AUSTRALIAN ARMY

LAND WARFARE DOCTRINE

LWD 3-3-7

EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY

This publication supersedes Land Warfare Doctrine 3-3-7, Employment of Infantry, 2005.
Contents
PREFACE

This publication supersedes Land Warfare Doctrine 3-3-7, Employment of Infantry, 2005.

Aim

1. The aim of the publication is to describe the capabilities of infantry in order to provide an understanding of its contribution to the comprehensive range of military activities within a 'whole-of-government' approach to national security.

Level

2. This publication is written for new members of the Army. It provides corps non-specialists with an understanding of the capabilities of the organisation and its raise, train and sustain role. This publication is a useful reference for government and non-government agencies working with the Army.

3. This publication provides application level doctrine. This is the capstone publication for infantry as part of the Land Warfare Doctrine Operation Series. This publication describes the employment of infantry and complements Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0, Operations (Developing Doctrine), 2008 and Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Land Tactics (Developing Doctrine), 2009. Detailed tactics, techniques and procedures are provided in the infantry Land Warfare Procedures – Combat Arms series.

Scope

4. This publication provides the following:

   a. a description of the operating environment for the employment of infantry;
b. an explanation of the role, capability, concepts of employment and sustainability issues associated with infantry;

c. a description of the tasks undertaken by infantry, including as part of a combined arms team and in a coalition environment;

d. a description of the infantry organisation and its assets;

e. a description of the limitations of infantry organisations or capabilities, including specific environments;

f. an explanation of the planning, tasking, coordination processes and control measures for infantry;

g. an explanation of the unique combat service support structures and systems that support infantry; and

h. an explanation of the employment of infantry in offensive, defensive, stability and enabling activities within a whole-of-government approach.

5. While this publication will focus primarily on Australian-led operations, it will do so in recognition that the contribution of these capabilities will normally be part of a joint or larger coalition force.

Structure of the Army

6. The Army is structured hierarchically into formations, units and sub-units. The usual hierarchy is division, brigade, unit and sub-unit. Infantry units are called battalions, sub-units are called companies and sub-sub-units are called platoons. This publication describes the capabilities and limitations of infantry and thus its contribution to defence capability. Although units are used to raise, train and sustain the Army, the Army usually regroups forces for specific operations and sometimes for phases of an operation.

*LWD 3-3-7, Employment of Infantry, 2008*
Task Organisation

7. The regrouping of forces for specific missions and phases within operations is described as task organisation. A task-organised unit consists of an appropriate headquarters and subordinate components grouped to meet the requirements of the task. It is typically at this level that sub-units are detached from one unit to another to form battlegroups to achieve specific tasks. The term ‘battlegroup’ has a specific meaning, being a combined arms grouping based on the headquarters of a tank, cavalry, infantry or aviation unit. Smaller groupings are called combat teams and, though they may operate alone, they are more likely to be components of a battlegroup.

Associated Publications

8. This publication should be read in conjunction with other publications and documents, in particular:


b. Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0, Operations (Developing Doctrine), 2008;

c. Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Land Tactics (Developing Doctrine), 2009;

d. Land Warfare Doctrine 3-9-1, Operations in Specific Environments (Developing Doctrine), 2004;

e. Land Warfare Doctrine 3-9-5, Urban Operations (Developing Doctrine), 2005;

f. Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0, Combat Service Support, 2008;
g. *Land Warfare Procedures - Combat Arms (Dismounted Combat) 3-3-3, Tracking (Developing Doctrine)*, 2009;

h. *Land Warfare Procedures - Combat Arms (Mounted Combat) 3-3-1, Mounted Minor Tactics (Developing Doctrine)*, 2006;

i. *Land Warfare Procedures - General 3-3-14, Battlegroup Handbook*, 2009; and


**On-line Doctrine**

9. This and other doctrine publications are available via the Army Doctrine Electronic Library website located at: [http://adel.defence.gov.au](http://adel.defence.gov.au). Paper copies may be out of date. The Army Doctrine Electronic Library is the authoritative source for current doctrine. Users are to ensure currency of all doctrine publications against the Army Doctrine Electronic Library.

**Gender**

10. This publication has been prepared with gender-neutral language.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cover</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title Page</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>xlii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrations</td>
<td>xxiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary</td>
<td>xxv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>xxix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER 1  FUNDAMENTALS OF INFANTRY EMPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 1-1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 1-2 ROLE</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 1-3 CHARACTERISTICS</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 1-4 TASKS</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 1-5 CAPABILITIES</td>
<td>1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 1-6 PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT</td>
<td>1-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 1-7 LIMITATIONS</td>
<td>1-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 1-8 CONTRIBUTION TO LAND WARFARE</td>
<td>1-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct of Land Warfare</td>
<td>1-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annex A</strong> A Concise History of the Australian Infantry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2</td>
<td>INFANTRY ORGANISATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 2-1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 2-2</td>
<td>COMMAND AND CONTROL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 2-3</td>
<td>STAFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 2-4</td>
<td>LEVELS AND TYPES OF SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of Advice</td>
<td>2-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitual Support Affiliations</td>
<td>2-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 2-5</td>
<td>UNITS AND SUB-UNITS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalions</td>
<td>2-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle Company</td>
<td>2-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Company</td>
<td>2-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex A Organisational Structure of Infantry Battalions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER 3</th>
<th>INFANTRY PLANNING</th>
<th>3-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 3-1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 3-2</td>
<td>FORCE ELEMENT OPTIONS</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Force Elements</td>
<td>3-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 3-3</td>
<td>PLANNING</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Factors</td>
<td>3-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 3-4</td>
<td>INFORMATION ACTIONS</td>
<td>3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 3-5</td>
<td>THREATS</td>
<td>3-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER 4</th>
<th>INFANTRY IN OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>4-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 4-1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 4-2</td>
<td>INFANTRY SUPPORT TO OFFENSIVE TACTICAL ACTIONS</td>
<td>4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 4-3</td>
<td>ADVANCE</td>
<td>4-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Advance</td>
<td>4-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battlegroup in the Advance</td>
<td>4-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment Groups</td>
<td>4-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>4-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION 4-4</th>
<th>ATTACK</th>
<th>4-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>4-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Service Support</td>
<td>4-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION 4-5</th>
<th>PURSUIT</th>
<th>4-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct</td>
<td>4-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>4-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION 4-6</th>
<th>TACTICAL TECHNIQUES</th>
<th>4-11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airborne</td>
<td>4-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>4-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious</td>
<td>4-13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack by Fire</td>
<td>4-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordon</td>
<td>4-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corridor Thrust</td>
<td>4-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup de Main</td>
<td>4-17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversionary Attack</td>
<td>4-17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raid</td>
<td>4-18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance in Force</td>
<td>4-19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search</td>
<td>4-20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support by Fire</td>
<td>4-20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweep</td>
<td>4-21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER 5</th>
<th>INFANTRY IN DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>5-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION 5-1</th>
<th>INTRODUCTION</th>
<th>5-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION 5-2</th>
<th>SUPPORT TO DEFENSIVE TACTICAL ACTIONS</th>
<th>5-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION 5-3</th>
<th>AREA DEFENCE</th>
<th>5-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Covering Force Battle</td>
<td>5-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Defensive Battle</td>
<td>5-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination Measures</td>
<td>5-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION 5-4</th>
<th>MOBILE DEFENCE</th>
<th>5-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groupings and Actions</td>
<td>5-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*LWD 3-3-7, Employment of Infantry, 2008*
Mobile Defence Stages 5-8
Coordination Measures 5-8

SECTION 5-5  DELAY 5-9
Manoeuvre Options 5-9
Groupings and Actions 5-10
Coordination Measures 5-11

SECTION 5-6  WITHDRAWAL 5-11
Manoeuvre Options 5-11
Groupings 5-12
Coordination Measures 5-13

SECTION 5-7  TACTICAL TECHNIQUES 5-14
Battle Handover 5-14
Break-out from Encirclement 5-14
Convoy Escort 5-16
Counterattack 5-16
Counterpenetration 5-17
Defend a Battle Position 5-17
Defend a Strongpoint 5-18
Defend in Sector 5-18
Reserved Demolition 5-18
Route Security 5-19
Spoiling Attack 5-20

CHAPTER 6  INFANTRY IN STABILITY ACTIVITIES 6-1

SECTION 6-1  INTRODUCTION 6-1

SECTION 6-2  INFANTRY SUPPORT TO STABILITY TACTICAL ACTIONS 6-1
Contribution 6-2

SECTION 6-3  CONTROL 6-2

SECTION 6-4  REFORM 6-6

SECTION 6-5  RESTORE 6-8

SECTION 6-6  ASSIST 6-10
SECTION 6-7 TACTICAL TECHNIQUES
  Cordon and Search
  Noncombatant Evacuation
  Recovery of Personnel and Equipment
  Traffic Control Posts and Vehicle Checkpoints

CHAPTER 7 INFANTRY IN ENABLING ACTIVITIES

SECTION 7-1 INTRODUCTION

SECTION 7-2 ENABLING ACTIVITIES
  Link-up
  March
  Obstacle Crossing and Breaching
  Passage of Lines
  Patrol
  Types of Patrols
  Reconnaissance
  Relief in Place
  Surveillance

CHAPTER 8 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

SECTION 8-1 INTRODUCTION

SECTION 8-2 ORGANISATION

SECTION 8-3 FUNCTIONS
  Supply Support
  Maintenance Support
  Transport Support
  Engineer Sustainability Support
  Combat Health Support
  Personnel Support

SECTION 8-4 APPLICATIONS

SECTION 8-5 TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
  Commanding Officer
  Staff

SECTION 8-6 COALITION OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER 9</th>
<th>INFANTRY EMPLOYMENT IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS</th>
<th>9-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 9-1</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>9-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 9-2</td>
<td>TROPICAL</td>
<td>9-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on Capability</td>
<td>9-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Factors</td>
<td>9-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 9-3</td>
<td>DESERT</td>
<td>9-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on Capability</td>
<td>9-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Factors</td>
<td>9-4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 9-4</td>
<td>COLD CONDITIONS</td>
<td>9-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on Capability</td>
<td>9-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Factors</td>
<td>9-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 9-5</td>
<td>CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENTS</td>
<td>9-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on Capability</td>
<td>9-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Factors</td>
<td>9-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 9-6</td>
<td>URBAN</td>
<td>9-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on Capability</td>
<td>9-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Factors</td>
<td>9-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bibliography 1
ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1–1: The Range of Tactical Activities Related to Operation Themes 1-1
Figure 2–1: Staff of Battalion Headquarters 2-3
Figure 2–2: Australian Light Infantry Battalion 2A-2
Figure 2–3: Mechanised Infantry Battalion 2A-3
Figure 2–4: Motorised Infantry Battalion 2A-4
1. The principle source for Australian Defence Force terms and definitions is the Australian Defence Glossary located at http://dlms.dcb.defence.gov.au. Terms and definitions contained within a publication are to be in accordance with the business rules, guidelines and conventions for the Australian Defence Glossary. All terms and definitions not sourced from the Australian Defence Glossary are to be justified by the author, recommended by the Sponsor and forwarded to the Manager of the Land Glossary for subsequent approval. This process also includes terms already contained in the Australian Defence Glossary but which for the purposes of a publication require a different definition.

**Army aviation**
The generic term for both fixed-wing and rotary wing organic to Army.

**battlegroup**
A tactical grouping of combat elements based on the headquarters of an armoured or infantry battalion, normally armoured or mechanised, or possibly on an armoured reconnaissance, aviation or artillery battalion.

**chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons**
Those weapons designed to kill or incapacitate large numbers of troops, neutralise area targets and weaken the will and morale of both the forces involved and the civilian population. These weapons are indiscriminate in their action and present a hazard to personnel, whether friendly or enemy, military or civilian.

**decisively engaged**
A unit or sub-unit is decisively engaged when enemy fire or other action is such that the unit or sub-unit no longer has freedom of action.
Defence Force aid to the civil authority
The provision of Defence Force aid to supplement law enforcement measures undertaken by the Commonwealth and/or State Governments and their responsible authorities, within the terms of the Constitution, in situations where there is a likelihood that members of the Australian Defence Force may be required to use force.

engagement area
An area in which the commander intends to trap and destroy an enemy force with the massed fires of all available weapons.

force commander
The senior operational commander appointed to command the deployed force.

humanitarian assistance
Support provided to humanitarian and development agencies in an insecure environment by a deployed force whose primary mission is not the provision of HA. Should the deployed force undertake such humanitarian tasks, responsibility should transition to the appropriate civilian agency at the earliest opportunity.

joint inter-agency task force
Complex warfighting operations will be conducted by combined joint inter-agency task forces. These task forces incorporate all elements of national power in an integrated framework, tailored and scaled to the requirements of a specific mission. Joint inter-agency task forces are, in effect, a combined joint inter-agency combined arms team.

light infantry
A standing organisation of Infantry that lacks organic transport assets but has additional equipment to that in mechanised and motorised infantry units.
mechanised infantry
A standing organisation of Infantry that has organic armoured personnel carriers.

military appreciation process
The military appreciation process is a doctrinal approach to decision-making that allows a battlefield situation to be examined and a logical decision to be reached. Use of the military appreciation process assists an individual commander or a commander and staff to make the best military decision using a proven analytical process to merge the art and science of war. The military appreciation process is also applicable within joint and combined environments as a component of the joint military appreciation process.

mounted infantry
A standing organisation of Infantry that has organic wheeled transport.

rear area security
Measures taken to prevent the enemy from disrupting the activities of administrative organisations in support of combat forces, civilian population and facilities.

regrouping
The action of changing the command status of units and sub-units. It may or may not involve physical movement.

replenishment
The positioning of stock to meet a periodic resupply requirement.

shock action
Shock action is a physical and psychological assault upon enemy troops and their commanders, employing both firepower and mobility of tanks to apply maximum combat power. Shock action will disrupt the enemy’s plans, destroy their cohesion, sap their morale and weaken their will to resist.
versatility
The capability to turn readily from one tactical task to another.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>attack by fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>air defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARH</td>
<td>armed reconnaissance helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>battlegroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFSW</td>
<td>direct fire support weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>direct support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>engagement area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance/aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>main effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>offensive support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVP</td>
<td>operational viability period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBF</td>
<td>support by fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>traffic control post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCP</td>
<td>vehicle checkpoint</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LWD 3-3-7, Employment of Infantry, 2008
2. The following abbreviations appear in tables and figures within the publication.

   **COIN** counterinsurgency
CHAPTER 1
FUNDAMENTALS OF INFANTRY
EMPLOYMENT

SECTION 1-1. INTRODUCTION

_The infantry must ever be valued as the very foundation and nerve of an army._

_N. Machiavelli_

1.1 Infantry are capable of conducting short-notice tasking with an appropriate level of endurance. They are able to move between activities throughout the range of tactical activities related to operation themes (see Figure 1–1) and across the comprehensive range of military activities.

Figure 1–1: The Range of Tactical Activities Related to Operation Themes

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1.2 Infantry’s main capability resides in close combat and in seizing and holding ground. It is usually employed in a combined arms team but can also act independently in complex terrain where technological advantages are degraded. The infantry requires sufficient organic firepower, networked communications and self-protection to enable independent operations. Flexible groupings, coupled with sound tactics and fighting power, enable infantry to defeat a range of threats.

1.3 Infantry has made the major contribution to every Australian military operation since Federation. A concise history of the Australian Infantry Corps is contained in Annex A.

1.4 This chapter describes the infantry’s role, characteristics, tasks, capabilities, principles of employment, limitations and contributions to land warfare.

SECTION 1-2. ROLE

1.5 The role of the infantry is to seek out and close with the enemy, to kill or capture them, to seize and hold ground and to repel attack by day and night, regardless of season, weather or terrain.

SECTION 1-3. CHARACTERISTICS

1.6 The characteristics of infantry are as follows:
   a. mobility,
   b. adaptability,
   c. versatility, and
   d. influence.

1.7 Mobility. Light, mechanised and motorised infantry have two key strengths: their ability to be projected rapidly by strategic mobility assets to anywhere in the world at short notice, and their ability to immediately perform a broad range of tactical tasks on arrival. Light infantry can be easily moved in any form.

LWD 3-3-7, Employment of Infantry, 2008
of strategic transport and can traverse almost any terrain by foot, but cannot relocate quickly over long distances without the provision of transport. Motorised infantry has limited cross-country mobility in organic wheeled vehicles and all vehicles, under light scales are air portable in medium-range transport aircraft. Mechanised infantry has a high degree of tactical mobility in organic armoured vehicles but requires more resources for strategic lift than dismounted infantry. Both motorised and mechanised infantry can dismount at any time (eg. to fight), and dismounted infantry can traverse virtually all terrain types.

1.8 Adaptability. Adaptability is the ability to embrace new or unforeseen tasks. The ability to understand constantly evolving and complex environments can only be achieved through a physical interaction with the population and the enemy. Infantry is uniquely placed to adapt to a complex environment because of its interaction at the tactical level. Infantry achieves adaptability through its ability to learn from experience and evolve behaviour to deal with changing circumstances. Infantry can tailor its procedures rapidly because of its training, procedures, equipment and inherent flexibility.

1.9 Versatility. Versatility is the ability to perform a range of tasks. The inherent versatility of land forces enables the infantry to adapt to the constantly changing conflict environment. Infantry can be employed throughout the spectrum of conflict and across the range of military activities. Infantry gains its versatility from its people, equipment and organisation. The versatile ethos is instilled through training and the application of mission command.

1.10 Influence. The battle for the hearts and minds of domestic and international audiences is a decisive element of warfare. Infantry, working among the people, is uniquely placed to influence perceptions through respect for the people,

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2. Due to a lack of protective mobility platforms, light infantry have developed habitual relationships with tactical and strategic mobility assets (eg. airmobile and airborne familiarity).
adherence to the laws of armed conflict and the sparing use of force (lethal and nonlethal, kinetic and non-kinetic) with the greatest possible discrimination. Australian infantry soldiers have an enviable reputation for winning the hearts of indigenous populations.

SECTION 1-4. TASKS

1.11 The tasks associated with the infantry role include:
   a. destroy,
   b. seize and hold ground,
   c. defend,
   d. secure,
   e. clear,
   f. peacekeeping and humanitarian support,
   g. noncombatant evacuations, and
   h. aid to civil authorities.

1.12 Destroy. This task addresses the destruction of the enemy or infrastructure. This includes dismounted close combat and attacks to defeat enemy forces in all terrain types.

1.13 Seize and Hold Ground. Infantry is the ultimate force for seizing and holding ground because of its ability to clear enemy, to dig in to gain protection, to use a range of organic weapon systems and to project power in order to defend a point or locality. This can be done with an infantry-only force or as part of a combined arms force.

1.14 Defend. Defending is a tactical task to defeat an attacker and prevent the attacker from achieving the objective. Infantry defends by employing fighting power to prevent, resist or destroy an enemy attack and accept decisive engagement.

4. All definitions are found in the Australian Defence Glossary located at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms/
Defence is required to hold ground but may also be used to gain time (eg. mobile defence).

1.15 Secure. Infantry can undertake security tasks as part of a screen, guard, covering force or security force. Security is provided by patrolling or the provision of checkpoints and defended localities.

1.16 Clear. Infantry is capable of ensuring that an objective or defined route is free from local enemy interference.

1.17 Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Support. Infantry is able to provide capabilities and skills to support activities ranging from humanitarian relief to the application of lethal force.

1.18 Noncombatant Evacuations. Infantry is able to provide the personnel and lethal or nonlethal force to support evacuations in permissive and non-permissive environments.

1.19 Aid to Civil Authorities. Infantry is able to provide personnel and capabilities to a broad range of activities from disaster relief to specialist support to government agencies.

SECTION 1-5. CAPABILITIES

1.20 The infantry capability is built primarily around the infantry battalion and the skills, knowledge, training and experience of its personnel. This also includes the effective employment of all vehicles, equipment and weapons systems. The capabilities of infantry include:

- personnel,
- close combat,
- weapon systems,
- equipment, and
- networked communications.

5. ibid.

LWD 3-3-7, Employment of Infantry, 2008
1.21 **Personnel.** The fundamental element of infantry capability is the soldier. The soldier conducts close combat, interacts with the local community and transitions quickly between lines of effort.

1.22 **Close Combat.** Close combat is the basis of all Infantry actions because the use of force or the threat of force is often necessary to achieve environmental dominance. Close combat defeats or destroys enemy forces or seizes or retains ground. Infantry provides discriminatory lethal force in complex environments.

1.23 **Weapon Systems.** Infantry weapon systems include both direct and indirect systems to neutralise, suppress or destroy enemy personnel and materiel.

1.24 **Equipment.** Infantry has a range of equipment for warfighting and close combat but may require specialised equipment for specific missions and in extreme environmental conditions. Mechanised infantry has protected mobility and firepower that allows domination of a larger part of the battlespace and faster transition from one activity to the next.

1.25 **Networked Communications.** Infantry forces have insecure communications at soldier level, secure voice to section level, and secure data to company level. When combined with the battle command support system and other technology, the result is an information network. Networked communications enable infantry to share information and access the capabilities of a range of Defence Force assets. The disadvantage of this level of communications is the electronic signature created by the force.

**SECTION 1-6. PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT**

1.26 The principles of infantry employment are as follows:

a. mission command,

b. task organisation,

c. combined arms,
1.27 Mission Command. Mission command is an organisational culture and a philosophy of command in which subordinates are given a clear indication of the commander’s intent, a mission, and the assets and resources to achieve that mission. Tempo in complex terrain demands decisive, orchestrated action. Mission command assists infantry commanders to make decisions where there is little time for reflection or capacity for consultation with superiors. A superior’s supervision of a subordinate’s planning process is implicit in mission command. Orders to infantry must detail the commander’s intent for achieving the immediate mission and the way in which infantry contributes to the overall plan. The orders will include a clear statement of tasks and purposes. LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, 2008 contains more information on mission command.

1.28 Task Organisation. Infantry is capable of independent operations; however, it is more likely to operate as part of a battlegroup (BG) or combat team (CT). Infantry battalions are used to raise, train and sustain a force. When部署, infantry will be allocated to task-organised CTs or BGs. The infantry BHQ is structured to absorb specialist staff and command a BG.

1.29 Combined Arms. Infantry provides a valuable offensive and defensive capability but with some limitations, as described in Section 1-7. Infantry is administered, trained and deployed in discrete units, but will generally fight as part of a combined arms team. Synergies achieved by combined arms teams often outweigh the sum of the component parts.

1.30 Sustainment. Any deployed force requires sustainment. Infantry requires a continuous supply of food, water and ammunition. Mechanised infantry also requires large quantities of fuel and spare parts. The logistics train must support continuous sustainment under combat conditions. Sustainment requirements for the force will be governed by a number of
1.31 Reserves. Reserves are used to provide flexibility and a response to unforeseen circumstances. This may not be possible at CT level and below; however, a commander should plan for a dedicated reserve at BG level and higher. Infantry may also form part of a task-organised reserve for another organisation.

### SECTION 1-7. LIMITATIONS

1.32 Commanders and staff who plan to work with and employ infantry need to understand the limitations of this force. Infantry limitations include:

- the mobility and firepower of dismounted forces,
- sustainment,
- maintenance and rest time, and
- protection.

1.33 Mobility and Firepower of Dismounted Forces. Dismounted infantry have limited tactical mobility and protection. Firepower will also be restricted by what can be carried on individual soldiers. Some terrains and circumstances warrant this level of mobility. However, dismounted infantry will not be able to move quickly over large distances without the use of other manoeuvre assets.

1.34 Sustainment. The organic CSS assets (first line) of an infantry battalion can sustain an infantry BG for a defined period based on a specific operational viability period (OVP), after which they will require ongoing sustainment from second line resources. These may include a CSS team for protracted operations, or attached BG or formation assets. Infantry is also reliant on second line sources for the supply and resupply of specialised equipment in extreme environments or for specific activities. Sustainment issues are discussed in Chapter 8.
1.35 **Maintenance and Rest Time.** Infantry requires rest time and its equipment requires maintenance, particularly during periods of high-tempo activity where close combat is likely for extended periods.

1.36 **Protection.** Infantry has limited protection when dismounted and may require support from other assets such as armour, GBAD. Motorised and mechanised infantry has comparatively more protection based on the mobility platform. Infantry requires local air superiority and offensive support (OS) for deployments into high-intensity activities. Infantry has limited protection from CBRN weapons.

### SECTION 1-8. CONTRIBUTION TO LAND WARFARE

1.37 The characteristics of the contemporary operating environment are evolving lethality, intensity of battle, the exploitation of complex terrain, operational uncertainty and information dominance. These characteristics combine to produce a range of challenges to land warfare where soldiers fight in a multidimensional battlespace against forces seeking to develop and exploit an asymmetric advantage and thereby influence the perceptions of the population.

#### Conduct of Land Warfare

1.38 Infantry will be critical to the success of deployments throughout the continuum of operations and across the range of military actions. Infantry is one of the primary means with which a commander can apply lethal and nonlethal force. Infantry can support disaster relief as part of peacetime military engagement, monitor a ceasefire as part of a UN-mandated operation and take part in major combat. Infantry is able to patrol, establish checkpoints and strongpoints, seize critical locations, assault enemy positions and defend against attack. Infantry can be rapidly re-roled or retasked to provide humanitarian assistance (HA) and is able to interact with the local population on a personal level to achieve information objectives.
1.39 **Adaptive Action.** Adaptive action is an iterative process of forcing the enemy to respond, learning from those responses and changing behaviour accordingly. Adaptive action incorporates outputs from deliberate planning as the start point for subsequent interaction with the operating environment. Infantry is a valuable asset for stimulating a response from a known enemy. In a complex competitive learning environment where friendly forces are fighting an adversary who can shelter below the discrimination threshold, infantry is able to confront those forces at the tactical level. Infantry within a complex environment assists in data gathering from the local community, while constricting the enemy’s freedom of action through security operations. These factors in concert will begin to lower the discrimination threshold and allow the targeting of enemy cells. Further, adaption requires a suitable system and process for the collation of lessons learned and their application. Infantry units have the structure to undertake such adaption; however, it should not be assumed that it will occur instinctively. Infantry can maintain effectiveness across a range of tasks from peacetime military engagement through to major combat.

1.40 **Range of Military Activities.** Infantry is able to operate throughout the range of military activities. Infantry forces are flexible and able to transition between and across multiple lines of effort. For example, soldiers may be used in an offensive tactical action to remove organised resistance, to provide protection and security to a threatened population through combat patrols, to use APCs to transport vital stores in order to assist humanitarian efforts, to evacuate personnel from hazardous situations, and to train local security forces. The inherent flexibility within the infantry force allows one element to provide the secure environment in which the other lines of effort take place.

**Annex:**

A. **A Concise History of the Australian Infantry**
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 1

A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY

The Early Days

1. Infantry soldiers have provided the basis of Australian forces since the landing of British Marines with the First Fleet in 1788.

2. During the period 1788–1870 British Marines and British Army infantry regiments carried out defence and security tasks in the Australian colonies. In the early stages British units assisted in the raising and training of small volunteer local units; however, it was not until the late 1850s that the raising of volunteer military forces based on infantry and artillery units gained momentum, and even then their existence was usually of short duration.

3. With the departure of the British in 1870, the Australian colonies became responsible for their own defence and raised volunteer units based mainly on part-time service citizen soldiers to provide infantry, light horse, field artillery and coastal defence capabilities. These colonial defence forces developed with a strong British military influence and identified strongly with their local area. Most current Army Reserve infantry battalions claim links that can be traced back to colonial units of the last half of the 19th century.

4. In 1885 the colony of NSW sent a contingent of volunteers based on an infantry battalion to serve with the British in the Sudan. During 1899–1902, Australia sent contingents of infantry and then mounted infantry to serve in South Africa with the British in the Boer War. A small force of infantry served with an Australian naval contingent in China’s Boxer Rebellion in 1900–01.

5. Federation in 1901 saw the creation of a volunteer Australian Army that had 12 infantry battalions of paid part-time citizen soldiers and almost 20 battalions of unpaid citizen soldiers. A
small permanent military force provided the administrative and training staff for the citizen force units. The infantry battalion organisation comprised a machine gun section and eight companies of infantry soldiers armed with rifles and bayonets. In 1911 a School of Musketry was created at Randwick in Sydney to train small arms instructors and improve weapon handling and marksmanship skills throughout the Army.

World War One

6. The lack of adequate citizen force volunteers led to the introduction of a compulsory military training scheme for boys and young men. When war was declared in August 1914 the compulsory training scheme became redundant, as a volunteer force known as the Australian Imperial Force had to be raised for overseas service. An advantage was that many of the volunteers for the Australian Imperial Force had already undergone some military training.

7. In September 1914 the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force, based on an infantry battalion, captured German-held territory and wireless stations in New Guinea and the islands of the Bismark Archipelago.

8. During April to December 1915, Australian infantry soldiers from 28 battalions fought against Turkish forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula. From July 1916 to November 1918 five Australian infantry divisions (60 infantry battalions) fought as part of the British Commonwealth forces against the German Army in trench warfare and manoeuvre battles on the Western Front in France and Belgium.

9. In January 1915, infantry battalions were restructured from eight to four rifle companies. From 1916 a machine gun company and trench mortar battery were employed at brigade level and each division had a pioneer battalion. By late 1917, infantry platoons armed with light machine guns and hand and rifle grenades were capable of fighting independently within the battalion structure. During 1918, fighting on the Western Front progressed from trench warfare to offensive actions involving
infantry and tanks, supported by closely coordinated artillery, mortar and machine gun fire to overcome defensive positions.

Between World Wars

10. By 1921 the Australian Imperial Force was disbanded and the capabilities of the Army again depended on part-time service citizen soldiers, with a small permanent force providing administration and training. In June 1921 the School of Musketry became the Small Arms School.

11. During the 1920s and 1930s the Australian Army paid little attention to developments in modern warfare, and the training of their infantry soldiers remained at a very basic level. In this period the organisation of the Australian infantry battalion changed from four to three rifle companies, and a support company with up to three machine gun platoons and a mortar platoon was added. The radical Darwin Mobile Force was raised in 1938, and for the first time the Army had raised a full-time service field force unit in peacetime that included infantry soldiers.

World War Two

12. The outbreak of WWII in September 1939 saw Australia almost completely unprepared for war, and the Army again had to create a volunteer force for overseas service, the 2nd Australian Imperial Force, while retaining the volunteer and conscript citizen forces for home defence, the Militia. From 1940, the infantry battalion organisation of the 1930s was progressively replaced as the Australian Imperial Force infantry battalions sought compatibility with British Army organisations. The militia infantry battalions were restructured as new weapons and equipment became available. The new infantry battalion organisation included four rifle companies and a support company.

13. Infantry soldiers from the 6th, 7th and 9th Divisions (27 infantry battalions) fought against the Germans, Italians and Vichy French in North Africa, Greece, Crete, Lebanon and Syria during 1940–42. Infantry soldiers from the 8th Division (nine infantry battalions) fought desperate battles against the
Japanese in Malaya, in Singapore and on the islands to the north of Australia during late 1941 and early 1942, but were soon forced to surrender, and most became prisoners of war.

14. During 1942–45 infantry soldiers from the 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th and 11th Divisions (60 infantry battalions) and 12 independent companies/commando squadrons, fought to remove the Japanese from the tropical jungle country of New Guinea, New Ireland, New Britain, Bougainville and Borneo. The early battles provided learning experiences that led to the development of suitable training for jungle warfare. Experience was also gained in the movement of infantry battalions by sea and air into operational areas. The importance of patrolling and close fire support in jungle and mountain country was also recognised. During 1944–45 a School of Infantry was established at Puckapunyal, and in late 1945 it moved to Bonegilla and absorbed the Small Arms School.

Korea, Malaya and Vietnam

15. At the end of WWII in September 1945, the Army raised three full-time service infantry battalions to serve with the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. These were the 65th, 66th and 67th Battalions, which during 1948–49 became the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the RAR. The School of Infantry moved to Seymour in 1947. The ARA was created in September 1947, the part-time service Citizen Military Force was reformed in July 1948 and the RA Inf was created in December 1948.

16. During 1950–53 all three battalions of the RAR saw active service as part of the UN force fighting North Korean and Chinese forces in the Korean War. This was followed during 1955–60 with the three RAR battalions being involved in counterinsurgency operations against communist guerillas during the Malayan Emergency.

17. Due to a lack of volunteers for service with the Citizen Military Force, a compulsory National Service Scheme for young men of 18 years of age was implemented during 1951–59. The National Service Scheme involved three months of full-time
18. In 1960 the Army reorganised and created the Pentropic division, based on five large infantry battalions operating directly to the division HQ. The new infantry battalion had five rifle companies, each with four rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. Each battalion could operate as an independent BG, with attached artillery, tanks and logistic support. In July 1960 the School of Infantry moved from Seymour to Ingleburn and became the Infantry Centre.

19. In 1960 the Citizen Military Force infantry battalions were reorganised into state infantry regiments and lost their existing numerical and regimental titles, many of which had links back to the 19th century. This caused a great deal of resentment among part-time citizen soldier infantry soldiers and in some local communities.

20. The Pentropic organisation was replaced at the end of 1964 by an infantry division and battalion organisation that resembled the organisations which had existed since 1940. In the mid-1960s the Australian Army was involved in a huge expansion through the introduction of a selective National Service Scheme for men of 20 years of age to serve on full-time service with the Regular Army for 2 years. During 1964–67, the RAR expanded from three to nine infantry battalions.

21. The Army was committed to operations in Malaysia during 1960–64, Borneo during 1965–66 and South Vietnam during 1965–71, as well as maintaining the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam in their training and advisory role with the South Vietnamese forces during 1962–72. During 1964–71 all battalions of the RAR saw at least one tour of duty on active service, and almost all experienced at least two tours of duty. The operations in Borneo and Vietnam provided Australian infantry soldiers with valuable experience in small-unit and battalion combat operations in a tropical environment, and the employment of APCs and helicopters to provide battlefield mobility.

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_LWD 3-3-7, Employment of Infantry, 2008_
Post-Vietnam

22. The end of Australian participation in the Vietnam War and the end of National Service in 1972 led to a dramatic reduction in the size of the Army. In 1973 the RAR was reduced from nine to six infantry battalions, and similar reductions and amalgamations occurred within the state-based Army Reserve regiments. The Infantry Centre moved from Ingleburn to Singleton. The withdrawal of the infantry battalion from Singapore in 1974 meant that, for the first time since 1940, there was no Australian infantry battalion serving overseas, although Australian rifle companies continued to be deployed to Malaysia to help provide security for the air base at Butterworth. The Army was given the task of defending continental Australia against enemy attack. To provide the infantry battalions with improved operational mobility a variety of concepts were trialled, resulting in two light infantry battalions, two standard infantry battalions, a parachute battalion and a mechanised battalion. All were based on having either three or four rifle companies, a support company and an administration company. In the late 1980s emphasis was placed on low-level operations in the defence of Australia. The RAR battalions retained their specialist roles and Army Reserve infantry battalions were allocated the task of vital asset protection in northern Australia.

23. During January to May 1993, the 1 RAR battalion group carried out peace support operations in Somalia, and a platoon from 2/4 RAR provided security during elections in Cambodia. In 1994–95 two rifle companies on rotation from 2/4 RAR and 2 RAR provided security for medical contingents in Rwanda.

24. In 1992 6 RAR became a motorised infantry battalion employing modified Land Rover Perentie light trucks as troop-carrying vehicles. During the late 1990s, 4 RAR was converted from the light infantry to a commando role.

25. During the period September 1999 to June 2004 each of the battalions of the RAR was involved in at least one tour of duty to carry out peace and security operations in East Timor.
26. Since April 2003 the infantry battalions of the RAR have contributed CTs based on one or two rifle platoons and an armoured cavalry troop for tours of duty with the Army security detachment in Baghdad.

27. During the period May 2005 to June 2008 six combined arms BGs, commanded either by an infantry battalion or cavalry regiment HQ, carried out security operations in southern Iraq. These deployments saw the introduction into operational service of the Bushmaster infantry mobility vehicle.

28. Since July 2003 security assistance operations have been carried out in the Solomon Islands by elements from the RAR battalions and composite rifle company groups from the Army Reserve.

29. In December 2005 and August 2006 the Government announced that the number of RAR infantry battalions would increase from six to eight, with the unlinking of 5/7 RAR to form two mechanised infantry battalions and the re-raising of 8/9 RAR as a motorised infantry battalion. 3 RAR would lose the parachute capability and re-role as a light infantry battalion. The future structure of the infantry battalion would be based on three rifle companies instead of four.

30. Since May 2006 combined arms BGs based on a battalion from the RAR have carried out security assistance operations in East Timor.

31. In November 2006 a half-company CT from 1 RAR deployed to Tonga to provide security assistance for a 2-week period.

32. Since November 2006 CTs comprising a reinforced rifle company and an armoured cavalry troop have provided protection and security for the engineer-based Australian reconstruction task force (TF) in Afghanistan. In October 2008 the role and structure of the reconstruction TF was changed to include mentoring and advisory assistance to the Afghan National Army, and it became a mentoring and reconstruction TF under the command of an infantry BHQ.
Further Reading

33. The following publications provide further information on this annex:


b. Ryan, A. 2003, *Putting your young men in the mud: Change, continuity and the Australian infantry battalion*, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra; and

CHAPTER 2

INFANTRY ORGANISATION

SECTION 2-1. INTRODUCTION

2.1 The battalion is infantry’s primary structure for raising, training and sustaining the infantry capability. The infantry battalion is equipped and trained to deploy as a complete unit, but is usually employed as part of a combined arms organisation. The infantry battalion is able to form a BG HQ and several CT HQ. Infantry CTs may also be attached to BGs formed by another combat arm.

2.2 This chapter describes the infantry organisation in terms of C2, staff, levels and types of support, and infantry units. It also describes BGs and CTs.

SECTION 2-2. COMMAND AND CONTROL

2.3 The detailed information on joint terminology can be found in the Australian Defence Glossary.

2.4 Infantry are usually allocated operational command or operational control, and are usually allocated in FEs of platoon or company size. As an example, an infantry sub-unit may be reinforced with additional elements for a specific mission. In this case, a platoon from A Company could be allocated operational command of B Company for a specific period. Alternatively, an engineer squadron may be allocated an infantry platoon operational control, with an understanding that the platoon is to be tasked with the provision of local defence of a work site.

2.5 Specialist infantry elements are normally allocated tactical control. As an example, a direct fire support weapon (DFSW) section may be allocated tactical control to a rifle company with a task to provide anti-armour defence in accordance with a BG plan.
Supported units will usually be required to provide administrative support to the allocated infantry unit.

Infantry units can be allocated support under any C2 relationship, although notice must be taken of administrative restrictions. Light units, for example, are capable of tasking and employing armour, but have no provision to provide repair or recovery support and limited ability to provide fuel resupply. In this case, an expectation would be that the armoured element would be reinforced with a suitable administrative detachment, or that the parent unit would retain responsibility for administration outside the capability of the infantry unit.

Support

Infantry FEs are rarely allocated outside the BG under support arrangements such as direct support (DS). The nature and range of infantry weapon systems means that they are usually intimately involved in supporting the close fight and allocation under C2 arrangements is more appropriate.

The exception within an infantry battalion is the mortar platoon. The platoon may be allocated in DS or support of an element of the BG in order to guarantee supporting indirect fire. This may be in addition to, or separate from, artillery or close air support assets.

For dispersed operations, it may be more appropriate to allocate a mortar section/platoon under a command relationship such as tactical control. While this ensures that the supporting element is provided with some local protection, it will also often imply that the supported element becomes responsible for at least the elements of administration. Alternatively, mortars may still be allocated in DS and operate separately, but a need for local protection may see the mortars allocated their own security element.

SECTION 2-3. STAFF

Each infantry unit provides a BHQ to enable a unit-sized BG to be commanded and controlled as a fighting unit. The
responsibility for command of the unit or BG rests with the CO, who exercises command through their company or through sub-unit commanders (see Figure 2–1).

Figure 2–1: Staff of Battalion Headquarters

2.12 The BG plan is controlled by the BHQ staff and coordinated by the 2IC or XO. The company staff coordinates the plan at company level. BHQ is the central element through which orders and information are passed. BHQ provides the CO with the staff and communications facilities required to command the unit in peace and a BG on deployment.

2.13 Battalions may allocate an LO to represent the CO at formation or flanking unit HQ. Each battalion LO is responsible for keeping their HQ, and other units to which they are attached, fully informed on the superior HQ plans. However, the battalion LO may also convey or amplify the CO’s orders at company HQ, and may be required to be positioned at key coordination points.
points or to assist in regrouping or other tactical functions (eg. with a covering force).

2.14 Infantry BGs will not routinely have a staff officer located on the TF or formation HQ. TF and formation HQ must ensure that units are advised when liaison staff are required to assist in planning or other tasks.

SECTION 2-4. LEVELS AND TYPES OF SUPPORT

2.15 The levels and types of support available to infantry and provided by infantry will be influenced by the nature of the operation or activity. Support refers to those actions that aid, protect, complement or sustain another force.

Levels

2.16 The levels of support provided by or received by infantry units will originate from the following sources:

a. *Unit Level.* The infantry battalion/BG is able to provide first line (organic) support to its own CTs and patrols, which will include CSS, combat support, liaison and advice. This type of unit-level support can also be provided externally to supported units, formations or agencies. In turn, unit-level or first line support from other units is provided to the infantry battalion/BG, initially from those elements forming the BG.

b. *Formation Level.* Formation level (second line) support is most commonly provided to an infantry unit when it forms a BG for specific missions and tasks. It will typically take the form of specific attachments on a degree of operational authority to augment capability. Infantry support provided to the formation will typically be specialised CTs for specific missions and tasks.

c. *Higher Command or National Level.* Infantry support at higher levels is determined by existing ADF procedures and policies. Higher level support will be directed towards Defence aid to the civil community and Defence
Types

2.17 Infantry commanders may be provided operational or administrative support for forces or FEs that are not under their operational or administrative authority. These forces are usually tactically grouped for specific missions. It is important to note that operational authorities are generally assigned to combat forces; types of support arrangements are often more applicable to the provision of assistance from non-organic combat support and CSS assets, such as firepower, lift or sensor units. Support will be provided normally in the form of tactical tasks, under DS, reinforcing, general support reinforcing, general support and non-standard tactical tasks. These are explained as follows:

a. **Direct Support.** The most decentralised standard tactical mission is DS. It is the type of support provided by a unit or formation not under an operational authority of another unit or formation, but required to give priority of effort to the supported FE. An infantry unit or FE in DS to another organisation cannot be tasked to provide the same resources under DS to another supported unit or organisation. While tasked under DS, the infantry unit is not assigned under an operational authority of the supported unit, but remains under the authority of its assigned HQ. Infantry allocated in DS will normally have time and other limitations imposed. The important distinction between operational control and DS is that forces in DS make their own determination as to how their support is provided. For example, an artillery commander in DS to an infantry BG plans the fire of the artillery battery or battalion to support the BG commander’s intent for the mission, and positions the fire of the battery or regiment where it can best support the scheme of manoeuvre.

b. **Reinforcing.** Reinforcing involves one unit augmenting another. When an infantry BG needs additional fire (not
necessarily artillery) to meet the support requirements of a manoeuvre formation, another unit may be assigned the reinforcing mission.

c. **General Support Reinforcing.** The general support reinforcing mission requires a unit to provide its main effort (ME) first, for the force as a whole and then to reinforce another unit as a second priority. A general support reinforcing unit remains under the control of the higher HQ, having the priority of effort. The general support reinforcing task allows the force commander flexibility to respond to varied tactical situations.

d. **General Support.** General support is the most centralised of the standard tactical tasks. A unit with a general support task supports the force as a whole and remains under the control of the higher HQ. An artillery unit provides immediate response to the needs of the DS BG commander; however, it also provides fire support from its guns in general support to the rest of the formation. An engineer plant troop may provide mechanical assistance for field defences in general support to all units of a formation after it has completed other higher priority tasks to specific units.

e. **Non-standard Tactical Tasks.** When the assignment of standard tactical missions will not meet all the requirements of a particular situation, commanders create non-standard tactical tasks by changing, modifying or amplifying one or more of the inherent responsibilities or by explaining contingencies not covered by those responsibilities.

2.18 Within the various types of support, a simple method exists that allows the refinement of the rate of effort. The priority for support can be refined and the priority to other units can be specified to remove ambiguity during a period of high tempo. The priority is normally specified for a period of time or a particular event. In this context, priority of effort is defined as the specific call sign (or unit or formation) that a tactical group will give absolute priority to. Requests for support from this unit
will take precedence over all other requests and provide a guarantee of effort. This priority of effort is allocated to a manoeuvre unit, a formation or a specified person for a length of time or a specific event.

Levels of Advice

2.19 Infantry battalions and deployed FEs are capable of providing a wide level of advice to supported commanders. These levels of advice are situated largely within the unit's habitual support affiliations and may provide situational awareness through reconnaissance and surveillance patrol activity, the vulnerabilities and limitations to effective employment on operations, and the wide variety of tasks and missions that may be undertaken.

Habitual Support Affiliations

2.20 Habitual support affiliations for infantry units will typically include the following units:

a. **Artillery.** Artillery units are habitually allocated in DS to infantry units when deployed. These units provide the necessary OS capabilities to augment organic OS, such as mortars.

b. **Armour.** Armoured sub-units and supporting elements are habitually allocated to infantry battalion groups when a BG is formed. This type of grouping will be for a specified period and will reflect of the type of mission to be conducted.

c. **Engineers.** Engineer units are usually allocated in support of formations, and may allocate sub-units in support of a BG to provide mobility and survivability capabilities not normally available to battalion-sized groups.

d. **Signals.** Signal detachments are normally allocated to an infantry battalion or BG for communication to higher HQ and to provide effective contributions to support C2.
e. **Intelligence.** Intelligence FEs normally support other types of infantry units (such as the RFSU) to augment their ISR capabilities and contribute to supporting ISTAR tasks.

f. **Aviation.** Army aviation will usually support a BG to augment ISR, OS and support manoeuvre capabilities.

g. **Combat Service Support.** CSS assets will typically support formations, units and FEs when the BG is formed and deployed, through the provision of second line support for CSS.

h. **Medical.** Medical detachments will habitually support formations, units and sub-units through the provision of specialised combat health support.

i. **Chaplain’s Department.** The chaplain’s department normally supports all units through the provision of unit padres/chaplains to augment welfare and pastoral care.

### SECTION 2-5. UNITS AND SUB-UNITS

2.21 Infantry battalions may have different roles and tasks; however, all are based on the following common structure:

a. a BHQ and command company,

b. three rifle companies,

c. a support company to provide combat support, and

d. an administration company to provide first line CSS.

**Infantry Battalions**

2.22 Infantry battalions may be classed as light if they have no organic transport, mechanised if they are mounted in APCs or motorised if they are mounted in organic wheeled vehicles. While the battalion structures are similar, there are more personnel in mechanised and motorised battalions due to the requirement for vehicle crews and technical support personnel. Annex A provides a graphical representation of the basic
structures of infantry battalions. The main fighting elements of an infantry battalion are described in paragraph 2.23 to paragraph 2.31.

Rifle Company

2.23 The smallest FE in a rifle company is a fire team. A fire team consists of three soldiers commanded by a lance corporal or corporal. A fire team consists of the following:
   a. a commander,
   b. a light support weapon gunner,
   c. a grenadier, and
   d. a sharpshooter.

2.24 Two fire teams combine to form an infantry section. In a mechanised battalion, each section has an organic APC, which is crewed by an additional two soldiers.

2.25 Three sections form a platoon. A platoon is commanded by a lieutenant, who is assisted by a platoon sergeant, a signaller, and a combat medic. A light infantry platoon is augmented by a fourth manoeuvre support section which contains three four-person teams. Each team is equipped with a commander, a grenadier, a marksman with a specialised rifle, and either a MAG 58 machine gun or an 84 mm medium DFSW. The mechanised infantry platoon does not have this fourth manoeuvre support section.

2.26 Three platoons form a company. Each company is commanded by a major, who is supported by a staff consisting of a 2IC, a CSM, a company QMS and associated administrative personnel. Mechanised companies have a support section in lieu of the manoeuvre support sections of the light company. Support sections are equipped with the Javelin direct fire guided weapon system.

Support Company

2.27 Support company has the following four platoons:
   a. the mortar platoon,
b. the signal platoon,
c. the DFSW platoon, and
d. the reconnaissance and surveillance platoon.

2.28 Mortar Platoon. The mortar platoon consists of the following:
a. an HQ;
b. three mortar sections (each consisting of three 81 mm mortars); and
c. an observer group (consisting of three three-person teams).

2.29 Signal Platoon. The signal platoon provides organic communications within the battalion.

2.30 Direct Fire Support Weapon Platoon. The DFSW platoon has three sections, each consisting of two teams. Each DFSW team is equipped with either a Javelin direct fire guided weapon system or an automatic grenade launcher. The DFSW sections of a light infantry battalion may also be equipped with a 0.50 calibre machine gun.

2.31 Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoon. The reconnaissance and surveillance platoon consists of the following three organisations:
a. a sniper section – consisting of six sniper pairs, each pair equipped with anti-materiel and antipersonnel sniper rifles;
b. a surveillance section – consisting of three or four three-person surveillance detachments, with a range of thermal imagery and other surveillance equipment; and
c. four five-person reconnaissance patrols – used to conduct close target and extended reconnaissance patrols.

Annex:
A. Organisational Structure of Infantry Battalions
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 2

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS

1. This annex provides generic outlines of the infantry battalion organisational structure.
2. The structures currently contained in this annex are not the final endorsed structures under Army Capability Requirement 2012 but may be used in the interim for training purposes.
3. Figure 2–2 depicts an Australian light infantry battalion.
4. Figure 2–3 depicts a mechanised infantry battalion.
5. Figure 2–4 depicts a motorised infantry battalion.
Figure 2–2: Australian Light Infantry Battalion
Figure 2–3: Mechanised Infantry Battalion
Figure 2–4: Motorised Infantry Battalion
CHAPTER 3

INFANTRY PLANNING

SECTION 3-1. INTRODUCTION

3.1 The time to prepare and plan for a mission is often limited. Commanders and staff must follow well-developed planning procedures, enhanced by sound training, clear SOP and well-developed TTP. Extensive use of the staff MAP and the individual MAP will, in turn, be supported by the combat MAP at lower levels.

3.2 This chapter discusses FE options, planning, information actions and threats.

SECTION 3-2. FORCE ELEMENT OPTIONS

3.3 In selecting the most appropriate infantry FEs for specific missions, planners will be mindful of resource constraints and the type of mission or task to be undertaken. The following considerations for the deployment of infantry are based on the employment principles detailed in Chapter 2:

a. mission command,

b. networked communications,

c. combined arms teams,

d. reserves, and

e. organisation and sustainment.

3.4 Mission Command. All infantry units are capable of operating independently for assigned missions or tasks. Infantry sections may also operate in isolated areas on a wide variety of tasks for sustained periods. Mission command allows commanders to action and conduct activities with a clear understanding of the commander’s intent and viable options.
3.5 **Networked Communications.** Infantry units are equipped with multiple secure radio communications, data communications, the battlefield management system and blue force tracker devices as described in Chapter 1. This capability facilitates freedom of action and interoperability.

3.6 **Combined Arms Teams.** The HQ of an infantry platoon, company or battalion is structured to facilitate interoperability and form combined arms teams, from small teams through to BGs. This capability affords planners a wide range of options for the deployment of selected infantry as combined arms teams.

3.7 **Reserves.** Planners need to consider the limitations of infantry units over protracted periods, which will include the need for rotation out of theatre or the AO and therefore the requirement for rotation forces to continue the mission.

3.8 **Organisation and Sustainment.** Depending on the task and the degree of operational authority allocated, deployed infantry will arrive with the appropriate elements, including an HQ, communications, CSS and possibly a liaison element. Sustainment planning for any FE will be based on a level of initial self-sufficiency of first line combat supplies for a defined period based on the OVP.

**Types of Force Elements**

3.9 **Small Team Force Elements.** Section teams or platoon teams consisting of infantry sections, mechanised or mounted in protected mobility vehicles, supported by engineer assets, Army aviation and OS, will increasingly characterise specific tasks and missions.

3.10 **Larger Force Elements.** Larger FEs can comprise a CT formed from the HQ of any infantry company with two to three platoons, supported by an allocation of appropriate combat support from the manoeuvre support company, a tank troop, the joint OS team, Army aviation, engineer assets and CSS (usually the A1 echelon). Such groupings will be commonly encountered for activities overseas, particularly for those missions in support of coalition forces. Other attachments may
include media representatives, aid agencies and civil affairs or civil–military cooperation representatives.

3.11 Whole-of-capability Force Elements. For operations where enhanced fighting power is required, a force can comprise part of or all of the infantry battalion, either acting as an independent force or formed as part of a coalition BG.

SECTION 3-3. PLANNING

Planning Factors

3.12 The MAP, used correctly, will ensure that all necessary planning factors are considered. Some planning factors that affect infantry include:

a. concentration,

b. vulnerability,

c. holding ground,

d. terrain,

e. noise,

f. fatigue,

g. darkness and limited visibility,

h. the OVP,

i. support arrangements,

j. force structures and groupings, and

k. sustainment requirements.

3.13 Concentration. Every opportunity must be taken to concentrate force at critical times. Planning will emphasise dispersion until the critical moment for operational security reasons.

3.14 Vulnerability. Dismounted infantry are vulnerable, and concealed approaches or suppressive fire are required to ensure their survival. Mechanised infantry are vulnerable to
anti-armour weapons and may also require concealed approaches or even dismounting to achieve the mission. Light infantry’s lack of mobility leaves their ability to dominate open terrain limited by their weapon ranges, and they are therefore vulnerable to geographical dislocation.

3.15 **Holding Ground.** Infantry is the force best suited for holding ground due to its ability to dig in.

3.16 **Terrain.** Dismounted infantry are able to move in all types of terrain and vegetation. Steep or very close country and difficult terrain may limit the movement of mechanised infantry.

3.17 **Noise.** Noise can prejudice surprise. Activities requiring a silent approach such as infiltration will often require the use of dismounted infantry. Mechanised infantry might also be used, but a deception plan will be required to conceal their intentions. The resonance effect of a number of vehicles or APCs makes estimating numbers and direction difficult.

3.18 **Fatigue.** Fatigue is a key planning factor for infantry. The ability to conduct 24-hour operations and the tempo that can be sustained must be considered in terms of the fatigue level of troops.

3.19 **Darkness and Limited Visibility.** Night or fog will restrict visibility. Infantry forces are equipped with a variety of devices to overcome this limitation.

3.20 **Operational Viability Period.** While infantry units have a defined OVP for a range of activities, these should be reviewed during planning to ensure that they meet specific mission requirements.

3.21 **Support Arrangements.** Based on the likely mission and tasks, the determination of specific support arrangements is a high priority. Infantry is best employed in a combined arms team and this should be well planned. Support arrangements should also include consideration for CSS commensurate with assigned forces.

3.22 **Force Structures and Groupings.** Force structures and groupings should be considered based on the likely mission.
3.23 **Sustainment Requirements.** The sustainment of infantry is based on organic and assigned CSS. While organic CSS can provide limited CSS for a defined period for a standing grouping, it requires augmentation to support additional assigned FEs.

**SECTION 3-4. INFORMATION ACTIONS**

3.24 Information actions consist of the following:

a. influence,

b. counter-command, and

c. command and information protection.

3.25 **Influence.** Influence has the primary purpose of changing the perception, will, attitude and behaviour of target audiences, both enemy and civilian. Relevant tools include military public affairs, civil–military cooperation and psychological operations. The majority of infantry activities are also influencing actions. In the offensive, infantry will force the enemy to either fight or run. Infantry will frequently establish and man checkpoints to provide protection to those behind the checkpoint and a threat to those seeking to do damage. The role infantry plays in defeating armed aggression plays a major part in the security of protected populations.

3.26 **Counter-command.** Counter-command is aimed at deceiving, disabling or destroying enemy commanders and disrupting, degrading, destroying or denying the information systems and information they rely upon. Activities include physical attack, deception, electronic attack and computer network attack. Infantry reconnaissance patrols seek to gain information, and this may be with or without the knowledge of the target group. Infantry units also fight for information. Infantry is ideally suited to the physical attack role, and the primary contribution of infantry to counter-command actions is to find and destroy
enemy C2 elements. Deception contributes to counter-command actions. Mechanised infantry units have a significant heat, noise, electronic and track signature which assists the enemy to detect them. This means that specific steps must be taken to reduce the signatures and increase the importance of deception measures. Every plan involving the use of mechanised infantry must involve both signature reduction and a deception plan. AFV drivers are taught specific driving techniques to reduce the AFV signature; however, there are other measures that must also be considered, as follows:

a. electronic countermeasures,
b. secondary attacks,
c. dispersions into individual vehicle hides,
d. preparing dummy positions or positioning dummy equipment,
e. hiding critical CSS and HQ elements, and
f. aggressive counter-reconnaissance.

3.27 Command and Information Protection. Command and information protection is aimed at protecting our own commanders and the information systems and information on which they depend. Infantry forces will fight to protect our own command elements.

SECTION 3-5. THREATS

3.28 Threats to the infantry attainment of any mission or task will be identified early in the threat analysis step of the MAP. The threats can include both conventional and non-conventional elements. The early and correct identification of threats will include:

a. their level of command, to identify who is being targeted or fought against or who or what is controlling the adversary forces;
b. their order of battle;
c. their critical vulnerabilities; and

d. their most likely and most dangerous COAs.

3.29 Conventional or linear threats to infantry include:

a. *Air.* Infantry is vulnerable to air attack, necessitating the need for both active and passive air defence (AD).

b. *Special Forces and Counter-reconnaissance Forces.* Enemy special forces and counter-reconnaissance forces will seek to identify friendly force dispositions, strengths and weaknesses. Operational security must be maintained at all levels through patrols, listening posts, OPs and security forces.

c. *Conventional Forces.* Conventional ground forces pose a significant threat to friendly forces. The MAP must identify the nature, strength and capabilities of these, together with their critical vulnerabilities, so that they may be targeted.

d. *Environmental Conditions.* Environmental conditions that may threaten infantry forces include extreme temperatures, high humidity, heavy rainfall and the presence of hostile fauna. Extreme environmental conditions are discussed in Chapter 9.
CHAPTER 4

INFANTRY IN OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES

SECTION 4-1. INTRODUCTION

4.1 The offence is decisive in war. For infantry, bold manoeuvre and the maintenance of tempo are the keys to success. In offensive activities, infantry’s ability to clear ground and engage in close combat makes it an essential component of the combined arms team.

4.2 Infantry seeks out and closes with the enemy, kills or captures the enemy, and seizes ground. These elements of the infantry role are described in the various tactical actions detailed in this chapter. The basic considerations for each action are explained in LWD 3-0-3, Land Tactics (Developing Doctrine), 2009.

4.3 This chapter describes the employment of infantry in offensive actions. It details the concept of offensive manoeuvre, the various offensive actions, including the advance, attack and pursuit, and the tactical techniques that support those actions.

SECTION 4-2. INFANTRY SUPPORT TO OFFENSIVE TACTICAL ACTIONS

4.4 Offensive activities are the decisive action in conflict. While defensive activities may be necessary in the course of a campaign, final success will only be achieved through offensive action. Offensive actions include:

a. the advance,

b. the attack, and

c. the pursuit.

LWD 3-3-7, Employment of Infantry, 2008
SECTION 4-3. ADVANCE

Types of Advance

4.5 There are two types of advance, as follows:
   a. the advance to contact, and
   b. the advance in contact.

4.6 **Advance to Contact.** An advance to contact is conducted when contact with the enemy is lost or has yet to be made. During the advance to contact, emphasis is placed on reconnaissance pull in order to find gaps and vulnerabilities. An advance to contact will end when the infantry BG has reached and secured its objective(s) or when contact is gained.

4.7 **Advance in Contact.** An advance in contact is conducted when contact has been made with the enemy’s forces and the infantry BG seeks to defeat them. A bypass policy will dictate the size of the forces to be destroyed or bypassed. During the advance in contact, emphasis is placed on maintaining contact and detecting vulnerabilities.

Infantry Battlegroup in the Advance

4.8 The infantry BG will normally conduct an advance as part of a parent TF advance. It can also be tasked to advance on one or more axes as an independent BG. These options may contribute to tempo, surprise and deception by disguising the ME from the enemy.

Deployment Groups

4.9 An infantry BG advancing as part of a larger formation will form or contribute to various deployment groups, including:
   a. the screen,
   b. the covering force,
   c. the advance guard,
   d. the main body,
   e. the reserve, and
f. flank guards and rearguards.

4.10 The tasks that a particular force could perform are dependent on the BG type and the structure of the force.

4.11 Security Forces. Security forces comprise advance guards, flank guards, rearguards and screens. The purpose of the security force is to provide security to the main body by protecting against enemy ground observation, direct fire and attack. The mobility of infantry used in the security forces will need to be equal to or better than that of the main body and the enemy. Security forces are discussed in paragraph 4.12 to paragraph 4.16.

4.12 Advance Guard. The advance guard consists of the vanguard and the main guard, and is formed on each axis to protect the movement of the main body and clear the axis. Infantry in the advance guard provide the firepower to destroy minor opposition and the ability to bypass or outmanoeuvre enemy forces. An advance guard for a TF advance might consist of one CT (including the joint OS team), with the reconnaissance and surveillance platoon and tank troop as the vanguard and a second infantry CT allocated to a similarly configured main guard. This will enable the main guard to rapidly become the vanguard if the old vanguard becomes decisively committed. An advance guard for a BG advance might consist of a single CT. Motorised or mechanised infantry can be used in the advance guard to generate momentum if the terrain and vegetation permit.

4.13 Main Body. The main body contains the bulk of the combat strength of the formation or the BG and moves immediately behind the main guard. The infantry BG, minus those forces already deployed as security forces, will contain the remainder of the force. Opportunity targets, particularly high-value targets, will be engaged by either direct assault or attack by fire (ABF). Attacks will be supported by tanks, Army aviation and the DFSW in the support by fire (SBF) role. The remainder of the BG would travel in the main body. This group would consist of a CT; BG HQ (tactical); a joint OS coordination centre, commonly referred to as JOSCC, a mortar platoon and the
supporting artillery battery. This would be followed by the third CT, BG HQ (main), and supporting platoons of the support company.

4.14 **Flank Security.** A screen or guard can be employed on the flanks to gain information on the enemy, destroy enemy reconnaissance and prevent surprise attacks. The infantry BG is likely to deploy elements of platoon strength to each of the flanks, with the task to engage targets by direct assault, supported where necessary by tanks employed in the ABF or SBF role.

4.15 **Rear Security.** Rear security protects the rear of the advancing BG and is likely to consist of a combined arms team of platoon strength deployed from the rear CT. The rearguard can also be tasked to protect CSS elements following the main body.

4.16 **Reserve.** The commander’s reserve will probably travel with the main body. The reserve will normally consist of armour and mechanised infantry. It is tasked with rapid deployment for any major tasks envisaged by the commander or for unexpected threats.

**Command and Control**

4.17 **Mission Command.** During the advance, mission command must be utilised to allow the exercise of initiative by commanders at all levels. All commanders must be capable of influencing the battle quickly to ensure that high tempo and continuous pressure are maintained on the enemy. Networked communications and the forward location of the BG commander and supporting commanders must facilitate mission command.

4.18 **Communications.** A comprehensive communications plan is essential to ensure that all elements can communicate throughout the advance. The use of retransmission facilities on aircraft or satellites may be required. Early planning is critical to provide continuous communications.
4.19 **Control.** Control measures that will assist in the conduct of the BG advance will include, but not be limited to, the following:

a. a comprehensive bypass policy;
b. route and road management;
c. bounds and phase lines;
d. coordination points;
e. feature numbers and checkpoints;
f. boundaries;
g. routes;
h. report lines;
i. centre line(s) and axis/axes of advance;
j. traffic control points;
k. fire support coordination measures;
l. air space control measures;
m. CSS control measures; and
n. event numbers.

SECTION 4-4. ATTACK

4.20 The attack is the essential focus of all offensive effort for the infantry BG. Destroying the enemy in close combat is central to the infantry’s role. The two types of attack are as follows:

a. quick, and
b. deliberate.

4.21 **Quick Attack.** The quick attack takes advantage of the enemy being relatively unprepared, capitalises on tactical advantage or exploits opportunities against lightly prepared positions. It can be launched from the line of march at CT level and seeks the immediate unbalancing of the enemy force. There will be limited time for reconnaissance and rehearsals. The element of
surprise is critical. A very high tempo, surprise, shock action and maximum violence will act as force multipliers. Both BGs and CTs frequently use the quick attack during the advance and pursuit.

4.22 **Deliberate Attack.** The deliberate attack will be required when the enemy has highly organised defences or if the momentum is lost during the conduct of a quick attack. BG deliberate attacks are characterised by extensive reconnaissance, planning and coordination of fires. The emphasis will be on preparation rather than speed. The BG deliberate attack can also require accompanying or subsequent actions such as feints, holding attacks or the placement of cut-offs.

4.23 **Groupings, Stages and Phases.** The following groupings, stages and phases may be used in an attack:

a. **Grouping.** Most attacks at BG level will employ:

   (1) **Flank Security.** The flank security group can comprise armour solely, or a specifically constituted combined arms team.

   (2) **Cut-off.** The cut-off group may comprise a separate force, such as a small combined arms team with tanks, or be allocated to an existing force such as the flank protection group if resources do not permit the creation of a separate cut-off group. The cut-off group is responsible for the destruction of withdrawing enemy forces and for effecting physical dislocation if the mission is to destroy.

   (3) **Fire Support.** The direct fire support group comprises elements from the manoeuvre support company and may include armour. It is responsible for providing suppression and harassment, thereby allowing freedom of manoeuvre for the assault onto the objective. Careful siting and the use of fire support may aid deception, which contributes to the generation of shock and surprise.
(4) **Assault Breaching Group.** The assault breaching group will comprise combat engineer specialist equipment, supported by OS and protected by infantry, to conduct an opposed or unopposed crossing \(^1\) and/or breaching to enable passage of the assault group.

(5) **Assault Group.** The assault group, which comprises CT supported by armour, is responsible for the destruction of the enemy. A CT will move directly behind BG HQ in the assault to provide depth.

(6) **Exploitation Group.** An exploitation group may be formed, and can comprise the depth CT at BG level or a specifically identified force at TF level. Whether this group is formed or not, the assault group retains the responsibility for exploitation after they have secured their assigned objectives.

(7) **Reserve.** The commander’s reserve is constituted at both BG and TF level. At BG level the reserve group will most likely be a platoon supported by a tank troop and anti-armour assets from the manoeuvre support company. At TF level a CT or other combined arms team will be formed from one of the BGs assigned this task.

b. **Stages.** The following are the four stages in any attack:

(1) Stage 1 – preparatory;
(2) Stage 2 – assault;
(3) Stage 3 – exploitation; and
(4) Stage 4 – reorganisation.

c. **Phasing.** The BG commander may phase an attack when the mission cannot be completed in one continuous action, when regrouping or the reallocation of

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\(^1\) ‘Crossing’ is the term applied to the negotiation of a natural obstacle, while ‘breaching’ is applied to artificial obstacles.
resources is necessary, or when fresh forces need to pass through another force. As a general rule, phasing will not be used below BG level.

Command and Control

4.24 Mission Command. All commanders in the BG must be capable of influencing the battle should the need arise, ensuring that the momentum and high tempo of the attack are retained. Networked communications and the forward location of the BG commander and CT commanders must facilitate mission command principles. Commanders of forces as yet uncommitted to battle should maintain a high degree of situational knowledge.

4.25 Communications. Communications will be challenging if the attack is conducted in a hostile electronic warfare environment. Sudden increases in radio traffic should be avoided when planning or coordinating an attack.

4.26 Control. Control will be facilitated by the BG networked communications and well-rehearsed and practised SOP and TTP. Control measures may include some or all of the following:

a. assembly areas;
b. line of departure and forming-up points;
c. boundaries;
d. fire lines;
e. phase lines;
f. engagement areas (EAs);
g. objectives;
h. limits of exploitation;
i. routes and rendezvous points;
j. checkpoints;
k. pre-planned reorganisation locations; and
Combat Service Support

4.27 Planning. The attack will test the robustness of BG CSS. Sustainment planning and the detailed supporting CSS plans will be developed during the MAP. Considerations include:

- ammunition requirements,
- the use of special weapons,
- vehicle and equipment servicing schedules,
- combat health support and anticipated battle casualties,
- transport requirements,
- stock holdings, and
- dumping plans.

4.28 Control. BG CSS assets may be placed under TF control for administrative efficiency, less those A1 echelon elements required for the immediate sustainment of the assault forces. The BG commander will need to consider these requirements and arrangements carefully to ensure that the organic CSS assets remain under technical control and are appropriately located for immediate sustainment of the force. The BG should have SOP to accommodate sustainment arrangements during the battle.

4.29 Vulnerabilities. The location of echelons is particularly important to balance the need for operational security and the need for immediate sustainment of the force. In deliberate attacks, second line CSS assets such as a CSS team may be deployed well forward to augment the BG CSS for the attack. In such cases, planning at TF level will need to consider the increased protection requirements.

SECTION 4-5. PURSUIT

4.30 Tactical grouping for the pursuit is very similar to the advance to contact, but differs in the assessment of the enemy situation.
and the enemy’s posture. The pursuit follows the defeat of an enemy whose degree of cohesive resistance has been considerably reduced. The BG commander in a pursuit will need to take considerable risks in order to maintain momentum. It will be important to maintain pressure on the withdrawing enemy forces, forcing them off balance and not allowing any opportunities for them to regain the initiative.

Conduct

4.31 The BG will conduct a pursuit on as many routes as practicable, to create simultaneity and exert concerted pressure on the enemy. The CO may decentralise control of OS, mobility, survivability and CSS assets and allocate them to each CT. CTs will require mobility and firepower greater than those of the enemy. Armoured and mechanised infantry forces will generally be preferred wherever the vegetation and terrain permit. The BG will also require significant combat support. Close coordination of assets such as Army aviation, offensive air support and additional OS is essential to minimise the risks of fratricide. The vulnerabilities inherent for CSS sustainment during the pursuit remain the same as for other offensive activities.

Command and Control

4.32 Mission Command. As for other offensive activities, the employment of mission command remains a central tenet for the conduct of the pursuit. There will be little time available for detailed orders on the move, and the BG, CT and small combined arms team commanders will be required to exercise initiative at short notice, rapidly transitioning from advance to contact to advance in contact, quick attacks, opportunity ambushing, key point security and vital asset protection. The BG commander will need to provide clear orders and delegate operational authority to dispersed elements.

4.33 Control. Control of the pursuit is likely to be decentralised, allowing subordinates to exercise their initiative in the pursuit and capitalise on fleeting opportunities. The networked communications of the BG will facilitate mission command,
together with the use of appropriate control measures. These measures will be similar to those used in the advance.

SECTION 4-6. TACTICAL TECHNIQUES

4.34 The offensive tactical techniques used by infantry include:
   a. airborne,
   b. ambush,
   c. amphibious,
   d. ABF,
   e. cordon,
   f. corridor thrust,
   g. coup de main,
   h. diversionary attack,
   i. raid,
   j. reconnaissance in force,
   k. search,
   l. SBF, and
   m. sweep.

Airborne

4.35 The following are common types of airborne tactical techniques:
   a. paratroop,
   b. airmobile,
   c. airland,
   d. airdrop, and
   e. special operations.
4.36 These techniques may be used to lodge a force, manoeuvre within the battlespace to gain advantage, assault an objective, or administratively move troops and materiel. Airborne insertions are usually a precursor to follow-on land forces.

4.37 Airborne techniques may involve a range of fixed-wing and rotary wing aircraft, some of which may land to deplane troops. The planning process and many of the considerations for the different types or airborne techniques are similar, except that an assault is expected to be strongly contested by the enemy whereas the other techniques are not.

4.38 **Airmobile.** Airmobile techniques include airmobile assault and airmobile movement in which combat forces and equipment manoeuvre about the battlespace in helicopters, under the control of a ground force commander, to engage in ground combat. Light infantry are frequently used for airmobile missions.

4.39 **Airmobile Assault.** Airmobile assault is a technique in which a combined arms force, using the firepower and integration of helicopter assets, manoeuvres within the battlespace under the command of a manoeuvre commander to engage and destroy threat forces or to seize and hold key terrain. Underpinning this definition is the inherent requirement for rotary wing assets to be combined with an assault ground force with appropriate OS assets as a combined arms team. Airmobile assaults can be launched from a ground base or an amphibious platform. Normally only infantry and special forces will undertake airmobile assault in conjunction with Army aviation.

**Ambush**

4.40 An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position by a force lying in wait. It is usually a brief encounter and does not require the seizure or holding of terrain. It is a technique combining surprise and shock action to the fullest extent in order to destroy an enemy, including their OS and mobility assets, and obtaining intelligence through the capture of enemy prisoners, information and material. Ambushing can be undertaken from section level through to BG level. It is
particularly useful in causing severe physical and psychological shock to an enemy force and, if used frequently enough, will cause moral dislocation of the enemy forces, restricting their movement and operations. Ambushing requires sound training, well-rehearsed TTPs, strong battle discipline and the application of mission command principles to the lowest levels.

4.41 Ambush patrols are usually deliberately planned (as a deliberate ambush) or may be hastily organised (as an immediate ambush) for opportunity targets. Further information is contained in LWP-CA (MTD CBT) 3-3-1, Mounted Minor Tactics (Developing Doctrine), 2006. Infantry are well suited to the ambush because of their low signature, ability to infiltrate into and out of areas and ability to concentrate firepower into the killing area.

Amphibious

4.42 The following are common types of amphibious tactical techniques:

   a. amphibious assault,
   b. amphibious raid,
   c. amphibious demonstration, and
   d. amphibious withdrawal.

4.43 The amphibious assault, as a part of amphibious actions, is a military mission launched from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked on ships or craft (comprising the amphibious TF) with the principal task of tactically landing forces ashore, into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile, in order to accomplish the assigned mission. It is important to note that the purpose of an amphibious action is not to secure a beachhead; rather it is for tactical objectives, which may include seizing and securing a point of entry for follow-on forces, and it may also be for the defeat of the threat itself. Amphibious insertions are not limited to periods of conflict and may be employed across the spectrum of conflict.
The landing/assault force invariably consists of ground, aviation and combat support together with their organic CSS components in the amphibious TF. They are task-organised to conduct the assault and may be functionally organised for specific tasks. The infantry contribution to amphibious assault includes:

a. *Guides.* Infantry may provide guides for beach landing zones.

b. *Assault Force.* Infantry and mechanised infantry can expect to be utilised in the assault force. The availability of landing craft and the suitability of the beach for disembarkation will be key determinants.

**4.45 Planning Process.** The amphibious TF planning process employs the reverse planning technique, which is essential for the establishment of a framework for the commencement of planning. Infantry commanders will contribute to planning.

**Attack by Fire**

**4.46** A combined arms team may be required to neutralise or destroy a threat force from a suitable distance. A commander has the opportunity to destroy it through the employment of the ABF technique. The purpose of the ABF is to employ direct fires to destroy a threat from a distance, normally used when the mission does not dictate or support the occupation of the objective. It can have the aim of destruction, suppression, fixing or deceiving a threat.

**4.47** ABF is normally a DFSW task, as it requires longer range weapons. Infantry may be supported by armour, Army aviation and mortars. The CT or BG commander will need to provide flank and rear security to those elements providing the direct fire.

**Cordon**

**4.48** During any action, a threat within any environment may need to be contained to allow the main body to bypass enemy positions or to undertake a containment or search of a specific area. When such an offensive action is required, the defender should
be isolated from outside help and dominated. The cordon provides one technique to achieve this effective physical and moral dislocation or disruption of the threat. The force conducting the cordon may be mechanised or light, depending on the threat and the speed and security required.

4.49 The cordon force is a combined arms grouping with the following:

a. **Headquarters.** The HQ is tasked to initially establish an ‘anchor’ fire support coordination centre (known as an FSCC or, more appropriately, a JOSCC), traffic control posts (TCPs) and a civil affairs and/or refugee cell. It requires protection and situational awareness and is invariably interagency.

b. **Liaison Officers.** LOs with appropriate communications must be exchanged at appropriate levels of command.

c. **Inner Cordon.** An inner cordon contains targeted suspects and stops all outward movement. The inner cordon composition is determined by the nature of the threat, but it will usually comprise dismounted infantry.

d. **Outer Cordon.** An outer cordon prevents inward movement and normally consists of movement control measures such as the deployment of vehicle checkpoints (VCPs), patrols, checkpoints and OPs. It should be noted that, despite what the name implies, the outer cordon does not have to be a continuous ring of troops; the nature of the terrain and threat determine its layout.

e. **Specifically Tasked Parties.** These parties will include search parties, detention parties, screening teams and escort teams.

f. **Traffic Control Posts.** TCPs should be joint teams with local police/law enforcement bodies.

g. **Lodgment Groups.** These groups are combined arms teams established to provide direct fire to dominate ground.
h. **Reserve(s).** The reserve(s) ideally are airmobile and have ground mobility for each flank.

i. **Flank Security.** Flank security is formed on an ‘as required’ basis.

### 4.50 Tasks

The following tasks are likely for the cordon force:

a. screening the bypass of another force,

b. denying or disrupting by fire and patrolling specific areas or routes outside or inside the objective area,

c. defending or ambushing routes in and out of a designated sector, and

d. providing SBF to actions and tasks within designated sectors.

### Corridor Thrust

**4.51** A corridor thrust is an advance on a narrow frontage. This may be because there are buildings, mountains or other key terrain to either side of the axis that must be captured and defended to provide security to the axis. So the force advances along a corridor, clearing in detail, securing and defending the axis to provide a cleared corridor. Concurrently, security forces manoeuvre on the flanks to disrupt the enemy’s scheme of manoeuvre and exploit opportunities. The use of this technique accepts high risk to the security of the lines of communication. It can be considered as a repetitive sequence of an obstacle crossing drill, close assault and hasty defence.

**4.52 Groupings.** A wider offensive action employs a covering force to shape and know the battlespace. Two main forces, the thrust force and the security and support force, conduct any corridor thrust, as follows:

a. **Thrust Force.** The thrust force consists of:

   (1) the enabling force,

   (2) the overwatch force, and

   (3) the assault force.
b. Security and Support Force. This force is tasked to secure cleared ground and ensure CSS for the thrust force. It may also be tasked to secure the initial lodgment and comprises:

(1) corridor security groups,
(2) the obstacle and screen group,
(3) a corridor reserve, and
(4) a logistic support group.

Coup de Main

4.53 A coup de main is designed to seize an objective of such significance that its loss to the enemy may well win the current battle. It relies on speed, shock and surprise for its overall impact. As with raids, coups de main entail significant risk and require well-prepared and well-trained forces, as those forces habitually may be committed to an isolated location (such as a bridge or road crossing in depth) and risk destruction if not quickly reinforced.

4.54 Coup de main techniques usually employ light forces, although an amphibious tactical lodgment against an objective in the littoral allows the employment of heavier forces. The force must be constituted to respond to the threat. This force will often use airmobile insertion escorted by armed reconnaissance helicopters (ARHs). ARHs can remain to provide intimate fire support. The inserted force may include GBAD and anti-armour assets. Infantry in the combined arms team have the additional role of linking with the coup de main force, regardless of how that force may be constituted. Tempo must be maintained to ensure that the force engaged in the coup de main is not decisively committed to a long defensive battle.

Diversionary Attack

4.55 A diversionary attack involves a show of force whereby a force attacks or threatens to attack a target or objective other than the main target or objective, for the purpose of drawing threat...
defences away from the main target. The diversion may take the form of a feint or a demonstration.

4.56 A demonstration is an attack or show of force without contacting the threat and usually forms a part of an overall deception plan. A demonstration is planned at the highest level, in concert with other battlespace deception measures, to mislead threats into believing that a force is larger than it actually is and/or to mislead the threat into reassigning forces elsewhere to deal with a suspected friendly force ME. A feint is an offensive technique involving actual contact with the threat. Demonstrations are designed to simulate the main attack.

4.57 All forms of infantry can conduct diversionary attacks, as either mounted or dismounted actions. The force must be large enough to simulate the ME but not so large as to weaken the real ME. The use of armour or mechanised forces in the diversion can add to the realism and give the impression of a much larger force.

Raid

4.58 A raid is an attack, usually small in scale, involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, equipment or people, to shape the battlespace, and/or to destroy an objective without any intention of holding ground. A raid ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of assigned tasks.

4.59 Special operations personnel are specifically trained, organised and equipped to conduct raids at short notice over long distances. Infantry commanders may task elements of the battalion or BG with the conduct of a raid, if a fleeting opportunity is presented and the raid can be conducted over short distances and in favourable conditions. Under these circumstances, the tactics and techniques for the attack will be employed with an emphasis on the following:

a. Preparation. The use of infantry forces for the conduct of a raid requires detailed preparation and rehearsals. The synchronisation of combat and combat support elements is critical.
b. **Tempo.** A raid by light forces must maintain a high tempo to generate shock and prevent the enemy from reacting effectively. The maximum use of fighting power must be applied at the decisive point and time, requiring the close synchronisation of all elements.

c. **Insertion.** The insertion of infantry forces for the conduct of a raid may be by airmobile or airborne means. If a fleeting opportunity requiring the conduct of a raid is presented, the CO may choose to insert the raiding force by vehicle.

d. **Extraction.** Extraction of the raiding force must occur as soon as the execution phase is complete and before the enemy can react.

**Reconnaissance in Force**

4.60 Reconnaissance in force is linked to the advance and the raid, in that it is a tactical technique designed to discover and/or test the strength of the threat, or to obtain other information. BG-sized combined arms teams or larger usually conduct a reconnaissance in force with the clear intent to gain information and to fight for it when required. A combined arms team of sufficient fighting power can conduct this technique in complex terrain where the threat is likely to ambush smaller reconnaissance forces, such as patrols. A reconnaissance in force is an aggressive reconnaissance, conducted as an offensive tactical action or task, with clearly stated reconnaissance objectives.

4.61 The less that is known about the threat, the stronger the force conducting the reconnaissance in force must be. Because of the lack of threat information, a commander normally conducts a reconnaissance in force as an advance to contact, or as a series of attacks across a broad frontage. Armoured and mechanised combined arms teams together with ARHs are ideal for this purpose.
Search

4.62 The purpose of a search is to systematically scan and search areas, persons or objects of interest to locate, identify and, where necessary, retain information or any objects of interest. Search techniques can vary considerably depending on the type and aim of the search required. Such techniques are therefore broad in scope, but they are generally based on two levels. The first level, an area search, involves searching and scanning a specified area of any type of terrain by dismounted and mounted patrols and by airmobile forces, as a part of reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. The second and lowest level of search is undertaken by patrols. Light infantry are best suited for patrol searches, and the size of the force will be tailored to suit the task and the threat. Possible tasks for a patrol search include:

a. personnel searches (such as detainees, prisoners of war and other persons of interest);
b. vehicle searches, particularly at VCPs and roadblocks;
c. route and vulnerable point check and search; and
d. searches of specific installations and key points (which may also include aspects of those already described, including the search and sweeps for weapons).

Support by Fire

4.63 The purpose of SBF is to increase the supported force’s freedom of manoeuvre by placing direct fires on an objective that is to be assaulted or breached by a friendly force. SBF may be used to fix or suppress. SBF positions are located within the maximum friendly direct fire range of the threat position. The commander selects them so that the moving assault force does not mask their supporting fire. For this reason, SBF positions are normally located on the flank of the assault force, elevated above the objective if possible.

4.64 SBF is generally provided by CTs and below. The SBF force may have to fight through some opposition to gain the most advantageous position to support the ME. Forces best suited to
an SBF include armour, mechanised infantry, aviation and DFSW elements.

**Sweep**

4.65 Following a successful attack, large areas may need to be cleared. This will necessitate a sweep. The purpose of a sweep is to advance on a broad front, systematically clearing any residual threats, usually inferior in strength and capability and likely to be demoralised. A sweep can be used in all terrain to clear specific small areas or larger areas. A sweep is a coordinated action that requires extensive pre-reconnaissance and well-sited OPs to detect enemy forces and to trigger viable reaction groups. The forces used in a sweep can be mechanised or light depending on the terrain, the threat and the requirements for speed.
CHAPTER 5
INFANTRY IN DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES

SECTION 5-1. INTRODUCTION

5.1 Defensive activities are designed to prevent, resist or destroy enemy attacks. They include:
   a. defensive battles,
   b. blocking actions, and
   c. counterattacks.

5.2 Defensive activities are seldom decisive. Every opportunity must be taken to use offensive manoeuvres. The primary role for infantry is defending a locality or holding ground. However, any and all of the types of actions described in this chapter can and should be conducted during the defensive.

5.3 The basic considerations for each type of defensive action are explained in detail in LWD 3-0-3, Land Tactics (Developing Doctrine), 2009 and further detailed in LWP-G 3-3-14, Battlegroup Handbook, 2009.

5.4 This chapter describes the employment of infantry in defensive activities, including area defence, mobile defence and delay.

SECTION 5-2. SUPPORT TO DEFENSIVE TACTICAL ACTIONS

5.5 Defensive activities are military activities undertaken when the initiative lies with the enemy, and are essentially defensive in nature. Defensive activities range from those designed to retain terrain with the intention of engaging in battle under favourable circumstances, to those that provide a safe environment for
civilian populations receiving HA. Land force defensive activities consist of two types of tactical actions, as follows:

a. **Defence.** Defensive activities include the tactical tasks of:
   (1) area defence, and
   (2) mobile defence.

b. **Retrograde.** Retrograde actions include the tactical tasks of:
   (1) delay, and
   (2) withdrawal.

**SECTION 5-3. AREA DEFENCE**

5.6 Area defence involves the planned occupation of ground of the commander’s choosing. There are generally two specific aims. The first is to draw or channel the enemy into selected EAs in order to destroy them by firepower and the second is to resume the offensive as soon as possible. Infantry will be deployed in area defence as part of a larger formation with the main tasks of holding ground and defending within boundaries. Other tasks will include active patrolling and the provision of forces for a contribution to the higher commander’s security, counterattack and counterpenetration forces.

5.7 The area defence is fought in the following two stages:

a. the covering force battle, and

b. the main defensive battle.

**Covering Force Battle**

5.8 The covering force battle begins when the covering force first makes contact with the advancing enemy and ends when the defensive aim is achieved. The transition from one stage of the battle to another will not always be distinct, and it will often occur at different times throughout the battlespace.
5.9 The covering force will usually fight their battle using delaying tactics, and it remains the higher commander’s key opportunity to shape the battlespace for the main defensive battle. The covering force battle may include the following features and actions:

a. The covering force should deploy as far forward of the main defensive zone as possible, in sufficient time to prepare its own positions and become familiar with its AO before contact is made with the enemy.

b. The covering force will normally deploy a screen over the width of its front (within designated boundaries), while the bulk of the force is deployed on suitable ground to cause enemy casualties, impose delay or enable effective reaction to unexpected or anticipated enemy moves.

c. The covering force screen must endeavour to remain in continuous contact with the enemy and pass accurate, detailed information to the covering force commander.

d. The remainder of the force will normally occupy a series of delaying positions which will cause the enemy to concentrate. Delaying positions must provide good withdrawal routes in order to assist the defending force to break contact.

e. The delaying positions aim to gain time for main defensive zone preparation by compelling the enemy to halt and deploy sufficient forces to attack or outflank them.

f. Once the force on any delaying position is in danger of being outflanked, it may then withdraw, using delay on alternate or successive positions until it returns rearwards into the main defensive zone.

g. The covering force commander should retain a reserve that is prepared to conduct a counterattack to extricate trapped delay elements or to strike the enemy when a vulnerability is exposed.
h. When the covering force’s tasks are completed, it may ideally, on order or once the commander’s intent is fulfilled, withdraw to prepared positions in the main defensive zone.

Main Defensive Battle

5.10 The key to success of the main defensive battle is the destruction of the enemy inside the EA. The conduct of the main defensive battle can be characterised by the following actions:

a. Screen and guard forces continue to provide essential security and early warning of the enemy’s direction and strengths once the covering force has withdrawn into the main defensive zone.

b. Probing attacks can be defeated locally, and infantry commanders at all levels will need to exercise fire discipline to avoid providing the enemy with the information sought by these attacks.

c. Infantry defending forces will need to be able to distinguish between a probing attack, feints and the main assault.

d. During the conduct of the battle the commander, whether at higher HQ or BG level, will need to be active:
   
   (1) directing concentrated OS to the most threatened areas in the main position to break up the enemy assault;
   
   (2) ensuring that every endeavour is made to separate enemy infantry and armour by the use of obstacles, direct and indirect OS and of obscurants;
   
   (3) seeking opportunities to conduct spoiling attacks against enemy forces through the use of the combined arms team’s ABF;
   
   (4) seeking the critical moments to direct counterattack and counterpenetration forces to
preserve the integrity of the defended locality or area; and

(5) seeking the critical moment when, or if, to deploy the reserve.

Coordination Measures

5.11 Coordination measures for the area defence will include initial ‘on-call’ control measures. These provide the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation and allow the infantry commander to concentrate firepower rapidly at a decisive time and place. In an area defence, the layout must accommodate defended positions, alternate positions, and routes for counterattack and counterpenetration forces. Each main element of the defending force is allocated a defined area. Coordination measures can include, but are not limited to:

a. report lines and handover lines;

b. EAs, which will include the infantry commander’s responsibility to engage targets in the TF EA;

c. boundaries, both within the infantry BG’s responsibility and those directed by higher command;

d. the designation of the forward edge of the battle area;

e. coordinating points along the boundary for fire support coordination liaison;

f. checkpoints;

g. the designation of the forward line of own troops;

h. minimum safety distances;

i. airspace control measures;

j. assembly areas;

k. obstacle restricted areas;

l. target reference points;

m. trigger lines, to guide the commander on the decision to commit certain forces;
n. controlled routes and reserved demolitions;
o. disengagement lines; and
p. fire support coordination measures.

SECTION 5-4. MOBILE DEFENCE

5.12 Mobile defence is based on battlespace mobility to achieve the mission. Mobile defence is essentially an armoured battle fought at formation level with mechanised infantry, anti-armour and Army aviation. It is a tactic particularly suited to the manoeuvrist approach, operating over wide areas that allow mobile forces to concentrate fighting power quickly. Its purpose is to exploit the mobility of friendly forces to dislocate, disrupt or destroy an enemy. Mobile defence defeats an attacking enemy force by permitting it to advance to a position that exposes it to a counterattack and/or envelopment by a mobile striking force. While many BG-level defenders will be conducting area defence, they would still be most likely to participate in, and contribute to, mobile defensive manoeuvre.

5.13 Manoeuvre Options. For the infantry commander participating in mobile defence, there will be three broad manoeuvre options which infantry can contribute to and conduct, as follows:

a. delay – where lead elements can be engaged at maximum range from a series of alternate or successive positions;

b. withdrawal – where intelligence estimates reveal that the enemy is likely to quickly follow up withdrawing forces, allowing opportunities to shape the enemy into a position where a decisive engagement can occur;

c. area defence – where defending in a specified sector can be used to shape the battlespace and fix the enemy for destruction by the attack force; and/or

d. a combination of all of the previously mentioned options.
Groupings and Actions

5.14 Infantry groupings for the mobile defensive battle will depend upon the tactical situation and adequate resources being available. The following are the normal groupings:

a. the covering force,
b. the blocking force,
c. the attack force, and
d. the reserve.

5.15 The stages of the mobile defence are reflected as follows:

a. Covering Force. The primary task of the covering force, which can include infantry mechanised or mounted forces, is to shape the battlespace for the higher commander. This force will lead or channel the enemy into the EA and undertake to detect and report the approach of the enemy, delay and disrupt the enemy advance, prevent the enemy from accurately locating the other elements of the force, hold the shoulders and flanks of the blocking position, and assist the movement of the attack force.

b. Blocking Force. The primary task of the blocking force is to fix the enemy’s advance until the attack force strikes. This force can be positioned in a designated area using obstacles and indirect fire. The force will comprise the minimum amount of fighting power required to achieve its task, without having the same mobility as the attack force.

c. Attack Force. The attack force is the decisive element, comprising the bulk of manoeuvre forces (eg. a mechanised infantry BG or a tank-heavy BG), supported by Army aviation. Mobility is the major characteristic of this force, supported by OS assets. The principal task of this force is the destruction of the enemy in a designated EA, and it will usually be committed when the blocking force has fixed the enemy.
d. Reserve. The higher commander will establish a discrete reserve for each stage of the defence, most likely to be based on a mechanised and armoured combined arms team with Army aviation support. It can be used for such tasks as undertaking counterpenetration, countering or destroying the enemy’s reserve, reinforcing the attack force, exploiting an opportunity or identified enemy critical vulnerabilities, and reacting to the unexpected or unforeseen.

Mobile Defence Stages

5.16 A mobile defence will involve the following major events:
   a. the covering force battle,
   b. the blocking and holding battle, and
   c. the attack.

5.17 Covering Force Battle. The aim of the covering force battle is to gain and maintain contact with the enemy and shape the enemy into arriving at an EA at a certain time.

5.18 Blocking and Holding Battle. In the blocking and holding battle, fought from prepared positions and dominating an EA, a combination of fire and manoeuvre is used, in conjunction with the temporary retention of terrains to inflict maximum casualties and shape the enemy for destruction by the attacking force.

5.19 Attack. The attack is launched when the enemy penetration has been sufficiently dislocated and disrupted, to destroy the remaining enemy in the designated EA.

Coordination Measures

5.20 For mobile defence, coordination and control measures are designed to enhance the rapid movement of forces and the execution of their tasks. The control measure for each of the deployment groups will include EAs, break-clean lines, attack objectives, hides and assembly areas, phase lines, boundaries, and manoeuvre areas and routes. The attacking force control measures will be the same as those used in offensive activities.
5.21 Infantry forces operating as a main part of a formation can expect to be tasked with imposing delay on the enemy in a specified area for a specified time. The intent of a delay is to trade space for time, while preserving the delaying force by slowing down the enemy’s advance and inflicting maximum damage without becoming decisively engaged.

5.22 The key objectives of a delay for infantry can include slowing down the enemy’s advance, manoeuvring the enemy into areas where it is vulnerable to attack or counterattack, avoiding combat under unfavourable conditions, or determining the enemy’s ME.

5.23 A delay can be conducted in any of the following circumstances:
   a. as a covering force for defending or withdrawing main bodies,
   b. by the advance guard or covering force when encountering larger forces,
   c. as an economy of force task to hold an enemy offensive on less critical avenues of approach,
   d. as a deception measure to establish a counterattack, and
   e. as part of mobile defence.

Manoeuvre Options

5.24 There are two techniques that provide the infantry commander with manoeuvre options in delay, both of which rely on suitable terrain. They are a delay conducted on alternate positions and a delay conducted on successive positions. Either may be used across the entire width and depth of the assigned delay sector, or they may be used in combination.
Groupings and Actions

5.25 Because of the mobility required in delay, a delaying force will normally be organised into the following:

a. security forces (such as guards, screens, patrols and OPs);

b. the main body; and

c. a reserve.

5.26 The various groupings at both TF and infantry BG level will be determined by the enemy’s strength, the size of the AO, the terrain and the period of delay specified. However, infantry can contribute to all of them. The various groupings are described as follows:

a. Security Forces. The security forces will vary in composition but mobility will be a key feature. The role of the security forces is to reduce the initiative of the enemy by gaining early warning of enemy intentions, denying information, disrupting preparations and delaying the enemy forces’ advance by forcing them to deploy early.

b. Main Body. The main body, which is the bulk of the combat forces, will undertake a delaying battle on successive positions. The delay can best be achieved from one or more battle positions astride the enemy’s most likely approach. Delay positions within the main defensive zone can provide the pivot for mobile actions, including counterattacks. Between these positions, the enemy can be engaged by longer range weapon systems if the terrain permits. When elements of the delay force in the main body are threatened with being overrun or seriously outflanked, they will move back on alternate or successive positions. The key to successful delay rests in imposing significant casualties on the enemy while avoiding decisive engagement.

c. Reserve. Reserves will be designated at all levels. Infantry commanders may be required to contribute part
of their force to the higher commander’s reserve. Key tasks can include, but are not limited to:

(1) counterpenetration,

(2) counterattack, and

(3) covering actions to cover the withdrawal of forces seeking disengagement.

Coordination Measures

5.27 Coordination measures are similar to those used for area defence, with the exception that operating on a wide front poses significant difficulties for an active command presence near all positions. The infantry commander will be provided with basic control and coordination measures by the higher commander, such as boundaries and higher level phase lines, but will also use specifically designated delay sectors for each unit/sub-unit. These will be supplemented by prescribed rearward movement events and designated report lines, delay and disengagement lines, and designated battle positions.

SECTION 5-6. WITHDRAWAL

5.28 A withdrawal occurs when a force disengages from the enemy in accordance with the intent of the higher commander. Withdrawal is a tactic employed regularly during mobile defence or delay. It may also be necessary as a consequence of an unsuccessful battle. Its primary purpose is to disengage from the enemy, ideally while not under pressure, and redeploy to a new position or task with a minimum of interference and casualties.

Manoeuvre Options

5.29 A withdrawal is demanding. If a withdrawal is conducted after a local defeat, the conditions will usually be adverse. The
withdrawal can be conducted in or out of contact and preferably under low-visibility conditions or at night, as follows:

a. **Out of Contact.** In the withdrawal, the infantry commander has the difficult task of extricating the force to make a clean break from a position where it may be in close contact with the enemy, retiring to a suitable distance and possibly transitioning to a new phase. The infantry will always seek to withdraw out of contact to regain control and the initiative. The withdrawal must make the best use of surprise, secrecy and deception, including taking advantage of conditions of limited visibility.

b. **In Contact.** A withdrawal in contact is difficult to conduct. Delaying tactics, such as the use of reserves to cover the withdrawal, will be needed for the infantry to fight their way to the rear, intermediate and final defensive localities before resuming offensive action.

**Groupings**

5.30 The infantry commander is likely to arrange forces as follows:

a. the security element,

b. the main body, and

c. the reserve.

5.31 **Security Element.** Covering troops are required between localities to impose successive delays on the attacker, whether in or out of contact.

5.32 **Main Body.** The main body comprises the bulk of the infantry BG, which will withdraw successively to predetermined, intermediate or new main positions, in a similar way to a delay. Flank and rear security and advance guards are required.

5.33 **Reserve.** The reserve, usually a small combined arms team at BG level, will be tasked to take limited offensive action to impose further delay, to undertake counterpenetration tasks to the front of the main position, and to assist in the withdrawal of any troops in contact by covering their routes.
Coordination Measures

5.34 Coordination measures include phasing, timings and control measures.

5.35 Phasing. Phases for the conduct of a withdrawal, at either TF or BG level, are as follows:
   a. *Preparatory Phase*. Reconnaissance is conducted, rear parties are dispatched, WNGO are issued, and non-essential vehicles, personnel and stores are moved to the rear.
   b. *Disengagement Phase*. Disengaged elements move to the rear according to the planned sequence. Tactical movement to the next position begins once contact with the enemy is broken.
   c. *Security Phase*. Rearguards or security elements cover the movement of disengaged forces with fire and manoeuvre. Where possible, they can attempt to deceive the enemy in accordance with the deception plan.

5.36 Timings. Timings are critical to success.

5.37 Control Measures. The following basic control measures are required:
   a. route selection and signing to ensure security and freedom of movement;
   b. route priorities;
   c. checkpoints, rendezvous points, bounds and report lines along the route;
   d. traffic control measures;
   e. obstacles and demolitions;
   f. coordination through boundaries, guides, route priorities and critical timings; and
   g. prepared intermediate and main positions to the rear.
5.38 Tactical techniques include:
   a. battle handover,
   b. break-out from encirclement,
   c. convoy escort,
   d. counterattack,
   e. counterpenetration,
   f. defend a battle position,
   g. defend a strongpoint,
   h. defend in sector,
   i. reserved demolition,
   j. route security, and
   k. spoiling attack.

Battle Handover

5.39 The purpose of the battle handover is to ensure a smooth handover of responsibility to another force, either passing to the rear on completion of their task or meeting a replacement force at the battle handover line. As such, it is considered a control measure.

Break-out from Encirclement

5.40 A force is considered to be encircled when it has lost its freedom to manoeuvre and all ground lines of communication are cut by threat actions. Encirclement may restrict the freedom of action not only of the commander of the encircled force, but also that of the higher commander. Once encircled, a force must conduct both offensive and defensive tasks to survive, and a successful break-out requires a very rapid transition between them to succeed.

5.41 There are two types of break-out: the deliberate break-out and the break-out by stealth.
5.42 **Deliberate Break-out.** The deliberate break-out is conducted as a deliberate attack by an advance guard to create, or secure, a gap in the encirclement, followed by the movement of the main body through the gap. The encircled force should be organised as for an advance, including a strong advance guard, a main body, flank guards and rearguards. Guards may be required to undertake shaping tasks such as diversionary attacks or feints. Both light and mechanised forces can conduct a deliberate break-out; however, mechanised forces will generate greater firepower and be more manoeuvrable. The creation of a gap is the decisive event in a break-out and is likely to require the tasking and close coordination of all OS.

5.43 **Break-out by Stealth.** A break-out by stealth is achieved by small groups breaking out in several directions, using stealth to pass through the encirclement. Small forces of sub-unit or lesser strength may be able to extricate themselves by this method if they move on foot or in poor visibility through complex terrain. Light infantry may choose to break out by stealth.

5.44 **Deployment Considerations.** To break out, the infantry BG can react swiftly by attacking the enemy before they can take advantage of the situation and fully close the trap. To be successful, the infantry BG must achieve the following:

a. deceive the enclosing enemy about the composition, strength and intentions of the BGs;

b. concentrate sufficient fighting power at the enemy’s weakest point; and

c. provide security to the flanks and rear of the BG as it manoeuvres out of the encircled area.

5.45 **Tasks.** Likely tasks for the infantry BG can include:

a. counterpenetration and counterattack,

b. ambushing and sniping,

c. providing assault forces and reserves for the break-out,

d. providing guards,
creating gaps in enemy positions for a break-in prior to the break-out, and
f. providing protection for armoured and other forces involved in the break-out.

Convoy Escort

5.46 Road convoys require protection in tactical situations. The purpose of a convoy escort is to act as a security force which is task-organised to provide support to a convoy. It is likely to be a combined arms team and to include forces such as cavalry, tanks, and mechanised or motorised infantry. High-priority moves may also warrant the use of ARH and airmobile assets to give situational awareness, enhance firepower and provide a casevac facility.

5.47 Mechanised or motorised infantry are ideally suited for convoy escort. An element of the escort would act as an advance patrol to clear the route in front of the convoy. Another element of the escort would move with the convoy to act as the close protection group. This close protection group should also be able to react to threats to the convoy. A rear strike group would provide the rearguard, the reserves and a counterattack force. The composition is based around the nature of the threat. Flank security may be provided by mechanised elements or ARHs depending on the terrain and the speed of the convoy.

Counterattack

5.48 At any time during the conduct of a defensive battle, the enemy is likely to gain a foothold within the defensive perimeter, requiring them to be dislodged by a counterattack. Alternatively, when friendly forces have completed an attack on an objective and are reorganising, they are then vulnerable to a counterattack by the apparently defeated threat, to regain terrain lost and seize the initiative again. The purpose of the counterattack is to regain lost terrain or disrupt a threat attack.

5.49 In the defence, counterattacks can be pre-planned and deliberate, but often they will be quick attacks to stabilise the situation. The grouping and size of the counterattack force will
depend on the terrain, the vegetation and the threat being countered. If possible, it should be a combined arms team. Dismounted infantry can undertake counterattacks in complex terrain and against dismounted forces. Mechanised and armoured forces are generally required to counterattack similar enemy capabilities. However, dismounted infantry is the only force that can clear an enemy force that has dug in or taken shelter in weapon pits.

5.50 A counterattack task can be allotted to the reserve or be a discrete force apart from the reserve. In a BG-defended area, a local counterattack force of platoon or troop size (sufficiently reinforced by armour, ARHs and OS) is generally sufficient. In a formation-defended area, the counterattack force is likely to be a CT which includes mechanised infantry and armour, reinforced with ARHs, and OS.

Counterpenetration

5.51 During the defensive battle, the enemy can penetrate the defended area and threaten the integrity of the defence. The purpose of counterpenetration is to block the attacking force that has achieved penetration, and stabilise the situation in preparation for a subsequent counterattack to restore the position. Counterpenetration positions can be pre-prepared in vulnerable areas or the counterpenetration can be undertaken as an ‘as-required’ task where no pre-planned positions exist.

5.52 Dismounted infantry and cavalry forces are ideally suited to the task, but should be supported by anti-armour weapons, OS and ARHs.

Defend a Battle Position

5.53 Battle positions are defended locations from which fire can be applied into an EA. Defence of a battle position is more important for the achievement of fire domination in an EA than for the retention of the terrain itself. Combined arms teams may be allocated individual battle positions or be integrated into a single battle position.
5.54 Forces occupying battle positions conduct their defence as for an area defence, but usually in a greatly reduced area of terrain, using small teams. Each defensive battle is conducted differently, with decisive events largely dependent upon the mission, the enemy and the terrain.

Defend a Strongpoint

5.55 Strongpoints are usually associated with the defence of specific areas, such as weapon sites or gun emplacements; important CSS facilities, such as stores and ammunition; or other key installations, such as power plants, dams and railway yards. Strongpoint defence can also include those located in coastal defence installations, ports, harbours and airfields. Strongpoints differ from battle positions in that they can be a single, fortified defended post or series of posts grouped into a detachment or section locality. The purpose of a strongpoint is the retention of specific terrain in order to deny its use to a threat; for example, the use of key terrain to dominate, influence or move through an area. The hub of the defence of a strongpoint is dug-in infantry, supported by tanks and other weapons.

Defend in Sector

5.56 The purpose of a defend in sector task is to prevent threat forces from passing beyond the rear boundary of the assigned sector, while retaining flank security and ensuring the integrity of effort within the parent unit’s scheme of manoeuvre. Infantry may be asked to defend an assigned sector when flexibility is desired and retention of specific terrain is not necessary. This technique may incorporate elements of both an area defence and a mobile defence. It relies on the ability of the defending force to manoeuvre and have maximum freedom of action within assigned sector boundaries. Infantry of all types can defend within sectors, but will usually be supported by other arms.

Reserved Demolition

5.57 The purpose of a reserved demolition is to provide a prepared demolition on a critical feature (such as a bridge, crossing or

LWD 3-3-7, Employment of Infantry, 2008
other feature) for blowing on the instructions of the formation commander, as delegated to the commander of a demolition guard. The main task of the demolition guard is to ensure that the enemy does not capture the demolition before it has been fired. The demolition guard commander commands all troops at the demolition site, including the engineers forming the firing party.

5.58 Threat reconnaissance is likely to close rapidly on these entry points, closely followed by the advance guard. At the same time or in advance, the threat may mount a coup de main to seize an entry point or points. The friendly formation's demolition guard is likely to be subjected to attacks by OS and attacks to seize these points. Parties of saboteurs may also seek to destroy important bridges, cutting off any potential withdrawal by friendly forces.

5.59 Dug-in infantry will be a key element of the demolition guard. Anti-armour weapons should be deployed beyond the demolition site. APCs should be as close to battle positions as the terrain and cover permit to enable the maximum use to be made of vehicle-mounted weapons and communications. Defenders must be prepared for OS at every stage of the demolition site's defence and for the possibility of an enemy coup de main. A joint OS team must be deployed to cover likely approaches, and possible airmobile landing sites should be registered. GBAD should be sited to cover likely approaches from both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.

Route Security

5.60 The purpose of route security techniques is to protect lines of communication and the friendly forces moving along them. Security should be provided by a combination of techniques, including fixed strongpoints, patrolling, route reconnaissance, the establishment of vulnerable point checks and VCPs, cordon security, convoy protection, and convoy escorts. Infantry is central to most of these techniques. Mechanised infantry, supported by aviation, is preferred for convoy escorts in high-threat environments.
Spoiling Attack

5.61 During the defence, a commander may be able to seize the opportunity for a spoiling attack to disrupt enemy preparations for an attack. Spoiling attacks are normally launched against an assault force that is forming up or assembling for an attack. They are usually conducted against opportunity targets to destroy personnel and equipment, but not to secure terrain. A spoiling attack may also be achieved by an ABF.

5.62 Mechanised forces, supported by armour, aviation and OS, are preferred for spoiling attacks if space and terrain will allow. Dismounted forces may be required in complex terrain.
CHAPTER 6

INFANTRY IN STABILITY ACTIVITIES

SECTION 6-1. INTRODUCTION

6.1 Stability activities are conducted to create and maintain stable conditions. Stability activities are designed to maintain or establish a secure environment, creating the conditions for the provision of essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief. Stability activities may or may not involve the use or threat of force. Tasks range from HA to training indigenous forces and the transition to a satisfactory endstate after major combat. Potentially applicable to all campaigns, in conjunction with offensive and defensive activities, they may be the ME to achieve a campaign objective.

6.2 Stability activities are usually conducted in complex physical terrain, with mixed populations and within a complex information environment. They are manpower-intensive and time-intensive, and incidents at the tactical level can have significant higher level consequences.

6.3 This chapter describes the role of infantry in stability activities.

SECTION 6-2. INFANTRY SUPPORT TO STABILITY TACTICAL ACTIONS

6.4 Stability activities are undertaken to establish control so that the whole-of-government effort can be applied to reform the security forces, to restore essential services and to assist normal government to function. Interagency cooperation is fundamental to achieving stability. The tactical actions that achieve stability are as follows:

a. control,

b. reform,
Contribution

6.5 Considerations for infantry include:

a. Early Deployment. The early deployment of infantry patrols will enable the force to develop familiarity with the tactical area of responsibility and gain an early appreciation of the situation. It will also assist the commander to identify hostile activities, meet the intelligence requirements of the supported commander and provide timely passage of this information to combat forces for denial activities.

b. Reconnaissance. Infantry, through extensive patrol activities, can provide information that contributes to a supported CO’s ISTAR plan to determine likely enemy targets and vulnerabilities that may effectively undermine the enemy’s centre of gravity.

c. Surveillance. Infantry can maintain surveillance on likely or known hostile locations, movements, activities and intentions, through patrol activities.

d. Community Engagement. Infantry can provide a feeling of security and confidence for the local population.

e. Human Intelligence. The infantry interaction with the indigenous population in their AO provides exploitable information not obtainable by normal means.

SECTION 6-3. CONTROL

6.6 Control aims to reduce disorder and violence to an acceptable level. Establishing a secure environment achieves the conditions for non-government organisations and civil agencies to operate; provides opportunity for the development or resumption of normal social, political and economic activity; and allows dialogue between the opposing factions. The
purpose of control is to create the conditions in which reform, restore and assist can occur. Infantry supports control through the provision of information, firepower, rapid reaction and protected mobility.

6.7 The tactical tasks associated with control include:
   a. conflict containment,
   b. crowd control,
   c. curfew,
   d. enforcement of out-of-bounds areas,
   e. internment and detention,
   f. key point protection,
   g. population protection,
   h. the movement of refugees and internally displaced persons,
   i. the separation of hostile forces, and
   j. the supervision of ceasefire.

6.8 Conflict Containment. The purpose of conflict containment activities and tasks is to prevent the spread of the conflict to neighbouring areas and states. Conflict containment requires interposition by either or both military forces and monitoring organisations to restore law and order; protect human rights; facilitate humanitarian relief; and conduct other reform, restore and assist tasks. Infantry contributes to this through the use of, or threat of using, armed force, including:
   a. patrols (to gather information and deter breaches of the peace);
   b. counterinsurgency and counterterrorist tasks;
   c. the protection of human rights;
   d. the recording and collecting evidence of violations; and
   e. arresting designated war criminals.
6.9 Crowd Control. Public order involves security forces managing and containing groups and crowds intent on confrontation or violence in order to achieve specific outcomes. Responses to incidents of public disorder vary from tolerance, escalating through to riot control, to the use of discriminate force to protect human life. Military forces are restrained by international law and the need to apply reasonable and proportional force. Further information on crowd control TTP is contained in LWP-G 3-8-2, Population Protection and Control Techniques (Restricted), 2001.

6.10 Curfew. A curfew is a means by which movement can be controlled for short periods. It is one of several actions that underpin the establishment and maintenance of the rule of law. It may be general and imposed over a wide area, or it may be restricted to a small area such as a town centre or housing estate. Troops are required for the following:
   a. cordons,
   b. roadblocks and other checkpoints,
   c. ISR,
   d. civilian vehicle movement bans,
   e. static and mobile patrols to supplement the police, and
   f. assistance to the civil authority in the maintenance of essential services.

6.11 Enforcement of Out-of-bounds Areas. Enforcement of out-of-bounds areas is a key component of conflict containment and also underpins the maintenance of the rule of law. A commander or civilian authority may make the assessment that the only practical means of preventing and containing further conflict through protecting key infrastructure or vulnerable communities is by declaring the area out of bounds and restricting all access to, or through, the declared area. Infantry can enforce out-of-bounds through the following:
   a. dominating approaches,
   b. cordons,
c. roadblocks and checkpoints,
d. static and mobile patrols to supplement the police, and
e. assistance to the civil authority in the maintenance of essential services within the out-of-bounds area.

6.12 Internment and Detention. The ADF may be required to assist law enforcement agencies with internment and detention tasks. It is a generic term that encompasses all persons, other than ADF members, captured or otherwise and taken into custody by a deployed force. All such persons in the custody of the ADF are referred to as captured persons until they have been classified. Internment and detention control tactical tasks comprise all actions which ensure the safe, secure movement and humane treatment of captured persons from the point of capture through to exploitation and classification, internment or detention, and ultimately release or repatriation. Infantry can be used for all these duties.

6.13 Key Point Protection. Important buildings and installations may be targeted for hostile action because they are vital to the functioning of the government or economy, or because their damage or disruption is likely to be politically embarrassing. Additionally, key points and vital assets may include buildings or areas of cultural and religious significance. Infantry may be tasked with key point protection and vital asset protection. This includes the requirement for security at the key point and all actions that are associated with its protection, routes in and out; the movement of persons and vehicles to, through and from it; and the checking of all transits through it.

6.14 Population Protection. Control is underpinned by the requirement to protect civilians and general populations from conflict, apart from the other control measures described in this section. These measures include activity to provide immediate security to threatened populations in order to control residence, identity, movement, assembly and the distribution of commodities, therefore setting the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order and the rule of law.
6.15 Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Movement. The purpose of controlling the movement of refugees and internally displaced persons is to provide military assistance to specialist agencies for the movement and protection of refugees. Refugee protection and security can mean the requirement for designated safe areas and camps as a temporary measure. Infantry can transport refugees and internally displaced persons and, if necessary, act as guides and provide assistance in establishing camps.

6.16 Separation of Hostile Forces. Military forces conduct separation of hostile forces tactical tasks to support the administration, monitoring and enforcement of agreed ceasefire lines. Infantry can assist with marking separation lines and erecting fences, arms control and verification of compliance with agreements.

6.17 Supervision of Ceasefire. Military forces may be deployed to supervise any commitments agreed to by the parties as part of a truce, ceasefire or other peace plan. The purpose of a ceasefire supervision is to prevent further conflict, through a suitable structure and organisation. Infantry is able to supervise ceasefires.

SECTION 6-4. REFORM

6.18 Reform is a tactical action to transform or train legitimate indigenous security sector forces and agencies to which responsibility for national defence and internal security will be transferred. It necessarily includes the police and paramilitary forces, security management and oversight bodies such as legislators and management bodies. The purposes of reform is to ensure the following:

a. that the quality of governance in the state, in terms of relationships between security institutions, the wider government and the general public, is established and maintained; and
b. that the technical competence and professionalism of those within the security institutions is established and maintained.

6.19 The tactical tasks associated with control include:
   a. the allocation and control of equipment and infrastructure;
   b. disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration;
   c. the selection and recruitment of future security forces; and
   d. training, mentoring and the transfer of responsibility.

6.20 Allocation and Control of Equipment and Infrastructure. Rebuilding indigenous security forces normally requires the issue of, and training on, new equipment and critical infrastructure. The allocation and control of this equipment and these facilities requires effective distribution and accounting by coalition forces. In addition to new equipment, indigenous forces may require new or modified infrastructure. This also requires coalition management and an effective system to manage the handover of infrastructure to the host nation (HN) authorities. Infantry is able to transport new equipment in either APCs or multipurpose vehicles, distribute the equipment, and then train indigenous police and army on its use. The primary task will be the provision of training teams.

6.21 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is one element in a wider and longer term transition designed to reform the indigenous security sector and to reintegrate those military personnel considered surplus to military requirement back into their society. The task invariably involves many civil and military agencies in a fully integrated reform plan. Key tasks for infantry are as follows:
   a. Disarmament. This encompasses the collection, documentation, control and disposal of weapons, ammunition and explosives belonging to combatants.
b. **Demobilisation.** This is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from the armed forces or other armed groups.

c. **Reintegration.** Reintegration assists civilian agencies with the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.

### 6.22 Selection and Recruitment of Future Security Forces

The purpose of the selection and recruitment of future security forces is to ensure the establishment of an effective and capable military and security force that has a culture grounded in national laws. Infantry personnel, working among the people, can assist with identifying those individuals who might be suitable for recruitment.

### 6.23 Training, Mentoring and the Transfer of Responsibility

Following the vetting process, the involvement of army training teams for facilitating the selection, recruitment and subsequent training of indigenous forces is critical for longer term success of the reform and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration program. Infantry can provide the training teams to train the armed forces, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security services, border guards, and reserve or local security units.

### SECTION 6-5. RESTORE

### 6.24 Restore

Restore is the process of post-conflict reconstruction or provincial reconstruction. Initially restore involves the provision of immediate health assistance and essential services and facilities, and it is often associated with disaster relief. The results of restore should be tangible and lend themselves to publicity as part of influence actions. The purpose of restore is to re-establish essential services, facilities and infrastructure and to provide HA and health assistance.

### 6.25 The primary contribution of infantry to restore

The primary contribution of infantry to restore is the provision of protection and support to personnel and organisations undertaking restore. Some infantry personnel may have
specialist trades that enable them to assist with the restoration of utilities and infrastructure, but, as a collective group, infantry forces are not trained or equipped to provide essential services or infrastructure. However, their position in the community and their professional and personal relationships with individuals and groups enables them to support civil–military cooperation and liaise with the various community groups and councils.

6.26 The tactical tasks associated with restore include:
   a. immediate health assistance,
   b. the restoration of essential public utilities,
   c. the restoration of essential public services,
   d. the restoration of essential facilities and infrastructure,
   e. the restoration of post-conflict special services, and
   f. the restoration of intellectual and institutional infrastructure.

6.27 Immediate Health Assistance. Health assistance is provided to assist HNs to cope with natural and national disasters. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, whether it be natural or man-made, the land forces and the broader ADF health community are capable of providing a range of health support options. Infantry medics are able to assist with this process. Soldiers may also act as stretcher-bearers and orderlies.

6.28 Restoration of Essential Public Utilities. Military forces help to re-establish essential public utilities in order to improve the standard of living for the affected community. Infantry can provide unskilled labour to assist other military forces (RAE and RAEME) with the restoration. This might include clearing rubble and raising power poles.

6.29 Restoration of Essential Public Services. Essential public services are those institutions that support the continued survival of the community. They depend on the availability of trained staff and specialist equipment, but do not necessarily require specialist infrastructure. They include such things as police, fire and rescue, waste management, and education.
Infantry can assist with those labour-intensive public services that do not require high levels of training, such as sanitation and debris removal.

6.30 **Restoration of Essential Facilities and Infrastructure.** Military forces help to restore essential facilities and national infrastructure in order to enable restoration efforts to reach all corners of the affected area, provide for economic recovery, and provide freedom of movement to the population. Infantry can provide unskilled labour to assist other military forces (RAE and RAEME) with the restoration.

6.31 **Restoration of Post-conflict Special Services.** The purpose of providing post-conflict special services is to remove the direct and immediately damaging residual effects of the conflict. Post-conflict special services are those functions unique to post-conflict or confrontation periods that facilitate the restoration process, for example, clearing unexploded ordnance and booby traps. Some specialists within infantry units may be able to assist with this task.

6.32 **Restoration of Intellectual and Institutional Infrastructure.** Military forces and supporting agencies help to restore intellectual and institutional infrastructure in order to enable the development of independence and cultural development in accordance with nation-building and political objectives. Restore tasks involve significant interagency work and cooperation.

**SECTION 6-6. ASSIST**

6.33 Assist aims to preserve the rule of law, enable the conduct of elections and provide humanitarian and environmental assistance (in the form of selected services). Examples of assist conducted abroad include Australian assistance to elections in Cambodia, and HA to Somalia, which involved infantry providing route security, the establishment of security points and checkpoints, and patrolling.
6.34 Infantry primarily establishes the control that allows assist to be provided by other agencies. The provision of assistance requires commanders to liaise closely with civilian authorities and military counterparts, establish links with communities and agencies providing support, and establish communications networks if required. Assist tasks include:

a. support to the rule of law, specifically that against criminal activity;

b. support to elections; and

c. enabling HA.

6.35 **Support to Rule of Law.** The purpose of this task is to deliver personal security for the population, particularly against criminal activity, and set the conditions for the resumption of normal economic and social activity. Infantry may be required to provide a measure of internal security and fill the vacuum while indigenous forces are being trained, at least as an interim measure. Where this is necessary, they should be complemented by civil law enforcement capabilities and replaced entirely by an appropriate civilian organisation as soon as practicable.

6.36 **Support to Elections.** The purpose of establishing and monitoring elections in an HN is to establish a democratic basis for interim governance by the HN and to ensure that the democratic processes, once established, can be maintained. While military involvement underpins the electoral process, largely through the creation of a secure environment, it cannot do so effectively without an election framework, which is a collaborative responsibility of the UN and HN bodies. Infantry involvement is likely to be the establishment and protection of voting centres and the possible transportation of votes.

6.37 **Enabling Humanitarian Assistance.** A military force is likely to provide HA only when the security conditions in an area preclude the involvement of non-government organisations and other civil agencies. HA is not always conducted in a permissive or benign environment, requiring a peacekeeping force or other force for protective tasks. Infantry participation
might include the protection of the homeless from lawlessness, the provision of emergency shelter, victim registration, the delivery of food and potable water, and the provision of immediate first aid.

SECTION 6-7. TACTICAL TECHNIQUES

6.38 Stability activities tactical techniques are the military methods for accomplishing a result in particular situations. They are intended to improve efficiency and uniformity of action, and to ensure consistency. The techniques provide an opportunity for commanders to exercise a series of options according to the dictates of the situation. Stability tactical techniques include:

a. cordon and search,
b. noncombatant evacuation,
c. the recovery of personnel and equipment, and
d. TCPs and VCPs.

Cordon and Search

6.39 Cordon and search involves the isolation of a chosen area and then its systematic search. The establishment of the cordon and the conduct of the search are two separate tasks that should be conducted as a joint military and interagency (including police forces) task.

6.40 Infantry forces are skilled and equipped for both these tasks. Their presence during both the cordon and search may also help other agencies undertake their tasks because of their ability to also provide protection to the force conducting the task.

Noncombatant Evacuation

6.41 Noncombatant evacuations may be conducted in either permissive or non-permissive circumstances and seek to relocate threatened noncombatants to a safe place. Noncombatant evacuation requires land forces, as part of a joint TF, to conduct, participate in, or contribute to the
evacuation of Australian nationals and/or other approved foreign nationals from a threat area. The infantry contribution to noncombatant evacuations is as follows:

a. *Permissive*. A noncombatant evacuation conducted in a permissive environment most commonly occurs following natural disaster or civil unrest, where no resistance to evacuation is expected. In such circumstances, there is HN consent and support for those wishing to leave. Infantry FEs may provide a range of assistance to authorities, including:

1. information on the operating environment,
2. networked communications,
3. transport or movement over challenging terrain, and
4. assistance to other government agencies.

b. *Non-permissive*. A noncombatant evacuation conducted in a hostile environment most commonly occurs when the HN's civil and military authorities have lost control and there is a general breakdown in law and order. Infantry is likely to be a key component of any noncombatant evacuation in a hostile environment. In addition to the services provided in a permissive environment, infantry would also provide security in the form of:

1. protection to other forces and communities,
2. protected mobility,
3. convoy escort,
4. TCP and VCP security,
5. route clearance, and
6. ready reaction forces.
Recovery of Personnel and Equipment

6.42 There are times when personnel or equipment may be cut off in an area from which they cannot extract themselves. In a non-permissive environment or when a terrorist organisation is active, the extraction of those assets may require a special recovery operation. Where the recovery task is long-range and at short notice, it will normally be allocated to special forces. Where the recovery task is short-range and an opportunity target, it may be accomplished by the infantry.

Traffic Control Posts and Vehicle Checkpoints

6.43 TCPs and VCPs form an integral part of general road and track movement control. They can be established by security forces or any other land-based force across the range of military activities. A higher planning HQ is generally responsible for establishing TCPs and VCPs on all route networks through an established control organisation.

6.44 Infantry can provide the personnel and firepower to establish both TCPs and VCPs under the direction of the control agency.
CHAPTER 7

INFANTRY IN ENABLING ACTIVITIES

SECTION 7-1. INTRODUCTION

7.1 Enabling activities are never conducted in isolation. Their purpose is to link and create the conditions for the conduct of offensive, defensive and stability actions, ensuring continuity and maintaining tempo. They do not have any associated tactical actions.

SECTION 7-2. ENABLING ACTIVITIES

7.2 Enabling activities include those intended to make or break contact with the threat and those that can be conducted out of contact. Enabling activities may be conducted as missions in their own right.

7.3 Enabling activities are as follows:
   a. link-up,
   b. march,
   c. obstacle crossing and breaching,
   d. passage of lines,
   e. patrol,
   f. reconnaissance,
   g. relief in place, and
   h. surveillance.

Link-up

7.4 Link-up is a task conducted to join two friendly forces and may occur frequently as part of regrouping. It may be necessary to destroy the threat between these two forces before a link-up can be established. Both forces may be moving toward one
another, stationary or encircled. They may have the same or different missions, but the task itself is always part of the overall tactical plan. As both forces attempt to link up, there is an inherent danger of fratricide; therefore the planning and coordination must account for these increased risks and it is preferable that one force is stationary.

7.5 The purpose of any link-up will include:
   a. to complete the encirclement of an enemy force;
   b. to assist the break-out of an encircled force; and
   c. to join an attacking force with a force inserted into the enemy’s rear, such as by airmobile or infiltration.

7.6 Infantry support to link-up will be conducted as part of a larger TF activity in which the higher HQ directing the link-up establishes the command relationships and responsibilities of the forces involved.

7.7 Detailed planning considerations for a link-up are contained in LWD 3-0-3, Land Tactics (Developing Doctrine), 2009.

March

7.8 The movement of land forces from one location to another is inherent in all military activity. The essence of battlespace agility is the capability to conduct rapid and orderly movement to concentrate fighting power at decisive moments and locations. The term ‘march’ does not necessarily involve dismounted troops, but is more appropriately used to describe movement of the force as an entity, while adopting appropriate formations. A march is conducted to move a military land force to its place of tactical employment efficiently. The underlying intent for every march is to reach the destination in the best possible condition to execute the mission. Although march discipline is of great importance, it is secondary to successful completion of the mission at the end of the march. Multiple axes should be used if possible to achieve dispersion and conceal the true purpose of the move.
7.9 The tactical march will frequently be along a lateral, although only the BG HQ and administrative elements are likely to travel on the lateral. CTs are likely to move either astride the lateral or to one side, avoiding the potential fire lane and providing flank security. Security forces should be employed in the same way as for an advance. A mechanised/armoured or mechanised infantry BG will cross the terrain using appropriate formations and techniques.

Obstacle Crossing and Breaching

7.10 An obstacle may be natural, artificial or a combination of both. ‘Crossing’ is the term applied to movement across natural obstacles. ‘Breaching’ is the term applied to securing passage through artificial obstacles. A breaching to clear an obstacle is planned in the same way as an attack.

7.11 The aim of a crossing or breaching is to minimise the loss of momentum and maximise protection of the force. The protected mobility and firepower of mechanised infantry should be maximised during a breach or crossing. A crossing or breaching action can be either hasty or deliberate, as follows:

a. Hasty. Hasty crossings are executed from the line of march. Infantry’s characteristics are ideal for hasty crossings.

b. Deliberate. A deliberate crossing is conducted when a hasty crossing fails or is inappropriate. Infantry may be employed for deliberate crossings in much the same manner as hasty crossings.

7.12 The crossing or breaching action will be either quiet or noisy, as follows:

a. Quiet. Mechanised infantry is not generally suited to quiet breaching or crossing activities because of the associated noise and dust. However, it can be employed in a deception plan or on prearranged tasks once the breach becomes noisy. Direct fire support once the breach becomes noisy is an example of a prearranged task.
b. Noisy. Mechanised infantry can provide elements to reconnoitre the obstacle, provide direct fire support and participate in the crossing.

7.13 To undertake breaching, mechanised infantry forces should be grouped with appropriate specialist equipment, as this is not organic to the battalion. Conducting breaching activities without specialist equipment increases risk, and therefore infantry is reliant on external mobility support.

7.14 Commanders must consider the time and cost in resources, and the surprise that may be achieved by breaching an obstacle against the cost of an outflanking action and the risk of being caught in an enemy EA. In order to retain the initiative and regain momentum once across, it is preferable to avoid using all the mechanised infantry available to breach or cross obstacles.

7.15 Infantry can contribute significantly to breach or crossing activities. Infantry can reconnoitre the obstacle in detail and participate in or provide a deception plan. APCs can provide fire in an SBF or ABF role as well as a means of exploiting the breach.

Passage of Lines

7.16 A forward passage of lines is conducted to pass one force through another while maintaining momentum. A rearward passage of lines is conducted to pass a force rearward through a defending or holding force while maintaining a secure frontage. The conduct of a passage of lines is subordinate to the overlying mission. The passage of lines for infantry is an SOP, at unit or BG level, as such activities happen routinely in the course of an advance or during a phased attack.

7.17 Infantry, in the in-transit force, should be fully administered prior to deployment and preferably prior to entering the tactical area of responsibility of the in-place force. The in-transit force normally has its A1 echelon move with it. If there is a suitable armoured echelon in the in-place force, armour and mechanised infantry in the in-transit force may take further or final replenishment in transit or just prior to the transit. This
7.18 The tasking of security forces in conventional activities differs from reconnaissance forces in conventional activities. The task of reconnaissance is to identify enemy capabilities and intent. The task of security forces is to identify the information they require for friendly force security.

Patrol

7.19 Detailed information regarding the planning and conduct of patrols is contained in LWP-CA (DMTD CBT) 3-3-3, Tracking (Developing Doctrine), 2009.

7.20 Patrolling is the responsibility of all corps and is carried out not only in the forward areas but also in rear areas to counter enemy infiltration and to protect installations and administrative areas. All members of the Australian Army are trained and practised in the techniques of patrolling see LWP-CA (DMTD CBT) 3-3-3, Tracking (Developing Doctrine), 2009.

Types of Patrols

7.21 Fighting patrols are designed to engage the enemy. They contribute to gaining and retaining the initiative and to our force's security. Fighting patrols may vary in size from a small team to an infantry sub-unit or larger. Standing patrols and hunter–killer teams/anti-armour patrols are particular types of fighting patrols.1

7.22 Reconnaissance patrols are designed to gain information by observation. They operate by stealth, avoiding contact except for self-protection.

7.23 Infantry Contribution. Patrolling is a core business of infantry units in the provision of security, protection and the gathering of information. Light, motorised and mechanised infantry forces are trained and capable of conducting patrols at strengths from single fire team to reinforced company. Mounted and mechanised patrols can operate at extended range and for

1. LWP-CA (DMTD CBT) 3-3-3, Tracking (Developing Doctrine), 2009.
extended periods, albeit with administrative requirements. At shorter ranges, light and dismounted patrols can operate for periods of up to a week with limited administrative support. Dismounted patrols can be inserted by air, vehicle or maritime assets. Operating from established and protected patrol bases and provided with suitable administrative support, mounted, mechanised and light patrols can dominate AOs indefinitely.

7.24 Patrols from the infantry battalion’s reconnaissance and surveillance platoon are trained to conduct close target reconnaissance, while surveillance patrols from the same platoon can use a suite of equipment to provide wide area or point surveillance by day or night for extended periods. The reconnaissance, surveillance, strike group is a specifically trained organisation that can be employed to conduct various aspects of reconnaissance, surveillance and strike operations (sensor, shooter and controller). Personnel within the group are trained to provide advice on the design and implementation of reconnaissance and surveillance tasks and the employment of their group assets as part of the ISTAR effort.

7.25 All patrols provide information, but the unique strength of infantry patrols is that they can fight to gain information, are trained and equipped to fight to exploit information gained, and are able to provide a far greater fidelity of information – not only on enemy dispositions, tactics, equipment and probable intents, but on issues such as terrain, weather, surface conditions, the going, routes, obstacles, infrastructure, flora and fauna, communities and the attitudes and human face of combatants and noncombatants likely to be encountered. Unlike air, armoured or vehicle patrols, infantry patrols can quickly and seamlessly adjust to fit the complex environmental and social terrain of the battlefield, transitioning from warfighting to security to population support tasking. They can manoeuvre and fire to win a firefight, discriminate friend from foe in a complex security environment, and provide the human face to win hearts and minds. The reconnaissance, surveillance, strike group is a specifically trained organisation that can be employed as part of the countersurveillance effort through its abilities as a sensor, shooter and controller.
Personnel within the group are trained to provide advice on the design and implementation of counter-reconnaissance and surveillance tasks and the employment of their group assets as part of the greater ISTAR effort.

**Reconnaissance**

7.26 Reconnaissance is an enabling activity undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy threat or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It may be land, aerial or maritime. Infantry units use reconnaissance patrols.

7.27 **Counter-reconnaissance.** Counter-reconnaissance is a critical task for all security forces, and is the directed effort to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance of the supported formation or force. For infantry, counter-reconnaissance is an active task that involves aggressive and sustained action to destroy or repel enemy collection assets. It must also include the passive measures of surveillance to identify the enemy’s reconnaissance objectives and the measures taken to deceive the enemy about own force activities. Counter-reconnaissance keeps enemy reconnaissance forces from observing the activities of the supported friendly main body. Infantry forces, in security activities, employ the full range of offensive tactics, defensive tactics and techniques to accomplish the counter-reconnaissance task. They may employ ambush, quick attack or indirect fire.

**Relief in Place**

7.28 A relief in place is conducted to replace one FE with another, usually in static defensive positions. It is a force preservation measure used by a commander to rotate forces before they reach their culminating point or to employ them on other tasks. A relief in place passes responsibility for an occupied locality or area from one FE to another.
7.29 Infantry uses relief in place to relieve static OPs and patrols on extended missions, or to withdraw forces that have been in contact in order to rest and restore them. Strict control measures are required to avoid fratricide and prevent the adversary from learning the nature of the action and seeking to disrupt it during a time of vulnerability.

7.30 The infantry battalion reconnaissance, surveillance, strike group is specifically designed as an organic asset to provide systematic and strike capabilities across the contemporary environment. Reconnaissance provides accurate information on force dispositions, strengths, intentions and activities. This information includes details such as a given location at a given time, while surveillance detects changes over time and is not specific.

Surveillance

7.31 Surveillance is a tactical task to systematically observe the aerospace, surface or sub-surface areas (for maritime application), places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means. It provides an enduring and systematic observation to inform a higher commander’s critical information requirements for a specified tactical action or task and to increase command situational awareness. It can be undertaken as part of a broader activity, and can be land-based, aerial or sea-based/maritime, or a combination of all three as part of an integrated surveillance network.

7.32 Surveillance is a secondary task for infantry who maintain focal area surveillance on likely or known enemy locations, movements, activities and intentions, through patrol activities and static OPs. Patrols can cue response assets for detailed reconnaissance or tactical action.
CHAPTER 8

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

SECTION 8-1. INTRODUCTION

8.1 The purpose of CSS is to sustain land operations through the replenishment of force resources and the provision of support services. For the infantry, CSS is best characterised by constrained organic assets. CSS requirements range from sustaining small teams, platoons and CTs operating independently, to sustaining the BGs operating in complex terrain, often with little or no access to road and transport systems if dismounted. The requirements to maintain rapid, strategic deployability, coupled with the nature of complex terrain as a common effect on the conduct of tactical actions, creates a challenging CSS environment. The nature and the challenge of CSS for other types of infantry units, such as the RFSU, are discussed in other publications.

8.2 This chapter describes CSS for infantry: its organisation, functions and applications; the tasks and responsibilities of CSS personnel; and the considerations for CSS when operating as part of coalition forces.

SECTION 8-2. ORGANISATION

8.3 Infantry’s versatility and austerity when dismounted is supported by integral CSS in the BG organisation and is reflected in all deployed forces. Infantry will be supported by its own first line supply carried on the soldier, with supplementation from its vehicles and the CSS organisation organic to the BG. CSS elements in motorised and mechanised units have an increased capacity but a larger routine CSS requirement.

8.4 Infantry CSS organisations are embedded in unit structures and provide integral support through the echelon system.
Additionally, when forming a combined arms team, other unit CSS elements will be attached and integrated with the infantry CSS, enabling the deployed groups to retain their own CSS at sub-unit level. When operating over large AOs with small, widely dispersed combined arms teams, decentralised control of CSS and sustainment will be critical to allow flexibility. While inherently vulnerable, small organisations are capable of self-sufficiency for a limited period. Larger formations may seek to ‘brigade’ or centrally group some CSS assets. While this has some advantages, it will reduce unit autonomy.

8.5 CSS sustainment will use a combination of unit-level and formation-level capabilities, configured to suit the situation. The CSS organisations likely to support the infantry BGs are as follows:

a. Organic Combat Service Support. The integration of BG and formation CSS capabilities provides the BG with a balanced level of maintenance, recovery, distribution and health support assets. Organic CSS to the infantry BG is provided by Admin Coy, which can provide the full range of these CSS assets, such as a transport platoon, a medical platoon, a technical support platoon, a QM (supply) platoon and a catering platoon. The provision of this support operates on a ‘push’ replenishment system. This system requires support assets to have a level of mobility commensurate with the mobility of the combat force being supported, in order to ensure the effective and timely provision of CSS. The provision of CSS to infantry units on deployment is further enhanced by the echelon system, which is organised as follows:

1. F Echelon. F Echelon consists of all the personnel, vehicles and equipment required to fight and control the battle. The command elements are located within the F Echelon. The administrative element in the F Echelon is normally small, usually acts only as a relay for the receipt and forwarding of requests, and is
normally located with or near the command element.

(2) **A Echelon.** A Echelon consists of all personnel, vehicles and equipment that must be readily available to replenish F Echelon at any time. A Echelon contains the largest administrative grouping in the BG and provides the basis for daily and routine maintenance and replenishment. HQ Admin Coy forms the basis of A Echelon, together with those administrative elements of the rifle companies and combat support company. For mechanised units or mounted infantry grouped with armoured units, A Echelon is split into A1 Echelon and A2 Echelon. A1 Echelons are commonly grouped with mounted rifle companies and mechanised companies in the CT/combined arms team organisations and provide their immediate combat supplies. A2 Echelon provides the immediate resupply of BG HQ and A1 Echelons. Any infantry unit might employ an A1 Echelon and A2 Echelon if volumes and distances dictate.

(3) **B Echelon.** B Echelon consists of the vehicles and personnel not required in F Echelon or A Echelon. B Echelon primarily comprises the personnel tasked with providing the necessary logistics liaison and planning with CSS units and formation staff. B Echelon also assists in the passage of reinforcements and replacements forward to A Echelon. This echelon is normally commanded by the assistant ADJT or QM in a dismounted organisation or by the OC of the technical support company in a mechanised or mounted unit, with the RQMS coordinating logistic requirements.

b. **Combat Service Support Team.** A CSS team can be deployed either from the organic infantry echelon or, if there is a requirement for immediate second line
augmentation, from the supporting CSS battalion. The CSS team is a task-organised capability of varying size depending on the task. Typically, second line CSS teams are configured to provide CSS for up to a battalion/BG-sized organisation or for other deployed forces if in a remote locality. The CSS team would normally have mobility and communications commensurate with the manoeuvre unit it is supporting. Usually it will be collocated with the A echelon when deployed, and has a limited capacity for self-defence.

c. **Combat Service Support Battalion.** The CSS battalion is a task-organised unit, typically configured to support a brigade/joint interagency TF and available to provide second line support to deployed infantry units and isolated forces, either directly or from a task-organised deployed CSS team. The CSS battalion has the capacity to deploy two CSS teams at any one time.

d. **Brigade Support Group.** The brigade support group is an organisation comprising the CSS battalion and any number of different units or elements. It is located in an area where CSS units and sub-units, stocks, facilities, and other units are not required forward. It is the brigade/joint interagency TF commander’s primary CSS asset and is a tactical unit. Widely dispersed Infantry units can draw from these facilities through normal sustainment arrangements according to the force sustainment plan.

e. **Force Support Battalion.** The force support battalion is a task-organised unit, comprising a number of CSS capabilities providing designated support to a force, usually abroad. Infantry forces deployed overseas can receive support and augmentation from the force support battalion for specialised tasks and missions.

f. **Other Australian Defence Force Logistic Support Agencies.** For some missions, infantry units may draw from other ADF logistic support agencies or the national support base. Any such support would be identified at an
early stage of the joint MAP and be promulgated in the theatre sustainment plan.

g. Other Non-Australian Defence Force Logistic Support Agencies. Widely dispersed forces may require support from other non-ADF logistic support agencies, sources or services, such as local contractors and suppliers.

SECTION 8-3. FUNCTIONS

8.6 The CSS functions are as follows:

a. supply support,
b. maintenance support,
c. transport support,
d. engineer sustainability support,
e. combat health support, and
f. personnel support.

Supply Support

8.7 Supply support is the CSS function responsible for the management of stores and equipment. It deals with activities such as procurement, provisioning, warehousing, inspection and quality control, issuing, receipting and disposal, and inventory management. Infantry supply support can be provided to some extent by the infantry unit and BG organisations, managed by the S4, QM, the OC of the technical support company and the XO, supported by external sources as demand and management dictate.

8.8 The infantry unit HQ will also provide such support as necessary to sub-units and CTs, who will make separate demands through the normal demand system. Some infantry units, such as the RFSU, have a diverse array of line items to support the conduct of patrolling activities, in excess of that normally expected from other land-based transport.
Maintenance Support

8.9 Maintenance support is the CSS function responsible for the maintenance and care of unit equipment and specified levels of serviceability. It incorporates maintenance engineering, materiel maintenance, configuration management and recovery. Many infantry units' maintenance capabilities are limited to immediate first line support in the battlespace. Close and general support will be required to complete these activities, particularly during sustained operations. Some infantry units, widely dispersed in remote localities either in Australia or overseas, may have to draw on civil contractors and other agencies and provide more unconventional support, such as the use of cash transactions for maximising the use of local resources.

8.10 Materiel maintenance support for infantry units includes all action taken to retain materiel in a fully functional condition or to restore it to such a condition. It will include the correct handling and storage of items, servicing, and repair to agreed levels. The infantry materiel maintenance system must strike a balance between repairing well forward for speed of response, and concentrating resources further to the rear areas where security of logistic and repair assets remains a priority.

Transport Support

8.11 Transport support is the CSS function responsible for the movement of stores, equipment and personnel throughout the CSS system. All types of infantry CSS organisations possess capable transport platoons in the Admin Coy (or equivalent), which contain a variety of vehicles. Additionally, infantry units without integral mobility can draw on second line resources for transport support.

8.12 In complex warfighting, there are likely to be increasing demands for ammunition of all natures and specialised natures, specialist equipment, demolition stores, and augmentation from other supporting units of the BG and the supported or supporting formation. Supply support in these circumstances will require stocks on wheels to be sufficiently

LWD 3-3-7, Employment of Infantry, 2008
responsive to the demands of dismounted troops, often carrying heavy loads over distance for a prolonged period. While the unit/BG can carry sufficient stocks based on its OVP, planners should aim for daily replenishment and the maintenance of forward troops as frequently as possible to minimise individual soldier loads. A deployed BG may consist of ASLAVs and protected military vehicles from different parent units requiring specific RAEME support to maintain these platforms.

**Engineer Sustainability Support**

8.13 Engineer sustainability support remains the responsibility of the engineers and, for infantry units, can be provided through normal demand channels or from civil agencies. Likely tasks in support of infantry will include construction, repairing and maintaining infrastructure tasks, the production of construction materials, finding and producing water supplies, and the disposal of waste materials.

**Combat Health Support**

8.14 Health support within infantry units will generally consist of a medical platoon located in the Admin Coy, which has a regimental medical officer and combat medical/first aid staff capable of deploying with sub-units. The infantry RAP is a Level 1 medical care facility and will deploy either with the HQ or with the infantry’s organic echelon. Serious casualties will be evacuated either by road or by air to second line combat health facilities, such as the health company or the health battalion. Dental care facilities are not organic to infantry units, and those requiring dental care will be evacuated to the nearest supporting health element, which can be deployed forward with the CSS team or situated further to the rear. The general principle of effective and responsive combat health rests in the early withdrawal of sick, wounded and stress-related casualties from forward positions by the quickest available means.

**Personnel Support**

8.15 Personnel support functions remain a joint responsibility and are not considered a CSS support function as such. However,
the delivery of personnel support services does remain a CSS function and can include pay and financial services, postal services, amenities, laundry, bath facilities in the field, catering services, spiritual services, and mortuary support. While infantry units remain largely self-sufficient, they can draw on external support when on extended deployments. This external support can include support reinforcement, assistance with acclimatisation, individual and troop rotations, respite facilities, welfare, and the return to home bases in Australia of personnel killed in action.

SECTION 8-4. APPLICATIONS

8.16 Reach and Fight. The ‘reach and fight’ capability of CSS is critical to mission success. Commanders and staff must understand the reach of the forces within their OVP and the number of fights they can undertake prior to replenishment and/or maintenance. In infantry terms, fight is the ability not just to fight for information and make and maintain contact, but also to break contact if necessary in order to undertake subsequent tasks and prosecute the mission. For planning purposes, the reach and fight of any force is initially based on its OVP and its maximum distance from the home base to its assigned AO or objective in order to prosecute its mission. Reach and fight capabilities can be extended through continuous replenishment and maintenance and through the forward placement of supporting CSS detachments.

8.17 Operational Viability Period. The OVP for any infantry organisation is determined by the duration of the assigned task and the commander’s requirement for that force to remain on task, consistent with the amount of first line supplies carried on the individual soldier. An infantry section patrol or small combined arms team may have an OVP of anywhere between 3 and 28 days without normal resupply, depending on mission requirements. The unit/BG SOP will dictate the lowest level of sustainment required to be carried in vehicles, by sections or patrols, and on the soldier.
8.18 **Military Units and Assets.** Sustainment to deployed sub-units from organic infantry CSS organisations will remain the priority in terms of support, with other support being demanded as the mission dictates. Where the organic infantry CSS organisation is wholly or partly collocated with the brigade support group, they will remain under the technical control of the infantry HQ.

8.19 **Host Nation Support.** When forces are deployed abroad, there will be occasions when support is required from an HN. The extent, type, nature and form of this support will be determined at an early stage of planning. HN support may be limited during the early stage of an operation when close combat dominates. However, HN support may be increased once operations transition to peace support or capacity building.

8.20 **Lines of Support.** Lines of support describe where the support has been provided from and the command authority, as follows:

a. **First Line.** First line support is that which is provided by the unit under the control of the CO and delegated to the OC Admin Coy. Infantry first line support typifies the normal arrangements of supply support from unit to sub-unit, sub-unit to platoon and attached small combined arms teams, and then to any deployed patrols. Another feature of infantry first line support is the CSS team, which is mission-tailored for the BG ORBAT and the mission profile. The CSS team and the BG Admin Coy might combine to form the A Echelon and B Echelon, together with the attached element’s A1 Echelon and A2 Echelon, to provide dedicated first line support on demand. Any unit may form an A1 Echelon and A2 Echelon, however, they are routinely utilised in mounted organisations as a direct result of the volumes of combat supplies and distances involved when mounted.

b. **Second Line.** Second line support is that which is provided from the supporting formation. In many cases, the infantry BG will be operating over a prolonged period and will require second line augmentation. These
requirements are determined and articulated in the sustainment plan during the MAP.

c. **Third Line.** Third line support is that which can be provided by organisations not organic to the supporting or supported formation. The requirement for third line support, which may include specialist equipment and supplies, will be determined at an early stage in the CSS plan during the MAP. Infantry may require third line support when operating outside the assignment of a supported or supporting formation, particularly when lines of communication are stretched in remote areas of Australia or overseas in a large AO.

d. **Fourth Line.** Fourth line support is the support provided by the national support base, which is made up of people, resources and industry in Australia. Some infantry units (such as the RFSU) that are widely dispersed may draw directly from the national support base in terms of access to local resources from remote communities and other civil agencies.

**SECTION 8-5. TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

**Commanding Officer**

8.21 The infantry CO has overall responsibility for the care of personnel and the maintenance and security of all unit stores and equipment. The detailed management is delegated to the XO for personnel logistics policy and management, while the S4 is responsible for the management of the unit CSS system and all CSS functions, less personnel and combat health. The CO provides overall guidance in terms of the commander’s intent for all missions.

8.22 **Lead Staff.** The S4 staff will initially lead the logistic planning under the guidance of the XO to ensure that specific infantry requirements are identified and integrated into the higher CSS plan. Other key logistic planners include the OC of the technical
support element (platoon for light and company for mounted), OC Admin Coy, the QM and the regimental QMS.

**Staff**

8.23 Infantry units follow the common staff system and assign responsibility for personnel to the S1, and responsibility for logistics and CSS to the XO and S4. However, the overall responsibility for CSS control, management, the security of stores and equipment, and risk assessments is borne by the CO.

8.24 **Executive Officer.** The XO is responsible for all unit administration and oversight of the CSS system with the S4. The XO will often command the administration group in the unit HQ if the S4 is deployed to establish a forward echelon, but otherwise will remain to oversee CSS activity in the HQ. Additionally, the XO will take responsibility for the day-to-day management and oversight of those personnel, administrative and health issues that do not normally fall under the CSS umbrella.

8.25 **Officer Commanding Administration Company.** The OC Admin Coy is responsible to the CO and the XO for the command of Admin Coy and the management of the sustainment function.

8.26 **Quartermaster.** The infantry QM is responsible to the S4 and the XO for the bulk of CSS functions, including:

a. daily maintenance;

b. the replacement of vehicles, weapons, stores and equipment as necessary;

c. technical supervision of the maintenance of vehicles, weapons, stores and equipment;

d. technical supervision of unit catering;

e. minor repairs to unit weapons and vehicles;

f. direction and supervision of the specialists within the QM platoon;
g. liaison with F echelon sub-units/CTs and B echelon supply units on logistic matters; and

h. the disposal of the personal effects of the missing or dead in conjunction with the AADJT.

8.27 Officer Commanding Technical Support Platoon/Company. The OC of the technical support platoon/company is responsible for the provision of all unit repair and assists in the recovery of the unit’s equipment. The platoon or company has three specialist repair groups, which are the vehicle section, the weapons section, and the radio and electronic equipment repair and maintenance section. The platoon is usually under the control of OC Admin Coy.

8.28 Assistant Adjutant. The assistant ADJT understudies the ADJT and is responsible for all unit personnel administration, particularly reinforcement, replacement and casualty documentation. The assistant ADJT is located in the HQ in barracks, and usually in B Echelon when deployed.

8.29 Regimental Medical Officer. The regimental medical officer is a fully qualified general practitioner and is part of the CO’s command team, being responsible to the CO for the unit’s combat health function.

8.30 Sub-unit Commanders. Sub-unit commanders remain responsible to the CO for the care of personnel and the maintenance and security of all stores and equipment in their sub-unit.

8.31 Sub-unit Second in Command. Sub-unit XOs understudy the OC and implement the administrative plan for the sub-unit. They must stay informed of the tactical situation and plans so that they can be ready to assume command if necessary. Their CSS functions are as follows:

a. resupply of the sub-unit;

b. the administration of all attached personnel;

c. the maintenance of equipment and stores;
the maintenance of allocated or organic transport support;

e. the accurate submission of administrative reports and returns;

f. the supervision of HQ personnel, including those attached;

g. the supervision of local combat health with the sub-unit medical personnel;

h. the siting of the sub-unit aid post and the organisation of casevac;

i. the establishment of the sub-unit kitchen when centralised cooking is possible;

j. the organisation of the sub-unit drop point or zone or landing point for the reception of supplies by air; and

k. arrangements for burials under the direction of unit HQ if required.

8.32 Padre/Chaplain. While not always directly involved in the CSS system, the padre contributes to the delivery of personnel support services and must be considered a part of the overall CSS plan.

SECTION 8-6. COALITION OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

8.33 When operating as part of a coalition force, infantry CSS staff will need to consider the following general CSS issues:

a. What is the force requirement for infantry support, particularly those special CSS considerations required for the long-term sustainment of isolated small combined arms teams?

b. How best can the infantry unit’s sustainability requirements be met through a specified combination of
c. What responsibility is the supported or supporting force accepting for the provision of CSS to the infantry force?

d. What are the contributing coalition force’s sustainability requirements and how will this affect the infantry force if allocated in support?

e. What is the requirement for infantry LOs?
CHAPTER 9
INFANTRY EMPLOYMENT IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

SECTION 9-1. INTRODUCTION

9.1 Different environments have a unique impact on vehicles, personnel and equipment that changes groupings, tactics and procedures. Personnel will require special training for each environment and infantry vehicles will require specific preparation. Failure to undertake the required training and/or modifications will compromise the infantry capability.

9.2 This chapter describes the impact of the environment on infantry and the considerations for the employment of infantry in the tropical, desert, cold weather, CBRN and urban environments.

SECTION 9-2. TROPICAL

Impact on Capability

9.3 Significant factors that impact on the capability of infantry in tropical environments include:

a. Heavy vegetation and steep terrain will limit the use of vehicles.

b. Armoured vehicles will require infantry escort and close protection in dense vegetation.

c. Periods of sustained heavy rain reduce the effectiveness of sensors, can affect the electronics of vehicles and can cause a greater than normal number of equipment failures.

d. Humidity and precipitation may impact on the reliability and performance of fuel and ammunition.
e. Reduced road and across-country travel may place a potentially higher reliance on aviation assets for mobility and other support. This may necessitate an increase in the rate of flying and increased tempo for the aviation force.

f. Difficulties may be experienced when navigating in heavy vegetation. GPS may not be as useful in steep terrain.

g. Fields of view and observation are likely to be impeded by the vegetation and canopy. This will have an impact on sensor effectiveness and weapons effect. Identification of the enemy may not be possible until well inside engagement range.

h. Dense vegetation will reduce the effectiveness of airborne reconnaissance and firepower. Low cloud may also prevent aviation from supporting ground activity.

i. Higher temperatures affect the performance of soldiers and reduce their capacity to carry combat loads. Heat stress and dehydration will be of concern.

j. Hygiene and sanitation will be more important. Heat and humidity are breeding grounds for fungus and bacteria. Tropical diseases, including mosquito-borne diseases, will be more prevalent.

k. All troops deployed into theatre need to undergo a period of acclimatisation to avoid a higher than normal risk of accident.

l. There will be a greater likelihood of ambush.

Planning Factors

9.4 The following factors need to be emphasised when planning for missions in tropical terrain:

a. the effects of adverse weather and particularly the effects of monsoonal conditions;

b. the impact of mobility on tempo;
c. the reduced flexibility and manoeuvrability of vehicles;
d. a degraded aircraft flight performance;
e. the difficulty of combat identification;
f. the reduced sensor footprint and effectiveness due to vegetation and weather;
g. reduced personal endurance;
h. the increased requirement for clean water;
i. the increased demand for combat health and medical supplies;
j. the suitability of pick-up zones, landing zones and other operating locations;
k. the effect of terrain and low cloud on the dependability of aircraft support;
l. the requirement for combined arms team synchronisation and training; and
m. the requirement for acclimatisation and in-theatre training.

SECTION 9-3. DESERT

Impact on Capability

9.5 Significant factors that impact on the capability of infantry in desert environments include:

a. Routine vehicle maintenance in sandy and dusty conditions is significantly more difficult and could affect operational readiness and availability.

b. The abrasive nature of sand and dust on and inside moving components (e.g. the drive train) significantly reduces their service life and the mean time between failures. This in turn impacts on the rate and intensity of maintenance, the number of spares which must be held, and the overall vehicle and equipment serviceability.
c. Poor weather, including low visibility caused by blowing dust or sand and strong winds, may adversely affect capability.

d. Large areas of flat, open terrain will impact on the ability of forces to move without being observed or engaged.

e. Extremes of heat and cold affect the performance of personnel and vehicles. When the temperature of vehicle systems exceeds the cooling system capacity, engines, avionics and sensors may not function correctly. Crew endurance will also be impacted.

f. Operating at night with high ambient moonlight may adversely affect the visual perception of terrain features and the utility of night vision devices.

g. Thermal imagers are less effective during the day, and visual sensors are subject to the effects of heat haze.

h. Navigation is made difficult in areas with poor mapping and/or flat featureless terrain.

Planning Factors

9.6 The following factors need to be emphasised when planning for missions in desert environments:

a. Rapid changes in climatic and environmental conditions can prohibit or limit the availability of aircraft support. Aircraft flight performance may be reduced, thus decreasing aircraft payload and range.

b. Environmental conditions, particularly sand and grit, can impact on vehicle components and their resultant availability.

c. The maintenance tempo must increase to maintain serviceability, necessitating the requirement for increased levels of Class 9 items.

d. TTP require modification on flat surfaces to reduce the possibility of detection and engagement by enemy weapon systems.
e. There is a requirement for adequately sheltered maintenance and supply facilities, normally found at fixed operating bases, to enable maintenance during periods of poor weather.

f. The vulnerability of forward operating bases and patrol bases to detection and interdiction by the enemy may increase during periods of extended visibility.

g. There is a requirement for acclimatisation and in-theatre training.

SECTION 9-4. COLD CONDITIONS

Impact on Capability

9.7 Significant factors that impact on the capability of infantry in cold weather include:

a. Low temperatures, wind, ice and snow can impact on vehicle serviceability rates, effective maintenance practices, ground support and personnel capability. Additional time is required to complete all ground support tasks.

b. Poor visibility and strong winds may reduce sensor and weapon ranges. Contingency plans are required.

c. Operating in snow can be difficult due to glare, a reduced or no horizon, and limited or no depth perception. Additionally, glare can reduce the effectiveness of optical sensor systems.

d. The preheating of key vehicle components may be required in temperatures below minus 10 °C.

e. Icy conditions will impact on the availability of aircraft support.

f. Thermal imagery will be more effective. Warm bodies and hot machinery will be more visible against a cold background.
g. During cold weather, vehicles and electrical equipment develop increased static electricity. High levels of static electricity increase the level of risk during refuelling and rearming. Additionally, static electricity can adversely affect electrical systems and sensor performance.

h. Snow can hide obstacles and traps for vehicles. Heavy snow will also slow movement by foot. Footprints will be highly visible, and it will be difficult to disguise activity.

i. A thick layer of snow alters the appearance of the landscape terrain, making features more difficult to locate or interpret and navigation more difficult.

j. Extreme cold conditions can render equipment and systems inoperable. This is a particular consideration for aviation assets.

**Planning Factors**

**9.8** The following factors need to be emphasised when planning infantry missions in cold weather environments:

a. an increased vehicle maintenance regime or alterations to practices and structures;

b. the impact of poor weather and other environmental effects on aviation support;

c. likely decreases in vehicle and equipment serviceability;

d. increases in the tempo of flight activity to compensate for a reduction in ground mobility;

e. the need for appropriate personal protective equipment, support equipment and specialist vehicle equipment;

f. suitably heated and protected accommodation and maintenance facilities to enable maintenance to continue in bad weather;

g. the requirement for acclimatisation and in-theatre training; and
h. the requirement for access to meteorological forecast and observation technology.

SECTION 9-5. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENTS

Impact on Capability

9.9 Significant factors that impact on the capability of infantry in a CBRN environment include:

a. Infantry vehicles offer little or no protection from a CBRN threat.

b. Troops would be required to wear protective clothing, which limits their endurance. The provision of suitable personal protective equipment will challenge the supply system.

c. Decontamination facilities and equipment is required, and decontamination is a lengthy process.

d. CBRN-suitable accommodation and maintenance areas are required to be provided.

e. The generation of sustained tempo may be difficult in such an environment.

f. Significant training is required to gain confidence in the equipment and to fight in it.

g. Increased fatigue is experienced by soldiers in a CBRN environment.

Planning Factors

9.10 The following factors should be considered when planning for missions in a CBRN environment:

a. the threat and type of agent and the extent of contamination;

b. dispersion versus concentration and the threat of follow-on attacks;
c. weather affects the dispersion of CBRN products or agents, and some areas may be easier to operate in than others;
d. the level of training and extent of equipment allocation;
e. vehicle modifications and personal protective equipment;
f. the availability of detection and decontamination equipment;
g. time for the qualification of personnel;
h. training;
i. the rotation of forces; and
j. the requirement to continue to provide CSS.

SECTION 9-6. URBAN

Impact on Capability

9.11 Significant factors that impact on infantry in urban areas include:

a. Streets are natural fire lanes and dispersion is difficult when moving along them.
b. Every building is a potential source of ambush, and each one may have to be cleared in turn. Once cleared, buildings must be secured to prevent them being reoccupied and necessitating re-clearing.
c. Frontages are often restricted and it is difficult to mass direct firepower.
d. Engagement ranges will often be short, negating the advantages of long-range weapon systems.
e. The enemy may be sheltering among the civilian population, and it may be difficult to distinguish combatants from noncombatants.
f. The availability of landing zones will be limited due to the nature of the terrain. Rooftop landings may be required. This will impact on the conduct of airmobile and aeromedical evacuation.

g. Low-flying aircraft are vulnerable to small arms fire. Downed aircraft and aircrew can quickly be lost to enemy action or hostile intent unless rapidly reinforced or recovered.

h. Visibility may be degraded due to weather, smog from industrial sites and smoke from fires.

i. Navigation may be difficult if street maps are not available or structural damage to buildings blocks many streets.

j. Manoeuvrability and engagement ranges may be limited due to the presence of buildings and obstacles.

k. Communications may be degraded due to urban sprawl and the presence of high-rise buildings. This may require the use of retransmission facilities.

l. The capacity of night vision devices may be diminished due to the higher light levels and numerous thermal sources found in urban areas.

m. Aircraft are vulnerable to all forms of enemy fire when operating at low airspeeds and at the lower altitudes that may be required for mission survivability or accomplishment.

Planning Factors

9.12 The following factors need to be emphasised when planning for missions in urban environments:

a. training in urban environments is required,

b. small teams will be very useful,

c. the provision of an unbroken networked communications framework,
d. the regular rotation of troops engaged in high-stress activities such as house clearing,

e. route selection to account for speed and possible ambushing,

f. measures to avoid fratricide and to assist in avoiding decisive engagement by the enemy,

g. combined arms team synchronisation and training should take place prior to employment,

h. preparation is required to respond rapidly for downed aircraft recovery and combat search and rescue,

i. combat limitations and media relations, and

j. planning is required to avoid or mitigate any potential conflict with civil activities.
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