AUSTRALIAN ARMY

LAND WARFARE DOCTRINE

LWD 3-0

OPERATIONS

This publication supersedes *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0, Operations,* 2008 and *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-0, Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment,* 2004.

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9 November 2015

Issued by command of
the Chief of Army

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Brigadier
Director General Training
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2.   It is certified that the amendments promulgated in the undermentioned amendment lists have been made in this publication.

Amendment List		Produced By	Publication Amended By	Date Amended
Number	Date of Endorsement			
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				

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PREFACE

> This publication supersedes *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0, Operations,* 2008 and *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-0, Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment,* 2004.

Aim

1.   The aim of this publication is to describe the land aspects of the conduct of operations.

Level

2.   This publication is a capstone document for the conduct of land operations written for the joint task force, land component and tactical commander. It also provides our combined, joint and other government agency partners an understanding of how the Australian Defence Force conducts land operations.

Scope

3.   This publication provides the framework for understanding the design, planning and conduct of the land aspects of a joint operation. It expands on and reinforces the Australian approach to land operations as described in the *Adaptive Campaigning - Future Land Operating Concept* and *Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power* and it compliments the joint operational doctrine contained in *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0, Campaigns and Operations*.

4.   The publication is structured as follows:

   a.   Chapter 1 provides an introduction.

   b.   Chapter 2 sets the context for and describes the spectrum of land operations.

   c.   Chapter 3 describes our command and control approach.

   d.   Chapter 4 explains the land operations conceptual frameworks that assist commanders and staffs to conceive, plan and orchestrate actions within a land operation. It expands on the description of manoeuvre theory in *Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power*.

e. Chapter 5 follows on to outline the design and planning of land operations and the importance of the clear articulation of the purpose of the operation across the joint, interagency and multinational force.

f. Chapter 6 describes the types of land operations tasks that will be conducted.

Associated Publications

5. This publication should be read in conjunction with other publications and documents, in particular:

a. *Adaptive Campaigning - Future Land Operating Concept;*

b. *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.1, Command and Control*;

c. *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0, Campaigns and Operations*;

d. *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication-D, Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*;

e. *Australian Defence Force Publication 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process*;

f. *British Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 3, Logistics*;

g. *Future Land Warfare Report;*

h. *Land Warfare Doctrine 0-0, Command, Leadership and Management*;

i. *Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power*,

j. *Land Warfare Doctrine 1-0, Personnel Support*;

k. *Land Warfare Doctrine 1-2, Health Support*;

l. *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-1, Counterinsurgency*;

m. *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-2, Peace Support (Developing Doctrine)*;

n. *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Land Tactics (Developing Doctrine)*;

o. *Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0, Combat Service Support (Developing Doctrine)*;

p. *Land Warfare Doctrine 4-1, Supply Support*;

q. *Land Warfare Doctrine 4-2, Maintenance Support (Developing Doctrine)*;

r. *Land Warfare Doctrine 4-3, Transport Support (Developing Doctrine)*;

s. *Land Warfare Doctrine 5-1-4, The Military Appreciation Process*;

t. *Land Warfare Doctrine 6-0, Signals*; and

u. *Quadripartite Advisory Publication 323, Coalition Logistics Handbook*.

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8. This publication has been prepared with gender-neutral language.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

If we keep in mind that war springs from political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process that can radically change it; yet the political consideration remains the first consideration. Policy will then permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.

Carl von Clausewitz[1]

1. The concept of change and continuity in war was proposed by Colin S Gray in *Another Bloody Century*[2]. He argued that the nature of war endured, while its character had continued and would continue to evolve. The character of war, driven by the means available for its conduct, evolves. But war's nature – friction, danger, uncertainty, chaos, chance, fluidity and its political purpose – endures.

2. Doctrine describes how we understand war and how we seek to win. While the character of war continues to change, the real value of doctrine is also to remind us of what has not changed. This publication describes how land operations are commanded, conceived, planned and executed.

3. War is a clash of irreconcilable wills. It is violence to achieve political ends. This makes it an inherently human activity. Because it is an inherently human activity, operations conducted on land – where humans live and where they will be most influenced – will inevitably be the most decisive of all operations in war. A commitment to land operations will as a consequence usually represent the most significant contribution the nation can make to the outcome of a war.

4. Consistent with the inherently human nature of war, land operations are conducted in crowded, connected and challenging environments where threats can operate undetected and strike without warning. They can do so from within a population that requires our protection and support. This has always been so. Winning in this environment demands what it always has. Our forces must be precise in action and they must be able to find and exploit enemy vulnerabilities. Winning demands flexibility, agility,

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1. Clausewitz, C von 1993, *On War,* ed and trans M Howard and P Paret, Alfred A Knopf, New York.
2. Gray, CS 2006, *Another Bloody Century*, Phoenix, London.

resilience, and the ability to focus and sustain the application of lethal force.

5.   Regardless of our technological advantages, our experience shows that the enemy we face will fight hard to exploit our vulnerabilities and avoid our strengths. They too will be smart and adaptive, and the operating environment will be uncertain and dangerous. Our force must be able to thrive in chaos, sensing and taking opportunity, and not retreating to gain more information.

6.   The complex and demanding nature in which land operations are conducted means that the quality of our platforms and personnel is central to success. We must seek to maximise our fighting power – the physical capacity or means to fight developed through our equipment, our organisation and the quality of our people, and as a consequence of our training, education, culture, values and legitimacy. We must be able to out-think the enemy, and our platforms, organisations and systems must be able to outperform and outlast all threats if we are to prevail. Doctrine is central to our fighting power.

7.   This publication complements *LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power*. It is written for the joint task force, land component and tactical commander and provides our combined, joint and other government agency partners with an understanding of how the Australian Defence Force conducts land operations.

8.   This publication supports *ADDP 3.0, Campaigns and Operations*. Land operations are joint operations. While Army force elements will usually form the core of the force conducting land operations, that force will be a joint, combined and interagency force.

CHAPTER 2

STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR LAND OPERATIONS

1. The Australian Defence Force deploys joint forces integrated with interagency and whole-of-government partners for operations in all domains: maritime, air, land, space, information and human. Land operations may be conducted directly from land bases or after being launched from the sea or by air.

2. In a land operation, the integrated force will deploy to conduct actions across the spectrum of conflict. These actions range from securing and controlling terrain and populations to lethal force and humanitarian assistance. The force may be required to conduct the full range of operations simultaneously. The force must be able to prevail in austere, uncertain, complex and dangerous environments.

3. Land operations are inherently joint and interagency actions, and they will also usually be coalition and/or multinational actions. Coalitions will be formed for political and strategic reasons and may involve burden sharing and providing offsets for capability gaps. Our concept for land operations therefore needs to be flexible, incorporating a willingness to adapt, especially with respect to command and control, and methods of integration. Regardless of the type of operation being conducted, the joint and combined interagency force represents the best way to provide the means to deliver the comprehensive range of capabilities that land operations require for success.

4. At the core of a force conducting land operations is the concept of land power. The Army is the foundation of land power but the concept demands force integration with joint and interagency capabilities and personnel. Land power provides government with a force with significant utility and flexibility which can be scaled to carrying out the following:

    a.   respond to humanitarian emergencies and disasters;

    b.   provide persistent influence on a population or area;

    c.   deny access;

    d.   protect and evacuate populations;

    e.   build the capacity of indigenous security forces;

    f.   stabilise security and address the causes of instability;

g.   keep and enforce peace; and

h.   find, disrupt and defeat threats and enemies to Australia and its interests.

5.   Land power provides government with the capability to achieve persistent control and sustained influence on or from the land across the spectrum of conflict. The deployment of land power is the most profound commitment available to the Government. Only land power with a capacity for close combat can achieve objectives across the spectrum of conflict. A key feature of land power is adaptability – to transition quickly between tasks or conduct a number of tasks simultaneously.

SECTION 2-1. SPECTRUM OF LAND OPERATIONS

The most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.

Carl von Clausewitz[1]

Spectrum of Conflict

6.   The distinction between conflict and war has become one of degrees and perception rather than substance. Conflict is a competition of political and human will and war is a clash of irreconcilable wills. But, even short of open hostilities and at peace, nations are in a constant state of competition, subject to direct, indirect, accommodating, coercive, engaging and deterring actions. Competition can escalate to conflict without warning.

7.   There is a spectrum of conflict which spans stable peace through competition and irregular conflict to war. The spectrum of conflict provides a foundation to establish the nature of conflict – the kind of war – under way. Comprehending the nature of the conflict is essential both to informing strategic objectives and to the design of operations to achieve those objectives.

8.   Our experience tells us that understanding the nature of conflict is not always straightforward. We may not immediately comprehend what the enemy seeks to achieve. Conflict does not always progress in a linear fashion from peace to war/war to peace, nor does it proceed through ordered steps or cycles. Different levels and types of conflict with different parties can occur in the same space and time. In these circumstances,

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1.   Clausewitz, C von 1993, *On War,* ed and trans M Howard and P Paret, Alfred A Knopf, New York.

defining the dominant condition that prevails in an operational environment is useful to focus planning and define the types of operations that may achieve strategic objectives. The spectrum of conflict encompasses the following:

a. *Peace.* This is characterised by the absence of militarily significant levels of violence but may include environmental or economic hazards and/or disasters. This also includes the natural but resolvable competition that continues to occur between nations and other actors.

b. *Instability.* This is characterised by a range of irregular activities (which can be conducted across the spectrum of conflict from peace to war) including environmental shocks, criminality, political and sectarian violence, acts of terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare.

c. *War.* This is dominated by high-intensity combat operations but could include a range of guerrilla or irregular warfare and humanitarian activities.

Types of Land Operations

9. Operations are the building blocks of campaigns, and the three broad types of operations conducted by the Australian Defence Force are decisive, shaping and transition. Decisive operations seek to defeat the enemy's will and means to fight. Shaping operations attempt to deter threats and set conditions that enable other operations. Transition operations aim to conclude an operation or transfer responsibility for the conduct of an operation to another force. These operations may occur sequentially or concurrently.

10. It is useful to determine the specific nature of an operation which is linked to its purpose. Specific operations can be defined as follows:

a. *Combat Operations.* These operations secure the environment, defeat organised threats and set the conditions for the conduct of other operations. Combat operations are dominated by combined-arms close combat focused on actions to attack, defend, shape or secure; they may include the use of unconventional forces and the conduct of irregular warfare.

b. *Peacetime Military Engagement Operations.* These operations shape the international and regional security environment to build cooperation, develop capabilities or deter aggression. Defence cooperation programs, bilateral exercises, training and infrastructure development are examples of these operations. Peacetime military engagement shapes the environment for operations that may be conducted in less stable periods or

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environments. Conducted effectively, peacetime military engagement may prevent the escalation of competition to conflict.

c. *Peace Operations.* The purpose of these operations is to contain conflict, prevent the escalation of violence and support stability. Peace operations aim to maintain or create a safe and secure environment, and to provide specialised support to enable civil agencies to address the underlying causes of conflict.

d. *Stability/Support Operations.* These operations focus military actions on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and threats conducting unconventional or hybrid warfare. Operations are focused on setting the conditions across all the dimensions for stabilising the operational environment with specific combined arms and Special Forces actions to defeat the irregular threat and secure the populace.

e. *Protection Operations.* Operations such as border protection, counter-piracy/smuggling and arms control are focused on the enforcement of controls, laws, international agreements and regimes, and freedom of movement. They are generally conducted in isolated or hostile physical environments or against threats that require capabilities that exceed those of civilian agencies.

f. *Aid to the Civilian Community.* Defence assistance to the civilian community provides the means through which Defence can assist government and non-government organisations or agencies to deliver an outcome at a time when their resources are not sufficient or have been overwhelmed. Defence assistance to the civil community is covered in the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual.

g. *Humanitarian/Environmental Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations.* These operations coordinate military or government agency emergency response actions in circumstances where the needs of a population exceed existing host nation or non-government organisation capacity. They are focused on the provision of basic necessities of life such as food, water, shelter or basic services in a stricken area.

CHAPTER 3

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF OPERATIONS

SECTION 3-1. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. The term 'command and control' is often used as a catch-all to describe a wide range of actions, activities and systems to do with employing, motivating, leading and organising military forces. It is important to understand the core functions that these words describe, and the interaction between them.

2. Command is a military concept which lies at the very heart of the military profession and is central to mission success. Command and control is the system that empowers designated personnel to exercise lawful authority and direction over assigned forces for the accomplishment of missions and tasks.

3. Command itself is the authority a commander exercises by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes authorities and responsibilities for the use of resources and for the planning and conduct of organising, directing, coordinating and controlling a joint force for a mission or operation. A commander is responsible for the health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.

4. Control is exercised by a commander over assigned forces and encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

SECTION 3-2. PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND

5. The Australian Defence Force recognises the following seven principles of command:

    a.   unity of command,

    b.   span of command,

    c.   clarity,

    d.   redundancy,

e.   delegation of command,

f.   control of significant resources, and

g.   obligation to subordinates.

6.   Effective command and control is vital to the operational effectiveness of a joint force. This maxim pertains to any level. Indeed, the effectiveness with which command and control is exercised within the joint force will have a profound impact on its ability to prosecute tactical actions effectively across the spectrum of conflict.

7.   **States of Command.** States of command describe the command authority delegated to a particular commander. Establishing clear command relationships is a fundamental requirement in all operations, and defining states of command is the means by which a commander delegates authority to subordinates within a mission command framework.

8.   Principles and states of command used in the Australian Defence Force are explained in *ADDP 00.1, Command and Control*.

SECTION 3-3. ORGANISATION FOR LAND OPERATIONS

Joint Task Force Structure

9.   A commander joint task force will be designated by the Chief of the Defence Force for a specified campaign, operation or activity. The Chief of the Defence Force is responsible for the conduct of operations. Force element groups, formations and units, are assigned to the joint task force for the conduct of an operation and are responsible to the Chief of the Defence Force for the achievement of joint task force objectives.

10.   Headquarters 1 Division, the standing deployable joint force headquarters will usually form the core of a joint task force headquarters for land operations. The joint task force will usually be force assigned specialist logistics, aviation, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition force elements from the Army as well as naval and air task groups/elements as required. Special Forces may be assigned at this level or, if assigned to strategic tasks, would deploy a command liaison team to coordinate actions.

11.   The joint task force will also be force assigned a combat brigade, the Australian Army's fighting formation. A combat brigade comprises a brigade headquarters, combat, combat support and combat service support units.

Land Operations Unit of Action

12. The combat brigade is the basic land operations unit of action. The capabilities within the units of the brigade are able to be grouped and tasked into combined arms battlegroups that can undertake a wide range of missions across the spectrum of conflict. The combat brigade headquarters provides the capacity to command and control the brigade and specialist force elements assigned to it by the joint task force. For operations of limited duration, threat and complexity, the combat brigade headquarters may fulfil a joint task force headquarters role with the provision of joint augmentation.

SECTION 3-4. COMMAND AND CONTROL IN EXECUTION

Preparation

13. Command and control is inextricably linked to the way we fight. Our command and control system must be consistent with our warfighting approach and with the structures and tactics we are equipped with and trained in. Strong habitual relationships formed through demanding training are critical to success in the complexity of land operations. The command and control system established by the Commander Joint Task Force must be exercised against the most demanding operational tasks that may be possible.

The Commander

14. Command provides the dynamic spark and genius to set organisations in motion, and control provides the means and method to achieve desired outcomes and posture organisations for future success. The whole is a single, coherent system that energises, motivates, directs, supports and sustains a force to overcome and prevail against an active and changing enemy in the crucible of war.

15. The effectiveness in which command and control is exercised will have a profound impact on a force's ability to prosecute tactical actions effectively across the spectrum of conflict. Effectiveness will rely on applying the following:

    a.   the philosophy that underpins successful command and control;

    b.   the principles of command;

    c.   orders that:

        (1)   clearly reflect the commander's intent,

   (2) describe unambiguous tasks and purposes, and

   (3) link ways and means with achievable ends;

  d. manoeuvre theory and its tenets;

  e. force integration and grouping/battlegrouping;

  f. the tenets of command, leadership and management;

  g. the integration of headquarters staff functions to:

   (1) enable the commander to exercise command and lead decision-making – a task which demands that the staff coordinate, monitor and develop sound options for the commander (these options, or choices, are founded on meticulous and directed analysis, collaboration and foresight);

   (2) enable subordinate units to achieve the commander's intent;

   (3) bring about an understanding and strict application of doctrinal definitions for mission and tasks, command and control, administration and support authorities; and

   (4) clearly defined roles and responsibilities within the headquarters.

16. The commander must be a leader. Leadership is the fundamental motivating principle that convinces soldiers to fight and win. Command without leadership produces an unsatisfactory and ultimately ineffective relationship: soldiers fight because of the consequences of not doing so rather than being motivated by sound leadership. The soldier without leadership wilts under pressure; the soldier with sound leadership is capable of flourishing in the hard realities of combat. A commander must lead from the main effort to best influence the fight and must demonstrate a willingness to share danger and privation.

17. **Command.** Command entails authority – specifically the legal right to order the actions of subordinates. Linked to the authority is the responsibility to use that legal right for the accomplishment of assigned missions. The dual concept of authority and responsibility is fundamental in the Army: command has the authority to order subordinates to perform actions in pursuit of a mission, often with the likelihood of death or injury, yet carries with it responsibility for the welfare and care of subordinates.

18. These seemingly contradictory ideas are inherent to command, and both must be accomplished by a commander. The motivating factor that helps blend these two requirements is leadership: while not every leader is a commander, every commander must be a leader.

19. A commander needs the following characteristics to achieve success in combat:

    a.   War is ultimately a clash of wills, and the will to fight, not force ratios, is the ultimate arbiter in war. The commander must bring an unshakeable will to the fight and the command and control must suffuse that will and resolve throughout the force to the lowest level.

    b.   Commanders must have courage, sustained in the face of personal danger, and must accept responsibility. At the highest point a commander must have a bias for action and a burning desire to lead, to direct and to act, often in circumstances of great uncertainty and where the consequences of failure are extreme.

    c.   Resilience, both physical and in terms of morale, is fundamental to a commander.

    d.   War is the realm of uncertainty, and a commander must exercise a sensitive and discriminating judgment to discern the truth. Intellect in this case is not brilliance; it is temperament and determination linked to conviction. This in turn leads to a propensity for daring and boldness, and a willingness to take calculated risks.

    e.   Intellect gives the commander a guiding 'inner light which leads to truth'[1], and courage gives him the conviction to follow that light.

20. The function of the command and control system rests ultimately with the commander. A chain of command links joint task force and brigade commanders to unit commanders, sub-unit commanders, and specialist and supporting commanders. The chain of command is not strictly hierarchical; indeed, a strict adherence to the structure is at odds with the principles of manoeuvre theory and mission command.

21. Commanders at every level develop a shared understanding and work together to generate a mutually supporting response to opportunities and battlespace requirements. The command team must be exactly that: a team on which everyone contributes. Ultimately, command is a human interrelationship, and commanders all work together to achieve a shared mission. Commanders at any level can relate directly to commanders at any other. A Joint Task Force commander may interact directly with a reconnaissance patrol commander, for example, to gain an intimate and shared understanding, and that junior leader may interact directly back, or to a flanking leader.

22. Similarly, a commander may order other elements to conform to orders and compel them to obey even without a specified command relationship if that is within the higher commander's intent. Finally, a subordinate

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1.   http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Cquotations.htm

commander may – indeed must – disobey a superior command if that command no longer makes sense when assessed against the commander's intent in a changing situation.

23. A subordinate commander is empowered and duty-bound to respond to a changing situation by reflecting back on the shared understanding of their commander's intent, and amending the orders that the commander would have if apprised of the changed situation.

24. There are some aspects of command which, by convention, direction or law, cannot be delegated. These aspects include:

    a. specific aspects of targeting,

    b. legal delegations and authorities,

    c. status of command changes, and

    d. national caveats.

Control

25. Control supports command by performing the functions of planning, execution and assessment. These functions allow commanders to visualise a problem, give options to resolve a problem, and then supervise the execution of a solution. They allow a commander to be well poised to respond to battlespace or operational environment changes and to seize opportunities.

26. **Planning.** Planning is driven by the commander to allow the organisation to best anticipate enemy actions and to develop options to achieve mission success. It is a continuous process, and always attempts to gain a temporal and geographic advantage by anticipating changes and opportunities.

27. The staff does not have any authority in its own right; all actions performed by the staff stems from the authority vested in it by the commander. This is not to say that the staff does not direct subordinate actions: implicit in the execution function is the right and need to give orders. But it is critical that these orders are within the clear boundaries set by the commander and are consistent with the commander's intent.

28. **Execution.** Execution is the production and implementation of orders and directives that drive actions. These can take the form of verbal, written or data orders. Execution is the staff process of planning, analysis, synchronisation and coordination that generates the orders. It is the expression of the commander's orders and intent and the staff's actions to ensure compliance. Execution also includes the effort to ensure that all parts of a formation or unit have situational awareness of events, so that elements may self-synchronise and respond without formal orders.

29. **Assessment.** Assessment is the monitoring of actions, both friendly and enemy, to provide feedback to the commander and staff against the assessed or assumed visualisation of the battlespace. It allows the refinement of the commander's critical information requirements and the resolution of assumptions, and monitors progress.

SECTION 3-5. MISSION COMMAND

30. Mission command is a decentralised approach to command and control that is consistent with the conceptual frameworks described in Chapter 2, and assists commanders and staffs to conceive, plan, and orchestrate actions. Most importantly, it is consistent with our warfighting approach.

31. Mission command does not just happen; it must be worked at and become habitual. It requires certain characteristics in a commander and command team. Similarly, its risks must be understood and managed.

Trust

32. Mission command involves trust between a commander and subordinates built upon professional excellence. Trust is mutual; a commander must trust subordinates and back them when they make a decision. Similarly, a subordinate must trust their own ability and back their own judgment. A subordinate must trust that the commander will reward initiative and not censure them if they are decisive. A subordinate who acts and makes a mistake can be trained; they have shown the character required to lead and a bias for action. Conversely, a subordinate who does not act when a decision is required, or an opportunity presents, is a follower, and should be removed.

33. Trust comes from mutual understanding; it is generated through a genuinely professional shared focus on mission outcomes. Trust is generated through continual interaction; the commander must see the battlefield through the subordinates' eyes and a subordinate must always relate their actions to the commander's mission.

Tempo

34. Decentralised command helps generate tempo because a subordinate is already in their commander's mind; nuanced and informed battlespace commentary coupled with fragmentary orders is the essence of speed in command and execution. It is also the quickest means of communication; implicit communication through mutual understanding and anticipation will always beat technological means.

Human Dimension

35. Mission command puts a premium on face-to-face command; a commander should always visit their subordinates and see the problem-set through their eyes. By sharing the same risks and sensing the same situation a commander can best understand, sense opportunities, and impose their will on subordinates. This is especially important in times of great stress and uncertainty; a commander must be seen by their subordinates at such times. Similarly, a commander must check key parts of the plan and key orders are being carried out to the required standard and satisfaction, especially where interaction is required between subordinate organisations. Again, this is important when troops are fatigued or morale is wavering. This is when personal courage, character and determination must radiate from the commander, and this can only be done in person.

Diverse Thinking

36. Mission command involves directive control. Often translated from the German 'Auftragstaktic' as mission command it is a way of expressing orders to emphasise the effect required rather than being prescriptive in how an order is to be achieved. In simple terms it means describing what needs to be achieved rather than how it is to be achieved. Commanders and staff need to define tasks conceptually rather than prescriptively so that a subordinate is given the widest latitude to achieve assigned tasks.

37. Mission command is not anarchy; it is a method that allows maximum subordinate freedom within a clearly defined overall mission. The guiding principle that glues the actions of subordinates together into a coherent whole is the commander's intent. This is a clearly defined end state for a particular mission that describes the reason and purpose of a mission.

38. By articulating and describing intent, subordinates can visualise and understand their own part to play, particularly when the situation changes or opportunities present themselves beyond specified orders. The commander's intent must allow for branches and sequels to the mission so that subordinates can act within this intent without further orders. This leads directly to speed and therefore tempo; if subordinates stop when they finish an assigned order without an understanding of what might come next it is extremely difficult to generate and maintain relative momentum and opportunities will be lost.

Self-synchronisation and the Obligation of Subordinate Commanders

39. The primary advantage of decentralised control operating within a philosophy of mission command is that it enables and empowers commanders at every level to work to intent, exploit opportunities and

operate in the inevitable uncertainty, chaos and friction. Subordinate command is bound by the mission, primarily the purpose, and the intent. Subordinate commanders have a duty to plan, act and execute in accordance with the mission and intent that is inviolable. How they achieve it is flexible and this freedom of action and duty to self-synchronise to the intent is critical to the Australian Army's approach to command.

Resources

40. Mission command also requires the means and resources to rapidly respond to opportunities and to adapt to changing circumstances. If resources are held centrally, and then assigned as each new task presents itself, then this creates self-imposed staff effort that in turn creates friction, and generating tempo then becomes very difficult if not impossible.

41. Mission command demands resources be decentralised; a force cannot have one without the other. Commanders must be bold in the allocation of resources and build main effort, through decentralisation. Commanders must not wait until a situation 'clarifies' before assigning resources. Forces are most agile when permanently grouped with the means to conduct the widest range of battlefield tasks.

42. Combat forces need to be grouped as combined arms forces, and maintained that way whenever possible. Constant staff churn to group, regroup and group again creates friction, wastes time and leads to lost opportunities. Constant regrouping is the bane of combined arms understanding and rapid adaptation to battlefield change.

SECTION 3-6. COMMAND AND CONTROL SUPPORT SYSTEMS

43. A command and control system will include a common approach to the arrangement and organisation of forces, personnel, information, doctrine and standard operating procedures. As the complexity of an operation or the span of command increases, the commander's ability to exercise command and control becomes increasingly reliant on the simplicity and robustness of these supporting systems.

Headquarters Capabilities

44. The headquarters enables effective command and control. Regardless of the level at which it operates, its structure, or the joint, interagency or

combined nature of the force it sits above, the headquarters must be able to provide the following functions for operations:

a. command communications;

b. monitoring, assessment and execution; and

c. planning and coordination.

45. **Characteristics.** The headquarters will be shaped by the commander's requirements, the functions of the forces and the nature of the operation. Regardless of the operation, a headquarters has the following characteristics:

    a. *Modular.* The headquarters must be capable of integrating staff, systems and functions to meet the mission being conducted.

    b. *Security.* The headquarters can function effectively only if it is secure from physical or electronic attack. The larger a headquarters and the less mobile it is, the more vulnerable it is. The desirability of additional staff and functions must be balanced by security requirements. Establishing reach back for staff heavy functions aids security. Only those personnel that must be in the combat area for the functions of a headquarters should be.

    c. *Nodal.* Depending on the level at which it operates and the type of operation it is conducting, a headquarters must be able to split to enable key command functions to support the movements of the commander and provide effective command and control in the face of enemy action while retaining the continuity of control functions. The composition, size duration and role of each node are mission dependent.

    d. *Sustainable.* The headquarters must be capable of supporting the commander regardless of the tempo of operations. This includes ensuring continuity of command in the event that the commander is killed, wounded or unavailable.

46. **Headquarters Types.** Depending on the situation, the role of the assigned forces and the availability of resources, the commander may elect to establish more than one headquarters. The different types of headquarters are as follows:

    a. *Main.* The main headquarters is the commander's principal command node. The main headquarters will contain the majority of the staff functions required for the operation. Its size and the systems required to support these functions will generally make the main headquarters the most difficult to move and protect. Depending on the expected duration and the nature of an operation,

the main headquarters may not deploy into the operational environment.

b.   *Forward.* The forward headquarters is limited in size, endurance and capacity. It will normally have a limited planning function, to adjust branches and sequels. A forward headquarters may be used as an advance headquarters in the initial stages of a deployment into an area of operations or as a headquarters for a discrete mission.

c.   *Tactical.* The tactical headquarters provides the commander with immediate support, normally with high mobility. It is an austere warfighting headquarters that provides essential communications for the commander to command and lead the current action and to direct either the main or forward headquarters to prepare for subsequent action.

d.   *Alternate.* An alternate headquarters may be considered where resources to equip and provide staff functions exist. It provides continuity of command when a headquarters either needs to be moved or is put out of action. A complete alternate headquarters duplicates the main headquarters in staff functions.

Information Management

47.   **Information Management.** Enhanced mission command systems aim to increase the effectiveness the command and control system through expanded and more efficient networking. However, information management requirements also increase and require specific focus in planning for force integration. Information management is the framework and set of processes by which a joint force collects and captures, analyses, prioritises, stores, and ensures the timely dissemination of relevant information for decision-making purposes.

48.   Information management planning must consider the personnel, processes, systems and procedures that facilitate the production, storage and dissemination of information. The information environment encompasses intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, information warfare, electronic warfare (including self-protection), command and headquarters processes and management systems.

49.   Information management involves the aggregation of information, individuals, and the systems that create, collect, process, protect, disseminate or deny this information. Critical to the planning of the command and control system employed for an operation is where to establish information management nodes. A node is a central point through which information is received, transmitted, relayed and disseminated.

Communications and Command Support Systems

50.   **The Electromagnetic Spectrum.** The successful integration of combat functions and passage of information is dependent on the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Reliance on the use of the electromagnetic spectrum, particularly for communications and command support systems, is an implicit vulnerability that an enemy will attempt to exploit. Regardless of enemy action, commanders must manage the use of the electromagnetic spectrum as a warfighting resource – negotiating its use with allies and other agencies, apportioning it across the force, and fighting to protect its availability.

Task Organisation

51.   The basic organisational principal for mission achievement is task organisation (or grouping). Every mission is different and the context unique. The complexity of land operations demands we apply force through mission specific task organisation. Army forces are organised, trained and prepared to task organise. In theory there are few, if any limits, to how a force will task organise or group. Core leadership, administration and sustainment requirements must however remain when grouped.

52.   Task organisation requires planning. The integration of combat support and combat service support capabilities into a force are essential to its capacity to achieve its tasks. Achieving effective integration is dependent on the following:

   a.   extensive understanding of the capabilities and limitations associated with each combat support and combat service support force element – attaining such understanding requires a thorough understanding of doctrine and staff engagement;

   b.   comprehensive understanding and practising of doctrinal command and control, administrative and supporting arrangements;

   c.   comprehension of the technical and administrative requirements for the integration of combat support and combat service support force elements;

   d.   analysis and foresight by commanders and staff at all levels;

   e.   effective regrouping standard operating procedures that are well understood and regularly practiced; and

   f.   established reception, staging, on-forwarding and integration procedures.

53.   *LWD 3-0-3, Land Tactics (Developing Doctrine)* provides further guidance on groupings for different types of land actions.

CHAPTER 4

FRAMEWORK FOR LAND OPERATIONS

SECTION 4-1. FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW

1. The use of land operations frameworks assists commanders and staffs to conceive, plan, and orchestrate actions to achieve the strategic objectives set by Government within the complexity of the land environment. These frameworks comprise:

    a. warfighting approach – how we seek to exploit the enemy's vulnerabilities to win in the chaotic and complex battlespace on land;

    b. human and geographical framework – how we conceive the battlespace or operational environment in which we will operate; and

    c. functional framework – how we orchestrate and focus our actions, exploit vulnerabilities and operate in the operational environment.

SECTION 4-2. WARFIGHTING APPROACH

2. As a small joint force, the Australian Defence Force's approach to land operations is underpinned by the principles of war (described in *Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power*), and framed by manoeuvre theory.

3. Actions are focused on the centre of gravity, and executed through combined arms, orchestration and mission command. This approach maximises the advantage a small technologically capable force can generate and is consistent with the Australian Defence Force's approach to other joint operations.

4. Land operations aim to defeat any threat through a series of actions which are orchestrated to a single purpose – to defeat the centre of gravity. The centre of gravity is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight. A centre of gravity will often change as an operation progresses.

5. Analysing an enemy centre of gravity exposes enemy strengths and critical vulnerabilities and can allow operations to be focused. Striking at

an enemy critical vulnerability, or centre of gravity can be described through three defeat mechanisms:

a. *Pre-emption.* Pre-emption is to seize an opportunity before the enemy to deny them a course of action or an objective and to achieve your own.

b. *Dislocation.* Dislocation renders an enemy strength irrelevant in time or space. Dislocation separates the enemy centre of gravity from the key capabilities that support or protect it. Dislocation may be:

    (1) *Physical.* Causing the enemy strength to focus in the wrong place. Physical dislocation could be achieved by attacking at an unexpected place or using deception to draw an enemy strength to a position where it is unable to disrupt our plans.

    (2) *Functional.* Setting conditions for an enemy strength to be effectively neutralised for the circumstances. An enemy with strong sensor and stand-off precision capabilities will be less capable if drawn to fight in close terrain with short engagement and detection ranges.

    (3) *Temporal.* Preventing the enemy from employing their strength at a time that could disrupt Australian Defence Force plans. Temporal dislocation could include actions such as a surprise attack on an unprepared enemy or preventing/slowing down the deployment of an enemy strength.

c. *Disruption.* Disruption is a direct attack on the centre of gravity. Disruption requires a relative advantage for asymmetry to be achieved. Acting faster than the enemy or being able to identify and seize a fleeting opportunity may provide the asymmetric circumstances.

Orchestration

6. Orchestration is the arrangement of physical and non-physical actions to ensure that their contribution is unified within a single mission. Orchestration requires a high level of cooperation across a force and is achieved through the disciplined application of rapid, unexpected, aggressive and discriminating force with the timely use of information and influence actions, and effective integration with interagency elements.

7. Tactical actions should be orchestrated to create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation that shatter's an enemy's cohesion, ability to respond effectively and will to fight. To set these conditions, land operations applies two key tenets – tempo and focus and their interrelated supporting concepts.

8. **Tempo.** War is a competition for time and space and the ability to maintain a higher tempo of operations relative to the enemy creates opportunities. Achieving a higher tempo is founded on a force's capacity to do the following:

   a. *Exploit Friction.* Uncertainty is an enduring feature of war, but it is a relative concept; as a long as a friendly force is able to cope with it better than its adversary, then it will gain an advantage. Operations must seek to exploit the fog of war and strike an enemy where and when they least expect it.

   b. *Achieve Surprise.* Surprise is a state of disorientation resulting from an unexpected event that degrades the enemy's ability to resist. Surprise aims to force the enemy into unplanned actions, thereby leading them into forced and unforced errors. Surprise is only effective when friendly actions are sufficiently unexpected to directly threaten or invalidate the enemy's plan. To be unexpected, actions must be perceived by the enemy as unreasonable. An apparently unreasonable action can be achieved only by accepting a degree of risk. The greater the risk, the greater the surprise and the potential results. Surprise, therefore, can decisively affect the outcome of an operation far beyond the physical means at hand. Based on speed, stealth, ambiguity and deception and founded on our ability to cope with uncertainty, surprise is a powerful psychological force. Without surprise, superiority at a decisive point is hardly conceivable.

   c. *Seize the Initiative.* Relies on decisive actions that exploit uncertainty to pursue major results and require the acceptance of risk. The commander must imbue a bias for action throughout the force – to penetrate an enemy's plan, to understand weakness, and to ruthlessly pursue it. Seizing the initiative requires action at the earliest possible time to upset the enemy's plans and force them to be reactive. Maintaining the initiative will keep the enemy from developing their plan or interfering with friendly operations.

   d. *Maintain Speed.* From action at the point of contact to the manoeuvre of formations, a force that acts faster than its opponent gains an advantage and retains the initiative. Speed over time is tempo and speed over distance is relative movement; both are powerful warfighting multipliers. Speed is relevant to all aspects of an operation – understanding, planning decision making and execution.

9. **Focus.** The focus of action is usually framed around the centre of gravity and requires direction and action for all available means, both physical and non-physical; to target the enemy's will to fight. Focus achieves unity of purpose and is the only way a numerically inferior force may achieve

decisive local superiority over a larger force. Focus is founded on the following:

a.   *Intelligence-led actions.* It is essential to tightly link intelligence and action to develop an understanding of complex adversary systems which will adapt over time. Intelligence-led operations recognise the need to continually interact, monitor and learn from the operating environment to determine where best to apply combat power against vulnerabilities and to identify opportunities. This is not an approach that involves a robust initial assessment followed by reactive intelligence collection; more intelligence is not necessarily better. It demands a balance between understanding and action. To be effective, intelligence-led actions require that intelligence requirements be continually refined by the commander and that priority requirements and subsequent analysis be judiciously resourced.

b.   *Reconnaissance Pull.* Reconnaissance pull is the identification and exploitation of fleeting opportunities of the enemy's weaknesses when they occur. As forces will seldom operate with a comprehensive knowledge of the enemy or their environment, there is a need to continually exploit enemy weaknesses (physical or psychological) as they appear. Successful reconnaissance pull requires mission command, and forces that are adaptable and able to maintain their freedom of action. On land, the force will be required to fight for, and not necessarily with, information. As a result, during the conduct of operations, force responses will be characterised by the 'adaption cycle' – Act, Sense, Decide and Adapt.

c.   *Shaping the Battlespace.* Shaping actions are lethal and non-lethal actions that limit the enemy's freedom of action, affect enemy capabilities, forces or decisions, and enhance the conditions for friendly decisive actions. Shaping actions are conducted at every level from strategic to tactical and are essential if a force is to establish or retain the initiative.

d.   *Establishing a Main Effort.* The designation and resourcing of a main effort focused where it will be decisive requires the acceptance and management of risk. The main effort is the task that at a given point of time is the most critical to mission success. The reasoning and assumptions behind the designation of the main effort must be understood and continually assessed for the main effort to remain valid. The main effort is a key binding decision for synchronisation and sequence. A supporting effort supports the success of the main effort.

     e.   *Synchronised Actions.* This is a disciplined approach that considers all relevant factors, reducing omissions and sharing information across the warfighting functions. It ensures the sum of all actions are greater than their individual outcomes and that those actions are focused.

     f.   *Establishing a Sequence.* This is how planned actions will interact in a coordinated and systematic way to attack critical enemy vulnerabilities and posture for opportunities. The sequence of actions in an operation must be able to be clearly linked back to the achievement of strategic objectives.

Mission Command

10.   Mission command generates tempo through decentralisation. Informed by the purpose of the mission, the commander on the spot is empowered to act on intent or to pre-empt an order based on the conditions that they see and the inevitable uncertainty in which they will operate. This bias for action is central to the force seeking to generate a temporal advantage over an enemy.

11.   Decentralised command demands that a commander also decentralise resources. The local commander is not empowered to act unless the force they lead is structured to grasp opportunity. Forces permanently grouped for the widest range of tasks are the most agile.

Combined Arms

12.   A combined arms team is a case-by-case combination of combat, combat support, and combat service support elements which have been tailored to the mission, threat and terrain. Flexible, modular combined arms teams which have been grouped for close combat and the widest range of tasks possible with the force available make a force agile and adaptable.

13.   A commander should group combined arms force elements with knowledge of the strengths and vulnerabilities of the enemy. The commander must aim to present the enemy with a dilemma; a combination of capabilities that will mean if the enemy seeks to counter one of them, they will be exposed to another. The effectiveness of a combined arms team is greatly enhanced by joint assets that provide strike, reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence support synchronised with land actions.

SECTION 4-3. GEOGRAPHICAL AND HUMAN FRAMEWORK

The Operating Environment

14. On land, combat is close, threats diffuse, and the terrain diverse even in small geographical areas. Global changes, such as changes in how societies interact and the development of technologies which increase the availability of lethal power means the operational environment continues to rapidly evolve. The technological advantage that advanced democracies may have relied on to now, are easily dislocated and discrimination in lethal force harder to achieve. To win, the Army must continually adapt its combat concepts and how it understands and comprehends the land operating environment.

15. The land operational environment is a composite of conditions, circumstances and influences that effect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. The operations environment encompasses physical, human, information and temporal factors. The operations environment will influence the conduct of a mission as well as that of a campaign.

Defining the Operational Environment

16. An operational environment is made up of four physical and two non-physical, but interrelated domains: sea, including subsurface; land; air; space; information, which covers the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace; human, including enemy, neutral, friendly and other actors. While one domain may be the dominant domain for the conduct of an operation, it cannot be considered in isolation.

17. A number of dimensions influence the domains and help build a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment, they include:

   a. *Physical.* The physical terrain that affects operations such as vegetation, geography, infrastructure and essential services.

   b. *Societal.* The composition of human groups: leadership and authority, culture, cultural structures and local forces. It includes laws, government and non-government organisations and commercial organisations.

   c. *Political.* Australian Government, coalition partner governments, host nation politics (including indigenous cultural and religious group considerations) and neighbouring states' political environments.

d.   *Informational.* The influence of audiences, the ways information is transmitted, media and key leadership.

e.   *Economic.* Local, regional, national and international economics, including factors and influences likely to contribute to stability/instability.

f.   *Military.* The relative capabilities of Australian Defence Force, host nation and enemy/threat forces (military, paramilitary, criminal and insurgent), private security companies, other government and non-government organisations.

18.   A commander and staff must develop a shared understanding of the operational environment. The domains and dimensions provide a framework for comprehending an operational environment and determining how operations might be conducted within it. Many of the dimensions will require the support of other government agencies to comprehend.

19.   Conflict is characterised by a complex interaction of historical, political, military, social, religious, cultural and economic issues. The conduct of land operations will inevitably alter the dynamic that exists within these factors in an operational environment. The domains and dimensions provide a framework to assess the changes that occur and can assist in determining success, as well as the threats and opportunities that emerge in the conduct of an operation.

The Evolving Battlespace

20.   **Trends.** Conflict and contest is not limited to the physical environment. Non-contiguous physical as well as psychological domains will continue to emerge and influence the conduct of operations. These characteristics generate the following related and enduring trends in conflict, which will also influence the operational environment:

a.   *Crowded Environment.* Population growth has contributed to greater urbanisation, especially in the littoral regions. This will ensure that operations conducted amongst populations will remain the dominant feature of conflict. Locating, identifying and discriminating combatants and non-combatants will be harder. The consequences of operations will inevitably be more significant with all actions observed and captured for examination and the use of some technology constrained (see *Future Land Warfare Report, 2014*).

b.   *Connected Environment.* The globe is undergoing a growing political, social, cultural, economic and technological interconnectedness. Advances in transport and communications technologies have increased the volume and speed of the movement of goods, services, information and people. The velocity

and volume of human interactions has increased contact between previously isolated cultures. Local issues can have global impact and operations need to be conducted in a manner where the consequences for local, state, non-state and international interests are considered.

c. *Advancing Technology.* Global communications networks, coupled with widely available and simple to employ communications equipment and highly lethal weapons, have increased the lethality and effectiveness of threats, both state and non-state. Improved connectivity enables potential threats to operate in distributed groupings below our detection threshold.[1] The demands on land forces are significant. Combined arms teams, integrated with or with ready access to joint enablers and employing their own distributed tactics, will be essential elements within a land operation.

d. *Lethal Environment.* Advances in weapon design have substantially increased lethality. Increased lethality does not necessarily generate a detectable 'tactical signature'; therefore, land forces can, without warning, encounter highly lethal small teams or individuals at any time. The land force must have inherently high levels of firepower, mobility and protection in order to survive the initial contact and regain the initiative.

e. *Collective Environment.* Joint and interagency operations require high levels of integration. Alongside these traditional partners, non-traditional parties including non-government organisations, host nation governments, indigenous security forces, sanctioned representatives, and non-state security elements may also support or influence land operations. The need to develop ad hoc coalitions and circumstantial cooperation will challenge how we plan, command, control, communicate and sustain operations.

f. *Uncertainty.* By its nature, complexity generates uncertainty. Forces need to retain flexibility and have inherent resilience to adapt to the unexpected.

Threats and the Enemy

21. An understanding of the nature of the specific or potential threat(s) or enemy is essential. The ability of an actor (enemy, friend or neutral) to use

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1. The combination of sensors, communications and weapons means that the exposure of manoeuvre elements, headquarters or combat service support nodes will lead to their rapid destruction. To avoid this, land forces are forced to either avoid detection or, if that is impossible, make discrimination so difficult that standoff engagement is not practicable. This type of approach is called operating below the threshold of discrimination, noting that all sides of a conflict may have to manoeuvre in this way.

force or the threat of force to achieve a desired outcome is dependent upon the following factors:

a.   their will to act (morale), which centres on the human aspects of the threat, their motivations and intentions;

b.   their understanding of the situation (intellectual), which provides the ideas and knowledge behind their ability to fight and how they understand the nature and character of the conflict they are part of; and

c.   their capability to act (physical), which speaks to their means to fight – manpower, equipment and training, and the ability to deploy and sustain their force at the required state of readiness.

22.   These three components define a group or organisation's effectiveness (fighting power)[2], and through an understanding of all three aspects plans can be made to defeat or neutralise a threat.

23.   There are varying types of threats or enemies. The principal types are as follows:

a.   *States.* These are established and recognised nations, representing groups of people who share the same history, traditions or language, and live in a particular area under one government. States have the powers and responsibilities of a nation as defined by international law. To achieve national security, states are usually a recognisable, uniformed military force as defined in the Geneva Convention. These forces usually comprise of both conventional and special forces.

b.   *Non-state Actors.* These are threats that have sufficient power to influence and cause political and economic change even though they do not belong to an established state. They operate without state control and are involved in both internal and trans-border conflicts. Non-state actors are motivated and constrained differently to states, which makes them challenging to understand and predict. The list of non-state actors includes transnational corporations, and issue-motivated groups such as transnational terrorists, criminal syndicates, pirates, and groups defined along ethnic or religious lines. They generally lack the conventional power of nation states but enjoy and may exploit the freedoms of action denied to states. Increasingly, non-state actors can gain access to advanced weapons and technologies (including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles) and may be able to threaten the survival of states.

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2.   'Effectiveness' is used here because 'fighting power' relates to a military/quasi-military actor rather than the broader range of actors within the contemporary operational environment.

24. In the future land forces are likely to face multiple enemies at the same time and in the same area. Many enemies will employ both conventional and irregular forces at the same time, making future enemies hybrid in nature. The dynamic nature of these hybrid threats[3] will make it very difficult to predict their actions accurately and will drive land forces to be adaptable and flexible in the changing environment in an area of operations. Understanding the sources and motivations of these enemies is critical for posturing the forces in the area of operations.

Area of Operations

25. As described in *LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power*, it is important to think of an operational environment in conceptual rather than purely geographic terms. The operational environment can be understood and assessed through the dimensions, but it will be bounded into an area of operations defined for a mission, with the following physical, cognitive and temporal influences:

    a.   The physical relates to the terrain, environmental and weather aspects of the operational environment that impact operations.

    b.   The cognitive relates to ideas, perceptions and mindsets and how these will influence operations. These influences can be local to global in nature.

    c.   The temporal reflects the changing nature of the operational environment over time as a result of our interactions with the operational environment as well as other influences.

26. For the purposes of defining the physical and cognitive nature of the operational environment for a specific mission, it can be divided into the following two basic components:

    a.   *Area of Operations.* An area of operations is that portion of the operational environment assigned by a commander to a subordinate for a mission for joint forces to conduct military activities. The area of operations is a permissive control measure that provides freedom of action within defined boundaries. Commanders can partition their assigned area of operation to subordinate elements. If more than one force is deployed, their area of operation may be contiguous (ie, sharing common boundaries) or non-contiguous (no sharing of boundaries). An area of operation is described as linear if there is an

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3.   A hybrid threat is a diverse and dynamic combination of state-based forces and non-state-based forces unified to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. Hybrid threats may involve state-based adversaries that conduct a protracted campaign, possibly using proxy forces, to coerce and intimidate, or non-state-based actors using operational concepts and high-end capabilities traditionally associated with nation states.

identifiable enemy with dispositions such that a forward line of own troops or a forward edge of battle area can be designated.

b. *Area of Interest.* The area of interest is the area of concern to a commander. It is usually larger than, and potentially dislocated from, the assigned area of operation. It reflects on the aspects a commander needs to influence or be cognisant of, as it affects their area of operation. The area of interest is not fixed in size or position but varies depending on the influence a commander needs to have over other factors in the operational environment.

27. Figure 4–1 shows a graphic representation of the physical, cognitive and temporal aspects of an operational environment and the nature of non-contiguous area of operation. Well planned and conducted operations address each and every circumstance and variable that influences their operation within the context of physical and cognitive boundaries.

28. Within this geographical and cognitive framework, a concept of deep, close and rear areas assists in our description of actions in terms of space and time. Deep, close and rear actions will occur simultaneously and should be complementary actions focused on the achievement of the objective or purpose of the operation. Deep, close and rear actions in further detail are as follows:

a. *Deep.* Actions conducted in the deep area are focused on forces and resources not engaged in close operations. They expand where action is conducted in time and space and shape the close battle making it difficult for the enemy to concentrate combat power, diminishing the coherence of the enemy's actions and reducing the enemy's tempo. At each level of command, the extent of deep operations is dependent on the commander's means to acquire information and engage the enemy. Deep actions may be physical or psychological in nature.

b. *Close.* Actions conducted either in contact with the enemy or to make contact with the enemy in the immediate timescale. Combined arms and joint coordination are essential aspects of close actions. They may be decisive, shaping or sustaining actions to achieve physical or influence outcomes.

c. *Rear.* Actions that support and sustain the conduct of close and deep actions. Rear actions are largely administrative and logistic in nature and therefore require security to function efficiently. The friendly joint force's rear area is likely to be the enemy's deep area. Regardless of the nature of the operation, secure lines of communication are essential. Rear area security will tend to focus on lines of communication and providing support to areas not manned by combat forces.

4-11

Figure 4–1: Operational Environment Framework

# SECTION 4-4. FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Combat Functions

29. There are six combat functions that describe the range of effects that a force conducting land operations must be able to undertake to plan, conduct, and consolidate operations. When integrated, these combat functions aid commanders in orchestrating and directing operations. They constitute the ways a military force applies its fighting power in the conduct of finding, fixing, striking and exploiting an enemy. They may be applied to both physical and influence activities. When harmonised they will accomplish all aspects of an operation. Combined arms teams should be structured to achieve an appropriate balance across these combat functions. Figure 4–2 illustrates the combat functions.

30. **Know.** To know is to possess the capacity to detect, recognise, assess and understand the strengths, vulnerabilities and opportunities available within the operational environment. Knowledge links the other combat functions and is derived from information and understanding. Information is gained from Army, joint, coalition and civilian sources and distributed on a needs basis in real time. When information is analysed, interpreted and understood, it becomes knowledge. Understanding is a cognitive process

that is enhanced by professional mastery. A force that can exploit knowledge will have a distinct advantage over the enemy.

31.   **Shape.** To shape is to take actions that delay an enemy's response, lead them into inadequate or inappropriate responses or prompt them to respond in a manner we want. Shaping can also include measures to prepare forces so that consequent action can be more effective. Actions to shape the operational environment may include reconnaissance, information collection, informational and physical strikes and support or protection of non-combatants.


Figure 4–2: Combat Functions

4-13

CHAPTER 5

THE DESIGN AND PLANNING OF LAND OPERATIONS

SECTION 5-1. OPERATIONAL ART

1.   Operational art is the intellectual ability to visualise and then orchestrate tactical actions to achieve a strategic objective. At its heart, operational art is the commander's ability to apply experience, creativity and vision to lead planning. It is not a process or trained skill. As described in *ADDP 5.0, Joint Planning,* it leads to the skilful employment of a joint force, to attain military goals through the design, organisation, sequencing and direction of operations.

2.   Operational art provides the link between strategy and tactics, translating intent into action. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose commanders employ military force to achieve missions. It defines the allocation, coordination and sustainment of resources to tactical units.

3.   It is the creative and innovative integration of tactics into an operational plan to achieve a strategic objective that defines operational art. Figure 5–1 shows the integrated and interwoven relationship between the capabilities (means) available to a commander and the tactics and tasks (ways) undertaken by the force to achieve the end state (ends).


Taking the available capabilities (means) and using different tasks and tactics (ways) to achieve an outcome (end)

Capabilities

Endstate

Tactics/Tasks

Figure 5–1: Operational Art in Action

SECTION 5-2. DESIGN

4. Commanders initiate the conduct of operations with design to guide their subordinate commanders and staff in planning, execution and assessment. Design is the method by which the purpose of the operation is translated into tactical guidance and tasks for subordinate commanders and staff. Design may be in direct response to strategic direction or it may be the commanders understanding of the changing situation and the need or opportunity to act.

5. The commander uses operational design to visualise, describe and direct those actions necessary to achieve the end state and accomplish the mission. It includes the purpose of the operation, the desired effects on the enemy and how the commander envisions seeking decision, expressed as a defeat mechanism. Design provides the vision to achieve the objective. Planning is the integrated formulation, prioritising, sequencing and synchronisation of action to make the plan a reality.[1]

6. Figure 5–2 shows the correlation between the operational art and the application of design and planning for operations. Design, within the framework of operations (see Chapter 3), provides the concept, conditions and key considerations for planning and subsequent conduct of operations in order to achieve the desired end state.

7. Design extends the operational art's vision with a creative methodology to understand the nature of the operational environment, the purpose of the operation, and possible options to achieve the purpose. Commanders lead design, but all those involved must be open to all sources of information. Design should establish an operations narrative and a concept for the operation. Design can be supported by tools such as: the objective, decisive events, themes, and lines of operations; that help the commander and staff to develop approaches to guide planning. It is important to see design as a continuous process.

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1. An appropriate analogy may be the relationship between architecture and draughtsmanship, the architect expressing the multi-dimensional design with the draughtsman creating the floor plan. The analogy could also be 'architect = design, project management = planning and building = execution'.

Figure 5–2: Correlation between the Operational Art, Design and Planning

Key Attributes for Design

8. **Visualisation.** Design is a command-led application of operational art. To lead design effectively, the commander must be able to visualise the operation. Visualisation is a continuous process that requires the commander to understand the current situation and, importantly, possible future options and sequence. These options and sequences are in relation to possible enemy actions and seek to create an operational advantage through pre-empting, dislocating and disruption.

9. Visualisation is a product of multiple inputs to the commander that include personal reconnaissance, interaction, and the development of a shared understanding with subordinate commanders, inputs from higher headquarters, operations and intelligence staff. The commander's visualisation, clearly expressed, focuses planning and execution by subordinates and staff.

10. **Commander's Guidance.** Visualisation helps the commander issue initial guidance to initiate or develop mission analysis. The Commander may express guidance in terms of a decisive – shaping – sustaining framework. The decisive action is that which will accomplish the mission, the shaping action is that which sets conditions for the decisive action, and the

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sustaining action is that which will generate and maintain combat power. The Commander's guidance will as a minimum include:

a.   *Mission.* The mission is the primary binding agent. The articulation of purpose is the superior and essential component of the mission to which all subordinate commanders are bound. Missions are therefore, nested from the highest to the lowest. Essential tasks and constraints (eg, timings and locations) are articulated in the mission and drawn from the analysis of higher intent. They may change and can be changed to meet the purpose of the stated mission.

b.   *Commander's Intent.* Commander's intent is the commander's personal expression of the purpose of the operation. It must be clear, concise and easily understood. It usually includes how the commander envisions achieving a decision, expressed as a defeat mechanism, as well as the desired end state. It should indicate opportunities that may be created by interaction with the enemy. It allows subordinates and planners to see the 'big picture' so that their actions self-synchronise when the unforseen occurs. It leads directly to freedom of action and creates tempo during planning and execution. Commander's intent is a subset of commander's guidance – they are not the same thing. Intent paints a picture to help guide subordinates actions in the absence of further direction; commander's guidance on the other hand is direction: preliminary decisions to focus planners' actions.

c.   *Commander's Critical Information Requirements.* Commander's critical information requirements identify information on friendly and enemy activities and the operational environment that the commander deems critical to understanding the enemy, own force and situation. Commander's critical information requirements are the binding agent for all staff functions and must be owned by the commander. Central to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities and assisting in timely and informed decision making, the number of commander's critical information requirements must be limited to only those that support critical decisions. Where understanding is limited, they also link directly to assumption based planning: as commander's critical information requirements are generated an assumption is stated as the answer, and planning continues based on the assumed answer. This allows planning to proceed in the absence of certain information and creates tempo. Importantly, as assumptions are made a method must be developed and assets tasked to answer the assumptions. If the assumed answer proves wrong then the planning flowing from the assumed answer must be reviewed as to its validity. The methods used and assets tasked to answer commander's critical

information requirements form a key part of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance plan. Commanders and staff must have a process for and be rigorous in continually refining and updating commander's critical information requirements.

d.   *Battlespace Analysis.* Battlespace analysis allows a commander to compare their assigned area of operations to the mission assigned or deduced. It allows them to understand the area of influence and the area of interest. The analysis of time, space and mission fuses the commanders understanding of the possible and also prompts a better understanding of likely sequels. If the area of operations is too small, the commander requests a larger area; if too large the commander should request a new or modified area. The commander must have the freedom of action to achieve the mission, but must also be able to command and control the force throughout the assigned area of operations. This analysis is a shared analysis between the commander, Service/Joint Intelligence and the Service/Joint Communications. It forms an understanding of where friendly and enemy forces may operate throughout the mission space and also identifies external inputs and support that may aid an understanding of the broader area of interest beyond the area of influence. It allows an initial appreciation of what methods of communications are possible and where the limits of available communications systems may degrade or prohibit friendly actions.

e.   *Centre of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities.* An important part of initial commander's guidance is the commanders understanding of centres of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. This analysis assists the commander in visualising relative strengths and weaknesses of enemy and friendly forces. The Service/Joint Intelligence would lead a detailed centre of gravity analysis but this initial guidance helps shape that analysis and saves time. By focusing the staff early on centres of gravity and critical vulnerabilities the commander ensures the staff looks to identify enemy weakness or is focused on developing options to expose weakness, so that enemy strength can be focused decisively.

11.   **Conceptual Planning.** The commander's guidance allows the staff to complete mission analysis. This provides further insight on the situation and allows the commander to refine the vision, confirm or modify intent and initial guidance on decisive and shaping actions and on sustainment.

12.   Once the mission statement has been produced the commander and staff develop the design by identifying decisive and shaping actions, how these actions are sustained and how the force will be controlled. The output of this interaction is courses of action to be developed in planning.

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13. Figure 5–3 shows the lines of operation for actions of a generic operation. This is a useful method by which the commander and staff transition from design to planning by determining courses of action that will meet the commander's intent for the operation.

14. A line of operation is developed with a number of inputs which are established in design and which are described in detail in *ADFP 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process,* and *LWD 5-1-4, The Military Appreciation Process*. These inputs include the assessment of the enemy and friendly centre of gravity and associated critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities; determination of the operational approach and intended effects; and determination of potential decisive conditions.

Figure 5–3: Lines of Operation

15. **Continuous Assessment of the Design.** The process of design is continuous as the situation will invariably change as the operation commences. The commander and staff need to continually test and refine the design once the operation commences to eliminate any shortfalls in the initial design. Continuous assessment ensures that the underlying design remains focused on the strategic objective throughout the operation.

SECTION 5-3. PLANNING

16. Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways of achieving it. The planning process is used by commanders and staff to place detail around design. Planning builds on

the commander's guidance and concept for the operation established in design. Planning is a constant process of configuring actions in time and space to achieve the end state. Once an operation commences, planning is usually conducted in three temporal frames – in response to events from current operations, future operations related to current objectives, and future plans which usually relate to subsequent objectives.

17.   Planning is a command driven function that allows the force to best anticipate enemy actions. Planning is central to a force achieving temporal and geographic advantage.

18.   Planning is laid out in detail in *LWD 5-1-4, The Military Appreciation Process*. Planning will continually develop the control of the operation by refining the following planning elements.

19.   **Purpose.** Chapter 3 described the centrality of the purpose to any operation. The purpose links action to strategy by clearly describing what is to be achieved and why it must be.

20.   **Method.** The method expresses the concept for the operation framed around a defeat mechanism. It will include the following:

   a.   objectives;

   b.   phases;

   c.   decisive events;

   d.   lines of operation (including contingencies); and

   e.   opportunities to be exploited.

21.   **End State.** The end state describes the desired outcomes of the operation; that is, the military conditions we must achieve to meet the purpose. End state factors are operation specific. Combat operations will normally see military conditions dominate the end state. Peace or stability operations will see non-military conditions dominate. As a minimum, the end state should include:

   a.   the objectives that must be achieved – by when and where;

   b.   the status and disposition of the force and agencies; and

   c.   the effect to be achieved on the enemy or threat.

22.   **Lines of Operation.** Lines of operation describe the way and order in which decisive points will be achieved. A single critical pathway may form the preferred lines of operation for execution within an operation. Alternate lines of operation may also be developed and form the basis for branch and sequel planning (becoming the contingency plans for the operation).

23.   **Phases.** Phases are linked to operational activities and the arrayed against lines of operation. Phases are a series of logically connected

decisive events planned to culminate on a defined objective. Phases can overlap, and sometimes can be planned for parallel execution, such as deception tasks. Phasing is often driven by the management of operational resources. Phases usually mark a significant change in the force, focus or direction of the operation. While a phase is generally distinguishable from another and aimed at an intermediate goal, it has context only within the purpose of the operation.

24. **Branches and Sequels.** Branches and sequels are considered at the outset. Branches ensure a line of operation incorporates flexibility or the capacity to achieve ambiguity while still being focused on the objective. Sequels ensure the force can be postured for the unexpected. Branches and sequels must have execution criteria that are monitored and updated based on assessment. They can form the basis of contingency plans for the operation. When combined with effective use of the adaptive principles and the cycle of Act, Sense, Decide and Adapt, they can facilitate the rapid adaptation to opportunities or the unexpected in the operational environment.

SECTION 5-4. ASSESSMENT AND ADAPTATION

Assessment

25. Design and planning are continuous and so is the requirement for assessment. Actions, both friendly and enemy must be assessed to provide feedback to the commander and staff against their intended outcomes. Assessment may alert the commander to opportunity or decisions that need to be made. It can also balance the commander's bias by providing evidence for alternative actions.

26. Assessment is achieved in the following manner:

    a. *Monitoring the Situation.* Monitoring the situation provides continuous observation of specific conditions.

    b. *Evaluating Progress.* The use of criteria to determine progress towards the end state. Measures of effectiveness assist in understanding changes in conditions – are we doing the right things? Measures of effectiveness may be linked respectively to the achievement of decisive events and the performance of lines of operation in long running operations where the tempo allows. Measures of performance assess task accomplishment and whether an action was performed properly – are we doing things right?

      c.   *Recommending or Directing Action for Improvement.* Assessment is not complete until improvements to actions are made.

27.   Effective assessment will incorporate both quantitative and qualitative indicators.

CHAPTER 6

CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS

SECTION 6-1. LAND OPERATIONS TASKS

1.   A joint land combat force will directly and persistently interact with the complex dynamics of culture, politics and populations in the land domain. The force must therefore be structured for a persistent, pervasive and proportionate presence. Reflecting the complex environment they operate in, land forces must be inherently flexible with a mix or complementary and reinforcing capabilities and the capacity to form and reform in ad hoc groupings. Joint enabled, combined arms teams are central to land operations.

2.   Just as organisational agility is essential, so to is the ability to shift between different modes of combat and non-combat actions – to adapt to prevent enemy success, to stabilise the population among which we will operate, and to achieve our own success.

3.   Land operations are conducted across the spectrum of conflict to destroy other land forces and joint capabilities on land, seize and secure physical objectives, influence and control populations, and create and maintain a secure environment in which other forces and agencies may operate.

4.   As described in Chapter 4, tactics are framed using combined arms, orchestration, tempo, focus and mission command to defeat the threat centre of gravity. The land commander's art is defined by visualising the right method, time and location to act to achieve the maximum effect on the enemy. As the enemy will be attempting to do the same, combat can be characterised as a constant struggle to gain and retain the initiative and freedom of action to act decisively and achieve the purpose of an operation.

5.   The complexity and dynamic nature of land operations creates an infinite number of variables which influence the conduct of land operations. The commander must therefore constantly employ different combinations of tactical tasks to achieve the purpose of an operation.

6.   Determined by considerations such as the purpose of the operation, threat, terrain and the capabilities of the friendly force, the commander will employ different combinations of offensive, defensive and stability tasks. The combinations employed must seek to gain the initiative and freedom of action, to disrupt enemy actions and therefore allow our forces to focus

effort on defeating the enemy centre of gravity. These tasks are defined as follows:

a. *Offensive.* An offensive task is conducted to defeat or destroy enemy forces, seize terrain or exploit the initiative. Offensive tasks impose our will on the enemy through actions that use speed, surprise and shock. Offensive tasks compel the enemy to react to us, creating or exposing vulnerabilities and opportunities.

b. *Defensive.* A defensive task is conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economise or preserve force or to develop conditions favourable for offensive action. Defensive tasks alone do not compel the enemy to act and will not normally be decisive. Defensive tasks will protect or shield our own actions, populations or areas.

c. *Stability.* Stability operations are integrated interagency operations focused on resolving the causes of instability either directly or through the support or development of host nation capacity.

7. The success of land operation also hinges on the conduct of shaping and enabling tasks which must occur in all operational phases and all types of operations. These tasks are defined as follows:

a. *Shaping.* A task conducted to establish conditions for the success of the decisive task. At every level, we must seek to establish conditions which enhance our actions and degrade the enemy's. Shaping will seek to retain the advantage for the friendly force while destroying the coherence and tempo of the enemy. Shaping will also seek to determine, expose and create enemy vulnerabilities for exploitation.

b. *Enabling.* Enabling tasks are actions that must be undertaken by a joint force conducting any land operations task. They are tasks that must be conducted to enable the conduct of all other tasks.

8. The tasks shown in Table 6–1 will be used at any level of command within a joint force conducting land operations.

9. A more detailed description of the application of tactics can be found in *LWD 3-0-3, Land Tactics (Developing Doctrine)*. This chapter will discuss the conduct of land operations.

Table 6–1: Land Combat Tasks

Land Combat Tasks		
Offensive:	**Defensive:**	**Stability:**
Movement to contact	Area defence	Peace operations
Attack:	Mobile defence	Counter-insurgency
a. Ambush	Retrograde:	Counter-piracy and arms control
b. Counterattack	a. Delay	Border security
c. Demonstration	b. Withdrawal	Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
d. Feint		Non-combatant evacuation operations
e. Raid		Security force assistance
f. Spoiling attack		Population control
Exploitation		
Pursuit		
Shaping:		**Enabling:**
Engagement		Sustainment:
Reconnaissance		a. Warehousing/Supply chain
Security:		b. Distribution
a. Cover		c. Repair
b. Guard		d. Medical
c. Screen		Force protection:
d. Area		a. Air defence
e. Patrol		b. Facilities
Mobility:		c. Electronic protective measures/Electronic countermeasures
a. Breach		d. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
b. Obstacle crossing		
c. Passage of lines		
Relief in place		
Information and influence		

SECTION 6-2. OFFENSIVE TASKS

Purpose

10. Offensive tasks are undertaken to achieve the following:

    a.   shatter the enemy's will,

    b.   destroy the enemy's cohesion,

    c.   seize terrain,

    d.   acquire information,

    e.   destroy enemy forces,

    f.   distract or divert an enemy's force, or

    g.   regain or retain the initiative by preventing an enemy from consolidating or regrouping.

11. **Description.** Offensive actions will either directly or indirectly attack the enemy centre of gravity by focusing on enemy decisive points, either simultaneously or sequentially. Forces forgo the protection of prepared and concealed positions for the advantage gained through taking the initiative and achieving surprise, and utilising firepower and ground. Offensive operations require a commander to accept risk and therefore must be undertaken ruthlessly.

12. A tactical manoeuvre will be employed to position the force from where it can attack and destroy or dislodge and pursue an enemy force – always looking to pit strength against weakness. Different combinations of dispersion, concentration and deception should be used to keep the enemy off balance and uncertain of the objective.

13. A dispersed attacking force will stretch enemy defences and deny high pay-off targets to the enemy. However, a successful attack will require concentration of forces, joint fires and effects. The capacity to generate mass rapidly from a dispersed disposition is therefore essential and forces must be grouped accordingly. Commanders must adopt the posture that best suits the situation, protects the force, and sustains momentum.

Characteristics of Offensive Tasks

14. Surprise, unity of effort, concentration, tempo, and audacity characterise the offensive. Unity of effort must be achieved through clearly identified objectives and simple and clear command relationships throughout the force. Concentration of force on the objective must be overwhelming and can only be achieved with sufficient accurate intelligence on key enemy capabilities.

15. Surprise is achieved by acting at a time or place the enemy does not expect and in a manner for which they are unprepared. Estimating the enemy commander's intent and denying their ability to gain situational understanding is necessary. Unpredictability and boldness will enhance the surprise achieved. Surprise induces a period of shock and disorientation in the enemy which can delay the enemy's reactions and overload and confuse command and control systems.

Offensive Manoeuvre

16. The commander uses offensive manoeuvre to gain a position of advantage over the enemy to employ one of the defeat mechanisms outlined in Chapter 4, to either defeat or set the conditions for the defeat of the enemy centre of gravity. The concepts of orchestration, tempo, focus and mission command will influence how the commander groups, controls and executes tactical manoeuvre.

17. Offensive manoeuvre will always require tradeoffs. The disposition and capabilities of the enemy, the terrain, weather, time available and friendly force capabilities will all influence what tactical manoeuvre options are available to a commander. The commander will seek to avoid enemy strengths and to create opportunities through surprise and tempo. Tactical manoeuvres can be used in combination and are as follows:

   a.   *Envelopment.* This is a manoeuvre where the attacking force moves to attack objectives to the enemy's rear or flank area. Enabled by a fixing or holding attack to limit the enemy's freedom of action, the envelopment requires the identification or generation of an assailable flank. The envelopment ensures the enemy is forced to fight in at least two directions as well as in close and rear zones.

   b.   *Turning Movement.* This is a manoeuvre where the attacking force avoids the enemy's main body to strike objectives in depth or in the enemy's rear area forcing the enemy to move or divert force to counter the threat. A successful turning movement must strike an objective that the enemy will be forced to defend. The attacking force must be strong enough to pose a real threat to the enemy at that location.

   c.   *Frontal attack.* A frontal attack is a form of manoeuvre in which the attacking force seeks to destroy a weaker enemy force or fix a larger enemy force along a broad front. The frontal attack does expose the attacker to the concentrated fires of the defender, but it is well suited to an attack in which speed and simplicity are essential; such as, overwhelming unprepared defensive positions, security positions or disorganised enemy forces.

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d. *Penetration.* This is a manoeuvre where the attacking force seeks to break an enemy defence on a narrow front to create an assailable flank or to allow subsequent movement into the enemy's rear area. A penetration may be utilised when enemy defences are stretched, when a gap is identified in a defensive area or when the available time does not permit some other form of manoeuvre. A force conducting a penetration will normally breach a defensive area, widen the gap, and then secure its penetration through temporary defences or guards to allow for a subsequent offensive manoeuvre such as envelopment.

e. *Infiltration.* This is a manoeuvre where the attacking force moves undetected into or through the enemy's defensive or security zone to attack an objective or to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy's rear area. Moving and assembling forces covertly through enemy positions takes time. An infiltration force should be grouped for independent operations. A successful infiltration will often require the support of a separate force conducting another form of manoeuvre to deceive the enemy.

Offensive Tactical Actions

18. **Advance to Contact.** Even on the defensive, the enemy can be expected to use every means available to retain freedom of action and to remain beneath the detection threshold, meaning little if any actionable intelligence may be available at the commencement of an offensive operation.

19. In this situation, the advance must force the enemy to respond so capabilities and intentions can be identified. Reconnaissance in this situation is an essential shaping action and constitutes a fight for information where the attacker seeks to gain information to develop situational awareness without losing freedom of action or becoming decisively engaged.

20. Where the attacking force is confident in its knowledge of the enemy, reconnaissance forces will seek to confirm the assessed enemy locations, capabilities and intentions and look for opportunities for an envelopment or turning movement. The commander will look to balance reconnaissance and attacking force groupings to retain flexibility and exploit the opportunities that offensive operations can generate.

21. **Attack.** The attack is a focused action to engage and force attrition on the enemy. It is normally directed at the achievement of an objective or as an essential step in the achievement of an objective. Determined by the purpose, the attack can be undertaken in many different forms – conducted by joint fires, direct fire or an assault. It is focused on the disruption and dislocation of key physical capabilities to prevent the

concentration of the enemy's fighting power. The attack requires coordinated employment of manoeuvre forces, joint fires and information actions.

22. **Exploitation.** The exploitation normally follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganise the enemy in depth and to complete its destruction.

23. **Pursuit.** The pursuit will normally follow a successful exploitation. However, if enemy resistance has broken down entirely and the enemy is fleeing the battlefield, any form of offensive operation can transition into a pursuit.

SECTION 6-3. DEFENSIVE TASKS

Purpose

24. Defensive tasks are undertaken to achieve the following:

    a. defeat or destroy the enemy on the ground of the defender's choice,

    b. deny decisive terrain,

    c. gain time to prepare for offensive action,

    d. protect or shield another force,

    e. avoid destruction or unacceptable loss, and

    f. to support or enable other operations.

25. **Description.** Defensive tasks develop favourable conditions for offensive action either as a prelude to offensive operations or to deny an enemy attack through attrition of the enemy force or the preservation of the friendly force for subsequent operations.

26. Defence is not a passive activity. The commander must task forces to find, strike, weaken and disrupt the enemy before they can attack. Success in the defence relies on offensive action. The defender must dominate the approaches to defensive locations. Security positions and manoeuvre forces must combine with joint fires to increase the depth of any type of defence to attrite the enemy and disguise the defensive plan.

27. The commander must exploit the inherent strengths of the defence. The defender will usually have a time advantage to identify and select positions and terrain features which afford a defensive advantage.

Characteristics of Defensive Tasks

28.   There are six characteristics of defensive actions:

a.   *Preparation.* The defender will generally have some time to prepare. The more effective the use of time, the stronger the defence will be. Preparations must be ruthlessly pursued and must continue up to the point when the enemy commences an attack.

b.   *Security.* Effective security will deceive the enemy as to the location of the defence and its strengths and weaknesses. Security should deny or defeat enemy reconnaissance operations, provide early warning and disrupt enemy attack preparations.

c.   *Disruption.* Efforts must be focused on disrupting enemy offensive preparations through tactical actions in the enemy rear area, attacks on enemy security actions and deception. Once an offensive action commences, disrupting the enemy's synchronisation through counterattacks, joint fires, obstacles, and the retention of key or decisive terrain will prevent the enemy from concentrating strength against the defence. The destruction of enemy command and control capabilities will often disproportionately disrupt enemy synchronisation and flexibility.

d.   *Concentration.* Concentration of force is essential to create or exploit enemy weakness. Focusing combat power at the decisive time and place will establish tactical advantage and enhance disruption. This requires offensive action and the use of surprise and deception. To concentrate combat power, the defender will need to accept risk in some areas. Joint fires are able to shift to critical points to concentrate destructive effects rapidly.

e.   *Offensive Action.* Offensive action is critical for the defence; every practicable opportunity should be used to regain the initiative.

f.   *Flexibility.* Defensive operations require flexibility. Planning focuses on preparations in depth, use of reserves, and the ability to shift the main effort of the defensive scheme. Commanders add flexibility by designating supplementary positions and preparing multiple counterattack options.

Defensive Tactical Actions

29.   **Area Defence.** The area defence is used to deny decisive ground to an attacker, to protect or shield another force or to defeat the enemy on ground that favours the defence. Forces with limited mobility may be forced into area defence. Static defensive positions or hard points are established to mass direct and joint fires into engagement areas and to

establish a pivot on which mobile forces can counter attack. The area defence can also form part of a larger mobile defence.

30.   **Mobile Defence.** The mobile defence is used where space is available and the defender has a mobility advantage over the enemy. The defending force combines offensive, defensive, and delaying actions to disrupt the enemy's offensive actions to draw out and expose capabilities for counterattack. Static or positional defensive locations are established but are economy of force actions. The majority of combat power will be grouped as a striking or counterattack force. Deception, relentless patrolling and other security measures combine with counter-reconnaissance actions to prevent successful enemy reconnaissance of the defensive scheme.

31.   **Retrograde.** A retrograde action is conducted to stabilise a situation, to prevent the enemy achieving the decisive engagement of the friendly force. The retrograde may also be conducted to extend the enemy's lines of supply or to shorten our own. The retrograde may also be employed to draw the enemy into ground of our choosing or as a prelude to our own offensive action. Types of retrograde actions are as follows:

   a.   *Delay.* The delay is an action where a force under pressure trades space for time to slow the enemy's momentum and inflict maximum destruction while avoiding decisive engagement. The delay gains time for the friendly force and will be considered where the friendly force is insufficient to attack or conduct area or mobile defence. The delay is also employed as a shaping operation to draw the enemy into an area for subsequent counterattack. Delaying units should be at least as mobile as their attackers and measures to increase friendly mobility and decrease enemy mobility are essential.

   b.   *Withdrawal.* The withdrawal is an action where the friendly force disengages from actual or potential contact with the enemy to preserve the force, conduct another task or occupy a different position, and avoid combat under unfavourable conditions. Depending on the nature of the withdrawal, a security force is tasked to prevent enemy interference. A reserve may be tasked to conduct a spoiling attack to disorganise, or delay the enemy to buy time for the withdrawing force or to extricate an encircled or decisively engaged force.

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SECTION 6-4. STABILITY TASKS

Purpose

32. Stability tasks are conducted to do the following:

   a.   contain and limit conflict;

   b.   monitor the cessation of conflict;

   c.   restore security and order;

   d.   provide a secure environment;

   e.   protect and/or evacuate non-combatants;

   f.   provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;

   g.   support host nation governance;

   h.   develop host nation capabilities;

   i.   defeat military, irregular and insurgent threats to stability; and

   j.   impose international agreements, obligations, rules or treaties.

33. **Description.** Stability operations are conducted as completely integrated interagency operations. It is not unusual for military forces to be in support of the lead of another government department. Stability operations may therefore not only be defined in military terms. They may involve the following:

   a.   reconstruction and economic support,

   b.   establishing or supporting rule of law and developing accountable governance and host nation security forces, or

   c.   defeating military threats to stability.

34. Stability tasks focus on the human dimension and specifically the causes of instability. As a consequence, in some combat operations, stability actions will be the decisive task.

35. Stability actions do not mean an absence of combat. Combat in stability actions may be as violent, and potentially more consequential, than in other warfighting actions. Combat will however have limited aims; generally to restore a situation to stability.

Characteristics of Stability Operations

36. The primary military task in stability operations will be the provision of security to protect and defend the population and to create a platform for

political, economic and human security. There are four characteristics of stability tasks as follows:

a. *Control.* Control is imposing order by establishing: priorities for collection, control and security actions; denying threat access to the population; and identifying leverage for interaction with the population.

b. *Influence.* Ensuring the opinion and attitudes regarding our actions are perceived as legitimate and that the population has a strong impulse to support our actions. While a focus of the information domain, our actions at every level must reinforce our legitimacy and reinforce the purpose of our involvement.

c. *Compel.* Self-protection, restraint and the use of minimum force will normally frame the conduct of stability operations. However, the use of force and the threat of force will be critical options for a commander to establish control and dominance to secure an area or population. Force credibility is essential and the joint force must be structured for, and have the capacity and the rules of engagement to deliver decisive military force against any threat to stability.

d. *Support.* The capacity of the host nation will perhaps be the most significant contributor to mission success. Determining, establishing and then reinforcing the conditions for and capacity of host nation functions will form the core of interagency efforts. Our sustainment capacity in particular, will hinge off host nation capacity.

SECTION 6-5. SHAPING TASKS

Purpose

37. Shaping is conducted in all operations and across the spectrum of conflict. Shaping is continuous. Most peacetime military engagement can be considered a shaping task. In conflict, shaping tasks set conditions for, and enhance the success of offensive, defensive and stability actions. The purpose of shaping is to achieve the following:

a. limit or prevent conflict;

b. develop capacity in friendly forces;

c. develop our understanding of the operational environment;

d. understand enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities;

e. find terrain which affords military advantage;

f. disrupt enemy actions to determine our intent;

g.   degrade key enemy capabilities;

h.   position and posture to dislocate or deter enemy action; and

i.   inform and influence friendly, enemy and non-combatants.

Shaping Tactical Actions

38.   **Engagement.** Engagement actions range from: meeting with civilian and military leaders and officials to influence their priorities, perspectives and actions; to the conduct of exercises and deployments with military forces of friendly nations to enhance our understanding of a potential operational environment, to develop interoperability; and to assist in the development of friendly nation military capacity.

39.   **Reconnaissance.** Reconnaissance is a critical shaping action. Reconnaissance should be directed by the commander and specific commander critical information requirements to identify enemy weakness and critical capabilities. Continuous reconnaissance will also identify opportunities.

40.   **Security.** Security actions support the friendly force retaining the initiative in the offence, while reducing the enemy's initiative in the defence. Security actions assist the commander to generate tempo and to develop focus by providing early and accurate information on the enemy. The following security actions also enhance that advantage by degrading the ability of the enemy to understand our intentions. The following security actions also enhance the advantage by degrading the ability of the enemy to understand our intentions:

a.   *Covering Force.* Covering forces protect the force by making initial contact with the enemy, fighting to gain information or time, and denying the enemy information. The covering force will generally operate independently of the main body and should be grouped with combat support and combat service support accordingly.

b.   *Guard.* The guard protects the main body by fighting to disrupt or dislocate the enemy on specified approaches. Guards will also enhance security through early warning. The guard force will not normally be grouped as an independent force.

c.   *Screen.* The screen enhances security to a force by providing early warning.

d.   *Area Security.* An area security force protects friendly forces, vital assets and installations, routes and key functions within a specific area.

e.   *Patrols.* Patrolling provides local security to prevent surprise.

41. **Mobility.** If we can move faster than the enemy we can generate a significant tempo advantage and retain the initiative. At the tactical level, mobility relies on protection, agility and the ability to move freely across a wide range of terrain both in and out of direct fire contact. Mobility also relies on our ability to transition forces in contact or in close proximity to the enemy and to move through or across natural and man made obstacles. These actions will be conducted during the following times:

    a.   passages of lines (forward and rearward);

    b.   relief in place;

    c.   breach; and

    d.   obstacle crossings.

42. At the operational level mobility will rely on supporting systems and nodes and networks for road, rail, air and shipping.

43. **Information and Influence.** The information dimension influences all other actions in the land domain. Information and influence actions are continuous. The purpose of information actions is to generate an advantage over a threat or enemy by better manipulation of the use, content and flow of information.

44. Information and influence actions should be framed to diminish or disrupt enemy or threat decision-making and information flows, while enhancing or protecting friendly information flows, messages and decisions. Information and influence actions include operations security, deception, computer network operations, electronic attack measures, electronic protection measures, counterintelligence, psychological operations and public affairs/information. Focused actions may be framed as the following:

    a.   *Cognitive.* Deny enemy understanding and perception by degrading, disrupting and manipulating information available to the enemy while enhancing what is available to us. Reinforce accurate information available to non-combatants and counter deceptive information.

    b.   *Moral.* Influence decision makers and key leaders at any level capable of influencing the situation whether adversary, friendly or non-combatant.

    c.   *Physical.* Degrade capabilities, such as the adversary's command, control, communications, computer and intelligence infrastructure to disrupt information flows for the enemy. Defend against disruptive actions by the enemy against our systems.

SECTION 6-6. ENABLING TASKS

45. Enabling actions are integral to any task. They will influence the planning and execution of any stage of an operation, task or action.

Sustainment

46. This is the provision of supply chain (warehousing), distribution, repair and medical support to maintain and prolong operations until task or mission completion. Sustainment integrates all forms of combat service support and determines the tempo, duration and intensity that can be achieved in any operation. Depending on the nature of the operation, sustainment may include considerations for basing, redeployment and force reconstitution.

47. Some critical sustainment capabilities may need to be centralised for efficiency. However, centralisation comes at a cost to mission command and freedom of action in the execution of tactical actions. Additionally, sustainment forces require protection and secure lines of communication and these demands can be exacerbated by centralised sustainment. Centralisation will inevitably require combat forces to provide protection to sustainment elements as a discrete task.

48. Freedom of action, particularly for dispersed forces, will be generated by robust echeloning of supply chain, distribution, repair and medical support down to sub-unit level. Protection will generally also be achieved more efficiently through echeloning as sustainment and combat forces will normally operate together. Where this mode of sustainment is employed, sustainment assets should have commensurate mobility and protection to the combat forces they support.

Force Protection

49. Force protection minimises vulnerabilities of personnel (military and interagency), equipment and facilities and preserves the operational effectiveness of the force. Force protection can be generic passive and active measures such as camouflage and concealment, armour protection, dispersion and alert levels or posture. Other specific capabilities include:

   a. *Air Defence and Counter-fire.* Consideration will be given to both point and area defence. Point air defence will normally be focused on protecting personnel and functions while area air defence will normally be focused on maintaining freedom of action. Air defence must be layered and where possible overlap on critical locations.

b.   *Facilities.* Where the joint force occupies fixed facilities, they will need to be hardened against potential threats.

c.   *Electronic Protective Measures/Electronic Countermeasures.* Electronic protective meausures/Electronic countermeasures will use the electromagnetic spectrum to limit detection and prevent threats targeting our forces.

d.   *Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear.* Measures that protect personnel, equipment, materiel and facilities both physically and mentally. The nature of the protection for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear must be threat specific and will inevitably restrict our actions.

6-16

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