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Introduction

Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the enemy’s forces as a means to a further end. That holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed. It follows that the destruction of the enemy’s force underlies all military actions; all plans are ultimately based upon it, resting on it like an arch on its abutment. Consequently all action is undertaken in the belief that if the ultimate test of arms should actually occur, the outcome would be favourable.

*Carl Von Clausewitz*¹

Military forces exist with one overarching purpose – to win in battle in furtherance of national objectives – Clausewitz providing the timeless maxim that ‘war is merely the continuation of policy by other means’². Given its complexity and existential stakes, the technical prosecution of war is normally entrusted to a nation’s military forces. The execution of battle therefore exists as both the raison d’être as well as the organisational imperative for professional military forces. Military forces are created, organised, trained and resourced for this principal purpose – to win in battle.

History proves war to be a complex human activity, and instructs us that contemporary battle will be prosecuted across multiple environmental domains along the full spectrum of conflict. While environmental expertise is entrusted to the single services, multi-domain success in contemporary battle is the purview of the joint force – the Australian Defence Force.

The Australian Defence Force achieves military strategic success through the conduct of campaigns and operations; campaigns and operations are the higher order orchestration of tactical actions within and across all domains of battle. The Australian Army – whose domain expertise remains the generation of forces expert in the application of land power – is therefore entrusted with the mission of fighting and winning the land battle.

Success in battle demands an organisational methodology harnessing all elements of national power in the application of joint effects to defeat an opposing force. It is this fundamental concept of fighting and winning – irrespective of domain – that demands a cohesive organising methodology which enables the orchestrated application of military force to achieve designated objectives.

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² ibid, p. 87.
This authorised and orchestrated application of military force is achieved through the design and execution (conduct) of operations. An operation is defined as a designated military activity using lethal and/or nonlethal ways and means to achieve directed outcomes in accordance with national legal obligations and constraints (Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0, Campaigns and Operations). Operations are the means by which military forces orchestrate and apply military effects in time and space to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives. For Army, operations are the physical means through which land power is systematically applied to achieve tactical success in the land domain.

This publication describes how the Australian Army organises to generate and apply land power to achieve designated objectives in the land domain. It provides higher order organisational precepts and concepts which guide the development of subordinate doctrinal and procedural publications that describe tactics, techniques and procedures.

Accordingly, this publication provides:

• the strategic context and operating environment within which land operations are conducted
• principal organising concepts guiding the design and planning of land operations
• fundamental considerations for the command and control of land operations
• factors regulating the conduct of land operations
• principal considerations for enabling and sustaining land operations.
Chapter 1

Strategic context for land operations

Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power stipulates that Army, as part of the joint force, promotes and protects Australia's interests, deters threats to Australia’s sovereignty and, if necessary, defeats them. This requires Army to shape Australia’s strategic environment, deny and defeat threats to Australia and its national interests, and protect and support Australian and foreign civil populations.

Army generates flexible and scalable land force options for government across the spectrum operations to achieve these strategic tasks. Land forces are oriented and organised to undertake five interdependent and mutually supporting efforts in the land domain: joint land combat, population protection, information dominance, population support and indigenous capacity building.

Army generates capabilities and applies joint effects to achieve military strategic objectives in the land domain. The primary mechanism by which Army accomplishes its strategic objectives through the application of efforts is through the conduct of land operations.

Land operations are inherently joint and interagency, and may also be coalition and/or multinational in scope. They are prosecuted across the full spectrum of conflict in a variety of international and domestic environments, subject to the influence of contemporary operating conditions. A land operation may be undertaken as a single tactical activity to achieve broader operational or strategic objectives, or may constitute one element of a broader Australian Defence Force, interagency or multinational campaign.

The perpetuity of these strategic tasks necessitates a sustainable force generation cycle enabling Army to continuously prepare, deploy and sustain land forces on joint operations.

This chapter outlines the strategic context for land operations, including:

- the nature of joint operations
- the spectrum of conflict
- types of land operations
- the framework for land operations
- the contemporary operating environment
- organisation for the conduct of land operations.
Nature of joint operations

The Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0, Campaigns and Operations specifies that whenever Australian military force is to be applied it will be coordinated and synchronised with other elements of national power. Accordingly, all campaigns and operations will be constituted and executed by an appropriately designed and enabled joint force, comprising force elements from two or more Services operating together under a single commander.

Irrespective of the primary domain in which decision is to be achieved, forces and/or effects from other Service environments will also be levied to contribute to success in that domain. The assignment of joint force elements, the application of joint fires and effects, and/or the provision of joint support to enable and sustain a land operation will render it a joint operation in both character and effect.

Australia’s Joint Operating Concept also specifies that the Australian Defence Force may be required to undertake a range of joint operations that could be independent, supporting or supported in nature. Independent operations are those in which only Australian Defence Force elements are involved. Supported operations are activities in which Australian forces are supported by other elements or forces, either indigenous or international. Supporting operations are activities in which the Australian Defence Force does not lead but provides contributory force elements.

As the land component for the Australian Defence Force, Army must be capable of prosecuting joint operations in the land domain in an independent, supporting or supported capacity. These operations occur within and across the full spectrum of conflict.

Spectrum of conflict

Conflict occurs as one potential outcome of political competition between human wills, and can rapidly escalate into armed hostilities between adversaries in the international system. Between the diametrically opposite categories of war and peace, nations remain in a constant state of competition, characterised by a wide range of direct, indirect, accommodating, coercive, engaging and deterring behaviours. Competition can escalate into open conflict with little warning. Competition and conflict can also occur between non-state entities acting against one another, against a government and/or as a proxy for other nation states.

A spectrum of conflict has been developed which describes the full range of political behaviours from stable peace through to competition, irregular conflict to overt war between nation states. The spectrum of conflict provides a conceptual foundation to aid understanding of the nature of conflict between adversaries, informing the development and prosecution of military operations. An informed comprehension of the nature of conflict that exists or may exist between
protagonists informs the formulation of strategic objectives and guides operational design to achieve those objectives.

The nature of conflict between adversaries may not be easily or precisely discerned at a given point in time, given that conflict is rarely either static in nature or linear in progression. Adversaries frequently seek to disguise themselves or to deceive others as to the nature of competition or conflict they are prosecuting for political advantage. This creates a highly complex and fluid environment within which operations are planned and executed. An informed or diagnostic understanding of the prevalent or dominant conflict conditions in an operational environment greatly assists in the development of tactical plans and actions to achieve strategic objectives.

Operations may occur across or within the following broad states of political and military activity along the spectrum of conflict:

- **Peace** – characterised by the absence of militarily significant levels of violence, but which may include environmental or economic hazards and/or disasters. This category subsumes the natural but peacefully resolvable competition that occurs between entities in the international system and within nation states.

- **Instability** – characterised by a range of irregular activities along the spectrum of conflict which derogate from the peaceful and stable functioning of a society; including environmental shocks, criminality, political and sectarian violence, acts of terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare.

- **War** – a state of organised armed conflict characterised by high-intensity combat operations, but which can also include a range of guerrilla or irregular combat activities and associated humanitarian interventions.

These broad categories of conflict, including the speed and rate of transition between them, inform the type of land operations that Army trains for, designs and prosecutes in order to achieve its strategic tasks. The type of operation to be undertaken, based upon environmental conditions described within the spectrum of conflict, also dictates a range of authorities, freedoms, limitations and force design factors in the planning and prosecution of land operations.

**Types of land operations**

The *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0, Campaigns and Operations* specifies that armed conflict generally occurs at three interdependent levels: strategic, operational and tactical. The level of military commitment by the Australian Defence Force can vary greatly from large-scale combat and high intensity warfighting, the province of campaigns and operations, to smaller-scale tactical actions.
The three broad types of joint operations conducted by the Australian Defence Force are decisive, shaping and transition operations. Decisive operations seek to defeat the enemy’s will and means to fight. Shaping operations seek to deter threats and set conditions that enable other operations. Transition operations aim to conclude an operation or transfer responsibility for the conduct of an operation to another force.

Within a joint operation, Army applies land power and coordinates joint effects to achieve decision in the land domain. This is normally achieved through a range of operational activities which generate combined arms teams to apply joint effects and regulate the level of violence based upon the desired outcome. These operations may occur concurrently or consecutively, as a standalone activity or as part of a broader campaign. Different operations or lines of effort within an operation necessitate different design and planning factors to ensure that tactical actions achieve their operational and strategic objectives.

The different types of land operations include:

- **Combat operations.** These operations secure the environment, defeat adversaries through the application of joint combat effects and set the conditions for the conduct of other operations. Combat operations are inherently violent and are characterised by combined arms close combat focused on tactical actions including offensive and defensive manoeuvre, and may include the use of unconventional forces and the conduct of irregular warfare to achieve tactical objectives. Combat operations are normally the raison d'être and principal organising methodology for nation’s armed forces for national defence.

- **Peacetime military engagement operations.** These operations shape the international and regional security environment to build cooperation, develop capabilities and/or deter aggression. They do not involve the application of combat effects against an adversary, but will normally include nonviolent activities such as defence cooperation programs, bilateral exercises, training and infrastructure development. Peacetime military engagement shapes the environment for operations that may be conducted in less stable periods or environments. Peacetime military engagement seeks to prevent the escalation of political competition into covert or overt armed conflict.

- **Peace operations.** These operations seek to contain conflict, prevent the escalation of violence and support stability. Peace operations aim to maintain or create a safe and secure environment, and to provide specialised support to enable civil agencies to address the underlying causes of conflict. They may result in the ancillary application of violence for force protection purposes which can include actions to encourage and/or compel compliance.

- **Stability/support operations.** These operations focus military actions against counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and adversary forces conducting unconventional or hybrid warfare. These operations seek to set

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- **Stability/support operations.** These operations focus military actions against counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and adversary forces conducting unconventional or hybrid warfare. These operations seek to set
conditions for the resumption of stable civil governance. They frequently employ specific combined arms and/or special force elements actions to contain or defeat the irregular threat to enable Civil Authorities to secure the populace.

• **Protection operations.** This type of operation includes activities designed to enforce domestic or international laws or norms including border protection, counter-piracy/-smuggling and/or arms control. They orient on enforcement of controls, domestic laws, international agreements and regimes, including actions to preserve lawful freedom of movement. They may be conducted in isolated or hostile physical environments against threats which overmatch the capabilities of civilian agencies.

• **Defence assistance to the civilian community.** Defence assistance to the civilian community is the construct through which Defence assists Australian Government agencies and non-government organisations to deliver civil effects within Australia where their resources are not sufficient or have been overwhelmed. This usually occurs as a result of natural disasters, and does not involve the application of violence against an adversary. Defence assistance to the civilian community operations are regulated in accordance with policy and procedures outlined in the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual.

• **Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.** These operations coordinate military or government agency emergency response actions offshore in circumstances where the needs of a population exceed existing host nation or non-government organisational capacity. These operations focus on the provision of basic necessities of life such as food, water, shelter or basic services in a stricken area. Defence may be the supported or supporting agency in humanitarian/environmental assistance and disaster relief operations.

**Framework for the conduct of land operations**

Land operations occur within the broader construct of national military strategic design which unites a comprehensive whole-of-government approach with the application of joint effects by the Australian Defence Force. While the nature of conflict endures – with elements such as friction, danger, uncertainty, chance, human interaction and terrain ever present – the means by which military operations are conducted continually evolves due to a variety of environmental, technological and societal factors.

Army’s framework approach to operations in these circumstances is characterised by two fundamentals: military operations as part of a holistic whole-of-government approach, and tactical actions that exploit and maximise joint effects to achieve decision. These fundamentals set the context and conditions for the planning and conduct of land operations in the contemporary operating environment.
Whole-of-government approach

The Australian Government leverages all aspects of national power to shape the strategic environment and respond to threats in furtherance of the national interest. The elements of national power available to government to achieve this are elaborated in *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – Doctrine, The Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine*, and include political and diplomatic influence; industrial and economic capacity; military force; educational, scientific and technical capabilities; national values; and the cultural landscape.

These elements of national power are harnessed and applied through a holistic national approach to the design and conduct of military operations. Government departments and agencies with pertinent subject matter expertise and resources will mobilise and integrate elements of national power in support of a military objective and/or operation. Alternately, the Australian Defence Force may provide contributory military effects in support of civil activities led by another government department. This collaborative approach in support of a unified outcome is described as the whole-of-government approach. It ensures that all elements of national power can be brought to bear to resolve problems and achieve holistic outcomes in support of military operations, including land operations, which in turn are designed to achieve higher political and military strategic objectives.

Further detail on the whole-of-government approach to joint operations can be found in *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0, Campaigns and Operations*.

Joint operational effects

*Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power* emphasises that Army’s philosophy of warfare integrates an understanding of the influences of national character, the nature of warfare, the utility of land power and its role in national strategy, within a whole-of-government and coalition construct. Success in land operations demands a high level of cooperation and integration between the Services, coalition partners, other government agencies, and non-government and international bodies. This fusion ensures that the full range of effects, including whole-of-government, joint and combined arms capabilities and effects can be brought to bear to defeat an adversary or to mitigate an environmental problem.

Land operations do not occur in isolation, and increasingly those capabilities and effects generated in one environmental domain can be quickly and effectively applied in other domains. Land operations integrate and apply the full suite of joint fires and effects to maximise the operational effectiveness of the force vis-à-vis the adversary, and to protect against or mitigate inherent vulnerabilities. The comprehensive integration and application of joint fires and effects is a fundamental organising principle in the design and execution of land operations.
The contemporary operating environment

Land Warfare Doctrine 1. The Fundamentals of Land Power highlights that developments in technology, politics, society, strategy and tactics continuously alter the character and conduct of war. These changes not only influence the manner in which Army thinks about warfare (Army’s philosophical approach), but also the conduct of warfare through the prism of land operations. Understanding the elements of the contemporary operating environment enables planners and commanders to successfully design, sequence and execute tactical actions to achieve designated operational objectives across the spectrum of conflict.

The operating environment

Land operations take place in an operating environment which is generally described or defined in terms of domains and dimensions.

Domains describe the physical or conceptual areas in which human activity and interaction occurs, including the four environmental domains of maritime (including subsurface), land, air and space, and the three non-environmental domains of cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and information.

Dimensions describe a range of organising frameworks or paradigms regulating human activity, including physical, human and societal, political, informational, economic and military organisational constructs.

An understanding of the domains and dimensions of the operating environment, particularly the interplay and interdependencies between them, orients and enables the planner and commander to comprehend the human and environmental dynamics at play that influence the conduct and success of an operation. This includes the potential reactions of adversaries, mission partners, noncombatants and other stakeholders to tactical actions undertaken as part of the land operation.

Contemporary and future trends in the joint operating environment

Trends and imperatives at play in the operating environment affect the analytic processes of design, sequencing and adapting an operation to achieve its desired outcomes.

The Future Operating Environment: 2035 provides a detailed and analytical insight into the broad trends and change agents influencing the conduct of joint operations at the strategic level in the contemporary and future operating environments across the categories of people and culture, climate, resources and energy, economics and governance, geopolitics, and technology.

Trends in the contemporary land environment

Land Warfare Doctrine 1. The Fundamentals of Land Power highlights Army’s operational experience and recent studies in the dynamics of global conflict, drawing attention to a range of contemporary influences likely to affect the conduct of land operations. These include current and emergent trends in the means and
manner of waging war, weapon effects, operating environments, force composition, use of terrain and military adaptation.

An understanding of these broad trends and change agents, and the means and manner by which they influence the operating environment, informs operational design, planning and adaptation of land operations.

A crowded operating environment. Increases in population growth and urbanisation mean that land operations will increasingly take place, in whole or in part, within crowded, dense and complex operating environments such as cities. This founds the contemporary observation of ‘war amongst the people’, connoting land operations are now less likely to occur on secluded battlefields between easily discernible adversaries engaged in overt kinetic military actions against one another. It suggests the adversary will seize any advantage to either immerse within or control an objective population to either secure vital terrain, and/or avoid detection and targeting by the opposing force. This concept recognises that conflict is conducted amongst and within population masses, and that complex human terrain will be the dominant operating environment within which the civilian population exists as the objective as well as a source of potential threat.

A connected operating environment. Globalisation, exponential technological development and proliferation of personal communication devices mean the land operating environment will be perpetually connected at all levels down to individual actors. Friendly force actions are more likely to be continuously observed, reported, critiqued and publicly contested by adversaries, noncombatants, media, domestic populations and international organisations. Interception (exploitation) and encryption (protection) of communications within and between civil and military communication networks will increasingly become an arena for contest between adversaries seeking information and decision dominance.

Disaggregated lethality in a non-contiguous battlespace. Improved communications coupled with greater lethality and availability of man-portable weapon systems within crowded human operating environments will enable asymmetry in tactical engagements. Adversaries, whether irregular, conventional or special forces, can operate in a more distributed manner in groupings small enough to shelter from detection, yet are able to bring catastrophic weapons effects to bear before dispersing again. The proliferation of civilian and military surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities through the electromagnetic spectrum and/or unmanned aerial surveillance systems, coupled with the increased effectiveness of human intelligence networks in crowded and connected human terrain, will likely force combatant forces to operate in a more distributed manner. As a result, the contemporary operating environment is predicted to be more disaggregated and less conventional in character.

Hybrid warfare. The concept of hybrid warfare is used to describe an amalgam; the potentially asymmetric means of waging war blending different and discrete methods of warfare, including conventional, irregular, information and cyber warfare. An adversary employing hybrid warfare exploits the full-spectrum of
means and methods of waging modern war without restricting their operations to conventional methodologies. Adversaries employing hybrid warfare tactics, techniques and procedures are unlikely to conform to the established laws of armed conflict and will establish a state of moral ambiguity in an attempt to legitimise or justify their activities. This potentially includes the use of criminal activities to complement or reinforce military activities.

An understanding of the characteristics of potential operating environments within which land operations will occur is essential for both planning and training purposes. The operating environment describes the environment within which forces will operate, but also defines what the land force must consider to physically and psychologically achieve the mission. This in turn informs the organisational configuration of Army enabling it to continuously prepare, deploy and sustain land forces for joint operations across the full spectrum of conflict.

Organisation for the conduct of land operations

Force generation is the process of providing suitably trained and equipped forces, and the means of their deployment, recovery and sustainment to meet all current and potential future tasks, within required readiness and preparation times (see Land Warfare Doctrine 7-0, Training and Education).

The single Services raise, train and sustain forces which are then assigned to the Chief of Joint Operations for campaigns and operations. The process by which a joint force is mounted, trained, assigned and deployed on operations is described in detail in Australian Defence Force Publication 3.0.3, Mounting Operations.

Army’s process of generating and sustaining land forces for joint operations is cyclic, based upon a conceptual force generation cycle rotating force elements through discrete phases of Readying, Ready and Reset. This cycle is designed to ensure that mission capable forces are continuously designed, equipped, trained, deployed, sustained, recovered and reconstituted to maintain military effectiveness in the operating environment.

Land Warfare Doctrine 7-0, Training and Education specifies five key priorities or components to ensure that land forces are ready to undertake joint operations:

- training, education and development of individual members of the force and the generation of a core collective training capability at prescribed levels and standards
- force structures – numbers of personnel and force composition
- equipment – technology, weapons systems and the quality of equipment
- readiness – the ability to provide the capabilities and execute an assigned mission within a prescribed time frame
- sustainability – the ability to maintain the assigned level of operational activity for a specified duration.
During the Readying phase land force elements are designed, configured and equipped appropriately to achieve designated military objectives in the operational environment for the specified duration. During this time the land force will be constituted, configured, concentrated, and will undertake mission-specific training which may culminate in a mission rehearsal. The land force may also be formally assessed and certified as ready and capable to undertake its designated mission sets.

During the Ready phase the land force will be deployed, sustained (including reinforcement and/or reprovisioning) and will also normally be recovered from the designated operation or campaign.

During the Reset phase the previously deployed force elements will be rested, reconstituted and may also be tasked to provide reinforcing effects for force elements engaged in the Readying and Ready phases of the force generation cycle.

Each of these considerations, outlined in this chapter, are fundamental to the successful application of land power within the broader joint and whole-of-government operating constructs, and in response to the challenges presented by the operating environment.

A thorough understanding of the operating environment, and the inherent characteristics of the land force in this environment, is essential to also understanding the nature of the operational task being assigned. This enables an understanding of the operational problem from which design, planning, execution, sustainment and adaptation of operations can progress in furtherance of designated operational objectives.
Chapter 2

Operational design and planning

The Australian approach to warfighting is based upon a manoeuvrist warfighting philosophy, which maximises effectiveness by applying friendly strengths against adversary vulnerabilities. This demands a systematic analysis of all relevant factors to ensure that battle occurs on the most favourable terms.

This approach could be neatly summarised in a quote widely attributed to Benjamin Franklin: ‘If you fail to plan, you are planning to fail’.

The Australian framework for operations describes the philosophical tenets and design considerations to be applied in the conduct of land operations. Operational design relies upon a clear understanding and articulation of the purpose for an operation, knowledge of the environment within which battle occurs, and all factors regulating the effective application of joint, interagency, multinational and coalition capabilities and effects.

This chapter describes the general principles that underline the Australian approach to the design and planning of land operations through the application of:

• operational art
• operational design and planning
• operational assessment and adaptation.

Operational art

It is essential to relate what is strategically desirable to what is tactically possible with the forces at your disposal. To this end it is necessary to decide the development of operations before the initial blow is delivered.

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery

Operational art is the intellectual ability to visualise and orchestrate tactical actions to achieve strategic objectives. It leverages a commander’s capacity to fuse and apply experience, creativity and vision in the design and execution of battle, leading to synchronised staff planning and action. Application of operational art facilitates the skilful employment of a force to attain military goals through the design, sequencing and ongoing development of operations.

Application of operational art links strategy to tactics, effectively translating broad political intent into tangible military action. The commander uses this process to design and execute military operations to achieve the political strategic objectives.

The creative and innovative application of tactical acumen into a military operation is the realisation of operational art. A commander must understand both the desired outcome as well as the capacity of the force to achieve this outcome through military action. There is, therefore, an integrated and interwoven relationship between the capabilities available to the commander, and the tactics and tasks they will employ to achieve the desired objectives.

The successful application of operational art in the design and planning for land operations therefore fuses:

- **Ends.** The desired endstate and operational level objectives to be achieved.
- **Means.** The capabilities and resources required to achieve the objectives.
- **Ways.** The order and sequence of actions that lead to the fulfilment of the operational objectives.

Operational art is thus the term used to describe the process by which a commander leverages personal experience, skill and creativity to shape the design, planning and execution of a military operation. It is continuously applied throughout all phases of a campaign or operation as the plan for battle is assessed and adapted as the operation unfolds.

**Operational design and planning**

The commander’s application of operational art informs the design and plan for battle, prior to the commencement and during the execution of battle. Operational design and planning are therefore two related but discrete activities; the former provides the context within which the latter occurs.

Operational design is a process of problem framing, providing the concept, conditions and key considerations for the detailed planning and conduct of operations. It is more macro than micro in process, given that it is the commander’s broad analysis and articulation of the key operational parameters which informs and shapes detailed operational planning by the staff.

Commanders initiate operational planning by communicating their operational design, which serves to continuously guide subordinate commanders and staff in the planning, execution and assessment of operations. Operational design is thus the method by which higher purpose and operative parameters are translated into actionable tactical guidance for subordinate commanders and staff. It may occur in direct response to new tasking from a higher headquarters, or it may be self-initiated by the commander in response to a developing or changed situation in the current operation.
Operational design is derived from the application of operational art. It provides a focused understanding of the nature of the operational environment, the purpose of the operation, and orients the staff to broad options available to achieve the mission. Commanders own and lead the process of operational design, but will leverage all sources of information in its development.

The commander utilises the tenets of operational design to visualise, describe and direct collective actions to achieve the designated endstate and accomplish the mission. This requires articulation of the purpose of the operation, desired effects on the enemy and how decision will be achieved in the operation. Operational design must clearly articulate the commander’s vision for the operation and the desired outcomes. This vision orients and informs detailed planning – the integrated formulation, prioritising, sequencing and synchronisation of action – to convert the vision into reality.

Operational design is only one element of a continuous process. Figure 2–1 depicts the design and planning continuum, figuratively demonstrating how operational design links to planning, development and the ongoing revision of the operational plan via the process of assessment and review.

Figure 2–1: Design and planning continuum
Key components of the design and planning continuum

Operational design is the first step in application of operational art. During this step, the commander visualises the operation as a process to achieve the objective—an ongoing process of reviewing and understanding the current situation and considering future options to achieve the designated objective.

Visualisation is enabled by multiple inputs to the commander including personal reconnaissance and observations, interaction with staff and subordinate commanders to develop a shared understanding of the current situation, inputs from higher headquarters, and intelligence feeds. The commander’s visualisation, clearly and continuously expressed, enables continuous planning and execution of the operation by subordinates and staff.

Commander’s guidance. Visualisation enables the commander to issue initial guidance to initiate or develop staff planning. For a full explanation of the components and process for developing commander’s guidance see Land Warfare Doctrine 5-1-4, The Military Appreciation Process. Commander’s guidance will, as a minimum, articulate:

- **Mission.** The mission is the primary binding agent for staff and subordinate commanders. It provides a clear statement of intent, action and binding purpose through a concise format delineating the who, what, when, where and why of operational activity.

- **Commander’s intent.** Commander’s intent is the commander’s personal expression of the purpose of the operation. It must be clear, concise and easily understood. It is usually expressed in the form of purpose, method and endstate. This expresses how the commander envisions achieving decision, expressed as a defeat mechanism, as the touchstone for achieving the desired endstate. It allows subordinates and planners to see the ‘big picture’ so that their actions can self-synchronise if they cannot contact the commander during execution. It facilitates freedom of action and encourages tempo during planning and execution.

- **Commander’s critical information requirements.** Commander’s critical information requirements identify information on friendly and enemy activities and the operational environment deemed essential to understanding the situation, own force and enemy. Commander’s critical information requirements are limited to information that is critical for decision-making. Where they are not able to be fulfilled, the Commander’s critical information requirements underpin/guide assumption-based planning to maintain operational tempo. Satisfaction of Commander’s critical information requirements shapes development of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection plan.

- **Battlespace analysis.** Battlespace analysis allows a commander to designate the essential and ancillary areas within which the operation will unfold. This geometry is normally expressed in terms of the area of operations and the area of interest in which own and supporting force
actions and information activities will occur. Battlespace analysis enables freedom of action while facilitating effective command and control.

- **Centre of gravity analysis.** A comprehensive understanding of own and enemy centres of gravity underpins the application of manoeuvre theory. The results of this analysis articulates the appraised relative strengths and weaknesses of enemy and friendly forces, enabling effective targeting of pivotal enemy capabilities while protecting critical friendly force capabilities.

**Operational planning**

Operational planning is the deliberate process used by commanders and staff to assess the situation, and construct the detailed methodology by which an operation will achieve its designated objectives. Planning is generally initiated in detail on receipt of commander’s guidance generated during the operational design process. Planning generates the actionable detail required to realise the commander’s intent, enabling subordinate organisations to sequence and synchronise their actions in time and space to achieve the designated operational objective(s).

The Australian framework for joint operational planning is the joint military appreciation process articulated in *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 5.0, Joint Planning* and *Australian Defence Force Publication 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process*. The more detailed procedural elements for planning in the land domain are articulated in *Land Warfare Doctrine 5-1-4, The Military Appreciation Process*. The key components of each process are deliberately similar, enabling commanders, staff and subordinate commanders to maintain the best possible understanding of the battlespace, purpose, situation and status of enemy and friendly forces to enable timely and effective decision-making at all stages of an operation.

The key components of this process are:

- **Intelligence preparation of the battlespace.** A continual process of understanding the operational environment and the current situation.
- **Mission analysis.** Understanding the purpose of the operation and relevant freedoms and limitations on action.
- **Course of action development.** Developing potential courses of action to realise the objectives, including any variations that may arise in the course of battle.
- **Course of action analysis.** Understanding the benefits and risks associated with each course of action.
- **Decision and execution.** Selection and continuous revision and rearticulation of modifications or additions to the plan.

Planning fuses the art and science of envisioning a desired future and developing and regulating the ways of achieving it. The planning process is a comprehensive sequence of collaborative activity that develops the necessary detail to realise the
vision developed in the operational design process. It is holistic, continuous and iterative. Planning is therefore a constant process of configuring actions in time and space to guide and revise tactical actions to achieve the endstate. Once an operation commences, planning will usually be conducted in three temporal frames: in response to events from current operations, to develop related future operations related to current objectives, and to develop new future plans which usually relate to subsequent objectives.

Planning remains a command-driven function that allows the force to effectively anticipate, pre-empt and/or respond to enemy actions. Depending on the situation, planning may be undertaken by an individual commander, or by a commander supported by a staff. Through the application of the military appreciation process a plan is developed which describes the desired outcome, the actions needed to achieve the desired outcome, necessary control measures and the measures of success.

The operational plan

The operational plan is the embodiment or physical manifestation of the operational planning process. It captures the results of the planning process, and fuses the results of operational art, design and planning into a concise and comprehensive order that can be easily transmitted, understood and referenced by superior and subordinate organisations. For this reason, it is captured in a relatively standard operational format and is developed, disseminated and amended in accordance with standard protocols to ensure its effectiveness. The process by which a plan is developed, formatted, recorded and articulated is outlined in Land Warfare Doctrine 5-1-4, The Military Appreciation Process.

There exist various forms of operational planning products; the primary means of communication including the operations order and the operations plans, and verbal orders which conform to the situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and signals format. The operations order is the primary means by which orders are conveyed in the Australian Army – for further detail refer to Land Warfare Procedures - General 0-5-1, Staff Officers Guide.

The adage that ‘no plan survives contact with the enemy’ is a cautionary reminder of the temporal relevance of any operational plan, and as such, the plan itself does not constitute the end point in the operational design and planning process. The operational plan is a tool used by the commander to synchronise and sequence action – the commander must fight the enemy and not the plan. As such, the operational plan remains a live document, subject to continual revision and adjustment as a result of operational assessment integrated within the planning continuum. An operational plan may be adjusted and/or supplemented with additional plans such as branch or sequel plans, or may lapse or be discarded throughout the operational planning continuum.

Once the operational plan has been disseminated via orders and rehearsals are complete, the commander and staff will monitor implementation and the progress of the operation. As the situation develops and new information emerges the plan will be adapted or redeveloped as required.
Operational assessment and adaptation

Operational assessment

Design and planning are continuous based upon the results of operational assessment. Actions, both friendly and enemy, are continuously assessed to measure progress against intended outcomes. Assessment may alert the commander to an opportunity to be exploited, a risk to be mitigated or key decisions that must be made. Assessment provides a more objective means by which the commander can assess the viability of the original plan and then provide informed guidance to the staff on its revision and modification.

Assessment takes the generic form of:

- **Monitoring the situation.** Monitoring the situation involves the continuous observation of specific conditions.
- **Evaluating progress.** The use of criteria to determine progress towards the endstate, usually expressed in terms of measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. Measures of performance assess task accomplishment and whether an action was performed properly (are we doing things right?). Measures of effectiveness assist in understanding changes in conditions (are we doing the right things?). Measures of effectiveness may be linked respectively to the achievement of decisive events and the performance of lines of operation in long running operations where the tempo allows.
- **Recommending or directing action for improvement.** Assessment is not complete until improvements to actions are made.

Effective assessment incorporates both quantitative and qualitative indicators in order to determine if amendments to the plan are required. As amendments are made to the plan, or branches and sequels need to be enacted, these are usually disseminated/enacted via a fragmentary order as described in *Land Warfare Procedures - General 0-5-1, Staff Officers Guide*.

Operational adaptation

On operations, problems and plans will change over time as conditions change, reflecting both the complexities of the modern battlespace and adaptive interaction between friendly and enemy forces. Accordingly, the systematic application of an operational adaptation cycle helps to ensure that friendly force action and decision-making remains focussed on solving the principal operational problem. This in turn ensures that tactical actions continuously support the commander’s intended outcomes.

As the friendly force executes its operational plan, systemic responses emerge from the operational environment. Analysis of these responses enables the commander to determine whether his/her understanding of the operational problem remains accurate. When systemic responses reveal that the commander’s understanding of the problem is no longer accurate, the commander
must develop a new problem frame. This becomes the formal basis for adapting the plan; this systematic process of operational adaptation over time is titled ‘adaptive campaigning’. Further detail on adaptive campaigning can be found in Army’s Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept.

The formal adaptation cycle involves six deliberate steps: plan, collect, analyse, decide, implement and validate. These steps are described in more detail in Joint Doctrine Note 1-17, Organisational Learning.

Operational assessment comprises the plan, collect and analyse steps of the adaptation cycle. It forms the process through which systemic responses from the operating environment are collected, measured and analysed to determine whether operational outcomes are achieving the level of success demanded by the commander. The results of this assessment provide the commander with key decision support information highlighting opportunities that can be exploited, risks to be mitigated or key decisions that must be made. The operational assessment cycle time varies based on the scale and complexity of the operation.

The decide step describes the point at which the commander either makes a decision to invoke a branch or sequel, or provides additional guidance to the staff to revise or modify the existing plan.

The implement step describes the point at which a branch, sequel or modified plan is executed.

The validate step finalises this evolution of the adaptation cycle, where operational assessment confirms that the change to friendly force action has had a positive impact in furtherance of intended outcomes.

As with operational assessment, the operational adaptation cycle time also varies based on the scale and complexity of the operation.
Chapter 3

Command and control of operations

Leadership is the sum of those qualities of intellect, human understanding, and moral character that enables a person to inspire and control a group of people successfully.

John A Lejeune

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction of a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish a mission. Effective command and control is critical for the synchronisation of manoeuvre and joint effects to achieve decision in land operations.

Command and control underpins and binds together all components of operational activity. It ensures that operations are properly designed and executed, and that tactical activity aligns with and achieves designated political, strategic and operational objectives.

Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.1, Command and Control is the capstone joint doctrinal publication outlining the philosophical and functional aspects of command and control. It emphasises the concept of command as a purely military construct oriented toward achieving success in battle.

This chapter provides an overview of the relevant principles for the command and control of operations in the land domain, including:

- key framework concepts and principles of command
- mission command
- command states
- command structures for land operations
- command support requirements.

Framework concepts and principles

Military operations are undertaken in furtherance of a political purpose. Commanders are appointed and assigned forces to achieve this political purpose through the conduct of military operations. It is the military framework of command and control which ensures that operations are properly designed, planned,

executed and continuously adapted so that military action remains aligned to the political objective.

The military command and control framework also ensures that operational activity is efficient and effective. Command and control mitigates the inherent complexity of war; the military force better able to harness and exploit its inherent strengths and consistently apply these against adversary weakness is the force more likely to prevail in combat. Command and control enables a force to impose some measure of order and overcome the complexity of war captured by Clausewitz’s remarkable trinity – the confluence of primordial violence, chance and probability and subordination of military action as an instrument of national policy.

**Definitions**

*Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.1, Command and Control* defines command as the authority a commander exercises by virtue of rank or assignment. It includes authorities and responsibilities for the use of resources and employment of military forces; that is, the process of organising, directing, coordinating and controlling a force on operations. Command authority also incorporates a stewardship responsibility for the health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel. The concept of command shines a light on the fundamentally human parameters of personality, leadership and personal relationships which enliven an operational chain of command.

Control is exercised by a commander over assigned forces and describes the inherent responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. The concept of control highlights the more procedural and mechanistic aspects of organising and sequencing military activities in time and space to achieve operational outcomes.

Command and control is a foundational building block in both the art and science of war. Commanders function as the central organisational entity on military operations and remain personally responsible and accountable for their prosecution. A supporting command and control architecture enables the commander to exercise their command functions and to effectively control operational activity to achieve designated missions.

**Principles of command**

*Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.1, Command and Control* highlights seven operative principles of command which – when applied – will optimise the supporting command and control framework enabling a commander to more effectively discharge their operational responsibilities.

These principles include:

- **Unity of command.** A single designated and recognised command authority promotes clarity and unity of effort. This means there must only be one recognised command authority at any point in time to ensure timely and effective decision-making, and to avoid potential conflict in orders and
direction. While the command authority may change as tasks change, a single command authority should only be operative at any given point in time.

- **Span of command.** A commander has a finite cognitive and physical capacity to successfully direct operations based upon the size and spatial deployment of the force. While no finite number is prescribed, experience suggests the optimum is between three and six separate operational entities under direct command. Should the span of command exceed the cognitive capacity of the commander, a deleterious impact upon the effectiveness and efficiency of the operation is inevitable.

- **Clarity.** A clear understanding of the chain of command and related coordination processes within the force promote unity of action. This enables each subordinate element to properly understand their roles, responsibilities and the command context within which they operate. Accordingly, each headquarters should normally report to only one superior headquarters, creating an unambiguous chain of command and a systematic flow of information and orders.

- **Redundancy.** Given the existential nature of combat operations, continuity of command through nominated alternative commanders and headquarters at all levels is necessary. Should a headquarters and/or commander be destroyed or become dislocated, command and control will suffer if an alternative system is not rapidly established. Practiced procedures allow command to be passed between commanders so that operations are not adversely affected during this transfer.

- **Delegation of command.** Commanders must be able to effectively assign tasks and authority to subordinate commanders based on the principles of authority, responsibility and accountability. Delegation of command authority enables a local commander freedom of action to achieve the objectives assigned by the superior commander. While superior commanders may delegate authority, assign resources and hold subordinates accountable for their use of resources and actions, they cannot delegate ultimate command responsibility for the success, failure or method by which the operation was undertaken.

- **Resource allocation.** Resources must be realistically matched with mission requirements to empower and enable subordinate commanders. If this is not done properly, the chances of mission success are significantly reduced.

- **Obligation to subordinates.** Commanders must consider the interests and wellbeing of subordinates, including their safety, health, welfare, morale and discipline to preserve the force and maximise available combat power.

The principles of command are proven guiding considerations for the design and implementation of an effective command and control framework. Their inclusion and incorporation into the operational command and control framework
strengthens the ability of commanders at all levels of war to design, sequence and execute successful tactical actions. Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power prescribes the means by which these principles of command are integrated into the operational command and control framework in the land domain, through the application of mission command.

Mission command

Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power describes mission command as the practice of assigning a subordinate commander a mission and allocating appropriate resources to achieve that mission, without specifying how the mission is to be achieved.

As the Australian Defence Force’s operative command philosophy, mission command promotes decentralised command, freedom of action, speed of decision-making and increased operational tempo while ensuring subordinate actions remain aligned to higher intent.

Mission command ensures that commanders at all levels remain focused on the achievement of tasks and the designation of their command responsibilities at their level of command, without becoming distracted or consumed by command responsibilities at other levels. It recognises that a local commander is best placed to understand, adapt and overcome impediments to mission success in their allocated operational area.

This demands an integrated and appropriate level of understanding of strategic, operational and tactical contexts and conditions across all levels of command. This understanding enables subordinate commanders to apply professional judgment, seek or relinquish additional resources, generate tempo, adapt their activities, and report relevant information in a timely manner.

Mission command is not an abrogation of any aspect of command responsibility; rather, it is a command and control methodology that maximises a subordinate commander’s freedom of action within clearly defined mission parameters. The guiding principle that binds the relative freedom of action granted to subordinates into a coherent whole is the higher commander’s intent. This is a clearly defined endstate for a particular mission that describes the reason and purpose for the mission, and any parameters which may limit the subordinate commander’s freedom of action.

Only through clear articulation of intent can subordinates visualise, understand and contextualise their own activities, particularly when the operational situation changes or when fleeting tactical opportunities present for exploitation. Commander’s intent enables subordinates to understand their role within the higher mission set and continuously adjust their scheme of manoeuvre to preserve unity of effort in a dynamic operational environment. This in turn increases speed of action and therefore operational tempo; the force maintaining a higher tempo than its adversary will normally seize and retain the initiative.
This decentralised methodology of command and control underpins the successful application of adaptive action and commander's tactical judgment described in *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics*.

Under mission command, the authorities assigned to a commander to employ or manoeuvre assigned force elements are regulated by the assigned state of command.

**States of command**

States of command describe those command authorities granted to an operational commander to achieve designated missions with allocated resources. This includes specific responsibilities, freedoms and constraints attaching to force elements for operational employment. Clear and unambiguous command parameters are a fundamental requirement for the prosecution of land operations, particularly given the availability of joint capabilities and/or effects to support a land commander in achieving their mission.

States of command cascade in alignment with the levels of war prescribing parameters applicable at military strategic, operational and tactical levels. Understanding the differences and interplay between command authorities at each level enables the effective employment of forces, and ensures the appropriate allocation of resources and the provision of relevant information between superior and subordinate commanders during the conduct of operations.

Further detail on the principles and states of command used in the Australian Defence Force can be found in *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.1, Command and Control*.

**National command states**

National command states specify authorities, freedoms and constraints at the military strategic level, regulating the assignment or employment of national forces in multinational operations and/or the assignment of authorities from originating Service raise–train–sustain organisations to an operational commander.

Theatre command is the authority given to Commander Joint Operations to command assigned forces to prepare for and conduct operations. Theatre command provides Commander Joint Operations the lawful authority to exercise the operational component of full command for all assigned joint forces, including the authority to assign and task assigned forces as necessary to achieve campaign objectives and attain the military strategic endstate required by the Chief of the Defence Force. Commander Joint Operations exercises theatre command through Australian national commanders, during combined operations or campaigns, designated joint task force commanders and/or any other commander conducting operations or activities on their behalf. Chief of Army will force assign land force elements to Commander Joint Operations for employment in the conduct of joint operations in a joint force area of operations.
National command is organised by and functions under the authority of a specific nation. In the Australian context, it is a standing command authority conferred upon a national appointee to safeguard Australian national interests in combined or coalition operations. It does not in itself include any operational command authorities. In most circumstances it will be conferred upon the senior Australian operational commander in the joint force area of operations to ensure that the activities of Australian force elements employed in coalition operations advance Australian national interests and do not breach any specified national operating constraints.

Full command confers the highest level of military authority and responsibility to an operational commander. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. Full command equates to ‘ownership’ of the force and conveys with it complete operational and administrative authority and responsibility. It covers every aspect of resource use, administration and the planning and control of military forces.

Operational command states

Operational command authorities empower a commander to employ the operational capabilities of forces to apply joint effects and achieve missions. The delegated authority may be command itself, or degrees of command and control with specific qualifications. The degree of authority delegated allows a commander to direct and deploy assigned forces to complete tasks without reference to a higher authority and is therefore balanced with the operational commander’s level of responsibility.

Operational command is the authority granted to a commander to specify missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, deploy units, reassign forces, and to retain or delegate subordinate states of command. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. It represents the highest degree of operational authority which can be assigned to an operational commander by Commander Joint Operations, and is usually retained for the duration of a campaign or operation. It provides the authority to task an asset over the full range of its capabilities without further approval being sought. While operational command does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistic support, commanders holding operational command require and invariably hold a level of authority and responsibility for both administration and logistic support.

Operational control is a lesser authority delegated to a commander to direct assigned forces so that the higher commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks limited by function, time or location, to deploy units and/or delegate tactical control of those units to subordinate commanders. It does not include the authority to allocate separate employment components of the units concerned. A commander assigned operational control of forces may direct assigned or attached forces – limited by function, time or location – and delegate operational control or tactical control to a subordinate commander. Operational control, of itself, does not include administrative or logistic control.
Tactical command states

Tactical command authorities operate in a similar fashion to operational command authorities, but more closely regulate a commander’s capacity to employ the assigned force in function, time and space.

Tactical command is the authority delegated to a commander to specify missions and tasks to forces under command for the accomplishment of a mission specified by higher authority. A commander assigned tactical command of forces may specify missions and tasks provided they accord with the mission given by higher authority, allocate separate employment of components of units involved, and delegate tactical command or tactical control to a subordinate commander. Tactical command is normally the highest operational authority that can be assigned to a non-Australian Defence Force commander over Australian Defence Force assets in combined and/or coalition operations. Tactical command allows a commander the freedom to task forces to achieve an assigned mission, and to group and regroup forces as required within their assigned force structure. Tactical command is commonly used below operational command in Australian Defence Force single-Service environments.

Tactical control is defined as the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. Tactical control covers the local direction of a force or asset in such a way that it assists in the accomplishment of missions or tasks. A commander delegated tactical control may direct forces and assets in manoeuvres to accomplish assigned missions or tasks, and may delegate tactical control to another commander. Tactical control is not usually a predesignated operational authority assigned at the operational level but is intended as short-term authority to be delegated by a local tactical commander for the immediate conduct of tactical activity. A commander assigned tactical control of forces or units cannot reassign missions or tasks. States of command provide the requisite authorities for a commander to employ assigned force elements to best effect within set parameters. Imposed parameters regulating employment enable a higher commander to mitigate risk in terms of preserving assigned forces for subsequent reassignment.

To achieve designated missions and tasks with assigned forces, a commander will also rely upon an effective operational command and control architecture enabling them to properly exercise mission command.

Command structures for land operations

It is not feasible for a commander to effectively exercise command and control as a single entity within a mission command paradigm. Operational commanders perform these functions through a command and control system – an arrangement of headquarters, staff and procedures enabling effective command and control of assigned forces in complex operating environments. As the complexity of an
operation increases, the span of command grows or the nature of an operation changes, a commander’s capacity to exercise effective command is impacted. In these circumstances the commander will become increasingly reliant on enabling command structures and systems to maintain situational awareness and to make timely and informed decisions.

The key components of this framework include headquarters, supporting staff, command relationships, and dedicated communication and support systems. This integrated framework provides a commander with a close network of functional specialists and communication networks enabling the design and direction of operations, the maintenance of situational awareness, of operational assessment, of decision support and dissemination of orders, and the synchronisation of joint effects.

**Headquarters**

Headquarters are a structured amalgam of a commander with staff, equipment, communication networks and procedures fully enabling effective command and control of assigned and supporting forces. The headquarters is both a physical and a conceptual construct, comprising a secure and tailored environment that enables planning, battle tracking, information analysis and decision-making.

The functionality and structure of an operational headquarters is shaped by the nature of the operation, the commander’s role and function, the structure and capabilities of assigned forces, and the available supporting effects.

Headquarters for land operations are designed, developed and deployed in accordance with the following requirements:

- **Modular.** At most levels of command, a commander requires specialist advice or additional capacity to control specialist attachments and coordinate joint and/or interagency effects. The headquarters must be capable of integrating additional staff without reducing its operational effectiveness. Modularity assists survivability in battle and also allows the headquarters to support the commander during specific activities such as tactical movement on the battlefield.

- **Security.** The headquarters must be consistently secure from physical attack and functional interference to maintain operational effectiveness.

- **Communications.** Headquarters are the focal point for information flows to and from the commander enabling situational awareness, receipt and analysis of higher orders, and direction to subordinate forces. A headquarters must be capable of establishing and maintaining continuous communications with superior and subordinate headquarters, assigned and supporting force elements, and its own distributed headquarters nodes.

- **Accessibility.** The headquarters must be accessible to allow the commander freedom to move across the operational area, and to allow commanders and staff from other headquarters and agencies to continuously interact with the commander.
Sustainability. The headquarters must be capable of supporting the commander regardless of the tempo of operations. This includes ensuring continuity of command in the event that the commander is killed, wounded, temporarily dislocated or replaced.

During the planning phase of a land operation, the commander must determine the way in which the assigned force will be organised and employed. This in turn will dictate the structure and organisation of the supporting command architecture, which may necessitate a variety of different effects or functions at designated points throughout the operation. The headquarters may therefore consist of one or all of the following nodes throughout a land operation:

• **Main.** This headquarters is the commander’s principal location for commanding operations. The main headquarters will contain the majority of the command and control functionality for the commander, including planning functions, and is the most capable of maintaining situational awareness and providing the highest level of command support. All staff functions will be represented in the main headquarters including specialist adviser staff.

• **Tactical.** The tactical headquarters provides the commander with immediate command support, prioritising mobility at the expense of staff and communications capacity. A tactical headquarters does not possess all staff functions to independently run operations – it must establish and maintain communications with main and/or forward headquarters to achieve this.

• **Forward.** The forward headquarters is limited in size, endurance and planning capacity. Its organisation is simpler, smaller and more austere than the main headquarters. Its primary focus is the monitoring, assessment and execution of the current battle. It has a small planning function limited to adjusting branches and sequels, as necessary, to cope with the immediate situation. A forward headquarters may be used as an advance headquarters in the initial stages of a deployment into an operational area, as an alternate headquarters, or as a headquarters for the deputy commander with a discrete mission. It is also utilised to enable continuous command of an operation when main headquarters must relocate or step-up in the joint area of operations.

• **Rear.** The rear headquarters is established in a secure offshore base, such as its home barracks location. This headquarters executes deliberate long-term planning and the fusion of strategic feeds prior to pushing this information forward for execution. Main and rear headquarters may merge and operate as a single entity if main headquarters remains in its home or host nation location.

• **Alternate.** An alternate headquarters provides the continuity of command when a headquarters must be moved or is put out of action. A complete alternate headquarters duplicates the main headquarters in staff functions.
Other operational functions. An operational headquarters is created and structured according to its role and/or function. This may require it to perform additional specialist functions or integrate other forces or agencies which change or modify the functions of the organic headquarters. These roles may be for limited duration (such as the entry phase of an operation) or enduring (such as provision of specialist combat service support to a deployed force). Augmentation of the headquarters with staff from other services, agencies or nations provides the additional capability required to command a broader range of forces.

Examples of the additional functions a headquarters may perform include:

- **Mounting headquarters.** A mounting headquarters prepares and moves forces to an operation in accordance with the joint plan. The mounting headquarters should not be part of a force deploying on operations.

- **Line of communication node.** This headquarters is responsible for the inwards processing (reception, staging, onward movement and integration) of units or formations, supply, general support, maintenance, health, and extraction of a deployed force. Command and control is split between the deployed force and the combat service support commander, with an ‘agreed point’ as the point of demarcation.

- **Joint task force, coalition and interagency functions.** This headquarters is structured to support the exercising of command over forces from more than one service, whole-of-government elements and/or multi-national forces. It will be constituted by a joint staff, staff from other government or non-government agencies, and/or personnel from troop-contributing nations.

Headquarters staff

A critical asset enabling a commander to exercise effective command and control on land operations is the headquarters staff. Staff provide specialist advice and support, including functional and/or domain expertise, and also operate as the primary network through which command decisions are disseminated throughout the force.

An operational staff for land operations is constituted using the continental staff system and will normally include the following functional appointments:

- **Deputy commander.** The deputy commander provides command redundancy and functions as the second-in-command. Their command responsibilities will be specified by the commander and may include independent command of discrete activities and/or operations. Standard duties may include preparing and monitoring the force’s operational and administrative policies and plans, and pursuing the commander’s intent by engaging directly with subordinate units, flanking forces, other government agencies, non-government organisations, and host nation authorities.

- **Chief of staff.** The chief of staff coordinates the work of the staff to ensure that it is efficient and effective. A close working relationship based on
mutual understanding and trust between commander and the chief of staff is essential. Effective use of the chief of staff allows the commander to be physically decoupled from the headquarters allowing the commander to be best positioned on the battlefield for command effect.

- **Staff.** At lower levels of war, in small sub-unit tactical organisations or in simple operational environments, commanders may be able to undertake the functions of planning, decision-making, directing forces and controlling in isolation. However, at unit and formation level the capacity of a commander to deal with the demands created by operational complexity and a broad span of command will normally be too great without assistance; hence they require staff. The staff’s primary function is to support the commander with detailed planning and the subsequent control of forces, allowing the commander to concentrate on their primary command functions – leadership, decision-making and design of future operations. Staffs exist to support the commander and have no independent executive or command authority. The commander therefore provides the focus, intent and operational authority for them, which includes the delegation of appropriate authority for routine decision-making to subordinates. Key duties include the preparation of plans and orders; detailed functional planning; liaison; battle tracking (situational awareness); representation both up and down the chain of command; and passage of information, intent and orders between the commander and assigned forces. Further detail on the composition, functions and roles of operational staff can be found in *Land Warfare Doctrine 0-0, Command, Leadership and Management.*

- **Specialist advisers.** The commander will rely on advice from senior representatives from one or more of the combat support arms (artillery, engineers and signals), combat service support specialists, joint effects coordinators and other specialist advisers. Advisers may either come from the staff or be attached to the headquarters from other agencies. Some will have the dual function of advising the commander on matters affecting their own force element while also commanding it (for example, an artillery or engineer regiment).

- **Liaison officers.** Liaison officers provide invaluable information to the commander’s immediate staff with respect to the organisation they represent. During battle, they can assist commanders by communicating orders and assisting in the control of units or the application of joint effects. As they represent their commander, liaison officers must understand the commander’s plans and be able to express their views cogently to the commander and the headquarters to which they are attached. Receiving headquarters must provide access to commanders, briefings and any

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2. The complexity of future warfare, as described in previous chapters, means that the level at which a commander can work in isolation is becoming lower, combat team and even platoon/troop commanders are more likely to require specialist advice or staff assistance to monitor and control their organisations, or effectively and efficiently apply joint effects in the future battlespace.
information relevant to their duties. Liaison officers provide 24-hour cover and maintain communications with their parent headquarters. Forces employing another nation’s units or equipment should exchange specialist liaison officers who are familiar with the requisite staff, organisations, doctrine and procedures of the force to which they are attached. They should also speak the language of that force or be accompanied by an interpreter.

- **Interagency staff.** Modern operations will normally require the integration of non-military staff into the headquarters. These personnel may be liaison officers or form a complete staff section to provide support to the commander from the integration of the non-military elements. The inclusion of non-military staff into a command presents challenges for the commander and the staff, and requires mutual understanding of respective organisational cultures.

**Command relationships**

Effective command and control relies upon productive relationships between superior and subordinate commanders, and commanders and their staff. The successful application of mission command also relies upon a high level of trust between commanders of land force elements, assigned or attached and supporting forces. While the timbre of personal relationships between commanders and staff may differ in form based upon individual personalities, these operational relationships are also regulated by a military chain of command enabling the exercise of battle command.

**Chain of command.** The chain of command is the hierarchical structure through which command is exercised and control is implemented. An unambiguous chain of command provides clarity and unity enabling commanders and staff to understand the means by which command and control is executed, their functions and authorities relative to one another, and the system for command succession in adverse circumstances. All operational directives, orders and instructions are passed through this system.

During the planning process, the higher commander and staff will develop a command and control architecture enlivening the principles of command. This architecture enables the most effective relationships between the commander, subordinate force elements and respective staffs. This command and control arrangement takes into account the size and capabilities of assigned forces, the operational span of command, the designated or anticipated missions and tasks, the characteristics of the operating environment, and the information exchange requirements. It must also mitigate any pre-existing variances in command and control employed by components from different environmental, interagency or multinational backgrounds.

**Battle command.** The unique role of the land force is to prosecute close combat with opposing forces and achieve decision in the land domain. This function demands focused and effective command and control at the point of main effort and/or decision. There is strong inherent value in the functional presence of the
commander at the point of main effort in an operation, particularly during combat operations.

The perennial dilemma for any commander is where to best position themselves on the battlefield to achieve decisive effect. At the tactical level, there is usually a stronger imperative for the commander to lead by personal example and to be physically present to supervise manoeuvre and/or orchestrate joint effects. At the operational and/or strategic levels of war, the commander will normally seek a position to maintain the best situational awareness and sustain communications with force elements providing supporting fires and effects to tactical commanders. In all cases the ideal position for a commander is the location from which they are best able to effect command and control, and thus decisively influence the progress of the operation or battle by making timely and informed decisions appropriate to their level of command.

Key factors informing the positioning of the commander to achieve decision in the land domain include:

- access to information enabling timely and informed decisions, including the ability to judge the progress of the operation and the condition and morale of friendly and opposing force elements
- effective communication with key points of command involved in the operation
- access to planning and decision-making support, including key battle management systems and specialist staff and advisers
- physical and informational security.

For an operational chain of command to be effective in these circumstances it must be well designed and understood, supported by communication networks linking commanders, and equipped with standard operating procedures facilitating information exchange and decision tempo. Where technical and/or procedural elements cannot be standardised or guaranteed, such as in multinational and/or interagency operations, physical liaison becomes essential. At all times respective commanders must understand where they fit into the chain of command, from whom they derive their command authority, whom they command and whether they are in a supported or supporting role. Once this is understood, communication networks enable effective interaction generating operational decision-making and control over operational activity.

This complex command and control matrix relies upon commanders and staff at all levels being able to communicate both vertically and horizontally to ensure effective information exchange, maintenance of a common operating picture and timely transmission of command intent and operational orders.
Command support requirements

In order to be able to exercise effective command and control on operations, commanders and staffs require a systematic means of being able to communicate, exchange information, collectively analyse and interrogate information to produce actionable intelligence, distribute command intent, and disseminate plans and orders. This system of communication networks, procedures and protocols form an essential element of the command support system that enables effective command and control during land operations. The importance and complexity of command support requirements are amplified during the conduct of joint, interagency and/or coalition operations.

The electromagnetic spectrum. The exercise of operational command and control increasingly relies upon use of the electromagnetic spectrum for distributed and networked communication. All stakeholders engaged in, or affected by, a land operation will seek to utilise the electromagnetic spectrum for their respective communication purposes. Accordingly, the electromagnetic spectrum will be both a congested and contested domain.

The electromagnetic spectrum is the predominant communications backbone enabling connectivity between command and control nodes on joint-enabled land operations. An operational commander will seek to establish a number of different means of communication to enable continuous command and control. These connections, linking force elements within and outside the land domain, must be flexible and provide redundancy. For land operations this will normally necessitate the provision of beyond line of sight (predominantly wide and narrow band satellite connections and high frequency radio) as well as line of sight connections (predominantly very high frequency and ultra high frequency radio). Operational communications networks will normally be enabled for both data and voice communication; data being the more efficient means for large fusion and deliberate planning serials and voice for immediate execution of time-critical tasks.

Adversary capabilities and the operational environment will also shape network design to preserve accessibility and survivability. Network design is undertaken to shield friendly vulnerabilities and exploit weaknesses in adversary command support systems. Commanders must therefore manage the use of the electromagnetic spectrum as another warfighting domain, including the requirement to negotiate its use with allies and other agencies, apportion it across the force, fighting to preserve its availability, and utilising it to shape and strike the adversary.

Command support systems. A command support system establishes and maintains the communication architecture enabling commanders and staff to continuously interact. It provides a platform upon which specific applications can function to facilitate command and control and the provision of supporting joint fires and effects. The command support system should also be designed to allow the fusion of coalition services beyond the boundaries of the host nation system. Command support systems serve as the portal through which information (at
various levels of classification) can pass between force elements of participating nations.

An operational command support system should also enable command and control interaction across a range of non-military stakeholders including other government agencies and potentially non-government organisations. A national command system remains essential for the provision of national command functions as well as protecting/segregating information with national release caveats.

Considerations for the physical network and communications are more comprehensively detailed in Land Warfare Doctrine 6-0, Signals.

**Command and control applications.** Applications are a form of user interface supporting specific functions within a command support system. Applications provide critical command and control enabling effects, including the provision of a common operating picture, battle management (including battle tracking), deliberate and dynamic targeting, collaborative staff tools, and enterprise functionality. The provision of a variety of command and control applications on a single or common command support system promotes unity and clarity of command. However, where the threat of disruption or intrusion exists, separation of key applications across two or more systems may be necessary. Sensitivity and sharing of particular applications with other nations or organisations also necessitates the operation of two or more command support systems supporting a single operational chain of command.

**Fusion and interoperability.** Receipt and fusion of operational information from a variety of sources and systems is necessary to maintain situational awareness and maintain a common operating picture. Fusion may be required on all systems at tactical, operational and strategic levels, and — depending on the threat of disruption or intrusion — may take place in or outside the joint force area of operations. This means the command support system may be required to integrate into a wider joint, coalition and/or interagency network populated by a variety of nodes and linkages connecting strategic, operational and tactical entities. Commanders and staff on operations must be prepared to adapt pre-existing systems and/or integrate them into command support systems functioning at higher or more distributed (including global) levels. The design and implementation of a command support system therefore demands an architecture supporting fusion of information and interoperability of applications, within national command systems as well as across coalition networks where necessary.

**Digital mounting requirements.** Given increasingly complex fusion and interoperability requirements, a digital mission rehearsal is required prior to entry into an operational theatre to synchronise systems and applications. A tactical theatre gateway will normally be established, usually at the point of entry into theatre, to ensure that all communication elements entering the area of operations are digitally and procedurally synchronised. This is normally the responsibility of the formation signals element. A similar process is normally required when demounting from operations.
Fundamentals of command and control

Core to operational success is effective command and control. The fundamental component of the command and control system is the effective exercise of command. Command is the authority, responsibility and accountability vested in an individual to lead a force. At the centre of the command and control system is the commander. The authority held by a commander enables them to not only control the physical elements of the force engaged in an operation, but also human dimensions including morale and trust. The commander’s influence is vital to mission success.

Modern operations require the maintenance of a high tempo of activity, situational awareness and speed of execution despite the inherent complexity of war. The command and control system must be able to support disparate forces and integrate combat support, combat service support, and coalition and interagency contributions. This will place great demands on the commander, but a flexible and robust command and control system will support a commander in achieving mission success. While mission command and effective placement on the battlefield will afford the commander a degree of flexibility, it is the organisation of the force and the effective use of control arrangements that will make the commander most effective. A headquarters with capable staff and advisers, linked through communications and liaison systems, will ensure that commanders are able to command and control their force effectively.

Modern network-enabled technology has caused a paradigm shift in the exercise of command and control; however, the principles of command and the importance of the commander will not change. The technology associated with being network enabled will never replace the philosophical requirements for professional mastery, mission command and trust.
Chapter 4

Conduct of land operations

Notwithstanding the proliferation of technology and the associated emergence of new domains, war without submission requires decision on land, where people live. The need for Orwellian ‘rough men’ (and women) is not going away anytime soon. War as a contest of wills, settled by close combat, is the enduring responsibility of the Army. However, the context within which that takes place has and continues to change.

LTGEN Angus Campbell, Chief of Army
(Lowy Institute for International Policy, 4th October 2016)1

Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0, Campaigns and Operations specifies the three types of joint operations undertaken by the Australian Defence Force as shaping, decisive and transition operations. Each constitutes a designated military activity using kinetic and/or non-kinetic means to achieve directed outcomes within specified political and legal parameters. Each may be undertaken independently or as part of a campaign. In each case, the fundamental building blocks are successful military activities undertaken at the tactical level. Most joint operations will require decisive tactical outcomes in the land domain to achieve designated operational and strategic objectives.

Land operations are conducted across the spectrum of conflict to favourably shape the operational environment, destroy adversary forces, seize and secure physical objectives, influence and/or control populations, and create and maintain a secure environment enabling the activities of other forces and agencies. In order to achieve these effects a land force will manoeuvre and/or apply joint effects to successfully prosecute offensive, defensive or stability actions.

This chapter outlines guiding considerations and the types of tactical action undertaken in the conduct of land operations, including:

- the utility of tactical land action
- the application of manoeuvre theory
- offensive actions
- defensive actions
- stability actions

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- shaping and enabling actions
- operational parameters.

This chapter should be read in conjunction with Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics which describes in greater detail the formation level tactics employed during land operations.

Utility of tactical land action

Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power outlines Army’s strategic tasks as shaping Australia’s strategic environment, denying and defeating threats to Australia and its interests, and protecting and supporting Australian and foreign civil populations. Army achieves these strategic tasks through five operational efforts: joint land combat, population protection, information dominance, population support and indigenous capacity building. While land power is not the only, and often may not be the lead instrument for achieving national interests and objectives, it possesses specific and unique characteristics enabling decision in the land domain.

By their very nature land forces achieve persistent, pervasive and proportionate presence in complex land terrain. Land forces conduct operations on land to favourably shape the operational environment, destroy adversary forces, seize and secure physical objectives, influence and/or control populations, and create and maintain a secure environment enabling the activities of other forces and agencies. Land forces utilise joint fires and other interagency effects to achieve designated outcomes in the land domain.

A unique and decisive characteristic of a land force is its manifest physical ability to interact with, shape and compel human actors. This is the domain from which political power and control emanates, and political control is exercised over human populations. Joint operations in furtherance of political objectives invariably seek to shape, compel or defeat military and/or paramilitary forces as well as exercise decisive influence over populations controlled by a state or non-state entity. Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.0, Campaigns and Operations outlines the three broad types of operation conducted by the Australian Defence Force to achieve these objectives; shaping, decisive and transition operations.

Shaping operations create the conditions for mission success by deterring an adversary and/or creating an environment conducive to future operations. Shaping at the military strategic and operational levels is initially aimed at deterring an adversary. Should deterrence fail and military conflict appears imminent, shaping refocuses on providing favourable conditions for subsequent decisive or transition operations. Land forces prosecute special force and/or conventional operations in the land domain to achieve strategic or operational shaping effects in furtherance of specific tactical objectives.

Decisive operations are undertaken to defeat an adversary’s will, and destroy the forces and capabilities utilised to conduct military operations. Decisive operations
apply military force to defeat the adversary through physical destruction of forces, or by dislocation or denial of the means by which political control is exercised over a target population. The unique role of the land force is to prosecute close combat with opposing land forces and achieve decision in the land domain. Land forces are physically and functionally enabled to achieve decision through joint land combat, population protection, population support or indigenous capacity building as decisive elements of a joint operation or campaign.

Transition operations seek to conclude an operation and set the conditions for subsequent operations or activities designated by government. Transition operations may entail the transfer of authority, and/or the training of indigenous or follow on forces to maintain decisive influence in the land domain. Once again, land forces are functionally enabled and equipped to achieve population protection, population support or indigenous capacity building effects as part of a joint transition operation.

International humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and domestic Defence assistance to the civilian community or protection operations also rely upon the intrinsic characteristics of land forces to achieve persistent, pervasive and proportionate effects in complex terrain, focused on protecting and/or supporting the target population.

In undertaking these operations, through the successful prosecution of one or more of Army’s five operational efforts, the land force applies the tenets of manoeuvre theory to achieve decision.

**Application of manoeuvre theory**

*Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power* reinforces Army’s subscription to manoeuvre theory as the cognitive and philosophical means for defeating adversaries in the land domain. Manoeuvre theory focuses commanders at every level on applying friendly strengths against adversary weaknesses, shielding friendly vulnerabilities and defeating the enemy’s will to fight through destruction of the enemy plan rather than attrition of the physical force. Manoeuvre is used to shatter the enemy’s morale and physical cohesion through orchestrated action across multiple lines of operation, creating an exponentially deteriorating situation overwhelming the adversary’s physical and cognitive capacity to respond. Manoeuvre theory encourages land forces to leverage traditional physical means in order to achieve psychological effects in furtherance of strategic objectives.

The application of manoeuvre theory to land operations requires commanders and staff to undertake a detailed, comprehensive and ongoing analysis of the situation; mission requirements; relative strengths; characteristics of the operational environment; and desired endstates. The mechanism through which this is
achieved is the military appreciation process. The military appreciation process is described in detail in *Land Warfare Doctrine 5-1-4, The Military Appreciation Process.*

As this cyclic process of analysing the situation unfolds, the land commander focuses friendly forces on fighting the enemy and adapting the scheme of manoeuvre to exploit opportunities, mitigate risks and generate a higher relative rate of action (and thus decision superiority) over the enemy. Manoeuvre theory demands that the commander constructively shape and fight the adversary rather than slavishly executing battle plans developed during the initial military appreciation process.

The application of the tenets of manoeuvre theory to joint land combat emphasises the importance of the following principles:

- **Focusing friendly action on the adversary centre of gravity.** The enemy’s centre of gravity is constituted by those characteristics, capabilities or localities from which the adversary derives freedom of action, physical strength or the will to fight. All friendly action (across physical, intellectual and moral domains) should be focussed on destroying or dislocating the adversary centre of gravity in order to achieve the psychological disruption prescribed by manoeuvre theory.

- **Achieving surprise.** Surprise confers a significant tactical advantage because the adversary is disadvantaged in attempting to effectively, appropriately or temporally counter the friendly action. Surprise generates shock and increases the sense of rapid situational deterioration (and corresponding psychological collapse) within the enemy.

- **Identifying and prioritising a main effort.** Identification and maintenance of a main effort ensures that all commanders and subordinate units act to support the focus of activity at a given time and place. Identifying and resourcing the main effort ensures concentration of force and maximises psychological impact at the point of tactical decision in a land operation.

- **Utilising deception.** Successful deception makes it difficult for the enemy to identify and counter the friendly main effort. Effective deception creates doubt and uncertainty in the mind of enemy commanders, amplifying the perception of risk and derogating the ability to effectively generate and resource a main effort.

- **Reconnaissance pull.** Reconnaissance pull describes the process of actively seeking to identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the adversary scheme of manoeuvre or tactical disposition for exploitation. It is guided by tactical analysis conducted during the military appreciation process, but must be confirmed by dedicated intelligence, surveillance or reconnaissance capabilities in order to overcome enemy deception measures. Reconnaissance pull ensures that friendly strengths are pitted
against adversary weaknesses at the point of main effort to achieve decisive physical and psychological effect.

- **Operational tempo.** Generating and maintaining a higher tempo of action than the adversary enables the friendly force to seize and maintain the initiative. A higher rate of operational tempo is achieved through decision superiority, a function of superior command and control relative to the adversary. Decision superiority is achieved when the commander is able to more rapidly and accurately translate information into actionable intelligence, shape the enemy in accordance with intent, and conceive and execute decisive manoeuvre faster than the adversary can counter it. Maintenance of a higher rate of operational tempo amplifies the deleterious psychological impact on the enemy prescribed by manoeuvre theory.

- **Combined arms teams.** Combined arms teams increase the versatility and flexibility of ground forces, increasing their combat effectiveness and mitigating their vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the enemy. Combined arms teams enable raise–train–sustain capabilities to be tailored and structured for optimum tactical employment and effect on operations. The composition, orientation and employment of combined arms teams on operations is determined by the commander and regulated by the assigned status of command. The inherent flexibility of combined arms teams enhances the application of mission command and manoeuvre theory by tactical commanders on operations.

- **Application of joint fires and effects.** Land forces leverage capabilities across all environmental and warfighting domains to achieve physical and psychological effects on the adversary. The application of joint fires and effects from land, air, sea and the electromagnetic spectrum in support of land manoeuvre greatly increases the lethality and effectiveness of the force. It also compounds force protection and counter-response dilemmas for the enemy, assisting in the preservation of combat power by avoiding unnecessary attrition through close combat.

These principles inform the planning and execution of tactical actions by the land force to achieved desired objectives and endstates. These tactical actions will include offensive actions against the adversary as well as temporary defensive effects enabling the land force to resume offensive operations. Land forces may also undertake stabilising actions or enabling actions for other forces or agencies.

### Offensive actions

Offensive actions involve decisive manoeuvre and the application of joint fires and effects to achieve one or more of the following outcomes:

- to shatter the opponent's will to fight
- to destroy opposing forces or capabilities
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- to seize key or decisive terrain
- to acquire information and/or shape an enemy response
- to attack enemy cohesion through the deprivation of resources or the means to influence the battlespace
- to distract, deceive or divert enemy forces from the point of decision
- to seize, retain or exploit the operational initiative by preventing the adversary from concentrating, consolidating or regrouping.

Offensive actions are the decisive form of operational manoeuvre in that they forcibly impose friendly will upon the adversary and/or key stakeholders in the area of operations. Offensive action compels the opponent to react to the friendly scheme of manoeuvre, thereby generating or exposing adversary vulnerabilities for exploitation. In order to prosecute successful offensive actions the land force must seize and retain the operational initiative and force the adversary into a reactive and defensive mindset. Offensive manoeuvre aims to positively and decisively alter the operational status quo in furtherance of friendly force intent and objectives.

Offensive actions attack the enemy centre of gravity in order to achieve the physical and psychological effects prescribed by manoeuvre theory. To undertake offensive action, land forces forgo the protection of prepared and/or concealed defensible positions in order to gain the operational initiative, and must manoeuvre to achieve positional, temporal or psychological advantage vis-à-vis the enemy. Once in a position of relative advantage the land force will execute close combat and apply joint fires and effects to destroy enemy capabilities, seize key or decisive terrain, and shape conditions for subsequent offensive action.

In order to effectively attack the adversary centre of gravity, whether directly or indirectly, the commander must optimally position the land force to bring friendly strengths to bear against adversary weaknesses, violently execute offensive manoeuvre, and apply joint fires and effects to rapidly overwhelm the enemy and achieve decision. The design and sequencing of tactical manoeuvre is undertaken in accordance with the principles of manoeuvre theory to amplify the psychological impact on the enemy and to minimise friendly losses by attrition through battle.

Offensive tactics

Specific detail on the tactics employed during offensive land actions is outlined in Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics [Chapter 3]. Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics describes the tactics to be employed in offensive manoeuvre to achieve decisive effect as the attack, the advance and the pursuit.

Attack. The attack is a focused action engaging the enemy in close combat in order to achieve destructive effect, both physically and psychologically. It focuses on the enemy and is the decisive form of manoeuvre in the joint land combat line of effort. It can be used in all types of manoeuvre, but is a critical component of offensive and defensive actions. The attack can be undertaken in many different
forms and can be prosecuted through indirect or direct fires (attack by fire), and/or physical assault (close combat). It seeks to destroy, disrupt or dislocate key adversary capabilities to degrade the enemy’s fighting power and cohesion. The attack requires coordinated employment of manoeuvre forces, joint fires and information actions.

**Advance.** The advance is an offensive tactic characterised by aggressive manoeuvre to position the land force in an advantageous tactical position vis-à-vis the enemy. The purpose of the advance is to enable the friendly force to close with and engage the enemy on favourable terms for close combat. The land force may conduct an advance to seek contact or to maintain contact with the enemy to prosecute close combat and achieve destructive, disruptive or dislocation effects.

**Pursuit.** The pursuit is an offensive tactic designed to catch, cut off or destroy an enemy attempting to withdraw or extract itself from close combat. It differs from the advance or subsequent exploitation of a successful attack in that it executes immediate and decisive follow-up of an enemy that has lost cohesion and is in defensive disarray.

The types, stages, basic considerations and key coordinating requirements for the attack, advance and pursuit are outlined in *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics.*

In order to favourably position the land force for close combat or best apply joint fires and effects, the land force will conduct one or several forms of offensive manoeuvre to achieve a position of relative advantage over the adversary.

**Forms of offensive manoeuvre**

Offensive manoeuvre is undertaken to shape an enemy force for physical and psychological destruction, dislocation or disruption. It necessitates the acceptance of risk due to exposed movement beyond defended terrain, requiring positive combat ratios to ensure success and enable exploitation of tactical opportunities. Enemy capabilities, combat ratios, terrain, weather, time and the availability of supporting fires and effects will influence the chosen form of offensive tactical manoeuvre.

The forms of offensive manoeuvre include:

- **Envelopment.** This is a manoeuvre where the attacking force moves around the enemy’s main body to attack objectives to the enemy’s rear or flank. Normally enabled by a fixing or holding attack to limit the enemy’s freedom of action, envelopment requires the identification or generation of an assailable flank. Envelopment ensures that the enemy is forced to fight in at least two directions as well as in close and rear zones.

- **Turning movement.** This is a manoeuvre in which the attacking force avoids the enemy’s main body to strike objectives in depth or in the rear, forcing the enemy to move or divert forces to counter the threat. A successful turning movement must strike at an objective the enemy is forced to defend.
The attacking force must therefore be strong enough to pose a credible threat at that location.

- **Frontal attack.** A frontal attack is a form of manoeuvre in which the attacking force engages the enemy’s main body, to destroy a weaker or fix a larger enemy force along a broad front. The frontal attack exposes the attacker to concentrated defensive fire, but may be appropriate in circumstances where speed and simplicity confer a marked tactical advantage. This could be overwhelming combat ratio advantage against an unprepared or temporary defensive or security position, or against a disorganised or uncoordinated enemy force.

- **Penetration.** This is a manoeuvre in which the attacking force seeks to break through the enemy’s defensive line on a narrow front, creating an assailable flank or allowing subsequent manoeuvre into the enemy’s rear area. A penetration is appropriate when enemy defences are stretched or brittle, an exploitable gap is identified, or when time does not permit a more complex form of manoeuvre. The land force executing penetration will normally breach the defensive line, widen the gap and then secure the breach through a temporary defence or guard enabling subsequent offensive manoeuvre to destroy or dislocate the defending force.

- **Infiltration.** This is a manoeuvre in which the attacking force moves stealthily or relatively undetected through or into the enemy’s defensive or security zone in order to attack an objective or occupy a position of advantage in the enemy’s rear area. Assembling and moving forces covertly through a defensive position involves elevated levels of risk and is usually time intensive. A successful infiltration often requires manoeuvre by a separate force to deceive the enemy as to the main effort.

Offensive manoeuvre positions the land force and shapes the adversary to achieve tactical decision through the destruction, dislocation or disruption of enemy forces (physical effects) and the opposing scheme of manoeuvre (cohesion). It requires the careful sequencing of a series of tactical actions, supporting fires and effects, and information operations to set the appropriate conditions for success. Defensive manoeuvre is used to generate the necessary preconditions for offensive action as the most decisive form of manoeuvre in the land domain.

**Defensive actions**

Defensive actions are a temporary expedient designed to set the conditions for concurrent or subsequent offensive manoeuvre, and are undertaken for the following purposes:

- to defeat, destroy or culminate the enemy’s offensive action on the ground of the defender’s choosing
- to deny enemy access to decisive terrain
Defensive actions enable the land force to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, preserve the force and/or to develop favourable conditions for future offensive action. Defensive actions do not compel the enemy to act or respond and are therefore rarely decisive if conducted in isolation. Defensive tasks shape the enemy and/or environment for subsequent offensive manoeuvre by committing the enemy to decisive battle and/or protecting or shielding friendly forces, populations or areas.

Although less decisive than offensive action, defensive actions confer and enable the defending force to exploit many situational advantages, including protective positions, cover and concealment, known ground, shorter or internal lines of sustainment, and exploitation of favourable terrain. The key challenge for the defending force is the requirement to mitigate the attacking forces' initial advantage in choosing the time and place to attack (the operational initiative). This is normally achieved through supporting but limited offensive manoeuvre including spoiling attacks, shaping actions, deception, and the employment of offensive fires and effects to disrupt preparatory offensive activity.

Defensive tactics

Specific detail on the tactics employed during defensive land actions is provided in Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics [Chapter 4]. Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics describes the three types of defensive tactic as the defence, delay and withdrawal.

**Defence.** The defence may be anchored to a relatively static defended position (area defence) or can be conducted in a more fluid fashion (mobile defence). Area defence focuses on occupation of a particular area which is organised and/or fortified in order to gain tactical dominance over an enemy seeking to attack the position. Mobile defence does not tie the defender to specific defensible positions but exploits a higher degree of mobility to engage the enemy in close combat while avoiding decisive engagement. Mobile defence is particularly suited to forces operating over wide areas to enable the defending force to quickly concentrate combat power at decisive points in the battle. The key objective of the defence is to culminate enemy offensive action leading to a loss of tactical momentum, enabling the friendly force to seize the initiative and transition to offensive action.

**Delay.** The delay is a form of defensive manoeuvre which trades space to gain time. It allows the defending force to impose a degree of control over enemy
offensive actions shaping them into situations and dispositions favourable to offensive fires from the defending force. It imposes delay by forcing the enemy to undertake contingency or deliberate action to deal with a perceived or manifest threat, consuming time, and forcing the enemy to commit resources from the main effort. This slows enemy offensive momentum, exposes enemy forces to the risk of attrition through direct action and/or offensive fires while avoiding decisive engagement. Delay can also be utilised to shape the enemy scheme of manoeuvre and/or achieve deception objectives.

Withdrawal. A withdrawal is a deliberate and planned disengagement from close combat in order to reposition the force for future offensive or defensive action. It is undertaken in accordance with command intent and entails the geographic separation of forces engaged in close combat, even though contact may be maintained through other means such as indirect fires, screens/guards, and/or reconnaissance or surveillance capabilities. The withdrawal seeks to preserve combat power for recommitment at another time and place of the commander’s choosing.

The purposes, stages, basic considerations, key coordinating requirements techniques and procedures for the defence, delay and withdrawal are outlined in Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics.

Stability actions

Stability actions stabilise human and/or environmental conditions within the operating environment enabling the friendly force or host nation to re-establish civil control. Coordinated interagency activity is normally required to effectively mitigate or resolve causes of societal instability, either through direct provision of support to the affected population or development of host nation or indigenous capacity.

Stability actions may be undertaken before, during or after military operations to accomplish one or several of the following functions:

• to contain and/or limit conflict
• monitor the cessation of conflict
• to restore security and/or law and order
• to establish a secure environment enabling interagency activities
• to protect and/or evacuate noncombatants
• to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
• to support host nation governance
• to develop host nation capabilities
• defeat military, irregular and/or insurgent threats to stability
Stability actions must be supported by coordinated interagency effort tailored to prevailing societal conditions. Military forces may therefore operate as the supported or the supporting force element during a stability operation. In many cases the expertise requirements and/or principal line of operational effort may be outside the technical expertise of military forces. These areas of expertise best delivered by interagency actors can include civil reconstruction; economic revitalisation; establishing the rule of law and effective governance; and developing host nation governmental and civic administrative functions, and/or international or regional diplomatic engagement.

Stability actions focus on resolving or mitigating unfavourable factors affecting the target population in a defined area of operations, addressing the causes of instability preventing conditions of societal 'normalcy'. This may mean that during a military campaign or operation, stability actions constitute the decisive line of effort.

Stability actions are not necessarily exclusive of combat operations. Joint land combat may be required as a precursor, a line of effort within, or a branch and/or sequel to stability actions, and may be as violent and destructive as close combat in a purely military operation. However, during a stability operation joint land combat is normally undertaken as an enabling function to allow population protection, population support or indigenous capacity building lines of effort to succeed.

Operational conditions
The primary military task during the conduct of stability actions is the provision of security to protect and support the target population, setting the conditions for effective political, economic and societal activity. To achieve this, the land force must establish the following operational conditions:

- **Control.** Control over the situation and target population is achieved through the imposition or management of civil order. To achieve this, the land force must deny adversary interaction and influence over the target population, set and maintain a regulatory system for civil control, and establish an effective means of communication with the target population or interlocutory civil agencies. The land force must have both the credibility and capacity to monitor, regulate, support civil primacy and if necessary impose civil order to achieve population control.

- **Influence.** The land force must be able to effectively communicate, shape and secure the support of the target population in order to set the conditions for stable political, economic and civic activity. The land force must present as a credible, supportive and effective interlocutor with a viable vision for the future and an effective counter narrative to any opposing force or agency. Information operations, physical actions and interagency efforts must reinforce and support the desired operational endstate in order to facilitate influence over the target population and other stakeholders.
• **Compel.** It is unlikely that the land force will be able to identify, contain and/or remove all malign actors or destabilising influences during the conduct of a stability or transition operation. While friendly force and population protection, restraint and the use of minimum force remain predominant principles, the threat and/or use of force remains essential in facilitating control and influence over the adversary and target population. Strength of arms, tactical credibility and capacity for decisive action must be emphasised and recognised by adversary groups and the target population. The land force must be structured, equipped and enabled with appropriate rules of engagement in order to deter and/or defeat any threat to stability.

• **Support.** The land force must be able to provide necessary support to both the target population and/or operative civil power, while marginalising or delegitimising alternate support provided by malign actors. The capacity of the host nation to provide its own population support can also be a significant contributor to mission success. Assessing, re-establishing and then reinforcing host nation or interlocutory capacity for population support is normally the focus of interagency efforts. It is important for the land force and/or other agencies to effectively reduce host nation or target population support dependency prior to or during transition operations.

In establishing these operational conditions in deployed overseas environments the land force will independently or in collaboration with interagency elements execute a range of civic reform, restore or assist functions. In domestic protection operations these functions will be undertaken by Australian Government or non-governmental agencies.

Reform activities focus on the training or transformation of legitimate indigenous security sector forces with sovereign responsibility for national defence and/or internal security functions.

Restore functions focus on the re-establishment of essential services, facilities and host nation infrastructure through repair, provision or restitution and the delivery of humanitarian aid and medical assistance.

Assist functions focus on the preservation of the rule of law, and enabling free and fair elections or the appropriate appointment of civic leaders.

*Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics* [Chapter 5] outlines the range of security tactics that are incorporated into land force operations when undertaking stability actions.

### Shaping and enabling actions

Shaping and enabling actions are undertaken at all levels of war and within all warfighting and environmental domains. Shaping and enabling actions at the tactical level link, support and/or set the conditions for the successful conduct of offensive, defensive and stability actions.
**Shaping.** Shaping actions establish preconditions supporting the achievement of a decisive event or activity. Shaping occurs prior to and continues during the conduct of offensive, defensive and stability actions. Shaping seeks to positively influence and constructively modify enemy, stakeholder and/or environmental factors to gain advantage for the friendly force. Shaping actions also seek to identify, expose or generate enemy vulnerabilities for exploitation.

**Enabling.** Enabling actions maintain or sustain the operational activities of the land force. They provide protective, supportive, restorative and sustainment functions which enable the land force to prosecute joint offensive, defensive and/or stability actions in the land domain.

**Shaping actions**

Shaping actions are undertaken to achieve one or all of the following effects:

- to limit or prevent conflict
- to develop capacity in friendly forces
- to develop understanding of the operational environment
- to understand enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities
- to identify and obtain terrain or facilities affording military advantage
- to disrupt or deceive enemy actions to determine friendly intent
- to degrade key enemy capabilities
- to position and posture to dislocate or deter enemy action
- to inform and/or influence friendly, enemy and noncombatant stakeholders.

**Types of shaping action**

To an extent all offensive, defensive and stability actions generate shaping effects. Each elicits a reaction from the enemy and impacts other stakeholders in the area of operations. However, certain types of tactical action are undertaken for the specific purpose of shaping the enemy and operational environment in accordance with command intent, rather than acknowledging a residual effect. These shaping actions are undertaken to create favourable preconditions for the prosecution of offensive, defensive or stability actions.

The types of shaping action undertaken to achieve this include reconnaissance, security, information and engagement actions.

**Reconnaissance.** Reconnaissance is a critical pre-emptive shaping function at the tactical level. While it is undertaken predominantly to fulfil the commander’s critical information requirements, locate enemy capabilities and identify tactical opportunities, it can also shape adversary perception of friendly main effort in
accordance with command intent. Reconnaissance forces are ideally placed to fulfil deception objectives ahead of main force operations.

An opposing force will normally seek to deny adversary reconnaissance in order to shield own force capabilities, disposition and intent. This is termed the ‘counter-reconnaissance battle’. During the counter-reconnaissance battle, the opposing force will also seek to understand friendly force reconnaissance objectives in order to forecast command intent and the friendly scheme of manoeuvre. This desire can be exploited through the conduct of deception actions in order to achieve a shaping effect in support of main force operations.

Security. Security actions actively shape the tactical situation by denying the enemy information, access and/or understanding of friendly force disposition and intent. Their principal function is to enable the friendly force to retain the initiative, forcing the enemy to pre-emptively move to engage in close combat before making contact with the main body.

Successful security actions confer an inverse advantage in that they deny the enemy commander information while providing it to the friendly force as to enemy disposition and intent, while often buying time for the friendly force commander through imposition of delay on the enemy force. This allows the friendly force to manoeuvre in order to protect critical capabilities and mitigate exploitable vulnerabilities.

The following types of security actions are utilised to favourably shape the tactical situation for land force offensive, defensive and stability actions:

• Covering force. The purpose of a covering force is to provide continuous information to the friendly main force, while also protecting it and denying the enemy accurate knowledge of friendly intentions. Covering forces achieve this by identifying and accepting contact with enemy covering or main force elements before they reach the friendly main force. In so doing they are able to disrupt, dislocate, weaken and/or fix enemy forces, impose delay, and afflict attrition on the enemy main force thereby buying time and providing timely information to the friendly force commander.

• Screen. A screen provides information about the enemy and provides early warning for the friendly main force as to enemy capabilities, disposition and intent. A screen is not designed or configured to accept decisive engagement with the enemy, but to buy time for the friendly force commander through early warning of enemy activity rather than the imposition of delay.

• Guard. The purpose of a guard is to protect the friendly main force by engaging the enemy while providing information to the friendly force commander. The guard protects the main body by accepting close combat and/or applying joint fires and effects to disrupt or dislocate the enemy on physical presence or action, rather than being simply the systematic observation of an area or adversary capability.

3. Reconnaissance differs from surveillance in its capacity to shape the adversary through physical presence or action, rather than being simply the systematic observation of an area or adversary capability.
specified approaches. A guard is designed and configured to engage in close combat with enemy forward echelons seeking to engage the friendly main force.

- **Rear area security.** A rear area security force protects friendly forces, vital assets and installations, routes, and key functions within a specific area. It prevents the enemy from disrupting friendly command and control, combat support, and combat service support. It may also provide population protection functions for a target population.

- **Patrols.** Patrolling is a tactical activity that provides local security to a force to deny reconnaissance and prevent surprise.

*Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics* [Chapter 5] provides greater detail on the tactics employed in the conduct of security actions, including force protection measures.

**Information.** The purpose of information actions is to generate an advantage over the enemy through superior access, manipulation, and flow of information and intelligence to the friendly force. Shaping actions in the information domain seek to regulate and manipulate the flow of accurate, actionable and timely information to the enemy in order to achieve friendly force decision superiority.

Information actions will diminish or disrupt enemy intelligence and decision-making while protecting friendly information flows. This is variously achieved through the application of operational security measures, information deception, computer network operations, electronic attack, electronic protection measures, counterintelligence, psychological operations and public affairs/information operations.

**Engagement.** Engagement activities constructively influence the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of targeted stakeholders. The means by which this can be achieved can be as simple as a personal meeting between the commander and key civilian and/or military leaders and officials, through to large-scale demonstrations of capability and/or intent by military forces within the area of operations. Engagement is always characterised by personal interaction and dialogue between key stakeholders in order to generate a response in accordance with command intent.

**Enabling actions**

Enabling actions link, support or set conditions for the conduct of offensive, defensive and stability actions by maintaining and sustaining the operational capabilities and activities of the land force. This is achieved through the provision of protective, supportive, restorative and sustainment functions allowing the land force to prosecute joint offensive, defensive and/or stability actions in the land domain.

Enabling actions are covered in greater detail in *Chapter 5.*
Operational parameters

Land operations are designed and prosecuted in accordance with a range of overarching political and legal parameters. These parameters apply over and above specific political and military strategic direction on the operational objectives to be achieved during the conduct of land operations. They include the laws of armed conflict, other binding international and domestic (host nation) legal stipulations, and the resolutions of international bodies such as the United Nations.

Laws of armed conflict

Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Law of Armed Conflict highlights that while it is the military objective of all commanders to win in battle, there are limits to the means and methods that can be used. The laws of armed conflict seek to regulate the conduct of nations in the international system, but they also govern the behaviour and conduct of combatants and noncombatants engaged in armed conflict. The purpose of laws of armed conflict, as an integral element of international law, is to:

• protect combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering
• safeguard certain fundamental rights of persons who fall into the hands of the enemy, such as prisoners of war, the sick and wounded, and civilians
• maintain the distinction between combatants and noncombatants
• facilitate the restoration of peace.

International law

International law primarily regulates the conduct of nations and supra-national organisations in the international system, but also imposes certain rules of law relating to individuals and non-state entities. The parameters affecting land operations emanate from its sources, including:

• international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law
• international conventions and treaties establishing rules accepted and applied by the contesting states
• general principles of law recognised by civilised nations
• judicial decisions and interpretations by international and national judicial bodies.

Domestic law

Domestic law encompasses the internal laws of Australia and other coalition nations regulating the behaviour of persons from the host nation, both within the host nation and abroad. Australian and other coalition domestic laws usually have extraterritorial effect, and therefore continue to apply in whole or part to personnel deployed on operations.
Commanders and staff undertaking operations must be familiar with, and comply with, relevant international and domestic laws in the prosecution of offensive, defensive, stability, and shaping or enabling actions. This includes knowledge and application of relevant domestic laws of participating coalition nations during multi-national operations, or where Australian or coalition nationals are embedded into the forces of another nation. Specific procedures and protocols must be established to ensure that operative legal parameters are understood, applied and – if necessary – mitigated to ensure successful tactical actions which do not generate unfavourable legal, political or economic consequences.

Greater detail on the operative legal parameters including the principles and application of the law of armed conflict to land operations is contained in *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Law of Armed Conflict*. Specific information on the conduct of targeting is contained in *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.14, Targeting* and *Australia Defence Force Publication 3.14.2, Targeting Procedures*. Specific detail on the design and application of the rules of engagement is contained in *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.1, Rules of Engagement*.

**United Nations resolutions**


Operational planning must now incorporate the whole-of-government implementation measures outlined in the *Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012–2018*. This will normally include provision of a gender advisor in the senior land headquarters undertaking military operations in order to:

- gain an understanding of gender roles within the human terrain and the cultural framework operative within the area of operations
- develop plans to protect vulnerable populations from violence
- report on conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence within the area of operations.

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Military logistics is the science of sustaining and enabling military forces, ensuring manpower and materiel to enable operational activity. It encompasses a diverse range of supply and support activities across a vast continuum of specialist functions at strategic, operational and tactical levels including the provision of essential services. In most operational environments, resource and service demands will exceed local source capacity and therefore resources must move from host nation to the deployed force. This operational logistic system must also function in reverse, moving materiel and personnel rearwards as required.

Operational logistics orients on fulfilling the commander’s requirement for manoeuvre, fires and effects at decisive points in an operation. This translates into the requirement to predict and replenish operational rates of resource consumption. Certain resources are regularly consumed by the deployed force and can be anticipated with relative accuracy. However, combat and other interactions with adversaries or stakeholder groups greatly complicate the process of accurately forecasting usage rates, requiring contingency logistic response. Operational planners therefore design the logistics system and adjust the volume and velocity of resource flows in support of the commander’s plan to dominate the operational environment and achieve the mission.

This chapter outlines the broad concepts, functions and considerations for logistic sustainment and enablement of joint operations in the land domain, including logistic:

- dimensions
- functions
- support phases
- principles
- combat service support functions
- combat service support planning considerations
- combat service support design.

This chapter should be read in conjunction with Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 4.2, Logistics Support to Operations which describes joint operational logistics at the strategic, operational and joint task force levels of command. Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0, Logistics describes in greater detail the nature and scope of combat service support provided to the land force, specifically the disciplines of supply, maintenance, transport, engineer sustainability support, command and control, and logistic planning.
Logistic dimensions

Logistics support to the land force is provided across two dimensions: capability support and operational support. Capability support is focused on generating capacity and readiness during the raise–train–sustain force generation cycle. Operational support is focused on enabling and sustaining the deployed joint force during the pre-deployment, deployment and redeployment phases of an operation.

Capability support enables Army to acquire, generate, manage and sustain land force capabilities to ensure that force elements are prepared and ready for operational employment. Capability support enables Army to achieve designated levels of capability outlined in the *Chief of Defence Force Preparedness Directive, 2017/18*. Land forces identified for operations will achieve and maintain directed levels of readiness and serviceability to ensure that they are capable of undertaking full spectrum joint operations at short notice.

Operational support generates an additional layer of logistic capability over and above capability support to deploy and sustain land forces on designated operations. Operational support is therefore tailored to the specifics of a particular operation and is designed to ensure that operational military objectives can be achieved. It connects the national support base to the deployed force through intermediate nodes or support bases in order to position resources at the appropriate time to enable tactical action. The provision of logistics to the operational land force is achieved through the provision of combat service support.

Expeditionary operations, particularly coalition or multinational operations, introduce additional levels of combat service support complexity. Coalition, joint and whole-of-government operations demand high levels of cooperation between services, coalition partners, government, non-government and international agencies. In some operations, the Australian Defence Force may also be called upon to provide logistics to a wide variety of non-military or multinational military organisations. In these cases, interoperability of logistic procedures and equipment types with allies, other services and government agencies is a critical enabler. Similarly, the development of close working partnerships with civilian contractors and multinational service providers must occur well before the deployed force embarks and commences operational activity in the assigned area of operations. This means logistic support to operations will be a merger or continuum of both capability and operational support dimensions.

Sustaining and enabling operations occurs through a range of different logistic functions to ensure that the deployed force has sufficient personnel, equipment and enabling services to achieve its operational objectives.
Logistic functions

Operational support necessitates the establishment of a tailored logistic system supporting the achievement of specified operational outcomes. This system is constituted by a multitude of interconnected and interrelated sub-systems ensuring that the deployed force has the requisite combat power to achieve its objectives. Combat service support delivers this to the operational commander through sustainment, support, supply and distribution functions.

Sustainment is the provision of personnel, logistic and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment of the mission or objective.

Support is defined as the action of a force or portion thereof which aids, protects, complements or sustains another force. Logistic support involves the performance of a range of administrative and logistic functions including command and control, planning, policy and processes, personnel support, transport and movement, supply, and infrastructure construction and maintenance.

Supply is the procurement, distribution, maintenance while in storage and salvage of supplies, including the determination of type and quantity of supplies.

Distribution is the operational process of synchronising all elements of the logistic system to deliver the ‘right things to the right place at the right time’ to support operational requirements.

Routine sustainment is the process of providing support, consumable and non-consumable materiel and essential infrastructure to enable deployed force elements to continue operations beyond their designated operational viability periods. Routine demands are made via logistic information systems. Demands for operations that require ‘other than routine’ management fall into the non-routine sustainment category and are usually managed through separate systems and/or processes.

Sustainment, support, supply and distribution functions are provided to the land force deployed on operations by phase and based upon generic requirements to prepare, deploy, sustain and redeploy the force.

Logistic support phases

Logistics underpins the operational requirement to prepare, deploy, sustain and return the land force to, from and within the designated area of operations. Operational logistic support is undertaken across four generic logistic support phases which includes pre-deployment, deployment, sustainment and redeployment.

Pre-deployment. Pre-deployment is an intensive preparatory stage that requires detailed operational planning at the strategic and operational levels to put in place
the necessary preconditions to deploy the operational force to the area of operations. This can include negotiation of strategic-level contracts and memorandums of understanding with national and/or international service and materiel providers. It also includes logistic support enabling the identified land force to heighten its preparedness and readiness in anticipation of its operational commitments. The phase is usually characterised by the development of contracts and agreements, the preparation and development of staging areas and bases, the dissemination of warning orders, and mission-specific work-up training for the designated land force element.

**Deployment.** The deployment phase involves preliminary moves and the delivery of force elements, equipment and stores to the joint force area of operations. It also entails specific environmental preparation of the deployed force for activity in its area of operations. Deployment incorporates mounting, strategic movement and reception, staging, onward movement and integration activity.

**Sustainment.** Following deployment and the commencement of operations, logistic main effort shifts from deployment to the sustainment of the land force. Sustainment focuses on the provision of personnel, logistics and any other form of support necessary to maintain the deployed force capability until completion of the mission. Operational sustainment relies on supply chains functioning along multiple node and mode networks, which may need to be redesigned, decoupled and reconstituted to provide mission-specific sustainment. Sustainment may incorporate deployment and redeployment activities for land force elements concurrently rotating into and out of the area of operations.

**Redeployment.** On completion of operational activity, all or some elements of the land force will redeploy and reconstitute for follow on operations or activities. The redeployment of the land force from theatre can be as complex as the deployment phase, and can be a prolonged activity incorporating drawdown, strategic movement, continuation, transfer and/or cessation of in-theatre logistic support, and the remediation/reconstitution of force elements.

Logistic planning supporting the deployed land force from pre-deployment through to redeployment must take account of a variety of complex and interdependent factors, including:

- strategic relationships between nations
- capacity and availability of supporting national and multinational organisational resources
- host nation and infrastructure capacities
- distance, time and geographic orientation of the area of operations to the national support base
- operational rates of effort and tempo

1. Noting that reception, staging, onward movement and integration activities continue throughout the operation.
• anticipated length of the sustainment phase
• the operating environment and its impact on materiel turnaround times
• potential and actual attrition rates
• status of the deployed force and remediation requirements.

Joint logistic support to the pre-deployment, deployment and redeployment phases of an operation are described in more detail in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 4.2, Logistics Support to Operations [Chapter 4]. Joint logistic support during the sustainment phase is covered in Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 4.2, Logistics Support to Operations [Chapter 5].

Planning and execution of logistic phases is therefore undertaken in accordance with proven principles to shape the planning and inform the execution of logistic support throughout all phases of the operation or campaign.

Principles of logistics

A number of proven and enduring logistic principles inform planning for joint operations in the land domain. These principles are equally applicable to planning as well as execution of the logistic plan. They include:

• **Responsiveness.** Responsiveness describes the ability of the logistic system to provide requisite support at critical points in the operation. Responsiveness operates as a keystone principle in that the manoeuvre plan will fail if the logistic system cannot support it. This means that logistic considerations must inform development of the manoeuvre plan to ensure that it is logistically feasible.

• **Simplicity.** The principle of simplicity encourages logistic planners to reduce complexity and associated friction in order to maximise the efficiency in planning and the execution of logistic support. Standardised and interoperable procedures linking services, coalition nations and civilian agencies significantly reduces complexity in execution. Complex logistic systems are inherently fragile and are unable to adapt quickly to changing situations and conditions. Prioritisation and the pre-allocation of supplies and services in supported units may also simplify logistic support operations.

• **Economy.** Logistic resources are invariably scarce, and economy in resource consumption and logistic effort is always an operational goal. Logistic economy is achieved when effective support is provided using the fewest resources at the least cost within acceptable levels of risk. Risk acceptance in the logistic plan vests with the operational commander, rather than the logistic planners.

• **Flexibility.** Flexibility describes an ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, concepts of operation and
operational contingencies. The logistic system – through logistic plans, operations and structures – must be flexible in order to achieve responsiveness and economy. The logistic system must be enabled and supported to adapt to the operational environment. Operational planners must be vigilant to ensure that adaptation improves rather than complicates or degrades the logistic system.

- **Balance.** The logistic system must balance the need for economy with the requirement for redundancy and reserve capacity, and the need to anticipate with the requirement to adapt and respond. There also exists an ongoing need to balance efficiency with the need for effective support in a battlespace characterised by friction, uncertainty, fluidity and disorder.

- **Foresight.** While it is not possible to anticipate all events and contingencies, logisticians must develop realistic and feasible logistic plans, systems and stockholdings to support the land force as the operation develops. Foresight entails anticipation of future operations in order to identify, accumulate and maintain resources, capabilities and information to support them. This requires close collaboration between operational and logistic planners throughout all phases of the operation.

- **Sustainability.** Sustainability describes the ability to maintain logistic support to all users for the duration of the operation or the lifetime of a capability. Sustainability necessarily orients on the long-term objectives and capabilities of the supported force. It demands a balance between factors including demand, duration, distance, resources, priority and risk and emanates from effective planning, accurate projections of requirements and effective application of the principles of economy, responsiveness and flexibility. Sustainability relies upon ongoing protection and maintenance of the lines of communication and disciplined consumption of operational resources by the deployed land force.

- **Survivability.** Logistic assets must be appropriately positioned and protected to ensure their operational viability and availability. Logistic installations, units and information systems are high-value targets that must be safeguarded using both active and passive defensive measures. Survivability orients on dispersion and protection of critical nodes within the logistic system. The allocation of reserves, development of alternatives and phasing of logistic support also contribute to logistic survivability.

- **Integration.** Integration\(^2\) is combining all elements of Army logistics (tasks, functions, systems, processes and organisations) to assure unity of command, effort and prioritisation of competing resources. The Army logistic system should be interoperable with other Services, multinational and coalition force partners, civil organisations, emergency services, non-government organisations, and other government departments.\(^3\)

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2. Referred to as cooperation in the current *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 4-0, Defence Logistics.*
The principles of logistics are described in more detail in *Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0, Logistics*.

**Combat service support functions**

Combat service support is that component of the logistic continuum that provides logistics to deployed land forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics. It encompasses all logistic actions, processes, functions and services undertaken during delivery of support to the deployed force. It is designed and configured to meet the specific requirements of the operation and operational environment, and is sourced from a multitude of organisations from the national support base to the tactical area of responsibility.

Combat service support is delivered through a variety of discrete but mutually supporting functions, which include:

- supply support
- maintenance support
- transport and movement
- engineer sustainability support
- personnel services support
- health support.

**Supply support.** Supply support is the supply function of combat service support that involves procurement, provisioning, warehousing, returns, salvage, disposal and supply control activities concerned with the distribution of all classes of supply and related services required to equip, operate and sustain the force.\(^4\)

**Maintenance support.** Maintenance support is the combat service support function of maintaining equipment at agreed levels of functionality. Maintenance support activities include materiel maintenance, maintenance engineering, recovery and configuration management to ensure that equipment within Army is in a fit condition to be used by the operator.\(^5\)

**Transport and movement.** Transport and movement includes the provision of protected and unprotected movement of stores, equipment and personnel. Transport elements enable the other combat service support elements to provide support and operate along the multi-modal links between the various nominated support nodes. Consequently, the role of controlling the movement of allocated transport resources is also provided.\(^6\)

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3. Army proposal to the *Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 4-0, Defence Logistics* is to replace cooperation with integration terminology.
4. *Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0, Logistics*.
5. *Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0, Logistics*.
6. *Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0, Logistics*. 
Engineer sustainability support. Engineer sustainability support is the action taken to enable a force to maintain the necessary level of fighting power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. Combat service support elements rely on engineering support to enable them to carry out their functions. They rely heavily on mobility and survivability effects for efficient activity. Essential services and infrastructure such as roads, airfields, protective bunds and shelters are created for mobility or survivability purposes, so that combat service support units can support the manoeuvre and manoeuvre support forces.7

Personnel services support. Personnel services support includes a wide range of functions undertaken at all levels to provide soldiers to operations (force generation) and to support soldiers during operations (force sustainment). Personnel services support is a joint responsibility and, while it is a critical element of the combat service support effort, it encompasses many services not provided by combat service support, including:

- the provision of personnel services such as pay, finance, postal, catering and chaplaincy services
- the provision of personnel management such as service conditions, honours and awards, discipline, and career development
- the provision of combat health support.8

Health support. The aim of health support is the conservation of personnel resources to maintain capability and facilitate operational success. The three primary thrusts of military health planning are to provide a fit and healthy force, to prevent casualties, and to treat and evacuate casualties.9

There are a variety of options for constructing logistic support structures, including joint and environmental options to enable the deployed force. Australian Defence Force logistic support organisations can be built based on function, geography, component command arrangements or echelons.

When organised by function, support is aligned to a particular functional area, which may be managed by joint or single-Service staffs, for example, a joint medical facility in one area and an aircraft maintenance facility in another. A geographical system groups all support services at convenient locations while a component structure groups or configures support based on the needs and/or locations of maritime, land and air forces. Echelons provide different levels of service extending from the combat forces to the secure base area. Whatever the method chosen, the logistic continuum must make effective use of modes and nodes to establish an integrated network that ensures the flow of goods and services to and from tactical units.

The Army approach to sustainment is based upon the provision of combat service support by a system of modular ‘capability bricks’ providing tailored support to the

7. Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0, Logistics.
combat force. Army combat service support structures range in size from task-organised combat service support teams (designed to support a battalion or battlegroup organisation) through to a force support group supporting a brigade or larger force. The specific size and structure of combat service support units depends on the size and composition of the force to be supported and the way in which those forces will be employed.

Combat service support is provided through a cascading system tailoring the level and type of support based upon the size and structure of the deployed land force. This has bearing on the lines and types of support for the deployed force.

**Types of support**

Combat service support can be arranged by type, depending on the requirements of the operational mission. The chief premise remains centralised control and decentralised execution of logistic support to optimise the use of scarce logistic resources. As combat forces are tailored for their mission and the geography, so too is the logistic force. This results in the following four types of combat service support:

- **Integral support.** These are capabilities necessary to provide unit viability, that is, the level of support necessary to maintain a unit at its designated readiness level, regardless of the assigned mission.

- **Close support.** Close support is the support provided by a unit or formation attached to or under the command/control of the supported unit or formation. This is a 'tailored' logistic capability targeted to provide responsiveness and balance to link manoeuvre forces to either general support or the national support base, and to extend or supplement their viability.

- **General support.** General support is given to the supported force as a whole and includes that combat service support activity carried out to greater depth where security and stability is needed to generate work. This is a tailored capability that includes unique capabilities for the theatre. For example, general support may include postal support, financial services, unique transport capabilities, theatre warehouses and terminal support.

- **Mounting support.** Mounting support is the deployment and sustainment of the force from the national support base through a logistic bridge to the theatre of operations. This is usually a joint operation and is planned and executed by organisations external to the theatre. It is usually a Defence Support Group/Joint Logistics Command responsibility.

Support categories are not generally linked to specific organisations or geographical areas, but rather will be flexibly tailored with appropriate capabilities to suit operational needs, mission and environment. The relationships between types of support and the levels of war are shown diagrammatically in **Figure 5–1.** Logistics support arrangements are described in more detail in *Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0, Logistics.*
Figure 5–1: Types of support relationships

**Combat service support planning considerations**

Logistic planning orients on, informs and supports the commander’s manoeuvre plan to dominate the operational environment. Plans are developed in accordance with the principles of logistics to tailor the functions, lines and types of support in furtherance of the manoeuvre plan. Land forces implementing manoeuvre theory must accept and mitigate risks, including combat service support risk, in order to build a main effort, exploit tactical opportunities and maintain a higher operational tempo and decision superiority over the adversary.

Combat service support planners must therefore ensure that commanders explicitly understand logistic risks associated with their manoeuvre plan. Commanders must understand the impact of combat service support capability upon combat forces, the rate of effort and the operational momentum. It is highly likely that combat service support will culminate at points in an operation where the land force consumes more resources than can be supplied by the combat service support system. Logistics staff must always ensure that the commander is aware of these points so that the manoeuvre plan can be adjusted and the operational risk mitigated.

The following key considerations apply in developing the logistic/combat service support plan in support of land force manoeuvre:

- **Tempo.** High-tempo operations place significant strain on combat service support resources and require careful prioritisation by a commander to ensure that the main effort is supported as required. The commander can generate tempo through weighting and regrouping combat service support in accordance with their manoeuvre priorities.

- **Friction and uncertainty.** Friction and uncertainty during an operation can have a marked effect on sustainment. Effective sustainment requires careful preparation and planning, based on quantifiable data and lead times. These characteristics can be incongruous with fluidity of manoeuvre.
in the battlespace. Combat service support systems must therefore be flexible enough to cope with unforeseen contingencies. Complex combat service support systems with single points of failure should be avoided. Simple combat service support plans that are easily adaptable and elastic with respect to operational circumstances survive better than complex and rigid systems.

- **Vulnerability.** The logistic system is a vulnerable and relatively fragile amalgamation of installations, processes, linkages and nodes that can be easily interrupted by enemy action or environmental factors. The development of redundant systems provides alternative solutions while avoiding unnecessary duplication of resources. There is always an enduring requirement to ensure that combat service support can survive in the battlespace. Planners need to ensure that the level of protection allocated to combat service support force elements is commensurate with the threat.

- **Non-linear sustainment.** The manoeuvrist approach presents three sustainment challenges for operational planners and commanders. Firstly, high rates of fire, enhanced mobility and endurance are demanding in terms of the amount of support and responsiveness required by combat service support. Secondly, the inherent chaos of the battlespace requires responsive, reliable and flexible combat service support to provide commanders with the freedom to exploit fleeting opportunities. Combat service support priorities must be established from the outset to provide flexibility and the ability to modify combat service support as the operation develops. Finally, the speed of decision cycles and the evolution of the concept of operations may limit the ability of logistic staff to anticipate and support all courses of action with a comprehensive sustainment plan. Logistic planners must ensure that any combat service support risk to manoeuvre is understood by manoeuvre commanders. Combat service support planners must also ensure that combat service support can be regrouped, surged or prioritised to support land force manoeuvre.

### Quantifying combat service support requirements

To plan effective combat service support, four fundamental factors exist as the start point for all combat service support planning in support of operations:

- **Destination.** This factor takes into consideration the location and environmental conditions influencing the conduct of operations.

- **Demand.** Demand is not simply the gross mathematical consumption or use of materiel but also the pattern, rate of change and variability. Demand stems directly from the commander’s intent expressed as the manoeuvre plan. It becomes the sum of steady state, cyclical and surge demands.

- **Dependency.** Analysing the type and quantity of forces requiring combat service support will enable logistic planners to quantify logistic requirements to mobilise and sustain the force and plan for any specialist or contractual
requirements in addition to defence logistic capabilities. Logistic planners will need to understand the dependencies’ equipment fleets, personnel numbers and likely operating characteristics.

- **Distance.** This factor determines the time and space limitations for the conduct of operations, which in turn defines the extent of the battlespace to be supported. This factor also influences the allocation and positioning of resources based on the length and capacity of the available support links or lines of communication. The distance will also determine the volume of resources committed to operating stock within the regeneration loop, the time in transit, and the requirement for forward bases or intermediary staging posts.

- **Duration.** The length of operations and rate of demand will determine the overall volume of materiel necessary or the size of the logistic problem.

Determination of combat service support requirements in accordance with these factors has an important bearing upon the design of the combat service support force and its modes of operation in support of the manoeuvre plan.

**Combat service support force design**

An operational combat service support system (network of nodes and links) can be designed a multitude of ways. Irrespective of the design philosophy, the combat service support system must be tailored to the operational need articulated in the commander’s intent and expressed in terms of the manoeuvre plan. The combat service support system will be developed taking into account the needs of the joint land force to defeat the adversary, shape other stakeholders and dominate the operational environment.

The combat service support system is unlikely to be static throughout the operation, but will ebb and surge as it adapts to the operational environment and loading placed upon it. The combat service support system will normally also develop in direct relation to operational phases articulated in the manoeuvre plan. Logistic planners must continually assess the logistic continuum and operational environment to ensure that the combat service support system consistently enables manoeuvre in accordance with the commander’s intent. At points where the combat service support system achieves balance and equilibrium, logistic planners must anticipate contingency shocks and surges. These may occur through unanticipated enemy action, additional manoeuvre, weather or supply chain difficulties. This means the operational combat service support system will be dynamic in both design and operation.
Support links and nodes

In most cases combat service support will be delivered through a system of support links and nodes:

- **Nodes.** Nodes are the locations where combat service support activity is conducted. The type of activity could include the receipting, staging, storing, configuring and issuing of stores; the treating of casualties; the repair of equipment; and the exchange of stores, personnel and equipment.

- **Links.** Nodes are interconnected by multi-modal support links (any available transport capability) enabling the transfer of resources through the system in a timely manner. The ability to bypass or cross-level between nodes is critical to enhancing responsiveness and flexibility. The links are effectively routes between each of the geographical locations.

Logistic support is typically grouped into nodes that correspond with the combat service support levels of centralised control likely to exist throughout the logistic continuum. The nodes can include:

- **Mounting base.** A mounting base is normally located in the national support base and acts as the focal point for the mounting and sustainment of a deployed force.

- **Intermediate staging base.** An intermediate staging base is a temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the forces into the operational theatre. It will not always be necessary but may be used when deployment distances are large and/or the deploying force elements need to be regrouped.

- **Forward mounting base.** A forward mounting base is a secure base, port or airfield from which an operation may be launched. It should have the capacity for an insertion force to form up within it, for acclimatisation and training to occur, and should subsequently be able to handle reinforcements and reserves. The forward mounting base may be the focal point for reception, staging, on-forwarding and integration activities.

- **Third-line support node/force support.** For other than minor operations, most mounting and third-line support will be grouped into a force support group. It maximises the utility of a modular approach to structuring support capabilities and is capable of incorporating joint and combined capabilities and meeting joint requirements. A force support group organisation is capable of being tailored to specific tasks based on the operational sustainability parameters of demand, duration, distance, resources and risk. A third-line support node may provide the full range of general and close support functions. The duration, intensity, scale and location of an operation and the availability of in-theatre commercial and allied support will determine the range and depth of capabilities required in theatre. A third-line support node will often be collocated with the point of disembarkation.
• **Forward operating base.** The operating environment may necessitate combat teams and battlegroups operating from secure forward operating bases. These nodes will normally include unit integral support elements or echelons. These integral elements could be reinforced by the temporary or permanent allocation of close or general support elements.

**Operational combat service support entities**

The combat service support system can be organised in a multitude of ways to support joint land operations. Army has established generic combat service support organisations supporting both force generation and operational employment of joint land forces. These serve as baseline combat service support entities from which a combat service support system can be designed and supported. Given that each operation will likely require a discrete combat service support force structure tailored to the requirements and exigencies of the operational environment, these baseline entities serve as building blocks from which a tailored combat service support system can be built.

An indicative operational combat service support system is shown diagrammatically in Figure 5–2 and is built from the following generic combat service support entities:

• **Combat service support team.** The combat service support team is a task-organised combat service support capability of up to sub-unit size, typically configured to provide combat service support up to a battlegroup. The combat service support team should have the protection, mobility and communications commensurate with the physical and threat environment in which it is operating and the unit(s) that it is supporting.

• **Combat service support battalion.** The combat service support battalion is a task-organised unit, typically configured to support a brigade/formation. The combat service support battalion should also have the protection, mobility and communications commensurate with the physical and threat environment in which it is operating and the formation that it is supporting.

• **Force support battalion.** The force support battalion is a task-organised unit, comprising a number of combat service support capabilities, providing designated logistic support to a force. The force support battalion may not have the mobility and communications commensurate with the force that it is supporting.

• **Combat service support task-organised groupings.** These comprise:
  • **Brigade support group.** The brigade support group is an organisation comprising the combat service support battalion and a number of different units or elements. It is task organised to support a brigade-sized formation. The brigade support group should have the mobility and communications commensurate with the brigade that it is supporting. The physical location of the brigade support group is referred to as the ‘brigade maintenance area’.
• Force support group. The force support group is an organisation comprising a number of different third-line combat service support units and elements, task organised to provide general support to a force. Examples of a task-organised force support group may include a force support group headquarters element, a force support battalion, a health support battalion, a joint amenities unit, a deployed forces cash office and a Royal Australian Air Force combat support squadron. The physical location of the force support group is referred to as the ‘force maintenance area’.
Figure 5–2: Indicative combat service support system supporting a deployed combat brigade
Summary

Operational logistics seeks to sustain and support the operational commander’s requirement for manoeuvre, and fires and effects at decisive points in an operation. It is built upon pre-existing raise–train–sustain functions and entities during the capability support phase to generate task-specific logistic forces, nodes and links, and support systems for operations. In the operational support phase it enables effective pre-deployment, deployment, sustainment and redeployment of the joint land force to, from and within the joint force area of operations. There remains an essentially symbiotic relationship between the operational manoeuvre and logistic plans; if they are not designed and executed properly in unison, an elevated risk of mission failure becomes manifest.

Each operation demands its own tailored logistic system to achieve specified operational outcomes. The function of joint logistics is to connect the deployed force to the national and/or other support bases, while the provision of combat service support to the deployed joint land force occurs through tailored land force sustainment, support, supply and distribution functions. The design, delivery and adaptation of the combat service support system is based upon operational requirements expressed in the manoeuvre plan, which is modified according to interaction with the enemy and other stakeholders within the operational environment. Historical practice and experience suggests that if this system is designed in accordance with proven logistic principles, combat service support requirements and utilises proven combat service support entity framework designs, it will be well positioned, flexible and robust enough to survive the operational stresses placed upon it.
Conclusion

The Australian Army generates forces expert in the application of land power. Army is therefore structured, equipped and trained to achieve the overarching mission of fighting and winning the land battle.

Winning the land battle requires the authorised and orchestrated application of military force to dominate the adversary and the operating environment. The means by which this force is applied in alignment with strategic intent is through the execution (conduct) of operations. Operations are the physical means through which land power is systematically applied to achieve tactical success in the land domain.

Contemporary land operations are inherently joint and interagency, and may also be coalition and/or multinational in scope. They are prosecuted across the full spectrum of conflict in a variety of international and domestic environments, subject to the influence of contemporary operating conditions. A land operation may be undertaken as a single tactical activity to achieve broader operational or strategic objectives, or may constitute one element of a broader Australian Defence Force, interagency or multinational campaign. Either way, Army’s framework approach to operations in these circumstances is characterised by two fundamentals – military operations as one element of a holistic whole-of-government approach, and tactical actions that exploit and maximise joint effects to achieve decision.

Army generates and sustains land forces capable of achieving this through a force generation cycle rotating force elements through three discrete phases of Readying, Ready and Reset. This cycle ensures that mission capable forces are continuously designed, equipped, trained, deployed, sustained, recovered and reconstituted to maintain military effectiveness in the deployed operating environment.

Land force elements identified for operations design, plan and execute operations employing a manoeuvrist warfighting philosophy, maximising military effectiveness by applying friendly strengths against adversary vulnerabilities. This is achieved through the integrated application of operational art, operational design and planning, and continuous assessment and adaptation. In designing an operational plan to achieve decision, land force elements fight the enemy and continuously adapt the plan to the situation in order to maintain the operational initiative in order to dominate the adversary and the operating environment.

Land operations are thus conducted across the spectrum of conflict to favourably shape the operational environment, destroy adversary forces, seize and secure physical objectives, influence and/or control populations, and create and maintain a secure environment enabling the activities of other forces and agencies. In order to achieve these effects the land force manoeuvres and applies joint effects to successfully prosecute offensive, defensive or stability actions.
Command and control of the force underpins and binds together all components of operational activity. It is the military framework of command and control which ensures that operations are properly designed, planned, executed and continuously adapted so that military action remains aligned to the political objective. Effective command and control is also critical for the synchronisation of manoeuvre and joint effects to achieve decision on land across the full spectrum of operational activity.

In sustaining land operations, operational logistics fulfils the commander’s requirement for manoeuvre, fires and effects at decisive points. Logistics critically underpin the operational requirement to prepare, deploy, sustain and return the land force to, from and within designated areas of operations. This necessitates the establishment of tailored logistic systems supporting the achievement of specified operational outcomes through a variety of functions including sustainment, support, supply and distribution.

It is apparent that achieving operational success demands an organisational methodology harnessing all elements of national power in the application of joint effects to defeat an opposing force. It is this fundamental concept of fighting and winning – irrespective of the domain – that demands a cohesive organising methodology enabling the orchestrated application of military force to achieve designated objectives. The comprehensive approach to the conduct of operations outlined in this publication ensures that Army remains continuously poised to fight and win the land battle in the contemporary joint operating environment.
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