaigns in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam, and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. Developed from an analysis of recent operational experience and historical examples, the Australian Army has developed ten principles of COIN to meet contemporary requirements. These principles are political primacy and legitimacy, a comprehensive approach, intelligence-led, reinforcing the rule of law, support for good governance, dominant narrative, physical and moral isolation of the insurgent, presence, adaption and HN primacy.

3.8 Political Primacy and Legitimacy. Ultimately, legitimacy of the government, through support of the populace, should be seen as the main objective of the HN government and COIN forces. Therefore, the development and nurturing of effective governance is critical. Generally, governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Governments described as ‘legitimate’ rule primarily with the consent of the governed; those described as ‘illegitimate’ tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion.

3.9 Citizens of illegitimate rule obey the state for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than because they voluntarily accept its rule. This type of rule is inherently unstable; as soon as the state’s coercive power is disrupted, the populace ceases to obey it.

A legitimate government derives its powers from the governed. It still uses coercion through legitimate social control mechanisms – for example, against criminals – but most of its citizens voluntarily accept its governance. Legitimate governance is inherently stable; the societal support it engenders allows it to adequately manage the internal problems, change and conflict that affect individual and collective well-being. Thus legitimate governments tend to be resilient and exercise better governance; illegitimate ones tend to be fragile and poorly administered.

It is important not to confuse ‘the governed’ as a western style of governance but to understand the local culture both present and historically. For example, theocratic societies fuse political and religious authority; political figures are accepted as legitimate because the populace views them as implementing the will of God. Sometimes, the ability of a state to provide security, albeit without freedoms associated with Western democracies, can provide enough legitimacy to govern in the people’s eyes, particularly if they have experienced a serious breakdown of order.

The structure of how politics may function in a particular culture needs to be identified early; for example, is it a tribal-based, bottom up driven system or a centralised top down driven structure? Failure to identify the correct structure can lead to catastrophe as occurred in Afghanistan, when failure to employ a historically successful bottom up approach – as when the Shah controlled the region – resulted in centralised corruption which ultimately led to poor popular support of the government.

Six indicators of legitimacy that can be used to analyse threats to stability include:

a. the ability to provide safety and security to the populace;

b. political selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the populace (eg. an accepted form of election);

c. high level of popular participation in elections;
d. culturally acceptable level of corruption;

e. culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic and social development; and

f. a high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.

3.14 It is important to understand that different cultures may view acceptable levels of development, corruption and participation differently, particularly when measured against Western society. For some societies, providing security and some basic services may be enough for citizens to grant a government legitimacy; indeed, the importance of security in situations where violence has escalated cannot be overemphasised. In such cases, establishing security can win the people’s confidence and enable a government to develop legitimacy in other areas.

\[\text{Whatever government is in power and whatever your political leanings, unless you are confident in the ability of your Government to enforce its peace then the man with the gun at your door at midnight is your master.}^{3}\]

3.15 Comprehensive Approach. Success in COIN requires a comprehensive approach. The comprehensive approach is focussed on harnessing and harmonising the efforts of relevant government and non-government agencies in order to develop the greatest possible influence over the operational environment.

3.16 A comprehensive approach seeks collective success while maximising resource efficiency. The need for coordination in a comprehensive approach requires a lead agency. This may not be the military; however, the military provides special skills in planning, C2, logistics and communications that other agencies may lack. Accordingly, the military must initially be prepared to fulfill a leading role as well as providing a secure operating environment until such time as HN can take the lead.

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3.17 Intelligence. Successful COIN is highly dependent on intelligence. In COIN, effective intelligence requires close engagement with, and understanding of, the target population including political, social and cultural organisation and structures. All sources of intelligence will be utilised, but there will be a special emphasis on human intelligence (HUMINT) and criminal intelligence. Where possible, linking to indigenous policing assets is critical in order to gain a thorough intelligence picture, and in some cases, COIN forces may need to provide this capability in order to fully understand this part of the intelligence spectrum.

3.18 Reinforcing the Rule of Law. The presence of the rule of law is a major factor in assuring voluntary acceptance of a government’s authority and therefore its legitimacy. A government’s respect for pre-existing legal rules can provide the key to gaining widespread, enduring societal support. Such government respect for rules, ideally ones recorded in some form of constitution and in laws adopted through a credible societal accepted process, is the essence of the rule of law. As such, it is a powerful potential tool for counterinsurgents.

3.19 Undermining the rule of law in the name of military expediency can be counter-productive. It is essential that COIN forces establish/reinforce the rule of law as early as possible. This should be considered in the initial stages and may require the use of paramilitary forces (such as a gendarmerie or military police forces) to fill the gap between standard civilian police and combat troops. Operations must be conducted in such a way to reassure the population that the law remains paramount. Rectitude is a vital part of COIN campaigning.

3.20 Support Good Governance. In addition to fighting insurgents, COIN must shape the operational environment to reduce support for the insurgency. This involves supporting good governance and the provision of a safe and secure environment in which the population can conduct normal life. Providing security reinforces law and order and facilitates legitimacy and local support so preventing insurgent forces from gaining control over the population. Establishing
population security permits political, civic and economic actions to be introduced to counter insurgent influence.

3.21 Dominant Narrative. Because the struggle in COIN is essentially political, the counterinsurgent must shape a narrative message with the aim of discrediting the insurgent’s cause. An insurgency movement will provide its own narrative based upon a mixture of simplicity, truth and myth and must be designed to maximise popular resentment against the lawful government.

3.22 The COIN narrative must negate the insurgent message. A counter-narrative must articulate the goals and purposes of the legitimate political authorities, highlight military and political successes and manage public expectations. The counterinsurgent narrative must be transparent, timely, open, honest, verifiable and accessible.

3.23 Physical and Moral Isolation of the Insurgent. Insurgents exist among the people and many rely on external support. They must be isolated from these sources of support. This will involve the application of appropriate force to detect, kill or capture insurgents and the imposition of population control measures. Since insurgents do not require widespread active support from a population, only passive acquiescence, unnecessarily restrictive population control measures may be counter-productive. In many Cold War-era rural insurgencies, such as those in Malaya, Kenya and Algeria in the 1950s, strategic resettlement was employed to isolate insurgents from the people. Urban environments make wholesale population resettlement difficult. Given the complexity of urban terrain, it may be more effective to isolate the insurgent by securing resident populations within their neighbourhoods.

3.24 Presence. In COIN, dealing with the causes and effects of violence will be an integral part of operations. Controlling violence is intimately connected to the presence of counterinsurgent forces. Without a COIN presence there can be no control of insurgent violence. The aim of Australian land forces must be to provide ‘a pervasive, persistent and proportionate presence in complex terrain’\(^4\) in order to deter
insurgent violence and intimidation. Presence is a means of limiting communal or ethnic violence and requires COIN forces to fully understand the human networks that make up an operational environment. Presence reinforces the rule of law and supports the dominant narrative. Living with a population and being actively engaged may be considered in order to gain more effective population support.

3.25 Adaption. The Chinese military philosopher, Sun-Tzu, observed that 'the warrior shapes his victory from the dynamic of the enemy'. In this context, the battle between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent represents an iterative action-reaction process; it is competitive learning. The side which is quickest to adapt its techniques and understanding seizes the initiative and progressively wins control of the operational environment. Counterinsurgent forces must posses mechanisms to identify and implement appropriate changes. Tactics, campaign plans and overarching strategy must be flexible enough to account for shifts in government policy, public sentiment and insurgent methods.

3.26 Host Nation Primacy. The eventual success of a campaign plan will be marked by the restoration of peacetime normalcy. A necessary precursor to this situation is the assumption of full responsibility by the security forces of the HN. This will involve the strengthening and preparation of HN security forces, the reduction of the threats they might face and the reinforcement


5. Adaption is the means by which the initiative is retained over potentially extended periods against innovative and constantly adapting enemies in an ever changing operational environment. Its basis is constant interaction with the enemy and the population, and gaining understanding through that interaction [LWD 3-0, Operations (Developing Doctrine), 2008]. See Chapter 7 for greater detail on the act-sense-decide-adapt cycle.

of the authority of the HN government. This transition is complicated and must be carefully managed.

3.27 The ten principles outlined suggest that COIN is protracted and costly. The land force has a long-established tradition of austerity involving the judicious use of all available assets, an emphasis upon in-theatre flexibility and skill in improvisation. Balancing mission requirements within a small land force means that the Army must use its resources wisely.

SECTION 3-4. THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

3.28 There can be many approaches to COIN. The Australian Army currently applies the ‘shape-clear-hold-build’ approach.

3.29 The shape-clear-hold-build approach should not be viewed as four distinct independent phases. Depending on the environment these can be conducted concurrently; for example, they could be considered lines of operation. Each aspect mutually supports the other and contributes to its success; for example, establishing/reinforcing the rule of law can commence in the initial stages of the campaign, using paramilitary forces to establish, train and mentor indigenous forces in preparation to handover to civilian police when safe to do so.

Shape-clear-hold-build

3.30 Shape-clear-hold-build aims for the following:

a. build population support and legitimacy of the HN government,

b. create a secure physical and psychological environment,

c. establish firm government control of the population and area, and

d. gain the population’s support by building the legitimacy of the HN government.

3.31 Shape-clear-hold-build is a resource-heavy and time-intensive
activity. Land forces and HN forces need to prepare for a long-term effort that requires comprehensive cooperation and support to achieve objectives. The detailed phases of clear-hold-build are as follows:

a. **Shape.** The narrative to gain population support for the HN government and supporting forces must begin at the outset. The aim is essentially to legitimately win the population support from the insurgents. To achieve this, clear political objectives must be agreed and must be based on what reflects the HN culture and history. Placing an imposed view of democracy onto any society is doomed to fail.

b. **Clear.** Joint land combat will have primacy during this phase, closely supported by public information and IA. The aim is to clear the AO of insurgents without alienating the local population. This will be achieved through:

   (1) COIN forces will be required to clear insurgent forces and eliminate the infrastructure that supports them. So long as insurgent infrastructure remains intact, insurgents will continue to recruit from the local population in an attempt to undermine the HN government. The elimination of insurgent infrastructure is primarily a police action that relies on the support of land force and other agency’s intelligence services.

   (2) Land forces and HN security forces cannot remain static once an area has been cleared. Patrolling must continue to deny insurgents the ability to re-enter or re-establish a structure in the cleared area.

   (3) An intensive public information and IA campaign is essential in the clearance. Possible themes to develop are the benefits of life without the insurgents or that if the local population continues to support the insurgent, operations will continue,
creating risks to either themselves or their community. The COIN focus must be upon targeting the insurgent with themes designed to convince them to either surrender or cease their activities.

c. **Hold.** Holding the cleared area enhances the population protection and support. HN security forces need to be seen as involved in the conduct of this phase, improving government legitimacy and indigenous capacity. This will be achieved through:

(1) Land forces and HN security forces need to establish secure areas within the community to achieve a presence at the local level and allow them to maintain security. Once security is re-established, normal daily living can be restored. This is supported by the re-establishment of effective HN policing and judicial processes.

(2) Holding the cleared area requires securing key infrastructure vital for the population support line of effort. Public information and IA reinforce successes and influence the populace to support the HN government.

d. **Build.** Security operations are paramount to deny insurgents the opportunity to disrupt or interdict indigenous capacity-building. Key tasks during the build phase are the support of governance, security, economic growth, the rule of law and the development of mutual trust. Infrastructure development at this stage is concentrated on supporting these activities.

**SECTION 3-5. RULE OF LAW IN COUNTERINSURGENCY**

There is a very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism and with guerrilla actions for government.
forces to act outside the law, the excuses being that the processes of law are too cumbersome, that the normal safeguards in the law …are not designed for insurgency… Not only is this morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves. A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot than expect its people to obey the law….7

3.32 The establishment and reinforcement of the rule of law is essential to gaining population support and for the seeking of legitimacy of government. Often, the initial target by the insurgent is the rule of law mechanism (police, judiciary) as it undermines the government and creates fear in the population – the Irish and Malayan campaigns being prime examples. If the government is seen to lack the ability to maintain social control, it will quickly lose the support and confidence of the civilian population. Establishing rule of law should be considered part of the comprehensive approach of any COIN strategy.

3.33 There are three mechanisms that are fundamental to establishing rule of law. These are as follows:

a. judiciary/legal framework;

b. detention; and

c. police.

3.34 Judiciary/Legal Framework. The legal framework (laws/policy) provides the backbone to the rule of law and must be addressed early, otherwise detention and police cannot function. The judiciary needs to be either re-established or nurtured as part of the whole-of-government effort. The legal framework needs to be established within the HN and widely accepted throughout the population in order to contribute to the legitimacy of the government. The framework needs to reflect

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the particular societal requirements (ie. it may be bottom up, tribal based or regionally based). A high level of understanding of the specific culture and history is pivotal in establishing a successful framework, with supporting judiciary. A level of non-western ‘cultural corruption’ may need to be accepted in order to gain acceptance by the particular society.

3.35 Detention. The incarceration of criminals/insurgents and the legal framework supporting this are essential in gaining successful prosecution and legitimacy of the legal system. Policing is virtually useless without a functioning legal framework and incarceration system. Where possible, detention should meet the highest international standards possible, which in turn will support legitimacy of the government and the supporting military forces. LWP-G 0-1-7, Internment and Detention (Developing Doctrine), 2007 can be useful in advising/establishing detention in the absence of an existing mechanism.

3.36 Police. Police (including border guards) are the most effective agency for the establishment and maintenance of law and order and should be considered a primary frontline force. Police are essentially a potent symbol of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The ability of the COIN to restore effective policing is a reliable barometer of the return of political and social stability.8

3.37 Police are an excellent HUMINT/criminal intelligence source of intelligence, via their special branch or investigative service, due to their frequent contact with the populace and maintaining information on divisive networks. Therefore, a primary aim of the insurgents is to destroy any effective law and order system. The reason is twofold: undermine the confidence in the government by the population and destroy the police intelligence system. Standard civil police can be confronted by levels of armed violence that are beyond their capacity to control or cope with. Paramilitary police (such as gendarmerie or military police) should be considered to bridge the gap

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between the military and police, as they are well trained to enforce and operate within the rule of law effectively. Paramilitary police make excellent arrest and evidence collection teams which can be utilised by military forces during COIN, in order to commence the prosecution process of criminals/insurgents. Due to their military structures and equipment, paramilitary forces also have an ability to respond well to hostile acts in complex environments in comparison to civilian police.

3.38 A police service can counter insurgency by enforcing the law, preserving the peace, guaranteeing the security of life and property and providing information on the growth of subversion. They must be able to police their respective areas by day and night, as the government will not gain legitimacy if the population believes insurgents and criminals control the streets. Successful rule of law has a multiplying effect on the legitimacy of the government. Conversely, a corrupt police force can have the opposite effect. It is imperative that the nation building process begin early for the police forces. This should also include mentoring. However, like the judiciary, a level of non-western cultural corruption may need to be accepted. In this case it must not be too detrimental to the overall acceptance by the population.

3.39 Despite military deployment, at all stages in a COIN, effective police-military coordination is fundamentally important. To ensure interoperability, the police–military relationship should be as follows:

a. establish common SOP,
b. conduct supporting information operations,
c. perform combined planning, and
d. ensure C2 is interoperable.

3.40 Judiciary, detention and police (including paramilitary) are fundamental to the establishment of the rule of law. This will have a direct correlation to how the population view the legitimacy of the HN government. Foreign forces involved in
COIN must be prepared to commence the establishment, mentor or fill the gap in the law enforcement functioning of the HN until such time as they are capable of providing indigenous support.
Policing Counterinsurgency: The Case of Malaya

In 1948, the Malayan Communist Party, whose members were primarily ethnic Chinese, began an insurgency against the British colonial government. The British first responded by dramatically expanding the Malayan security forces. The police, not the army, served as the lead counterinsurgency force. Between 1948 and 1950, the number of Malayan police expanded fivefold to 50,000. However, the Police were given rudimentary training. Together with incompetent leadership they were ineffective in conducting operations. They abused the civilian population and fell into corrupt practices. The population largely regarded the police as hostile; they were reluctant to give them information on the insurgents.

By 1952, the insurgency reached a stalemate. The British then established a new strategy. The strategy included reforming and retraining the entire Malayan Police Force. First, 10,000 corrupt or incompetent police officers were removed. Then, police officers who had proven the most competent in operations were made instructors in new police schools. During 1952 and 1953, every police officer attended a four-month basic training course. Police commissioned and non-commissioned officers were sent to three- to four-month advanced courses. All senior Malayan police officers were required to attend the police intelligence school. There they learned the latest criminal investigation techniques. Teams of Britain's top police officers taught them intelligence collection and analysis methods as well. Dozens of the most promising Malayan officers attended the full yearlong course in advanced police operations in Britain.

The British worked closely with ethnic Chinese organisations to recruit Chinese for the Malaya Police Force. In 1952, the number of ethnic Chinese in the force more than doubled. At the same time, some
Chinese and Malay political groups were building a coalition to establish an independent Malaya in which all the major ethnic groups would participate. The two efforts complemented each other. Better trained police officers and soldiers led by fully trained commissioned and non-commissioned officers dramatically improved the Malayan security forces' discipline. Better relations between the population and security forces resulted, and the people began to provide information on the insurgents. They began to break the insurgent organization. In 1953, the government gained the initiative. After that, the insurgent forces and support structure declined rapidly. In late 1953, the British began withdrawing forces. They progressively turned the war over to the Malayans, who were fully prepared to conduct operations without a drop in efficiency.

SECTION 3-6. COUNTERINSURGENCY WITHIN A COALITION

3.41 It is unlikely that Australia would undertake any form of COIN alone. It is most likely to be part of a US led coalition or a coalition with some form of alliance with the HN. There is a strong possibility that Australia would be required to provide a formation HQ to coordinate part of the overall military force (eg. providing a regional HQ within an overall coalition campaign). This would result in the HQ having to adapt its working practices, procedures and information systems to take account of other members of the coalition. Ideally, the force should adopt ABCA/NATO doctrine and SOP in order to allow all member states to work together, but in reality there are huge variations in the interpretation of these working practices between the nations. At the same time, national command issues and responsibilities need to be factored into the solution, which can often cause frustration and conflict with coalition partners.

3.42 A compromise modus operandi should therefore be agreed before the operation commences and a mechanism established to manage the inevitable changes that occur over
the course of an operation (eg. introduction of new information systems by one country). It is critical that Australian commanders and staff fully understand the military culture of the lead nation and in particular its command style and train with them before deploying. Commanders and staff should make every effort to personally get to know key members of their superior HQ and establish good working relationships; these will reduce the inevitable frictions and minimise misunderstanding.

SECTION 3-7. SUMMARY

3.43 There is no purely military solution to the problem of COIN and any successful response requires a comprehensive approach that involves the Australian Army working with interagency and multinational partners. Successful COIN ultimately requires the application of principles outlined in this chapter.

9. For example, the centrality of the commander and importance of PowerPoint presentations in conveying information and even orders within a US formation HQ.
CHAPTER 4

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.¹

4.1 Contemporary COIN are highly complex undertakings with a multitude of interconnecting components. As Mark Twain’s quotation suggests, a detailed study of both past and present COIN campaigns will reward future commanders.

4.2 This chapter outlines the operating environment considerations specific to the conduct of COIN. To enable a greater understanding of these considerations, the operating environment is divided into distinct yet strongly interconnected dimensions. The military cannot directly influence all the dimensions of the operating environment. Regardless, all the dimensions will impact in some way on military operations; therefore, it is essential that they are understood by campaign planners.

4.3 LWD 3-0, Operations (Developing Doctrine), 2008, divides the contemporary operating environment into the elements of human population, physical terrain and the information domain. Within a COIN, these elements are further broken into six dimensions. These are political, IA, military, economic, physical and human and societal (see Figure 4–1).

SECTION 4-1. POLITICAL DIMENSION

4.4 As noted in the previous chapters, insurgency and COIN are essentially political in character. LWD 1, *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, 2008 notes that the Australian Government exercises influence through the various elements of national power – diplomatic, information, military and economic – collectively known by the acronym DIME. The politics of COIN are encompassed by the diplomatic category within which there are a number of considerations. It is important to ensure that political leaders understand the requirement for a comprehensive approach. The following aspects need to be considered:

a. *Domestic Political Environment.* Commitment to a COIN must be consistent with Australian Government policy objectives. There must be an understanding at both the political level and within the electorate that COIN are lengthy undertakings. Once committed to such a campaign, the land force must be equipped with the appropriate equipment and authority with which to fulfil its responsibilities. The commander must also understand the political dynamics of the operational
environment and be able to communicate that understanding downwards to the tactical level.

b. Australia’s Role as a Contributor in a Coalition. An Australian land force may function as part of a joint and multinational coalition. In such these circumstances, a commander must understand the ROE, domestic policies and sensitivities that may shape operations.

c. Australia’s Role as a Leader in a Coalition. In some circumstances an Australian land force may be assigned to take the leading role in the planning and execution of a COIN. In a lead-nation coalition environment, an Australian commander must understand the dynamics, requirements and limitations of coalition partners.

d. Host Nation Government. Sovereignty issues are among the most difficult for foreign nations in a COIN. Australian commanders may be required to exercise a degree of diplomacy in addition to traditional command practices. Commanders and subordinates must be politically aware but not become politically involved. Legal officers and their staffs are especially valuable in the clarification of procedural arrangements with HN (see Annex A). Sovereignty issues can be addressed through the chain of command with any unresolved arrangements being referred to the strategic level.

e. Sovereignty. Sovereignty should be addressed before executing operations or as soon as they become apparent. Sovereignty issues may include:

(1) air and sea ports of disembarkation;
(2) basing;
(3) border crossings;
(4) collecting and sharing information;
(5) protection (tasks related to preserving the force);
(6) jurisdiction over Australian and multinational forces;
(7) operations in territorial waters, both sea and landlocked;
(8) overflight permissions;
(9) police operations, including arrest and detention;
(10) legal and penal authorities and procedures; and
(11) railheads.

f. **Coordination.** Commanders must be prepared to specify coordination arrangements such as committees or liaison elements to facilitate cooperation with HN authorities. When possible, HN representatives should be given leading roles. This creates a sense of ownership, facilitating an eventual transition to full HN control.

g. **Coordinating Bodies.** Coordinating bodies facilitate operations by reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings. Sovereignty issues can be formally resolved with the HN by developing appropriate agreements to augment the status of forces agreement (SOFA). In many cases, non-governmental organisations (NGO) and international organisations may possess detailed local knowledge that can aid in the establishment of positive and constructive relationships within the HN.

h. **Coordination with Host Nation Authorities.** Coordination with HN authorities must exist down to the tactical level. Soldiers should be aware of the political and societal structure in their AO. While political structures usually contain appointed leaders, the HN’s societal structure may include informal tribal or ethnic leaders (clerics, chiefs and village elders) who may be influential and operate outside of the political structure. The power of informal leaders may indicate ineffective central governance and the existence of regionalism. Commanders need to identify the significance of any
informal leadership and make an appreciation of likely effects or opportunities.

i. Neighbouring State Political Position. Deployed commanders must understand the political intentions of neighbouring states. A neighbouring state may be supportive of an insurgency and offer logistics, finance, training and/or means of safe passage to insurgents. These lines of support need to be cut to isolate the insurgent. This requires border security with appropriate ROE. Commanders also need to be aware that external support for insurgents may affect the HN’s capacity to provide population security.

j. Legal Issues. International law provides the authority to act and is the genesis of legitimacy. Annex A explains the legal issues that commanders and staff must understand in a COIN.

SECTION 4-2. INFORMATION DIMENSION

4.5 LWD 3-0, Operations (Developing Doctrine), 2008 describes the information dimension as ‘a powerful tool or weapon’ that, in some circumstances, can be the decisive factor in an operation. Because COIN is a contest for the support of the population, IA are critical to success. While IA in COIN are multifaceted and complex, their aim is to achieve ‘information dominance’. The elements of the information dimension include:

a. Command and Control. IA must be coordinated at the highest level. A strategic information plan must be developed to ensure that there is a ‘dominant narrative’ – a single message – that captures a clear purpose for Australian involvement. This dominant narrative must reinforce the legitimacy of the land force and be reflected in all subsequent lines of effort.

b. Levels of Command. IA must align at all levels of command in COIN. At the strategic level, IA support...
national objectives involving higher-level leadership and international legitimacy. At the operational level, IA must support the attainment of military objectives. At the tactical level, IA are designed to support the achievement of tactical objectives.

c. **Perception Battle.** *LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare,* 2008 describes the perception battle as the battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of both domestic and international audiences. The perception battle is potentially the decisive element of war, especially in a COIN. Only through a combination of the disciplined application of appropriate force can the land force expect success in the perception battle.

d. **Dimension Diversity.** Commanders and their staff must be fully aware of the variety of means available to transmit messages. An insurgency will establish a propaganda strategy that utilises radio, television, newspaper, flyers, public broadcasting systems, personal video cameras, the internet and billboards. Planning must identify those means that permit the widest, timely and most effective means of information dissemination.

**Insurgent Information Actions in Iraq**

*Australian forces deployed as part of the overwatch battlegroup in Iraq often observed a variety of creative means by which insurgents delivered propaganda. In addition to the typical employment of electronic media to distribute messages, insurgents also utilised basic means such as leaflet drops, graffiti and public broadcast systems in the local mosques. On many occasions Australian soldiers identified the fact that, during the daily prayer sermon, a local mosque broadcast a selected verse from the Koran and linked it with anti-Coalition sentiment. Sermons also included coordination detail for insurgent activities and general public actions such as encouragement for public protest, both violent and peaceful.*
e. **Offence and Defence.** IA can be categorised as offensive or defensive in a campaign plan. Offensive actions, when synchronised with wider activities, are designed to counter the information processes and systems of the insurgent to undermine their decision-making processes. Defensive actions are designed to ensure that friendly information, processes and systems are protected from hostile activity.

f. **Media Interaction.** The media are a permanent presence. Effective public affairs are critical because military activities are subject to immediate media scrutiny. Accordingly, some form of control is needed. Commanders must plan for media interaction and consider embedding media representatives at applicable levels, conducting regular press conferences and investing time and resources into developing a military-media relationship beneficial to both parties. Understanding that the media can influence the outcome of operations by influencing public and enemy perceptions is critical. All information released must be accurate, balanced and consistent with campaign themes. There must also be procedures that control the informal flow of information including the ‘strategic private video’, where footage taken by soldiers is uploaded directly onto the internet without clearance.

g. **Information Sharing.** The Australian Army must develop relationships with foreign governmental agencies and international organisations. Such relationships promote the sharing of information that is vital to develop a comprehensive and adaptive information strategy.

**SECTION 4-3. MILITARY DIMENSION**

4.6 The Army may find itself acting in a supporting role during a COIN. Relationships may be formed with the following:

a. other ADF elements;
Other Australian Defence Force Elements

4.7 COIN draws on the broad range of capabilities within the joint force. The ADF must be prepared to conduct a concurrent mixture of offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities. Air and maritime forces will contribute elements to a land force (see Annex B and Annex C).

4.8 Usually in a COIN, the land force will be the largest component. Soldiers will be required to fulfil not only combat roles but to participate in population protection and support, indigenous capacity building and public IA. Disciplined soldiers, able to interact with the local population and led by adaptive and intelligent leaders, are vital in a COIN. Stability operations are essential to long-term success in winning the support of the local population. Land forces engaged in stability operations provide security and control through presence. Through presence, they also restore and safeguard essential services that permit normal life.

4.9 Australian soldiers will assist HN military, paramilitary and police forces to provide area and local security. They will advise and assist in finding, dispersing, capturing and defeating the insurgent while helping train HN forces. Success in stability operations enables the HN to generate an effective indigenous COIN capacity, so creating the conditions that will permit Australian forces to disengage from direct action against the insurgents.

Other Government Departments and Agencies

4.10 Commanders must be familiar with other government departments and agencies and be aware of their capabilities. During planning, the Army must determine which other
Australian organisations, departments or agencies are operating in its AO.

4.11 Key Australian Government organisations include:

a. *Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.* The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet is the primary source of advice on government and parliamentary policy matters covering such issues as cabinet processes, accountability and the management of the Australian Public Service. It provides coordination and direction to the whole-of-government effort.

b. *Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.* The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is responsible for the Australian Government’s international relations, trade and development assistance programs through its HQ in Canberra and Embassies, High Commissions and Consulates throughout the world. It helps interactions across coalitions.

c. *Australian Agency for International Development.* The Australian Agency for International Development (commonly known as AusAID) is the Australian Government’s overseas aid program. It promotes sustainable development in partner countries in line with Australia’s national interest and can provide specialist advice to the HN.

d. *Attorney-General’s Department.* The Attorney-General’s Department provides essential expert advice to the Government in the maintenance and improvement of Australia’s system of law and justice. It can help develop or bolster a judicial and penal framework in a failed or failing state.

e. *Australian Federal Police.* The Australian Federal Police is the principal law-enforcement agency through which the Australian Government pursues its law-enforcement interests. It is unique in Australian law enforcement in that its functions relate both to community policing and to investigations of offences against Commonwealth law.
both in Australia and overseas. The Australian Federal Police can provide law-enforcement advice and training to a COIN effort, as well as provide police forces.

f. **Australian Customs Service.** The principal roles of customs are to facilitate trade and the movement of people across the Australian border while protecting the community and maintaining appropriate compliance with Australian law. Customs also collects customs revenue and administers specific industry assistance schemes and trade measures.

g. **Department of Immigration and Citizenship.** The Department of Immigration and Citizenship facilitates migration to Australia and provides information about settling in Australia, Australian citizenship and multicultural affairs.

h. **Australian Trade Commission.** The Australian Trade Commission assists Australian companies and supports business to export products and services.

### Multinational Military Forces

**4.12** COIN will usually occur in a multinational coalition setting. Accordingly, in both lead and contribution missions, an Australian commander must be able to overcome language barriers, equipment incompatibility (especially communications), inconsistent ROE, tensions over information/intelligence sharing and doctrinal differences. Self-sufficient LO and planned coordination meetings will help coordinate operations.

### Non-governmental Organisations

**4.13** NGO are private, self-governing, not-for-profit organisations dedicated to alleviating human suffering. They promote such programs as education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights and conflict resolution. Some of them are also involved in encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Some NGO receive at least part of their funding from national
governments or international governmental organisations and may become implementing partners in accordance with specific grants or contracts. In such cases, the funding organisation often gains oversight and authority over how funds are used. A commander must understand how these external funds are to be committed within the AO and avoid duplication.

4.14 The existence of NGO is established in Article 71 of the UN Charter that establishes two categories of NGO as follows:

a. Mandated. A mandated NGO has been recognised by the lead international organisation in a conflict or crisis and authorised to work in the affected area.

b. Non-mandated. With no official authorisation, a non-mandated NGO may be sub-contracted by an international organisation or mandated NGO. Non-mandated NGO may be privately funded and some have supported specific factions in a conflict in order to deliver support. Contact with such NGO must be identified as early as possible. They must be handled with caution as their influence may serve to undermine a COIN.

4.15 Some NGO will maintain strict independence from governments and do not want any direct association with military forces, thus making coordination difficult. Many of the NGO will be present in the AO before and after there is a military presence, and hence they can be a force for creating lasting stability. Where possible the military should complement and not override their capabilities. Building a complementary and trust-based relationship is vital and regular peacetime liaison will help the military and NGO to understand one another.

International Organisations

4.16 The most important international organisation is the UN. The UN has many subordinate or affiliated agencies that are active around the world. Depending on the nature of the situation, any number of UN organisations may be present in an AO, which
necessitates coordination. Additionally, a number of other international organisations will operate independently in a COIN. Examples include the International Committee for the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, and *Medecins Sans Frontieres* (Doctors without Borders).

**Multinational Corporations and Contractors**

4.17 Multinational corporations often engage in reconstruction, economic development and governance activities. They provide capabilities similar to some NGO and will often win contracts with government agencies. In a COIN, commanders need to understand which corporations are present. Cooperation prevents duplication of effort or destruction of private property and minimises potential fratricide.

4.18 Private security companies are increasingly being used to provide area security, close protection, escort and guard duties. Their actions may complement or hinder an overall COIN effort and the commander must be aware of their presence. The law of armed conflict (LOAC) affords them protected civilian status, provided they take no part in hostilities. Positive engagement with security companies may influence their behaviour and offer opportunities to access greater intelligence.

**SECTION 4-4. ECONOMIC DIMENSION**

4.19 Money is ammunition in both insurgency and COIN. Global networks allow insurgent money to be transferred with ease across national boundaries. In a COIN, where reconstruction, economic revival and the restoration of basic services are priorities, money is a vital resource. The injection of finance into the local economy, with monetary inducements, may convince the local population that working for the HN government is more beneficial than working for insurgents. Some aspects of the economic dimension of COIN include:

a. *Host Nation Economy*. Consideration must be given to the effectiveness of the HN economy. Counterinsurgents
must understand the financial realities within an AO, especially the workings of any informal economy (e.g. a black market). These realities will often indicate the level of dissatisfaction among the wider population that may be a cause of insurgency. Correcting economic imbalance is a long-term effort and will only succeed when led by the HN. Counterinsurgents must guard against superimposing a Western process of financial management in preference to a locally understood system. Without an implicit working knowledge of financial management at all levels of government, a foreign system of economics will likely deteriorate once external support is withdrawn. During the life of a COIN, states can move between stability and instability as economic conditions change.

b. Military Finances. Local economies may be stimulated by military finances and reconstruction projects that provide employment opportunities for a local population. The challenge in using military finances is to avoid creating a false economy that may collapse when the land force departs. To sustain economic activity there needs to be a transition from the tasks of immediate reconstruction towards long-term HN economic capacity building.

c. Natural Resources. During a COIN, foreign governments and commercial organisations may have vested interests in a HN's failed or failing economy. Examples include the diamond industry in Sierra Leone and oil resources in Iraq. Insurgents may portray interest in natural resources as being the main reason for a foreign COIN presence. Repudiation of these perceptions through an IA plan must be undertaken.

d. Multinational Corporations/Foreign Contractors. Involvement of multinational corporations and contractors in insurgency-affected areas must be coordinated with military activity in a COIN campaign. Regular liaison between counterinsurgents,
multinational corporations and foreign contractors permits a commander to shape the way finance is invested in an AO, enhancing the potential for stability.

SECTION 4-5. PHYSICAL DIMENSION

4.20 The physical dimension of a COIN varies greatly due to factors such as geography and demography. Some relevant considerations are as follows:

a. Rural Areas. Traditionally, rural areas produce successful insurgencies and such conflicts are likely to continue. Due to geographical space and inaccessible terrain that limit a permanent security-force presence, rural populations continue to be vulnerable to insurgent activities.

b. Urban Areas. In 2000, over 40 per cent of the world’s population was living in urban areas. By 2025, this figure will grow to approximately 60 per cent, with some five billion people inhabiting towns and cities throughout the developing world.\(^2\) It is likely that many COIN will be conducted in complex urban terrain and in a large demographic battlespace that affords insurgents both sanctuary and support.

c. Littoral Areas. Population growth and urbanisation are pronounced in littoral areas with industrial and commerce markets linked to transport nodes. COIN in littoral areas that require control of ports for logistical purposes are likely contingencies in the future.

d. **Borders.** Borders adjoining a COIN are of critical importance. Shared land borders, or non-populated littoral areas, represent areas in which sustained insurgency can be expected to flourish. COIN planning must take into account joint operations aimed at isolating an insurgency through means of border surveillance and protection.

e. **Population.** In a COIN, a detailed analysis of the local population and its culture must be conducted in order to understand the nature of the insurgency. In addition to the local population, the Army must also understand the diverse range of individuals, groups, government and non-government agencies and international organisations that inhabit an AO.

f. **Infrastructure and Essential Services.** In insurgencies in developing countries, basic infrastructure and essential services are frequently absent. It is critical for counterinsurgents to identify as opportunities those areas of infrastructure and essential services that can be built or rebuilt in order to promote local support and reinforce the legitimacy of the HN government.

g. **Geographic Considerations.** Australian land forces must be prepared to conduct COIN in all varieties of terrain and weather. Equally, geographical considerations on insurgent operations must be understood by the counterinsurgent.

**Terrain and Weather Impact in Afghanistan**

*Upon deployment of Australian forces to Afghanistan, soldiers quickly gained an appreciation for how the harsh winter conditions within the AO restricted the movement of all persons by foot, animal or vehicle. This restriction represented a period of respite for both the insurgents and counterinsurgents. This respite was in direct contrast in the summer months when insurgent activity significantly increased. Insurgent activity in summer months varied according to the pattern of regional agriculture. Agricultural imperatives often*
directed insurgent manpower into harvesting during daylight hours restricting activity to night operations. It should be noted, however, that over the last two years insurgents have adapted and now represent a year-round threat.

SECTION 4-6. HUMAN AND SOCIETAL DIMENSIONS

4.21 A COIN will be affected by human and societal trends. Accordingly, the land force must have a clear understanding of the human-societal dimensions within the AO. Pre-deployment preparation must include appropriate language training and cultural knowledge. Analytical tools such as human population mapping, link and pattern analysis, and relationship matrixes are also useful to understanding the complexity of the population.

Human Dimension

4.22 The population composition is likely to be highly complex and may include a variety of ethno-linguistic groups, tribes or clans, political factions, religious sects and ideological movements. These may coexist peacefully or compete with each other violently. In analysing the human dimension of insurgency the following points need to be considered:

a. Identity. Individual identity is forged in terms of national, political, racial and religious categories. Understanding these categories and their interaction is an important feature of COIN.

b. Affiliations and Relationships. The human environment is comprised of groups based on nationality, family, clan and tribe. Understanding the language, religion, culture, ethnicity, beliefs and values of such groups takes time and effort. However, such understanding is essential if actionable intelligence is to be forthcoming.

c. Culture and Beliefs. Counterinsurgents must understand that Western culture and belief systems are not universal. It is counterproductive to enforce social and
political values unsuited to the HN’s culture and society. Any perception that foreign values and beliefs are being imposed upon the local population will be exploited by insurgent propaganda. Cultural awareness is critical and must range from understanding language to the nuances of behaviour.

d. **Leadership and Authority.** In insurgencies, positions of authority are conditioned by such factors as culture, education, religion and political beliefs. The careful mapping of such beliefs allows commanders to understand the social dynamics involved.

**Societal Dimension**

4.23 A society may be defined as any concentration of population whose members are subject to the same authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture or share a sense of identity. Within each society there are different groups, institutions, organisations and networks. Identifying the diverse actors and complex motivations at play in the operating environment is of critical importance in determining the character of operations. Understanding how power structures work gives the counterinsurgent an insight into how to short-circuit or interrupt insurgent activity, propaganda and support. For example, the counterinsurgent may need only influence the head of a clan to quell insurgent support or arrest key gang members to disrupt criminal activities that accompany an insurgency. The following are some examples of differing social affiliations:

a. tribes and clans,
b. churches and other religious institutions,
c. gangs and criminal entities,
d. schools and universities,
e. community groups,
f. NGO, and
g. sporting groups.
Misunderstanding the Operating Environment:
The Case of the Barrier Minefield—Vietnam 1967

In an attempt to interdict Viet Cong (VC) lines of communication and further separate the insurgents from the local population, the Commander 1ATF, Brigadier Stuart Graham, ordered the construction of a barrier fence and minefield. The barrier minefield was 12 km long, ran from the town of Dat Do to the South China Sea, and consisted of two rows of concertina wire with over 20,000 anti-personnel mines laid between the rows. The fence was to be patrolled by a battalion of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Regional and Popular Force assigned to garrison duties at Dat Do.

The fence was initially successful and there was a reduction in VC movement. However, the VC quickly adapted to the obstacle and cleared paths through it, thus re-opening their lines of communication. In doing so, they discovered three things: the ARVN unit was not conducting effective patrols; the anti-lifting devices fitted to many of the mines had deactivated in the damp ground; and they had access to a massive ordnance cache. The mines were harvested and redistributed around the Dat Do area, causing a dramatic increase in Australian casualty rates. By 1968 the minefield was considered to be ineffective.

While the initial idea for the minefield was considered sound at the time, the failures surrounding it point to a number of issues associated with the conduct of COIN. Firstly, the ARVN did not have any ownership of the project, were not involved in its design or construction, nor were they trained to the standard required for conducting field operations. Secondly, Australian forces left the ARVN to their own devices; they did not guide or assist with the patrolling mission and did not intervene when they discovered that the patrolling was not being conducted effectively. Thirdly, the VC did not react as expected—they chose to avoid direct conflict with the
Australian forces, choosing instead to go through the minefield.

These events point to an incomplete understanding of the operating environment by the counterinsurgents. Better indigenous capacity-building, improved integration with and mentoring of local forces, and detailed human terrain mapping may well have proved useful in closing the gaps in the planning and execution of this particular barrier and prevented its ultimate failure.

SECTION 4-7. SUMMARY

4.24 The operating environment for COIN is complex and multi-dimensional. To be successful the COIN campaign must take comprehensive approach combining political, information, military, economic, physical and human-societal activities. Inter-agency, joint and multinational arrangements are also of great importance. Failure to identify and understand the diversity and complexity of any given situation is a recipe for COIN failure.

4.25 Finally the adaption cycle of act, sense, decide and adapt (ASDA), also described in Adaptive Campaigning, Australian Army, 2009 provides a simple yet effective approach to how units can ensure that they better understand and influence their environment. It is a simple model that does not seek operational perfection, but instead seeks to ensure that friendly forces are more successful in their environment relative to any adversary (see Figure 4–2\(^3\) and Annex D).

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Annex:

A. Legal Considerations
B. Air Power in Counterinsurgency Operations
C. Maritime Power in Counterinsurgency Operations
D. Adaptive Campaigning in Counterinsurgency

Figure 4–2: Adaptive Campaigning – Lines of Operation
Contents

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 4

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

1. All ADF operations are conducted in compliance with Australian domestic law, international law and any applicable HN law. Respect for the rule of law assumes special significance in COIN. History has shown that COIN fail if they lose legal, moral and ethical ascendancy. Compliance with the law has proven a fundamental pillar in the efforts of counterinsurgents to prevent populations from supporting insurgents.

2. This annex outlines the legal issues that commanders should consider and seek advice upon in the planning and conduct of COIN. Every COIN is different and will pose its own unique legal issues. Accordingly, it is not possible to set out an exhaustive law of COIN. Legal advice must be obtained at the start of planning and at all stages of COIN.

Role of Legal Officers

3. Legal officers are available to provide advice to ADF commanders at all levels regarding the issues covered in this annex. In COIN, it is essential that legal officers become involved in planning, training and mission rehearsal at the tactical level from the outset. Their involvement allows early identification of specific authorisations that may need to be requested of the operational and strategic levels. Deployed legal officers may assume a liaison role with HN authorities, such as the police and the judiciary.

*The ADF's Legal Contribution in Somalia*

In 1993, the 1 RAR Group deployed to Somalia on Operation SOLACE in support of the multinational United Task Force (UNITAF). The 1 RAR Group’s mission was to create a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian aid in the Baidoa Sector.
UNITAF’s operations were authorised by a UN Security Council resolution. Broader nation-building activities were also high on the agenda of the UN.

HQ UNITAF recognised the importance of establishing a Somali judicial system and police force in facing UNITAF’s political and security challenges. In liaisons between HQ UNITAF’s Judge Advocate Branch and the Australian Force–Somalia (AFS) legal officer, the decision was made to start in the Australian sector. The town of Baidoa was chosen as the test bed for re-establishing the Somali judicial system and police force.

In the Baidoa sector, the AFS legal officer, Major Michael Kelly, facilitated the appointment of two judges and advised in the establishment of the ASF (Auxiliary Security Force) which became the first stage in the introduction of a national police force. American legal officers monitored the development of the ASF and more judges and judicial staff were recruited to operate a new judicial system based on the 1962 Somali Criminal Code. Australian efforts to establish a judicial system and police force resulted in the execution of a criminal convicted of murdering numerous Somali citizens.

Context and Framework

4. The legal framework of COIN comprises the following three levels:
   a. Australian domestic level,
   b. international level, and
   c. HN domestic level.

Australian Domestic Level

5. At the Australian domestic level, the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 applies to ADF members at all times. Other relevant laws include customs and quarantine provisions that apply to personnel and equipment upon return to Australia.
6. **Legal Authority of Operations.** At the international level, ADF operations will always have a clear legal basis. During planning, the Government of Australia will communicate the legal basis that it intends to rely upon to the ADF. The legal basis of COIN assumes significance from the very beginning. IA themes will rely heavily on the legal basis for presence of foreign forces in a HN confronted by insurgency. ADF COIN efforts may be supported by one or more of the following three legal grounds:

   a. A HN request formed the basis of Australian participation in the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (commonly known as RAMSI). A HN request is also the basis for the ADF presence in Afghanistan.

   b. A resolution of the United Nations Security Council. For example, the ADF presence in Afghanistan relies upon both United Nations Security Council resolutions and the request of the Government of Afghanistan. The terms of the request are formalised in an agreement between the two governments.

   c. Exercising the inherent right of self-defence, either collectively or in defence of Australian sovereignty. Self-defence as a legal justification is more unlikely due to the level of threat and slow-to-evolve nature of insurgencies. However, members of regional arrangements may request the assistance of one another in combating an insurgency (eg. Australian assistance to UK COIN operations in Malaya).

7. **Law of Armed Conflict.** Legal advice should be obtained in relation to the specific LOAC provisions that apply to individual COIN. Different international conventions apply depending upon whether the conflict is international or non-international. COIN usually fall short of international armed conflict to which the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 apply. Although the 1949 conventions contain the main body of LOAC principles, two further protocols, additional to the Geneva Conventions.
of 1949, were adopted in 1977. The additional protocols supplement the 1949 conventions. In particular, Additional Protocol II is intended to apply to non-international armed conflicts.

8. Additional Protocol II is specifically expressed not to apply in situations of internal disturbance and tension, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature. Such situations are regarded as falling short of armed conflict and HN domestic law applies. Legal advice should be obtained about the sometimes complex interplay between LOAC and HN domestic law in a COIN.

9. Irrespective of the specific provisions of LOAC that are deemed to cover a COIN, Common Article 3 applies to armed conflicts not of an international character. Common Article 3 is identical in each of the four 1949 conventions and is specifically intended to apply to conflicts not of an international character. The article is often referred to as a convention within a convention as it contains fundamental guarantees of the most basic human rights.

10. More specifically, Common Article 3 provides that persons not taking part in hostilities must be treated humanely and without discrimination. They must not be subject to violence to life and person, being taken as hostages or subjected to humiliating and degrading treatment. If charged with a crime, they must be afforded the judicial protections commonly guaranteed by civilised nations. Finally, if wounded or sick they must be collected and cared for. These standards also apply to insurgents, irrespective of any status according to international law, who are captured, surrendered or rendered hors de combat by wounds or sickness.

Host Nation Domestic Level

11. As with any operation, a SOFA or similar arrangement with the HN is necessary. Perhaps most importantly, SOFA will usually provide that ADF members (and civilians accompanying the ADF) are immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the HN. The
immunity may be limited to conduct committed in the course of duty.

12. The domestic laws of the HN apply to COIN forces subject to the provisions of any SOFA or similar arrangement. Specific legal powers are required to conduct effective security operations, including use of lethal force, search, apprehension and detention. As such, powers will often not be covered in a SOFA; a separate arrangement is sometimes required with the HN. RAMSI may serve as an example. ADF members of RAMSI acquired the same powers as local police officers by legislation passed in the Solomon Islands Parliament.

Rules of Engagement

13. ADF members are subject to ROE at all times. In the absence of any mission-specific ROE, the extant serial of CDF Standing ROE will apply. However, separate and specific ROE are likely to apply to COIN operations. ROE will always be consistent with LOAC. Historically, ADF elements have deployed as part of a multinational force. Early liaison with multinational partners is required to identify any ROE inconsistencies or national caveats.

14. Drafting and review of ROE should involve close liaison between legal officers at the tactical and operational/strategic level. Insurgencies have demonstrated a capacity to adapt tactics as they gain experience in combating COIN forces. ROE review may be required to ensure effective tactical action within LOAC against changed insurgency threats and tactics.

15. Consideration may be given to whether a targeting directive is necessary. Targeting directives are legal policy documents that control both time-sensitive and deliberate lethal targeting. More specifically, Targeting directives outline the LOAC considerations and authorisation procedures that apply to targeting actions. The requirement for a target directive will depend upon the intensity of the conflict, the type of actions being conducted by combat elements and the type of weapon platforms that may be employed.
Detention and Internment

16. Few issues have greater potential to erode the legitimacy of COIN forces than failure of detainee management. Therefore, it is essential to ensure that a comprehensive apprehension, detention and transfer policy is put in place. The policy must be consistent with applicable LOAC, international human rights law and HN domestic law. Captured insurgents may offer intelligence of high tactical value. Any authorisation to conduct tactical questioning and/or interrogation should be specified in ROE. If ADF elements maintain a detention facility, consideration must be given to issuing standing orders covering daily routine of the facility.

17. In addition to having a clear and detailed detainee management framework, the management of detainees is equally important. All deployed ADF members must be properly trained to apply the extant detention policy. Adequate resources must be dedicated, including sufficient numbers of properly qualified personnel. Resources are particularly crucial if ADF elements maintain a detention facility. Alternatively, detainees may be transferred to facilities maintained by multinational partners. In the latter case, significant liaison is necessary with the multinational partner.

18. A number of issues are relevant if detainees are transferred to multinational facilities. Apart from ensuring a speedy transfer of detainees from the point of capture, the ADF has a responsibility to track detainees and conduct periodic visits. Another practical issue is ensuring that detention and transfer records can be completed by the soldier on the ground prior to transfer. Often, military police members will not be available to assist with the completion of detention and transfer records. In such cases abbreviated forms are necessary. Most importantly, ADF elements must retain concise records of detention and transfer details. Web Form AD615 Australian Defence Force Record of Search, Detention, Release and/or Transfer is designed to be completed by combat team members.
Evidence Preservation

19. Securing detainees focuses on own-force protection and maintaining the primacy of HN authorities. ADF members detain persons in accordance with extant policy but in a HN criminal law context. More specifically, captured insurgents may be handed over to HN authorities for possible prosecution. If there are no viable HN authorities, captured insurgents may be committed to internment by multinational forces.

20. Capturing forces must, therefore, be in a position to produce sufficient evidence for use by local authorities or to support an internment decision. Military police members will not always be available to look after collection of evidence. Accordingly, legal officers and military police members must be prepared to train combat teams in the basic collection and recording of evidence. Deliberate searches will often require warrants obtained through HN authorities. Tactical-level legal officers should liaise with local authorities to advise on and obtain warrants where necessary.

21. Attacks by insurgents may not involve capture. However, ADF elements should still be prepared to preserve evidence and conduct analysis. An example is the site of an indirect fire attack against ADF elements or other COIN forces.

Compensation Claims

22. Compensation claims by members of the HN must be properly managed. COIN operations will often cause unintended personal injury and property damage. Uncompensated loss suffered by innocent bystanders has the capacity to undermine support for the COIN. A claims policy must be in place and appropriate financial delegations are required to enable processing of claims in country.

Timely Compensation in Timor-Leste

During Operation ASTUTE in 2007, a distressed elder approached the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) deployed in Timor-Leste and complained that a Blackhawk helicopter had damaged his village crops.
The village and its surroundings were a haven for the rebel leader Alfredo Reinado and his followers. The ISF decided to prevent the Reinado rebels from exploiting this incident by using the ISF’s civil-military liaison, legal and chaplaincy resources to meet the village chief and his elders to estimate damages. As a result, the complaint was resolved by timely compensation measures in the form of a quantity of rice and a modest cash payment. The village chief announced his gratitude and the Reinado group were denied the opportunity to exploit a grievance.
ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 4

AIR POWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

1. Air power, like other branches of the military, provides a supporting role in COIN. The main effort in COIN is political. Air power will not win a COIN by itself (nor will any other single form of combat power); but without it, a COIN will be inordinately expensive in terms of lives and resources.

2. Effective employment of air and space assets require effective and responsive joint and multinational C2. Most COIN planning occurs at lower echelons; however, all components must fully coordinate these plans with the air planners to provide the most effective air support. The air commander needs to know the land mission and plan the air part to support that mission. The land commander and their subordinates must consider the requirements for air support at the earliest stages of planning to fully exploit the air capability.

3. Air land integration and battlespace management requires careful planning; specialist input to the planning process must be sought as early as possible. The mix of combat, humanitarian assistance, transport and ISR missions will result in complex planning and close coordination between the air and the land component commanders. Integrated planning and execution is necessary in order to ensure that the air contribution, alongside other joint inputs, remains directed to the priorities of the joint task force commander.

4. There is a mistaken belief that COIN, since they are fought among the people, are only conducive to the use of land power. The concealment of the adversary within the general population is touted as an insurmountable problem for the effective employment of air power’s precision strike capabilities. The isolation of the areas in which irregular forces have taken refuge can only be effectively done through the
employment of air power in the precision strike and ISR roles — control of the air being a prerequisite for success.

5. Insurgents adapt to counter the overwhelming conventional military superiority of their opponents. They use asymmetry to even the disparity in combat capabilities. Such tactics can only be countered by adapting the same concept to suit the strengths of a conventional military force and this can only be done if the force possesses sufficient air power capabilities. Air power’s unique capability to insert, sustain and extract ground forces rapidly and the ability to provide timely ISR and strike supports land forces to effectively dominate disproportionately large areas of insurgent territory. Air power brings three key enablers to COIN and these are, precision attack, air mobility and ISR.

Precision Attack

6. Precision attack requires convergence of information, C2 and weapon systems to engage targets. Precision attack in a COIN includes air interdiction and close air support (CAS). Precision attack allows a smaller land force to operate in a less concentrated manner over a larger area.

7. **Air Interdiction.** The aim of interdiction is to disrupt the enemy before they engage us by striking their concentration areas and disrupting their lines of communication. Insurgents faced with superior firepower will generally adapt by avoiding overt concentration of force. They will tend to melt away into the local population when threatened, creating challenges in prosecuting force.

8. An advantage of air power is that it has the ability to cover large distances quickly and can have a devastating impact on insurgents’ capabilities. In suitable conditions any attempt by the insurgents to use mass force can be dealt with effectively by air power. To escape the treat from the air, insurgents must avoid large concentrations which can be easily interdicted. Consequently, their freedom of movement and ability to concentrate firepower becomes more limited; insurgents are forced to disperse throughout the AO.
9. There are risks with using air power. Faced with the superior and far reaching power of air interdiction, insurgents adapt by reducing the number of attractive targets and by blending themselves into the local population. In these instances interdiction cannot easily be achieved. Targeting lines of communications used by insurgents and ourselves, such as bridges, roads and communications nodes may be counterproductive. Imprecise targeting of insurgents in urban areas can also undermine the support among both the local population being attacked and the home population of the nation conducting the attacks.

10. Insurgents may also actively encourage air power to cause unintentional damage which can be exploited through their own IA. Killing innocent people and destroying infrastructure will result in reduced support from both the local and international population.

11. **Close Air Support.** CAS is conducted against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces or in contact with those forces. CAS requires the highest degree of coordination between air and surface forces, because of the immediacy of the threat, the close proximity of friendly forces and the risk of fratricide.

12. CAS can be used as a planned mission against known enemy locations or in support of troops in combat. When CAS is part of a planned operation, it can be thoroughly prepared and fully integrated into the battle plan providing maximum efficiency and flexibility. Battle locations can be selected, target areas can be analysed and communication procedures can be put in place. Weapons can be matched to expected targets, ROE can be optimised, air power assets coordinated and ground controllers assigned. During a planned mission large numbers of aircraft can be allocated, allowing near continuous presence over the battlefield.

13. When troops come into contact with the enemy unexpectedly, CAS can rapidly provide the required offensive support. Air power’s ability to respond rapidly with precision effects reduces the likelihood of friendly losses as well as enabling the friendly
14. CAS is a fundamentally important air power role in COIN warfare. The ability to provide rapid precision effects throughout the battlespace allows ground forces more freedom to operate in the dispersed manner which is desirable in COIN warfare. The unique view of the battlespace from the air and the ability to provide an independent visual verification of the target is an air power strength.

Air Mobility

15. Air mobility is the rapid movement of personnel, material and forces to and from a theatre of activity and within that theatre by air across the full range of operations. Air power provides the mobility to move forces quickly to where they are needed most in COIN operations. Air mobility provides significant asymmetric advantage to COIN forces, enabling commanders to rapidly deploy, redeploy, sustain and reposition land forces throughout the theatre. This asymmetric advantage, especially when operations must be conducted in remote areas or difficult terrain, provides a timely response and alleviates the necessity of ground forces having to traverse terrain in slow vehicles. Air mobility reduces the risk to ground forces from improvised explosive devices (IED).

16. Air mobility also provides support to government, non-government and international civilian agencies to safely transport civilian personnel to assist the COIN strategy and to move aid and equipment to deliver direct support to the local population when the host country does not have the capability or capacity. Air mobility has utility in being able to support humanitarian assistance to the local population, which can promote the counterinsurgent’s message and bolster public support.

17. Air mobility is provided by fixed-wing and rotary wing aircraft and may include multinational and/or coalition assets. Air
mobility assets need to be centrally tasked to enable a synchronised approach to logistics and operational support.

18. One of its most critical roles is to support the medical services by transporting critically ill and injured soldiers, enemy and non-combatant civilians to medical support centres. This ability to transport critically injured people at short notice to medical facilities is a unique morale booster that supports the strategic COIN campaign.

19. Air mobility is a capability that crosses all lines of operations. It supports IA when COIN forces provides humanitarian airlift and it clearly supports combat operations.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

20. The airpower contribution to COIN goes beyond the delivery of CAS and air mobility. Even though aircraft can be used in a lethal role, they are often equally effective in a non-lethal role performing ISR missions. Air platforms (fitted with advanced radar technologies) and space-based satellites are an effective means of conducting surveillance and reconnaissance of insurgent movements and operations. They can do so in peace support and can also provide crucial intelligence prior to and during COIN. Although HUMINT provided by the relevant agencies is at the fore-front of COIN, air and space platforms are often better able to conduct ISR missions, both in urban areas and over vast, uninhabited terrain. They are much less constrained by distances, national borders (to an extent) or geographic barriers, providing the capacity to quickly locate, observe and report on insurgent activity wherever it appears. Nevertheless, air and space-based ISR cannot replace HUMINT capabilities; it only enhances them. While overhead imagery can monitor insurgent movements, it cannot ‘explain why’ nor can it see inside buildings.

21. Air and space platforms cannot only observe insurgents, but can also monitor and disseminate real-time information relating to the movements of neutral civilians who may be located close to insurgents, thereby decreasing the likelihood of collateral damage if a strike by friendly forces is undertaken. Persistent
ISR of an area, once analysed, provides patterns of normalcy which help detect irregularities and focus operations. Therefore, air and space power is well placed to make a vital contribution to intelligence gathering efforts, which are critical to the success of any COIN campaign.

22. Air power’s ability to observe the AO, free from line-of-sight limitations, helps condense the decision cycle and produce a ‘knowledge edge’ over the enemy. Knowledge of roadblocks, enemy movements and concentrations, and proximity of neutral civilians can assist the surface force, while real-time targeting from air and space-based ISR assets allows timely and accurate employment of tactical level firepower. Due to the time-sensitive nature of insurgent targets, meaning that they can mobilise quickly, attack and disappear soon afterwards, ISR platforms may be fitted with strike capabilities to enable response in near real-time upon identified insurgents.
ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 4

MARITIME POWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

The third role of the RAN during the (Malayan) Emergency was that of ‘showing the flag’. To the observer, and perhaps to some of those participating, this traditional naval role can often seem as just an excuse for just another cocktail party, a round of official visits and entertainment. In fact warship visits to foreign ports are part of a diplomatic offensive, demonstrating solidarity with the hosts, or veiled menace, as the circumstance dictate. During the Malaysian Emergency it was especially important to show the flag as often and as effectively as possible. The credit is generally given to GEN Sir Gerald Templar for the invention of the phrase ‘hearts and minds’ to describe his campaign to strengthen the resolve of the Malayan community to resist CT pressure and violence, and to faster national identity and confidence. Ship visits to Malayan ports thus had both an immediate and important purpose as part of this campaign.

1. Much of the world’s population lives in the littoral zone. Australia’s direct area of interest sees the majority of large cities and populations located in the littoral zone. Maritime considerations are likely to be a major consideration when conducting COIN in these areas.

2. The warfighting capabilities of maritime forces provide the basis for their use in a wide range of operations. Maritime forces are valuable instruments of diplomatic efforts and a unique symbol on national resolve and interest. Naval support may consist of providing deterrence, presence patrols,

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enforcing international sanctions, blockades, naval gunfire support and providing logistical support to the land and air components. Often naval forces have air assets that may be used for COIN. The presence of maritime forces can also send a strong political message to insurgents and their supporters, either by being visible from shore or concealing their presence below the horizon. Naval assets also have unique radars and communication interception equipment (eg. used in Malayan Emergency by Army/Navy teams onboard ships monitoring shore-based transmissions).

3. During the initial stages of a COIN, maritime assets can be sea based in order to respect country’s sovereignty. Maritime forces also bring unique C2, medical capabilities and respite opportunities that may not be available on shore.6

4. Insurgents may have developed maritime capabilities through the use of deception, IED and attacks from small craft with low signatures. During the Malayan Emergency, insurgents realised the best time to conduct waterborne infiltration was at night during storms, when maritime asset detection capabilities were degraded.

1. While the nature of war remains enduring, its characteristics change. Future conflict will increasingly involve both regular and irregular forces using a mixture of violence and non-violence. It will include conventional manoeuvre, abductions and assassinations, subversion and insurgency. It will entail attacks on infrastructure to produce economic paralysis, but also against military targets to induce exhaustion or provoke overreaction. Resistance will include popular mobilisation and protest, social services and legitimate political activity and propaganda. It will mean Molotov cocktails and roadside bombs combined with latest generation artillery and antitank missiles. The outcome of future conflict will not be decided on the battlefield alone; rather it will be won in the minds of populations using ideas as weapons. Therefore, combat operations alone can no longer be seen as the decisive phase of conflict and as a result, an alternative approach to land force operations is required – Adaptive Campaigning.

2. Adaptive Campaigning is defined as, ‘Actions taken by the joint land force as part of the military contribution to a whole-of-government approach to resolving conflicts.’ The purpose of Adaptive Campaigning is to influence and shape the overall environment to allow peaceful political discourse and to transition the environment to a stabilised state conducive with Australia’s national interests. Adaptive Campaigning comprises five interdependent and mutually reinforcing lines of operation, as follows:
   a. joint land combat,
   b. population protection,
   c. IA,
   d. population support,
Due to operational uncertainty, at least initially, the joint land force must be prepared to take rapid and leading action on all lines of operation, especially in the early phases of a COIN campaign. As the situation stabilises, a gradual transfer of responsibilities to other agencies will occur, with the joint land force retaining a supporting role. Key to the joint land force’s success will be its ability to effectively orchestrate effort across all five lines of operation (see Figure 4–2).
CHAPTER 5
INTELLIGENCE

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.¹

SECTION 5-1. INTRODUCTION

5.1 In a COIN campaign success or failure will be influenced by the effectiveness of intelligence. For intelligence to be effective, it must not only be accurate and timely but it must also be actionable. However, intelligence does not exist in isolation. A dynamic intelligence cycle – one where operations are command led and intelligence driven – will play an important part in achieving the counterinsurgent mission. This chapter outlines intelligence preparation and monitoring of the battlespace (IPMB); the intelligence cycle, intelligence collection, counterintelligence and security, intelligence fusion, the intelligence staff and intelligence sharing.

SECTION 5-2. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION AND MONITORING OF THE BATTLESPACE

5.2 Understanding the operational environment is vital to COIN. Achieving this comprehension is as important for COIN practitioners as it is for intelligence staffs. Not the least because the counterinsurgent is likely to be at a disadvantage until they develop a nuanced understanding of the operational environment. It is therefore important that the intelligence effort is maximised early and maintained throughout a campaign. Because intelligence in a COIN is integral to the planning process, understanding is required not only of the insurgents but also of the local population, the HN and other actors.

Layered over these factors will be diplomatic, information, military and economic issues. Consequently, the intelligence effort in a COIN campaign is shaped by the need to understand the ‘human terrain’.

5.3 IPMB is the systematic, continuous process of analysing the threat and the environment in a specific geographic area. Employing IPMB to generate intelligence estimates and other products or to review the situation is likely to be a routine part of any battle rhythm. However, the utility of the IPMB process lies in its adaptation to the requirements of COIN. For example, ‘key terrain’ may refer not to a geographic area but to elements of the population.

5.4 When working in a foreign COIN the assistance of linguists and cultural experts will be necessary. Language skills allow interaction with the local population and cultural awareness should be regarded as a counterinsurgent force multiplier. Counterinsurgents would ideally have access to military linguists, but if these are not available then local interpreters must be employed at the tactical level. Commanders require insight into the culture, perceptions, values, beliefs, interests, social networks and decision-making processes of the local population. In order to develop the necessary range and depth of products, the input of experts, possibly from external organisations, may be required. Once in country the local populace will also provide another source of cultural and social information.

We spent nearly ten hours searching for insurgents and weapons in hundreds of dwellings throughout our objective area, a bad neighbourhood off Haifa Street [in Baghdad] that was a hub of insurgent activity – and for what? Ultimately we captured half a dozen weapons and a handful of suspects. Much more worrisome to me than the meagre results of our operation was the ill will and anger we had created among the Iraqi citizens who were the unwelcome recipients of our dead-of-night operations. I had been on enough such sweeps already to picture the scene clearly: mothers crying, children screaming, husbands humiliated. No matter how
professionally you executed such searches the net result was inevitably ugly. That profoundly disappointing experience led me to a blunt realisation: our dependency on conventional intelligence collection methods and our failure to understand the negative perceptions our actions were generating amongst the Iraqi citizens threatened to doom our mission. If we did not change our methods, and change them quickly, we were not going to be successful in the urban counterinsurgency environment in which we found ourselves.

_Bde Comd, US Army, Iraq, 2003_

5.5 Although human factors are paramount in COIN, a detailed understanding of the background to the insurgency and the motivations of the insurgents must also be developed. Using the IPMB process to perceive how the insurgents interact with local communities will assist the counterinsurgent in developing a campaign that will work with rather than against the population they seek to influence. An insurgency may resemble a mosaic, composed of different insurgent factions, criminal groups and opportunists. So it is important to distinguish between them and act against them according to their intent and capability. Such action can assist in driving levels of violence down to the point where other activities, primarily political, can be employed.

5.6 IPMB should also consider the many organisations active in an AO. This might include government departments, military, paramilitary and police forces of the HN; coalition partners and allies; international or NGO; interested third parties (both state and non-state); and private security companies. Developing knowledge of these actors, their motivations, strengths and weaknesses, and ability to provide information and intelligence will aid in analysing their impact both on the insurgency and the COIN campaign.
5.7 The intelligence cycle applies across the spectrum of conflict. The cycle is continuous and regular direction from the commander is crucial, as this will direct intelligence collection, targeting priorities, and the management of risk and opportunities. Effective intelligence drives effective operations, which in turn generates information that helps to shape target sets and priorities for future activities. This suggests that COIN should be supported by systematic and disciplined analysis that draws on an effective intelligence collection effort. However, commanders may have finite resources and so their collection plans will be influenced by factors such as coverage, capability, priority and gain. Allowing time for a collection plan to develop and for the chosen methods to produce results may prove to be more beneficial than switching the collection focus repeatedly. Similarly, commanders should be wary of single source reporting and instead pursue opportunities as the intelligence effort matures.

5.8 The lack of front lines and traditional echelons in a COIN campaign reflect the pervasive nature of the threat environment. The situational awareness, operations security (OPSEC) and force protection requirements of such a threat environment may see intelligence resources deployed with units that may not normally receive such support in other types of conflict. Furthermore, ISR assets that are often associated with the formation level may become unit or even sub-unit assets for limited or extended periods. This situation can strengthen local and tactical intelligence, enhance regional and national reporting, and bolster the conduct of a COIN campaign at all levels.

Intelligence Collection

5.9 All units collect and report information and all soldiers are potential intelligence collectors. The regular interaction by soldiers with the local population creates the conditions for a bottom-up flow of information that may be more responsive and relevant to unit needs than the traditional top-down
dissemination of intelligence. Soldiers should therefore be aware of their commander’s priority intelligence requirements and recognise their own importance in making the intelligence cycle function effectively. Every time a group of soldiers is assigned a task, they should be given intelligence collection requirements as well as operational requirements.

5.10 When conducting intelligence collection operations, the overall collection plan should be synchronised and controlled centrally. This will help to avoid duplication and missed opportunities. Priority intelligence requirements must be identified at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. These requirements may be tailored to local or regional circumstances, but tactical and operational collection efforts should support one another and commanders must ensure that their staffs understand this arrangement. Requests for information should be managed actively rather than passively. Feedback from analytical staff to collection assets is important in confirming the accuracy and the reliability of intelligence.

5.11 An integrated and synchronised intelligence collection requires coordination with other Australian Government and law-enforcement agencies, HN security and intelligence organisations, and multinational intelligence organisations. Operational-level intelligence planning drives the synchronisation of these agencies’ and organisations’ efforts. However, coordination occurs at all levels. Communication among collection managers and collectors down to the tactical level is important; it can eliminate circular reporting and unnecessary duplication of work.

Human Intelligence

5.12 HUMINT is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. HUMINT operations often collect information that is difficult to obtain by other, more technical, means. During COIN information gathered from the local populace is likely to be an important source of information. Counterinsurgents should not, however, expect the populace to willingly supply information if insurgents retain the ability to intimidate them and the usual guidelines for protecting sources
remains extant. As always, intelligence staffs should be wary of the true motivation of any source and analyse any information offered in this context. Depending on the level of specialised HUMINT training, military elements will be able to collect either base-level intelligence or higher and more complex HUMINT. More complex HUMINT operations involve highly trained HUMINT specialists who may require additional support to conduct their valuable tasks. There will be some constraints on access to and the releasability of HUMINT. Consequently, the protective marking of the resultant product should be stated in the original collection requirement in order that intelligence staffs can 'write for release.'

There are areas that do need resourcing; HUMINT (and I am not speaking here about a Brit in a dishdash smoking a fag on a street corner, but a proper HUMINT-trained operative and agent-handler deployed forward). Currently our HUMINT world thinks that this is merely a liaison function, but it is not. The other strand of targeting is EW [Electronic Warfare] and SIGINT [Signals Intelligence]. The difference between not having these and having them is the difference between conducting an intelligence-led operation or an advance to ambush.

CO Inf Bn, British Army, Afghanistan, 2009

Exploitation and Debriefing

5.13 Exploitation. Exploitation is the process of obtaining intelligence information from a source, document or equipment item and taking advantage of it for intelligence purposes.\(^2\) While exploitation is primarily an intelligence responsibility, its effectiveness will depend greatly on the cooperation of non-intelligence staff and units facilitating the collection, safe custody, administration and rapid evacuation of captured personnel, documents and equipment.

5.14 Technical Exploitation. Technical exploitation of documents and information can also provide critical information regarding

insurgency organisation, capability and intentions and must be exploited fully. The information gained can support further personnel exploitation or assist in other source operations. The conduct of technical exploitation should not undermine the legal process. Personnel records, financial statements and property records can assist with planning operations, in particular screening operations.

5.15 Debriefing. Debriefing is the process by which information is elicited from individuals who are either willing to voluntarily provide information in response to questions asked or in the case of exploitation operations, by people whose will to resist the questioning process has been broken.\textsuperscript{3} Detainees are important sources of intelligence. Details and insights into an insurgent organisation’s perceptions, motivations, goals, morale, organisation and tactics can be gleaned from detainees. Insurgent defectors should also be fully debriefed to provide similar information. Every effort should be made to exploit these sources to the fullest extent.

Own-force Reporting

5.16 Significant intelligence will be sourced from own-force operations within the battlespace. In many areas, own forces may be the only available source of information and patrol reporting will greatly assist commanders to understand in detail the environment, the insurgents and the population. Additionally, specialist surveillance and reconnaissance forces, such as snipers, reconnaissance patrols and SF will provide further collection assets within own force structures. This information must in all cases be supported by an active, continual and efficient patrol debriefing process by the relevant headquarters intelligence staff. It should be noted that not all information collected by soldiers will be accurate, and robust analysis and cross checking (all source verification) is a key task for any intelligence staff. Inaccurate and conflicting information may be provided to counterinsurgents purposefully. Reasons for this include:

\textsuperscript{3} Refer to LWD 2-2, Intelligence Activities, 2008.
a. using counterinsurgents to settle tribal, ethnic or business disputes;
b. leading counterinsurgents into ambushes;
c. enticing counterinsurgents into executing operations that impact negatively on the local populace;
d. to learn about counterinsurgent planning methods, response times and their TTP; and
e. stretching COIN forces thin by causing them to react to false reports.

5.17 Information that tactical forces can provide to support the intelligence collection plan include:

a. intentions of the local populace in specific areas or regions;
b. attitude of the local populace towards each other, the insurgents and the counterinsurgents;
c. imagery on local personalities, leaders, geographic areas and events;
d. assessments on villages, towns, choke points, key terrain or other areas;
e. identifying insurgent TTP;
f. effectiveness of previous operations against insurgents and/or the population;
g. the identification of potential sources for HUMINT personnel to develop;
h. effectiveness of the psychological operations product disseminated among the population; and
i. the collection of biometrics data.

Signals Intelligence

5.18 Traditionally strategic in outlook, signals intelligence (SIGINT) can be tasked to operate at the tactical level. SIGINT is intelligence gained through the exploitation of the
electromagnetic spectrum. SIGINT collection is a good source for determining enemy locations, intentions, capabilities and morale or confirming other reporting. It may be the significant source of intelligence in areas under insurgent control but its effectiveness may be limited by the sophistication of local communications infrastructure (or lack thereof) and insurgent OPSEC. As for HUMINT, there will be constraints on access to and releasability of this form of intelligence.

**Imagery Intelligence**

5.19 Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar. The use of IMINT during a COIN campaign can range from wide area surveillance so as to aid force protection to the production of detailed target packs in preparation for specific operations. However, some aspects of IMINT require sophisticated communications architecture to ensure that it can be employed in an accurate and timely fashion. Again, there may be some restrictions on access and releasability on some IMINT products.

5.20 Geospatial information is a subset of IMINT that describes, assesses and visually depicts physical features and geographically references activities on Earth. It has great application in COIN, allowing concentrated analysis of the physical features of a battlespace, sometimes overlaying this with cultural aspects in graphical forms, to support all mission sets. Geospatial information can also effectively support commanders in urban environments, analysing in detail structures and complex terrain features and translating this information into graphical formats that are easily understood.

**Open-source Intelligence**

5.21 Open-source intelligence is valuable for understanding the operational environment. Background information on the population, cultures, languages, history and governments of states in a theatre can be found in open-source material. It is extremely useful for understanding public attitudes, culture and
public support for insurgents and counterinsurgents. Open-source intelligence is also an important means of determining the effectiveness of IA. As insurgents also use open-source intelligence, monitoring a wide variety of media in multiple languages benefits the COIN effort at all levels, strategic through to tactical.

Technical Intelligence

5.22 Insurgents often adapt their TTP rapidly. Technical intelligence on equipment and weapons can help build an understanding of current insurgent capabilities and the ways they are adapting their methods. These may include how insurgents are using IED, homemade mortars and other pieces of customised military equipment as well as exploiting technically advanced communications systems or captured technical documentation.

_The WISREPs [Weapons Intelligence Section Reports] that the British passed to our Battle Group were an invaluable source of intelligence. They helped us to understand how the insurgents were employing IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] and this in turn allowed us to adapt our drills and counter-measures. Without the WISREPs we would have been at a distinct disadvantage when conducting our operations._

_Combat Team Comd, Australian Army, Iraq, 2007_

Counterintelligence and Operations Security

5.23 Counterintelligence is that aspect of intelligence devoted to identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organisations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.

5.24 Insurgents place heavy emphasis on gathering intelligence. They use informants, reconnaissance, surveillance, open-source media and open-source imagery. Insurgents can potentially use any person interacting with Australian or multinational personnel as an informant. These include the same people that Australian forces use as potential HUMINT sources. Another factor to consider is that insurgents may also
have a SIGINT capability based on commercially available scanners and radios, wiretaps or captured counterinsurgent equipment.

5.25 Insurgents have their own reconnaissance and surveillance networks and given their ability to blend in with the local populace their reconnaissance efforts can be difficult to identify. Insurgent early warning systems, provided by the local population, may also make it difficult for the counterinsurgent to achieve the element of surprise. Identifying the techniques and weaknesses of enemy reconnaissance and surveillance enables commanders to detect signs of insurgent preparations.

5.26 OPSEC is very important as it allows counterinsurgents to protect essential elements of friendly information. Screening contractors, translators, locally engaged staff, HUMINT sources and any other personnel working with them, including HN government personnel, is one aspect in ensuring effective OPSEC. Security aids such as biometrics can assist this process.

SECTION 5-4. INTELLIGENCE FUSION

5.27 Information is not intelligence until it has been analysed, assessed and fused with other information – the output of this process is intelligence. Intelligence fusion is the integration of intelligence products and combat information from all sources into single products and optimised to meet the intelligence and information requirements of the commander, staff and subordinate formations. The basis of fused products could be from a single nation or from an accumulation of information and intelligence originating from a number of individual national sources. Fusion results in knowledge and is a prerequisite to understanding. It operates at all levels of command and is essential to situational awareness. It should also be noted that the over reliance of technical means, without an all-source perspective, may impact detrimentally on intelligence in a COIN.
Databases are important for analysing insurgent activities and personalities. At a minimum, there should be common searchable combatant command databases of insurgent actions and personnel, as well as another database of all intelligence reporting. These should be accessible by all analysts in and out of theatre. The common operational picture should include reporting from all units and organisations involved in the effort.

Our intelligence efforts were but a cottage industry compared to the American fusion machine and use of databases. When we compare what we had in Iraq with what we had in Northern Ireland, we could see what we were lacking. We need to deploy on campaigns with a database that will allow us to fuse, analyse and exploit intelligence and historical data in order to act as a tool for commanders, rather than as merely a TOP SECRET filing cabinet.

Division Chief of Staff, British Army, Iraq, 2008

Insurgency Analysis

Accurate and comprehensive intelligence on insurgent organisations, leadership, financial support networks and the operational environment contribute to effective operations. Effectively developing and integrating information from a range of sources provides the detailed knowledge and insights required to exploit insurgent vulnerabilities and mitigate their strengths. Insurgency analysis examines interactions among individuals, groups and beliefs within the operational environment's historic and cultural context. One of the more important products of this analysis is an understanding of how local people think. This knowledge allows predictive analysis of enemy actions. It also contributes to the ability to develop effective IA and civil-military operations. Table 5–1 summarises key tasks associated with insurgency analysis.
5.30 Developing knowledge and using network analytical tools requires an unusually large investment of time compared with conventional analytical problem-solving methods. Insurgency analysis may not provide immediate usable intelligence. Analysts may have to spend weeks or months analysing numerous all-source intelligence reports before providing an accurate picture of insurgent groups, networks, leaders and activities. A dedicated analytical team is a priority early in the deployment of the counterinsurgent force and is an enduring requirement throughout.
It takes time to build an effective intelligence staff and commanders should invest heavily in establishing this capability. This process can be assisted by conducting liaison with in-theatre intelligence staff. The architecture of the intelligence staff will be dependent on operational requirements but should include an all-source cell consisting of the senior intelligence officer and their staff as a minimum. Representatives of other agencies may be best employed in the all-source cell and, in some cases, it will be necessary for the cell to be segregated with stringent access controls. Despite these access requirements, the intelligence staff must not be isolated from the rest of the HQ – in particular they must be closely integrated with operations and plans staff. The hierarchy and reporting responsibilities of the intelligence staff should be clearly defined and clear direction provided to non-traditional collectors.

Robust analytical fusion is particularly important at the tactical level. However, conventional organic intelligence structures can be inadequate for the task of all-source fusion. If this issue is not addressed, a unit may struggle to collect and collate patrol debriefs, analyse incoming information from multiple sources, produce fused intelligence products and disseminate products to appropriate users. Consequently, commanders may need to be creative in developing analytical capabilities within their units by creating ad hoc all-source cells. Although not ideal, these cells may have to use non-intelligence personnel working under the direction of an intelligence supervisor. Regardless of how intelligence staffs are assembled, ensuring that they are composed of the right calibre of soldier will pay dividends.

Intelligence Committees

Intelligence officers from all organisations, military and civil may form intelligence working groups or committees as required. The concept of an intelligence working group is to synchronise direction, collection (targeting), processing (analysis) and dissemination of intelligence. These intelligence
working groups should conduct regular meetings to accomplish the following:

a. establish and maintain shared situational awareness,
b. share collection priorities,
c. deconflict activities and operations,
d. target development, and
e. share results of operations.

5.34 These meetings build mutual trust and understanding of each member’s mission, capabilities and limitations. Meetings should be coordinated with meetings of other staff cells, working groups, and boards as part of an organisation’s battle rhythm. Incorporating HN representatives (eg. intelligence services, military forces and local government officials) and multinational partners into the intelligence working group could foster teamwork, gain an insight into the local society and prepare the HN to assume the COIN mission when multinational forces depart.

Reachback

5.35 Reachback refers to the process of obtaining products, services, applications, forces, equipment or material from organisations that are not forward deployed. Intelligence staffs should use reachback capabilities to ‘outsource’ time-intensive aspects of analysis. Analysts may receive reachback assistance from strategic or operational level analyst cells or external sources.

Corporate Knowledge Continuity

5.36 The complexity and difficulty of analysing an insurgency means it often takes analysts months to understand a specific operational environment and the insurgency it contains. Continuity of intelligence analytical staff is therefore essential. In protracted COIN, rotations of intelligence staff must be managed to minimise any loss of knowledge. Unit transition should include exchange of relevant databases and knowledge of the area. Effective intelligence handover saves time and
The use of in-theatre strategic analysts from the Australian intelligence community may assist with the continuity of corporate and area knowledge. These analysts often work within the specific area of expertise or geographic region for longer periods of time that some military intelligence staff. In a COIN these subject matter analytical experts are highly useful.

SECTION 5-5. INTELLIGENCE SHARING

Intelligence sharing is the timely dissemination of relevant information and intelligence derived either from individual national structures or from higher levels, between coalition partners and civil agency partners.\(^4\)

Sharing Agreements and Protocols

COIN occurs in a joint, interagency and multinational environment at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical. Commanders and staffs must coordinate intelligence collection and analysis with coalition/foreign military forces, Australian intelligence community organisations and other HN or own government and non-government organisations. Intelligence and information sharing will therefore require close management and control. Robust intelligence-sharing protocols, including multilateral bilateral memorandums of understanding between all interested parties are essential for the overall structure to remain responsive. National and theatre intelligence support plans must be coherent, mutually supportive and detailed. The establishment of good working relationships with various agencies and HN intelligence services and the establishment of intelligence LO are also essential to ensure unity of effort.\(^5\)

The caveats and level of protective marking required for some intelligence products will be a constraint on intelligence sharing

\(^4\) ibid.
\(^5\) ibid.
with partners and even one’s own forces. However, as noted elsewhere in this chapter, intelligence staffs should write for release where ever possible. Intelligence staffs can and should request that the originators of external intelligence products sanitise or downgrade reports to ensure that they are releasable. Establishing an authorised and timely process to achieve this early on in a campaign will pay dividends.

5.41 Intelligence reporting must be focused for the end-user and intelligence staffs must be mindful of who their target audience is. Tactical-level intelligence reporting should be aimed at informing manoeuvre elements, while the operational-level intelligence reporting, conducted at the joint task force level, should be aimed at informing the strategic/political level in order to guide strategic decision-making.

5.42 HN intelligence services may not be well-developed and their personnel not well trained. HN intelligence capabilities should be evaluated and training may be required. HN security forces may also be infiltrated by insurgents or foreign intelligence services, and this must be taken into consideration when forming an intelligence-sharing arrangement.

Liaison

5.43 Intelligence liaison is a technique for establishing and maintaining close, continuous information/data and intelligence sharing between coalition partners. Specialist LO may be appointed at all levels as required and may include engineers, intelligence staff, communication specialists and linguists. Effective intelligence liaison in COIN will ensure synchronisation of the intelligence effort and support a common operational understanding. The function could extend beyond military liaison to include coordination between military intelligence and other government agencies. Intelligence liaison ensures the flow of all relevant information and intelligence in a timely manner between all interested organisations.

6. LWD 3-0-3, Land Tactics (Developing Doctrine), 2009.
SECTION 5-6. SUMMARY

5.44 Effective intelligence will facilitate a nuanced understanding of the operating environment and its key human factors: the insurgents, the populace and the HN. In turn, a robust intelligence cycle will ensure that intelligence collection is targeted to best effect. Nevertheless, time needs to be allowed for intelligence strands to develop and for these strands to produce actionable intelligence. Intelligence staff should never work in isolation but work intimately with operations and plans staff throughout the COIN campaign. In a COIN campaign it is essential that commanders harness, prioritise and provide sufficient resources for intelligence and counterintelligence to support operations. There will be much to achieve and insufficient resources to do everything; the commander's direction will be crucial to success.

Annex:

A. Information Actions

ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 5

INFORMATION ACTIONS

General

1. **Overview.** *LWD 3-2-0, Information Actions (Developing Doctrine),* 2008 defines IA as coordinated and synchronised actions that shape the will, understanding and capability of target audiences by affecting their perceptions, cohesion, information, and decision making while protecting our own. IA employs capabilities that significantly contribute to the achievement of the operational mission. A strong IA plan, when integrated effectively in military operations, will assist the government in acquiring control of legitimate social, political, economic and security institutions, and marginalise or separate, both physically and psychologically, insurgency and its leaders from the population. Well executed IA can help demobilise and reintegrate armed insurgent forces into the political, economic and social structures of the population. Specifically, IA focuses on influencing the population’s perception of events and the legitimacy of the government, as well as insurgent decisions and decision-making processes.

2. **Information Environment.** The information environment[^8] is made up of three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational and cognitive. All of the dimensions are important for COIN but the cognitive dimension is vital for COIN. The cognitive dimension is normally where COIN success is determined – in the population’s perception of legitimacy. It is also vital to understand that the information environment in COIN is dynamic. The free flow of information present in all theatres via television, telephone and internet can present conflicting messages that quickly defeat the intended effects. To preclude unintended effects, continuous synchronisation and coordination between IA, public affairs, public diplomacy,

[^8]: For more information on the information environment and its dimensions, see *ADDP 3.13, Information Operations, 2006.*
and allies are imperative. This effort will allow information themes employed during operations involving neutral or friendly populations to remain consistent.

3. **Information Superiority and Its Advantages.** The forces possessing better information and using that information to more effectively gain understanding have a major advantage over their adversaries. Counterinsurgents who gain this advantage can use it to accomplish missions by affecting perceptions, attitudes, decisions and actions. However, information superiority is not static. During COIN, all sides continually attempt to secure their own advantages and deny useful information to adversaries. IA has a direct impact on the population’s perceptions of COIN credibility and legitimacy; consequently, the struggle between counterinsurgents and insurgents will be centered on the population’s perception of information.

4. Information superiority can be difficult to attain during an insurgency. When it exists, the information available to counterinsurgents allows them to accurately visualise the situation, anticipate events and make appropriate, timely decisions more effectively than adversary decision makers. In essence, information superiority enhances counterinsurgents’ freedom of action and facilitates maintaining the initiative. However, counterinsurgents must recognise that without continuous IA designed to achieve and maintain information superiority, adversaries may counter those advantages and possibly attain information superiority themselves. Counterinsurgents can achieve information superiority by maintaining accurate situational understanding while controlling or affecting the adversaries’ or target audience’s perceptions. The more counterinsurgents shape this disparity, the greater the friendly advantage.

5. **Dominant Narrative.** Counterinsurgent leaders must compose a unified message that exploits the negative aspects of the insurgent efforts and reinforces the credibility and legitimacy of the counterinsurgent efforts, which can be referred to as the ‘dominant narrative’. The dominant narrative counters
insurgent narrative and propaganda. It is vital for counterinsurgents to analyse, advertise and exploit the differences between accepted cultural norms and the insurgent narrative and propaganda. The dominant narrative must be the result of a painstaking and detailed effort using a comprehensive approach. While the dominant narrative should appeal to a wider audience, it must be shaped and adaptable to appeal to the cultural perspective of the population. The dominant narrative must strike a balance between simplicity for ease of understanding and explain an often complex situation. The dominant narrative must also be adaptive or it will fail or even be counterproductive. Finally, it assists in managing both expectations and information.

Employing Information Operations Capabilities

6. Insurgencies typically succeed or fail based on the support of the population. IA\(^9\) provides COIN with capabilities to influence the population’s perceptions of the insurgents’ activities and leadership.

7. **Information Actions Tools.** IA tools are used in the planning and execution of operations. It is the systematic coordination of a range of information-related tools designed to impact on the decision-making of an adversary and to protect our own decision superiority. IA seeks to harmonise these tools to achieve the greatest offensive and defensive contribution to a commander’s objectives. The set of information tools encompassed by ADF IA doctrine are as follows:

   a. **OPSEC;**
   b. psychological operations;
   c. deception,
   d. electronic warfare;
   e. computer network operations;
   f. destruction;

| g. | information assurance; |
| h. | protective security; |
| i. | counterintelligence; |
| j. | military networking and presence, posture and profile; |
| k. | civil-military cooperation; and |
| l. | related element – public affairs. |
CHAPTER 6
OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND PLANNING

The most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, not trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.

—Carl von Clausewitz

6.1 Operational design is a systemic approach to the problem of identifying, framing and solving the complex challenge presented by an insurgency. Mindful of Clausewitz’s adage, recognising when a COIN is required, allows for successful design and planning. This chapter outlines the design and planning required. Operational design is discussed as a method of examining or ‘framing’ an operational problem.

6.2 Operational design is viewed in the context of Australia acting in the role of either a security leader (lead nation force generation) or contributor (alliance force provision). When Australia is the lead nation, it will produce the operational design. The more common role for Australia is likely to be as a contributor to an alliance. In such circumstances, Australia will seek to influence the operational design produced by the lead nation. Furthermore, it will have to produce an operational design that frames the issue in line with national strategy. Planning and execution are examined as the means for integrating, sequencing, conducting and adapting the diverse range of actions necessary to defeat an insurgency. Finally, the adaptive cycle and its relevance to effective operational design, planning and execution is explained.

SECTION 6-1. COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

6.3 COIN requires a comprehensive approach that integrates the instruments of national power – DIME. These capabilities must be integrated and flow from the strategic, through the operational to the tactical level. Effective COIN often utilises task-organised, joint, combined and interagency organisations. Government policy will determine whether Australia will act as a security leader or whether its interests are better served as a security contributor.

6.4 Addressing the root causes of any insurgency usually requires political and social solutions which involves civilian elements of government. Early identification of a potential insurgency may enable the government to employ civilian instruments of power to address the root causes of the problem and prevent the requirement for military intervention.

Failing or Failed State Intervention

6.5 Operating in a failed, as opposed to a failing, state requires different interagency elements to achieve a desired strategic outcome. A failing state may have some functioning elements of governance and security that remain intact. The counterinsurgent must support these institutions to rectify the causes of a nascent insurgency. In a failed state, the functions of the HN government will have decayed to such an extent that basic services and security are no longer present. Therefore, the counterinsurgent will probably have to fulfil a broader range of governance roles.

6.6 Initiatives to establish governance should take account of the culture, context and unique aspects of the given AO. Such an approach needs to be centrally coordinated and de-centrally executed within the national, regional, provincial and district settings. This task is critical to any comprehensive approach.

Interagency Approach

6.7 The Strategic Command Group represents the ADF in an interactive dialogue with the National Crisis Management Machinery. This process is informed by all agencies of...
government. The National Security Committee of Cabinet decides which agency or department will take the lead for the campaign. The ADF may contribute to a multi-agency organisation in a supporting role, as illustrated by RAMSI. The ADF may also be required to provide support to other agencies, including C2 or logistics functions.

SECTION 6-2. OPERATIONAL DESIGN

… if we misdiagnose the problem we are not likely to come up with a solution.3

General

6.8 In COIN it is essential for commanders to gain an understanding of the operational environment in order to develop an operational design that complements the objectives of the overarching campaign plan and in doing so ensuring that it is tailored for the unique specifics of their AO.

6.9 The importance of design in conducting COIN cannot be understated; however, higher strategic level design is often of a holistic approach with a tendency to provide macro solutions. The challenge for the commander is to interpret the macro approach and provide micro solutions to the environment.

6.10 Operational design provides a means to gain understanding of a complex problem and insights towards achieving a workable solution. Operational planning is the traditional focus at the operational/tactical level in COIN. It is important that design is provided sufficient attention. While planning applies established procedures to solve a largely understood problem within an accepted framework, design inquires into the nature

2. National Crisis Management Machinery is the series of committees within Government, headed by the National Security Committee of Cabinet, which assists the Government develop a whole-of-government approach in response to situations that have the potential to threaten Australia’s national interest. This is outlined further in ADDP 5.0, Joint Planning (Provisional), 2006, [Chapter 3].

of a problem to conceive a framework for solving that problem. Simply, planning is problem-solving, design is problem setting. Design provides a means to conceptualise and hypothesise about the underlying causes and dynamics that explain an unfamiliar problem.

Counterinsurgency – A Complex Problem

6.11 COIN requires an understanding of complex problem-solving due to the character of the operating environment and the political nature of insurgency warfare. In a given operating environment there are a number of actors, inputs and variables, the interrelationships between which form a complex system. The interdependencies of this system mean that any action against one variable will have potentially unpredictable and unintended consequences throughout the remainder of the system. The operating environment is also dynamic and actors within the system continually adapt and modify methods, ideas and objectives, while new actors join and others leave further complicating the ability to understand the system.

6.12 Operating successfully in such a complex environment requires a considered and systematic approach to problem-solving that allows creativity, embraces complexity and fosters analysis and understanding. In COIN, operational design, planning and execution should seek to exploit complexity in a protracted and chaotic competition with the insurgent. Commanders must constantly assess and re-assess the system in which they are operating. They must regularly question the assumptions surrounding their approach.

Applying Operational Design to the Complex Problem

6.13 Operational design identifies the scope and nature of an operational problem, based on an analysis of the operating environment as a complex system.

6.14 At the operational level it is important to frame the parameters of the problem within the specific AO. While commanders and staff will endeavour to understand the operational environment prior to deployment, understanding is an iterative process and early efforts to understand the problem will be assumption
based. For both strategic- and operational-level design, it is likely that initial designs will be iterative and intended to interact with the system in order to produce outcomes which increase the understanding of the system and allow refining of design objectives. Recognising the importance of time and space in this process and its direct relationship with the diverse nature of the environment is paramount to understanding the problem.

6.15 While the operational design may provide holistic parameters for the entire theatre, FE commanders must gain an effective understanding of their specific AO in order to establish the unique parameters for subsequent analysis and operational design pertinent to their area of responsibility. Intelligence is key to the design process. This understanding through design drives operational planning and execution.

**Complexity in Iraq**

The town of Tarmiyah is a regional centre that sits on the western bank of the Tigris River in Iraq’s Sunni Triangle, approximately 45 km north of Baghdad. With a pre-invasion population of 50,000 (80% Sunni/20% Shia) and located in a fertile area, Tarmiyah’s prosperity was founded on servicing the luxurious villas built along the Tigris as weekend estates by senior figures in Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party. Several strong Sunni tribes lived in the area, including the influential Mashhadani, headed locally by Sheik Saed Jassim. A man of significant local influence, Jassim had risen to the 5th level of the Ba’ath party under Saddam Hussein.

Initially, Tarmiyah received relatively little attention from the Coalition forces, and subsequently the influence of former Ba’athists, disenfranchised Sunni and AQI elements were able to develop a stronghold within the town. Subsequently, the Shia element of the population was ethnically cleansed – the vast majority moving to Baghdad.

From late 2005 until mid-2007 a succession of US Army and Iraqi security force elements made serious attempts to secure Tarmiyah. The area was cleared
several times, without any large scale combat developing; however, in February 2007 Sheik Jassim was detained by US forces on suspicion of a variety of offences relating to fraud, embezzlement and collusion with AQI. He was subsequently handed over to the Iraqi authorities and imprisoned in Baghdad under the control of the Shia dominated Ministry of the Interior.

Following a VBIED attack on local police and Coalition forces on the 19th Feb 07, the situation for Coalition forces in Tarmiyah remained dire until August 07 when the 4th Bde of the US 2 ID launched OPERATION HEADHUNTER to clear and secure the town. HEADHUNTER was conducted using the classic ‘Clear – Hold – Build’ approach and marked the beginning of an improvement in the security situation within Tarmiyah. It also coincided with the arrival of the ‘Sunni awakening’ in Tarmiyah, which saw Sheik Jassim’s son, Imad Jassim, organise a citizens group to assist with local security.

The incarceration of Sheik Jassim was an ongoing issue in the relationship between the people of Tarmiyah and Coalition forces. While Imad was cooperating with CF, as a relatively young man he did not have the same influence in Sunni tribal politics that his father did. In early 2008 the 1/14th Infantry, commanded by LTC Tom Boccardi, assumed responsibility for the area of Tarmiyah. Whilst substantial progress had been made in the security situation in the months since OP HEADHUNTER under the 4/9th Infantry, the ongoing detention of Jassim remained a major obstacle to progress. After considerable pressure from senior figures within MNF-I, Jassim’s release was arranged. Importantly, Boccardi made the decision to pick up Jassim from his detention and personally bring him back to Tarmiyah.

Sheik Jassim made a public return to Tarmiyah accompanied by the CO 1/14th Inf. His return was marked by several days’ celebration in Tarmiyah. LTC Tom Boccardi was seen as responsible for the Sheik’s
return – and the decision to personally accompany Jassim was seen by the Iraqis as offering appropriate respect. This action marked a period of sustained progress by the people of Tarmiyah, the GOI and the Coalition in the security, governance and development of the region. A key factor in enabling this was the relationship that developed between Boccardi and Jassim.

6.16 Operational design focuses the JIPB through the identification of initial commander’s critical information requirements and an assessment of key actor relationships within the specific operating environment. In combination with aspects of preliminary scoping, the design ensures that deliberate mission analysis is conducted in context.

6.17 Interagency engagement at the design level promotes integration, effectiveness and, above all, consensus on the character of the operational problem. The design process should be inclusive not exclusive.

Design and Planning Interaction in Counterinsurgency

6.18 The inherent nature of a complex adaptive system is that it will continue to evolve, particularly once the FE begins to interact with it. As a result, it is important that design is conducted as an evolving process that is systematically reviewed based on relevant and AO specific measures of effectiveness (MOE). Ongoing critical self and independent review and assessment is a critical component of the Australian approach to COIN. The relationship between operational design, planning and execution is illustrated in Figure 6–1.
Design Considerations for Counterinsurgency

6.19 When conducting operational design for COIN a number of basic tenets are evident. Noting the role of the military in the whole-of-government approach to the COIN design process, commanders are offered the following areas for consideration:

a. **Political Primacy**. COIN requires a balanced whole-of-government approach when seeking an effective solution. Central to this is the need for political primacy, remembering that the military input is a small, albeit integral, aspect of this approach.

b. **Unity and Coordination of Effort**. The need in COIN is to integrate multiple, relevant agencies into a single campaign plan based on a comprehensive approach.

c. **Intelligence**. Integrate and coordinate the full range of intelligence capabilities into COIN design in order to answer critical questions and allow rapid counterinsurgent adaptation.
d. **Legitimacy.** The need for HN government legitimacy must be reinforced, particularly through the use of targeted IA. Methods to achieve legitimacy must be analysed carefully.

e. **Isolate Insurgents from Their Support Bases.** The effort to isolate insurgents from their support base may require careful analysis of the social or cultural implications of a program of ‘selective relocation’. The combination of physical and psychological means to be employed to isolate insurgents from their support base must be chosen with discrimination.

f. **Long-term Post-insurgency Planning.** The long-term strategic objectives of COIN campaigning should be developed in the campaign plan. The meaning of both ‘success’ and ‘failure’ will require consideration.

g. **Cultural Awareness and Sensitivity.** Recognise the elements in any campaign plan that ensures proper attention is paid to cultural sensitivities.

**SECTION 6-3. OPERATIONAL PLANNING**

*The essential thing is action. Action has three stages; the decision born of thought, the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. All three stages are governed by the will. The commander will tell them [his subordinates] what he considers necessary for the execution of his will, but no more, and he will leave them freedom in the manner thereof which alone ensures ready co-operation in the spirit of the whole.*

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Planning guides action and action generates change in the complex system that is the operating environment. In the case of COIN, any plan must embody ‘the spirit of the whole’ by articulating a comprehensive approach that supports decentralised and effective targeting. This section explains campaign planning in the specific context of COIN and how the operational design translates into a synchronised operational plan. It explains the considerations applicable to COIN campaign planning. The military objectives and campaign planning remain subordinate to and support the achievement of the ultimate aim: a political solution to the insurgency.

Operational planning is a process that controls the sequencing of operational-level activities to achieve strategic-level objectives. Operational planning integrates both the deliberate and immediate planning guidance and seeks to orchestrate the ways in which tactical means can be used to achieve strategic ends. In COIN planning, the need to integrate interagency planning from the outset cannot be overstated to ensure that the most robust solution is achieved.

The JMAP requires emphasis to be placed on the following areas:

a. The JIPB must be focused on defining and understanding the operational environment and the nature of the relationship between variables and actors. This requires expertise in and concentration on areas well beyond the normal range of conventional problems. This may require the force to draw on expertise and information not normally resident within the military.

b. In conventional problems there is a primary focus on the enemy. While dealing with the insurgent remains critical in resolving COIN problems, there is a need to remember that insurgency threat constructs are often more complex. There may be one or more active insurgent group but nascent groups are also important.

c. The staff planning process in COIN is likely to involve a broad range of stakeholders beyond those found in
6-11

standard military staff branches. The use and integration of other government agencies and non-military experts and stakeholders should be considered and their skills and knowledge exploited. Collaborative planning works to generate a comprehensive approach owned and understood by all involved. As a general rule, the COIN planning process should be inclusive. This requires careful management of information and a sophisticated assessment of operational security risk.

d. The design of appropriate MOE is a key to success. MOE and the metrics applied to assess the selected measures must link to the campaign objectives and must provide an effective means by which to assess progress and identify the need to change.

6.24 When developing a COIN campaign plan, the following should be considered:

a. The military must be prepared to take a subordinate role in planning and to support another government department-led assistance mission.

b. If the assistance mission is led by the military, the widest possible consultation in the preparation of the plan must occur.

c. Decisive points or events must be carefully sequenced and expressed in such a way that clearly and logically link to the campaign end-state and objectives.

d. All contributions – military and interagency – need to be harmonised to support the development of the HN government or authority as a credible and viable institution.

e. The initial level of effort may be dominated by security but as law and order improves, it will transfer to other agencies.

f. At the core of the planning process must be an understanding of the ultimate requirement for a political outcome.
SECTION 6-4. LINES OF EFFORT

6.25 The campaign plan will include multiple lines of effort. LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, 2008, describes five generic lines of effort that are interdependent, mutually reinforcing and necessary for orchestrating activities against insurgent forces. A operation designed along specified lines of effort unites the collective efforts of joint, interagency, multinational and HN forces. Lines of effort applicable to COIN may include, but are not limited to:

a. joint land combat,
b. population protection,
c. public information and IA,
d. population support, and
e. indigenous capacity building.

Joint Land Combat

6.26 Joint land combat involves establishing security and removing organised resistance to deny effective insurgent action. Combat will utilise all joint capabilities available to achieve the maximum effect on the insurgent. The land force must be proficient in joint close combat and be capable of securing a decisive advantage in combat power relative to the insurgent.

6.27 Where the insurgent uses conventional methods or concentrates combat power, the land force must be capable of fixing and destroying targets of opportunity.

6.28 Joint land combat must be anticipated in all COIN contexts. The capacity of the counterinsurgent force to fight and dominate regardless of the frequency of close combat has a direct impact upon insurgent freedom of action and the perceptions of the population. Close combat and combined arms must be practised during mission rehearsal exercises prior to deploying and must be internally and externally coordinated to be successful. The establishment of HN population security will be a key outcome in achieving the strategic-level objectives.
Population Protection

6.29 In a COIN, the highest priority initially will be controlling and mastering violence. In a failing or failed state, violence will almost certainly be a major feature of the operating environment. Therefore, control of violence will be a central requirement prior to establishing the conditions for major actions along the other lines of effort. Population protection will often be enabled by joint land combat. The ultimate outcome of population protection is to ensure the security of the threatened population, to establish law and order and to separate the insurgent from the population. Population protection and security is central to winning the perception battle and in building confidence in the COIN force and HN government (see Table 6–1). Human terrain mapping and monitoring is essential to the effective conduct of population protection.

Table 6–1: CAPT Ian Teague’s (Australian Army) ‘Principles and Regulations’, 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quang Ngai Province, South Vietnam</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principles:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respect the people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help the people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect the People</td>
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<tr>
<td>Obey Orders</td>
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</table>
6.30 Public information informs and shapes the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of a range of local, regional and international audiences. During planning, public information and its management must be central. A comprehensive approach to campaign planning will be bounded by the dominant narrative. A narrative is a story of events and the dominant narrative is an argument supporting the objectives of the counterinsurgent.

6.31 Employing and managing public information is vital for influencing perceptions. Therefore, the information battle is hotly contested by the insurgent, who is able to use their limited accountability and legal restrictions, advanced communications technology, human networks and innovative methods to generate international effects that support their political objectives. To counter the insurgent in this realm, emphasis must be placed on integrated IA, innovative methods and a focus on speed and timing in the use of information.
6.32 Campaign planning also needs to consider the key themes that will be communicated to the Australian public, the HN population and the international community, which are manifest in a dominant narrative. Framing the dominant narrative becomes the lead element in developing this line of effort. The support of the Australian people will be crucial during a protracted COIN as domestic resolve is a key determinant in a successful campaign.

Population Support

6.33 Population support establishes, restores or temporarily replaces essential services and infrastructure in affected communities and caters for displaced sections of the population. The campaign plan should consider the contributions that can be made by the military in such aspects as cash employment, reconstruction and contracted works. Consideration should be given to working with coalition and international agencies, AusAID and NGO to assist in population support. Initially, the security situation may preclude the use of some government and NGO.

6.34 Campaign planning must systematically assess the state of HN essential services and infrastructure and the capacity of non-military agencies to deploy and support the population. Each situation is unique and the plan will need to develop case-specific solutions. In some cases, especially where the security situation is poor or the threat to civilian agencies is particularly high, there may be a requirement for the military force to fill the population support ‘void’. This situation will directly influence force composition, the deployment sequence and the allocation of resources to population support. The aim is to move to a position where other agencies, NGO, humanitarian organisations and HN institutions and organisations can operate effectively within the AO. To reach this point, close and continuous liaison with these stakeholders is essential. Time and effort must be invested in understanding the aims, objectives and support base for each key stakeholder. For example, NGO have a wide variety of
6.35 Invariably, these civilian-support organisations will play an important and eventually leading role in this line of effort if the COIN is to succeed. Coordination with HN agencies ensures that population support activities are consistent with identified priorities and support local legitimacy.

Indigenous Capacity Building

6.36 Indigenous capacity building nurtures the establishment and strengthening of civilian governance including security; law enforcement; and legal, financial and infrastructure planning. Consideration should be given to training and mentoring of the HN security forces and establishing trade training schools and police academies. Support to and training of the judicial system and potentially the mentoring of local governors and town planners may also be required. The military can contribute to some of these roles but many aspects of civil governance are best developed using assets and people from other government departments or from the Australian domestic private sector.

SECTION 6-5. ADAPTIVE ACTION IN OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND PLANNING

6.37 The COIN forces understand and learn by interacting with the population and the enemy. Chance, own force actions or enemy mistakes create opportunities for exploitation. This section describes the need to ensure the campaign plan embeds the ethos, means, measures and systems required to ensure the plan adapts effectively during the conduct of COIN operations.

Adaptation

6.38 The complex nature of COIN operations requires monitoring and reassessment of the operational problem. Adaptation is the primary tool for retaining the initiative over a determined
and capable enemy. Adaptation is vital at all levels and across participating agencies.

6.39 The initial operational design and plan must incorporate the learning and adaptation method. The operational design and plan should be critically reviewed regularly and in liaison with other agencies. Crucial to adaptation are the MOE used to learn and gauge COIN actions.

SECTION 6-6. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

If we never look at the consequences of our behaviour, we can always maintain the illusion of our competence. If we make a decision to correct a deficiency and then never check on the consequences of that decision, we can believe the deficiency has been corrected.5

The Logic of Failure

6.40 The ongoing, systematic critical review of the campaign plan is a key to success in COIN. The complex system of the operating environment will change and COIN actions and their consequences need to be continually reassessed. It must always be remembered that the insurgent has an independent will. Insurgent actions and means will quickly and creatively adapt to the COIN and it is vital to invest considerable effort in anticipating, pre-empting or countering new or emerging insurgent objectives and methods. This requires command-led, systematic vigilance and targeted, ongoing JIPB.

6.41 MOE are an essential tool for monitoring campaign progress. MOE are those indicators that are considered to provide an insight into whether Australian actions are producing the intended or expected result. The selection and design of MOE is, therefore, important to understanding progress toward achieving COIN objectives. The selected MOE serve to focus the COIN intelligence effort and shape subsequent actions and methods. They are integral to systematic adaption as they

provide targeted information and feedback that triggers changes or modifications to the plan. They are, however, based on judgments and underlying assumptions that must be regularly reviewed.

6.42 Effectiveness is often difficult to estimate. The selection of metrics, or units of measure, applied to provide an estimate of each measure requires careful assessment and continual review. COIN requires a mix of quantitative and qualitative metrics. A key MOE may be the level of local support provided to the insurgency to mount attacks against COIN forces. A wide variety of metrics could be applied to estimate or judge this measure. A number of quantitative metrics can be used, such as the number, type and location of attacks against the COIN. These may be supported by qualitative metrics such as assessments of the levels of support based on surveys and the reviews of intelligence reporting. The selection of a particular measure and the mix of metrics employed to assess it must link directly to campaign objectives and be based on a systematic assessment of the operating environment.

Avoiding a Single Measure:

The Body Count Fallacy in South Vietnam

If you took Long Tan out of it, our average kill ratio was about 2.5–3 to 1; only about half or one man better than the South Vietnamese Army and 1 and 1.25 men less than the Americans. It is not a very creditable performance... some people would disagree and say killing is not a measure of success. I think it is...

—MAJGEN Tim Vincent, July 1967

MAJGEN Vincent’s comment reflects the importance of body count or insurgent kill rates during the Vietnam War. Although Vincent was careful to add that ‘we [Australians] do not measure overall success by body count kills’, operational success in Vietnam was frequently gauged using a single dominant metric – namely that of ‘dead insurgents’. The body count fallacy was particularly prevalent among Americans and was...
based on the assumption that military victory in the field against the insurgent was not only possible but represented the most critical requirement for strategic success. An overwhelming reliance on a body count metric had a profound impact on the shape of counterinsurgency in South Vietnam meant that the US effort was focused on military action. In an overall sense, successful counterinsurgency was undermined by a lack of emphasis upon population control and security and other non-military lines of operation.

In Vietnam, most Australian operations in South Vietnam avoided the body count fallacy and often emphasised integrated ‘hearts and minds’ operations and exploited the lessons of Australia’s jungle and counterinsurgency experience in New Guinea and Malaya respectively. However, as a smaller security contributor, Australia was unable to influence or change the operational approach of its larger US ally. As Australian military historian, Paul Ham, notes, ‘the body count psychology impinged at every level, from the largest operations to the smallest skirmishes’. In counterinsurgency, MOE must always take into account the results of activities – military and non-military – across all lines of operational effort.

6.43 The MOE are a key element of the comprehensive approach. Selected MOE must inform and shape tactical-level actions. The tactical commander focuses their activities on tasks that facilitate improved operational-level effectiveness. It is vital that the metrics support and do not undermine campaign objectives.

6.44 The MOE will be derived from the lines of effort and be informed by both the deployed land forces, interagency players and other stakeholders, especially HN leaders, groups and institutions. Metrics may be relevant to more than one MOE. Both MOE and metrics are mission specific.

6.45 In COIN, operational design and planning are critical to overall success and must be considered in terms of a comprehensive approach. Operational design concentrates on the framing of an operational problem, while campaign planning focuses upon developing an appropriate operational solution. The two functions are different, but remain closely linked and must be consistently reviewed in terms of complex problem-solving. Design must develop a systemic analysis of the operating environment that permits planning to be agile and adaptive. Features in COIN, such as lines of effort, population protection and support, MOE and adaptive action, must be considered as fundamental to the close functional interaction between elements of design and planning.
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 6

RESERVED
CHAPTER 7

CONDUCTING COUNTERINSURGENCY

What is dubbed the war on terror is in grim reality, a prolonged, world-wide irregular campaign - a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and moderation. In the long-term effort against terrorist networks and other extremists we know that direct military force will continue to have a role. But we also understand that over the long term we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. Where possible, … operations should be subordinate to measures to promote better governance, economic programs to spur development and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented from which the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideology.¹

SECTION 7-1. INTRODUCTION

7.1 Population security, based on presence, is the foundation-stone of successful COIN. The land force is likely, at least initially, to have the lead in any joint, combined and integrated force and must understand that there may be a number of centres of gravity within the population.

7.2 This chapter discusses the conduct of a COIN. It emphasises generic lines of effort, operational approaches, tactical activities, the employment of BOS, and the need to learn and adapt in order to successfully counter changes in insurgency activity and behaviour.

SECTION 7-2. EXECUTION OF THE OPERATIONAL PLAN

7.3 The conduct of a COIN must be linked to a campaign plan. The land force will play a supporting role in the achievement of some lines of effort and may take the lead in others. This balance may vary across the generic lines of operation.

7.4 The land force must be prepared to conduct the full range of military activities. However, the focus during COIN will be different from general war. A judicious and disciplined approach to close combat is required while the threat of force to create space for action will have more utility. Above all, the conduct of COIN requires that a land force place emphasis on becoming a learning and adaptive organisation.

7.5 The Australian approach to COIN is underpinned by the traditional warfighting philosophies of manoeuvre warfare and mission command. The manoeuvrist approach must consider both lethal and non-lethal means to achieve decisive events (see Table 7–1).

Table 7–1: Serong's Progression of Operative Technique

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Deterioration of economic stability or disappointment of economic expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Deterioration of political stability – general or more probably regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Police intelligence action – Special Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Police political action – arrests of individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Police tactical action – against small armed groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Minor tactical action – against larger armed groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Orchestrating Actions Along Generic Lines of Effort

7.6 Campaign design and planning is based on generic lines of effort with decisive events targeting the insurgent’s critical vulnerabilities. Decisive events are unlikely to be geographically focused, but rather related to security, governance or infrastructure (see Figure 7–1).

Figure 7–1: Australian Generic Lines of Operation for a Counterinsurgency Campaign

7.7 A well-designed campaign is based on a clear understanding of the generic lines of effort. This understanding needs to be imparted by the land force to all other agencies involved in the COIN. Commanders should link their operations to achieving the decisive events along the lines of effort.

7.8 An action on one generic line of effort will influence another line. Minor tactical incidents may have strategic implications. The Abu Ghraib incident in 2004, where Coalition forces mistreated Iraqi detainees, is a good example of an incident on
a population protection line of effort affecting public information and IA. It illustrates how a tactical action can have strategic consequences.

Special Operations Forces

7.9 Australian SOF have a strong heritage in COIN and will typically conduct initial shaping actions to enable the deployment of follow-on conventional forces. The quality of their personnel, high level of training, wide-ranging capabilities and interoperability with other land, joint and coalition forces make them ideally suited to fighting irregular forces in complex terrain.

7.10 SOF are trained to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. They are tailored for specific tasks where they can achieve disproportionate operational and strategic outcomes. SOF can be employed for protracted periods throughout a COIN, commanded by a relatively small operational HQ and employed unilaterally or in a coordinated manner. Further details are contained in LWD 9-1, Employment of Special Operations Forces (Developing Doctrine), 2005.

Generic Lines of Effort

Any national plan to counter revolutionary warfare must be directed at undermining the enemy’s prerequisites for successful insurgency operations. At the same time it must outstrip the insurgent efforts in each of its facets: political, social, economic and psychological policies, as well as diversified military tactics.3

7.11 These lines of effort are generic and should only be used as a planning guide. Each insurgency will be different and the campaign conduct should recognise this.

7.12 Each COIN requires a different balance of effort along the generic lines of effort. A number of considerations for each line


LWD 3-0-1, Counterinsurgency, 2009
of effort are provided in this section. These considerations are not exhaustive and should be used only as a guide.

Joint Land Combat

7.13 Joint land combat involves establishing security and removing organised resistance to facilitate effective action in the other lines of effort. Therefore, care must be taken not to apply too many resources to this line of effort at the expense of others. The size and composition of land forces will be a major factor influencing the conduct of COIN to achieve the desired end-state. The initial deployment must be sufficient to achieve the decisive events and be balanced to meet the operational needs of other lines of effort.

7.14 Land forces must aim at isolating the insurgents from the population, protecting the population, destroying the sources of insurgent support, performing security operations, and advising and assisting HN forces to conduct operations along this line of effort. By achieving these tasks the joint land combat line of effort sets the conditions for other lines of effort to succeed.

7.15 Traditionally, military forces define success based on the outcomes of combat. The impact of operations must be considered in relation to their impact on the population. In essence, when conducting COIN, a military victory does not equate to success.

7.16 Considerations for the joint land combat line of effort are as follows:

a. **Understanding and Respect of the Environment and Culture.** Develop environmental and cultural intelligence to enhance organisational knowledge. This can be achieved by:

   1. active patrolling that interacts with and observes the population;

   2. establishing a liaison network, which may include involvement in local meetings; and
(3) ensuring that interaction between land forces and the local population is marked by respect, courtesy, cultural awareness and sensitivity and professionalism.

b. **Judicious, Disciplined and Targeted use of Force.** Guard against the misuse of force by:

   (1) ensuring that ROE are understood and applied;

   (2) acknowledging, and being prepared to remedy, the unintended consequences of operations, such as building destruction; and

   (3) considering how the population might react when planning operations even for something as simple as a traffic control point.

c. **Provision of Security.** Population security is essential if other lines of effort are to be achieved. Some actions in aid of providing security include:

   (1) establishing population control measures,

   (2) retaining control of cleared areas, and

   (3) engaging with the local HN security forces in order to provide security.

d. **Reduce the Insurgent Organisation.** The insurgency is unlikely to be completely destroyed. Aim to reduce it so that HN forces can keep it suppressed. Some actions in aid of this goal include:

   (1) Exhaust, divide, capture, kill or possibly win over the senior and mid-level insurgent leaders as well as their networks. Establishing an amnesty or repatriation system is a method for achieving this.

   (2) Disrupt insurgent recruiting by supporting the development of employment opportunities.

   (3) Deny the use of insurgent base areas and sanctuaries.
Population Protection

7.17 Population protection is aimed at providing security to threatened populations. It is aimed at control and has both immediate and long-term aspects. In the immediate term, protection by control is concerned with defusing civil unrest and creating the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order. In the longer term, population protection continues in concert with indigenous capacity building to further strengthen law and order to a point where Australian land forces can withdraw.

7.18 In an insecure environment, the land force may initially have the leading role, as other agencies and HN forces may not be present or might not have the capacity to meet local needs. This line of effort is also closely intertwined with the joint land combat line of effort. Some considerations for population protection are as follows:

a. Secure the Population. Promote an environment whereby the populace can engage in normal daily activities, such as the sourcing of food, shelter, water, education and so on. This can be achieved by:

(1) dominating the environment through patrolling and population control measures,
(2) use of surveillance assets to gain intelligence and deter insurgents, and
(3) explosive ordnance disposal and hazardous material management.

b. Protect Essential Infrastructure. The protection of infrastructure and institutions that allow the conduct of normal daily activity complements security of the population. This can be achieved by:

(1) physical security of key points to deter an insurgent attack, and
(2) hardening of key points to reduce the impact of an insurgent attack.

c. Working with Local Security Forces. The HN’s security forces usually have the environmental and cultural intelligence to improve the effectiveness of this line of effort. This can be achieved by:

(1) assisting and reinforcing HN forces in their conduct of constabulary functions including arrest, investigation, processing and detention of criminals and insurgents; and

(2) special recovery operations and protective security details for selected dignitaries.

7.19 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the relationship between police and military forces is critical in COIN. Since COIN often occurs at the juncture between law enforcement and military operations, it represents a challenge to both police and soldiers. Neither police nor military units are optimised for the peculiarities of COIN. Police forces are concerned with consensual law enforcement operations in permissive and low-threat environments. In contrast, Australian land forces are trained for close combat in medium-threat to high-threat environments.

7.20 The requirements of the population protection line of effort highlights the reality of a ‘paramilitary’ gap between policing and military functions. A commander must therefore understand the paramilitary gap that exists between policing functions and military operations. This understanding can be achieved by a close liaison between police and military authorities. An integrated and calibrated political-military approach is required that is accompanied by clarity in C2 arrangements.

Population Support

7.21 The population support line of effort is the establishment, restoration or temporary replacement of essential services. Population support requires a comprehensive approach to
reduce the likelihood of humanitarian crises, mitigate the damage to infrastructure as a result of combat, reduce the internal displacement of the population, encourage a return to normal routines within communities and build confidence in the legitimacy of the HN government.

7.22 Failure to achieve decisive events in this line of effort creates opportunities for insurgents to gain influence over the population or to seek to profit from a destabilised situation. Land forces must be prepared to increase resources to support this line of effort.

7.23 Commanders and other agencies are required to work closely with the HN government to establish achievable goals. If goals are too ambitious, the COIN can lose the population’s respect and support. Importantly, MOE must be in place to ensure that false dependencies and unrealistic expectations are not created that would undermine the COIN.

7.24 In some cases, the land force has the greatest capacity to respond effectively to population support needs in the initial phase of a COIN. However, it is likely that once the population protection line of effort has been achieved to a pre-determined level, other government and non-governmental agencies will take the lead. In the case of an Australian-led operation, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, through AusAID, is likely to assume responsibility for this role. Regardless, the commander must continue to monitor the population support line of effort throughout the COIN to ensure synchronisation. Some considerations for this line of effort are as follows:

a. **Support to Basic Needs.** The provision of food, water and shelter can be achieved by:

   (1) **Airlift or airdrops of supplies from bases on land or at sea.** This may include water purification equipment, non-perishable food and similar items.

   (2) **Providing security to allow other agencies to supply basic needs.**
Support to Enabling Needs. The provision of enabling infrastructure to allow the handover of responsibility to other agencies can be achieved by:

1. Runway and road repair to allow distribution of basic needs.

2. Transport assets to enable other agencies to repair infrastructure such as electricity grids.

Population Support in Vietnam

The 1st Australian Civil Affairs Unit arrived in Vietnam in June 1967 and was tasked with winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese population within the Australian AO. Australian units were required to participate in civic action programs; however, due to the primacy of operational tasks, civic action programs were generally conducted during periods of low activity by small groups of personnel in their spare time.

Key aspects of these programs included the distribution of food and clothing, building and infrastructure repairs, medical and dental clinics, education and assistance for orphanages. General results of these programs included overall improvements in community health, reductions in orphan mortality rates and development of local economies through the establishment of village markets. Some programs had such an impact that villages previously thought to be supportive of the Viet Cong showed signs of openly supporting the activities of Australian forces.

The importance of all aspects of population support cannot be overlooked and are necessary in the creation of a security environment which enables the separation of the insurgents from the population. The actions of small groups and individuals in this process can dramatically influence the success of the COIN campaign.4
Indigenous Capacity Building

7.25 The indigenous capacity building line of effort includes the actions taken by land forces to assist in the establishment and strengthening of indigenous governance, security, policing, legal, financial and administrative agencies. This line of effort sets the conditions for transition to HN governance and, as such, it is fundamental to achieve the end-state. Land force contribution to this line of effort will predominately be security sector reform – the speed and effectiveness of reform in this sector will strongly influence progress in other areas. In the early stages of COIN, the land force may be required to take the lead in other areas of indigenous capacity building.

7.26 Indigenous capacity building aims to provide effective HN governance; this sends a powerful message that impacts on the perceptions of the population and helps reinforce government legitimacy. Central to this line of effort is the identification and empowerment of indigenous leaders who are not only credible and competent but also have potential for the future. The selection of local leaders, and their interaction with Australian land forces, will often be a balancing act between competing interests. The commander needs to align this situation with achievement of decisive events. Some considerations are as follows:

   a. **Building Capacity in the Security Forces.** This is likely to be the main decisive point achieved by the land forces in this line of effort. This can be achieved by:

      (1) understanding the security problem, including the capabilities and capacity of the HN security forces;

      (2) targeting capacity building to the local cultural context not the Australian context;

(3) training HN cadres first by focusing on identifying leaders and trainers of indigenous forces; and
(4) establishing an intelligence-sharing system and building trust from the outset.

b. **Building Capacity in Other Institutions.** Land forces may need to build capacity in other institutions until such time as other agencies are prepared to take the lead. This can be achieved by:

   1. Taking a comprehensive approach by consulting local representatives and Australian domestic specialists to encourage their buy-in and ownership.
   2. Including HN government institutions as equal partners and share leadership with local authorities to achieve legitimacy with the population.

**Public Information and Information Actions**

7.27 The public information and IA line of effort is a collection of capabilities brought together and focused to inform and shape perceptions, attitudes, behaviour and understanding of population groups. This reinforces the positive aspects of all lines of effort. Public information and IA underpin every element of COIN and are essential prerequisites for achieving decisive events.

7.28 Public information and IA must be coordinated into a comprehensive effort that includes HN governments and agencies. Once coordinated, key messages need to be disseminated and updated regularly at all levels. Centralised design with a decentralised execution underpins the process. Media coverage as well as insurgent propaganda can harm the COIN. Therefore, all personnel must be trained in basic media skills to mitigate negative media coverage and reinforce the dominant narrative.

7.29 Contemporary preoccupation with the moral dimension of conflict provides an opportunity for exploitation by insurgent
propaganda. Some considerations for this line of effort are as follows:

a. **Assess.** Comprehend the social, cultural and values framework of the population by:
   
   (1) understanding the gender relationship in the dissemination of information; and
   
   (2) understanding the means by which information is passed in the battlespace, whether it is by radio, phone or word of mouth.

b. **Plan and Integrate.** Effectively plan and integrate effort across the land force and between other government agencies, NGO and indigenous agencies and organisations by:

   (1) ensuring consistency of the message to avoid confusion and agitation; and

   (2) targeting insurgents, supporters of the government and the uncommitted populace individually and collectively.

c. **Disseminate.** Disseminate key messages by:

   (1) using culturally accepted means of dissemination and innovative means and employ the authority of local leaders; and

   (2) ensuring that means of dissemination will be able to be continued by HN agencies through the consideration of technical maintenance issues.

d. **Monitor.** Measure the effectiveness of the message and adapt it as required through:

   (1) robust MOE, and

   (2) achievement of decisive events in other lines of effort.
The Strategic Digger

During the period 12 to 14 December 2006, the 1st Reconstruction Task Force (1RTF) was conducting its first significant mission outside the wire in Uruzgan Province, southern Afghanistan. There had been an operational pause while 1RTF built up its force elements resulting in a loss of momentum. Furthermore, the local populace had seen a number of coalition partners, including the US Army, US Marine Corps and the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team, conduct operations in the area with only limited outputs being delivered.

On 14 December 2006, 1RTF conducted a tactical activity to reduce a piece of unexploded ordnance at the request of village elders. During the activity, a cavalry trooper noticed a vehicle moving toward the protective cordon. The cavalry trooper seized the initiative and dismounted from his ASLAV and stopped the vehicle from moving into danger. On inspection of the vehicle, he noticed an injured local national. On closer inspection, he realised that the situation was dire and that the injured person was likely to die if first aid and evacuation was not provided immediately. The digger took command of the situation, rendered life-saving first aid and, through thorough reporting, facilitated the evacuation.

The incident greatly added to the legitimacy of the mission and the winning of the perception battle with the local population. The saving of one man’s life had a significant effect on not only the attitudes of the local villagers but also in the larger town of Tarin Kowt, with the Uruzgan Provincial Governor, and the Afghani Government. The incident and accompanying IA facilitated greater access to the people, directly contributing to isolating the anti-Coalition militia from their likely support bases. The actions of one cavalry trooper had a significant influence on the operation.
SECTION 7-3. COUNTERINSURGENCY TACTICAL ACTIONS

Offensive military operations are necessary to restrict the enemy’s freedom of action in territory surrounding controlled areas and to seize the initiative in an area to be cleared and held.5

7.30 The conduct of operations during a COIN campaign will conform to guidelines laid down in LWD 3-0, Operations (Developing Doctrine), 2008. The components of fighting power – physical, moral and intellectual – remain relevant in a COIN although the balance required between them may change in comparison to conventional operations. In the case of COIN, the balance required favours an emphasis upon intellectual and moral components.

7.31 There are four types of tactical activities: offensive, defensive, stability and enabling. Types of tactical actions are not mutually exclusive. Offensive actions, defensive actions and stability actions will occur during the same operation.

7.32 The conduct of actions should not violate the overarching philosophy and dominant narrative inherent in the conduct of the COIN. At times, the success offered by an operation may have to be delayed in order to support a decisive event in another line of effort. For example, the pursuit of a fleeing adversary may have to cease or be postponed in order to secure an urban area or provide emergency humanitarian assistance to a local population that had been under adversary control. While the pursuit may capture or kill insurgents, the emergency assistance to the population garners popular support and gains legitimacy for the campaign.


LWD 3-0-1, Counterinsurgency, 2009
Offensive Actions

7.33 The aim of offensive actions in COIN is to seize and retain the initiative, destroy insurgent forces and capabilities, acquire information and deprive the insurgent of resources. Considerations for offensive actions are as follows:

a. They are underpinned with a manoeuvrist approach using combined arms teams. Offensive actions do not always include close combat. An indirect method can be used such as cordoning an area then convincing the insurgent to surrender without the use of force.

b. Offensive actions can be conducted against individuals (such as a lone sniper) or by large, formations (as occurred against North Vietnamese Army units).

c. The use of firepower in the form of artillery or air support comes with inherent risk and must be managed effectively to minimise unintended damage and consequences.

d. Recent trends indicate that offensive support has been unable to fix the insurgent in place. This tactic has meant that COIN forces now require increased proficiency in pursuit. This requires land forces making initial contact with the insurgent force to have access to rapid augmentation in order to maintain pressure against the fleeing force and destroy it.

Defensive Actions

7.34 The aim of defensive actions in a COIN is to regain the initiative, protect and shield actions of another force, collect information and destroy insurgent forces. Considerations for defensive actions are as follows:

a. Defences are oriented to the location of the community or installation rather than upon the most favourable terrain.

b. Perimeter defence is particularly applicable in support of the population security and population support line of
effort. When using HN security forces, training must instil the necessary confidence and ability to provide an effective defence for a community under attack until reinforcements arrive.

c. Defensive actions will assist in stabilisation of the area and allow government and other agencies to conduct their tasks during the build phase of an operation.

d. Defensive actions conducted by HN security forces provide protection for the populace and instil confidence. These actions should be integrated with the public information and IA line of effort.

**Stability Actions**

7.35 The aim of stability actions in a COIN is to prevent hostile acts from interfering with the normal routine of commercial and civilian life, thus enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government. Stability actions provide security for interagency cooperation and HN assuming responsibility. Considerations for stability actions are as follows:

a. There is likely to be a requirement for them to be conducted over a long period of time. It is essential that land forces remain dynamic and not fall into routines and patterns.

b. Operations should create an environment where the primacy of non-military and legitimate indigenous institutions can develop and function.

c. Security intervention should be undertaken in concert with local forces and agencies as part of a comprehensive approach.

d. Restoration of essential services, facilities and infrastructure is vital to return the population to normal routine and improve HN government legitimacy.

e. Setting the conditions for international and HN organisations to operate is a primary concern and will
provide the foundations for longer-term stability and wider reform.

f. Reinforcement of local institutions through respectful interaction is essential. Building trust between all parties develops legitimacy.

g. Support and train indigenous security forces and, when necessary, other HN agencies, to enable transfer of responsibility for national defence and internal security.

Enabling Activities

7.36 The aim of enabling activities in COIN is to link and create the conditions for the conduct of offensive, defensive and stability actions, ensuring continuity and maintenance of tempo. More detail on enabling activities can be found in LWD 3-0-3, Land Tactics (Developing Doctrine), 2009. Considerations for enabling activities are as follows:

a. Posturing across the battlespace to allow the transition between other activities in pursuit of decisive events along the lines of effort is essential.

b. Allow land forces to transfer contact with the insurgency from one combined arms team to another.

c. Enabling actions are likely to be required over an extended period and may have to support other agencies.

SECTION 7-4. EMPLOYMENT OF BATTLESPACE OPERATING SYSTEMS

7.37 BOS provide the framework within which the actions of the land force are synchronised across the battlespace. COIN provides the unique opportunity and ability to develop flexible task organisations to achieve assigned missions. To achieve the assigned mission, combined arms teams can be formed at the lowest level – a section or detachment. Combined arms teams can comprise all arms and services, joint, other government, coalition, HN and NGO.
In an effort to counter the threat of the anti-coalition militia-led insurgency, the 1st Reconstruction Task Force (1RTF) was required to conduct inter-agency operations on a frequent basis. Operations were frequently conducted using Australian infantry, cavalry, engineers, artilleryman, signals as well as Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team personnel, United States Operational Monitoring Team, Afghanistan National Army, Afghanistan National Police, Afghanistan National Highway Patrol, and USAID personnel. Using this approach, the activities of 1RTF were able to make a more comprehensive contribution to ‘fighting’ the insurgency and providing population support and enabling indigenous capacity building in the province.

7.38 The BOS considerations for COIN are as follows:

a. Command and Control. C2 requires a comprehensive approach that includes HN input (advisors, partnering and LO). HQ need to be centralised with decentralised command for operational and tactical commanders. The Army approach to mission command requires it to be fully embraced to allow commanders the latitude and flexibility to achieve their tasks and assigned mission. Coordination is required between all government and non-government agencies – and replicated at every level from the national level downwards. A joint planning approach should be used to synchronise actions and maximise the use of resources.

b. Manoeuvre. Manoeuvre conduct in COIN is in accordance with LWD 3-0-3, Land Tactics (Developing Doctrine), 2009. However, commanders need to be cognisant of synchronising tactical and IA that may influence the indigenous population. Therefore, the manoeuvre BOS requires detailed coordination and synchronisation with supporting BOS.
c. **Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.** ISR within a COIN is paramount. Coordination is required at the highest level to coordinate platforms and other means of intelligence and reconnaissance. However, ISR require decentralisation in order for forces at the operational and tactical level to gain maximum benefit. Land forces should allocate sufficient resources to counter-intelligence activities due to the close proximity and interaction with the indigenous population.

d. **Information Operations.** IA become paramount in COIN operations. Insurgent forces will utilise propaganda to discredit and undermine COIN and HN forces. COIN requires well thought-out and coordinated media campaigns by HN and COIN forces in order to gain the trust and support of the population. Conventional electronic attack and electronic warfare means are vital in COIN as the insurgents utilise modern communications to conduct their IA globally.

e. **Offensive Support.** Offensive support requires good coordination and control. Offensive support gives COIN and HN forces the upper hand and ability to destroy insurgent capability. If misused or insufficiently controlled, offensive support can be utilised by insurgents to undermine legitimacy.

f. **Mobility and Survivability.** In a COIN, mobility and survivability resources and assets can be employed to assist in building indigenous support and creditability. Mobility and survivability assets could be the initial response prior to civilian or other agency assets being employed. These assets will also provide interoperability and liaison with NGO and other organisations.

g. **Ground Based Air Defence.** GBAD can be used to develop TTP to counter the insurgent threat against ADF aircraft, provide local air warning and defence against indirect fire or may be re-roled to support another BOS.
h. **Combat Service Support.** CSS may be required initially to support HN forces and provide resources to indigenous population until government or NGO can commence operations to support affected indigenous areas. CSS elements will require protection from insurgent activities because they may be seen as opportune targets and sources to equip and sustain insurgents.

**SECTION 7-5. LEARNING, ADAPTING AND COUNTERING INSURGENT ADAPTION**

*There have been literally hundreds of unexpected events—incidents that you would not encounter in your wildest dreams. That is when we all fall back on training and adaptability.*

7.39 The conduct of COIN seldom follows a smooth and orderly path. To be effective, the land force must be multi-skilled, agile, versatile, adaptable and well-trained. It needs to be smarter than the insurgent. Because of the diversity of threats insurgents pose and their ability to develop and change tactics rapidly, land forces need to prepare to learn quickly and ‘on-the-job’. The ability to adapt to changing circumstances more quickly than the insurgent is central to ensuring operational success. To achieve this, each soldier must be committed to continuous self-development and learning while at the same time conducting operations to counter the insurgents’ ability to adapt.

7.40 COIN are conducted in a competitive learning environment. The key to success will be its ability to effectively orchestrate effort across lines of effort. As a result, the land force must have the ability to quickly shift its main effort between lines of effort.

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Learning and Adapting

7.41 Adaptive action is an iterative process of forcing the enemy to respond while the land force itself learns from those responses. Adaptive action is therefore a process of discovery and learning and is about ‘context appropriate behaviour’. It incorporates outputs from deliberate planning as the start point for subsequent interaction with the environment and is continuously developed during the conduct of operations. The use of IED in various forms against Australian land forces and the latter’s subsequent ability to adapt to the use of these devices is an example of this process.

7.42 The adaption cycle of ASDA is the Australian basis for learning and adapting and is shown at Figure 7–2. Importantly, ASDA is not a template and it should be applied to the unique circumstances of each COIN.
Figure 7–2: Adaption Cycle of Act, Sense, Decide and Adapt

7.43 ASDA is described as follows:

a. Act. The land force acts to stimulate a response from the insurgent or environment. Its actions are characterised as follows:

1. Probing Actions. To test or confirm its understanding of the environment, the land force conducts actions. Holding a town meeting, for example, in order to understand local cultural and leadership dynamics.
(2) **Decisive Action.** Having confirmed its understanding of the battlespace, the land force may elect to conduct larger actions, such as a clear-hold-build operation. In committing itself to a larger action, the land force acknowledges that further modifications will be necessary and are likely based on an improved understanding of the operational problem.

(3) **Modifying Actions.** In response to land force actions, adaption in the COIN will occur. The development of new TTP to deal with traffic control points is but one example.

b. **Sense.** Reactions to land force actions need to be observed and interpreted. Consequently, the land force needs to do the following:

   (1) **Learn to See What is Important.** To ensure that the land force is able to adapt to change it needs to develop a plan for observing the reactions and adaption of both the insurgents and the population.

   (2) **Learn to Measure What is Important.** The need to develop a plan for measuring the effectiveness of land force operations across lines of effort is crucial. Body counts are rarely an effective measure of success in COIN.

c. **Decide.** The key to deciding when and how to adapt is as follows:

   (1) **Understanding What the Response Means.** Having acted to stimulate a response, and sensed the response, the key is to understand what that response means.

   (2) **Understanding What Should be Done.** Having understood what the response means, understanding what should be done is therefore vital. Once the land force has understood a
problem it can decide upon a solution. For example, up-armouring a vehicle may not necessarily be the best way to defeat IED and a change in routines and habits might be more effective.

d. **Adapt.** It is inevitable that as a consequence of land force actions, insurgents will adapt their methods. As a result, the land force must be able to accommodate change and, if required, adapt at a quicker rate. Therefore, the land force must do the following:

(1) **Learn How to Learn.** Small teams will often discover successful strategies for dealing with a problem. These strategies need to be disseminated quickly to improve effectiveness. Often the most important lessons will come from early identification of people’s mistakes. Consequently, the land force needs to move away from a ‘zero defects mentality’ in favour of a culture that embraces learning from mistakes.

(2) **Know When to Change.** An important aspect of learning is knowledge of what to learn and its relevance to the future. Identifying what to learn must be accompanied by identifying when to implement change. To be effective, change needs to permeate the entire land force.

(3) **Challenge Understanding and Perceptions.** Success breeds complacency and the more successful a force becomes, it can also become less responsive to change. Commanders at all levels must be encouraged to constantly challenge their understanding and perceptions or they risk being deceived by insurgents.

**Countering Improvised Explosive Devices**

An attack by an IED represents a significant hazard to personnel, property and operations and has over numerous COIN campaigns proved one of the
insurgents’ most effective weapons, allowing them to distance themselves from contact. The IED threat is constantly evolving and recent operations have demonstrated an extremely quick development cycle by insurgents.

Whilst the basics of patrolling outlined below have remained constant, the appearance of new devices designed to outwit land force countermeasures (both technical and procedural) requires a constant level of vigilance and a preparedness to change TTP to overcome the latest threat. It is therefore essential that all those involved in a COIN campaign understand the nature of the threat in order to identify it on the ground, assist in defeating the insurgency and, ultimately, save lives. Through the use of the ASDA cycle, TTP have been developed to reduce the effectiveness of IED. This development flows largely from the After Action Review and lessons learned methodology employed by Australian and coalition forces. Some of these TTP include renewed emphasis on joint intelligence preparation and management of the battlespace, increasing the element of risk to the insurgent. They also make use of air, aviation, ISTAR assets for route safety and removal or clearance of roadside debris.

Another factor of importance in reducing IED threats has been the introduction of new armoured vehicles with improved sensory and countermeasure equipment. The use of IED offers insurgents a means of attacking security forces with a high probability of success. However, it is possible to defeat IED, put the insurgents on the defensive and, ultimately kill or capture them, through the intelligent use of correct technical and procedural countermeasures.7

7.44 The following considerations will assist in the development of adaption skills in the COIN battlespace:

7. Adapted from information from the Australian Land Warfare Development Centre, Puckapunyal.
a. Continue developing an understanding of the COIN. Continuous joint intelligence preparation and management of the battlespace, matched with fusion concepts, is the key.

b. Develop simple, effective MOE that will help determine a shift in emphasis in lines of effort when required.

c. Continue to learn from the experience of others by reading operational reports, both Australian and foreign.

d. Learn from one’s own actions through after action reviews and feedback into the planning process.

e. Feed information into creating ‘lessons learnt’ material to allow follow-on forces to undertake improved preparation and planning.

f. Study and implement various learning organisation concepts to suit the particular battlespace and land force structure.

Countering Insurgent Adaption

7.45 Insurgents will adapt and continually evolve. Acknowledging this reality will allow the development of countermeasures that will reduce the insurgents’ ability to learn and adapt. Consideration in disrupting the insurgents adaption cycle are as follows:

a. identifying insurgent adaption through HUMINT, forensic examination and after action reviews;

b. responding to insurgent adaption:

(1) influence the probing actions of the insurgent;

(2) degrade the insurgent’s sensing capacity and deny recognition of land force patterns and procedures; and

(3) interdict communication of successful adaptation and target key innovators;
c. recover any lost initiative by continually improving TTP without being prompted by insurgent action; and

d. protect essential elements of friendly information.

**Successful Adaption to Irregular Military Activity in East Timor:**

**UNTAET Sector West Peace Keeping Force in 2000**

Between May and October 2000, the United Nations Transitional Administration East Timor (UNTAET) Peace Keeping Force (PKF) confronted cross border infiltration by former East Timorese armed militia groups operating from bases within West Timor. Cross-border infiltration in force by militia irregulars led to a series of attacks and ambushes against the 6th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) and the 2/1st Battalion Royal New Zealand Regiment (RNZIR), both operating as part of the PKF formation, Sector West. Increased militia incursion and infiltration resulted in the death of two PKF soldiers and to the rise of fear within the local population. The militia deliberately employed methods that exploited their relatively light scales, low profile and agility. They used the close country to mask their movement and to neutralise any PKF technological superiority based on assets such as helicopters and forward looking infrared (FLIR). In order to counter the increase in militia activity, the Commander Sector West, Brigadier Ken Gillespie, developed a new and adaptive concept of operations. His intention was to detect, locate and intercept militia groups as early as possible through an increased emphasis upon HUMINT, population support, terrain analysis and interdiction missions.

**Human Intelligence and Population Support**

To conform to the new concept of operations, an expanded HUMINT and liaison network was established by the PKF across the entire AO. Communications with the local community were revitalised, improved and networked. Village elders
were given radios and cell phones in order to allow them to report sightings of militia groups. 'Fly away' HUMINT teams were deployed to interview and collect information from villagers and a requirement for indigenous support was fully integrated into the PKF concept of operations. PKF tracker teams were used extensively to exploit information supplied by various village sources. A surveillance screen was also established along the border through the use of observation posts and electronic measures. FALANTIL elements played an important role in ensuring the success of these measures by assisting the PKF in establishing good relations with local communities and by providing useful intelligence on the activities of militia forces. Coalition contributors to Sector West were also focused on those missions and tasks that ensured the best use of their particular capabilities and specialist skills. For example, Fijian affinity with the local population was exploited by an expanded role across the Sector’s CIMIC (civil military cooperation) effort.

**Detailed Terrain Analysis and Interdiction of the Adversary**

In the new PKF concept of operations, a painstaking analysis of militia routes was developed in order to supplement ‘follow on’ actions with interdiction measures. Detailed terrain analysis revealed that militia groups tended to adhere to common infiltration routes often located at river crossings or other natural obstacles. A good understanding of local terrain allowed the PKF to anticipate the adversary by using a combination of airborne insertion operations, reconnaissance missions and tracker teams to identify, fix and interdict militia groups. In particular, helicopters were used to mould militia activities by masking routes and points so encouraging militia movement towards areas in which PKF interception could occur.
Successfully Intercepting and Dispersing the Enemy

An adaptive concept of operations sensitive to changing conditions and equipped with timely intelligence, permitted Sector West Forces to engage the enemy on ground of their choosing by driving militia forces towards a series of known choke points. In October 2000, when three major militia groups attempted to return to the sanctuary of West Timor, they were successfully intercepted and dispersed with a number of militiamen killed.

Following these successful missions, Sector West HUMINT teams returned to Timorese villages in order to conduct follow up actions. These activities involved the display of photos of dead militiamen in an attempt to verify the identity of those killed. These follow up actions proved invaluable in that they clearly demonstrated the ability of the security forces to provide rapid and effective population protection. Finally, and with the cooperation of the Indonesian Border Security Task Force and from the UN and other agencies, news of PKF operational successes against militia infiltrators was widely disseminated throughout the West Timor border refugee camps.

SECTION 7-6. SUMMARY

7.46 The Australian Army’s approach to COIN is clear-hold-build. The aim of this approach is to provide population protection by clearing insurgents from areas and then holding and building upon HN capacity in those areas. Winning support from the population requires a comprehensive approach and an emphasis upon stability, reconstruction and indigenous capacity building after areas are cleared and held. The conduct of COIN follows generic lines of effort, employs tactical and IA and is based on the ability to adapt while on-the-job.
CHAPTER 8
SUSTAINMENT

Ensure your CSS assets are hardened, have communications, and are trained in combat operations. They may do more fighting than your rifle squads.¹

SECTION 8-1. INTRODUCTION

8.1 This chapter describes sustainment for COIN and guides commanders and logisticians in the planning and conduct of CSS specific to COIN. The fundamental principles of sustainment, as outlined in LWD 4-0, Combat Service Support, 2008 apply to all natures of conflict, including COIN. However, the unique and continually changing aspects of COIN demand that the following principles are emphasised: flexibility, responsiveness, sustainability and survivability.

8.2 In addition to the specific logistical requirements of COIN, logisticians and commanders must develop an intimate understanding of the distinct threats to lines of communication. CSS units are part of the COIN fight and in some cases the provision of logistics will be the main effort. Logistics nodes represent high pay-off targets and will be expected to simultaneously support units conducting a variety of operations, from capacity building to mid-intensity combat operations; often in unfamiliar environmental conditions and producing unexpected frictions.

8.3 The logistician will provide support to military units, other government, non-government and local authorities. Activities will include both local capacity building and promoting the self-sufficiency of indigenous organisations as a key requirement. A high degree of innovation, improvisation and

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adaptation throughout the logistics chain will be very important in defeating an insurgency.

8.4 Initially, in a COIN the military may be the only organisation capable of supporting the indigenous population. Therefore, logistics must be able to sustain the force and be prepared to provide essential support to the population. Support provided to the population may become an important shaping or even decisive operation.

SECTION 8-2. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

8.5 The conduct of logistical support will always rely on a number of fundamental questions or issues to be addressed: the destination, the demand, the duration and the distance. Given a typical COIN, tailored or focused logistics are an overarching requirement. For example, rather than small stock holdings being distributed throughout the supply chain, the COIN fight may demand the stockpiling of key supplies within operational areas close to the fight. There is a real risk of insurgent interdiction of the supply chain. All measures must be taken to ensure open lines of communication so that supported units can carry out sustained operations. The following considerations will also underpin the execution of sustainment in COIN:

a. In addition to operational and geographical considerations, the level of threat against static CSS installations will dictate basing options. Consideration should be given toward third-country locations, combined in-theatre bases and sea-basing options, particularly when the number and rate of effort of lift (air and helicopter) assets is relatively high.

b. The dispersal of operational units will require multiple support areas and an increased complexity in the supply chain.

c. Lines of communication are vulnerable to insurgent interdiction and urban areas will provide obstacles to the
effective movement of CSS. Movement will typically be slowed and restricted. Routine patterns (including delivery method and route) will give rise to force protection issues. Aerial delivery can be very effective, particularly when dispersed units require rapid resupply.

d. Dependency on HN and/or local resources may highlight vulnerabilities in sustaining the force, including contractual, coordination and standardisation issues. However, local providers will represent an important alternative in many cases, particularly for units in dispersed locations.

e. The manpower intensiveness of these operations may see efficiencies in CSS manpower being sought over time. Any surge in combat operations must be supportable and should see CSS manpower levels adjusted accordingly.

f. The operating environment and consequences of lapses in OPSEC highlight the importance of it. Care must be taken not to expose operational intent through CSS preparations.

8.6 COIN logistics planning will typically also require an assessment of the following:

a. HN and other military (coalition) or agency logistics (UN, IA, NGO) capabilities and capacity;

b. strategic lift availability, including commercial charter options;

c. life support requirements (food, medical, shelter, power, sanitation) of civilians, including displaced persons;

d. existing economic capacity and any causal factors to any breakdown in industrial, manufacturing or agricultural output. This assessment should include an impact study on domestic requirements and determine measures to recover essential capacity. The location of specialised industries (manufacturing, mining and agriculture).
service industries and transport nodes, links and methods is required;

e. means by which to effectively communicate with HN authorities to determine their requirements;

f. the urban system within a country or region: the size, location and level of interdependency between urban areas or cities, including essential transport corridors (which may represent potential lines of communication); rail lines; airports; ports and pipelines. An understanding of the normal flow patterns of people, freight and information, which the insurgents will exploit is important; and

g. geographical analysis to identify natural distribution corridors, choke points, logistic friction locations and potential lines of communication interdiction points.

SECTION 8-3. PROVISION OF LOGISTICS

8.7 In COIN, CSS units are not only required to support the combat force but may also be required to assist the local population. CSS units may provide support to the campaign lines of effort by reinforcing HN organisations. Overall, the provision of logistics to a COIN campaign by CSS elements will be determined by the following three key factors:

a. the nature of Australia’s involvement in the operation, either as a leader or as a contributor;

b. it will be a combined effort between Australian, HN and Coalition logistic providers, both military and contract, as well as IA and NGO; and

c. there may be a requirement to support lines of effort by providing logistical effort to HN agencies and population.

8.8 As detailed in Chapter 5, Australia’s involvement in a COIN campaign either as a leader or as a contributing nation will impact on the appropriate balance between the various agencies providing in-theatre logistics support.
Logistics Providers

8.9 The numerous agencies providing in-theatre logistics include military logistics units and other logistic providers including civilian contractors are as follows:

a. ADF units – the CSS elements force-assigned;

b. Australian contractors – these include Australian contractors deployed to the theatre and strategic-level contractors providing support from the national support base;

c. Coalition military units;

d. HN military units – if the HN has an operating military, it may have CSS elements providing logistic support; and

e. other civilian contractors and organisations.

8.10 The relationship and responsibilities will vary between theatres. However, considerations for an effective balance between the various logistics providers are as follows:

a. Initial planning must be based on self-sufficiency until support from HN and/or Coalition partners is established. Clear delineation of responsibilities here is essential.

b. The provision of legal instruments, as detailed in Annex A to Chapter 4, for example, MOU.

c. The level of interoperability between Coalition and HN military forces. For example, there are slight variations to the classes of supply between ABCA nations, but comparison tables are available to overcome the differences.

d. Maximum use should be made of HN resources in order to provide timely and cost-effective logistics. This will also support the HN economy and indigenous capacity building. This utilisation of indigenous supply chains must be balanced against security and in some cases quality concerns.
Military Logistics and Civilian Contractors

8.11 In COIN, civilian logistic contractors may support Australian and multinational forces. Contractors may often be heavily reliant on the employment of HN local staff. This is because large-scale pre-arranged contracts with international private contract agencies are very often sub-contracted to some degree to smaller theatre-based providers. Theatre-support contractors usually obtain most of their materials, goods and labour from local providers. Examples of the types of goods and services which theatre-support contractors may provide can include:

a. construction, delivery and installation of concrete security barriers for the defence of counterinsurgent bases and HN public buildings;

b. construction of security fencing;

c. public building construction and renovations;

d. sanitation services;

e. maintenance of motor vehicles;

f. road construction and repair;

g. trucking and cartage;

h. provision of food and water and support to messes and canteens; and

i. provision of material supplies.

Considerations for the Employment of Contractors

8.12 Assessing the Risk. In a COIN commanders must carefully consider the appropriateness of using contractors, particularly those who will apportion much of the work to sub-contractors and local staff. Again, ongoing risk analysis is essential. On the one hand, the widespread employment offered by contract arrangements will invariably support COIN economic
objectives; but the risks associated with such programs, especially as a result of insurgent infiltration, can also be significant. The risk versus opportunity must be carefully assessed and managed. Most importantly, this is a command responsibility; it is not just solely a logistician’s job.

8.13 Security Management and Identification. Due to the subversive nature of many insurgent activities, all contractors and their employees will need careful security vetting. In addition, all contractors and their employees will require state-of-the-art identification that is tamperproof (ideally photographic and biometrics). This identification needs to be coded to indicate the relevant security status, supervision requirements and access clearance. In the case of HN employees ‘badging’ can also be an accountability tool at daily entry and exit control/check points.

8.14 Risks to Contract Employees. The security and safety of contracted local employees should also be a high priority of commanders and logistics staff. Although insurgents may target logistic contractors and their employees, both are not combatants. They are, and should be classified as ‘civilians accompanying the force’. This status must not be jeopardised and the military units with which they are working should take responsibility for their security. Units employing HN contractors and employees must watch for signs of exploitation or corruption which may alienate sections of the society and further erode COIN objectives. Treated fairly and respectfully, HN employees can provide good insights into the local culture and the general ‘climate’ of community acceptance (or rejection) of COIN initiatives within an AO.

8.15 Local Labour Policy. Additionally, local labour can represent a vital source of information for insurgents. A vetting system for local national support is a mandatory and ongoing requirement. A local labour policy detailing management of these issues must be compiled.
Logistics Customers

8.16 The relatively broad logistics customer base in a COIN adds additional complexities to the provision of effective support. This support will often extend beyond the function of simply ‘sustaining military activities’. It may, for example, include the provision of support to the local population of the HN as part of the operational lines of effort.

8.17 When supporting lines of effort through logistics, it is important to ask the locals what they need and want, rather than to pre-empt this. The potential impact on the logistic system must then be carefully calculated. For example, the conduct of medical combat aid patrols in outlying areas will significantly increase the medical supply requirement and level of risk during resupply.

8.18 Government agencies and NGO may request additional support on an ad hoc basis. This may include requesting support for aiding refugees or displaced persons and members of the civil population. It is important to consider all requests in light of how they may support lines of effort and contribute to achievement of the campaign plan, and this must be balanced with the additional stress placed upon the logistic system. Assistance may also take the form of advice, loans or expert supervision. This may also include the gifting of equipment during the draw-down of an operation for equipment and stores that cannot be returned to Australia.

8.19 The use of CSS assets to directly support lines of effort or provide support to NGO must never impact on the unit’s ability to provide CSS for ADF elements.

SECTION 8-4. FORCE ELEMENT ISSUES

8.20 Most attacks on Coalition forces in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, outside pre-planned combat actions, were against CSS installations and convoys. Additionally, the operational environment is likely to include non-contiguous AO and a wide
dispersion of units down to platoon level. Force protection and modes of transport are vital considerations to minimise risk.

8.21 Force Protection. As outlined, insurgents have deliberately sought to interdict and engage CSS FE as they are often considered ‘soft targets’ with limited or no response capability. Therefore, CSS assets must be hardened, have communications, have situational awareness and be thoroughly trained in infantry minor tactics in order to protect themselves and others. Other force protection measures are outlined in LWP-G 3-6-4, Physical Force Protection, 2007.

8.22 Modes of Transport. It is relatively easy for insurgents to observe patterns in friendly logistic activities that make them vulnerable to interdiction. Commanders need to seek logistic distribution methods using all modes of transport available in order to maximise efficiency and security. Large scale convoy movement of a routine or predictable nature must be avoided. The following are two modes of transport:

a. **Surface.** Surface transport means are most vulnerable to interdiction. Routes should, where possible, bypass population centres and heavily used civilian transport nodes and systems. Within controlled areas, surface transport remains the most economical means. In areas inaccessible to vehicles, porters or pack animals may be used to transport logistic stores, although their carrying capacities are relatively small and their rate of movement is slow.

b. **Air.** Air transport is the best method for overcoming the vulnerability of surface modes, reducing time frames and limiting the impact on public roadways which could alienate the HN population. Air transport is vulnerable if the insurgent possesses a GBAD capability. Air modes of distribution enable access to areas inaccessible by road or water but are costly and limited in lift capacity for bulky equipment. Military airframes are the preferred means of air transport. However, it is not uncommon to establish civil contracts for strategic lift and aeromedical evacuation.
Personnel

8.23 Sustained operations will necessitate combat elements to operate within strict OPSEC guidelines, including irregular contact with families at times. The IA campaign of the insurgents can potentially undermine the morale of the troops and their families, and personnel support to families is often best affected by donor units and defence support organisations.

8.24 Delivery of in-theatre personnel service is a CSS responsibility and is essential to maintaining the morale of all personnel and therefore promoting a force’s fighting power. These services include:

a. a rapid incident notification process (including casualties and deaths), evacuation and casualty treatment capability and appropriate mortuary affairs policy;

b. a frequent postal service;

c. an efficient reinforcement procedure;

d. financial services;

e. reliable welfare services (internet, telephones, local newspapers/magazines religious support and legal advice); and

f. provision for in-theatre of out-of-theatre leave.

Health Support

8.25 The COIN is physically and psychologically punishing. Personnel will routinely be placed in stressful situations and the necessity for increased awareness and focus will place constant high demands on individuals. Casualties rates, both combatant and non-combatants, will be relatively high and evacuation is often dangerous and time-consuming, given the dispersed nature of combat units and their operating environments. Medical services will also be placed under significant pressure, particularly specialist medical support at Level 2 and Level 3 facilities. In some cases (eg. critical
incident management) specialists will be required to move forward to provide essential services.

8.26 A number of measures can be taken to augment the in-theatre health support capability and include:

a. acclimatisation of the force before entering the theatre of operations;

b. regular refresher training for all personnel in combat first aid;

c. the provision of combat first aid-qualified personnel down to the lowest level;

d. education on preventative health measures;

e. careful management of health professionals, including the rotation of specialist personnel; and

f. maintaining close relationships with Coalition partners.

8.27 Local health capacity building is also important and may require health education and clinical initiatives. In more remote areas, combat units should also be prepared to conduct medical clinics (general practitioner or nurse) and where possible facilitate dental and veterinary support.

SECTION 8-5. REAL ESTATE AND INFRASTRUCTURE

8.28 Establishing CSS elements in a HN requires significant infrastructure and real estate requirements. Operations will necessitate an early assessment of HN infrastructure (railways, ports, airfields, waterways and storage facilities). However, insurgents will also appreciate the importance of these facilities and will either seek to utilise them or prevent others from doing so through ongoing interdiction or destruction. The retention of key infrastructure, including any necessary repair and maintenance, is important to the sustainment as well as the restoration of civil capacity and ongoing economic development.
8.29 One of the key issues with infrastructure and real estate is the legal aspect of acquiring the use of such facilities. This needs to be addressed in the SOFA. Close cooperation with the HN is required because the siting of bases can either support or offend local cultural sensitivities. Potential exists for ill-sited facilities to substantially disrupt the daily lives of the HN population.

8.30 Points of Entry Infrastructure. Secure ports and airports are critical to sustainment. The identification of suitable facilities and establishing the necessary legal instruments.

8.31 Basing. The following are two main options for establishing bases:
   a. use existing infrastructure under a contractual arrangement with the HN, or
   b. acquire real estate through a contractual arrangement with the HN and then construct a base.

8.32 The purpose, size of force to be accommodated, duration of use and security situation will determine which option is suitable. The asymmetric and non-linear nature of the insurgent threat will threaten typical ‘rear area’ logistic hubs and potentially force basing options to be smaller, dispersed and sometimes temporary. Permanent options should be carefully sited to maintain a balance between base force protection and the effective supply forward to combat units. Additionally, bases should not be seen by the HN population as being akin to ‘opulence amidst poverty’. Such impressions will be quickly used by insurgents to undermine the otherwise legitimate presence and intentions of the COIN.

SECTION 8-6. GOVERNANCE

8.33 Sustaining capability over the longer term (both equipment and personnel) is fundamental to the success of COIN. The ability of combat units to constantly apply pressure to the threat demands robust logistical procedures and practices. In this sense, governance remains central to the maintenance of core
logistics requirements in the longer term. However, interaction with HN and/or other agencies and the provision of logistics support to these external organisations will require flexibility in the manner in which governance requirements are scheduled. In many cases, particularly if local logistic capacity building is being enabled, the provision of material support should seek to complement local customs and practices. As an example, it may initially seem prudent to provide local security forces with Australian Army equipment, including vehicles (eg. Bushmasters), thereby enabling these forces to be protected, have firepower and mobility and conduct tasks in a more effective manner. However, any longer-term problems in procuring spare parts or maintaining the vehicles could be avoided if the solution focused on a local tailored solution.

8.34 Mandated equipment and procedural auditing is essential when conducting COIN. The unexpected and changing nature of operations will dictate that both procedures and equipment demands will also change. The necessary agility to keep pace with these requirements can only be met if commanders encourage routine auditing and ensure, as much as possible, that extant governance guidelines and recommendations are implemented.

SECTION 8-7. LONG-TERM SUSTAINMENT FOR PROTRACTED COUNTERINSURGENCY

8.35 The nature of insurgency indicates a protracted style of war. Therefore, unless Australia’s commitment to a COIN is specified, it should be anticipated that the duration required for sustainment will be extended. This section will discuss the implications of protracted operations on sustainment.

8.36 Rotation of Personnel. The protracted nature of insurgencies and domestic preparedness requirements pose challenges to sustaining appropriate manpower levels. The rotation of personnel through COIN theatres must maximise continuity in operational effort but be balanced against the broader Army and individual needs.
8.37 Rotation of Equipment. COIN will place additional demands on all equipment over a protracted period. This will necessitate close care and maintenance of equipment at all levels, the pre-positioning of spare fleets and repair parts, and a rotation program that replaces in-theatre equipment.

8.38 Ongoing Engineering Works. As time passes, there will be an expectation that facilities will be upgraded, thus ongoing engineering works will be needed. However, the ongoing improvement to facilities must be balanced against any local perceptions of permanency that can be detrimental to the level of population support.

8.39 Review of Contractual Arrangements. The extensive use of civilian contractors will require a program to periodically review the existing contracts to determine continued relevance, performance and value for money. A theatre contract management function is essential.

Logistics in Vietnam: from Defensive target to Offensive opportunity

The Americans’ adoption of the base camp method of logistic support in Vietnam proved to be something of a dream come true for the insurgents. The bases provided fat, juicy targets that didn’t move much, and as such, they were often the targets of the insurgents’ avowed covert methods of corruption and theft by local sympathisers hired on to perform menial labour. Even more enticing was the high volume of predictably rich logistic traffic that flowed between the bases. Despite the increasing use of tactical and intra-theatre air for logistics, the primary method of resupply for most of the war remained overland by road.

The bases supporting the 25th Infantry Division at and surrounding Cu Chi provide a good example of how these practices played out in reality. By the summer of 1968, the Cu Chi bases were being supported by 4 convoys a day, totalling over 268 vehicles, being pushed out from the Long Binh depot complex. Despite taking all the ‘usual precautions,’ including planning for
well-placed artillery support, patrols, ambushes, search-and-destroy operations along the route, emplacing outposts at critical junctions, insurgent attacks continued to occur.

Frustrations with recurring losses rose to such a level that in August 1968 the 25th Division ‘developed new aggressive convoy procedures.’ Mimicking the insurgents’ smaller scale delivery methods proved beneficial for operations. Now, ‘convoys were divided into smaller, self-sufficient march units.’ Furthermore, ‘ammunition and fuel vehicles were placed at the rear to prevent an entire convoy from being blocked by burning vehicles, wreckers and spare vehicles were added…a major innovation was having the convoy commander airborne…from where he directed march units and security forces … [and] gunship cover was arranged ahead of time,’ particularly for sensitive passages. Convoy personnel were retrained on the new robust procedures. It did not take long for these new methods to reap results. Instead of being sources of insurgent supply, US convoy forces began to kill substantial numbers of enemy attackers and capture their weapons. By taking this approach, ‘the division had turned a defensive situation into a highly profitable offensive manoeuvre’.2

SECTION 8-8. SUMMARY

8.40 Sustainment is fundamental in protracted operations. In COIN, CSS elements must be capable of flexibility, responsiveness, sustainability and survivability. Long-term logistical assessment must encompass not only the requirements of COIN forces but also those of HN population support and military contractors.

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