Land Warfare Doctrine 3-8-6
Civil–Military Cooperation
2018

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Australian Army

Land Warfare Doctrine

LWD 3-8-6

Civil–Military Cooperation

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Issued by command of
Chief of Army

SH Porter
Major General
Commander
2nd Division
Preface

Australian Land Warfare Doctrine and Land Warfare Procedures publications are authorised land doctrine for the guidance of Australian Defence Force operations. Land Warfare Doctrine publications are authored at the philosophical and application level while Land Warfare Procedures publications are authored at the procedural level.

The content of this publication has been drawn from general lessons, principles and doctrine contained in other relevant publications, instructions and agreements. Every opportunity should be taken by users of this publication to examine its contents, applicability and currency. If deficiencies or errors are found, amendment action should be taken. Land Doctrine invites any assistance to improve this publication.

Aim

The aim of this publication is to provide guidance on the responsibilities, procedures and planning considerations for the achievement of civil–military cooperation effects.

Level

This publication is the functional tactical doctrine and procedures written to support commander’s integration of civil–military cooperation effects into combat brigade, minor joint task force, battlegroup or combat team operations.

Scope

This publication is for use by Australian Defence Force commanders, staff and senior non-commissioned officers engaged in civil–military cooperation training, as well as planning civil–military cooperation inform and influence actions as part of an operation or a tactical task. It is aimed at the tactical level for brigade or minor joint task force down to combat team or patrol commanders. It should be used as a reference when participating in decision-making processes where population protection is required, as well as when civil–military cooperation inform and influence actions are directed toward target audiences within the civil space. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the purpose, definition and tenets of civil–military cooperation, as well as describing standing Australian Defence Force civil–military cooperation capability. Chapter 2 describes the civil space, elaborating on some priority areas that typically are relevant to understanding risks and opportunities relating to the mission and the civil space. Chapter 3 details the guiding principles for conducting civil–military cooperation tasks, including civil space collection tasks and civil–military cooperation inform and influence actions. Chapter 4 provides guidance on the staff procedures for...
managing information, reporting and for preparing non-kinetic targeting recommendations to working groups and boards for decision. Finally, Chapter 5 provides specific guidance on civil–military cooperation inputs to intelligence preparation of the battlespace and the staff military appreciation process.

Images

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Summary of changes

Changes have been made to this publication and a familiarisation with all of the content is highly recommended. Significant changes from the most recent rewrite are listed in the following table.

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Chapter 1

Civil–military cooperation

In the past, wars were fought mainly on battlefields, but by the end of the 20th century a fundamental shift has occurred – civilians have moved to centre stage in the theatre of war. This fundamental shift in the character of war is illustrated by a stark statistic: in World War I, nine soldiers were killed for every civilian life lost. In today’s wars, it is estimated that 10 civilians die for every soldier or fighter killed in battle.¹

Modern military endeavour is complex, as is the battlespace in which it is conducted. Gone are the days of two-dimensional battlefields devoid of actors other than opposing military forces. In the 21st century, militaries must work within a multidimensional battlespace which embraces the land, maritime, air, space and information environments. These environments are shared by a multitude of civil actors engaged in the full spectrum of human activity. The need to deconflict and coordinate military and civilian activity within the same space is essential to maximise the success of military operations and minimise disruption to civilian activities. As such, military decision-makers must understand and consider the civil space during the planning and conduct of operations.

Typically, military operations occur when fragile or failing states are unable to adequately protect and serve the population. This can be due to warfare, internal conflict or natural disaster. Such environments are characterised by a breakdown in security, reduced access to essential services, population displacement and destruction of infrastructure. Civilians are likely to experience chaos, suffering, violence, social and economic dislocation, and the destruction of life and property. Military operations address the threats and/or destabilising factors which are either the cause of, or caused by, instability. Myriad civil stakeholders (referred to as actors) – both indigenous and international – will also be active within the battlespace. They may be conducting activities designed to reduce destabilising factors, provide humanitarian aid and build or rebuild the state’s capacity to protect and serve its population. Conversely, they may be antagonists who profit in some way from the chaos and breakdown of law and order.

The multitude of actors – both civil and military – operating within an area affected by warfare, complex emergency² or disaster cannot avoid constant interaction with each other. If not managed, this can easily lead to misconceptions of the

². A multifaceted humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires a multi-sectoral, international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country program.
The presence of a military force, its military manoeuvre and strike actions, its logistics capabilities, as well as a myriad of other minor interactions, all have physical and psychological impacts that influence attitudes and perceptions of civil actors. It is therefore important that civil–military interactions (CMIs) are deliberately managed to maximise the success of military operations.

Everything an armed force does, or does not do, may impact on civil perceptions of the military. These perceptions can be positive or negative, accurate or false, but often result in actions (or reactions) by civil actors and those whom they influence, which have the potential to support or significantly hinder the achievement of the military mission. The challenge is to understand the civil actors and consider the consequences of military presence, posture and activity upon them and then develop plans which maximises their support and minimises disruption to them. This is the role of civil–military cooperation (CIMIC) within the ADF.

Civil–military cooperation purpose and definition

Purpose
The purpose of CIMIC is to establish, maintain, influence and exploit relationships between the military force and civil actors in support of the military mission.

Australian Defence Force definition
The ADF defines CIMIC as the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international organisations, national organisations and NGOs and non-government agencies.

Other terminology
The term CIMIC is widely used by other militaries and civil organisations, as are a number of other terms that identify how military forces and civil actors manage relationships between their respective mandates and objectives. It is therefore important that ADF military planners and commanders are aware of how terms are used by international and humanitarian organisations as well as other nations’ military forces to represent their mandate and objectives. There are four principal terms used to describe the civil and military relationship in other contexts.

Civil–military interactions. CMI is a NATO term specifically describing a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors. Such activities mutually increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises.

Civil–military operation. A civil–military operation (CMO) is conducted in support of military operations or in times of emergency aimed at enhancing the
effectiveness of a military force or civil operation and reducing the negative aspects of military operations on civilians.

**Civil affairs.** The term civil affairs (CA) is predominantly used in the United States military to denote component forces and units organised, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct CA activities and to support CMOs. CA activities are those activities that enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities, involving the application of CA functional specialist skills, in areas that are normally the responsibility of civil government, or activities to enhance CMOs.

**United Nations civil–military coordination.** UN civil–military coordination is defined as the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Civil–military coordination is a function mandated to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) under international agreements at the UN.

Differences in these definitions are due to differences in force structures, coalition arrangements, and agendas/missions. More importantly, the commonality in these definitions focuses on the importance of optimising the civil–military interface in order to support the achievement of the mission. In the ADF context, CIMIC is the primary term used to describe interaction between civil actors and military forces.

**Civil–military cooperation and information operations**

To understand how CIMIC is utilised within a joint task force (JTF), an understanding of information operations (IO) (see Figure 1–1) and inform and influence actions (IIA) is essential. CIMIC effects contribute to achievement of military IO objectives through IIA. IO and IIA are defined as:

- IO is the operational level planning and execution of integrated, coordinated and synchronised kinetic and non-kinetic (NK) actions against the capability, will and understanding of a target audience (TA).
- IIA are the coordinated and synchronised execution of tactical tasks by assigned information-related capabilities (IRCs) during operations. IIA generate and sustain changes in the operational environment to place friendly forces in a position of advantage. IIA is broadly categorised as command and information protection, counter-command, and influence actions executed to meet IO objectives.

**Conduct of inform and influence actions**

IIA planning and execution is conducted at the JTF HQ through the daily battle rhythm of working groups (WGs) and deliberate planning. The JTF HQ seeks to identify targets or a TA and, through IIA, alter their perceptions or attack their will to fight. IIA may be either positive or negative depending upon the TA and the outcome sought.
Information-related capabilities

IRCs are the tools, capabilities or processes that can have effects of a physical, functional, temporal or psychological nature upon targets or TAs and/or to protect our own use of information. Information actions are the use of IRCs planned and coordinated to create specific effects to achieve the mission.

CIMIC is an IRC which directly influences the civil population. CIMIC activity is guided by the commander’s IO narrative, objectives and themes. Through the IO concept, CIMIC IIA are coordinated and synchronised with the activities of other IRCs to support the manoeuvre plan.

IRCs include:
- CIMIC
- computer network operations
- counter-intelligence
- electronic warfare (EW)
- evidentiary imagery information assurance
- key leader engagement (KLE)
- military deception
- military networking
- military public affairs (MPA)
Tenets of civil–military cooperation

There are seven tenets of effective CIMIC which need to be considered while developing plans or advice:

- mission primacy
- unity of effort
- coordination
- identification of common goals
- minimising adverse military impact
- prioritisation and concentration
- international treaty obligations.

**Mission primacy.** The military mission is the driver of all military activity, therefore CIMIC considerations must contribute to mission achievement. Incorporating CIMIC considerations in mission statements actively facilitates the development of civil–military relationships assessed to be beneficial to the achievement of the military mission. As such, tactical missions should include direction and guidance for civil space effects and end state conditions.

**Unity of effort.** Unity of effort requires all agencies to work toward a common agreed end state, through a common, mandated coordinating authority. An appreciation of the civil space and its impact on the operational environment enables the commander to consider relevant civil factors when setting priorities for tasks. These factors include the priorities of:

- the Government of Australia (GOAS)
- host nation (HN) authorities
- key actors within the international community
- governments of coalition partners.

Where CIMIC force elements (FEs) are working with communities to achieve influence effects, the local community and HN government’s needs, goals, and expectations should be considered and prioritised in accordance with the unified
effort. The operations of humanitarian actors in the area or sector should also be considered.

**Coordination.** Coordination mechanisms deconflict the actions and activities of actors and agencies including civil and military actors in order to achieve the military mission.

**Identification of common goals.** Goals of civil actors need to be understood in order to identify those that are common with military goals; however there will be many civil objectives that do not complement military goals. In these circumstances, military commanders should respect civil objectives if they are legitimate and lawful, even though they may be mutually exclusive to military goals.

**Minimising adverse military impact.** There is a legal, moral and operational responsibility to minimise the adverse impact on people, economies and infrastructure from military activities and operations. When the military force accesses local civilian resources, care must be shown to ensure that the civil population life support and support to essential services and economic security are not adversely affected.

**Prioritisation and concentration.** Military resources available for population support tasks and indigenous capacity building (ICB) are likely to be limited. While local commanders may have discretionary authority within guidelines, scarcity of resources as well as maintenance of the aim and concentration of effort requires civil influence activities to be prioritised. This is to ensure that only those activities supporting the mission, the main effort (ME), the higher commander’s intent and Australian whole-of-government (WOG) priorities are conducted and sustained.

**International treaty obligations.** International treaties and laws place certain obligations on commanders to protect life and property. Commanders have a legal and moral obligation to prevent unnecessary suffering by protecting noncombatants, cultural heritage, and critical infrastructure. This responsibility extends to people and infrastructure impacted by military operations.

**Civil–military cooperation functions**

The three CIMIC functions that define the CIMIC mission-essential task (MET) list are:

- MET 1 – enhance situational understanding of the civil space
- MET 2 – support/enhance decision-making
- MET 3 – conduct tactical CIMIC tasks.
Staff civil–military cooperation tasks

CIMIC staff tasks to enhance situational understanding and support decisions include:

- understand how the civil space impacts military operations
- understand how military operations affect the civil environment
- design, synchronise and deliver messages to civil TAs
- design, synchronise and deliver CIMIC IIA
- contribute to the identification and prioritisation of engagement for key leaders and influencers
- support planning to enhance population control and protection
- support planning for displaced civilian (DC) operations.

Tactical civil–military cooperation tasks

Civil space information collection. CIMIC operators continually observe and monitor actors within the civil space. Through their dealings with civil actors they are well placed to collect information to support the overall information collection process.

Inform and influence actions. Military influence on civil agencies, organisations, or individuals isolates threat groups, provides opportunities to collect information and encourages civil cooperation, or at least civil actors’ tolerance of military objectives and actions. CIMIC influence activities seek to achieve four essential outcomes within the civil space:

- reduce negative impacts from the civil space on the military mission
- enhance protection for the population as well as governance and rule of law by the legitimate civil authority
- reduce negative impacts of military operations on the attitudes and perceptions of actors and sectors across the civil space
- enhance civil agency and actor actions compatible with the military mission and end state (including information collection).

Population support or protection operations. Population support operations are conducted if required to protect life and to support civil agencies in providing humanitarian assistance (HA) or disaster relief (DR). Population support operations should only be conducted by the ADF as a matter of last resort and, for direct support actions, are also referred to as immediate life sustaining assistance (ILSA). Population protection incorporates a range of staff and coordination functions as well as tactical guidance and direction to protect civilians from the impacts of military operations.

Detailed considerations and explanation of CIMIC tasks are covered in Chapter 3.
Civil–military cooperation organisation

Commanders at the tactical level are supported by civil–military cooperation detachments (CDets) raised from within ADF CIMIC tactical support teams (TSTs).

**Civil–military cooperation tactical support team.** CIMIC enabling capability is force assigned to JTF and tactical commanders from Army’s TSTs. The CIMIC TSTs are established within HQ 2 DIV CIMIC Group. Each of the CIMIC TSTs is aligned for force generation to one of the three combat brigades (CBs).

**Civil–military cooperation enabling capability task organisation**

The civil–military cooperation capability brick

For tactical employment, CIMIC enabling capability is task organised according to operational need and tactical conditions. The capability brick is a CIMIC team comprising two CIMIC tactical operators. CIMIC teams are force assigned operational command or operational control to the enabled commander. A technical control link between S9 staff of the respective higher and subordinate HQ is maintained.

**Task organisation for deployment**

Deployment groupings to battlegroup (BG) and JTF should include sufficient CIMIC teams for concurrent staff and tactical employment. The enabled commander will benefit from CIMIC teams providing sustained staff functions as well as CIMIC teams to support tactical CIMIC effects. CIMIC teams may be force assigned to a particular commander for an enduring period when the enabled tactical manoeuvre FE anticipates significant civil space interaction over the period.

The number of CIMIC teams force assigned across or within a deployed force on an operation or exercise is dependent on:

- the task and operational environment of the commander
- the level of interaction of the force with the civil space
- the size of the force being enabled
- the available positions or berths.

The CIMIC staff functions at a HQ for each level of command include:

- S9 principal staff officer (PSO) subject matter expert (SME) adviser
- S95 support to planning
• joint fires and effects coordination centre (JFECC) non-kinetic energy (NKE) and targeting coordinator
• S93 support to current operations monitoring.

Depending on the size of the operation, the requirement for sustained 24 hour operations, and the level of the HQ these functions may require a larger staff group than four, or may be achievable with two staff CIMIC personnel force assigned to provide the staff functions may need to be reassigned across the force to support tactical actions for specific periods or tasks.

Civil–military cooperation force element in the enabled combat brigade

The CIMIC task organisation grouping for a fully enabled CB includes a staff cell of three CIMIC teams, and up to an additional six tactical teams.

The CB CIMIC Staff Cell (CB SOP) is comprised of three teams: which can consist of:
• MAJ S9
• CAPT S95
• CAPT S935 JFECC NKE Coordinator
• WO2 S93
• WO2 KLE Coordinator
• SGT S933 Watchkeeper.

Enabled CB, can be force assigned up to six additional CIMIC tactical teams:
• (1 x CAPT, 1 x WO2) x 3
• (1 x WO2, 1 x SGT) x 3.

Civil–military cooperation enabling capability amphibious ready element

The amphibious task group SOP identifies the following grouping:
• a CIMIC staff team, MAJ S9 and CAPT S95 that supports commander amphibious task force
• four tactical CIMIC teams supporting the ground combat element of the amphibious ready element and amphibious ready group, which can consist of amphibious task group CIMIC staff and tactical teams.

Civil–military cooperation summary

Although CIMIC is one of several IRCs, it has a distinct function in influencing and informing key stakeholders within the civil space. This IIA role needs to be guided by clear guidelines and boundaries and synchronised with other military activities in order to support the enduring narrative. This chapter has provided an overview of the role, structures and environments in which CIMIC activities occur. It has
explained the requirement for coordination and synchronisation with multiple military and civil actors and that CIMIC plans and activities must always support the mission. Before this can be achieved, CIMIC planners and operators must be familiar with the civil environment.
Chapter 2

The civil space

The civil space has multiple characteristics, some that are physical and others that are not. They encompass terrain, infrastructure and the activities, attitudes and locations of civil actors. These actors include government, humanitarian and civilian population individuals and organisations.

This chapter will examine the key characteristics of each of these groups and identify organisations in each that the ADF commonly interacts with while on operations.

Definition – civil space. The civil space is the aggregate of non-military actors, areas and infrastructure pertinent to the mission. It combines three interrelated sectors; the government sector, the humanitarian space and, most importantly, civil society (including the infrastructure and cultural aspects of communities, organisations and people).

When military forces are deployed it is often because the ruling government or governance is ineffective. This may be due to insurgents attempting to overthrow the government, or the institutions of governance being overwhelmed due to a natural disaster or crisis. In extreme circumstances an effective government may be non-existent. Regardless of the level of effectiveness of the government, the ultimate goal of military forces is to set the preconditions for the return of effective government and governance in accordance with Australian WOG policy. As well as their objectives, the GOAS and Australian WOG agencies are the foremost civil space considerations for the commander and the force.

The combination and capacity of the elements of the civil space changes from place to place over time, making the civil space in each operational area different to that in another. Despite this, the civil space has four enduring elements which must be considered in the planning and tactical execution of military operations:

- civil areas, geographic priorities and critical/decisive infrastructure
- HN government system, as well as political and cultural leadership
- civil administration, including essential services and life support, rule of law and economic institutions for stability
- other international government agencies or actors.

It is important that CIMIC operators understand the capabilities of the HN government and the expectations of the GOAS, as this information is crucial in aligning effects, priorities and measures of success.
Government and governance

A government is the system by which a state (or nation) is ordered and controlled. A government is a formal body invested with the authority to make decisions in a given political system. An effective government develops policies, implements laws and maintains effective institutions in order to protect the wellbeing of its constituents. Through the maintenance of effective institutions a government effects good governance. Governance refers to the way the rules, norms and actions are structured, regulated and enforced.

Governance

Governance refers to all processes of governing undertaken by a government, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organisation or territory; and whether through laws, norms, power or language. It includes the processes of interaction and decision-making among the actors involved in a collective problem that leads to the creation, reinforcement, or reproduction of social norms and institutions.

Whether the organisation is a geopolitical entity (nation-state), a corporation (a business or organisation incorporated as a legal entity), a sociopolitical entity (chiefdom, tribe, family, etc.), or of an informal nature, its governance is the way rules, customary procedures and actions are developed, sustained and regulated and its officers are held accountable. The degree of formality depends on the internal rules of a given organisation.

Indicators of effective governance

ADF CIMIC assessment of governance utilises the following six dimensions of effectiveness:¹

• voice and accountability
• political stability and absence of violence
• government effectiveness
• regulatory quality
• rule of law
• control of corruption.

Individuals tolerate the rule of the state by acceptance of the required collective behaviour. Good governance, rule of law, personal security and inalienable rights provide balance for the state. However, the functioning and the acceptance of the rule of the state may become unbalanced through oppression or by the denial of basic rights such as health, education, security and justice. This imbalance may occur through slow degradation or a rapid transition through revolution.

¹. These indicators are derived from the Worldwide Governance Indicators project.
Rule of law

The rule of law is a system in which the following four universal principles are upheld:2

• The government and its officials and agents, as well as individuals and private entities, are accountable under the law.
• The laws are clear, publicised, stable, and just, are applied evenly and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.
• The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient.
• Justice is delivered in a timely fashion by competent, ethical, and independent as well as neutral representatives, who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.

Rule of law factors

These four universal principles are further developed using the following nine factors which measure how the rule of law is experienced by ordinary people:3

• Constraints on government powers. In a society governed by the rule of law, the government and its officials and agents are subject to, and held accountable under the law.
• Absence of corruption. Corruption is a manifestation of the degrees of abuse of position versus diligence; its absence is one of the hallmarks of a society governed by the rule of law.
• Open government. Open government is the degree to which people have access to information about their community, the decisions being made and their own records.
• Fundamental rights. Under the rule of law, fundamental rights must be effectively guaranteed. A system of positive law that fails to respect core human rights established under international law is, at best, ‘rule by law’.
• Order and security. Human security is one of the defining aspects of any rule of law society. Protecting human security, mainly assuring the security of persons and property, is a fundamental function of the state under the social contract.
• Regulatory enforcement. Public enforcement of government regulations is pervasive in modern societies as a method to induce conduct. Regulations include building codes, training and education compliance, fire and emergency procedures, workplace health and safety legislation, licensing, and many more.

2. This definition is taken from The World Justice Project.
3. These factors are drawn from the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index.
Civil justice. In a rule of law society, ordinary people should be able to resolve their grievances and obtain remedies, in conformity with fundamental rights, through formal institutions of justice in a peaceful process. Dispute resolution with representation and arbitration under scrutiny of the law is also essential to the access of civil justice.

Criminal justice. An effective criminal justice system is a key aspect of the rule of law, as it constitutes the natural mechanism to redress grievances and bring action against individuals for offences against society.

Informal justice. For many countries it is important to acknowledge the role played by traditional, or ‘informal’, systems of law. Informal systems of law include traditional, tribal, and religious courts, as well as community-based mediation. Informal systems are used in all countries and include workplace mediation, relationship mediation, wage negotiation processes involving union representation, as well as religious jurisdictional systems such as Catholic canon law or Islamic Sharia law. Such systems are established processes and can be effective as well as just and legitimate.

Government of Australia

No emergency in the 21st century occurs in isolation, with ripple effects occurring in countless ways across the globe. The GOAS will select agencies to participate in a crisis response in accordance with Australia’s national priorities and strategic interests, as well as task suitability tailored to the specific response. These commitments are shaped by international agreements, treaties and Australia’s membership of international organisations. Some key GOAS commitments to international treaties are outlined in Annex A.

When ADF forces deploy, they do so at the direction of the GOAS. In most circumstances the ADF will be a component of a WOG effort. This approach integrates the resources of multiple agencies – including the ADF – and is specifically tailored to address specific needs assessed and prioritised by government. DFAT will usually be the lead agency with the ADF in support.

Regardless of which GOAS organisation is assigned as lead agency, careful negotiation, communication, and coordination will be required to ensure that the actions of the ADF and other GOAS agencies are mutually supporting. JTF commanders will often look to CIMIC to coordinate with other government agencies (OGAs). It is therefore important that strong relationships are developed with key staff from these agencies and that a common understanding of the mission is established. This will ensure that potential problems are averted and opportunities created for deconfliction, mutual support and cooperation.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. DFAT’s role is to advance the interests of Australia and Australians internationally by strengthening Australia’s security, enhancing Australia’s prosperity and providing assistance to Australians overseas. The department provides foreign and trade policy advice to the
government and works with OGAs to ensure that Australia’s pursuit of its global, regional and bilateral interests is coordinated effectively. The two main branches of DFAT actors that the military will encounter on operations are:

- Australian consular posts and embassies provide representational and consular services on behalf of the GOAS. Military liaison with the head of post or ambassador is conducted by the senior operational commander or their representative. There is often a military attaché with Australian diplomatic missions who can assist in military/consular liaison. In some instances Australia may not have a diplomatic mission in an affected country. In these circumstances a DFAT political adviser may be embedded with the JTF HQ.

- Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) is the sub-agency responsible for Australia’s overseas aid program. The objective of the aid program is to influence strategic regional interests by assisting developing countries to promote prosperity, reduce poverty and enhance stability in line with Australia’s national interest.

DFAT presence in the HN often pre-dates the arrival of ADF troops. Consular staff will have well-established relationships with the higher level leaders of HN government. Similarly, AusAID workers will have well established relationships with humanitarian actors in the HN, as well as regional level HN government actors.

**Australian Federal Police.** The Australian Federal Police (AFP) employs the core principles of prevention, deterrence, partnerships and innovation when involved in a GOAS crisis response. The AFP works with the GOAS and key agencies on a range of counterterrorism, crime-fighting, and capacity building initiatives. The AFP is routinely found in operational areas through all phases of the operation.

**Other Government of Australia actors.** Other GOAS organisations that are commonly encountered by military personnel on operations include those specialising in:

- immigration and border protection
- electoral matters
- health and epidemiology
- environment and natural resources
- finance and economy.

The nature of the crisis being responded to and the phase of the response will dictate the presence of other GOAS agencies.
Host nation

ADF deployments must always be cognisant of the HN and its government. It is the HN’s duty to protect and serve its population, providing governance and essential services as well as rule of law. In the case of crisis affected communities, whether from armed conflict or from natural disaster, it remains the responsibility of the HN government to provide protection, response and recovery for its citizens. It is likely that when combat operations or peace and stability operations occur there will be an accompanying humanitarian crisis. This does not correspondingly mean that the ADF is deployed on a humanitarian operation wherever conflict occurs to which GOAS send an ADF response. A précis of key elements defining humanitarian operations is in Annex B.

Where a HN government exists in the theatre of operations, ADF forces will support maintaining or returning control by legitimate authorities. Where the HN government has become ineffective (or non-existent) ADF forces will work towards setting the conditions for a return to normalcy and a legitimate authority. This will usually be done as part of a WOG effort.

When an effective (or partially effective) HN government remains, the ADF deployment will usually occur under an agreement between the HN and the GOAS, referred to as a Status of Forces Agreement (commonly known as SOFA). Regardless of the conditions of the Status of Forces Agreement, ADF forces must respect HN sovereignty. To achieve this, commanders of military forces need to understand the structure and nature of the HN government including:

- government leaders and other members of the government
- representational leaders
- senior personnel from executive government directorates, departments and services
- other influential government appointees or employees
- the judiciary
- security/emergency services (eg, police/military/fire)
- community services (power, water, infrastructure, telecommunications, health services, sanitation, etc.).

CIMIC operators are expected to understand the structure and capabilities of the HN government and civil society. Through CIMIC analysis tools such as political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure (PMESII)/areas, structures, capacities, organisations, people, events (ASCOPE) and stakeholder analysis CIMIC operators identify the key government and civil service capabilities, as well as personalities to understand areas of opportunity and risk. CIMIC operators are expected to understand and advise on the effect that HN government has on sectors of the civil community or other civil actors. CIMIC operators also must be able to identify key factors that enable the ADF to positively
influence the HN government. This insight allows an ADF commander to align their operations to the higher level goals of the GOAS.

Civilian society

The civil community encompasses all civilians within an area, region or battlespace. Civil society is the ‘third sector’ of society, along with government and business. It comprises civil society organisations and NGOs, as well as communities and civil community relationships. Civil society organisations and NGOs refer to organisations with a primary focus on social purpose, whether local, regional or national, or voluntary, not-for-profit or social enterprise. These include extended familial organisations or identities, cultural and religious as well as social, sporting and donor or assistance organisations. Civil society includes community relationships and interactions between community service organisations, people in communities and organisations in different sectors (including business and government). Civil society depends on a range of infrastructure to function and remain stable. A description of what constitutes relevant HN civil society infrastructure is included in Annex C.

A civilian community is defined by several factors, including:

- geographical identity
- cultural heritage
- political or economic factors
- legal jurisdictions
- access to information systems
- ethnic and religious demographics
- level of human need.

These and other factors delineate one group of civilians from another and provide indicators whether the groups can coexist, intermingle or are so disparate that conflict is inevitable. There are many groups or communities of civilians within the general population of any geographic area. Individuals or subgroups may belong to one or more communities. It is the role of CIMIC to understand the civil community, the different groups that exist and what motivates each group.

Community leaders. All population groups have individuals who are able to influence significant sectors of a given population group. Although these leaders may have formal authority and representative responsibility (e.g., a town mayor or school principal), many informal leaders exist in every community and should not be overlooked by military commanders. Community leaders may not hold a government position but are able to influence community opinions, decisions and actions. In many societies community leaders have constitutionally endorsed authority in community arbitration and legal affairs, land tenure decisions, economic influence or community communication networks. CIMIC specialists
assist in identifying these informal community leaders and assessing the level of influence they have in order to gauge the impact on, or potential for, liaison with such leaders. Identifying and supporting traditional leadership in parallel to formal government leadership often results in accelerated improvement in civil capacity, thus reducing the need for military support.

**Categories of civilians**

**General population.** The general population includes inhabitants who hold no formal office, posting or position that identifies them as a representative of a recognised administration or mandated organisation. Where a military intervention occurs, the general population will be affected by the lack of security and/or essential services. This can make them vulnerable and concerned about their safety, as well as their future. Commanders and their staff should understand the concerns of the general population, including risks to their safety, security and stability, in order to address the associated risks so as to factor protection, control and essential life support governance into the plan.

**Resident civilians.** Resident civilians are indigenous to an area or residing permanently in that area. They remain in close proximity to their home and, if forced to evacuate, will go to a nominated evacuation location in order to return to their homes at the earliest opportunity. Resident civilians include the established local population as well as visiting foreign workers and relatively newly arrived civil relief workers all continuing to go about their business as best they can, according to the daily situation. Resident populations have a greater capacity to care for themselves than do DCs. As such, it is far better for resident populations to remain in location where possible. If displacement or evacuation is required due to the danger presented by natural hazards or military manoeuvre, military planners need to factor in the coordination, CIMIC and potential logistic impacts of providing life support to a displaced population as well as the effect that this will have on the manoeuvre plan if civil agencies/organisations cannot adequately support the need.

Temporarily displaced populations can be returned rapidly to their home communities if governance, shelter, security and emergency relief are available. In such circumstances, military planners should consider the capacity of civil security and response agencies, civil emergency coordination mechanisms and the potential logistic impacts of the life support requirements of displaced persons and resident civilians. These factors inform considerations regarding the combined effects of displacement and resident civilian needs on the civil agencies’ capacities, as well as the effect of the resulting humanitarian situation on the mission, on military manoeuvre and on the enduring narrative. In particular, military planners should consider appropriate CIMIC contingencies for circumstances where the responsible civil agencies capacity cannot meet the humanitarian need using their current capacity.

**Displaced civilians.** DC is a generic term describing persons who have left their home because of armed conflict, generalised violence, human rights violations or natural or human-made disasters. DCs may be local residents who find...
themselves without shelter or are moving from danger and have not yet travelled
great distances. Equally, they may have travelled significant distances depending
on the circumstances of the crisis and the opportunities for refuge, security and life
offered elsewhere. There are five categories of DC, each with different rights and
protections:

- **Evacuees.** Evacuees are those individuals who:
  - are civilians
  - have been removed from their place of residence by military authority
    for their own personal security or because of the requirements of the
    military situation.

- **Internally displaced persons.** Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are those
  individuals who:
  - have not crossed an international border
  - have fled their homes or places of habitual residence because of
    armed conflict, generalised violence, human rights violations or
    natural or human-made disasters.

- **Asylum-seekers.** Asylum-seekers are displaced persons who claim to be
  refugees and are awaiting verification of their claim.

- **Refugees.** Refugees are those persons who:
  - have left the country of their nationality and crossed an international
    border
  - are fleeing persecution
  - suffer persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in
    a particular social group or political opinion.

- **Stateless persons.** Stateless persons are those individuals who are not
  considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law. Those
  born in refugee camps are often categorised as stateless persons.

### Managing displaced civilians

The management of a DC should ideally be managed by the HN and/or
humanitarian actors within the battlespace. Military involvement should only occur
as a matter of last resort or when the DC interferes with military operations. In
either circumstance, military involvement should be as short as possible until
appropriate organisations can resume their management.

DCs do impose a burden on the HN and local communities. The provision of
welfare and protection for these people places extra pressure on essential
services, police services, community security perceptions, social and cultural
structures and community space. Often this burden exceeds the HN or
community’s capacity.
Notwithstanding the burden DCs can impose on a fragile community, protection and welfare of DCs is an international priority. It is therefore essential that DC populations are monitored in order to inform the military planning effort. Monitoring the locations and movement corridors of DCs allows tactical commanders to either avoid massed DCs or provide discrete locations and movement corridors.

**International and humanitarian actors**

**International organisations**

International organisations are established by intergovernmental agreements and operate at the international level. The most prominent international organisations are the UN and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. International organisations also include defence and trade collaborative associations such as NATO and the Association of South-East Asian Nations. Other international organisations include constituent organisations, agencies and funds of the UN which are responsible for administration, coordination and conduct of DR, HA, technical assistance and recovery.

The disparate nature of international organisations makes it difficult to generalise about their characteristics. Clearly, a security-focused body like NATO is fundamentally different to an international organisation with a humanitarian or diplomatic agenda. Security actors tend to have evolved characteristics that mirror military hierarchical structures while the humanitarian sector reflects the decentralised and flattened approaches needed to derive maximum field-based effect. This publication will focus on international organisations operating within the humanitarian space.

**The United Nations**

The primary purpose of the UN is to maintain peace and security throughout the world and to develop friendly relations among nations. Membership of the UN is a voluntary association of sovereign states which are signatories to the UN Charter. Signatories have made a national commitment to ensure international peace and security through international cooperation to solve economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems.

The UN is a large and complex organisation. Its operations are managed and coordinated by several organic offices or agencies delineated according to function. The following UN organisations are among those whose staff or activities are most likely to be encountered within an area of operations (AO):

- UN OCHA or the OCHA
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- UN missions.
A detailed description of the UN organisations listed in the preceding paragraphs is contained in Annex D.

An explanation of the UN bodies’ mandates and methods for coordination of humanitarian response to crises is located in Annex E.

Humanitarian actors

Humanitarian actors may be individuals or organisations, ranging in size from one to many thousands of workers. Humanitarian actors are divided into two main groups:

• **International organisations.** These are large, global and have well-organised internal structures and functions.

• **Non-government organisations.** These vary considerably in their organisation, capability and reflect the agendas of their donors.

Despite the differences, all humanitarian actors subscribe to the core humanitarian principles of:

• **Humanity.** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women, the elderly and the disabled. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.

• **Neutrality.** HA must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.

• **Impartiality.** HA must be provided without discriminating as to a person’s ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, sexuality, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.

The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted the landmark resolution on Women Peace and Security (United Nations Security Council Resolution [UNSCR] 1325) on 31 October 2000. It addresses the significant and disproportionate impact that armed conflict has on women and children, notably girls, as well as recognising the undervalued and under-utilised contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace building.

There are seven related resolutions (these resolutions have been updated starting from 2008) that provide support to UNSCR 1325 and concrete areas for implementation. An explanation of the Australian National Action Plan – Women, Peace and Security is contained in Annex A.4.

The humanitarian principles are included in Appendix 1 to Annex E.

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The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is a global humanitarian movement of 80 million people that helps those facing disaster, conflict and health and social problems. It consists of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the 190 national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies.

The International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation. It has a humanitarian mission to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It also conducts and coordinates international relief and works to promote and strengthen humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. The principal tasks of the ICRC are to:

- monitor compliance of warring parties with the Geneva Conventions
- organise care for those who are wounded on the battlefield
- supervise the treatment of POWs and make confidential interventions with detaining authorities
- help with the search for missing persons in an armed conflict
- organise protection and care for civil populations
- act as a neutral intermediary between warring parties.

The ICRC’s authority was formed through a permanent mandate founded in international law – a worldwide mission to help victims of conflicts. The ICRC has a unique status as it fulfils a role conferred upon it by international treaties of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as well as the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. It is the only non-state entity that is a member of the UN.

The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society. Founded in 1919, the IFRC comprises 190 member Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies, a secretariat in Geneva and more than 60 delegations strategically located to support activities around the world. The IFRC carries out relief operations to assist victims of disasters, and combines this with development work to strengthen the capacities of its member national societies. The IFRC work focuses on four core areas:

- promoting humanitarian values
- disaster response
- disaster preparedness
- health and community care.

National Red Cross societies. The unique network of national societies is the IFRC’s principal strength. Cooperation between national societies gives the IFRC
greater potential to develop capacities and assist those most in need. At a local
type, the network enables the IFRC to reach individual communities.

Non-government organisations

NGOs are primarily not-for-profit organisations which are independent of
government, international organisations or commercial interests. In contrast to UN
agencies, NGOs each have their own unique charter and mission. NGOs
generally view themselves as strongly independent from political control in order
to preserve their independence and effectiveness.

NGOs are, however, primarily accountable to their beneficiaries to ensure that the
effects of their actions benefit those that they are trying to help. Secondly, NGOs
are accountable to their benefactors, be they individuals or national donors,
ensuring that funds donated are spent effectively and appropriately. Finally, NGOs
are accountable to their trustees, thereby ensuring that their actions remain true
to their organisation’s values. Military personnel must understand the necessity for
NGOs to defer to the values their trustees, donors and beneficiaries expect them
to be championing. This ‘donor sentiment’ demands that NGOs seek effective
solutions in the most pressing of circumstances and provide support to those most
in need, without consideration as to their loyalties or allegiances.

NGOs conduct a range of activities to:

• support relief or recovery of affected populations
• design and implement recovery and development related projects
• contribute to a specific cause or program.

In recent decades there has been an enormous increase in the number and scale
of NGOs. At one extreme, an NGO may resemble a multinational corporation with
significant budgets, international presence and considerable diplomatic leverage.
At the other end of the scale, local NGOs may pursue a narrow agenda with a low
budget and limited means.

Most NGOs are now signatories of the Code of Conduct for the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in DR. This voluntary code
articulates principles of conduct for NGOs and describes how host governments,
donor governments and international organisations should shape the working
environment to enable the provision of HA. The humanitarian principles of
humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence will dominate civil organisation
involvement in assistance and relief efforts. In many cases the impartiality of
NGOs has been of great benefit, forming the only available means of rebuilding
relations when political dialogue has broken down.

Interaction and understanding. Some NGOs will coordinate their efforts with
those of military organisations if the security and integrity of their operations are
not compromised. Others may not and will vigorously protect their independence,
impartiality and neutrality. Association with security forces, real or perceived, may
jeopardise the safety of NGO workers and their beneficiaries by exposing them to
the risk of reprisal attack or being mistaken as a military target. Consequently, this
has a significant impact on the ability and appetite for humanitarian actors to associate, cooperate or coordinate their activities with military forces. Despite this, experience has demonstrated that an acceptable degree of complementary activity can be achieved if military forces recognise and respect NGO commitment to the humanitarian principles. CIMIC planners need to know enough about the key NGOs within the AO to advise the commander and staff when cooperation is appropriate and when it is not.

**International government organisations**

In multinational responses, representatives of other governments will also be present in much the same manner as the GOAS is represented. The missions of these government actors will vary and may include economic, political, humanitarian, environmental and/or intelligence gathering agendas. These actors will represent the policies of their own governments.

In the same way that the ADF commander will liaise with military commanders of other nations, agencies of foreign governments will usually liaise with the GOAS agency with a similar role. Despite this, it is important for a military commander to understand who the foreign government actors are within the battlespace and, most importantly, what affect they will have on operations. This is particularly pertinent for international government aid organisations who are often confused with non-government humanitarian actors.

International government aid organisations (eg, AusAID, USAID\(^5\) and the Department for International Development [UK]) have expertise in good governance, health support, economic development, infrastructure reconstruction and development, education and political capacity building. Their main focus varies from grants for HA to long-term development projects. Their work often supplements or supports UN agency work, however differs in its intent, which may vary between broad regional stability objectives, commercial or trade access objectives or specific bilateral agreements across multiple portfolios. CIMIC specialists can assist a commander’s understanding of how these actors affect not only the military plan but also the GOAS’ goals.

**Transnational actors**

Transnational actors, such as multinational companies, civil contractors and security contractors, are also likely to be present within an operational area. While these actors do not usually have a direct impact on military operations, it is important to understand who is in the area, what their roles are and what is their primary motivation (usually profit driven).

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\(^5\) United States Agency for International Development.
Security contractors

A recent trend in multinational operations is the employment of civilian security contractors in hostile environments. These organisations employ armed personnel who are empowered to use armed force if necessary. For more information see ADDP 00.3, Multinational Operations.

Security contractors are predominantly ex-military personnel and therefore have a sound understanding of military operations. However, depending upon their role, they can be secretive about their tasking and schedules, making it difficult to coordinate and deconflict activities.

Multinational companies and civil contractors

Multinational companies and civil contractors will usually try to maintain a low profile when working within a hostile area. From a CIMIC perspective, it is important to understand who they are, what they do and where they are located. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, to deconflict activities and potentially take advantage of mutually beneficial activities. Secondly, if hostilities escalate, there may be a need to assist with evacuation of foreign nationals – in particular if they are Australian or citizens of close allies.

Civil space actors summary

The various actors comprising the civil space act in a complex network of influence relationships. These influence networks are characterised by myriad interests, perceptions, loyalties and intentions linked by information conduits and systems.

The civil space influencers, leaders, and coordinators within these networks come from government, civil society and the humanitarian space. These influencers represent ideological, cultural, historical and political perspectives. Their network links include families and communities, security sector organisations, essential services, commercial interests, politically motivated groups, criminally motivated groups, and issue-motivated groups. All of these civil actors work in accordance with their fundamental principles and beliefs in pursuit of their own objectives.

With respect to the military mission, these civil actors’ objectives and motivations may be aligned or non-aligned and their attitude may be belligerent, intolerant, tolerant or cooperative. Regardless, it is vital that CIMIC operators know and understand the civil space so that they can maximise the capabilities of the civil space to support military operations and minimise negative impacts.
Annexes:

A. Australian Government commitments to international treaties
B. Understanding humanitarian operations
C. Civil society infrastructure
D. United Nations bodies
E. Coordination of humanitarian operations
Annex A to Chapter 2

Australian Government commitments to international treaties

Key points of the Geneva Convention and international humanitarian law

While the determination of international humanitarian law (IHL) responsibilities is the legal officer’s role, it is important to be aware that while the commander does not have a humanitarian mandate, they do have responsibilities when deemed to be an occupying military force. A priority for the military force with regard to the civil–military relationship is to reduce this burden. Early identification, liaison and cooperation between the military force and appropriate civil authorities for Rule of Law, population control operations (PCOs), essential services and emergency response will assist transition and ensure maintenance of the military aim.

Further information on IHL in operations is available in the following publications:

- ADDP 00.9, Multiagency Coordination – Defence’s Contribution to Australian Government Responses
- ADDP 3.20, The Military Contribution to Humanitarian Operations
- ADDP 06.4, Law of Armed Conflict.

War and occupation

This publication is not a forum for legal debate of the semantics of legal definitions for a state war. The laws of belligerent occupation, however, remain, in any armed conflict, a relevant guide to the application of the humanitarian laws of war. They are generally accepted as applicable whenever the armed forces of a country are in control of foreign territory and find themselves faced to face with the local civilian population.

Belligerent

Belligerent is a term used in international law to indicate the status of two or more entities being engaged in a war. A state of belligerency may exist between sovereign states or between one or more sovereign states on one side and rebel forces on the other, if such rebel forces are recognised as belligerents. In circumstances where there is a rebellion against a constituted authority (for example, an authority recognised as legitimate by the UN) and those taking part in the rebellion are not recognised as belligerents, then the rebellion is an insurgency. Once the status of belligerency is established between two or more entities, their relations are determined and governed by the laws of war.

The law of occupation

Belligerent occupation is the exercise of authority over territory by military rule without the consent of the deposed regime. By contrast, non-belligerent occupation is the military administration of foreign territory with the consent of the
government of a state, or the various parties exercising control over its territory. Occupying powers do not acquire legal title to occupied territory.

Occupying powers do assume obligations as administrators of the territory during the period of occupation. This includes the responsibility for the protection of civilians during times of war and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts. It also requires the occupying force to take all measures in their power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety while respecting the laws in force in the country. The international law of occupation is, however, not confined to treaty law. Other sources include customary law, applicable domestic law and UN resolutions.

When the law of occupation applies

The law of occupation applies when an occupying force exercises effective control over foreign territory. The Hague Convention IV: Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 1907 [Section III: Military Authority Over the Territory of the Hostile State, Article 42] provides that ‘… territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army’. However, it further provides that, ‘occupation extends only to the territory where such an authority has been established and can be exercised’. Whether or not territory is occupied is a question of fact which, in the initial stages at least, is a matter for the occupying army to determine. Occupation of foreign territory will usually be self-evident to all observers, although the precise extent of the occupation may be difficult to determine.

There are still no effective mechanisms, however, for the independent enforcement of this body of law. Therefore, in the event of a breach by the occupiers, accountability for such violations is a matter for the occupying powers.

Australia’s commitment to the protection of civilians

Australia has a long history of being involved in the protection of civilians’ issues in international forums. As a founding member of the UN, Australia is the 12th largest contributor to the UN regular and peace operations budgets. Australia has contributed 65,000 personnel to more than 50 UN and other multilateral peace and security operations worldwide, and is committed to the implementation of international law to prevent and minimise the harmful effects of armed conflict and restore peace and security.

Australia plays a significant role in enhancing protection of civilians globally. During its 2013 to 2014 UN Security Council term, Australia advocated for the strengthening of protection of civilians in Security Council mandates and sponsored UNSCR 2185 on the role of police in peacekeeping. This resolution emphasised the central role of the protection of civilians. Australia engages actively in the UN General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and is a member of the informal Member State Group of Friends of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict and the Group of Friends on Women, Peace and Security. The GOAS has also worked jointly to develop protection of
civilians’ guidelines for the African Union Peace Support Operations. For more information, refer to the Australian Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians.

**Definition**

For the purpose of the Australian Guidelines, the protection of civilians includes all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of civilians in accordance with the law, including human rights law, IHL, international criminal law and international refugee law. For the purpose of the Australian Guidelines, protection of civilians comprises activities, including the use of force, undertaken for the protection for civilians. The specific activities Australia will undertake to protect civilians will depend on the GOAS’s authorising mandate, which will take into account the scope of the UN Security Council’s authorisations and other mandates, where applicable.6

Australia has identified three focus areas for the protection of civilians:

- protection through dialogue and engagement
- provision of physical protection
- establishment of a protective environment.7

**Responsibility to protect**

The responsibility to protect (R2P) is an international agreement within the UN Forum toward which Australia’s diplomatic effort was a driving force, and to which the GOAS remains committed. The R2P refers to the obligation of states towards their populations and towards all populations at risk of genocide and other mass atrocity crimes. The R2P stipulates three pillars of responsibility:

- **Pillar one.** Every state has the R2P its populations from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
- **Pillar two.** The wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility.
- **Pillar three.** If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter.

These principles originated in a 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and were endorsed by the UN General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document (Responsibility to protect civilians, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, paragraph 138 to paragraph 140)8.

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7. Ibid.
A gender perspective – women, peace and security


UNSCR 1325 recognises that the experiences and needs of women and girls differ from those of men and boys in conflict and post-conflict situations, particularly in relation to human rights violations such as sexual and gender-based violence. UNSCR 1325 also underlines the essential role of women in conflict prevention, management and resolution.

The Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018 sets out Australia’s actions in the domestic and international arenas to integrate a gender perspective into peace and security efforts, protect women’s and girls’ human rights, and promote their participation in conflict prevention, management and resolution.

Australian National Action Plan – Women, Peace and Security. The Australian National Action Plan – Women, Peace and Security details the framework for the Australian WOG implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions. CA intent is to enhance Army’s capability through the implementation of the National Action Plan and to embed Women, Peace and Security considerations into the planning and conduct of operations. UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security and associated resolutions will be implemented through:

• incorporating UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions into joint pre-deployment training

• implementing UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions into everyday core business

• integrating UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions in a holistic (raise train and sustain) approach through staff and leadership training continuums and this will extend to single service doctrine reviews to provide gender-specific development of operational tools, guidelines, resources and capacity building for gender mainstreaming for planning and conduct of operations

• incorporating UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions into collective mission-specific training and exercises.


Annex B to Chapter 2

Understanding humanitarian operations

This annex has been specifically included separate to glossary terms as there is widespread misunderstanding of these terms which, over many years, has led to incorrect assumptions about what CIMIC is and what CIMIC achieves for the ADF. They are included separately here as it is critical that the reader knows and understands the true definition of these terms as part of the teachings regarding the civil space, and in anticipation of the mandates of authority of humanitarian and disaster response agencies as well as military commanders.

Disaster. A disaster is a serious disruption to the functioning of society which poses a significant, widespread threat to human life, health, property or the environment, whether arising from accident, nature or human activity, whether developing suddenly or as the result of long-term processes, but excluding armed conflict.

Complex emergency. A complex emergency is defined as a multifaceted humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict, and which requires a multi-sectoral, international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country program. Such emergencies have, in particular, a devastating effect on children and women, and call for a complex range of responses.

Humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention is defined as an armed intervention in another state, without the agreement of that state, to address (the threat of) a humanitarian disaster, in particular caused by grave and large-scale violations of fundamental human rights.

Humanitarian action. Humanitarian actions are assistance, protection and advocacy actions undertaken on an impartial basis in response to human needs resulting from complex political emergencies and natural hazards. Humanitarian actions require the provider to commit to humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality, which are unlikely to be compatible with the military force mission or mandate.

Humanitarian operations. Humanitarian operations are operations specifically mounted to alleviate human suffering in areas where the civil actors normally responsible for so doing are unable or unwilling to adequately support a population. It may proceed, parallel, or complement the activity of specialised civil humanitarian organisations.

Humanitarian operations include:

- Humanitarian assistance. HA is the provision of goods and services to meet the immediate needs of conflict-affected communities. The ADF deployed on operations may have a legal requirement to provide HA. To distinguish
this assistance from humanitarian action and humanitarian principles, in accordance with the Oslo Guidelines\textsuperscript{12}, provision of this type of assistance while on armed missions is best described as the CIMIC effect of ILSA.

- **Disaster relief.** DR is the provision of goods and services provided to meet the immediate needs of disaster-affected communities. The military force may deploy with the mission of DR. DR deployments can be to offshore contingencies called DR operations or within Australian territory under the Defence Assistance to Civil Communities framework.

Further information on HA and DR operations is available in the following publications:

- ADDP 00.9, Multiagency Coordination – Defence’s Contribution to Australian Government Responses
- ADDP 3.20, The Military Contribution to Humanitarian Operations
- D(G) OPS 01-1, Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority.

Annex C to Chapter 2

Civil society infrastructure

All activity within civil society relies directly or indirectly on infrastructure, regardless of its level of sophistication. Often infrastructure is the physical interface between government or other providers and civil society. The destruction or removal of access to infrastructure has varying effects on the normal economic and social pattern of life, depending on the level of dependence of the civil society on each respective type of infrastructure and whether other redundant options are available. The main categories of infrastructure include:

- **Protected infrastructure.** Some categories of infrastructure are protected by IHL or international conventions due to the profound effect that destruction or damage will have on the civil community. The following infrastructure in this category is identified in the targeting no-strike list (NSL) which includes:
  - health and medical facilities or capabilities marked with the Red Cross or Red Crescent symbol
  - life support critical to civilian survival such as water supplies and food stocks
  - cultural and religious heritage infrastructure
  - works or installations containing dangerous forces that would cause severe losses to the civilian population, including nuclear power facilities, dams.

- **Dual use infrastructure.** Dual use infrastructure includes those facilities required for both military and civil agency operations. The effects of destruction or denial of access to the civil community of infrastructure in this category needs to be considered carefully and will usually require authorisation of higher level command. Such infrastructure will usually be included in the Restricted Target List and will require CIMIC assessment of the impact on civil society of any strike action on or about the infrastructure:
  - ports, both air and sea
  - road, rail and telecommunications networks
  - warehousing and bulk handling facilities
  - power production and distribution
  - water resource.

- **Essential services infrastructure.** These infrastructure assets are the foundation requirements for the provision of essential life services or support to a population group. If these services or support are disrupted or the infrastructure is damaged or destroyed, the provision of life sustaining services or supplies, under international law, will fall to the occupying force.
This has the potential to adversely affect friendly force operations in the area. Essential services infrastructure includes:

- rule of law and security agencies, institutions, facilities, communications infrastructure, and equipment stocks
- essential services, such as water, sanitation, power and telecommunications
- civil assistance, including civil emergency response, social services and recovery agencies.

- Economic infrastructure. Economic infrastructure includes that infrastructure required to support the economic base of the community and includes markets for trading food, commodities, inputs to production and inputs to essential services logistics such as fuel and electricity. While these infrastructure assets are not the foundation requirements for the provision of essential life support or support to a population group, they are critical to achieving the return to normalcy. The follow on effect if these services or support are disrupted, or if infrastructure is damaged or destroyed, has the potential to adversely affect friendly force legitimacy, and may lead to adverse second- and third-order effects. This may include a shift in a population’s attitude away from the friendly forces. The CIMIC operator/planner provides HQ planners with advice and guidance on what the impact upon the civil population will be, if this were to occur. Their advice will include relevant civil–military liaison contacts such as government bodies, civil agencies or other stakeholders who may be able to assist with or facilitate restoration of such services. The CIMIC FE can facilitate a technical assessment of the relevant asset and may provide HQ planners with valuable points for attack that minimise damage to the asset as a whole, resulting in reduced repair and restoration times of the assets or services.
Annex D to Chapter 2

United Nations bodies

United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

The mission of the UN OCHA is to mobilise and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors in order to:

- alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies
- advocate for the rights of people in need
- promote preparedness and prevention
- facilitate sustainable solutions.

The UN OCHA will assist a HN government or, if the government is incapable or absent, take the lead for the coordination of humanitarian organisations in response to a humanitarian crisis. It does this through the cluster approach. Annex E describes the coordination of humanitarian operations.

The UN OCHA will be the principal organisation that CIMIC planners will coordinate with in order to align or deconflict military operations with the activities of humanitarian actors.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Office of the UNHCR is mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and wellbeing of refugees. It strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another state, with the option to return home voluntarily, integrate locally or to resettle in a third country.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The OHCHR represents the world’s commitment to universal ideals of human dignity. The mandate from the international community is to promote and protect all human rights. The High Commissioner heads the OHCHR and spearheads the UN human rights efforts.

United Nations missions. A UN mission is a civilian organisation, often with military or police components providing direct support. UN missions maintain a humanitarian focus where the needs of the population are the paramount consideration in the planning process. UN missions are advisory, coordination and support bodies. They do not replace or constitute a sovereign government’s policy development, decision-making or legislative processes.

Office of the Special Representative to the Secretary General. The head of the UN mission for a particular crisis or region is the Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG). The SRSG focuses on diplomatic, governance and security sector matters with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary
General (DSRSG) Political. The portfolio of the DSRSG Political is to support and provide advice to the HN government for the purpose of development of legislative and government institutions. UN missions may incorporate security sector reform elements within this portfolio and include UN military forces or UN police which have been seconded to the UN by member nations for that particular mission.

Humanitarian coordinator. UN missions also have a DSRSG for humanitarian affairs, who is also the humanitarian coordinator (HC) and answers directly to the UN OCHA. The HC has a mandate to manage forums responsible for humanitarian coordination as well as monitoring recovery and development for civil society. The HC will therefore necessarily have close ties with the HN disaster response and early recovery and with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as well as with the humanitarian response cluster leads and NGOs. A short summary of the responsibilities and structures, including the cluster approach established by the UN OCHA, for coordination of the humanitarian response is described in Annex E.

United Nations Development Program

The UNDP works in nearly 170 countries and territories, helping to achieve the eradication of poverty and the reduction of inequalities and exclusion through development of policies, leadership skills, partnering abilities, institutional capabilities and building resilience in order to sustain development results.

The UNDP is working to strengthen new frameworks for development, disaster risk reduction and climate change. The UNDP focuses on helping countries build and share solutions in three main areas:

- sustainable development
- democratic governance and peace building
- climate and disaster resilience.

In this way the SRSG, DSRSG Political and DSRSG HC are positioned to broadly coordinate the efforts of civil actors across the government and civil society sectors.

A typical UN mission incorporating both a civil and a military element is illustrated in Figure 2–1.

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13. A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the way a HN provides safety, security and justice.
Figure 2–1: Example structure of a United Nations mission

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN XYZAB (UNMIX)
(HEADQUARTERS IN NAT CAP)

SRSG

DSRSG (Political)

JOC
Civil Affairs

JMAC
Political Affairs

DSRSG
Chief of
RCHC Staff

Legal Affairs

Press/
Human
Public Info

Rights

Human

Conduct &

Discipline

DDR

Elections

Child

Protection

Director
Mission Support

Chief
ISS

Chief Admin
Services

JLOC
Dir Security

UN Police
Headquarters

UNMIX Force
Headquarters

Police
advisers

Formed
Police Units

Force Support
Elements

Sector
West
(+UNMO Teams)

Sector
East
(+UNMO Teams)

UNDP

OCHA

UNHCR

WFP

WHO

UNICEF

OHCHR

NGO
National Organizations

UN Country
Team/IASC
Country Team

UN Authority

UN OPCON
Coordination

Coordination
Annex E to Chapter 2
Coordination of humanitarian operations

The HN or, in their absence, the UN OCHA, have the lead role for the coordination of humanitarian organisations within the humanitarian space for a disaster. In cases where the HN cannot provide an adequate and timely response, coordination is a shared responsibility. The UN OCHA’s mission is to mobilise and coordinate principled humanitarian action. As such, the UN OCHA or their delegate will be the authorised principal international organisation that CIMIC planners will work with to align or deconflict military and civilian efforts.

DR operations will most likely have a humanitarian-focused mission, with the requirements of the population at the centre of the planning process. This type of operation is usually led by a civilian organisation with the military providing direct support.

In complex emergencies, the military role is primarily focused on the mandated application of force or support to provide a secure environment. In such operations, HA is only provided when life is at risk and no other organisation is capable of providing support.

The humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality impartiality and independence (see Appendix 1) will dominate civil organisation involvement in assistance and relief efforts and the protection of these principles will form the main considerations for military cooperation with these organisations. Working with the military may be seen by civil actors or agencies and other militaries to compromise some of these principles and can endanger civil actors, especially where threats are asymmetric or the ADF presence in an area is intermittent.

International lead agencies

A lead agency is one that has been mandated by the international community to coordinate the activities of civilian organisations that have volunteered to participate in an operation. The lead agency is normally a major UN agency such as the UN OCHA. Specific responsibilities of a lead agency are as follows:

• act as a POC for other agencies, particularly in the areas of planning and information sharing
• coordinate field activities to avoid duplication of effort and wasting of resources
• act as an interface with the military at the theatre level.

The lead agency concept in practice. Often the lead agency will coordinate field activities through another agency’s field offices. A lead agency may contract other international organisations and NGOs to implement health, food or transportation programs or to operate refugee camps. In such situations, the contracted agency
will operate under legal agreements involving them as partners with the HN
government and other agencies.

The relationship between the ADF and the lead agency is important for both
humanitarian actors and the deployed force. The lead agency can provide
valuable assistance in monitoring the civil space risks, the activities and locations
of NGOs, and be a conduit to key civil actors with mutual interest in population
protection. The lead agency will also be able to provide information on priorities
and gaps for population support and ICB. Proactive efforts to maintain ADF liaison
representation at coordination forums, as well as specific early engagement
meetings are effective ways to enhance the relationship.

United Nations cluster approach

The UN OCHA coordinates the humanitarian effort between civil humanitarian
actors using a cluster approach. There are eleven clusters corresponding to the
sectors of response. A lead agency in each cluster will be responsible for
coordination of that effort among contributing nations, programs and
organisations. The cluster system was implemented to strengthen UN leadership
and partnership with other humanitarian actors and improve assistance outcomes
and efficiency through coordination. Aid partners working within the cluster are not
working in a command relationship and, while the coordinating agency can make
recommendations as well as provide priority guidance, the equitable distribution
of assistance from multiple partners relies on the willing cooperation of
participating organisations.

The designated global cluster leads for the eleven sectors are:

• protection – UNHCR
• emergency shelter – United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
  (UNICEF)/Save the Children
• emergency telecommunications – World Food Programme (WFP)/OCHA
• water sanitation and hygiene – UNICEF
• nutrition – UNICEF
• logistics – WFP
• camp coordination and camp management – UNHCR/International
  Organisation for Migration
• health – World Health Organization
• food security – WFP/Food and Agriculture Organization
• early recovery – UNDP
• education – UNICEF/Save the Children.
The global cluster leaders, together with their partners, provide the following types of support to strengthen field response:

- technical surge capacity (e.g., camp management and coordination staff, early recovery advisers, logistics response teams, health emergency and assessment response teams)
- trained experts to lead cluster coordination at the field level
- increased stockpiles, some pre-positioned within regions (e.g., emergency shelter materials)
- standardised technical tools, including those for information management
- agreement on common methods and formats for needs assessments, monitoring and benchmarking
- best practices and lessons learned from field tests.

Each cluster chair and the HC for a country or crisis will hold regular (possibly weekly or bi-weekly) meetings to share information, update their situational understanding and coordinate response and recovery efforts. Of particular note for the military commander are the security forum and the HC cluster chair forum.

Appendix:

1. The humanitarian principles
Appendix 1 to Annex E to Chapter 2

The humanitarian principles

Core principles

The United Nations Assembly Resolution 46/182, Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations, provides guiding principles for UN HA operations: humanity, neutrality and impartiality. ADF forces operating under UN authority should apply these principles.

Humanity. Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.

Neutrality. HA must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.

Impartiality. HA must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs, and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.

Guiding principles

In addition to the three core principles, there is also a catalogue of ten principles that provide more detailed guidance to the planning and conduct of projects. They are as follows:

• Common objective of humanitarian and development assistance. Working together to contribute to improvements in the quality of life of the people. Assistance focuses on alleviating suffering, eradicating poverty, enabling communities to become self-sufficient and supporting an inclusive peaceful solution to the conflict.

• Non-discrimination. Provide assistance solely based on identified needs, regardless of location, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, social status or religion.

• Impartiality. Will remain impartial and not accept assistance, supplies, vehicles, facilities or equipment to be used for any military, political or sectarian purposes.

• Respect of human dignity. Request the respect for human rights as depicted in customary international law. Work is in response to the expressed wishes of local communities and respecting the dignity of people, their culture, religion and customs.

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- **Transparency and accountability.** Accountable to those whom we seek to assist. Ensure that assistance is transparent. Zero tolerance for any corruption, theft or misuse of development or humanitarian supplies or equipment.

- **Sustainability and preparedness.** Activities are tailored to local circumstances and aim to enhance locally available resources. Local capacities are strengthened (civil society, business community, local authorities, etc.) to address current needs and to prevent or prepare for future emergencies.

- **Consultation and participation.** Seek to involve communities in the design, planning, management, implementation and evaluation of programs implemented for their benefit.

- **Coordination.** Coordinate activities with the government and all relevant stakeholders at every level.

- **Access.** As a basic requirement, request unrestricted access to all people in need of assistance. Expect relevant authorities to expedite the accreditation of staff and the customs clearance of humanitarian goods and services.

- **Security and safety.** Request all parties concerned protect and promote the safety, security and freedom of the agencies and their staff. Do not accept staff to be subjected to violence, abduction, harassment or intimidation. Vehicles should not be used to transport persons or goods that have no connections with work.
Chapter 3

Civil–military cooperation tasks and actions

This chapter describes a range of common CIMIC tasks and actions that can be undertaken to support the tactical commander’s plan. As discussed in Chapter 1, all CIMIC actions are coordinated with those of other IRCs in order to support broader IO themes and objectives.

CIMIC actions support the friendly manoeuvre plan, undermine the enemy’s plans and increase stability within the civil space. Well-planned and well-executed CIMIC tasks and actions can have the following effect:

• enhance freedom of action, economy of effort, force protection and legitimacy for the friendly force
• support stable governance, security and public confidence
• contribute to the force’s population protection responsibilities.

The resultant positive civil–military relationships can then contribute to the disruption, degradation, denial or dislocation of the adversary’s ability to influence the civil space or benefit from civil space support.

There are three broad categories of CIMIC actions and non-CIMIC actions, as follows:

• civil space information collection
• IIA
• population support operations, actions or tasks.

Civil space information collection

Civil space information collection is planned and managed by the S2 and S3 HQ staff. FEs are tasked to collect information according to the collection plan priorities approved by the commander.

Civil space information gaps will form a component of the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) for any force. As such, the collection and priority of civil space PIRs will not be the sole responsibility of the CIMIC FE. Civil space information collection tasks seek to:

• confirm existing information
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• update existing information
• collect new civil space information
• provide specific information relating to combat assessment.

Collection for monitoring of the civil space
The civil estimate and intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) identify principal areas of risk or opportunity relating to civil space impacts. These, as well as potential areas of risk and civil space conditions for transition, will need to be monitored. IPB monitoring of the civil space is informed by the collection plan. The areas of focus include:
• civil areas and critical/decisive infrastructure
• civil security conditions, population stability and displacement and the humanitarian situation
• HN government systems, as well as political and cultural leadership
• civil administration, including essential services, life support, rule of law and economic institutions, all of which contribute to stability and transition
• HN and international civil humanitarian response coordination mechanisms and DR or HA operations
• other international organisations, international government agencies and actors, as well as corporations
• operational risks from threat force civil space objectives and actions, as well as consequences of friendly force actions.

Collection begins from preliminary analysis and should utilise a variety of open source, civil agency humanitarian networks, HN government reporting and media and second hand information through liaison networks, as well as first hand observation as the force lodges and expands its presence. Information collected and analysed will inform the civil estimate and reverse battlespace operating systems (BOSs) analysis, which are updated daily.

Collection for combat assessment
The purpose of combat assessment is to confirm or measure the impact of an action against the planned or desired outcome. CIMIC specialists may be tasked to conduct combat assessments where the specific action or activity may have had an effect on civil society.

When developing proposals or tasks for combat assessment, CIMIC specialists must include specific characteristics of the information, including its source, location, time to collect and method of collection.

For combat assessment of CIMIC IIA, the information required includes:
• status of effects delivery, known as measure of performance (MOP)
• evidence of IO message broadcast – first-order measure of impact (MOI), being the physical effect on the TA, message was heard or received
• indicators of IO message resonance – second-order impacts intended and unintended; second-order MOIs being the effect of the message on information being passed, information availability or direct actions and reactions within the TA
• indicators of reactions and counteractions – third-order MOI; being the indicators of threat force adaptability, counteraction as well as other stakeholder reactions, in terms of related decisions, attitudes, perceptions or messages
• assessment against measures of effectiveness (MOEs); these are operational-level conditions or the commander’s decisive event (DE) conditions that have been developed to measure operational progress
• recommendation, whether completed, needs to be repeated, needs to be modified or requires a new targeting option.

Chapter 4 provides a detailed explanation of MOPs, MOIs and MOEs.

Inform and influence actions

One of the key CIMIC tasks of the force (utilising the IRC) is the conduct of IIA, informing and influencing civil actors and populations to support or accept force presence and actions. While generally focusing on achieving cooperation through positive relationships, IIA may also seek to degrade, reduce, isolate, undermine or usurp TAs in the civil space. Objectives, actions and tasks for IIA are nested with IO guidance, the mission and the commander’s priorities and manoeuvre plan.

Inform actions. Inform\(^1\) actions provide declassified information to civil actors in order to shape their perceptions of friendly force actions and intent and, in doing so, reinforce the dominant narrative\(^2\). Inform actions can be conducted in isolation from influence actions, however it is common that they work in concert and can be most powerful when combined across several actions to achieve a desired effect to optimise the effectiveness of inform actions, they should be coordinated across multiple IRCs. CIMIC, MPA and psyops teams are commonly tasked to plan and conduct inform actions targeting the civil space, while other FEs may also be tasked to perform this role. Regardless of which FEs have been assigned to conduct the task, inform actions must be planned, prioritised, coordinated and always seek to achieve and reinforce the dominant narrative while ensuring that operations security is not compromised.

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1. Inform: context and understanding is developed among larger populations through the availability of basic facts or knowledge of a circumstance.
2. The fundamental story or perception that has been established as valid in the minds of members of one or more TAs.
Influence actions. Influence actions are specific actions designed to influence a TA to behave in a manner that is advantageous to the force. CIMIC influence actions seek to improve or maintain positive attitudes and perceptions of the force. Good relationships with civil actors and communities will increase cooperation and enhance a commander’s freedom of action in relation to the civil society. This can have a significant impact upon achieving the overall mission.

Conduct of inform and influence actions

IIA fall into two broad categories: civil sector engagement and ICB. Engagement refers to the way a force communicates and interacts with the civil society. ICBs are actions that provide a tangible benefit to the civil society. Civil sector engagement and ICBs are discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.

Civil sector engagement

The principal method used to achieve CIMIC outcomes is communicating and liaising with civil actors, including individuals, groups or whole communities. Engagement enables information to be disseminated and enhances CIMIC, military freedom of action and the legitimacy of the mission.

Deliberate and opportunity engagement. Engagement can be both deliberate and non-deliberate:

- Deliberate engagement. Deliberate engagement encompasses all forecast military-initiated dialogue between the force and civil actors within the operational environment. Deliberate civil engagement includes routine liaison with a HN or other coordinating agencies, KLEs targeting key leaders and stakeholders, as well as liaison contact with civil agencies or organisations for disseminating public information or for collection opportunities. Deliberate engagement is planned to achieve specific outcomes. A well-planned and well-executed engagement strategy will assist in:
  - maintaining situational awareness and situational understanding
  - developing and maintaining relationships with individuals of influence
  - monitoring the civil space (particularly changes)
  - collecting information.

- Opportunity engagement. Not all engagement with civil actors is planned and it is essential that all FEIs understand the guiding intent provided by IO themes and messages which, in turn, support the enduring narrative. A chance encounter with civilians where soldiers behave in a negative manner can have far-reaching consequences for the legitimacy of the force and the overall achievement of the mission. CIMIC specialists must be prepared to facilitate training and education for FEIs on how to act appropriately when engaging with the civil society.

3. Influence: the behaviour of individuals or selectively targeted small groups is changed for the purpose of generating an operational advantage.
The principles of engagement. In most instances, engagement actions should be well planned to ensure that favourable outcomes are achieved. Tools such as a sufficiently developed PMESII/ASCOPE stakeholder analysis and liaison architecture will identify key civil actors suitable for deliberate engagement. The key principles of engagement are as follows:

- **Consistency.** Consistency is important in both the message delivered and the messenger. Building rapport and developing a relationship takes time. The responsibility for engagement with a specified engagement target should be a deliberate decision in order to allow consistency in the interface. This allows trust to be built and the relationships to develop over time.

- **Appropriate.** The stature or authority of the military member assigned to build a relationship must be roughly equivalent to that of the TA and consistent across the civil sector and the AO.

- **Credible.** The military member conducting the engagement must be credible. They must be able to quickly adapt to opportunities or risks, assess information and information requirements (IRs) as well as be trusted to make decisions and provide advice at the appropriate level.

- **Authority.** The military member conducting the engagement must have sufficient authority to make decisions and be fully aware of constraints and limitations.

Selecting engagement targets. Deliberate engagement opportunities between the military force and civil actors are assessed, prioritised and approved through the targeting process according to each relationship’s relevance to the mission. The resulting engagement tasks are then planned, synchronised and managed. The considerations and checklist of procedures for planning engagement tasks are described in Annex A.

Deliberate engagement tasks include:

- KLE and key stakeholder engagement (KSE)
- official meetings
- civil–military operations centre (CMOC) and other civil coordination forums
- CIMIC centres.

Key leader engagement and key stakeholder engagement

KLE and KSE are specific engagement actions targeting influential individuals, organisations or groups within a society. KLE and KSE are proven and reliable tactical actions for shaping influence relationships within civil society. KLE may require the participation of the commander for the senior civil leadership relationship while KSE will involve a delegated representative of the commander across identified priority areas of government, civil society or civil leadership.
KLE and KSE are an important part of the targeting process and need to be synchronised with fires, manoeuvre, IO and other specialist capabilities in order to best achieve planned effects. The identification of key leaders and stakeholders will be a product of the stakeholder analysis undertaken during the staff military appreciation process (SMAP) and maintained as part of continuous IPB monitoring. The prioritisation of TAs and IIs for KLE and KSE are decisions of the targeting process. Decisions with respect to NK influence effects for KLE and KSE will be reflected in the targeting synchronisation matrix. The appropriate level of engagement and delegation guidance will be determined and deconflicted within the liaison architecture. These two planning synchronisation tools are essential to ensure effective KLE/KSE outcomes contributing to the commander’s end state and mission. Key effects will also be noted in the manoeuvre synchronisation matrix. Information collection, preparation and engagement actions must be completed with sufficient time for effects to resonate and still be synchronised with the manoeuvre scheme or achievement of the relevant DE.

Before conducting KLE/KSE, a risk assessment is made and a briefing pack is prepared that includes relevant personal details, specific message guidance and topics to avoid. This ensures that the desired outcomes are achieved and the likelihood of unplanned adverse outcomes is minimised. An example KLE/KSE briefing plan is described in Appendix 1 to Annex A.

**Official meetings**

Official meetings are a formal and structured form of KSE with control measures, such as a chairperson, agenda, agreed attendees and a specific focus for discussion. They may be a regular or even routine scheduled event, or they may be convened as required for a specific period, project or objective. Military participation in official meetings with civil actors may vary depending upon the audience, aim and status of attendance and the organisation convening the meeting. Notwithstanding this, official meetings represent an excellent opportunity to engage with a broad audience. Every opportunity should be taken to reinforce key messages. In addition, a meeting can be a good opportunity to engage individually with key stakeholders who may otherwise be difficult to contact. Therefore, meetings at which identified priority stakeholders are present should be embraced as an opportunity to engage. It is important that preparation for meetings is conducted formally with briefing packs prepared for the meeting participant.

**Civil–military operations centre.** A CMOC is a unique forum established to coordinate the efforts of support agencies (eg, UN, government bodies and NGOs) in a crisis area.

A CMOC is established as an interagency HQ and is responsible for coordinating the civil–military interface within an area or theatre of operations. It is rare that the military would establish a CMOC. This is because the coordination of such agencies is usually undertaken by the HN government or the UN. The military would establish a CMOC under conditions where the other coordinating bodies were unable to effectively coordinate humanitarian support operations. As such,
CMOCs are usually civil-led forums, normally only established and supported at operational or strategic level HQs. A military tactical commander deploying before any civil agency in the early phases of an operation will be best positioned to provide interim coordination of the crisis response until civil agencies and NGOs arrive. In these instances, a CMOC chaired by the commander’s representative may be established to support civil agencies, but establishment arrangements must include a transition plan enabling transfer of the CMOC function and facilities to the designated lead agency at the earliest opportunity.

Civil–military cooperation centres

A CIMIC centre is a liaison forum normally employed at the tactical level. CIMIC centres are forums established by the military and, as such, the military commander can control and manage attendance and access by civil actors, representatives or organisations. CIMIC centres are established for information exchange between civil actors and the military force. The CIMIC centre provides a meeting place where the tactical HQ can interface with the civil population authorities and organisations.

CIMIC centres may be described according to the duration of occupation as permanent, intermittent, temporary or spot. A spot CIMIC centre is an occurrence where a patrol or local commander seizes an opportunity or responds to an incident or community or civil actor’s request for a small immediate forum.

CIMIC centres are able to be established either physically or virtually and provide an information and collection capability to support broader civil space influence goals as well as intelligence collection tasks.

Virtual CIMIC centres may be created in a digital information space with social media sites, websites or telephone hotlines established and advertised. They may also include MPAs and media information outlets.

CIMIC centres also support the following:

- enhanced visibility of civil emergency planning status, capabilities and capacity
- identification of key capability gaps
- the establishment of a credible and authoritative information exchange with the military
- the method of requesting military support
- provision of military advice to key non-military agencies.

Establishing a CIMIC centre as a physical presence has inherent risk as they are overt and consideration must be given to the protection of personnel, civil actors in the vicinity and civil actors visiting the facility, as well as to military equipment and information. Considerations for establishing a CIMIC centre are detailed in Appendix 2 to Annex A.
Force protection is an all corps, all arms responsibility, although for conducting engagement tasks there are some specific considerations and TTPs. A summary of key points relating to force protection considerations for civil engagement activities can be found in Appendix 3 to Annex A.

**Civil actors summary**

We have seen in this section that engagement with civil actors is as important as it is unavoidable. The importance of good communication between military and civil actors is that it is the foundation for many other CIMIC influence actions, one such being ICB.

**Indigenous capacity building**

ICB encompasses a range of targeted actions designed to improve the capacity of a specific sector of the civil society to support itself and the broader community. Properly planned and executed ICB projects can serve as a significant contribution to force protection and are a positive influence on attitudes and perceptions. In contrast, a poorly planned and implemented project has significant potential to damage the reputation of the military force. Typical ICB actions include:

- interagency cooperation
- mentoring
- quick impact projects (QIPs)
- consent-winning actions (CWAs).

Many of these actions have shared goals and objectives as they all provide benefits in the civil space. For example, interagency cooperation may be aimed at developing the capabilities of the HN policing capabilities, but will also incorporate mentoring or CWAs.

**Interagency cooperation**

Interagency cooperation occurs when components of the military force work with agencies of recognised governments – HN, GOAS or OGAs. While the motivations, methods and outcomes may differ, all parties should strive to achieve a common goal. Cooperation may be led by either the civil or military component. The conduct of interagency actions with the HN has significant benefits for both the HN and the military force. These include:

- enhancing the legitimacy of all parties
- building the constituency’s confidence in the HN government
- assisting a return to normalcy
- remediating some of the societal causes of instability.
Mentoring

Mentoring is a capability building process whereby qualified SMEs work closely with officials from the HN to develop skills in a particular area. Mentoring can occur in military, government or civil areas. The key outcome from a mentoring program is the transfer of skills and knowledge to enable the HN to be able to maintain and develop a capability independently.

Quick impact projects

QIPs are deliberate influence actions identified and planned during the joint effects and targeting process. As such, a QIP proposal must include a clear statement defining how the project will support the mission.

QIPs are specific tasks or actions managed by the military force, either independently or in partnership with one or more civil bodies. These civil bodies can be national and/or regional authorities, civilian populations, NGOs and international organisations. Partnerships for QIPs are preferable because they enhance the feasibility and sustainability of a project. At the tactical level, QIPs are the most likely form of ICB. Guiding principles for a QIP are in Annex B.

Consent-winning actions

CWAs are a specific form of ICB designed to directly involve local civil groups in the conduct of an activity and for them to directly gain from it. Military forces may provide key resources for CWAs. It is essential that CIMIC planners identify what is important to a community by canvassing the civil actors directly. The results will provide a variety of options from which military planners can select any that support the mission and achieve a desired military effect.

The typical types of CWAs are:

- cash for work
- food for work
- community development programs such as improving sanitation or disaster prevention programs
- civil assistance programs, such as:
  - Medical Civil Assistance Program
  - Engineering Civil Assistance Program
  - Veterinary Civil Assistance Program
  - Dental Civil Assistance Program.

With the possible exception of small scale civil assistance programs, CWAs such as Cash for Work, Food for Work and community development programs would rarely be undertaken at the tactical level due to a lack of staff to plan, implement and monitor them. BGs and CBs may identify opportunities for these types of CWAs, however, they would most likely be part of a WOG approach with OGAs.
Advice should be obtained from either an embedded DFAT adviser or a higher HQ.

TAs for CWAs come from all sectors of the civil space and include:

- indigenous population
- indigenous government (elected) including security forces
- coalition force, UN, NGOs, media
- GOAS/Australian population.

Identifying and selecting indigenous capacity building

ICBs are a useful way for the force to interact positively with the civil society while assisting communities to develop and, therefore, influence civilian behaviours which, if well planned and executed, will support the military commander’s mission and intent. A force will regularly receive requests for assistance from the civil society. Such requests should be reviewed carefully to ensure that they meet the conditions specified in the following paragraph.

The key considerations for identifying and selecting an ICB proposal are as follows:

- **Mission relevance.** To ensure that these actions support the achievement of the military mission, it is important that civil development actions are closely scrutinised to ensure that they are achieving the desired effect. If an ICB activity cannot be linked to the mission, a DE or the IO themes and objectives, the activity should not proceed.

- **Cost.** The cost of the project should be commensurate with the benefit gained and not exceed the funding limits specified in orders. At the operational level, funds may be made available for the conduct of ICB actions. The higher HQ opord/tasking order (taskord) should outline what funds, if any, are available for CIMIC ICB and the guidelines relating to expenditure of these funds. The formation finance officer will be the POC for ICB funding.

- **Time frame.** The time frame for the ICB activity must allow the desired effect to be realised within a reasonable time frame, noting that changes in the will, perception or understanding of a TA can take many months if not years. This needs to be taken into account when planning CWAs in particular, as the follow-on force may inherit a project that is no longer relevant. In larger operations where the mission is supporting nation building or capacity building, longer term tasks may be considered. Such tasks will normally be controlled at the operational level to ensure that operational and strategic objectives are being met.
Risk. The risk of non-completion or failure of the activity needs to be considered. Common risks include the following:

- negative impact of failing to complete the activity on time or to a satisfactory standard
- creation of a legacy or dependency
- physical risk to civil actors
- friction within the civil community over perceived bias, favouritism or benefits
- HN unable to sustain and maintain the completed project.

Population support operations actions or tasks

Population support operations includes military tasks, control measures and actions aimed at reducing the negative impact of military activity on civil society and the legitimate government, including protecting civil society and vulnerable groups. There are three broad means of providing population support: direct support, indirect support and infrastructure support.

Types of support

The types of population support operations that the ADF may commit to follow a simple hierarchy:

- **Direct support.** Direct support involves the face-to-face provision and distribution of goods and services by the military. This may involve the distribution of relief supplies, providing first aid, transporting personnel, interviewing refugees, locating families, and so on. Direct support is the least preferred type of support and should only be undertaken in extremis, except when the force or task group is deployed on DR operations or where the threats to life result from military actions involving the ADF.

- **Indirect support.** Indirect support is one step, or more, removed from the relief activity. It includes providing the necessary logistic and engineering support to allow other actors to be the face of the relief effort. FEs may be tasked to transport relief goods, build camps and shelters, provide water sources, clear mines or explosive remnants of war, enhancing security conditions and conducting or supporting PCOs.

- **Infrastructure support.** Infrastructure support provides general services that facilitate relief, but which are not necessarily visible to, or solely for the benefit of, the affected population. Tasks may include repairing critical infrastructure, operating airfields, providing access to communication networks, and so on.

To maintain distinction between military and humanitarian actors, direct support should generally only be delivered by military personnel in peacetime, and then
only if there is no civilian alternative available (‘last resort’). Military troops or assets engaged in combat will, as a general rule, not be used at all, except for infrastructure support where absolutely necessary. Figure 3–1 shows a support task guidance matrix which helps to decide whether it is appropriate to use foreign military assets or not.

![Figure 3–1: Support task guidance matrix](image)

As with any other military activity, population support operations, such as the provision of HA by the ADF to populations affected by a crisis, must always consider the possibility of negative outcomes such as endangering the safety, credibility and work of the humanitarian actors, the relief beneficiaries and the military force. Consequences and reprisals can arise for civil actors and agencies, both during the crisis and in the longer term.

The ADF is not a humanitarian organisation and is not well placed to provide humanitarian aid and general support to the civil population. As such, the principles of impartiality and neutrality cannot usually apply to military forces operating in complex emergencies. Despite the allure that the provision of HA may have, the most enduring assistance the military force can provide in operations (other than DR operations) is to restore security and stability to enable humanitarian actors to provide relief and recovery, coordinated and supported by the mandated civil authorities.

In extremis the commander has a legal obligation to provide life-saving measures to civilians if no other political authority or humanitarian actor has the access or ability to do so. There will also be a range of other legal obligations that the force must comply with that will vary depending on the type of mission being undertaken. The legal officer and the legal annex to the relevant opord/taskord will provide direction and guidance. The ADF may also be requested to provide, or support, HA as part of operations, although the use of military assets should be viewed as a last resort.
Planning principles for the provision of population support

When considering potential population support tasks, the following principles should be applied:

• in the first instance, ascertain if there are any HN, IO or NGOs who able to assist
• provide life-saving support only
• transfer responsibility back to the HN/NGO as soon as possible
• apply the humanitarian principles (where possible)
• protect the lives of noncombatants
• minimise disruption to the military mission.

Typical population support tasks

Population support operations include:

• population protection
• managing DCs
• controlling civilian mass movement
• provision of ILSA.

Population protection

Under IHL and International Human Rights Law, the primary responsibility for the wellbeing of a population rests with the lawful government or de facto authorities of the affected state.

Protection of civilians at the tactical level is guided by the scope of legal obligations and operational tasking. R2P is defined as the responsibility (for a nation) to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.

Population protection is undertaken in order to reduce the adverse impact of disasters or complex emergencies on affected civilians. This includes protection from the effects of military operations on civilians, and protection of civilians from the destabilising security conditions characteristic of complex emergencies or natural disasters, as well as protection from the loss of shelter, water, food, essential services, and institutions of society.

PCOs include operations and actions such as movement control, curfews, road monitoring and other direction to civil actors and HN authorities so as to separate vulnerable civilians from the effects of military operations, explosive ordnance and manoeuvre actions. PCOs also enhance operational security.

Where the civil authority cannot provide protection, security and sustenance, the military commander of the occupying force has a legal obligation to provide
governance, including protection and life-saving assistance. The legal requirement of the commander may be limited, however, as it is the occupying power who determines whether or not the liability exists. Failure in protection can have a significant effect on the moral authority of the operation or action as well as the psychological wellbeing of the soldiers.

DCs are often persecuted and therefore feel unsafe. As a consequence, they will often move en masse searching for safety and comfort. Mass movement of noncombatants within any AO can pose a significant risk to military forces. It can block vital routes and provide enemy combatants with opportunities to gain an advantage.

Managing displaced civilians
DCs, whether static in humanitarian camps or moving as a massed group, need to be managed to ensure that they do not hinder military operations. In the first instance, humanitarian actors should take the lead in managing DCs; however, if they are unable to cope with the scale of the DCs the military may be required to provide assistance.

The management of IDPs/refugee camps is normally conducted by humanitarian actors. Military intervention to provide ILSA should only occur in extremis. At times, the location of a DC camp may hinder planned military actions; however it would rarely be feasible to relocate a DC camp to negate the effect on the military force. In these circumstances the best COA may be to secure it from collateral damage.

Managing mass movement. Civilian mass movements, if uncontrolled and not coordinated, may hamper military forces and operations. Deconfliction between civilian and military authorities is essential to avoid unintended and collateral damage to civilians. It is therefore in the commander’s interest to deconflict civilian mass movements with military operations. Ideally, local authorities and civil agencies will coordinate civilian mass movements and cooperate with military formations to deconflict civilian and military movements. In cases where local authorities and/or civil agencies cannot or will not coordinate civilian mass movements, the military may have to play a more active role in the coordination and control of civil movements.

Immediate life sustaining assistance
ILSA is the provision of life-saving supplies and services which are needed as a matter of extreme urgency. The provision of ILSA is a legal requirement in areas controlled by the force and where governance by the HN or designated civil agency cannot be provided.

When ILSA is provided by the force, the commander’s priority is to contain and secure a life-threatening civil crisis or disaster in order to stabilise the situation until this responsibility can be transferred to civil actors with the capacity and authority to deal with the crisis.
When planning the provision of ILSAs, consultation with the HN government and relevant humanitarian sector is essential in order to maximise cooperation and partnership. Early consultation will identify the conditions required for the transition of responsibility to capable civil agencies and organisations as soon as possible. Additionally, civil humanitarian coordination agencies will identify equity, access, impartiality and security issues that military planners need to consider.

Decisions made in these circumstances need to be balanced with the commander’s requirement to:

- achieve mission success
- provide ILSA only where the other agencies cannot render assistance
- manage second- and third-order effects that the provision of, or failure to provide, assistance may create
- prevent enduring liability for ongoing ADF or GOAS assistance.

When providing ILSA, the Sphere Handbook4 is the universal minimum standard for the delivery of quality humanitarian response. Australian WOG agencies may also provide guidance on the type and level of support, as well as the resources provided by the GOAS for provision of HA.

**Effective communication techniques**

To be effective in their role, CIMIC operators must understand the skills required to be an effective communicator. Effective communication relies upon listening, reading non-verbal signals and understanding culture, as well as talking and active listening. Importantly, an effective communicator will fuse both the verbal and non-verbal messages to respond appropriately.

Effective communication is saying the right thing in the right way, at the right time, supported by the right PPP, in order to achieve the desired effect on the relationship and the desired behavioural change in the TA.

This section will provide an overview of the basics of communication techniques. Annex C provides a thorough checklist for the three principal areas of communication raining: elicitation, negotiation and working with interpreters.

**Building relationships**

Appropriate influence relationships with key leaders and key stakeholders are the decisive and key objectives within the human terrain. Identifying influence targets is conducted in the early stages of the IPB with the development of the liaison architecture.

Relationships must be closely managed so as to develop rapport, trust and influence. This in turn encourages civil agencies and communities to change their

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behaviour or decisions in support of, or at least in tolerance of, the military mission. IIA will shape suitable civil transition conditions as well as degrade or dislocate the adversary from population influence and support.

Trusting relationships are not necessarily conciliatory or generous, they are characterised by honest representation of the commander’s intent and the enduring narrative. Not all relationships are cooperative and it is not always in the commander’s interest to pursue cooperation or influence. In such circumstances the CIMIC operator is required to be professional and represent the ADF in accordance with the commander’s direction or intent. Regardless of the nature of the relationship, CIMIC operators must invest time and effort into building an honest relationship that supports mission success. Figure 3–2 shows how time can improve the effectiveness of a relationship’s capacity to influence without coercion.

**Common Understanding**

- CIMIC relationship – influence model; requires a high level of practiced communication and negotiation skills
- CIMIC liaison is not a junior officer post box for the COMD

**Figure 3–2: Time–relationship influence diagram**

**Elicitation**

Elicitation is the planned use of conversation to gather information without the subject feeling they are being interrogated or used to gather intelligence. Elicitation is based on building relationships of trust facilitating the willing exchange of information. Elicitation may be simple and obvious or, equally, may be imaginative, persistent, well planned and employ multiple contacts. Conversations may develop from cover stories and be linked to information that is either known to be true or known to be false to initiate response. Elicitation relies on rapport and trust rather than inducements.

Elicitation is not limited to meetings or formal gatherings; it can be attempted during social engagements, over the phone or the internet. Further detail on elicitation techniques is contained in Appendix 1 to Annex C.
Negotiation

Negotiation is a dialogue between two or more parties intended to reach a beneficial outcome over one or more issues. It is aimed to resolve points of difference, gain advantage for an individual or collective, or craft outcomes to satisfy various interests. It is often conducted by putting forward a position and making small concessions to achieve an agreement.

The degree to which the negotiating parties trust each other to implement the negotiated solution is a major factor in determining whether negotiations are successful. In many cases, negotiation is not a ‘zero-sum’ game, allowing for cooperation to improve the results of the negotiation.

Before commencing a negotiation, it is important to understand the desired outcome and the areas where you have room to concede (or negotiate). You should also analyse the other party so that you may be able to make concessions favourable to them.

Appendix 2 to Annex C provides additional guidelines to assist in the preparation and conduct of negotiations.

Working with interpreters

Communicating through interpreters presents a significant challenge to successful communication. The message can be altered or misinterpreted, which creates confusion, misunderstanding and possibly a breakdown of trust. It is therefore vital that when CIMIC operators understand the limitations of working with interpreters to ensure that the effectiveness of any dialogue is maximised.

Where possible work with known interpreters. If this is not possible take time to rehearse with your interpreter prior to any engagement task. There will be circumstances where you do not have this luxury, and in some cases you will have to rely on an interpreter supplied by the other party. To assist in working with interpreters, the guidelines in Appendix 3 to Annex C provide useful tips to maximise the effectiveness of your interpreter.

Annexes:

A. Considerations for engagement
B. Quick impact project guiding principles
C. Communication skills
Annex A to Chapter 3

Considerations for engagement

Engagement with civil stakeholders is essential if CIMIC actions or effects are to be successful. As with any other military action, planning civil stakeholder engagement needs to consider factors that will enable the greatest effect, as well as fundamental military considerations such as security. This annex covers considerations for a range of fundamental CIMIC actions, including:

• individual KLE briefing packs (see Appendix 1)
• multiple stakeholder KLE including civilian military cooperation centres (see Appendix 2)
• force protection considerations (see Appendix 3).

Appendices:
1. Individual key leader engagement briefing packs
2. Civil–military cooperation centre tasks – civil engagement with multiple stakeholders
3. Individual force protection during civil engagement
Appendix 1 to Annex A to Chapter 3

Individual key leader engagement briefing packs

Impromptu or deliberate engagement with civil actors should be planned. For deliberate engagement, particularly with individual stakeholders, a detailed engagement pack should be developed regardless of who is to conduct the engagement. Engagement packs:

- are developed for approved engagement targets
- are informed by intelligence products produced on the engagement target (e.g., profile cards, commonly known as P-Cards)
- form the basis for briefing and rehearsing the member who is nominated as the principal military representative at the engagement meeting
- must provide sufficient detail to enable the military engagement principal to conduct the engagement when there has been insufficient time for pre-briefing or rehearsals.

A KLE briefing pack is normally developed in the following three parts:

- a back-brief detailing the concept of operations (conops) of the engagement action is delivered after the engagement task has been allocated
- a development of risk analysis
- a development of an engagement brief for the engagement target and location.

Concept of operations expanded essential fire support task brief

The format for a conops/expanded essential fire support task (EFST) is as follows:

- Task. This is the task effect verb, target or TA, location, time effect required.
- Purpose. This is the IO objective – prioritised IIA targeting guidance or direction (higher HQ/published IO matrix).
- Method. This includes the following:
  - phase and date-time group (DTG)
  - high-priority target (HPT) number and name/HPT unique identification
  - allocation:
    - tasked FE/person
    - attack system – tasked IRC delivery system or platforms
    - limitations and constraints
Contents

- time to be acquired and dwell (how long will we continue this task, continuous/intermittent) or window of opportunity/sustainable period of effect
- latest time effect required to be useful.
- Resources project funding:
  - FE support (IRC)
  - specialist equipment
  - logistic support available
  - psyops/other product required (eg, location, required delivery [earliest and latest], resources allocated, means and medium).
- Effect. This is the summary of intended end state statement for combat assessment.
- Measure of performance. This will include the following information:
  - task initiated
  - quantity and evidence of delivery to TA
  - task completed
  - information required (how many, where, when, how long, acknowledgement or feedback from TA observed).
- Measure of impact. These are the elements indicating the level of effect achieved, and include the following:
  - observed behaviour or action indicating effect
  - assessment of progress toward end state
  - assessment of efficiency of means
  - assessment of adaptability of approach
  - criteria for ‘re-attack’/modify/cease activity recommendations.
- Collection task for force element/information-related capability. This will include the following:
  - method of data collection
  - location (geographic/spectrum/system/person)
  - time period for data collection
  - results (link to reporting).
- Remarks. This is to include the following:
  - DE contributed to
  - IO objective contributed to (if not already mentioned)
non-target civilian actors or agencies associated and their roles.

*Prepared by.* This is to include the name of the person who prepared the brief, and the DTG.

*Released by.* This is to include the name of the person who released the brief, and the DTG.

Residual risk assessment summary

Only brief residual risks that are above the commander’s authority. A variety of foreseeable risk source categories and all risk impact categories (such as mission, people, systems/resources, reputation, environment) should be considered, such as the following:

- risk to target (if NKE is positive), including:
  - first-order effects (physical damage)
  - second-order effects (information and flow of information effects)
  - third-order effects (intellectual and moral components)

- risk to CB – mission, people, systems/resources, reputation, environment, including:
  - first-order effects (physical damage)
  - second-order effects (information and flow of information effects)

- risk to relationship/influence network – stakeholder targets from intended consequences, including:
  - first-order effects (physical damage)
  - second-order effects (information and flow of information effects)
  - third-order effects (intellectual and moral components)

- risk of collateral damage – third party actors/stakeholder unintended consequences, including:
  - first-order effects (physical damage)
  - second-order effects (information and flow of information effects)
  - third-order effects (intellectual and moral components).

Brief for the engagement meeting

The brief for the engagement meeting should include the following details:

- Target details:
  - target name
  - date of birth
  - address
Contents

- telephone number
- mobile phone number
- alternate contact means
- family details
- address or location of meeting and description
- access and alternate access to the building, room or area the meeting is scheduled for
- likely attendees, including security elements for other persons attending and whether armed or not.

The target profile includes:

- **Background.** This is about the person and reads the person who is doing the KLE into who they are talking to. It will talk about their family (names and ages) and what they do in terms of the personal life. This is important for relationship building. Secondly, it will then go into their professional life, business and uses. Some information to include is attitude to ADF/coalition operations, known attitude to enemy conventional forces and other belligerents, political affiliations, religion, known associates, known relatives and allegiance/affiliation.

- **Précis last three engagements.** This is to update the person conducting KLE into what has happened recently. This avoids repeating points that have already been covered. It also minimises the chance of appearing that we do not know what we are talking about and stops us from being taken advantage of in agreeing to fulfill promises that were never made. It should reference the chat report or source document to enable further info to be obtained.

- **Talking points.** This area has a number of points, firstly to establish rapport and then move into areas from which PIR and information is sought.

- **Avoid points and explanation.** This area briefs on topics or sensitive events which should be avoided when speaking to this subject, as well as identifying essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) to protect, such as information that may reveal a source or may undermine a negotiating position or objective. By knowing this you avoid damaging or destroying relationships that have been hard won. This should also reference the source document or interview when this ‘avoid’ point was revealed.

- **Warnings and cautions.** For threat environments this should contain information about the individual or immediate surrounds (eg, body guards), relationships with known associates/criminal/terrorist elements (which may also fall into do not talk points) and PIRs.
**EXAMPLE PRINCIPAL KLE/KSE SUMMARY BRIEF – 6-C-5-1 AUG 16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>NAME</strong></th>
<th>Tommy Raoul – Mayor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOB</strong></td>
<td>26 Feb 1954 (62 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADDRESS</strong></td>
<td>15 Johanna Blvd, Svensson Heights, Tropicana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TELEPHONE</strong></td>
<td>(07) 4123 4500 ; M 0408 564 223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other means of recognition</strong></td>
<td>Veh (2014 Toyota Hilux, Rego: SVH276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALT CONTACT</strong></td>
<td>TBC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **FAMILY DETAILS** | Married: Vanessa – (Daughter of Former Mayor of Rockhampton)  
Children:  
17 F Trudy Raoul – High school student  
20 M Geez Raoul – Part-time study at Bundaberg Technical College – previous minor legal infringements  
22 M Rupert Raoul – Full time student at Rockhampton University  
24 F Stacey Raoul – Articled clerk – Local Solicitors |

**Background.**
- Well educated – Economics and Admin – Political Motivated – Sport – Football  
- Long term political involvement (Welfare and Social background) early 70s  
- GoT Minister 1994-1997 – Elected Deputy Mayor 2003, (Current Mayor at the time resigned suddenly on his appointment)  
- Very strong links to (Tropicana Democratic Party)TD Party – GoT Ruling Party since 2007  
- Openly encourages trade with many countries (incl Musoria loose foreign policy and intense series of visits and contacts)  
- 2015 Uprising – against state institutions Pro-Musorian Party (IPM)  
- Publically accused GoA of ‘overstaying their welcome’ by failing to coop with TP scy  
- Influenced by money and power  
- Had previous convictions with Money irregularities – (spent 4 months in prison)  

**Religion:** Lutheran (Practicing) – Regular church goer, Financial  
**Family:** Bilal Raoul – Brother is the CEO Bundaberg excavation  
**Cousins:** Paul and Anne Erlich – ?  
**Political:** Mr Harry Ball Minister of Security and Trade  
**Attitude ADF:** April 16 – Wavering as positive / deem to be reliant on A sy FE for the maintenance of limited capacity building  
**Attitude En:** Unknown
Précis last three engagements:

1. 20 October 15 – Visit to Bundaberg from the Minister for Security and Trade, Mr Harry Ball, with Mr Raoul in attendance and ADF reps discussed need for the coordination of the restoration of key local infrastructure. Mr Ball voiced his support of Mr Raoul and his leadership in the region. Cooperation between ADF engineers and local excavation and construction services has been a key highlight in local media.

2. 15 January 16 – Local dispute between council service workers and the council executive resulted in a 3 week halt to local services. Coordination between ADF and NGO groups was a vital component in the maintenance of civil capacity. Mr Raoul was reported by local media that ‘such interference from the foreign visitors was an unnecessary reaction’ to what he described as a minor issue.
   a. Location: Bundaberg Showgrounds, 45 Burrum Street, Bundaberg Central
   b. ADF Rep: XO BG Cannan
   c. Meeting reason: In attendance were reps from ICRC, Oxfam, ActionAid, Council Union Rep, B’berg Hospital CEO, B’berg Council Works CEO to assess grievances, key issues and plan for distribution of assistance to critically affected areas.
   d. Atmospherics at close: ADF perceived that although the common worker was willing to overcome the issues identified, council leadership appeared to be a hampering any hope of cooperation with the various groups. NGOs were frustrated by the perceived lack of cooperation.

3. 9 April 16 – A number of local businessman and government workers make complaints to the ADF forces that they are being unfairly treated by the local police and council due to their suspected alignment and/or family ties to the activities behind the July uprising. ADF conduct a meeting involving local police leadership and council representatives, including Mr Raoul in order to resolve the issue. Mr Raoul reacted with anger to these accusations and accused the ADF of generating fear and instability within ‘his community’.
   a. Location: Bundaberg Regional Council – 190 Bourbong St, Bundaberg Central
   b. ADF Rep: CO BG Cannan
   c. Meeting reason: ADF requested meeting involving reps from the various parties involved in order to discuss the issues identified by the civilian community and come to a resolution.
   d. Atmospherics at close: Council agreed that the community’s requests for critical repairs to essential infrastructure in localised areas will be addressed in a reasonable, yet undefined, time frame. Community dissatisfied with ADF restrictions to enforce compliance of both council and police however Deputy Police Comd gave tacit approval for local police to coordinate with the ADF to assist maintain law and order.

Talking points
Current: Current ADF ops in sp of return to normalcy/positive media coverage of recent events
Perception discontent with police and policing tactics, reports of civ discontent
Mil – Security of Township, Police Cap, Expectation management WRT capacity building
Pers – Family, Children

Avoid points and explanation
Prison
Finance irregularities
Links IPM – Musoria
Opinion on GOAS FE – overstaying
Opinion Fester Guel
## Example Stakeholder Analysis for Engagement Subject 6-C-2-1 Aug 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Name:</th>
<th>Tommy Raoul</th>
<th>Location:</th>
<th>Bundaberg</th>
<th>Org/Function and Position:</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Sex/Age/Bio Info:</th>
<th>62 yrs Male</th>
<th>Organisation Links:</th>
<th>Ruling Party of GoT (TD Party)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Background – Family, Professional, AS and Mi Relation History
- Born in Clermont, Educated Rockhampton, Tertiary Qual in Finance and Admin
- Married – 4 Kids, youngest 17
- Career Politician
- Practicing Lutheran – Strong connection to church (Assessed)

### Alignment/Disposition

#### Attitude to ADF
- Overstaying/non supportive of GoT Sec F and failing to apply appropriate restriction on civ pop

#### Attitude to Belligerents
- Spoken against Government Staff and Private institution loyal to Geul (Ldr IPM)

#### Capabilities/capacities in Role
- Very influential both political and police, well supported

#### Links to IMG
- TBC

#### Key Leader Cultural/political Links
- Tropicana Democratic Party – Founding Mbr

#### Community Perception
- Supportive of women and youth involvement in politics
- Well liked by community

#### Motivations and Level
- Financial and Political Power

#### Evidence of/Links to Corruption
- 4 Month Prison term for Fraud – 1997

#### Evidence of Coercion by Belligerents or IMG
- TBC

#### Power/Influence Relationships Diagram
- Foundation member of TD party – ruling party of GoT

#### Org Structure Diagram
- TBC
## Previous ADF Associations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Meeting:</th>
<th>20 October 15 (Bundaberg)</th>
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<tr>
<td>DTG/Loc</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ADF Rep</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting reason</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Atmospherics at close</td>
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</table>

**Attendees:** Mr Harry Ball, with Mr Raoul

**Meeting Reasons:** Discussed need for the coordination of the restoration of key local infrastructure. Mr Ball voiced his support of Mr Raoul and his leadership in the region. Cooperation between ADF engineers and local excavation and construction services have been a key highlight in local media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Earlier Meeting:</th>
<th>15 January 16 (Bundaberg)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DTG/Loc</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Themes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Attendees:** ICRC, Oxfam, ActionAid, Council Union Rep, B'berg Hospital CEO, B'berg Council Works CEO

**Meeting Reason:** Local dispute between council service workers and the council executive resulted in a 3 week halt to local services. Coordination between ADF and NGO groups was a vital component in the maintenance of civil capacity. Mr Raoul was reported by local media that 'such interference from the foreign visitors was an unnecessary reaction’ to what he described as a minor issue.

**Atmospherics at close:** ADF perceived that although the common worker was willing to overcome the issues identified, council leadership appeared to be a hampering any hope of cooperation with the various groups. NGOs were frustrated by the perceived lack of cooperation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous Commitments</th>
<th>Ours</th>
<th>Theirs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 April 16 (Bundaberg)</td>
<td>ADF Rep: BG Cannan Rep</td>
<td>Attendees: Local Businessmen and Govt Workers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Meeting Reason:** ADF requested meeting involving reps from the various parties involved in order to discuss the issues identified by the civilian community and come to a resolution Police Force/Local Law and Order issues.

**Atmospherics at close:** Council agreed that the community’s requests for critical repairs to essential infrastructure in localised areas will be addressed in a reasonable, yet undefined, time frame. Community dissatisfied with ADF restrictions to enforce compliance of both council and police however Deputy Police Comd gave tacit approval for local police to coordinate with the ADF to assist maintain law and order.

**Desired Influence effect**
- Mutual Benefit and understanding of each other’s posn + IO themes and key messages

**Engagement approach**
- Firm but Friendly

**Engagement Messages**
- IO TBC

**Specific points to raise**
- Meet and Greet New CO
- Progress to date
- Sy
- Partnered Patrols?
- TBC
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Messages and topics to avoid</th>
<th>Prison sentence</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public perceptions</td>
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<td>Finance irregularities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opinion Fester Guel</td>
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Appendix 2 to Annex A to Chapter 3

Civil–military cooperation centre tasks – civil engagement with multiple stakeholders

Not all engagement with civil actors is one-on-one. It is common for military personnel to engage with multiple stakeholders through forums, meetings or CIMIC centres. The principles for engagement with civil stakeholders through forums or meetings are generally the same as for one-on-one meetings.

CIMIC centres are established to provide a more general effect that is not focused on a single event or series of events.

The purposes of a CIMIC centre are as follows:

• manage and coordinate information flow between the civil and military actors
• relieve the staff of direct contact with civil bodies
• promote legitimacy of the mission through transparency
• collect information and atmospherics relating to the civil environment and civil AIs
• manage and validate requests for support from civil bodies
• promote common interests
• develop rapport and influence from which to leverage CIMIC effects
• receive enquiries and claims from the civil population.

The functions of a CIMIC Centre are as follows:

• POC for civil actors
• focal point for liaison with civil organisations
• support local deconfliction of actions
• a point of information exchange
• shape perception of legitimacy
• collect information to support, including:
  • prioritisation
  • planning
  • implementation of civil projects
  • the civil dimension
  • situation understanding and assessments of operational progress.
CIMIC centres may be characterised by the following:

- a permanent presence
- an interim presence
- a spot presence.

The task to establish a CIMIC centre includes the following:

- must have a specific effect it is trying to achieve for a specific or range of TAs
- must be planned
- is one effective conduit to the local civilian population
- can be the face of the BG
- is a means for local nationals to initiate communication with the Australian FEs.

Options available for the establishment of a CIMIC centre include:

- Virtual, including:
  - telephone hotline
  - Facebook
  - website
  - MPAs
- spot/mobile/temporary – not enduring, such as:
  - CIMIC centre may be as temporary as using the bonnet of a vehicle which is parked in the market place for a short time
  - CIMIC centre could be pre-advertised or just arrive and act as a POC
- static, enduring for longer than a short halt.

Static CIMIC centres may be in a building or in a tent and are established with support of Australian or coalition FEs providing security. Planners should consider the following:

- the requirement for an enduring presence
- the security threat and force protection considerations, including:
  - threats to personnel or FEs
  - threats to civilian actors visiting or using the CIMIC centre
  - threat of civil actors being identified or having imagery captured for subsequent identification and their identities being used later for reprisals
  - threat of direct attack
threat of reprisals against local community for hosting or visiting the CIMIC centre.

As a collection tool, a CIMIC centre is dependent on attracting civilian organisations to visit and, in turn, share information and coordinate their actions. To attract them, the CIMIC centre must provide a service or inducement. These may include:

- area security assessments (including unclassified supported HQ SITREP's)
- mine awareness briefs/information/maps
- weather reports
- road/going reports
- information technology/telecommunications facilities
- a convenient and secure mutual meeting place
- feeling welcoming and secure as well as offering light refreshments.
Appendix 3 to Annex A to Chapter 3

Individual force protection during civil engagement

When a taskord is issued to an FE to conduct or support CIMIC IIA, detailed planning for the task commences. Fundamental military planning considerations for patrols and other tactical actions including inherent force protection must provide the framework within which CIMIC IIA are planned.

**Force protection consideration.** Patrols or other FEs assigned IIA tasks can vary significantly in composition with consideration to threat environment, location, security conditions achieved by the force and the type of operation. Task groupings may comprise a small team attending a meeting with limited security and mobility assets or the task may be assigned to a manoeuvre combat team (CT) or platoon patrol with SME attached.

**Actions at the objective**

Formal or informal engagement may occur in a variety of situations and environments. Often, these engagement actions require the military personnel involved to be temporarily separated from the patrol’s main body manoeuvre element. As such, TTPs should be developed, understood and rehearsed to ensure the safety of military personnel involved in engagements with civil actors.

Tasks for IIA or collection requiring direct contact with civil actors have three phases. The approach to the objective, conduct of the civil–military engagement task, and return to a forward base or other secure location.

Planning for force protection on the way to and following meetings is well-established in patrol TTP planning factors.

Rehearsals of C2 as well as signals and actions-on during the time of the engagement as well as at the point of separation and return are essential. The commander of the force protection party has tactical control for security at all times.

Personnel assigned protection roles should be able to observe and identify threats within and external to the principal actors. Care must also be taken to ensure that personnel present for protection are managed appropriately, so as not to be distracted by what is happening in the meeting and not to become engaged in the meeting conversation or side-bar conversations.

**Conducting civil engagement**

This annex describes key elements of force protection during the conduct of engagement tasks due to some unique elements of the tactical micro-environment in that place and at that time.
Tactical presence. Safety during an engagement is described as tactical presence. There are five components of tactical presence, as follows:

- Identification of threats:
  - What is the impact of your presence?
  - What potential threats are in the tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) and the meeting area?
  - Is everyone present known and were they expected to be there?
  - Security of movement locations and times when attending a prearranged location?
  - Who else will be present (armed security contractors/civil security agencies)?

- Communication is verbal and non-verbal:
  - To achieve the desired effect, communicating the right message at the right time supported by PPP, techniques, style and non-verbal communication.
  - Look for non-verbal cues and atmospherics.
  - In situations that are escalating, be prepared to finish and leave to send a message.

- Threat assessment is continuous and holistic considering people, objects (weapons, potential weapons) and environmental factors (location, weather, time of day, escape routes. If in a room, or at a table what is the avenue of evacuation and route to the marry up location. What alternatives are there? Is it the ground floor?

- Mechanics of assault:
  - When a person changes into an aggressive posture they move their feet and hands, often preceded by their head and eyes. Constant awareness of positioning of the arms, hands and feet of persons being engaged and in the periphery is required (including change in balance).
  - Endeavour to maintain a safety distance. 1.5 paces is a personal space that gives some protection through a reactionary gap of an instant (noting the CIMIC IIA is not facing an armed aggressor).

- Safety concepts (adapted from the Australian Defence Force Service Police Manual):
  - Interview stance: a wide base (feet shoulder-width apart), deep base (non-master leg forward), head over centre and low centre of gravity (COG) (slightly bent knees) is a stance that gives the member a foundation for effective balance and movement to react or move.
• Positioning: positions are described by numbers.
• Triangulation: use of one team member at Position 1 and one team member at Position 1.75 allows triangulation so that the members can see behind each other and observe 360°. Having a team member behind the subject can make them uncomfortable.
• Force protection personnel should be positioned to view access and egress as well as monitoring the engagement team if required.

Considerations
Considerations include:
• manoeuvre force, insertion and extraction: air, vehicle mounted, foot
• security of dismount point and marry up RV
• overwatch or other external site security
• terrain (often complex)
• actors:
  • actors expected at the location including armed security personnel
  • previous meetings or reports of actors
  • actors observed on approach or in vicinity of the objective
  • communications devices being used
• atmospherics:
  • usual atmospherics and events at the location at the time
  • changes to atmospherics or events reported on approach
  • changed atmospherics during the task
• communications between the security force and the engagement team when separated
• alternate routes, including building entrances and exits that may be used
• actions on while engagement team are in the meeting, including recall messages
• PPP of military FEs involved in the engagement, as well as attached manoeuvre FEs
• cultural awareness
• communications within the team
• communications with external security elements
• teamwork
• command and signals.
Annex B to Chapter 3

Quick impact project guiding principles

The military force can implement QIPs directly or indirectly, or by managing implementation by a third party (often a local contractor). Indirect QIPs are preferable, as they create job opportunities for the local population, help it get back on its feet and put a local face on the project.

Characteristics

QIPs have the following characteristics:

- small-scale and low-cost
- designed to be of benefit to the local population
- planned and implemented within a short time frame
- do not place an unforeseen financial burden on the recipient or create material requirements that cannot be met within the country
- usually visible to the population
- done in consultation with representatives of national or local authorities, and, where appropriate, with the participation of local communities and relevant humanitarian actors
- should not duplicate the programs of other actors
- are sensitive to considerations of gender, ethnicity, age and vulnerability
- selected and implemented in accordance with the principles of ‘do no harm’
- sensitive to any potential risks to the population, including risk of conflict or risk of damage to the environment.

Guiding principles

Military projects conducted in support of IIA effects and IO objectives should be seen to support the humanitarian coordination priorities and the recovery and development objectives of the mandated lead agencies. The military actions should use procedures that are common and familiar to approaches used by the civilian organisations, including reference to HN authorities recognised by GOAS as well as mandated civil coordination authorities. The staff can utilise CIMIC relationships to seek consultation, and fully consider advice, from all legitimate sources in areas where the military has less expertise.

QIPs should aim to bolster the responsibility or credibility of the local authorities, so make sure to obtain their endorsement or participation. Failure to do so could result in unintended consequences, such as deterioration in security at a later date or creation of an aid-dependency culture.

Interventions must not exacerbate any religious, ethnic or cultural tensions.
Be aware that local cultural sensitivities will be different to yours. Never force people to talk about subjects that might make them uncomfortable.

Bear in mind that many civilians might have suffered traumatic experiences involving the military (national or international). This includes bereavement, sexual abuse or rape, violence and other forms of abuse.

Always take advice on orphanage projects – there may be protection issues of which you are unaware.

Do not raise expectations that cannot be met consistently over time. People who are destitute or vulnerable will expect results immediately. They may quickly lose confidence in the absence of visible benefits or, alternatively, become dependent upon what is provided.

Include monitoring and accountability. Apply and insist upon minimum standards of work in the project.

**General guidance – take a collaborative approach**

You should consult with all relevant parties, including:

- DFAT
- local authorities
- international police
- international military units
- humanitarian, stabilisation and development organisations.

Liaise with sector authorities, such as a Ministry of Health or a sanitation agency, and take part in sectoral (or ‘cluster’) meetings.

Never venture into areas where you have no expertise.

Focus on your QIP objectives and work with other agencies to meet them.

Develop a demand-driven approach; let your beneficiaries tell you what they need.

Engage with, and listen to, the local population so that it feels able to contribute. Women sometimes find it more difficult than men to contribute.

Do not just go looking for projects that meet your need. For example, do not rehabilitate a school just because it is next to your camp.
Annex C to Chapter 3

Communication skills

The essence of CIMIC actions is the effect of interactions with civil actors. To shape relationships through engagement, military personnel assigned to conduct civil space IIA need to understand and use a variety of communication techniques and procedures.

These techniques are not exclusive to CIMIC endeavours. Some are used globally in a multitude of industry sectors and professions and are proven enablers to effective communication. Others are specific to a broad range of military activity and are key considerations for any military activity while on operations.

Appendix 1 to Appendix 3 outline the key considerations of the most important of these foundation procedures and techniques. They are those that are guaranteed to be used on every operation. While keeping this in mind, remember that there are many skills, techniques and procedures that will assist military personnel in the execution of engagement tasks with civil actors in set circumstances. These should be identified, practised and employed as required.

Appendix 1 to Appendix 3 describe the following foundation procedures and techniques:

- elicitation
- negotiation
- communicating through interpreters.

Appendices:
1. Elicitation techniques
2. Negotiation planning
3. Working with interpreters
Appendix 1 to Annex C to Chapter 3

Elicitation techniques

Some elicitation techniques include the following:

- apply cultural competence
- use funnel technique
- use active listening
- be attentive
- be patient
- be tolerant
- affirm the speaker with regular reflective feedback
- be interested:
  - ask open questions
  - ask clarifying questions
- be respectful – wait for the speaker to pause before speaking or asking questions
- create a comfortable environment with minimal distractions
- be attuned to non-verbal signs in the subject and in any third party actors
- be aware of non-verbal cues which include:
  - scratching, tapping, eye shifting, weight shifting
  - folding their arms or crossing their legs
  - looking for someone
  - the volume, tone, pitch and tempo of their speech
  - culturally normal behaviours
- give something such as:
  - a smile
  - culturally appropriate greetings
  - positive emotion
  - coffee, snacks or other small gifts
  - subtle flattery
  - releasable information
Contents

- mutual interest
- offer/present public/open source information to guide conversation
- make oblique reference
- use feigned ignorance to exploit the tendency of people to educate
- exploit assumed knowledge – show knowledge of associations in common that may lead them to assume you know more, encouraging them to talk freely; for CIMIC tasks, never reveal your associations or information gleaned from other civil actors or you may create doubt in the subject’s mind about the security of their information and their physical security; you may also compromise other sources
- bracketing – provide a high and low estimate in order to entice a more specific number
- opposition/feigned incredulity – indicate disbelief or opposition in order to prompt a person to offer information in defence of their position
- provocative statement – make a provocative statement to trigger the person to question you in order to set up a conversation topic
- questionnaires and surveys.

Question techniques

Questions used should be:
- clear – the interviewee must easily understand the question
- concise – the more concise the question is, the more easily the interviewee interprets it
- prepared – when planning an interview, interviewers need to prepare a general line of questioning.

Question types

Types of questions include:
- closed
- interrogative (begin with interrogative words such as who, what, when, where, why, which, how)
- open
- probing
- leading
- mirror (can help minimise misunderstandings and increase rapport)
- compound
- check
load.

Deflecting elicitation attempts

To protect military information you should:

- know what information is releasable and what is to be protected
- be suspicious of people who seek information
- not tell people any information they are not authorised to know, including personal information about you and other service personnel and other civil actors
- politely discourage conversation topics and deflect possible elicitation by referring persons making enquiries to public sources (websites, press releases, spokespersons).

If asked or approached for information, response options include:

- ignore any question or statement you think is improper and then change the topic
- deflect a question with one of your own
- respond with ‘why do you ask?’
- state that it is not an appropriate question
- state you would have to clear such discussions with your security officer
- state that you cannot discuss this matter.

If you believe that someone has tried to elicit information from you, especially about your work, report it to your security officer at the first opportunity. Have as much information about the person, including contact phone numbers and photographs, if possible.
Appendix 2 to Annex C to Chapter 3

Negotiation planning

Considerations for negotiations

Considerations for negotiation preparation and planning include:

- negotiations may involve several meetings using a variety of means, influencers and influences to determine preliminaries and standards as well as the base positions
- define the negotiation aims and objectives
- identify limits
- thorough preparation
- sequence:
  - preliminaries and consensus on standards
  - the negotiation meeting
  - post-meeting actions and follow up
- regard all participants as equals
- never underestimate people
- empathy is vital
- avoid emotional confrontation
- position disagreement carefully
- remain professional, calm and unemotional
- abide by the rules (legal, social, cultural, etc.)
- be as open as possible with regard to positions and objectives
- state and maintain clear objectives
- patience is a key characteristic of good negotiation
- deal with concessions progressively
- use silence and extended pause
- remain alert
- do not let perfection be the enemy of a good, or an acceptable outcome
- re-state and confirm closing positions, task to be completed by each party, questions to be answered and commitments made
Contents

• determine the need for subsequent meetings; set a date and location if possible
• written reports on progress and commitments
• follow up correspondence to participants.

The seven steps to negotiation

The seven elements of negotiation planning are as follows:
• Step 1 – the key issue being negotiated
• Step 2 – stakeholder list
• Step 3 – objective and interests:
  • ours
  • principal stakeholder
  • other stakeholders in order of priority
• Step 4 – options:
  • alternative possible outcomes for each stakeholder
    • preferred
    • best alternative
    • worst alternative
    • impact of no negotiated outcome
  • options and offers available:
    • from us for each stakeholder
    • from each stakeholder to us
  • standards applicable to the negotiation and the situation to guide decisions and assess options
• Step 5 – relationships:
  • the dynamics of existing known or reported attitudes and perceptions as well as previous experience that may affect the outcome, conduct or objectives of the negotiation
  • relationships between principals and third parties related to the negotiation objectives and the situation
• Step 6 – commitments and authority of representatives at the negotiation:
  • authority delegated or pre-approved limits, offers and options
  • restrictions – constraints and limitations
  • historical commitments
• precedents

• Step 7 – communication:
  • cultural considerations for the sequence, preparatory phase or conduct including non-verbal cues, ‘dos and don’ts’
  • questions to ask
  • information authorised for release
  • specific messages to give
  • strategy to communicate.
Appendix 3 to Annex C to Chapter 3

Working with interpreters

Effective communication is essential for the success of any form of stakeholder engagement. Over the last century, the vast majority of ADF expeditionary operations have been conducted in areas where English is not the principal language. Using interpreters, either civil or military, who are competent in both English and the local language(s)/dialect(s) provides a solution to this dilemma if managed in accordance with the following principles and considerations.

Principles

The following principles should be used when selecting, managing and employing interpreters:

- respect:
  - culture
  - interests/attitudes
- impact of employment on interpreter and family
- teamwork, establishing:
  - trust
  - rapport
  - inclusion:
    - familiarise your interpreter with ADF customs, standards, culture, expectations, jargon and acronyms
    - keep them informed (as much as possible) about what is happening
    - quality assurance (alternative ‘competency’), including:
      - selection – linguistic skills/dialects, age, gender and race need to be acceptable to engagement audience
      - practice – test the accuracy of your interpreter’s skills with local people or with other interpreters to ensure accuracy
- supervision
- managing risk to the following:
  - mission – operational security
  - military personnel
  - the interpreter (including family and associates of locally employed interpreters).
Considerations

Planning engagements. Considerations for planning engagements include:

- suitability of the interpreter for the activity – consider the following:
  - social/cultural background
  - skill level
  - reliability
- brief the interpreter on the following:
  - situation/context
  - engagement target(s)
  - issues to be discussed
  - expectations of the interpreter
- rehearse:
  - positioning
  - technique
  - key/technical terms
- ensure that your interpreter has the equipment they need (notepad, pens, sleeping bag, boots, etc.).

Conduct of engagements

Consider the following when conducting engagements:

- Position your interpreter beside or slightly behind you in order to maintain the focus of the engagement target/audience on you.
- Restrict the scope for interpreters to inject their own personality, opinions, ideas or questions.
- Never resolve differences with your interpreter in front of the engagement target/audience.
- Attention should always be directed towards engagement target/audience – not towards the interpreter.
- Never address the engagement target/audience in the third person.
- Ensure that you lead the discussion; interpreters should never independently offer response or discussion.
- Your tone, mannerisms and body language should be the same as if you were not speaking through an intermediary.
• Do not whisper or say anything to your interpreter that will not be translated; this undermines your credibility and may insult/offend the engagement target/audience.

• Employ the following techniques of speech:
  • slow and clear, using short sentences
  • pause at natural breaks about every 5 seconds
  • summarise periodically to confirm the conversation is on track
  • avoid ambiguous terms, slang, idioms or colloquialisms to avoid misunderstanding
  • keep it simple – avoid flowery or effusive language.
Chapter 4

Civil–military cooperation staff procedures

Tactical advantage is generated through decision superiority, controlling tempo by timeliness and quality of decisions. Both timing and quality in decision-making are enhanced by the accurate and timely situational understanding of the operating environment. The purpose of the staff is to support the commander in making decisions and to support subordinate commanders in executing those decisions. Good situational understanding is the result of organised staff systems, battlespace monitoring, information management and timely advice to commanders for targeting decisions. CIMIC staff procedures describe the responsibilities and procedures for CIMIC staff on a tactical HQ.

Each commander will bring unique aspects to the organisation and conduct of staff planning, briefings and staff collaboration. Underlying the nuances brought by the personality of the commander there is, however, always a routine within the HQ, which is known as the HQ battle rhythm.

Battle rhythm

The HQ battle rhythm is the schedule of daily or weekly routines within the HQ. The battle rhythm ensures that staff processes are followed, staff WG forums are provided, reporting deadlines are adhered to and situational understanding is current. The WGs are a mechanism to monitor and adjust the plan. The checks and balances within a staff, achieved through the battle rhythm, enables synchronised, coordinated action by subordinate FEs, supported by accurate, timely information and guidance.

Staff on a CB or minor JTF are continuously planning, concurrent with the execution of the operation. Ongoing planning uses the SMAP to develop branches, sequels and contingencies, as well as for conducting immediate response planning as significant activities occur. The time line for these planning activities will depend on the staff available, urgency of the requirement and the task being planned. For such planning, the plans cell (SS) will have a nested SMAP battle rhythm concurrent with the daily routine of the HQ.

The CIMIC staff need to ensure that information, assessments, recommendations and task concepts are ready in accordance with the battle rhythm and the planning cycle in order to be synchronised and coordinated with other staff functional areas and BOS effects in time for dissemination, planning and action.
The staff working groups

WG are forums of key staff assembled to ensure collaboration in development of staff recommendations to support the commander’s decision-making. CIMIC staff assess and input risks and opportunities of civil space impacts when BOS effects are being developed and proposed, as well as proposing civil space IIAs, TAs and effects. The commander relies on this collaboration to ensure that staff advice on key issues thoroughly considers all aspects of a situation. Typical WGs involving CIMIC staff include:

- IO WGs
- targeting WGs (formal or informal)
- intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) WGs
- assessment WGs.

Commander’s decision board

The commander’s decision board is a small forum which convenes routinely and as required to review recommendations on targeting, collection and operational progress in order to make decisions. The targeting decision board (TDB) usually comprises the commander, S3, S2, JFENCC OIC and legal officer. It is augmented by additional, appropriate PSOs or advisory staff, who are invited to attend when required.

The procedural aspects for staff WGs and decision boards are contained in Annex A.

Civil–military cooperation staff functions and responsibilities

The NATO staff system identifies the nine principal staff functions as well as associated commander’s advisers such as the legal officer, public affairs officer (PAO), senior medical officer and chaplain. In addition, there are a range of BOS or capability advisers on the enabled HQ. These may include:

- brigade air LO
- RAN LO
- EW
- ground-based air defence
- unmanned aerial vehicle
- MP
- IO coordinator
The senior CIMIC operator is the tactical commander’s S9 PSO. The S9 works in close cooperation with the other PSOs, the commander’s advisory group (CAG) and the JFECC, as well as the various IRC enabler leads on the HQ staff.

The S9 also leads the CIMIC staff team. The CIMIC staff team work as an integrated part of the HQ to which they are force assigned. CIMIC staff work closely in cooperation with all the PSO staff groups, CAG and IRC. A detailed list of areas for cooperation focus with each PSO staff group and CAG is contained in Annex B.

CB SOPs state that a fully enabled CB may be force assigned a staff of six CIMIC operators. A minor JTF or battlegroup may receive a detachment of four or a team of two.

Regardless of the number of operators force assigned, the following staff functions must be performed:

- S9 CIMIC PSO
- S95 CIMIC support to deliberate planning SMAP
- S93 monitoring tactical and operational progress as well as civil space conditions (including S935 CIMIC support to immediate planning as a result of operational incidents or decision points being reached)
- civil–military engagement coordination.

A list of duties for each staff functions is contained in Annex C.

**Responsibilities**

There are five primary responsibilities of the CIMIC staff:

- **Support to the staff military appreciation process.** CIMIC staff are to provide support to initial IPB and SMAP as covered in detail in Chapter 5.

- **Enhance situational understanding.** The CIMIC staff’s first responsibility is to maintain situational awareness of the state of progress of the military operation overall. This general situational awareness ensures that civil space conditions and impacts are considered in the context of current dispositions, as well as the priorities and intentions of the commander. With understanding of the operational context, the CIMIC staff role is to be aware of the civil space issues, activities and priorities in order to provide timely SME information, assessments and recommendations.

- **Monitor the civil space.** CIMIC staff monitor priority risks and TAs within the civil space to maintain situational understanding and track operational
progress. In this way opportunities and threats relating to the mission or the force are assessed and the resulting assessment is available to support decisions.

- **Manage information.** CIMIC staff provide input to the SMAP and targeting decisions.
- **Provide input to targeting decisions.** Appropriate influence activities that reduce risk or exploit opportunities are communicated, using targeting methodology, as a recommendation to the commander for a decision.

## Enhance situational understanding

Synchronisation and coordination within the staff is a prerequisite for synchronisation and coordination of tactical action. Staff coordinated effort requires common understanding of the friendly situation, the threat situation, the operational environment and the commander’s priorities. Such situational understanding requires all staff to maintain current understanding of the following:

- orders and SITREPs
- objectives, force dispositions, actions and plans
- threat assessment and intelligence summary
- reporting pertaining to the civil space.

Situational understanding requires CIMIC staff to collaborate across staff functions, attend the operations room 2 minute drills, have the S9 or representative at the commander’s update brief and read all orders and fragmentary orders (fragos) sent and received. It is also a fundamental requirement to read the higher HQ, the commander’s and all subordinate FE SITREPs, as well as the daily intelligence summary and CIMIC periodic report.

Functional knowledge of the civil space and operational context across the CIMIC staff, even if a team of two, requires active staff investigation and regular knowledge sharing. Internally, the CIMIC staff should have an informal or formal team brief scheduled to share and update common understanding.

The operations log of significant activities, patrol reports and SITREPs, in addition to CIMIC periodic returns, are all sources of information to maintain situational understanding. A listening watch on significant activities or regular spot checks with operations watch keepers will help maintain both situational understanding and identify likely or current civil space issues and events.

CIMIC staff must be prepared to be called to the operations room to provide relevant, current information and assessment to support an immediate action drill response to an incident or reporting. CIMIC staff will also be consulted and engaged in adhoc contingency planning and will routinely respond to other staff cells and CAG staff.
Monitoring the civil space

The purpose of civil space monitoring is to ensure that military decisions are made by the commander considering civil space elements of the operating environment, civil space objectives of the operation and civil space impacts. The CIMIC staff monitoring effort is related to the following:

- information pertaining to risks and opportunities arising from the civil space
- information required for decisions and for task execution to exploit opportunities and treat risks
- information on operational progress, including information on task progress, and the progress of the operation overall with respect to the civil space.

Civil space monitoring priorities

The management of civil space monitoring and information is the responsibility of the S2, who will be assisted considerably in this if there is a dedicated SME CIMIC staff team.

The collection of information to monitor the civil space priority areas commences during preliminary analysis. The collection and monitoring priorities are developed during IPB and mission analysis (MA) to ensure that IPB enhances staff situational understanding of the civil space priority risks and opportunities. The monitoring of risks, opportunities and IIA task requirements for the civil space is prioritised in accordance with the mission as well as the operational and tactical environment. Priority civil space elements considered include:

- civil areas incorporating sociopolitical and cultural demographics
- civil structures and infrastructure providing information systems, essential services and stability as well as those designated as protected or restricted targets
- leadership and influencers
- civil administration, governance and security conditions and capacity including rule of law
- threat influence on civil space attitudes, perceptions and civil actor actions
- population stability or propensity for displacement and economic security
- the humanitarian need, HN capacity and response as well as the international response and coordination.

While the IPB assessment comprises the full body of knowledge and situational understanding of the S2 and CIMIC SME, a précis of current priority considerations and assessments is recorded on the CIMIC running estimate and the CIMIC MA worksheet. These are maintained and updated daily throughout the operation. Monitoring of the civil space as a component of IPB is also covered extensively in Chapter 5.
Monitoring operational progress

CIMIC effects and civil space conditions are assessed just as are the kinetic, manoeuvre, engineer and other effects are assessed.

MOPs, MOIs and MOEs are all used to assess IIA. These measures are described by conditions or questions that are incorporated into the collection plan by the S2 as specific IRs. The S2 and CIMIC SME should work closely together to develop suitable indicators and questions or observation descriptors that are readily collected. These IRs are tasked to specific FEs for collection.

To measure progress toward civil space end state conditions for an operation, the force should be provided with specific MOE and normalcy indicators.

Normalcy indicators. Normalcy indicators identify civil situation conditions normally experienced by the HN. In particular, for the military commander’s CIMIC effects it is important to work toward the ‘normal’ security, law, economic basis, housing and social conditions experienced by the residents of the community at the time specified as the base line for the operation.

Normalcy indicators are important to:

- prevent the force trying to achieve conditions not achieved by the resident society, government or culture before the requirement for intervention (ie, over-achieving)
- measure trends of progress or degradation of a civil society to assess the effectiveness of operations
- measure improvement of the civilian condition to cue reduction in the level of dependency on the military force by the civil populace and civil authorities
- cue decisions for transition of responsibility from military to civil agencies or cue civil agency recovery and development support.

Measure of performance. MOP is the record of friendly force activities conducted contributing to a specific objective. For CIMIC activities, it would represent the number of PAO or psyops message broadcasts, meetings attended, engagements conducted or stage of progress toward a project being completed. This output related measure may also be used to check that the intended audience was reached, how long they were engaged and if other media sources accessed and used the information. MOP is usually easy to measure, track and record, however it still requires clear reporting and tracking guidance.

Measure of impact. MOI is a criterion used to assess the changes of a system expected because of friendly tasks leading to a change in the system’s function or behaviour. MOI measures changes internal to the system. MOIs are important in planning as these expected system changes are immediately transferable to a collection plan. MOIs can be viewed as a form of battle damage assessment (BDA) for IO tasks. An example of MOI is the number of calls to an established tips...
line following the dissemination of psyops and MPA products and a KLE within a
targeted village. MOI measure the impact on the TA including:

- **First-order effects.** First-order effects are effects on the physical component of the information domain\(^1\). They are also referred to as the immediate temporal effects of the action at the time and place of delivery.

- **Second-order effects.** Second-order effects are effects on knowledge accuracy, information availability and flow of information in the TA. The term second-order effects is also commonly used to refer to temporal effects that impact on secondary TA. These may be intended or unintended.

- **Third-order effects.** Third-order effects are effects on the intellectual and moral components of the information domain. This includes how attitudes and perceptions have changed in the TA. These may be intended or unintended. The term ‘third-order effects’ is also used in the temporal sense as the physical reaction, reorientation or decision by TAs and collateral audiences as a result of an action. This includes, from a CIMIC staff perspective, reaction and counteraction by a variety of TAs including friendly, neutral, belligerent and threat TAs across the civil space and toward the civil space.

Collecting information in relation to second-order and third-order effects is generally difficult and time consuming. Well-developed, simple and succinct indicators are important in detecting changes in perceptions, attitudes and behaviours, and in recognising reactions, trends and patterns.

**Measures of effectiveness.** The MOEs are used to assess changes in system behaviour, capability or operational environment that indicate progress towards mission achievement. MOEs are tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, a DE or a major objective. MOEs may be specific observations that relate to identifying the conditions for such operational milestones. An example of an MOE from a CIMIC perspective may be tracking behavioural change in the civil space signalling improved perceptions of security. This may include such things as an increase in road usage, access by NGOs or reopening of local markets. Negative indicators can also be used as MOEs to monitor for increases in undesired effects and identify their potential impact.

MOEs enable commanders to identify the impact of a targeting action in relation to the overall mission. Measuring outcomes against an initial baseline is the only way to judge effectiveness.

**Planning for monitoring**

In developing MOPs, MOIs and MOEs the essential guide for CIMIC staff is to ensure that they are as follows:

- **Linked.** Measures are to be directly linked to one or more objective (the more the better).

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\(^1\) The aggregate of individuals, organisations and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.
Specific. Measures should consist of one, two or three clear questions.

Observable. Measures should be observable as an effect on a system, an actor’s decision or TA’s tactical decision. They are not statements of the actions being used to achieve the effects.

Distinguishable. Measures are to be distinguishable from the objectives they support.

Measureable. Measures should enable comparative evaluation of data collected to determine progressive change. Criteria specifying ‘number of …’ or ‘percentage of …’ to the collector are preferable to allow comparative analysis over time.

Comparable. Measures are to be comparable against successive collection efforts over time or to a baseline to show the change as a result of the action or influence.

Allocated. The observing FE may be the same FE conducting the tactical action or may be an independent observer or collector (e.g., a PAO can provide information from local and international media, EW can collect digital spectrum traffic changes).

Referenced to a named area of interest. Named areas of interest (NAIs) are usually areas in the physical terrain. They can also be specific actors or organisations in the human terrain, being an actor, agency or meeting forum. Similarly, NAIs can be identified in the information terrain, such as media and social media sources, information systems or specific communications networks or devices.

Time based. Both the time period of observation as well as the time the information is required to be reported should be specified. Reporting of no change at the specified time is equally as important as reports of change.

When developing monitoring proposals or tasks to undertake combat assessment, consider information required to meet MOIs, its source, location and time and method of collection. Information required includes:

- status of effects delivery (MOP)
- evidence of IO message broadcast – first-order MOI
- indicators of IO message resonance – second-order MOI
- indicators of reactions and counteractions – third-order MOI
- assessment against MOE or DE conditions
- recommendation (complete, repeat, modify, develop new target).
Information management

Information management is the processes by which information is obtained, manipulated, directed, and controlled. Information management includes the creation, collection and control, dissemination, storage and retrieval, protection and destruction of information. Information management is covered in detail in LWP-G 0-3-3, Battlespace Information Management. CIMIC staff should refer to this publication to get a thorough understanding of the management of information.

The purpose of information management is the enhancement of situational awareness and situational understanding across all FEs to achieve decision superiority.

Since combat is inherently uncertain, information management must be flexible enough to provide information that supports both planned and spontaneous decisions, for which no prior planning was conducted.

Planned decisions. The commander and the staff use COA war gaming to identify environmental factors and threat activities that could affect the friendly COA, and to develop branch plans to address these possibilities. Decision points in the operational plan and the decision support matrix are tools that identify situations and environmental conditions indicating when the commander needs to make a decision.

Spontaneous decisions. Spontaneous decisions are those decisions generated by unexpected or unplanned events or environmental conditions. In such cases information will be required at short notice from across the staff, including CIMIC staff planners, for input into the commander’s current contextual understanding. Such situational understanding, coupled with experience and judgement, enables the commander to make an informed decision and control the tempo despite unexpected events.

Quality information

Quality information supports the commander to make robust decisions by enabling the following:

• timely execution
• understanding of the effects generated by previous decisions
• understanding information required for decisions
• understanding of where information supporting decisions can be obtained
• understanding the nature of the operational environment
• clear links between information priorities and the military mission
• protection of information.
Civil space information management is not the sole responsibility of CIMIC. It is an essential task for all components of the JTF to enhance the common operational picture (COP) and support the IPB process.

The characteristics of quality information are as follows:

- **Accuracy.** Information conveys the true situation.
- **Relevance.** Information is relevant to the mission or DE, commander’s priorities, risks to the force or specified conditions.
- **Timeliness.** Information is provided in time to make a decision and use that decision to influence events favourably.
- **Usability.** Information is presented in an appropriate format, accessible language and to the right forum.
- **Brevity.** Information can be assimilated in the time available.
- **Security.** Information is afforded the appropriate classification and protection or releasability.

### Receiving and sharing information

On a busy HQ opportunities to find and collate information will be fleeting. Civil space information needs to be managed by the CIMIC staff to ensure that priority intelligence can be accessed when it is most relevant to the commander to inform decision-making. Information should be handled as follows:

- shared within the HQ
- shared with higher HQ
- shared with subordinate FEs
- may be shared with Australian WOG agencies, as authorised by the commander through the security officer and information manager, S2
- may be shared with the HN, international government organisations or NGOs, as authorised by the commander through the security officer and information manager, S2.

### Prioritising information requirements

**Commander’s critical information requirements.** The commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) comprise the critical information a commander needs to make timely decisions. CCIRs comprise PIRs, friendly force information requirements (FFIRs) and EEFIs.

**Priority intelligence requirements.** PIRs are specific IRs about stakeholders and the environment within a battlespace. PIRs most relevant to the CIMIC staff relate to monitoring priority risks with regard to the civil space, such as risks that are likely to divert resources, undermine legitimacy or degrade Australian WOG objectives. PIRs will also relate to collection requirements for priority CIMIC.
actions. Indicators of civil space DE conditions may also be included. PIRs for the civil space are likely to include the following:

- information regarding key leaders and civil space influencers
- government effectiveness, including capacity for rule of law and governance
- status of key civil life support (water, sanitation, power, health and food)
- humanitarian issues (ability of HN with or without IO/NGO support to respond)
- key civil infrastructure.

S9 can propose PIRs to the S2. S9 can identify PIRs which may be answered through CIMIC engagement and activities of the force. The PIRs drive collection tasking to subordinate FEs.

Friendly force information requirements. FFIRs are IRs about force dispositions, capabilities or progress that support or enhance a commander’s decisions. FFIRs most relevant to CIMIC may include capacity of civil agencies, progress towards CIMIC influence effects, as well as capacity of FEs to contribute to CIMIC effects.

Essential elements of friendly information. EEFI are those elements of friendly force dispositions, intentions and activities that must be protected as a priority due to the potential impact on the mission or the force.

Requests for information

Requests for information (RFIs) are staff requests to the information manager to search the database. Before submitting an RFI ensure that the information is not on hand in the staff cell. Once submitted, the RFI will be checked against the S2 database and, if found, an answer will be provided. If not found, the RFI may be repositioned to a higher or subordinate HQ which may have the information. Alternatively, a task may be given to a subordinate FE or staff cell to collect the information.

RFIs must be clear, unambiguous single questions and should start with an interrogative such as who, what, when, where or how. They are provided to the RFI manager on the HQ, who maintains a log and has access to the database of information managed by the S2.

Holding information

CIMIC staff hold information by maintaining a small data repository supplementing the information manager’s record for civil space information. Such a repository must supplement and not replace the central information management database, which must hold a record of the information to ensure integrated operations. The CIMIC staff cell maintain a CIMIC log for correspondence in and out of the staff cell which records task completion and information cross-referencing links to the
operations log and daily staff occurrences. Types of correspondence recorded include the following:

- RFIs received and submitted, including answers
- records of targeting nominations and decisions
- references to significant activities and reporting relevant to civil space priorities, including actions taken and recommendations provided
- periodic reports received and sent via the operations cell
- CIMIC staff shift handover and staff internal cross briefings
- information or messages passed through the technical chain of command that do not appear on the main operations log.

**Reporting and dissemination**

**Reporting principles.** Principles considered in managing the reporting of information are:

- **Visibility.** Reporting provides the essential insight on the civil aspects of the operational environment in order to facilitate military planning and decision-making. The purpose of CIMIC information management and reporting is to provide a clear and accurate picture of the civil situation, enabling the commander and staff to focus on key aspects of the civil space without being distracted from the ME.

- **Relevance.** CIMIC routine reporting, as well as actions, should focus on those areas that contribute directly to mission, DE, decision point or IIA effects as identified in the force synchronisation matrix or decision support matrix. The relevance of information should consider both the current operational effort and enabling civil space information or effects that set conditions for the next operational effort.

- **Simplicity.** Simplicity combines brevity, clarity and accuracy, which are the principles of service writing. CIMIC information needs to be synthesised into its essential points so that all staff can easily understand and be cognisant of civil space impacts and priorities. Displaying graphics and using traffic light indicators can be useful to convey meaning simply, improving clarity and efficiency where digital display formats and staff SOPs permit.

- **Flexibility.** Information management must use a practical and flexible approach to the reporting, monitoring and presenting of CIMIC-related information. Staff preparation must provide inherent flexibility so as to ensure that reporting is:
  - formatted in accordance with requirements of the commander and S3
  - tailored to the characteristics of the civil situation
  - focused sufficiently broadly to meet the dynamics of changing priorities throughout the mission.
Consistency. The commander and unit SOPs will provide guidance on how and what civil space information is reported.

Information is disseminated up and down the chain of command as well as throughout the staff. CIMIC staff disseminate civil space information through staff routines as well as through ‘on occurrence’ reports and staff networks.

Opportunities for CIMIC staff input to HQ routines where information is disseminated include:

- routine reporting
- on occurrence reporting
- battle management system (BMS)/COP overlays
- maintaining staff information and task synchronisation tools within the HQ
- staff WGs and forums and their minutes
- interagency staff forums and their minutes
- operations and targeting fragos released by the S3 or JFECC
- intelligence reports or intelligence summaries drafted by S2 staff and released by the S2
- informal staff liaison, as well as the 2 minute drills or other internal HQ situation update procedures
- commander’s update brief.

Routine civil–military cooperation reporting. Routine CIMIC staff reporting includes six distinct products. The staff’s reporting products complement each other and provide a comprehensive system, which enables CIMIC and non-CIMIC staff to view current relevant CIMIC-related information in a standard format. This enables rapid identification of key areas of operational risk or concern to be monitored, as well as providing a wide forum in which operational civil space risk or opportunity is understood contextually. Routine information reporting products include:

- **Map overlay.** Significant civil incidents, events, points or infrastructure updated on the COP or civil space map overlay.
- **Civil–military cooperation reverse battlespace operating system analysis.** This is described in Chapter 5 as part of IPB.
- **Civil–military cooperation estimate.** The CIMIC estimate informs the staff daily on current priorities for civil monitoring, collection and analysis, as well as the results of assessment relevant to current and contingent operations. A sample CIMIC estimate is shown in Chapter 5 as part of MA.
- **Civil–military cooperation periodic report (reports and returns).** A CIMIC periodic report is sent daily, or as directed, from all command levels up the chain of command. This report provides a single reporting focus with a
common generic format that allows each command level to build up an appropriate assessment synchronised across the AO and force. A doctrinal format for a CIMIC periodic report is shown in Annex D.

- **Commander’s update brief.** This is a standard format 30 second brief that provides a key issues update to the commander. The brief identifies the current status of CIMIC support to the ME, progress of critical civil space influence effects and preconditions the operational risk with regard to the civil space. It also provides any answers to the commander’s RFIs. Different commanders will require different formats and they may include the requirement for progress indicators or colour coded traffic lights for some aspects. The back brief should align to other SMEs and there should be no surprises for the staff, in particular S3 and S2. Essential elements of any brief are as follows:
  - results from CIMIC IIA synchronisation matrix effects over the last 24 hours
  - CIMIC IIA synch matrix tasks scheduled over the next 24 hours
  - answers to commander’s RFIs (including those not yet answered)
  - decisions pending for the commander.

- **Combat assessment.** Assessment of operational progress against specified MOIs, MOEs and decisive conditions to the collection WG. The format should be in accordance with HQ SOPs, or as described in the segment on monitoring operational progress earlier in this chapter.

**On occurrence civil–military cooperation reporting.** On occurrence reports and records include the following:

- PIR reporting
- RFI responses to the commander, requesting staff groups, other FEs or civil agencies
- civil space influence action conops, target nominations and proposals in the form of an information activity (IA) EFST
- civil engagement briefs
- back briefs as part of plans and orders
- chat reports (see Annex E)
- quick assessments
- civil capacity briefs or briefs following collection tasks pertaining to civil areas or capacities.

**Information and task synchronisation.** Maintaining synchronisation tools within the HQ includes maintaining:

- the liaison architecture matrix (see Chapter 5)
Contents

- CIMIC elements of the synchronisation matrix (see Chapter 5)
- the decision support matrix (see *LWP-G 0-3-3, Battlespace Information Management* for more information)
- CIMIC elements of the targeting synchronisation matrix (TSM), covered in more detail at the end of this chapter.

**Information protection**

All users share responsibility for information protection. Information security is a force protection issue and all users should be vigilant in the use of any form of communication. It is imperative to use established security protocols and procedures to ensure that information is not accidentally compromised.

**Targeting procedures**

Targeting integrates and synchronises lethal and nonlethal systems to achieve the commander’s mission, objectives and desired effects. Modern conflict requires a targeting philosophy for the civil space that can respond very quickly to changes in the environment, maximise the collection and exploitation of available information and sustain concurrent target development and execution at a tempo compatible with achieving decision superiority over the enemy in the joint land combat line of effort.

**Targeting purpose**

The purpose of targeting procedures is to prioritise, synchronise and coordinate effects to achieve the commander’s mission, objectives and DEs. Targeting includes means such as:

- destroying, defeating, degrading, capturing or neutralising enemy systems and forces
- isolating, limiting, shaping or neutralising non-military actors aligned to or supporting threat forces
- enhancing, supporting, shaping or informing non-military actors that are friendly, non-aligned or neutral
- protecting noncombatants and critical elements of the civil space.

**Non-kinetic nonlethal target development**

Targeting commences in the operational planning cycle when the first targeting WG is assembled. This is usually following the first MA brief and commander’s guidance in SMAP preparation of the operation plan. Targeting continues until the force is extracted.

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2. Operational activity representing the identification, validation, nomination and prioritisation of targets and effects.
Tactical intent for CIMIC effects will conform to centrally prioritised joint operational effects issued in orders or guidance from operational level command such as the IO narrative, themes and objectives. There will be specific civil space conditions within the DEs or operational objectives for the tactical commander.

**Targeting cycle**

Successful civil space targeting for the CB and BG in complex environments is heavily reliant on cooperation, common understanding and the exploitation of local civil situation information to achieve the following:

- locate specific suitable actors or TA
- identify means and appropriate FEIs to deliver influence effects or perform tasks
- assess effectiveness in order to facilitate informed follow-on targeting decisions.

Staff responsible for CIMIC IAs must take every opportunity to be informed of the commander’s intent and direction and to collaborate with BG staff and IRC enablers.

**Decide, detect, deliver, assess.** Army uses the decide, detect, deliver, assess (D3A) targeting cycle. It accurately models how targeting decisions are made within a CB or minor JTF. D3A is described in detail in Annex F.

**Civil–military cooperation targeting at the battlegroup.** The find, fix, finish, exploit, analyse, disseminate (F3EAD) targeting cycle is a more suitable model to understand the BG process. F3EAD is much less focused on target selection in decision-making, which for CIMIC IIA is done at the higher command level. F3EAD focuses instead on relevant tactical aspects. These include finding the appropriate actor or means that represents the specified TA. Fixing the TA in terms of ensuring access to the TA by the tasked FE to get the influence effect delivered effectively. This could be a meeting appointment, a phone call, a routine civil engagement activity at which the TA is in attendance or a media means. It could also be a third party influencer. The delivery of the effect follows.

The F3EAD model also emphasises the follow up exploitation, analysis and dissemination of information and so ensures that the force and the commander are well informed to take advantage of the dynamics of changes observed. F3EAD is described in detail in Annex G.

**Identifying target audiences and effects**

**Target audience identification.** The principal staff tools for identifying and promulgating TAs are the PMESII/ASCOPE analysis, civil COG analysis and TA analysis. These are discussed in Chapter 5 as part of SMAP and IPB. These analyses are continuously reviewed and updated through formal and informal staff processes and appropriate effects and mission task verbs are assigned to prioritised TAs.
Target effects identification. The CIMIC staff utilise commander’s guidance as well as direction from IPB, the SMAP and orders to identify priority protect, inform, influence or collection effects. Sources of guidance include:

- the enduring narrative
- IO themes and objectives
- the synchronisation matrix
- specified and implied tasks
- effects identified in DE conditions.

From these sources and the assessment of the civil space, specific IIA can be described against specific TAs at specific locations in support of the mission.

Targeting effects definitions. Target task verbs and target effects are defined in LWP-CA (OS) 5-3-3, Joint Fires and Effects – Planning, Execution and Targeting (Land) and ADFP 3.13.1, Information Operations Procedures. The task verbs most appropriate to CIMIC IIA are contained in Table 4–1 in Annex H.

Target system analysis. Target systems analysis must be conducted for each target group and targeted individual. Target systems analysis is part of continuous monitoring and assessment under the IPB/joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. A précis of steps for target systems analysis is included in Annex I.

From the target systems analysis, the specific IA concept or NK EFST can be developed.

Inform and influence actions essential fire support task

An EFST is determined from the planning process and describes an effect that the force is to have upon a target or TA. It articulates to a commander precisely what effect is desired, on which target, where and when; for what purpose and priority, as well as stating who will conduct the task and what information can be collected to assess its impact.

The utility of an EFST in planning is that it links the targeting objective (task) with the manoeuvre plan (purpose), the means by which this is to be achieved (method) and what quantifies accomplishment of the task (effects). Measurement of these is then described in specific MOP and MOI terms.

SOPs will dictate how formal the process is and what tasks require an EFST to be developed. The IO BOS coordinator or the S3 and JFECC will provide guidance on the commander’s requirements. The EFST briefing format and the target preparation procedures outlined later in this chapter are a robust and effective manner in which to develop and communicate CIMIC IIA concepts for approval and to develop frago or taskords for execution of those tasks.

An EFST is not a full set of orders (that is what an operations order or frago is for); it is succinct and precise. An EFST conveys only the relevant information at a level of detail commensurate with the level of the HQ you are working in.
An example format of the IIA EFST ready for briefing is contained in Annex J.

Target brief background preparation

In developing the IIA concept, the following outputs for each nominated IIA concept or NK target nomination are prepared:

- **Develop the concept.** The IIA concept/IIA EFST is elaborated on to check all elements required of the TSM as well as the IIA worksheet are considered. This includes:
  - IO themes and objectives are identified and linked
  - a summary of the combat assessment collection requirement for MOPs and MOIs is prepared
  - FFIRs detailing FEs to locate and ‘fix’ the target or TA
  - FFIRs detailing capabilities to deliver or facilitate delivery of the effect.

- **Assess information requirements.** A summary of the collection requirements is prepared in the IRC slide for submission at the collection WG. This includes:
  - background information known and IRs for the target or TA are collated to inform decision makers as to the collection effort required
  - information on the means and mechanism for effect delivery (eg, phone number, media organisation, psyops advice, tasks or products, is collated to ensure that the task is feasible in the time frame)
  - information on capacity, contact and support may need to be negotiated with external partners or facilitating actors and organisations.

- **Assess the risk.** A risk assessment should be conducted to determine potential unintended first-, second- and third-order effects on the target, the CB and third parties in the civil space. The risk assessment should consider collateral impacts of threat actions to civil actors and other third party consequences such as economic or social consequences, precedents that may create an impression of ADF liability, legacy responsibilities or liabilities and the risk of reprisals. A summary of the military risk management (MRM) process applied to the development of NK EFST is contained in Annex K.

Targeting decisions

Once a target has been identified, the staff will consider the merits of the target and, if considered appropriate, will present the target to the commander for approval. Targets are presented as concepts for commander’s decision at a SMAP decision brief or at a TDB. The commander can also be sought for an
immediate priority decision to seize an opportunity by working through the targeting decision staff process informally in close cooperation with the S3 and S2.

The targeting working group (TWG) has responsibility to direct adjustment to proposals and for endorsement to progress to the TDB.

The formal staff process to provide timely relevant input to the CB targeting cycle for decision at the TDB is as follows:

• target effects are identified and provided to the functional staff for which they are relevant
• target systems analysis and TA analysis is conducted to develop the IIA concept as an IA EFST
• the IIA concept is developed and recommendation made to the TWG
• if recommended, the target is nominated by the TWG chair to the commander for approval at the TDB
• if approved as a target, a frago is issued to the tasked FE or patrol.

Rapid decisions made outside the staff battle rhythm using this process must still be considered by all stakeholders in the same way. A member of the staff may have to walk around the HQ to get input from essential staff and then to the chair of the TWG before the commander for the final decision. This process can be achieved in a very short time for high-priority opportunities, but cannot be circumvented.

Approval and dissemination

Once approved at the TDB the elements of the EFST are placed into the TSM and included in a frago from the operations cell or the JFECC to the executing subordinate FE.

Manoeuvre synchronisation matrix. The manoeuvre synchronisation matrix is the principal tool for coordinating and synchronising all effects, including CIMIC IA and protection effects. The manoeuvre synchronisation matrix is managed by the S3.

Targeting synchronisation matrix. The TSM is the principal staff tool at the CB/minor JTF used for tracking the development, approval and delivery of targeting effects and maintaining alignment of effects with the manoeuvre synchronisation matrix. The TWG chair manages the TSM and recommends future targets to the TDB at which the commander authorises future targets. The TSM is used to track targeting progress and effect delivery and is supplemented by the collection WG and assessment WG. The targeting process informs collection priorities to ensure that targets are acquired and fixed, as well as for assessment of effects. For more information on these processes refer to the CB SOP. A guide to completing the TSM fields for CIMIC IA EFST is found in Annex L.

The CIMIC staff maintain a working copy of the TSM for the development and tracking of CIMIC IIA targeting briefs. These are presented to the IO WG and the
TWG for recommendation or refinement and then to the TDB for decision. If approved, they are loaded onto the JFECC managed TSM. Approved targets are monitored by the CIMIC staff and reported on through the assessment WG, the TWG and the commander’s update brief if required.

Annexes:
A. Procedural aspects of working groups and decision boards
B. Civil–military cooperation staff interactions with other branches
C. Civil–military cooperation staff functions
D. Example civil–military cooperation periodic report
E. Example chat report as per combat brigade standard operating procedures
F. Detect, decide, deliver and assess targeting model
G. Find, fix, finish, exploit, analyse and disseminate targeting model
H. Targeting task verbs and effects terms most relevant to civil–military cooperation
I. Target system analysis
J. Example essential fire support task for non-kinetic/nonlethal influence activities brief
K. Non-kinetic effect target risk assessment
L. Example civil–military cooperation inform and influence actions targeting synchronisation matrix field inputs
Annex A to Chapter 4

Procedural aspects of working groups and decision boards

The CIMIC staff cell may receive or initiate a recommendation from anyone within the force, at which time it should be considered for a decision recommendation. For the CIMIC staff this is most often pertaining to civil space collection for monitoring or civil space influence activity. The proposal is developed into an influence activity concept, using the EFST format, for a recommendation to be provided to the relevant WG before being presented to the commander. The WG considers the proposal and the SME recommendation in order to make a determination regarding the recommendation as well as prioritising the concept within the WG.

The CIMIC staff officer at the targeting WG, IO WG and at the collection WG, will also have the opportunity to make observations and recommendations on other BOS task proposals to ensure that civil space impacts and objectives are considered.

The possible recommendations to the WG chair may include:
- not recommended
- recommended
- hold for consideration at a future time
- resubmit for consideration following further development or modification.

During the WG each recommended task is prioritised for presentation to the TDB. Influence activities that are not recommended may still be presented to the decision board. This ensures that the commander has the opportunity to make the decision and the staff are not deciding on the commander’s behalf.

The four possible decision outcomes for any task resulting from the decision board are as follows:
- task approved, frago to be drafted and released
- task declined
- task declined at this time and shelved for future contingency plan or a more appropriate time, frago drafted
- task declined and/or referred back for further development and subsequent reconsideration.

Conduct of the working group

WGs may be formal meetings as part of the HQ battle rhythm or they can be less formal staff interactions with appropriate HQ PSOs and staff advisers. Appropriate PSOs and staff advisers to be consulted for informal processes regarding
influence activities include S3, S2, S9, IO coordinator, joint fires and legal. In a large HQ such as the enabled CB or a minor JTF, both these approaches may be used, with the schedule of WGs and decision boards published in SOPs as the battle rhythm. In a small staff, such as a BG HQ, informal systems involving close staff collaboration and cooperation may be utilised almost exclusively or predominantly.

Regardless of the SOPs, the CIMIC staff has the responsibility of working collaboratively within and throughout the HQ staff in the preparation of information for the commander to make decisions based on SME assessment of the civil space and civil space impacts.
Annex B to Chapter 4

Civil–military cooperation staff interactions with other branches

S9 staff key points for interaction with S1 are as follows:
- requirements for the emergency burial of civilians
- liaison over the use of land for POW camps and burial sites
- terms and conditions of service for locally employed civilians
- identification and provision of specialist manpower (such as linguists).

S9 staff key points for interaction with S2 are as follows:
- RFIs
- input and advice to the human intelligence
- provide input to TA analysis and target systems analysis for civil space effects and collection priorities
- deconfliction through liaison architecture.

S9 staff key points for interaction with S3 are as follows:
- advice on the effect of current operations on the civil population and environment
- advice on the effect of civilians on current operations
- inclusion of civil factors in the AO
- passage of CIMIC information to and from subordinate HQs.

S9 staff key points for interaction with S3/S5 are as follows:
- the consideration of both short- and long-term civil factors that will affect the joint campaign plan
- planning IIA
- force assignment of CDets, teams and operators
- synchronisation and coordination of CIMIC effects in support of the ME and supporting effort (SE).

S9 staff key points for interaction with S3/5 JFECC are as follows:
- NK EFST targeting concepts for recommendation to the IO WG and the TWG and approval at the TDB
- TSM entry for NKE in the civil space
- restricted and protected target consultation
- target packs to support task orders for IIA.
S9 staff key points for interaction with S3/5 ISTAR are as follows:
- operations support
- target suitability and deconfliction, in conjunction with the legal officer
- reconnaissance possibilities
- target/BDA.

S9 staff key points for interaction with IO coordinator are as follows:
- synergy and coherence with IO
- contribute to developing MOE for IO
- contribute to effects design.

S9 staff key points for interaction with S4 are as follows:
- coordinate with HN police, emergency services and planning authorities for logistics and other matters through a single civil–military police LO
- marking and policing of routes for military or civilian use (such as refugee flow)
- HN support/civil–military resource management
- real estate management in the rear area, including deconflicting sites of cultural significance
- identifying resources required to provide for ILSA
- customs duties
- use of transportation and other resources to support CIMIC tasks
- medical and environmental health
- use of HN medical support facilities
- medical intelligence assessments
- advice on civilian medical support, disease control and provision of water
- support to vehicle recovery and route clearance to maintain freedom of movement.

S9 staff key points for interaction with S5 are as follows:
- contribution to SMAP for all operational and contingency planning groups to ensure that civil factors are properly accounted for and that military operations are planned with due consideration to friendly or neutral civil agencies wherever possible
- preparation of CIMIC inputs to long-term plans, such as post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction.
S9 staff key points for interaction with S6 are as follows:
• advice on balancing the need to communicate with civilian agencies versus operations security requirements
• advice on spectrum management issues to deal with bandwidth issues or interference on the combat net radio.

The S9 staff key point for interaction with S7 is training and theatre orientation of newly arrived personnel with regards to civil space and cultural competence.

S9 staff key points for interaction with S4/S8 are as follows:
• the coordination of financial and contractual matters between FEs and the HN or other civil agencies
• budget management of CIMIC coordinated projects
• accessing civil actors funding to initiate CIMIC in support of ADF objectives.

The S9 staff key point for interaction with PAO media is synergy and coherence with media activities affecting the Australian civil space.

S9 staff key points for interaction with engineers are as follows:
• liaison with HN authorities on infrastructure support matters
• impact assessment of the use of local resources/access to facilities
• specialist advice such as explosive ordnance disposal awareness
• opportunities for local civil lead or partnership projects to contribute to mobility/survivability or engineer effects and achieve economy of effort.

S9 staff key points for interaction with engineers – military geographic information are as follows:
• identifying civil factors that should be included in the battle field area evaluation
• assistance in adding civil space information onto maps/products/overlays.

S9 staff key points for interaction with engineers – CBRN are as follows:
• identification of sites (including research facilities) that present a potential environmental industrial hazard
• impact of an environmental industrial hazard threat on civil actors
• assessing the CBRN capability of the civilian population and the facilities likely to be available to them and friendly forces for CBRN purposes
• location of water sources to be decontaminated.

S9 staff key points for interaction with the legal officer are as follows:
• seeking advice on IHL, refugee law and human rights law
• legal interpretation Status of Forces Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding.
Annex C to Chapter 4

Civil–military cooperation staff functions

The role of the S9 includes the following:

• facilitate integration of CIMIC effects across the force through opord and staff processes
• support the following WGs:
  • ISTAR WG
  • TWG
  • IO WG
• support S3/S5 monitoring and immediate planning
• be prepared to chair the IO WG in the absence of IO coordination
• write the CIMIC annex to the opord or operation plans
• supervise CIMIC staff
• support the IO coordination
• provide technical control guidance to subordinate FEs or CIMIC operators as required.

The role of the S95 includes the following:

• support S2 and the 'All Sources Cell' to maintain the IPB for the civil space
• support S9 in initial SMAP
• support S5 in SMAP for continuous refinement throughout execution of the following:
  • conduct MA and input to staff MA
  • identify nonlethal effects opportunities in manoeuvre COAs
  • identify civil space risks in manoeuvre COAs
  • develop CIMIC COAs support to plans
  • input nonlethal effects to manoeuvre synch matrix
  • develop nonlethal effects for input to the TWG
  • coordinate input of nonlethal effects to TSM in support of the JFECC SO2 joint fires
• support psyops and PAO planning
Contents

- lead, participate and support CIMIC SME planning groups including inter-agency planning for the following:
  - cooperation with civil agencies
  - ICB
  - population support, including the following:
    - PCO
    - ILSA
    - displaced civilian operations (DCO)
    - military support to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.

The role of the S93 includes the following:
- ensure that CIMIC staff effort is aligned to the battle rhythm
- CIMIC support to immediate planning
- maintain situational awareness
- contribute to IPB and SMAP of the civil space
- prepare, submit, track and manage RFIs
- support maintenance of running estimate
- support psyops and PAO plans
- assess nonlethal effects
- provide staff support to PAO and IO coordination
- input assessment into assessment WG
- monitor the civilian situation and operational progress in accordance with directed priorities.

Civil–military engagement coordination involves the following:
- support KLE/KSE planning staff effort for coordination of delivery and synch enablers
- contribute to S2 ISTAR production of KLE/KSE briefing/targeting pack
- participate in or conduct civil liaison KLE/KSE
- advise on cultural and other aspects of negotiation of liaison
- support management of locally employed contractor language assistants (interpreters/linguists).
Annex D to Chapter 4

Example civil–military cooperation periodic report

**SUBJ:** FM/TG/BG/CDET SITREP XX/XX, DTG XXXX to DTG XXXX

1. **AO/REGION/PROVINCE**

2. **PREVIOUS 24HRS:**
   a. OVERVIEW OF AO STATUS, INCL SECURITY, EMERGENCY SERVICES AND GOVERNANCE SECTOR.
   b. MAJOR ACTIVITIES – SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS / EVENTS THAT AFFECTED THE CIVPOP.
   c. CIVIL INTERACTION WITH AUS FE.
   d. KNOWN CIVIL INTERACTION WITH OTHER FE BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL.
   e. CIVIL ATTITUDES/ACTIONS TOWARDS AUS FE.
   f. CIVIL ATTITUDES TOWARDS OTHER FE.
   g. OGA/NGO/IO ACTIVITY, INCL REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE.
   h. POPULATION MVMT AND EMERGENCY RELIEF/PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS.
   i. MAIN ISSUES/CONCERNS WITHIN AO.
   j. DETAIL ANY TRENDS WITHIN CIVIL DIMENSION.
   k. IDENTIFIED OPPORTUNITIES FOR AUS INFLUENCE.
   l. STATUS OF SIGNIFICANT CULTURAL FACILITIES/LOCATIONS.

3. **NEXT 24HRS:**
   a. ANTICIPATED MILITARY AND CIVIL ACTIVITY/INCIDENTS/EVENTS THAT MAY EFFECT OPS/INFLUENCE THE CIVPOP.
   b. PLANNED CIMIC ENGAGEMENT/ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES.
   c. KNOWN CIVIL INTERACTION WITH OTHER FE BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL.
   d. EXPECTED MOVEMENT OF POPULATION AND EFFECT ON AUS FE.
Annex E to Chapter 4

Example chat report as per combat brigade standard operating procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJ</th>
<th>CHATREP 038 OF 111050K JUL15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM</td>
<td>CIMIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>S9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>SPC BURNS, SGT BAKER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>ASHLEY FROST – BANKER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>RC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>111050K JUL 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>111130K JUL 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>BLUF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GP OF FIGHTING AGE MALE LOCS IVO EAST OF WAGUBAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ATMOSPHERICS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HN POLICE INFL OF LOCAL INFLUENCER DEVLOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRO ADF HN INFLUENCERS ID IN WAGUBAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HN STATUS OF WOMEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HN ATTITUDE TO COOPERATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMMENTARY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. THERE IS A GROUP OF MEN TO THE EAST OF TOWN THAT NO ONE KNOWS WHO THEY ARE OR WHAT THEY ARE UP TO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. MAYOR POLICE CHIEF AND HOTEL OWNER DO NOT SUPPORT WPS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. LEADER DEVLOM STEALING THE KEYS FROM THE POLICE CHIEF VEHICLE. MISS A FROST WITNESSED THE EVENT AND REPORTED.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. RLPF WILL NOT TAKE HER ACCOUNT AS SHE IS FEMALE SO IT IS NOT VALID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. ACCUSED OF BEING A ‘SNITCH’ (INFORMER) BY OTHER TOWN MEMBERS OF WAGUBAN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. LOCAL PADRE/PRIEST IS A SUPPORTER OF LOCAL WOMEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>ENGLISH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex F to Chapter 4

Detect, decide, deliver and assess targeting model

The steps in the D3A targeting model are:

- **Decide.** Decision includes target identification and prioritisation, then TA analysis and target systems analysis to determine the task, target, effect, location, apportionment of FEs as well as means and mechanism. The process of decision includes review and coordination of civil space IIAs with IRC at the NKE WG. Progress and recommendation through the TWG as an EFST and presentation using the targeting information sheet (TIS).

- **Detect.** Detect includes identifying collection requirements, allocating collection tasks for locating the target and tracking the target until the engagement occurs. For NK inform effects in the civil space, this can include establishing a reliable telephone POC for an individual, a media outlet that a target group utilises or the physical location. For more enduring civil effects and collection, detection tracking may include development of a receptive and familiar relationship with a key leader, an organisation or a population in order to develop the required rapport through civil–military liaison over a period of time.

- **Deliver.** Deliver in the NKE context for the civil space requires coordinated, synchronised IIA and manoeuvre effects for the civilian space within the BG AO. This includes IIA concept development, force apportionment and tasking, planning and preparation by the tasked FE, as well as conduct of the task. One IIA concept at the CB may have a number of associated tasks across AOs or over time, and involve manoeuvre FEs, CIMIC liaison, psyops messages and production, as well as support from other IRCs or SMEs. Delivery of NKEs in the civil space should never be considered in the same way as a kinetic strike with immediate and enduring results. Relationship trust and similar effects, as well as messages, take time to resonate and their impact requires maintenance of the aim to ensure that it is enduring.

- **Assess.** Assess includes immediate combat assessment of the task or message delivery as an MOP. This is gauged by the first- and second-order temporal effect indicators by effect on the TA reception and changed behaviour. This is delivered in post-activity reporting and at the next CB TWG. Assessment of NKE in the civil space also includes assessment of effects across IRC tasks and over time to monitor the second- and third-order information effects as well as third-order physical effects. These are reported as MOIs to subsequent TWG and will inform re-attack guidance, modification and priority of effort for CB tasking. Assessment also considers assessment of the combined IIA effects across the civil space toward achievement of condition marking decision points, DEs or transition conditions. These are reported as MOEs.
Annex G to Chapter 4

Find, fix, finish, exploit, analyse and disseminate targeting model

The F3EAD concept is represented as a cycle (see Figure 4–1), with tasks and outputs of each stage defined. Bolded items are elements of the doctrinal targeting process. The Exploit phase allows for an implicit branch to a second targeting operation, normally truncated to reflect opportunism.

Figure 4–1: Non-kinetic targeting process find, fix, finish, exploit, analyse, disseminate within decide, detect, deliver, assess

F3EAD at the BG supports the following:

- **Coordination.** F3EAD allows tactical commanders to develop targets nominated for IIA in the civil space where there may be initially limited or incomplete knowledge of the target system, as well as where the relationships for influence will take time to develop. Commanders can initiate effects while still developing their complete understanding of the civil information system and network.
• **Combat brigade decision.** NK targeting decision staff work has well developed command guidance to initiate targeting while BG staff emphasis needs to be on information flow, dissemination and adaption. IRC at the BG may be force assigned with different command status making coordination of effects and synchronisation critical.

• **Flexibility.** Significant flexibility for NKE tasking is required at the BG to manage scarce resources and engage the civil space concurrent with manoeuvre tasks. Not all civil actor targets will be immediately locatable or accessible. Flexibility as well as economy of effort must be considered in the manner of developing relationships through networks or over information systems followed by direct engagement when access, time, resources and security conditions permit. F3EAD encourages the BG to make dynamic targeting decisions responsive to opportunities identified and to treat risks emerging in the civil space.

• **Adaptive action.** F3EAD uses fast and slow feedback loops to develop more responsive and deeper understanding of relational and perceptual opportunities and risks. Rapid detailed analysis of information at the point collected enhances understanding of the environment and the adversary influence effects in the AO. The ability to understand the environment and the actors is limited when not directly engaged, making learning within the environment a key element of achieving influence.

• **Organisational situational understanding.** Gaining and maintaining the initiative within the civil space at the tactical execution level requires a comprehensive understanding of actors, capacities, attitudes and perceptions as well as access to influencers and leaders. Targeting is therefore not merely about neutralising and defeating threats, it also must emphasise the relationship development shaping effects for the civil space and dissemination to inform all staff and coordinate effects development. F3EAD emphasises and enhances BG staff processing, understanding and dissemination of assessment and re-attack guidance for NKE.

__The find, fix, finish, exploit, analyse and disseminate model__

The F3EAD model can be separated into two elements: target development and target execution. F3EAD has the following IRC-related elements:

• **Find.** For the civil space IIA planner the find stage includes:
  • determination that a target exists and is accessible (TA analysis and target systems analysis)
  • priority targets in priority areas are detected and identified
  • targets are located and can be accessed
  • preliminary target locations identified across the AO (town or district, address telephone, media means)
  • specific influence effects or messages are identified
• NK EFST or TIS developed
• target pack developed
• refinement and preparation of any psyops messaging or production
• talking points or negotiation preparation completed
• IRC supporting tasks synchronised and coordination.

• **Fix.** The fix stage includes:
  • determining a time and location for target engagement
  • validating all aspects of target preparation
  • messaging means and mechanism confirmed by the FE tasked which is tasked
  • confirming and reconnoitring the precise location or means, including monitoring or tracking to ensure that the target remains accessible (eg, indirect contact intermediaries or direct contact information, such as phone numbers or address details)
  • determining indicators of change in accessibility.

• **Finish.** Finish describes the following:
  • The final tracking of the target to ensure that the engagement will occur. Tracking may be continuous, intermittent, periodic or at a set time. It may comprise a follow up phone call to confirm a meeting, routine liaison contact, a preliminary meeting or observation. This will depend on the nature of the task, priority, access and resources.
  • The delivery of all tasks contributing to an effect for the identified TA at a specific time and location.

• **Exploit.** Exploitation is as follows:
  • set conditions for the future relationship intent while finishing relationship shaping
  • any follow up messaging, agreed actions or liaison to consolidate the effect
  • immediate collection and consolidation of information at the BG
  • immediate analysis informing the short cycle decision loop for follow up action opportunities
  • newly identified or existing risks have treatment or mitigation options assessed
  • recommendations to the BG commander or higher HQ in favour of, or opposing, follow-on IIA tasks or effects.
• **Analyse.** Analyse takes the information gained during exploitation, plus other sources of intelligence, in order to:
  • provide an assessment of effects
  • support new intelligence assessment about targets or the environment
  • inform prioritisation and ongoing risk decisions for civil space impacts and IIA as part of IPB continuous assessment of the civil space
  • discover new targets for development
  • self-analyse own-force performance and effects for the purpose of operational learning
  • assess MOP, MOI and MOE across IIA effects for attitudes, perceptions and actions of TA in order to inform the CB targeting cycle.

• **Disseminate.** Disseminate information, assessment, MOP, MOI and MOE up and down the chain of command to build situational understanding and inform future adaption and action.
### Annex H to Chapter 4

**Targeting task verbs and effects terms most relevant to civil–military cooperation**

**Table 4–1: Targeting task verbs and effects terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task verb</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambush</td>
<td>To surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy (LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block</td>
<td>To deny access to a given area, or to prevent an advance in a particular direction (LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breach</td>
<td>To break through an obstacle or defensive measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bypass</td>
<td>To manoeuvre around an obstacle, position, or enemy force (LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canalise</td>
<td>To limit the movement of individuals, groups, or organisations to a specified direction (can be used to specify an information system, means or source).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capture</td>
<td>Seize and retain an adversary’s personnel, equipment, infrastructure and information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>Remove resistance or materiel from, and/or cause actors to leave, an area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coerce</td>
<td>Compel an actor to adopt desired behaviours by threat of force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collect</td>
<td>Operational activity representing the collection of information in order to produce intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection operations</td>
<td>The collection of information, on the adversary and the environment, by any means and the dissemination of the information, either raw or processed, from the collector to analysts or directly to users, coordinated by the collection management staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection task</td>
<td>The assignment of a collection requirement to a specific source or agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contain</td>
<td>To restrict the movement of an individual, group or organisation to a defined area or to have or hold them under control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Note: This may also apply to diseases and disasters where the intent is to prevent its spread or the situation becoming worse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>a. Persuade an actor to adopt desired behaviours, or maintain physical influence over an area to prevent its access and use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. A stability tactical action designed to reduce disorder and violence to an acceptable level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cover</td>
<td>To provide security for the main force by fighting while also observing and reporting information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Note: A covering force is self-contained and can operate independently of the main force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceive</td>
<td>To mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce them to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defeat</td>
<td>Diminish the effectiveness of an adversary such that they are either unable or unwilling to achieve their objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task verb</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Degrad</strong>e</td>
<td>Reduce the effectiveness of a capability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Delay** | An action where a force under pressure trades space for time to slow the enemy’s momentum and inflict maximum destruction while avoiding decisive engagement.  
  a. Prevent an actor from arriving at a location before a specific time or event. *(ADFP 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process)*  
  b. Prevent an actor from using personnel, equipment, infrastructure and information *(ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process)*  
  Notes:  
  1. The delay gains time for the friendly force and will be considered where the friendly force is insufficient at attack or conduct area or mobile defence.  
  2. The delay is also employed as a shaping operation to draw the enemy into an area for subsequent counterattack.  
  3. Delaying units should be at least as mobile as their attackers, and measures to increase friendly mobility and decrease enemy mobility are essential. |
| **Demonstrate** | An attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, but made with the aim of deceiving the enemy. |
| **Deny** | Prevent an actor from using personnel, equipment, infrastructure and information *(ADFP 5.0.1 Joint Military Appreciation Process)*.  
  b. To prevent enemy use of an area, feature, route, facility or combat capability in a particular environment, by a physical or implied presence, firepower, obstacles, contamination, destruction or a combination of these measures. |
| **Destroy** | Render an adversary or object permanently ineffective *(ADFP 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process)*. |
| **Detect** | To discover or discern an attack on, or intrusion into, command, control, communications, computers, ISTAR systems. |
| **Deter** | Persuade an actor that the consequences of a COA would outweigh potential gains *(ADFP 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process)*. |
| **Dislocate** | Render an actor’s capabilities irrelevant by not allowing them to be employed at a critical time and place *(ADFP 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process)*. |
| **Disrupt** | Reduce an actor’s ability to act as a coordinated whole. |
| **Enhance** | To increase or make greater the capabilities of a force or a people *(ADFP 3.14.2, Targeting Procedures)*. |
| **Escort** | A combatant unit or units assigned to accompany and protect another force.  
  Note: Used colloquially as a generic expression for a destroyer or frigate. |
| **Exploit** | To gain access to; enemy command, control, communications, computers, ISTAR systems, to collect information or to plant false or misleading information. |
| **Expose** | To make visible, to reveal something undesirable or injurious *(ADFP 3.14.2, Targeting Procedures)*. |
| **Feint** | In military deception, an offensive tactical technique involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary about the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action. |
Fix  A tactical task in which actions are taken to prevent the enemy from moving any part of its forces from a specific location, and/or for a specific period of time, by holding or surrounding them to prevent their withdrawal for use elsewhere. A tactical obstacle that integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker within a specified area, normally an engagement area.

Follow and assume  A tactical task in which a committed force follows a force conducting an offensive operation and is prepared to continue the mission if the lead force is fixed, attritted or unable to continue. The follow and assume force is not a reserve but is a depth force committed to specific tasks (LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics).

Follow and support  A tactical task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive operation. The follow and support force is not a reserve but is committed to specific tasks (LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics).

Guard  A security element whose primary task is to protect the main force by fighting to gain time, while also observing and reporting information.

Influence  
- a. To alter the will, attitudes and behaviour of TAs by affecting their perceptions.\(^{(1)}\)
- b. To cause a change in the character, thought, or action of a particular entity (ADFP 3.14.2, Targeting Procedures).

Inform  
- a. To communicate information to TAs.
- b. To impart information or knowledge (ADFP 3.14.2, Targeting Procedures).

Interdict  Engage an adversary before they can affect friendly forces.

Isolate  Separate an actor from their source of support and deny freedom of movement.

Monitor  To watch and collect information in order to ensure compliance with an agreement and to highlight measures to be taken, in case an agreement is not met.

Neutralise  Render an actor or objects temporarily ineffective.

Overwatch  A tactical task in which the commander positions one element (the overwatching element) to support by fire and movement of another element. Note: The overwatch element observes known or suspect enemy locations and engages the enemy if the enemy is visible or attempts to fire on the friendly element.

Penetrate  Breach an adversary’s defence and affect their defensive system.

Prevent  Stop an action from occurring.

Protect/ safeguard  Preserve the effectiveness of personnel, equipment, infrastructure and information.

Raid  An operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability culminating with a planned withdrawal.

Reconnaissance  A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an adversary or potential adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
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| Inform          | a. To communicate information to TAs.  
- b. To impart information or knowledge (ADFP 3.14.2, Targeting Procedures). |
| Interdict       | Engage an adversary before they can affect friendly forces. |
| Isolate         | Separate an actor from their source of support and deny freedom of movement. |
| Monitor         | To watch and collect information in order to ensure compliance with an agreement and to highlight measures to be taken, in case an agreement is not met. |
| Neutralise      | Render an actor or objects temporarily ineffective. |
| Overwatch       | A tactical task in which the commander positions one element (the overwatching element) to support by fire and movement of another element. Note: The overwatch element observes known or suspect enemy locations and engages the enemy if the enemy is visible or attempts to fire on the friendly element. |
| Penetrate       | Breach an adversary’s defence and affect their defensive system. |
| Prevent         | Stop an action from occurring. |
| Protect/ safeguard | Preserve the effectiveness of personnel, equipment, infrastructure and information. |
| Raid            | An operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability culminating with a planned withdrawal. |
| Reconnaissance  | A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an adversary or potential adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. |
## Contents

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<tr>
<th>Task verb</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recover</td>
<td>To extract a friendly force, non-hostile individual or group and/or materiel from a location not under friendly control, with or without force.(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore</td>
<td>To bring degraded command, control, communications, computers, ISTAR systems back to their original state. A stability tactical action to re-establish essential services, facilities and infrastructure by repairing, provisions or restitution and the provision of humanitarian aid and medical assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain</td>
<td>Maintain possession of personnel, equipment, infrastructure and information for friendly use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen</td>
<td>A form of security operation that provides early warning to the protected force (<em>LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics</em>). Note: A screen differs from a guard in that it does not fight to protect the force and avoids becoming decisively engaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure</td>
<td>Gain possession of and protect personnel, equipment, infrastructure and information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seize</td>
<td>Gain possession of personnel, equipment, infrastructure and information by force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shape</td>
<td>Enhance the friendly force’s position, delay an adversary’s response, or lead an adversary into an inadequate or inappropriate response to set the conditions for decisive action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilise</td>
<td>Impose control and establish security over an area while restoring services and support to civilian agencies, which set the conditions to allow primacy of indigenous organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppress</td>
<td>Temporarily degrade a capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>The action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements or sustains any other force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support by fire</td>
<td>A tactical technique in which a manoeuvre element moves to a position on the battlefield where it can engage the enemy by direct fire in support of another manoeuvre force. Note: The manoeuvre element does not attempt to manoeuvre to capture enemy forces or terrain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>To take a general or comprehensive view of in order to ascertain condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turn</td>
<td>To force a hostile element, group or organisation to change direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undermine</td>
<td>Weaken an actor’s capabilities, morale, loyalty or reliability by affecting their military, cultural, economic, societal or political strength.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal operations</td>
<td>A planned retrograde operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force and moves in a direction away from the enemy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

Annex I to Chapter 4

Target system analysis

The analysis of the target system allows a determination for recommended of the NKE delivery task, means and mechanism, allocation, resources, location, timing. These are added to the EFST being developed noting there may be a number of sub-tasks for different IRC as well as task elements of the force.

Define the target audience and effect

Review the individual stakeholder analysis:
- State the name of the TA population, organisation, stakeholder or actor.
- Identify the most important effect or civil space critical capability (CC) that this TA contributes in the civil space to the military mission or end state.
- State the intended effect on this actor or TA, the location and time.

Conduct analysis

Analyse stakeholder or TA information and influence networks including technological systems by conducting the following:
- Identify TA and key stakeholders associated with the CC, critical requirement (CR) or critical vulnerability (CV) in networks of influence
- Identify network nodes of influence and confluence:
  - Record attitudes, perceptions, motivation and motivators
  - Consider cultural, political, social, background relationships
- Identify military means for delivering effects equals what actions are possible
- Identify mechanisms for collection, contact using the available means relevant to identified TA/stakeholder
- Identify collection requirements to access this TA using each identified means and mechanisms; including consideration of where, when and how this information can be obtained as well as the window of time the information is useful
- Consider second- and third-order effects intended
- Consider potential second- and third-order effects and impacts unintended
- Consider potential collateral consequences of contact with this TA
- Review the feasibility, acceptability, suitability, sustainability and compatibility (compatibility refers to the commander’s guidance, the manoeuvre plan and unit policies).

Make a recommendation on preferred and alternate means and mechanism/system of actions for achieving the desired effect for this TA.
Annex J to Chapter 4

Example essential fire support task for non-kinetic/nonlethal influence activities brief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Describes what targeting objective (e.g., coerce, deceive, deter, exploit, expose, influence, inform, mislead, shape, undermine) the tasked FE must achieve on the target object, function or capability.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Describes how the task contributes to the manoeuvre plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>The method section describes how the task will be accomplished by assigning responsibility to observers or units and delivery assets, and providing amplifying information or restrictions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The method is described by:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority.</td>
<td>Refers to IO objectives, DEs or high payoff target list (HPTL).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocation.</td>
<td>FE to whom the task will be assigned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions.</td>
<td>Any constraints or limitations of resources, movement, means or mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>The effects section is where MOI are quantified/articulated as precisely as possible. This should give consideration to the desired effects on both the target/enemy and friendly forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note(s)</td>
<td>Any other essential or relevant information at the commander’s threshold for decision.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prepared by: DTG:

Recommended by: DTG:

Approved by: DTG:
Annex K to Chapter 4

Non-kinetic effect target risk assessment

MRM is nested within the SMAP for development of NKE targeting proposals.

**Step 1 – communicate and consult**

Engage appropriate staff, and consider input from external stakeholders, to develop an understanding of the environment, threats, opportunities risks and controls as part of the IPB for the task.

**Step 2 – establish the context**

Conduct MA and IPB for the operating environment and task to determine critical facts and assumptions, legal, policy and other requirements that define existing controls, as well as identifying the likely FE, capabilities, phases, tasks being undertaken, time periods, routes, locations and media. Such considerations contribute to developing effective controls as well as to identifying risks.

**Step 3 – risk assessment**

The following sub-steps form part of the risk assessment.

**Step 3.1 – risk identification**

Develop risk statements, each of which identifies the principal risk, the root cause and other causal factors, along with each impact area potentially affected. Make note of the time and space of the risk or threat occurrence, as well as the time of decision by causal agent where appropriate.

Some risks will be intuitive and their treatment or controls will be identified within the scope of planning the detail of the task or in the appropriate doctrine, SOP or TTP. The staff should consider the requirements for these risks to ensure that sufficient resources and FEs are allocated to the task or action. Not all of these risks will be recorded separately in the application of MRM to NKE target risk assessment.

The NKE targeting risk analysis must identify and link risk source categories arising as both intended and unintended consequences of the proposed action. These include actions and reactions of the TA and the cascading effect this may have on other stakeholders, on information and flow of information, as well as on attitudes and perceptions. The risk impact of these consequences may be to civil actors in the TA, other civil actors, information flow to and from the civil space, the civil–military relationships, the enduring narrative or to the mandate and legitimacy of the force and its mission. Comprehensive risk analysis should therefore consider first-order, second-order and third-order effects and their potential risk impact.
First-order effects. A first-order effect is the intended immediate effect, damage, decision or behaviour which is a direct result of the action. For CIMIC actions constituting NKEs, this could include examples such as:

- the likely positive and negative impacts on the civil–military relationship and their relative impacts on further contacts, actions or messaging
- the most likely and most dangerous response of the TA or actor as a result of the action
- the flow or lack of flow of information provided from the key leader/stakeholder/media to and from the local population
- information flow between belligerent actors or to threat FEs as an immediate consequence of the action.

Second-order effects. A second-order effect is the initial response by actors, stakeholders and threat FEs to a friendly action, including information effects and flow of information effects. The second-order effects may include intended and unintended changes to behaviour as well as changes to attitudes and perceptions. These changes may impact directly on civil actors or indirectly on information collection, dissemination of messages, network influence or future cooperation. For CIMIC NKEs, this could include examples such as:

- the civil population/TA may change their behaviour as intended or in an unexpected way, which may necessitate staff having to consider the most likely course of action (MLCOA) and most dangerous course of action (MDCOA)
- the likely alternative changes to stakeholders or TA attitudes or perceptions
- the most likely and most dangerous action by the threat force or belligerent actors in response to the CIMIC action, including decisions, actions or influence efforts with regard to civil actors in a manner counter to our intent and may involve influence actions, reprisals, coercion or isolation of civil stakeholders from support
- the possibility of incorrect identification or misrepresentation by threat IO of the neutrality/impartiality of civil actors or the loss of loss of protected status for civil actors or agencies.

Third-order effects. A third-order effect is the cognitive impact of friendly action such as changes to attitudes and perceptions impacting the intellectual and moral components, such as mandate and legitimacy of the force. All actors in the information area of interest (AI) are to be considered. For CIMIC NKEs, this could include examples such as:

- third party actors within the AO see a precedent and change their expectations for future dealings
- actions are perceived as beyond the military mandate and change the civil–military relationship, attitudes and perceptions
actions are perceived as counter to the dominant narrative or IO themes and will undermine the message or trust in the commander and the force
reprisals against civil actors lead to withdrawal of information collection opportunities or access to civil areas and agencies
perceptions resulting from the action undermine the legitimacy or mandate of the mission or the force.

The following five risk impact categories are to be considered:
• mission
• people
• systems/resources
• reputation
• environment.

A selection of causal factor considerations for impact categories is shown in Table 4–2 in Appendix 1.

The following risk factors must be considered:
• risk to target – unintended consequences:
  • first-order effects – physical damage/change
  • second-order effects – information and flow of information effects
  • third-order effects – intellectual and moral components
• risk to CB – mission, people, systems/resources, reputation, environment:
  • first-order effects – physical damage/change
  • second-order effects – information and flow of information effects
  • third-order effects – intellectual and moral components
• risk of collateral consequences – risk to third party actors/stakeholder through unintended consequences:
  • first-order effects – physical damage/change
  • second-order effects – information and flow of information effects
  • third-order effects – intellectual and moral components.

Step 3.2 – risk analysis
The following sub-sets form part of the risk analysis:
• Likelihood and impact. For each preliminary risk statement consider existing controls, and then assess the likelihood and impact against each impact category.
Contents

- *Existing risk controls.* Existing controls may be legal requirements, requirements of coalition or international agreements, SOPs, standing orders, constraints or control measures specified in the opord, WNGO or taskord or they may be characteristics of the TA and the civil capacity to respond.

- *Determine likelihood.* Using judgment, contextual understanding and the MRM risk likelihood table, select and record the most appropriate descriptor in the likelihood descriptor set.

- *Determine the impact.* Assess the impact of each risk event (in each impact category), if it was to occur, and select the most appropriate descriptor in the impact MRM descriptor set. Maintain separate impact statements for each category of impact area to ensure that appropriate risk controls are developed and implemented for every impact outcome. All risk impacts assessed should be recorded, noting however that only those remaining at or above the commander’s threshold will be briefed for the staff WG recommendation and commander’s decision.

**Step 3.3 – risk evaluation**

The following risk tasks must be undertaken:

- Evaluate the inherent risk level for each risk event using the MRM matrix.

- Identify risks that are at or that exceed the commander’s threshold of authority and that are not as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) for consideration for further treatment.

**Step 4 – risk treatment**

Apply risk controls that reduce assessed risk to be ALARP and are, ideally, within the commander’s authorised threshold.

Developing risk controls is a cyclic process. The risk is evaluated repeatedly after risk control measures are added. Controls are added to reduce the likelihood or the impact, or both, until the risk is considered to be ALARP. This also requires the resources required to implement the controls are appropriate to the priority of the task.

Risk controls are actions, tasks, constraints, resources or messages that reduce the likelihood or the impact of the risk event. They can also be actions that mitigate the impact if it does occur.

Once the residual risk level is ALARP the staff make a determination to recommend to the commander, through the targeting process, to tolerate, transfer, terminate or defer a targeting proposal.

**Recommendation for decision**

If all risks are assessed ALARP and within the commander’s threshold of authority, then the target can be recommended to the TWG for subsequent presentation to the commander. The key risks identified and which remain at or above the
The risk recommendations are:

- **Tolerate.** A recommendation to the commander to tolerate risk is a recommendation to approve the task accepting the assessed level of risk. MRM guidelines, operational targeting directives\(^3\) and the opord all identify risk authority levels and special caveats. Note, the staff are not accepting the risk – in making the targeting decision the commander accepts the risk, so inform the commander of all significant and relevant priority risks that are at, close to or above their threshold of authority.

- **Transfer.** A recommendation to transfer is a recommendation to refer the target to a higher commander who has a higher threshold of authority to accept risk. It must be made clear why the target is of sufficient priority to warrant referring to a higher command authority for a decision.

- **Terminate.** A recommendation to terminate is a recommendation not to proceed with the target proposal. It is the commander’s decision, not the staff, and the TWG may still need to consider the SME advice on declining such targets. The chair of the TWG may elect to present a target recommended for decline to the commander, in particular where a target appears on the manoeuvre synchronisation matrix, TSM or the HPTL.

- **Defer.** The commander may decide to, or the staff may recommend that the commander defer a target proposal for reconsideration when the risk profile will have changed.

**Appendix:**

1. **Risk source categories and causal factors**

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3. The principal strategic level directive for the conduct of Australian Defence Force targeting activities in support of operations. It is in parallel with ROE and informs all subordinate targeting guidance and should allow maximum operational flexibility and autonomy consistent with national policy.
## Appendix 1 to Annex K to Chapter 4

### Risk source categories and causal factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk source</th>
<th>Causal factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hostile elements</td>
<td>Main force objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(action/reaction/counteraction/reprisal)</td>
<td>Aligned belligerents’ objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sympathetic/opportunistic action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-aligned spoilers’ objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corrupt/coerced interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time and space</td>
<td>Assess against each decisive point in each stage/step/phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact on plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel (ours)</td>
<td>Skills, other tasks and PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitudes and perceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recent actions or experiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human nature (civil space)</td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expectations or precedence of further action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-interest and community interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian need/expectation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal and other mandated requirements</td>
<td>ROE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laws of armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orders and directives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HN law, regulations, statutory authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International or HN coordination mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legacy liability to GOAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Principal items or capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel/capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact on local economy or price points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact on community access to resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact on storage, delivery or distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk source</td>
<td>Causal factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational complexity</td>
<td>Level of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culture/attitudes and perceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural or man-made environment</td>
<td>Urban complex and buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social/political/influence structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media – information environment and reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural environment</td>
<td>Weather (wind, rain, snow, heat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water flow/levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fauna and flora</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex L to Chapter 4

**Example civil–military cooperation inform and influence actions targeting synchronisation matrix field inputs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID no.</th>
<th>Tgt set</th>
<th>Pri</th>
<th>HPT</th>
<th>Category: F-Fixed S- Static M- Mobile</th>
<th>Statement of purpose</th>
<th>LOC TAI(s)/ GR/ Lat-Long</th>
<th>Phase/ timing/ event</th>
<th>SR (Detection Agency)</th>
<th>TSS criteria</th>
<th>Selection Standards</th>
<th>Exploitation agency</th>
<th>Method (brief description of the method to engage)</th>
<th>BDA</th>
<th>For period:</th>
<th>Approved by:</th>
<th>Draft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- A. Sequential number (not critical – simply reflects the serial/reference of the line item on that list).
- B. May be a defined grouping of targets (eg, target block number) or a capability (eg, C2), or an individual.
- C. Priority (assigned by JFECC on approved targets, reflects preference for target nominations).
- D. HPTL number if applicable.
- E. Context dependent (eg, civilian population in ‘Smithville’ is static, but an individual may be mobile).
- F. Specify targeting objective starting with the targeting effect as the first word (eg, ‘Degrade enemy ISR’…).
- G. Specify the operational intent of the task.
- H. Enter any location information (eg, GR, address and area).
- I. Enter Operational phase or timing for engagement.
- J. Specify the primary FE tasked to detect/track the target (not required if engagement is an arranged/planned meeting).
- K. Specify the alternate FE tasked to detect/track the target (not required if engagement is an arranged/planned meeting).
- L. Specify any size threshold that must be met for engagement to occur (if applicable).
- M. Specify any degree of protection criteria that must be met for engagement to occur (if applicable).
- N. Specify the minimum time the target must be in location for engagement to occur (if applicable).
- O. Specify any restrictions on methods or FE for engagement (eg, direct messaging only).
- P. Specify the minimum accuracy requirements for acquisition (eg, observation of motorcade).
- Q. Specify the primary FE tasked to deliver the effect on the target.
- R. Specify the alternate FE tasked to deliver the effect on the target.
- S. Describe the desired effect or end state (eg, civilian population movement to the W is reduced and increased to the N).
- T. Describe the method of engagement (eg, ‘KLE with village chief of Smithville’, ‘leaflet drop’, and ‘verbal messaging’).
- U. Specify whether a post-engagement BDA is required (see Note).
- V. Specify the asset responsible for collecting information for BDA or conducting BDA.
- W. Record any other information relevant to the execution of the target.

**Note:**
If Y, separate collection tasks are required for BDA and combat assessment. If N, the FE implementing the task will collect on the MOP and MOI.
Chapter 5

Civil–military cooperation staff input to the staff military appreciation process

This chapter details the CIMIC staff procedures for preparation and input into the SMAP.

SMAP is an iterative process which, at each stage revisits IPB as well as the prior staff inputs to planning. SMAP is a collaborative staff activity which is led by a designated staff officer, usually the S3 or chief of staff. At each stage of the SMAP the commander has the opportunity to review progress through formal back briefings. After receiving each brief, the commander will consider the planning progress, priorities and actions being developed then provide guidance for the staff. The review conducted at the start of each stage ensures that the staff consider the commander’s guidance as well as the integration and synchronisation of BOS actions as they are progressively developed. The staff back-briefs to the commander are formal decision briefs. It is the commander’s plan and the commander’s decisions that the staff are working towards.

CIMIC staff conduct their functional staff branch research then collate and analyse information to prepare the main CIMIC planner (S9 or S95) for the staff planning forums at each stage of the SMAP. In a small HQ, one CIMIC operator may be responsible for both preparation and provision of inputs, for each stage of the SMAP. In such cases, the CIMIC planner must draw heavily on their current situational understanding and documented information. For large problems the CIMIC lead planner (S9 or S95) needs the support of a CIMIC staff cell to ensure that comprehensive consideration and analysis is provided.

The CIMIC staff lead planner (S9 or S95) takes information and analysis prepared by the CIMIC staff to each stage of the SMAP. All BOS functional areas have representation, and it is within these forums that the CIMIC inputs are considered and integrated into the staff planning process. At the end of each stage, the CIMIC lead planner will participate in the lead planner’s brief to the commander.

Following commander’s guidance, the lead planner must update the CIMIC staff on the progressive development of the plan and the commander’s priorities.

Stages of the staff military appreciation process and intelligence preparation of the battlespace

The SMAP and IPB begin on receipt of a WNGO. IPB analysis of the civil space relies on an operational context. To highlight this, the first stage of SMAP, preliminary analysis, will be presented first in this chapter. This will be followed by the steps of the IPB and then the final four stages of SMAP.
CIMIC staff provide specific input to the SMAP. This chapter describes the inputs and considerations for CIMIC staff when developing their inputs to the whole staff process. Each of the IPB and SMAP stages are presented showing the following:

- the steps within each stage
- the CIMIC staff procedures for analysis and development
- CIMIC inputs to whole staff SMAP stage
- outputs from SMAP stages that guide ongoing CIMIC staff work.

For more information on SMAP, the MAP is described in detail in LWD 5-1-4, *The Military Appreciation Process*.

**Preliminary analysis – staff military appreciation process Stage 1**

On receipt of the WNGO the staff scope the problem by defining the intent, time available, capabilities allocated, specified objectives and key limitations. CIMIC staff are briefed by the lead planner on the WNGO and planning time line which is published by the S3 or S5 at the commencement of the planning cycle. The staff may also receive commander’s initial guidance at this time.

The preliminary analysis frames the problem and focuses the staff at the start of planning by identifying key elements of the situation, higher commander’s intent, and likely tasks and known restrictions.

Preliminary analysis is an appropriate time to organise the staff effort and information management processes, as well as commence developing tools for ongoing use in information management and analysis. Depending on the complexity and time available, these tools may only be partially prepared at this time.

During preliminary analysis CIMIC staff input will rely heavily on higher HQ briefs, WNGOs and guidance. Time available will determine the level of detail. The CIMIC staff must quickly assess the time available until the first staff planning meeting at which the S9 or S95 will present the CIMIC staff preliminary analysis to the HQ staff PSO forum or the plans team.

**Preliminary analysis steps**

Preliminary analysis and its CIMIC staff context includes:

- identifying the intent two up and one up for civil space conditions and objectives
- understanding time available detailed in the planning battle rhythm
- identifying resources and capabilities allocated which are suitable and available for CIMIC influence activities
identifying the desired civil space end state conditions for the operating environment.

The S9/S95 attends the lead planner’s preliminary analysis forum to input the CIMIC staff preliminary analysis. Once the preliminary analysis is being presented, the CIMIC staff cell can commence IPB and MA.

Civil–military cooperation staff procedures for preliminary analysis

Priority for CIMIC staff in preliminary analysis is identification of civil capacity and information gaps, as well as CIMIC priorities. Staff immediately consider the nature of the operation, the civil environment, the current situation or crisis and the broad effects on the civil space, as well as potential effects from the civil space, so as to identify planning facts and assumptions that will best inform the whole of staff priorities and planning effort. Assumptions become IRs and areas for confirmation or monitoring, if required.

This initial rapid estimate scopes and focuses the research and collection priorities of IPB and MA. Resulting RFIs are forwarded to the S2 watch keeper. If RFIs are unable to be answered from information held within the force internal databases they are later prioritised and may be allocated as collection tasks.

CIMIC staff need to understand the civil situation to the extent time permits. To this end they quickly gather and review available information sources, including:

- higher HQ guidance/orders/directives focusing on commander’s intent, mission and end state conditions with respect to the civil space
- IO narrative, themes and objectives
- WOG direction, UN mandates and any other legal basis
- higher HQ CIMIC estimate, higher HQ civil assessment and CIMIC staff current body of knowledge (assessment of civil space within IPB)
- commander’s guidance
- current intelligence reports and intelligence summaries
- open source information
- country studies/fact books/situation brief (provided by higher HQ, S2 branch or GOAS agencies)
- situation brief
- psyops information and environment analysis.

The situation brief, WNGO, and guidance received should alert the CIMIC planners to both the geographic area, duration of the operation, likely tasks and end state conditions. Areas of focus include:

- GOAS national objectives, as well as coalition and WOG agency priorities, objectives and commitments
the higher commander’s mission and intent (eg, purpose, method, end state):
- commander two up
- commander one up (WNGO)
- this commander (guidance)
- UN mandates (where applicable)
- international laws and GOAS commitments
- directed tasks and higher commanders’ intent
- capabilities across the force that can contribute to CIMIC effects
- known international civil response or HN capacity for population support.

This information will enable expedient consideration of the priority civil space areas in initial assessment of the civil space situation. The CIMIC running estimate should commence during preliminary analysis, be developed during MA and be updated daily throughout the operation. The CIMIC running estimate is summarised on the MA worksheet, located in CB SOPs.

Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis is an effective, expedient tool to support the rapid development of conclusions and recommendations.

The lead CIMIC planner (S9/S95) takes the analysis from the CIMIC staff to the preliminary analysis forum of the SMAP. The CIMIC staff support the S9 by concurrent preparation and analysis.

Civil–military cooperation inputs to staff preliminary analysis

The three principal CIMIC inputs to staff preliminary analysis are as follows:
- commander’s intent, two up, one up, and this command for civil space conditions and objectives
- the initial CIMIC running estimate (see CIMIC considerations)
- recommendations for inclusion in the WNGO.

A dot point list of CIMIC staff inputs to preliminary analysis is contained in Annex A.

Preparation for intelligence preparation of the battlespace and mission analysis

The CIMIC staff are able to continue with planning preparation by establishing systems for information management and dissemination by gathering or preparing the following:
- the initial assessment of the civil space (collating the body of mission relevant knowledge)
• IO theme/concept development matrix
• an initial framework for TA analysis and a liaison architecture
• a CIMIC staff information and effects tracking log
• an EFST development table (copy of TSM).

The CIMIC staff continue their analysis by commencing IPB and MA (see subsequent sections for staff procedures) in anticipation of the commander’s guidance out of the preliminary analysis brief of the whole staff. The purpose of continuing is to make use of available time and to:
• understand timing impacts, including imposed timings and time available for planning, including duration of the operation
• identify significant gaps in information
• identify significant gaps in civil space security and stability preconditions, governance or protection for civilians that could impact on the force and its mission.

Outputs of staff preliminary analysis to the civil–military cooperation staff cell

At the conclusion of the preliminary analysis the commander’s guidance will be provided.

The lead planner or S3 will provide a clear and concise time line to set the battle rhythm for the SMAP stages. It is critical for CIMIC planners to be aware of the time and space allocated to each step of the SMAP. These imposed timings take precedence over other time considerations.

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace

The IPB is a process by which the battlespace is defined and continuously monitored to support and enhance situational understanding. IPB commences on receipt of the WNGO and continues throughout the operation. The initial development and continuous process of IPB is an S2 function. CIMIC inputs to the initial IPB are integrated in close cooperation with the S2 to prevent duplication of effort or contradiction. The S2 also leads information management and combat assessment for continuous monitoring of the battlespace. CIMIC staff support ongoing IPB by continuous monitoring of the civil space in close collaboration with the S2.

Steps for intelligence preparation of the battlespace

IPB follows four steps to which the CIMIC staff contribute. The CIMIC contribution to initial IPB, in close collaboration with S2 staff is:
• Define the battlespace – for CIMIC considerations, the staff define the civil space.
• Describe the battlespace effects – for CIMIC considerations, the staff describe the civil space effects.

• Evaluate threat capabilities – for CIMIC considerations the staff evaluate civil stakeholders and civil stakeholder capabilities as well as threat IO and threat CIMIC capabilities.

• Determine threat COAs – for CIMIC considerations the staff develop concepts for enemy objectives with regard to the civil dimension and then determine the MLCOA and MDCOA of the threat force in the civil space. The staff also develop most likely and most dangerous civil stakeholder and civil society events, decisions and actions which includes civil society routine events and their reaction to military activity and changes to civil security conditions. These are developed as civil space events.

Defining the civil space
The civil space includes all aspects of the operating environment encompassed by the AO and AI. The CB/minor JTF does not have the capacity to monitor or influence the entire civil space.

The following are elements of the civil space that are useful in prioritising analysis effort:
• locations or areas of influence
• civil areas defined by sociopolitical, language and cultural demographics, political boundaries and police jurisdictions
• critical/decisive infrastructure including:
  • protected, restricted or sensitive targets
  • civil space information systems, (telecommunications access and media coverage)
  • essential services infrastructure (hospitals and clinics, water supply, sanitation, power generation and distribution)
  • emergency relief hubs and coordination mechanisms
  • communications infrastructure and media distribution/broadcast
  • significant police posts of operations rooms
• civil security conditions, civil administration and governance effectiveness, focusing on:
  • rule of law including the presence and effectiveness of police and internal security services
  • the reliability of essential services
  • life support; shelter, water, food, sanitation
• health facilities providing services as well as emergency first responders
• power supply and distribution
• local media and broadcasting
• economic institutions
• population stability and levels of displacement
• the humanitarian situation expressed as a priority of need and case load:
  • humanitarian need by area
  • vulnerable populations
• the HN and international civil agency humanitarian coordination and status of response
• leadership/influence provided by government actors, cultural and community leaders, and service providers, focusing on:
  • HN government political and administration leadership, cultural leadership, religious and community leadership, community influencers
  • security services and rule of law leaders
  • humanitarian and emergency response coordination leaders or implementers
  • medical and essential services providers
• population access to media services and communications
• contexts:
  • cultural
  • political
  • historical.

**Geographic and temporal priorities.** The geographic priorities for the civil space in the situation overlay are identified and continuously reviewed, from the initial estimate, based on the changing military and civil situation. The estimate is continuously updated in terms of the present risk to the mission, the manoeuvre scheme and the force. The current civil situation in the context of our own operations, as well as civil space trends are used to inform continued analysis and reporting of priorities.

Staff procedures for CIMIC inputs to IPB are at Annex B.
Civil–military cooperation inputs to the intelligence preparation of the battlespace Step 1 – define the civil space environment

CIMIC inputs into Step 1 of the IPB are about understanding the civil space. This requires the prioritisation of those physical and human characteristics of the civil space that are most important to the achievement of the mission. This is achieved by reviewing all current information on the civil space and identifying the key facts. These facts are then used to start populating key analytical tools that will be further developed throughout the IPB.

Political, military, economic, societal, infrastructure, information/areas, structures, capacities, organisations, people, events analysis

PMESII/ASCOPE analysis (see Appendix 1 to Annex B) is used to focus the staff and rapidly define the civil space against operational objectives. The initial PMESII/ASCOPE analysis identifies the PMESII environments of the AI and makes note of their respective areas, structures, capacities, organisations, people and events to assess relevance, risk or opportunity for the force and its mission.

The PMESII information comprises:

- **Political.** Consider political; areas, structures, capacities, organisations, people, events.
- **Military.** Consider non-belligerent military, paramilitary and organised armed groups and their areas, structures, capacities, organisations, people, events (CIMIC considerations relate to non-belligerent armed groups such as police and other civil security sector agencies and private armed contractors in support of S2 analysis, which focuses on belligerent threat groups).
- **Economic.** Consider economic areas, structures, capacities, organisations, people, events.
- **Societal/social elements.** Societal, social and culturally significant areas, structures, capacities, organisations, people, events.
- **Infrastructure.** Infrastructure providing essential services; areas, structures, capacities, organisations, people, events (including identifying protected and restricted targets).
- **Information systems.** Information systems areas, structures, capacities, organisations, people, events.

The ASCOPE inputs to PMESII/ASCOPE are as follows:

- **Areas.** Civil areas defined by geographic location, population size, political influence, cultural and religious influence and economic base, as well as legal jurisdiction, should be noted. Information system nodes and access, as well as means of information uptake, are overlayed to identify high-priority areas for influence or monitoring.
• **Structures.** Significant structures on which the HN civil community relies should be shown on the operations overlay. Without cluttering the situational overlay, the civil infrastructure and civil area visual representation is built up over time. Structures to include are protected infrastructure such as medical facilities and cultural sites, as well as critical enablers such as water supply, power and food distribution nodes, media and security facilities and communication and information systems, as well as concentration of DCs and emergency shelters. While it is the JFECC responsibility to maintain situational understanding of restricted and protected targets in accordance with higher targeting directives, it is incumbent on the CIMIC staff to monitor and understand these, as well as inform the relevant staff of new information pertaining to civil agencies and capacities, as well as structures that may need to be assessed. It should be noted that the CB targeting officer (JFECC) will review the restricted target list and NSL from the operational HQ joint prioritised integrated target list and ensure that this is included in planning and coordination of offensive fires. CIMIC planners should be aware and familiar with the NSL directive and monitor any areas, structures or other civil space capacities that should be considered for nomination as restricted targets. The operations overlay should have markings denoting restricted and protected targets.

• **Capabilities.** Civil space CCs inform construction and analysis of the civil space COG. Civil space CCs, and the contributing capacities within the civil space, are monitored to assess risk and assess operational progress. These may be supplemented by separate, specific civil capacity briefing notes held in a database, notebook or file.

• **Organisations.** Those organisations that are active in the TAOR, including HN government and security agencies, as well as civil corporations, political organisations and cultural organisations. International organisations and NGO are also considered.

• **People.** A range of stakeholders relevant to CCs and priority organisations will be known or included as PIR to identify and locate. These may include HN government and security agencies as well as civil organisations, political leaders, police commanders, HCs and security personnel. The early identification of civil actor and civil area influencers such as cultural and traditional leaders and arbitrators can enhance influence effects for the commander.

• **Events.** Key events list identifying the sequence of civil events that present potential risk or opportunity, as well as military events that may impact on the civil space in a negative or favourable manner. Initially the time line will include a monthly or weekly calendar of political, social, cultural, religious and economic events. This will be refined and developed into a detailed civil space situation template for use in analysis and synchronisation of manoeuvre effects as well as for monitoring the civil space.
Civil–military cooperation outputs of intelligence preparation of the battlespace Step 1 – define the civil space

There are two principal outputs of IPB Step 1 for CIMIC planners:

- PMESII/ASCOPE analysis (Example at Appendix 1 to Annex B)
- initial overlay development on the COP or tactical operating picture.

Civil–military cooperation inputs to intelligence preparation of the battlespace Step 2 – describe the civil space effects

Civil areas and organisations characterised by conflict, dependent on support or suffering enduring lost capacity for governance, essential services and security pose a considerable risk to the mission and are of significant interest to the tactical commander.

Military impacts on civil areas and population protection and the requirement in the absence of civil capacity to provide ILSA, can present a legal or a perceived moral obligation for the commander. Such obligations may require resources to be diverted from what should otherwise be the ME.

Early identification of conditions, impact and effects, supported and mitigated by effective CIMIC planning, can significantly reduce risks to the force, the mission and the civil population in order to ultimately provide a secure environment, as early as possible, for civil agency operations.

The description of civil space effects briefed to the staff prioritises areas of risk and opportunity that are targetable and a priority for the force and the mission. These priorities will shape decisions on collection for civil space monitoring, population support requirements and IIA effects. These priorities include identification of the need for access by external civil agencies such as humanitarian response organisations in order to reduce the potential for ADF resources to be diverted. They also consider countering threat objectives with respect to the civil space.

Collation and dissemination within the planning forums of these estimates allow aligned understanding of the operating environment and of progress toward civil situation conditions.

Inputs to the staff intelligence preparation of the battlespace Step 2 – describe the civil space effects

The analysis of civil space effects focuses on stakeholder identification and initial analysis illustrating priority civil space sectors, capabilities and influencers drawn from the PMESII/ASCOPE analysis. The refining of this list into clear targetable priorities for the force uses COG analysis.

The COG construct applied to civil space analysis, is a good tool to take advantage of the experience and training of military staff to identify targetable CVs. A civil space COG construct allows development of recommendations that focus military effort onto those targetable priorities that underpin the essential pillars of civil society that set conditions for the military end state and transition.
Once stakeholders are identified as a priority for protect, influence or inform effects, they are prioritized for staff analysis effort. The table of priority civil space stakeholders is the stakeholder analysis matrix. When ordered according to level of liaison forms the draft liaison architecture in anticipation of MA.

Further refinement and development of information for these priority stakeholders, occurs in Step 3 of IPB to assess their capability and influence. When the refined list is transitioned from IPB to MA in SMAP, the continued refinement of information is referred to as TA analysis and target systems analysis. TA analysis and target systems analysis continue in MA and in ongoing targeting procedures throughout the operation. They are developed as TAs for protection, collection, IIAs in close cooperation with S2, S3, S5 and other IRC in accordance with mission priorities.

The COG construct focuses on areas of risk and opportunity identified in PMESII/ASCOPE analysis.

Civil space centre of gravity construct

The civil space COG is a description of the attribute that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action and will for the civil community to act or endure to the extent required to achieve the civil space conditions essential to the military end state conditions. The civil space COG construct uses CCs and CRs to focus staff effort onto organisations and actors who are targetable for monitoring, liaison, engagement and influence. The COG construct ensures that the focus of civil space monitoring and analysis is relevant to the mission and the end state criteria for the military force. The more tangible at the operational and tactical level, the greater capacity for focusing action effects. Alternatively, the more holistic the COG considered, the greater the breadth of analysis and also the more time required to influence.

Critical capabilities

CCs are the functions of the civil space and its elements that support the identified civil space COG. The CCs form the pillars of the civil space COG and can be used to define the end state conditions for the military mission.

To determine what functions of the elements of civil society and government form the CCs it is useful to ask three questions:

- What functions within the civil space are critical to achieving the required civil space end state conditions and support the civil COG for the military task?
- What functions of civil society, if not occurring will create significant risk in the context of the military mission and type of operation?
- What functions of civil society, when controlled or influenced by threat interests or events, create significant risk in the context of the military mission and type of operation?
Critical requirements

CRs of the civil space are the people, relationships, systems, resources, facilities and infrastructure upon which a CC is dependent. Another example of categories of CR to consider are:

• operational mechanism or capability components
• their mandate, control and organisational structure
• their leadership and direction through organisational levels
• functional organic systems and equipment
• network infrastructure
• relevant population, jurisdiction or civil areas.

Critical vulnerabilities

CVs are those CRs, or their components, whose deficiency or vulnerability to neutralisation, degradation or dislocation such that there is a risk to the military commander that civil space conditions will not be achieved.

CVs for the civil space includes consideration of those CRs, components of CRs, CR AOs that are functioning CVs areas of deficiency. Such civil capacity can be monitored, safe-guarded, supported, facilitated or enhanced to reduce risk and exploit economy of effort in achieving the military end state conditions for the civil space.

Targetable critical vulnerabilities

Targetable CVs are those that can be effected by the military force within the capacity of the force structure, its major systems, and resources, the geographic and information environment and the civil–military relationships available to the force. The operational design, objectives and tempo will also need to be considered.

Targeting CCs, in the civil space, through CVs usually requires the commander to effect a combination of vulnerable CRs; simultaneously or sequentially, to produce a cumulative effect achieving the decisive result.

Target systems analysis discussed in Chapter 4 supports the identification of TA which can be reached and also assists in identifying means and mechanisms to implement civil space IIA.

The IO concept development tool used in MA links this approach to target development in planning.

Stakeholder analysis

As IPB progresses the stakeholder analysis matches risk to the force with capability and capability gaps to highlight areas of concern to the commander. Stakeholders identified in previous analytical procedures will determine who the priority stakeholders are in the context of the operating environment.
Continued development of the civil space stakeholder analysis highlights priority areas of attention for monitoring and collection with organisations or civil agencies considered as civil space NAI. Collation and dissemination of these observations ensure that CIMIC IIA priority of effort supports the military mission. The civil space stakeholder analysis will describe attitudes and perceptions, as well as motivations and capacities. Such analysis informs decisions on priorities for CIMIC IIA, including capacity building and PCOs. It can also identify the need for access by HN or external civil agencies, to reduce the potential for ADF resources to be required for population support and protection. Ultimately these combined effects from civil capacity allow the military to focus on defeating threat armed groups to provide a more secure environment, earlier, in support of civil agency operations. Stakeholder analysis is supplemented in MA by target systems analysis to identify information systems, relationship networks, means and mechanisms that support civil space monitoring as well as IIA.

Civil–military cooperation outputs of intelligence preparation of the battlespace Step 2 – describe the civil space effects

There are four principle outputs of IPB Step 2:

- civil space COG construct, example at Appendix 2 to Annex B
- stakeholder analysis matrix, example at Appendix 3 to Annex B
- updated civil space elements on the operational overlay, COP or BMS
- a register of submitted RFI for civil space elements identified as priority for monitoring and RFI to gain information on targetable civil actors or organisations.

Civil–military cooperation intelligence preparation of the battlespace Step 3 – evaluate stakeholder capabilities

There are three main categories of stakeholder capabilities to be considered in this stage:

- threat force CIMIC and IO capabilities
- HN capability
- international organisations and humanitarian actors’ capabilities.

Civil–military cooperation inputs to the intelligence preparation of the battlespace Step 3 – evaluate stakeholder capabilities

Assess threat civil–military cooperation capability. A reverse BOS analysis is done to assess threat IO and CIMIC capability and intent. CIMIC reverse BOS analysis is done in close cooperation with the S2. In reverse BOS analysis, the evident threat TTP as well as risks and opportunities identified in PMEII/ASCOPE analysis and the civil COG construct are considered when
assessing threat CIMIC objectives and priorities. The threat IO and CIMIC capability is assessed in the following categories:

- main enemy IO and CIMIC strengths including; civil–military relationships, information systems, means and mechanisms, TTP and PPP
- main enemy weaknesses across including; civil–military relationships, information systems, means and mechanisms, TTPs and PPP
- enemy IO and CIMIC FE available
- synthesis of facts to identify opportunities to exploit.

A reverse BOS analysis worksheet is at Appendix 4 to Annex B.

**Assess civil capabilities**

Civil capability to maintain governance and security across civil areas, from a CIMIC point of view is founded on individual stakeholder capability. Individual stakeholders contributing to the civil space COG have been identified and these are analysed in more detail individually.

Capability is a function of willingness and as well as functional and resources capacity. Civil capability is analysed across the priority areas identified in PMESII/ASCOPE and civil COG analysis.

**Individual stakeholder analysis.** The individual stakeholder analysis looks at each stakeholder group in detail to determine the key opportunities and threats for each priority stakeholder as well as their MLCOA and MDCOA. Assessment of capability includes analysis of the current and possible future level of:

- political, economic or military alignment or sympathy
- motivations and influencers
- opportunity
- resources
- capability platforms.

In the analysis of individual stakeholder capability, willingness, resources and capability platforms are considered. The impact of risks and potential risks arising from the civil situation, from friendly actions as well as threats from other antagonists are considered with respect to their impact on the stakeholder and therefore the stakeholder’s opportunity, willingness or resources. Aspects of the environment impacting stakeholder perceptions and capability include:

- the start state for civil security, governance, displacement and humanitarian as well as climate and economic conditions
- mandates and motivations of the stakeholder and their organisation
- past threat actions and operations including IO and their impacts
- how they historically perceive friendly operations and actions
• measures taken or planned to reduce the impact of the civil space on military operations or actions
• direct and indirect impacts of friendly military activity on stakeholders and their interests

An example of an individual stakeholder analysis is at Appendix 5 to Annex B.

Civil–military cooperation outputs of intelligence preparation of the battlespace Step 3 – determine stakeholder capabilities

There are three principle outputs of IPB Step 3:
• reverse BOS analysis
• individual stakeholder analysis
• broad MLCOA and MDCOA for each stakeholder.

Civil–military cooperation inputs to intelligence preparation of the battlespace Step 4 – determine civil space events

Civil space events are both normal events and the result of first-order, second-order or third-order effects in response to the actions of military forces and civil actors. In addition, the stakeholder COAs, impact of civil space events and enemy impact on the civil dimension is considered.

The impact of events is framed in terms of the resulting attitudes, perceptions and actions of key actors and groups of civilians. Impacts on the civil space, civil actor reactions and our possible counteractions should be considered. Reactions considered include direct and indirect temporal consequential effects, as well as first-, second- and third-order information effects.

Information and analysis are retained for later use by the CIMIC staff or for additional information requested from other staff on the HQ.

Civil–military cooperation staff procedures for intelligence preparation of the battlespace Step 4 – determine civil space events

In considering civil space events that have potential impact on the force, the mission or the threat force, all of the IPB tools are updated in the context of the current situation as well as the time line of actions for the operation being conducted. IPB development outputs being continuously updated and revisited include the following:
• PMESII/ASCOPE analysis
• operational overlay COP
• civil capability assessment
• reverse BOS analysis
• CIMIC running estimate
• stakeholder/TA analysis.
Inputs to the staff intelligence preparation of the battlespace Step 4 – determine civil space events

Civil space event matrix. A civil space events matrix identifying ‘normal’ events, known emerging events, anticipated most likely and most dangerous responses, as well as counter-responses for the civil space, is developed. This events list should be routinely revisited in the context of operational planning to ensure that reaction and counteraction by civil actors and populations is being considered in relation to our own and enemy actions, as well as recent evidence or precedents. The situation template should be supported by the CIMIC planner providing information that is succinct and clear on a corresponding time scale to the master events list for use in COA analysis.

Events in the civil space to be considered include the following:

- civil space routine events
- likely civil space actions, friendly actions, enemy actions and natural disasters
- full range of enemy COAs
- adversary’s CIMIC capability, their integration with the local population and ability to influence and control the civil space
- evaluation and prioritisation of threat COAs (MLCOA and MDCOA)
- analysis and development of a civil COG construct
- impact of friendly actions on the civil space
- impact of enemy actions on the civil space
- identification of likely objectives and desired end state with regard to the civil space.

Stakeholder analysis. Stakeholder analysis will be well developed and will include a list of civil space information actions means and mechanisms for scoping civil space influence actions and TA in support of monitoring.

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace continuous monitoring

The IPB is continuously updated and maintained by the results of collection, analysis of routine reporting. IPB considers both the civil situation and civil capacities, and is informed by, as well as responding to, priorities expressed in orders or commander’s guidance, as well as by communication through the CIMIC technical chain.
Outputs of intelligence preparation of the battlespace continuous monitoring of the civil space

The civil space IPB is the entire body of knowledge of the staff and associated tools, reference material and database records. It is represented in dissemination by:

- updates to the operational overlay or COP on digital BMS including:
  - priority civil areas, including established and emergency civil communities
  - protected and restricted targets
  - critical life support, economic stability and communications infrastructure
  - governance and rule of law jurisdictions
- civil estimate with priorities determined according to assessment of the stakeholders, access, effects, capabilities and events with regard to:
  - civil administration, governance and security conditions and capacity, including rule of law
  - leaders and influencers
  - impacts and objectives of enemy/threat actions on civil space attitudes and perceptions
  - potential impacts of own and coalition operations and actions
  - population stability or propensity for displacement and economic security
  - the humanitarian situation, including:
    - humanitarian need
    - vulnerable populations
    - HN and international response to humanitarian need
    - coordination mechanisms and locations
- draft liaison architecture supported by developed TA analysis and target systems analysis
- contextual understanding of:
  - cultural considerations and influences
  - political considerations and influences
  - historical considerations and influences
- civil events matrix situation template
threat force objectives and capacities with regard to influence or impact on the civil space.

**Updated civil–military cooperation running estimate.** The CIMIC running estimate is the CIMIC staff assessment of priority areas for operational progress including key considerations, risks and opportunities. It is maintained to provide current situational awareness to the staff, higher HQ and subordinate planning groups.

**Mission analysis – staff military appreciation process**

**Stage 2**

MA is the key component of SMAP, providing the deep understanding of the commander’s intent, tasks, freedoms and limitations, assumptions, mission, DEs and own troops capabilities that will contribute to mission success. CIMIC staff review the civil and military situation and identify the events, objectives, tasks and conditions that reduce civil space impacts and support the CIMIC influence objectives for the force.

**Mission analysis steps**

The following are the steps taken in the MA:

- **Review the situation.** The staff will review the situation analysing the IPB, S2 situation update and the CIMIC staff’s civil assessment to date with particular focus on the civil space intent, risks and the likely task in the order or WNGO.

- **Commander’s intent.** The staff will analyse the superior commander’s intent and the CIMIC planner will identify the civil space priority effects that contribute to the purpose or end state conditions. The identified intent from the preliminary analysis should be reviewed quickly in the context of the improved situational understanding from the situation update.

- **Analyse tasks.** The CIMIC planners will identify a range of specified and implied tasks relevant to the civil space. These may include collection tasks and influence activities as discussed in Chapter 3. Essential CIMIC tasks are identified from the specified and implied task list and developed further using the IIA EFST procedure.

- **Determine freedom of action.** Determine freedom of action and identify limitations and constraints.

- **Identify facts and assumptions.** Identify critical facts and assumptions resulting from outstanding RFIs, IRs of tasks and effects such as TA location or contact means and considering the situation brief from IPB.

- **Confirm the mission.** CIMIC is an enabling capability and as such will not have its own mission; however staff planners will want input on civil space
purpose, method and contribution to DEs or end state conditions within the commander’s intent.

- Analyse own troops. CIMIC planners will need to confirm CIMIC structures, identify coalition CMO assets (if applicable), OGA assets/resources and CIMIC and other FE assets that support IIA and determine collectors and effectors. CIMIC planners will also identify any additional assets and resources needed to execute or support tasks and identify civil space actors that can provide information, enhance influence or who have capacity to reduce risk in the civil space.

A summary of CIMIC inputs to MA can be found in Annex C.

Civil–military cooperation staff procedures for mission analysis

Review information sources. CIMIC staff access a range of operational documents including the WNGO or operations order from the higher HQ, any Australian WOG guidance and situation briefs, UN resolutions and open source material for analysis relevant to the mission. The IPB and preliminary analysis, including the reverse BOS analysis, are reviewed for situational update prior to commencing the MA.

Commander’s intent. The commander’s intent is a clear and brief articulation of the role of the force in the civil space aligned to the enduring narrative and the operation. The most important information to derive from the higher commander’s order and the WOG direction, in support of the staff MA is as follows:

- the civil end state condition with regard to Australian WOG objectives and guidance (if provided)
- intent (purpose, method, end state) for civil space concept two up and one up, including civil space DEs
- the higher commander’s issued enduring narrative, IO themes and objectives
- the commander’s guidance for the lead planner for manoeuvre and DEs and stated priorities, if available
- specified and implied tasks, which include:
  - broad decisive effects on the civil space within the commander’s task and intent
  - specific CIMIC IIA tasks as well as civil liaison and engagement relationships with high-priority civil actors, agencies and capacities for monitoring the civil space
  - specific collection tasks for measuring operational progress against MOE or DE conditions.
Once all the information has been analysed CIMIC staff prepare a number of products that will assist in the MA and future SMAP processes. These products are:

- TA analysis
- liaison architecture
- MA worksheet (CIMIC running estimate)
- IO concept development worksheet.

**Information operations concept development**

**Civil space inform and influence actions concepts.** Development of civil space influence activity concepts to achieve essential tasks specified in the IO concept as well as protection effects is commenced during MA. The targeting process commences after MA and the staff will require disseminated understanding of the specified IO priorities as well as develop CIMIC IIA concepts to support targeting decisions. Detailed development of IIA as tasks will continue through MA and COAs development, as well as throughout execution.

The enduring narrative sets the foundation of messaging and influence activity and should be referred to, along with the theme and objective being supported by IIA target proposals. Each IO theme will have a number of objectives and associated IRC IIA or tasks. An IO concept development matrix is a useful way to develop the concept and separate out the influence activities and collection tasks for each IRC.

An example of key elements to include in an IIA concept development worksheet can be found in Appendix 3 to Annex C.

Each task will subsequently be developed as an EFST in accordance with the brief preceding description and the detailed procedures in Chapter 4.

**Target audience analysis**

In order to make informed military decisions, commanders must have visibility over both the military situation and the civil situation; to view one without the other serves only to increase the level of potential operational risk.

The TA analysis is a fusion of the IO concept development worksheet and the stakeholder analysis from the IPB.

The TA analysis consists of:

- Identification of key capability gaps. Early identification of areas where the military may be required to assist is important to allow contingency planning to take place and operations tailored accordingly.

- Visibility over areas of mutual interest. To avoid duplication and maximise economy of effort, visibility of civil activity is essential.
Credible and authoritative link to the military. If the liaison architecture is to be effective, it must be viewed as a credible source of information regarding the military.

The most visible output of the TA analysis is the liaison architecture matrix.

Liaison architecture

A coordinated and prioritised approach to liaison and civil–military engagement is essential to achieve and monitor civil space IIA. More information on liaison planning and conduct is contained in Chapter 4. The liaison architecture matrix continues to be developed through the planning process and is released as part of coordinating instructions.

The liaison architecture provides the following:

• **Priority of effort for direct liaison to the host nation.** The support of the HN to military operations, at all levels, is essential. Deconfliction of activities, assistance where applicable and the provision of resources and materiel will assist in maintaining freedom of action and manoeuvre.

• **Deconfliction and priority of effort.** The liaison architecture maps the civil space and provides boundaries and responsibility for military FE engagement with civil actors and agencies to ensure consistent messaging and prevent multiple POCs with civil agencies or actors.

• **Single point of liaison.** Relationships are best managed through a single point of contact. This ensures that relationships are not compromised by military personnel or FEs giving different messages or receiving information without the principal POC being made aware and ensures that the appropriate level of engagement is maintained.

• **Point of contact for requests for military support.** As part of being the recognised, single source/POC for the civil community with the military, it must also be the recognised route, or conduit, for requests for assistance from the military.

Constructing a liaison architecture

To construct a liaison architecture the level of command hierarchy and staff appointments are mapped against civil AIs for liaison in a matrix.

**Civil areas of interest for liaison.** The key civil AI for CIMIC effects that specifically relate to liaison and coordination are as follows:

• key leaders identified in IO objectives as well as cultural and community informal influencers

• government and governmental agencies, rule of law and civil security

• civil emergency response coordination, forums including HN and international agencies providing coordination of humanitarian response
specific HN, IO or NGOs operating in the TAOR to provide life support, essential services and emergency relief or support

- messaging mechanisms and means to civil areas and population groups such as media or other networks.

An example liaison architecture is contained in Appendix 1 to Annex C.

The mission analysis worksheet

The MA worksheet (CIMIC running estimate) contains the following:

- **Facts and assumptions.** Included assumptions are recorded and an RFI is raised, or an IR is identified for each one. Assumptions are those aspects for which an assessment is made to allow planning to continue. As such they must be linked to an RFI and changed to facts when the RFI or IR is answered. Assumptions may include assumptions regarding:
  - the force
  - the task
  - threat civil impacts
  - civil actors’ dispositions, intentions, actions and reactions.

- **Essential tasks.** The task is described in five to seven words. Task effect (use targeting task verb definition), TA, location, time (phase) and purpose (the purpose can be a link to a HPT, PIR, MOE, a DE condition, or it can be an effect task verb highlighting support to the ME or link to other actions). Each essential task on the MA worksheet will be developed further in the format of an EFST, also referred to in CB SOPs as a TIS. The IA EFSTs are presented to the TWG and, if endorsed, are presented to the TDB. The IA EFST contains the following information:
  - **Task.** This contains the task effect (use targeting task verb definition), TA, location, time (phase) and purpose.
  - **Priority.** Priority is stated according to PIR or HPTL if these have been decided, or it can refer to directed tasks or decisive conditions.
  - **Method.** Method specifies the key task elements and conditions, such as media, teleconferencing, meeting, regular engagement, KLEs, and so on.
  - **Allocation.** The allocation refers to the FE to be tasked and any force assigned assets required to complete the activity.
  - **Resources.** Resources include cash or physical logistics resources required to undertake the task.
  - **Command and control.** C2 needs to be considered for FEs and civilian agency involvement specifying status of the civilian organisations involved.
• **Remarks.** Remarks are to include combat assessment MOIs.

• **Limitations and constraints.** Limitations and constraints are ‘must not do’ and ‘must do’ statements. In particular they consider the following:
  - timings
  - authority and type of contact with particular ethnic or political groups or individuals
  - Australian WOG advice on recognition of government and members of government
  - status of civilian police and other armed civilian groups
  - budgets, restrictions and constraints pertaining to IIA, population support and ICB
  - restrictions on population support and emergency relief.

• **Battlespace operating system capability brief and status update.** The BOS capability brief and status update identify five main contributors to achieving civil space effects. These are as follows:
  - current force assignment and capability of CIMIC personnel, and should specifically mention capabilities related to their manoeuvre such as inherent mobility, force protection and communications or availability of supporting FEs enabling CIMIC freedom of action
  - capacity of mandated civil agencies providing protection, rule of law and essential services
  - assessed capacity of the force to conduct priority CIMIC actions with military personnel, logistics or supplies
  - status of relationships with civil actors and influencers in civil agencies and media outlets that are critical to achieving identified civil space effects
  - ability to implement control measures and procedures for the force and for the civil population that enhance protection for the civil population.

• **Identified opportunities.** This is a place to have some detail on liaison effects and their utility to the force in monitoring the civil space as well as influencing civil actors to reduce risk for the commander or achieve economy of effort by ensuring that civil agency capabilities are considered and accounted for when allocating troops to task.

An example CIMIC running estimate form is contained in Appendix 2 to Annex C.

**Information requirements.** IRs are closely tied to the preceding assumptions. The collection planner or ISTAR WG will prioritise IRs to identify those that are PIRs and CCIRs. IRs need to be supplemented by an assessment of their priority,
time required, potential sources or NAIs and who may be suitable to collect the information.

**Civil–military cooperation staff attendance at the staff mission analysis**

Following analysis, the CIMIC staff planner (S9 or S95) attends the staff planning forum for MA to input the CIMIC staff team advice. While the CIMIC planner is at staff MA, the CIMIC staff commences their COAs development preparation and IPB updates.

**Civil–military cooperation inputs to staff mission analysis**

**Review the situation.** The staff will receive a situation update brief from the S2 and S3. Each BOS may need to review the situation if there are significant updates to the IPB for their functional area that are pertinent to ongoing analysis.

**Commander’s intent.** The PSOs or staff planning representatives will brief their analysis of the superior commander’s intent with regard to their own staff functional area. The CIMIC staff’s assessment of commander’s intent will have a particular focus on the civil space intent, risks and the most prominent essential civil space effects in the order or WNGO. The lead planner will contribute their analysis and collate the inputs.

**Specified and implied tasks.** The CIMIC planner will identify the civil space priority effects that contribute to the purpose or end state conditions. The CIMIC planner will identify specified and implied civil space tasks such as influence activities, collection and liaison tasks and population protection or indigenous capacity tasks.

**Freedom of action.** Determine freedom of action and identify limitations and constraints, in particular considering the following:

- time
- restrictions on contact of particular ethnic or political groups
- Australian WOG advice on recognition of government and members of government
- status of civilian police and other armed civilian groups
- budgets, restrictions and constraints pertaining to IIA, population support and ICB
- restrictions on population support and emergency relief.

**Facts and assumptions.** Critical facts and assumptions resulting from answers to RFIs and outstanding RFIs can be raised here in the staff forum. There should be no surprises here for the RFI manager in the PSO forum. All RFIs raised should have been submitted, or at least have been prepared, by the CIMIC staff team before the MA staff forum convenes. IRs of tasks and effects such as TA, location or contact means and considering the situation brief from the IPB may be relevant if planning a task or contingency within an operation. In a full staff SMAP at the
commencement of an operation such details are not required to be briefed but should be being prepared at this stage of planning.

**Confirm the mission.** CIMIC is an enabling capability and as such will not have its own mission. Staff planners will want input on civil space purpose and method as well as CIMIC input to DEs or end state conditions. The CIMIC contribution to commander’s guidance can be significant if such conditions are prepared and delivered well at this point.

**Analyse own troops.** CIMIC planners will need to identify coalition CMO assets (if applicable), OGA assets/resources and own force CIMIC assets and their dispositions or stage of mounting and force integration. Also relevant are potential collectors and effectors across the BOS from the task organisation matrix. Additional assets and initial recommendations on force assignment of CIMIC teams or CDets are relevant at this stage of planning. Resources available or required to execute or support influence activities should be identified and briefed. Civil space actors that can provide information, enhance influence or who have capacity to reduce risk and are accessible in the civil space, such as humanitarian coordination agencies whose operations are essential to protection of populations, can be identified. Care must be taken to ensure that they are not identified as own troops and that they are protected from being identified with aligned or belligerent groups.

**Outputs from staff mission analysis**

Outputs of the staff MA will include confirmed mission, commander’s intent, DEs and CCIRs.

CIMIC staff are back-briefed by the lead planner after the commander receives the MA brief, and following commander’s guidance. The CIMIC staff then focus and update the civil assessment and CIMIC running estimate and liaison architecture in accordance with that guidance.

**Courses of action development – staff military appreciation process Stage 3**

DEs and essential tasks are used to describe initial broad COA statements that are then built on to provide the commander with feasible, acceptable, sustainable and distinguishable plans from which to select or develop the final COA. CIMIC staff prepare inputs to COA development based on priorities, tasks and guidance from the commander’s MA back-brief. CIMIC priorities, effects, and tasks are synchronised and coordinated into all COAs in development. COAs are assessed by the CIMIC staff for feasibility, acceptability, suitability, sustainability, distinguishability (FASSD) from a CIMIC space and civil space objectives context.

**Steps of courses of action development**

The COA development step commences at the conclusion of the MA when the commander confirms the broad COAs to be developed. COA development refines
the broad concepts into COA statements that provide the commander with a range of workable options from which to choose a solution to achieve the mission. COA statements and their supporting graphics, including the synchronisation matrix and decision support overlays are developed ready for COA analysis. Broad steps include:

- create COA concepts
- test COA concepts
- fully develop COAs.

Civil–military cooperation staff procedures for inputs to courses of action development

Create course of action concepts. The CIMIC planner will take each of the events identified in the MA and the range of effects described to achieve the intent for the civil space and develop the CIMIC IIA concepts contributing to their achievement. The result is a CIMIC supporting concept in the format purpose, method, end state of CIMIC effort, support to ME by phase and the liaison architecture.

The higher intent and commander’s intent for civil space conditions at each DE and at the end state of the mission need to be clearly and succinctly expressed. If the IO concept does not include the narrative it may be required to be included in the CIMIC concept.

For each manoeuvre COA, the CIMIC planners need to identify specific CIMIC IIA and protection contingencies as well as TA, actors, partners and stakeholders. In addition, the resource requirements and time frame for CIMIC effects relevant to each COA must be assessed. Planners need to consider when the initial engagement and negotiations should occur in order to deliver the effect in time for the manoeuvre plan.

Identified effects need to be carefully synchronised to the manoeuvre scheme at this stage to the manoeuvre scheme for each COA being developed. While most effects should be common, the sequence or priority of effort may vary significantly for different approaches. Any of the COAs being developed may end up as the ME or a contingency plan, branch or sequel. Concurrent effort is required within the CIMIC staff team to develop the liaison architecture, the civil space events for war gaming and synchronisation matrix inputs, as well as inputs to orders so as to be ready when these are required.

Fully develop courses of action

At the conclusion of COA development, a CIMIC concept of support for each of the selected or composite COAs is provided. The concept of support is supplemented by details regarding CIMIC actions as well as their ISTAR collection plan elements and priorities, although these may not be required in the brief. Without detail the viability of the COAs cannot be evaluated. The concept and supporting detail must show how the CIMIC effects support the ME as well as
showing the CIMIC SE by phase. Essential resource requirements as well as the tasks must be synchronised and coordinated within the manoeuvre scheme. All tasks identified in the concept of support should have an EFST or TIS prepared and a target pack under development. The CIMIC COA concept is likely to have the following elements:

• enduring narrative (if not included elsewhere)
• purpose of CIMIC for this operation
• method, including:
  • critical infrastructure
  • population protection and support priorities such as PCO, DCO, ILSA
  • KLE priorities
  • civil space influence effects, IIA, ICBs or CWAs
  • civil agency liaison priorities
  • civil space conditions that link to MOE for mission end state conditions
• priorities of effort.

This is supported by preparing inputs to the main order for each considered COA containing the following:

• *Situation paragraph inputs*. The recommended civil space monitoring priorities for S2 inclusion in the situation brief including:
  • security and rule of law situation
  • civil administration and governance situation
  • humanitarian situation
  • population stability and displacement situation
  • humanitarian response capability
  • threat force objectives, impacts and capabilities with regard to the civil space.

• *Groupings*. Force assignment recommendations that match the manoeuvre scheme and tasking of the subordinate FEs.

• *Tasks*. Developed or developing IA EFSTs for delegation in the order.

• *Coordination instructions*. Priorities, liaison architecture and effects consistent with the planned timing and sequence of operational phases and tactical manoeuvre objectives.

• *Administration and logistics*. CIMIC logistics and administrative details for resourcing IAs and protection activities, including contingency plans.
• **Command, control and communications.** Decisions to meet civil space liaison, influence and collection requirements.

Concurrently with the SMAP, the normal battle rhythm of the HQ including NKE/IO WG and TWG continues. Effects are developed as targets in accordance with the procedure outlined in Chapter 3 and detailed in the ‘decision and execution – SMAP Stage 5’ section.

A summary of CIMIC inputs to COA development is contained in Annex D.

**Test courses of action concepts**

The purpose of COA development is to provide the commander with robust choices for a decision. The choices provided must all be workable solutions for the commander to have a choice. The CIMIC S9 or CIMIC planner needs to be prepared to brief a comparison of the FASSD analysis with regard to how well CIMIC effects can support each COA with justification and suitability of each COA as they pertain to civil space DEs and end states.

**Civil–military cooperation inputs for courses of action development briefing**

Each COA is briefed by the lead planner or the lead planners for each COA. Each COA briefed must be FASSD across all areas including CIMIC and civil space impacts.

The CIMIC supporting concepts from COA development are included as part of the brief for each COA. The synchronisation matrix for each COA should at this stage include major effects for all BOS, including effects on the civil space and effects generated by CIMIC influence activities.

The CIMIC planner (S9/S95) may provide the lead planner with the CIMIC concept to brief or they may be required to brief it themselves. Supporting concepts, tasks and coordinating instructions for CIMIC effects may include priorities, control measures, effects, tasks and contingency policies (as discussed in preceding paragraphs). Not all CIMIC effects will be briefed. The principal effects in support of the ME are usually all that is required at this stage.

**Outputs of courses of action development briefing**

The commander provides guidance on improvements and modifications to the COAs, as well as direction on which COA or which elements of each COA are to be developed and taken to war game for analysis.

CIMIC staff work closely with S3 and IO coordination to synchronise, coordinate and develop concepts and effects to be ready for analysis.

**Courses of action analysis – staff military appreciation process Stage 4**

COA analysis commences with the war game refinement process and concludes with the decision brief to the commander. CIMIC staff prepare civil events time line
synchronised to the situation tempo periods for the war game. Relevant, priority civil space impacts and effects are injected into the action, reaction, and counteraction cycle. Priority CIMIC effects and adjustments are recorded for inclusion in the manoeuvre synchronisation matrix.

**Steps in courses of action analysis**

There are two steps in COA analysis, as follows:

- the war game
- the decision brief.

**The war game**

The war game tests each COA against threat actions and the operational environment impacts through cycles of action, reaction and counteraction analysis. In addition to informing the commander’s decision, the war game is a critical tool for plan improvement, as well as for identifying and developing contingencies.

**Civil–military cooperation input into the war game**

Inputs to the war game are brief and include the following three elements:

- confirming the effects in the synchronisation matrix are synchronised and coordinated
- identifying significant impacts on and from the civil space to inform population protection requirements, civil space monitoring or CIMIC influence activities
- confirming and identifying civil space conditions that comprise end state conditions and that could inform a commander’s decision.

These effects and the synchronisation of effects constitute the refinement to the plan and need to be included in the order, which in a large staff process is likely to be developed concurrently.

The civil space war game inputs should be the master civil events matrix combining synchronisation matrix inputs and IPB events. This should not replace but, rather, supplement the master events matrix, situation template or war game record that the S2 provides. On a busy staff the S2 and S3 will rely heavily on the CIMIC staff to provide relevant succinct civil space impacts and effects as the war game progresses.

**The war game synchronisation matrix**

A detailed synchronisation matrix is used to manage the war game progression and record results, as well as to record modifications and counteractions.

The S3 or lead planner, S2 cell representative and each BOS representative support development of the war game synchronisation matrix before the war game begins. This is done concurrent with COA development. Separate synchronisation matrices may be prepared by staff cells and brought independently to the war
game. In such cases, each of the synchronisation matrix elements must be prepared using common time periods and formats in accordance with the S3 direction so they can be used effectively and rapidly combined when compiling the war game record.

The use of a well-prepared synchronisation matrix assists with identifying priority BOS actions and risk reduction, as well as ensuring that input is relevant, timely and succinct. All of the information provided by BOS specialists is combined to ensure that it is accurately captured and that the war game record is complete. The war game synchronisation matrix is used as the manoeuvre synchronisation matrix for each COA during the war game. The war game synchronisation matrix is updated as the war game is conducted to become the war game record. The war game record is used to produce the manoeuvre synchronisation matrix for the order in execution of the plan. Records for COAs not selected are very useful in planning branches, sequels or contingencies.

Civil–military cooperation contribution to the war game

For the commander’s CIMIC effects, the war game and the post-war game synchronisation record provides an opportunity to confirm the civil space situation impacts, the civil end state conditions and any specific, critical civil space conditions relating to DEs or decision points, including:

- test that the CIMIC supporting concept as well as specific CIMIC effects and actions are coordinated and synchronised
- identify gaps in mission relevant knowledge, to be listed as RFIs
- refine and modify the CIMIC concept of support and force assignment to address issues or opportunities identified in the war game
- update the manoeuvre synchronisation matrix IO and CIMIC IIA effects to ensure that CIMIC actions are resonant within the TA in time to have the effect required in support of the manoeuvre force.

Important considerations for the preparation and injection of the civil dimension into the wargames are the following:

- CIMIC is a SE and must be synchronised with the manoeuvre COA
- use the stakeholder COAs and the NKE targeting priorities identified, developed and agreed to by the staff in IPB, MA and COA development
- liaise closely to ensure that the actions and reactions are synchronised, understood and consistent with other staff branches (there should be no real surprises)
- be prepared to modify the CIMIC concept or the synchronisation of effects to best support the plan and situation as presented
- consider the lag between CIMIC action and TA resonance or impact for NKE.
Conduct of the war game

The war game is conducted by the S3 or lead planner, who directs both the sequence and technique, as well as managing when the war game participants have opportunities to input.

The war game is conducted in sequential time periods. These are specified by the lead planner before the war game commences. The war game time periods will often correspond to time periods in the operational synchronisation matrix, although for specific events they may be made incrementally smaller or grouped into longer periods.

For each time period tested within the war game, the lead planner conducts four steps. These steps are:

- situation update and force dispositions
- friendly force/blue force actions
- threat force/red force and stakeholder reactions
- friendly force/blue force counteractions and plan modifications.

Situation update and force dispositions. The S2 representative provides the threat situation update, including relevant civil space situational understanding. At this point the S9 representative may be asked to input specific relevant information. The S3 or lead planner updates the friendly force dispositions at the commencement of the time period.

Friendly force/blue force actions. The lead planner states the blue force actions for the time period at the relevant geographic locations. Friendly actions include relevant CIMIC effects critical to the plan and the TA in the geographic area being considered. BOS specialists may have the opportunity to input critical relevant actions such as priority logistics, CIMIC, IO or engineer effects contributing to manoeuvre success.

Threat force/red force and stakeholder reactions. The S2 states the reaction by threat commanders, FEs and other stakeholders to blue force manoeuvre and effects. BOS representatives, such as the CIMIC staff representative, may be called upon to identify threat civil space influence effects, civil actor reactions or other critical stakeholder actions impacting the civil space at this time.

Friendly force/blue force counteractions and plan modifications. The lead planner considers the impact of threat actions and reactions. Blue force counteractions, modifications or force structure changes are proposed so as to pre-empt any new threats or risks identified. BOS specialists, such as the S9 representative, may be called upon to provide advice or recommend actions, modifications or tasks at this time.

A checklist for CIMIC input to the war game is contained in Annex E.
Outputs of courses of action analysis

Civil space war game outputs are provided to the lead planner for the decision brief and to the CIMIC staff team to amend the input to orders. Considerations are as follows:

- synchronise matrix effects, events, priorities and tasks confirmed or adjusted
- conditions, warnings and indicators to be monitored, including locations and timings, to be synchronised and coordinated
- confirmed concepts of support
- residual risks identified at a level requiring the commander’s consideration.

Decision and execution – staff military appreciation process Stage 5

Decision and execution has three main components, these being the commander’s decision brief, production of the order and the continuous refinement of the plan as it is executed.

The decision brief is the final opportunity for all staff functions, including CIMIC as well as the CAG, to inform the commander of the advantages, disadvantages and relative risks associated with each COA.

Execution of the plan starts with production of the order which is a clear conclusion of the deliberate SMAP planning process. Plan execution is a dynamic process characterised by continuous in-stride decision-making. Production of the order starts the process of continuous refinement of the plan, the prioritised target list, collection priorities and other tactical actions. Refinement continues until the end state is reached or a new order is issued.

Decisions are made by the commander at identified decision points to initiate contingencies, branches or sequels as well as at DEs and changes of phases. Occurrence of significant activities or incidents may also trigger an immediate planning group for the commander to assess or make a decision. Following decisions fragos and taskords are issued to subordinate FEs to update the original order.

CIMIC staff provide input to the initial order and to any refinements. CIMIC staff inputs to orders are authorised and released through the S3 or JFCC and are disseminated by fragos or taskords. CIMIC refinement can be adjusting priorities, activities or the synchronisation and coordination of CIMIC effects across the force.

CIMIC inputs are included throughout the order at the tactical level, although an additional annex for coordinating instructions may be useful for clarity. CIMIC-relevant information in each of the five paragraphs of the
'situation–mission–execution–administration and logistics–command and signals' format includes:

• **Paragraph 1, situation.** Civil situation and the status of Australian WOG agencies who may be attached.

• **Paragraph 2, mission.** This will be provided by the commander.

• **Paragraph 3, execution.** The CIMIC concept of support, force assignment of CIMIC teams and detachments, CIMIC influence activity tasks and coordinating instructions identifying priorities, civil engagement liaison authorisation, and policies on influence activities and ILSA.

• **Paragraph 4, administration and logistics.** This includes financial and other resources allocated for CIMIC influence activities, Australian WOG/ADF emergency relief supplies and procedures to initiate provision of HN as well as international agency humanitarian relief supplies.

• **Paragraph 5, command and signals.** This includes communications systems and authorities for liaison.

A summary of key points for CIMIC inputs to the opord and examples are included in Annex F.

Civil–military cooperation procedures for decision and execution (combat brigade operation order or battlegroup orders)

In the production of the order, be it the initial opord or operation plan, or the subsequent fragos that keep the order current, it is critical to highlight that the implementation of CIMIC effects provides a SE to the whole force and as such, is an integrated part of the synchronised plan.

There is only one situation brief and one mission for the tactical commander. CIMIC staff input to the production of the order at the tactical level includes:

• ensuring that pertinent civil space situation impacts are conveyed in the S2 situation paragraph or brief

• providing a CIMIC supporting concept that is nested and integrated with the manoeuvre scheme and other support concepts

• ensuring that key CIMIC effects and tasks are represented in the synchronisation matrix and the subordinate FE tasks

• ensuring that groupings and tasks support civil space CIMIC effects in the synchronisation matrix

• ensuring that coordination instructions include:
  • message themes and CIMIC collection and influence priorities
  • population control measures, routes for civilian traffic and DC collection points
  • liaison architecture is identified
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• resources and approval processes are noted.
• ensuring that administration and logistics includes resources available for population support, ILSA and influence activities, and ensuring that C2 includes levels of authority for civil influence activity and reporting requirements.

The CB/minor JTF operations order will usually include a coordinating CIMIC annex (this may be an appendix to the IO annex). The CIMIC annex/appendix, an example of which is shown in Appendix 1 to Annex F, is not a tasking tool for CIMIC FE (CDet); it is a coordinating instruction to the formation.

A sample input to CB opord is shown in Appendix 1 to Annex F.

A sample input to BMS orders is shown in Appendix 2 to Annex F.

Annexes:
A. Civil–military cooperation inputs into preliminary analysis
B. Civil–military cooperation procedure for input into intelligence preparation of the battlespace
C. Civil–military cooperation procedures for input to mission analysis
D. Civil–military cooperation input to courses of action development
E. Civil–military cooperation inputs to course of action analysis
F. Civil–military cooperation inputs to orders
Annex A to Chapter 5

Civil–military cooperation inputs into preliminary analysis

Civil–military cooperation procedure for input to preliminary analysis

Civil–military cooperation staff scope the problem. On receipt of the WNGO organise the staff effort, prepare for and initiate ongoing planning to support IPB and SMAP.

Procedures for developing CIMIC inputs to preliminary analysis are as follows:

- state the type of operation and operational threat environment
- identify the staff available for input to CIMIC considerations and organise the staff effort
- establish information management procedures within the staff cell
- identify the time available to prepare for staff preliminary analysis and for the operations planning
- identify the likely duration of the operation
- identify and collate sources of information:
  - higher order or WNGOs
  - commander’s guidance
  - WOG interagency objectives
  - UN mandates or resolutions
  - situation brief, current country study or fact book provided by S2, higher HQ or GOAS agencies
  - current intelligence reports
  - psyops analysis of the information environment
  - open source reporting on the state of civil capacity and the humanitarian situation
  - open source reports from civil agency emergency response coordination agencies (HN Disaster Management Coordinator or UNHCR)
- record the two up and one up commander’s intent with respect to the civil space as well as the IO narrative, themes and objectives
- list desired civil space end state conditions and describe them in terms that are achievable and able to be recognised (as provide or anticipated)
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- list CIMIC staff assigned to the force, include their limitations and capabilities
- list FEIs that can contribute to planning and achieving CIMIC IIA
- list the most significant known information about the HN government, governance and rule of law
- identify the degree of degradation or disruption to civil society and government
- identify the HN capacity and mechanisms to manage the response to any civil emergency as well as the current international response
- identify any civil space and CIMIC RFI that must be resolved by facts or assumptions for planning to commence.

Provide civil–military mission analysis preliminary analysis inputs to whole staff mission preliminary analysis

S9 or S95 takes the CIMIC input to preliminary analysis to the S3 or lead planner for consideration during the whole staff preliminary analysis. This includes:

- assumption based on essential RFIs
- recommend principal areas of focus for civil space monitoring and CIMIC IIA effects relevant to the operation at this stage
- any proposed civil space DE or civil space conditions within DE for the commander’s consideration
- critical civil space conditions that present risk or opportunity identified at this stage
- critical civil capacities of the HN, international response or civil society that reduce risk or create opportunities for the commander.

Essential RFIs are submitted to the RFI manager and, if required, to the collection planner.
Annex B to Chapter 5

Civil–military cooperation procedure for input into intelligence preparation of the battlespace

Elements of the civil space for analysis and monitoring for input to the intelligence preparation of the battlespaces

The following are elements of the civil space that are useful in prioritising analysis effort:

- locations or areas of influence
- civil areas defined by sociopolitical, language and cultural demographics, political boundaries and police jurisdictions
- critical/decisive infrastructure including:
  - protected, restricted or sensitive targets
  - civil space information systems (telecommunications access and media coverage)
  - essential services infrastructure (hospitals and clinics, water supply, sanitation, power generation and distribution)
  - emergency relief hubs and coordination mechanisms
  - communications infrastructure and media distribution/broadcast
  - significant police posts of operations rooms
- civil security conditions, civil administration and governance effectiveness, focusing on:
  - rule of law including the presence and effectiveness of police and internal security services
  - the reliability of essential services
  - life support (shelter, water, food, sanitation)
  - health facilities providing services as well as emergency first responders
  - power supply and distribution
  - local media and broadcasting
  - economic institutions
- population stability and levels of displacement
- the humanitarian situation expressed as a priority of need and case load:
  - humanitarian need by area
vulnerable populations
the HN and international civil agency humanitarian coordination and status of response
leadership/influence provided by government actors, cultural and community leaders, and service providers, focusing on:
HN government political and administration leadership, cultural leadership, religious and community leadership, community influencers
security services and rule of law leaders
humanitarian and emergency response coordination leaders or implementers
medical and essential services providers
population access to media services and communications
contexts:
- cultural
- political
- historical.

Procedures for developing civil–military cooperation inputs to the intelligence preparation of the battlespace
Define priority civil space elements of the operating environment:
- Determine priority areas of the civil space, with respect to the mission and the situation presented.
- Analyse the civil space to determine which areas, capabilities and elements of the civil space are the priority for monitoring, collecting, informing and influencing:
  - overlay influence boundaries for language and culture, religious denomination, political jurisdiction, information systems/media coverage and economic infrastructure
  - use an analysis tool or method, such as PMESII/ASCOPE in Table 5–1 at Appendix 1 to determine risks and opportunity arising from the known situation across the civil space areas, capabilities and elements, including opportunity for the military to achieve economy of effort by enhancing, supporting or facilitating civil agency actions and access.

Describe the civil space effects:
- Describe how the current civil space situation, as well as the civil space reaction to military action, is likely to impact the military mission, the end
state conditions as well as conditions for any key effect or phase changes for the operation:

- Consider what aspects of the civil space must stay the same and what aspects of the civil space must improve to achieve the desired end state conditions for the civil space.
- Consider how populations and stakeholders will react to military actions and how these decisions may impact the military ME at that time as well as the impact that action may have on end state conditions.
- Determine what civil space conditions, capabilities or elements must be sustained, supported, controlled, monitored or changed without regard to what is a military task or what is a civil agency responsibility. Consider:
  - civil actor and essential services protection effects (physical security, provision of life support, essential services, policing) for civil areas and infrastructure
  - population control effects (civil order, protection of information, protection of military capabilities, protection of civilians) for civil space elements, routes or areas
  - collection from or about the civil space supporting planning, monitoring, and commander's decisions points
  - inform effects for civil space TA or elements
  - support, sustain or enhance effects for civil space TA or elements.
- The civil space elements, identified as a priority within the PMESII/ASCOPE analysis become the CCs, as pillars in a civil space COG construct. An example COG construct is shown in Table 5–2 at Appendix 2. Assess CRs and CVs of the civil space for the identified priority areas of risk and opportunity.
- Example CCs impacting civil society and identified vulnerable groups are:
  - leadership provided by HN civil government legislative, executive and community representatives
  - rule of law by effective policing, security services and arbitration
  - sustainment of essential services such as medical, power and water
  - a coordinated HN and international humanitarian emergency response.
Identify key stakeholders and influencers and other requirements for CCs of the civil space. An example civil space stakeholder analysis matrix is in Table 5–3 at Appendix 3.

Describe these civil space effects and potential effects as risk statements relating to the military force and its mission across the priority civil space areas, capabilities and elements. Describe the:

- operational risks to the mission, DE or end state conditions arising from the current situation
- operational risk to the mission, DE or end state conditions arising from civil space reaction to military actions
- operational risk to the mission, DE, IO objectives or end state conditions arising from potential enemy/threat force actions
- risk to people, resources and major systems arising from the civil space
- risks to reputation arising from civil space conditions, civil space events, civil responses to military actions, or threat aligned information actions
- risk to the environment, including critical civil infrastructure, rule of law, civil leadership or cultural heritage arising from military action or operations.

Evaluate capabilities as follows:

- Evaluate civil space capabilities, stakeholders and their capacity as well as threat CIMIC capabilities:
  - Describe the threat IO/CIMIC capability.
  - Develop threat force objectives in relation to each identified civil space CCs and for specific civil areas, stakeholders and actors in a reverse BOS analysis. An example reverse BOS analysis worksheet is at Appendix 4.
  - Develop a broad MLCOA and MDCOA for threat force CIMIC, for civil society, vulnerable groups and for priority civil space stakeholders and actors forming CRs of the identified CCs. Describe the capacity and willingness to act for each of the key stakeholders and TA identified in CCs, CRs and CVs.
  - Develop an individual stakeholder analysis for each identified TA selected from the key stakeholders and actors. The individual TA analysis is in Table 5–4 at Appendix 5.

Determine civil space events as follows:

- Create a time line of events that allows synchronisation of collection, protection, and IIA with the military manoeuvre scheme. Identify any
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required civil space conditions not being met by the expected civil space COA and events:

• Develop the broad COA statements into a civil actor timeline for each TA. The time line initially may be very broad covering the operational phases, operational period or the calendar year. Specific military events or tasks may be boxed and considered in isolation to prepare analysis of civil space reactions when there is not yet a known or specified commencement time.

• Revisit the civil space effects analysis and identify any civil space effects (risks and opportunities) that the civil space events analysis has not resolved, or that may be impacted adversely by military actions, and highlight these as residual risks requiring action and monitoring or risk transfer if required.

• The civil space time line is developed, refined and updated as IPB and planning continue. The time line of civil space events will ultimately be expressed in time increments matching the operational phasing and manoeuvre synchronisation matrix as a civil situation template. The civil space situation template is used in COA analysis, in the Rehearsal of Concept drill as well as in monitoring the civil space throughout the operation. If used well, the civil space situation template can identify changes in expected actions in the civil space that may inform decisions, identify the need for branches or sequels as well as support monitoring of operational progress.

• Refine the description of alternative civil space COAs providing sufficient detail to identify a specific COA or confirm an assumption at critical times or events. Collection tasks will be developed to observe and report civil space TA actions and events (or their absence) if they are of sufficient priority. Such collection tasks may be allocated to a collection asset to observe the TA at the time and place they are expected to occur, or the information can be collected from a civil actor or agency through engagement and liaison tasking.

Appendices:

1. Political, military, economic, societal, infrastructure, information/areas, structures, capacities, organisations, people, events analysis
2. Example civil space centre of gravity
3. Stakeholder matrix
4. Example reverse battlespace operating system worksheet
5. Individual stakeholder analysis
## APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 5

### POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC, SOCIETAL, INFRASTRUCTURE, INFORMATION/AREAS, STRUCTURES, CAPACITIES, ORGANISATIONS, PEOPLE, EVENTS ANALYSIS

Table 5–1: Political, military, economic, societal, infrastructure, information/areas, structures, capacities, organisations, people, events analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A – Areas</td>
<td>Population centres</td>
<td>District/provincial boundary</td>
<td>Party affiliation areas, cultural areas</td>
<td>Insurgent/shadow government influence area</td>
<td>Jurisdictions for legal institutions, representation, judicial process, policing</td>
<td>Coverage for emergency relief or recovery efforts, both national and international</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S2 considers – coalition, HN and foreign military bases</td>
<td>Historic ambush/improvised explosive device sites/insurgent bases</td>
<td>Enemy and politically motivated group armed element influence on, or connections within, civilian areas and the military objectives for CIMIC effects on CA</td>
<td>Basis of economic drivers for civil areas</td>
<td>Social demographic area delineations</td>
<td>Areas covered by major infrastructure:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Principal wealth creating industries for areas</td>
<td>Economic base industry, bazaar areas, farming areas, livestock dealers, auto repair shops</td>
<td>Smuggling routes, locations/areas of illicit trafficking activity</td>
<td>Religious areas – influence, reach of centres of religion or culture</td>
<td>Bazaars, outdoor shura sites</td>
<td>Power grids of transformers/generators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Historic ambush/improvised explosive device sites/insurgent bases</td>
<td>Enemy and politically motivated group armed element influence on, or connections within, civilian areas and the military objectives for CIMIC effects on CA</td>
<td>Basis of economic drivers for civil areas</td>
<td>Social demographic area delineations</td>
<td>Religious areas – influence, reach of centres of religion or culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S – Structures</td>
<td>Provincial/district centres, shura halls, polling sites, court house, mobile courts</td>
<td>Provincial/district police HQ</td>
<td>Insurgent known leader house/business</td>
<td>Bazaar, wheat storage, banks, mining structure, industrial plants</td>
<td>Mosques, wedding halls, popular restaurants</td>
<td>Protected or restricted sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Essential services:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Police stations, hospitals, telecommunications, roads, bridges, electrical lines, gabion walls, dams</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Government agency communications

Education standards, demographics and language or dialect

Means for public information – media coverage areas

Social networks/word of mouth gathering points

Graffiti/posters indicating influence boundaries
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C – Capacities</td>
<td>Dispute resolution, local leadership, insurgent ability to have impact</td>
<td>HN security forces, including all civil paramilitary organisations, border protection and customs agencies</td>
<td>Economic institutions</td>
<td>Strength of tribal/village traditional structures, mullahs</td>
<td>Ability to build/maintain roads, walls, check dams, irrigation system, sewage</td>
<td>Literacy rate, availability of electronic media, phone service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judiciary capacity</td>
<td>Formed police units or paramilitary response capability</td>
<td>Access to banks</td>
<td>Traditional means of justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government representation, national and provincial leadership and influence</td>
<td>Hard insurgent strength/weapons</td>
<td>Ability to withstand drought, development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ombudsman committee</td>
<td>Enemy recruiting potential</td>
<td>Estimated size of black market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Irrigation potential</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O – Organisations</td>
<td>Political parties, insurgent group affiliations, government and NGOs, court system UNHCR, local active groups (eg, Rotary and Country Women's Association), religious and cultural influencers</td>
<td>Coalition and HN security forces present, insurgent groups present</td>
<td>Banks, large landholders, cooperatives</td>
<td>Tribes, clans, families, sports shuras, youth shuras</td>
<td>Government ministries</td>
<td>News organisations, influential mosques, insurgent IO group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction companies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P – People</td>
<td>Key leaders and influencers</td>
<td>Key leaders and influencers</td>
<td>Key leaders and influencers</td>
<td>Key leaders and influencers</td>
<td>Key leaders and influencers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E – Events</td>
<td>Governors, councils, shura members, elders, mullahs, parliamentarians, judges, prosecutors, ombudsman</td>
<td>Coalition, HN security forces, insurgent military leaders</td>
<td>Bankers, landholders, merchants, money lenders, illegal facilitators, smuggling chain</td>
<td>Mullahs, maliks, elders, shura members, influential families, entertainment figures</td>
<td>Builders, road contractors, local development councils</td>
<td>Media owners, mullahs, maliks, elders, heads of families</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Example Civil Space Centre of Gravity

#### Table 5-2: Example civil space centre of gravity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical capability</th>
<th>Security enforcement</th>
<th>Functioning economy</th>
<th>Provision of basic services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Critical requirement</td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>Financial aid</td>
<td>Aid organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local police force</td>
<td>Functioning workplaces</td>
<td>Routes and distribution point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence, posture, profile</td>
<td>Social security arrangements</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government support (legitimacy)</td>
<td>Ability to buy and sell goods</td>
<td>Aid assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ability to manoeuvre within TAOR and jurisdictional population centres</td>
<td>Security presence</td>
<td>Out of country logistical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belief in security forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical vulnerability</td>
<td>Defection of police</td>
<td>Financial aid vulnerability to corruption/disruption</td>
<td>Aid organisations vulnerability to deteriorating security situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operations security breaches</td>
<td>Functioning workplace vulnerability to violence and civil unrest</td>
<td>Route and distribution point vulnerability to disruption/attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perception of vulnerability to IO</td>
<td>Social security vulnerability to corruption</td>
<td>Aid agency vulnerability to denial of key infrastructure (nodes, routes, warehousing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government support vulnerability to corruption/bribery (perceive or actual)</td>
<td>Healthy market vulnerability to economic instability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local policing vulnerability to feuding</td>
<td>Security presence vulnerability to violence and civil unrest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manoeuvre vulnerability to denial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Confidence and trust in security forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Susceptibility to influence or coercion by threat aligned actors or threat forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LWD 3-8-6, Civil–Military Cooperation, 2018
### APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 5

#### STAKEHOLDER MATRIX

Table 5-3: Stakeholder matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Current position</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Motivation level</th>
<th>Degree of influence</th>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Social reparation, improved quality of life, employment</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low to high</td>
<td>Large social network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israelis</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Security, social frustration</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
<td>Powerful government and military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Government</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Security, financial</td>
<td>Medium to high</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Dominant military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public affairs</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Increased independence, improved quality of life, increased international influence, financial gain</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Government of the Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developers</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Development capital and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
<td>Investment, financial leverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European community</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Investment possibilities, improved Middle East relations</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Humanitarian, increased trade</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Donors, political network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Negative/Positive</td>
<td>Financial competitor, political support</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Political influence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4 to Annex B to Chapter 5
Example reverse battlespace operating system worksheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOS: IO</th>
<th>DTG:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main enemy strengths:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence by messaging in person</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to disseminate propaganda messages within hours on social media accounts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence over 45% newspapers and 55% radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key leaders charismatic and tolerated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main enemy weaknesses:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy – they focus on negative reporting, no good news stories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles poorly written without key themes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT likely to be targetable by EW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enemy force available (total assets):</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely to have coordinated cell – likely to be one to three key personnel with IT and IO skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Synthesis (how to exploit the enemy by BOS):</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target misinformation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter influence by positive stories and messages of community stability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Capabilities:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT equipment</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enemy HVT:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local media representative that approves their stories for publishing/radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proxy and named social media accounts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Input to ISR:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 5 to Annex B to Chapter 5

**Individual stakeholder analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TA stakeholder/actor name</th>
<th>Status (primary/secondary)</th>
<th>Motivations</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Operational mandate</th>
<th>Organisational structure</th>
<th>CC link (refer to civil COG)</th>
<th>Current operations and effectiveness</th>
<th>Impact on civil space if actions are degraded</th>
<th>This TA reaction to changed security or humanitarian situation</th>
<th>This TA reaction to friendly military actions</th>
<th>This TA reaction to threat military COA</th>
<th>CR current capacity by location, area or TA</th>
<th>CV, TCV/opportunities</th>
<th>Network links to other stakeholders</th>
<th>Influence/authority over …</th>
<th>This actor influenced by …</th>
<th>Means to reach this actor, stakeholder or TA and mechanisms for those means</th>
<th>Risks/opportunities to the force with respect to this civil actor</th>
<th>Risk/benefits to this civil actor from the friendly force operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>TA stakeholder/actor name</td>
<td>Status (primary/secondary)</td>
<td>Motivations</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Operational mandate</td>
<td>Organisational structure</td>
<td>CC link (refer to civil COG)</td>
<td>Current operations and effectiveness</td>
<td>Impact on civil space if actions are degraded</td>
<td>This TA reaction to changed security or humanitarian situation</td>
<td>This TA reaction to friendly military actions</td>
<td>This TA reaction to threat military COA</td>
<td>CR current capacity by location, area or TA</td>
<td>CV, TCV/opportunities</td>
<td>Network links to other stakeholders</td>
<td>Influence/authority over …</td>
<td>This actor influenced by …</td>
<td>Means to reach this actor, stakeholder or TA and mechanisms for those means</td>
<td>Risks/opportunities to the force with respect to this civil actor</td>
<td>Risk/benefits to this civil actor from the friendly force operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note:
1. **Name.** Name and title/position. This can be a group or population if that is appropriate but needs to be a specific as possible for key stakeholders within a population or organisation.
2. **Status.** Primary = part of the organisation or issue/secondary = an external influencer or provider.
3. **Motivations.** What is the motivation to perform their role, or in relation to the identified links.
4. **Organisation.** Name of the organisation or group this actor identifies as belonging to.
5. **Operational mandate.** The mandate or purpose of the organisation.
6. **Organisation structure.** The organisational structure, hierarchy and elements (diagram) and locations if known.
7. **Critical capability.** CC link to COG construct for this TA or stakeholder.
8. **Current operations and effectiveness.** Current known operations by location or TAs. Effectiveness this actor or organisation has currently.
9. **Impact of degraded capability on civil space.** What impact would result from withdrawal of this actor or the capability provided by their organisation and actions.
10. **Reaction to changed security conditions.** Describe the predicted actions and reactions in response to credible changes to the civil situation. Responses may be corrective actions or self-protective actions.
11. **Reaction to friendly force actions.** Describe the predicted actions and reactions in response to FF operational phases, geographical locations, tactical actions, IOs and other military activity. Responses may be actions in support of civil actors, self-protective actions, actions to avoid civil–military interaction or in the information domain.
12. **Reaction to threat actions.** Describe credible actions and reactions in response to threat force operational phases, geographical locations, tactical actions, IOs. Responses may be actions in support of civil actors, self-protective actions, actions to avoid civil–military interaction or in the information domain.
13. **Critical requirements.** Physical requirements of the capability identified. This includes organisational structures, command, systems and infrastructure, resources they can mobilise including people, budgets and equipment.
14. **Critical vulnerabilities, targetable critical vulnerabilities/targetable opportunities.** Targetable CVs and opportunities relevant to desired civil space conditions may be positive or negative, but usually if considered for CIMIC they would be positive effects to protect, safeguard, support, enhance or control.
15. **Network.** Links to other stakeholders.
16. **Influence/authority.** Subjective degree of influence on whom and their location:
   a. limited/moderate/significant/decisive
   b. influence on list specific actors, positions or groups
   c. their location.
17. **Influenced by.** Which leaders or influencers have persuasive or coercive influence on this actor or TA.
18. **Means and mechanisms.** Address, phone number, address, website or social media, media coverage and access (print, radio, TV, web).
19. **Risks and opportunities.** Describe principal risks and opportunities relevant to the mission with respect to this actor.
20. **Risk to this Target Audience.** Describe principal risks to this actor and their interests from the friendly force operations.
Annex C to Chapter 5

Civil–military cooperation procedures for input to mission analysis

The CIMIC inputs to MA provide situational understanding of the following:

- civil space WOG and higher commander’s intent
- civil space end state conditions
- civil space DEs and the conditions defining DEs and IO objectives
- likely CIMIC effects and tasks contributing to the achievement of DE and IO objectives
- military and civil space capacity to achieve the priority tasks and effects
- proposed EFST to achieve the prioritised CIMIC effects and tasks.

CIMIC effects are an effect created by the whole of the force. Civil state conditions may be the result of civil agency operations and civil actor actions as well as military actions. The required actions of the military force that contribute to the HN and international civil community sustaining civil space conditions, become essential CIMIC tasks for the force. CIMIC subtasks of the force contribute to those effects through protection, collection, IIA:

- **Protection.** Protection includes limitations, constraints, control measures and actions that achieve the following:
  - IHL and GOAS commitments to protect civilians and prohibited targets from the effects of war including population control tasks and IIA
  - the protection or facilitation of civil capacity that enables transition or extraction of the military force on mission achievement
  - consideration for the protection of vulnerable groups
  - conditions to facilitate the recognised HN government and its mandated international partners to provide security, life support, emergency and humanitarian relief as well as build an economic foundation for civil society
  - military-provided ILSA.

- **Collection tasks.** Collection tasks about the civil space and from civil space actors for:
  - monitoring civil space conditions and civil actor capabilities
  - monitoring operational progress
  - assessing risk from and to the civil space
Inform and influence actions tasks. Identify actions to reduce or mitigate risks or impacts.

Civil space elements for consideration during CIMIC input to MA will be determined by the civil space situation, the operation being undertaken and by the duration and end state conditions.

Civil space elements to consider as risks to the force, prompting recommendations for defining decisive conditions, as well as actions to protect, collect, inform or influence include:

- civil security conditions, governance and civil administration effectiveness, including:
  - police, other civil security services, private security contractors, irregular militias
  - civil society access to essential services, such as:
    - life support (shelter, water, food, sanitation)
    - health facilities providing services as well as emergency first responders
    - power supply and distribution
    - income and education
  - media broadcasting and telecommunications
  - economic institutions

- the humanitarian situation:
  - population stability by area or community
  - humanitarian need and vulnerable populations by area
  - displaced persons locations, routes and destinations

- the HN and supporting international organisation humanitarian coordination and response

- leadership/influence provided within the civil space including:
  - HN government political and administration leadership including politico-military group influencers
  - cultural and religious leaders
  - community leadership and community/TA/issue-motivated group influencers
  - security services and rule of law leaders
• humanitarian and emergency response coordination leaders and regional implementers
• leaders and policy makers for medical, life support and essential services providers including international organisations.

Mission analysis procedures

The procedure to develop CIMIC inputs to MA is as follows:

• Review the situation.
• Review the current situational overlay.
• Review the IPB civil space situation as identified by:
  • civil space effects
  • civil space COG analysis
  • civil space TA analysis
  • civil space events.
• Review the threat CIMIC and IO situation as identified in:
  • IO reverse BOS analysis
  • current intelligence summaries and intelligence reports
  • CIMIC periodic reports from higher and lower HQ when available
  • responses to RFIs
  • identify facts and assumptions
  • for all assumptions seek facts and submit an RFI
  • complete the facts and assumption serials of the MA worksheet/CIMIC running estimates at Appendix 1.
• Analyse the superior commander’s civil space intent:
  • Collate the direction regarding intent for the civil space using the:
    • Australian WOG intent, objectives and guidance for civil state conditions
    • commander two up and commander one up intent as provided in the order
    • civil space conditions stated within end state and DE for the higher commander’s order
    • higher commanders IO narrative, themes and objectives
    • the commander’s guidance to the lead planner considering manoeuvre, DE, phases or tasks and stated priorities.
Contents

• Record the critical civil space conditions that define success for the military mission.

• Analyse CIMIC tasks:
  • Identify the effects the force must achieve across the priority civil space elements as well as identifying effects that civil actors and agencies will or can perform that contribute to decisive end state conditions. Ensure that the qualifying measures for each effect support achievable end state goals given the resources and time available.
  • Identify the limitations, constraints, control measures, collection tasks and IIA of the force and of civil agencies that are required to achieve each effect identified.
  • Identify subtasks that contribute to achieving the desired effects.
  • Procedure for analysis of CIMIC tasks is to record specified CIMIC tasks and civil space related IO and manoeuvre tasks as well as civil space effects and conditions that are stated in the order.

• Record implied CIMIC tasks:
  • Deduce and record priority tasks and controls relating to civil space conditions and effects within the IPB analysis and commander’s intent that are not included in specified tasks.
  • Identify the civil actor operations and effects that contribute to military economy of effort and mission DE conditions.
  • Identify the principle military effects and control measures that enable or facilitate those civil agency actions.

• Determine essential CIMIC tasks:
  • Highlight or transfer those effects listed as specified or implied tasks that are essential to mission achievement and the achievement of decisive conditions.
  • Sequence the essential tasks in the order of their achievement.
  • These essential tasks become recommendations for inclusion as a DE or for inclusion as conditions for DE including the military end state.
  • Complete ‘Essential Tasks’ field, and ‘Opportunities’ field, of the CIMIC estimate at Appendix 1.
  • Use the essential tasks and subtasks identified to refine the TA analysis from IPB.
  • Develop a draft liaison architecture from the list of TA; an example liaison architecture matrix is in Table 5–5 at Appendix 2.
• **Prioritise and group CIMIC effects and tasks:**
  - Group priority specified and implied subtasks with the essential task they support.
  - Develop IIA concepts for each essential task and key IO objective. The IO concept development guide at Appendix 3 can be used. Draw on information from task analysis, the IO priorities and the TA analysis.
  - Review tasks that are not relevant to any of the essential tasks and either update the essential task list or remove the task from the list of priorities. (If any of these are specified tasks, reconsider their relevance and prepare a brief. The higher commander’s authority, requested by the commander is required to remove these tasks from the order).
  - Develop a draft EFST and TSM row for each task being proposed. These will be submitted to the NKE/TWG. Those endorsed will be recommended to the commander’s TDB. An example EFST is at Annex J to Chapter 4 and TSM is at Annex L to Chapter 4.
    - Review the TA analysis for additional targetable stakeholders or actors relevant to each of the CCs, priority effects and tasks.
    - Add considerations from the target systems analysis to identify the best means to inform or influence the TA.
    - A target systems analysis is at Annex I to Chapter 4.
    - Develop MOP, MOI and MOE.
  - EFST fields are at Annex J to Chapter 4 (note constraints and limitations, military resources, civil stakeholders/agencies involved). They are:
    - task, target, location
    - purpose
    - method (means/action, priority, allocation, restrictions)
    - effect (this short statement informs MOI/MOE for BDAs).
• **Determine freedoms of action and limitations:**
  - For each priority civil space effect and their contributing tasks, determine freedoms, constraints and limitations identified in the order and in commander’s guidance.
  - Constraints – must do, completed by time, synch to what manoeuvre action.
  - Restrictions – must not do/must limit resources usage to limit/no later than/no move before.
• Freedoms of action – authority to act, access to TA, or resources available.
• Complete the ‘Constraints’ and ‘Restrictions’ fields of the MA worksheet/CIMIC estimate. Add any new tasks identified to the priority task list/remove tasks if not permitted.
• Note specific freedoms constraints and limitations in the EFST.

• Confirm facts and assumptions
• For each effect and contributing task, identify gaps in knowledge and understanding. Prepare assumptions based on analysis to allow planning to continue, prepare RFI and collection requests.
• Record all RFI and collection requirements for monitoring – Update ‘Facts’ and ‘Assumptions’ fields of the MA worksheet/CIMIC estimate.

• Confirm the mission:
  • There is not a separate CIMIC mission.
  • Ensure that the priority civil space effects set conditions to achieve the mission and end state conditions by:
    • confirming any civil space conditions within the mission statement
    • confirming or proposing a civil space DE
    • confirming or proposing civil space conditions within relevant DEs and the mission statements
    • ensuring that relevant civil space conditions are included in the end state
    • checking for alignment between the DE and the mission statement to the enduring operational IO narrative.

• Analyse own troops’ capabilities:
  • Assess and develop CIMIC FE force assignment options.
  • Consider the force component capabilities and the likely manoeuvre scheme to allocate FE to identified tasks and effects. The procedure is as follows:
    • Prepare a brief statement of the CIMIC capability of the force and of civil society focusing on priority civil space effects.
    • Prepare a recommendation for how CIMIC teams are force assigned for the operation.
    • Liaison architecture and EFST are updated with allocation of FE for action. These allocations may be general (eg, BG or
combat team until the COA are developed and specific force assignment can be identified).

- Complete the remaining fields of the MA worksheet/CIMIC estimate employment considerations, impact of weather, time considerations and available assets.

**Provide civil–military cooperation mission analysis inputs to whole staff mission analysis and planning**

The S9 or S95 provides the following to the lead planner as part of whole staff MA:

- proposed civil space DE if appropriate
- proposed civil space conditions within relevant DE
- proposed civil space conditions for inclusion in the end state
- proposed priorities for civil space effects and BPT brief subtasks
- proposed civil space coordinating instructions and control measures
- identified freedoms, constraints and restrictions that are significant
- facts and assumptions relevant to priority effects (be sure to check and adjust assumptions to facts when RFIs answered)
- state Yes/No – is the mission for the force appropriate with regards to a CIMIC perspective?
- CIMIC staff capability for the force and recommended force assignment options
- FE proposed for allocation of CIMIC effects and tasks
- principle residual risks at the limit of, or above the commander’s threshold
- a completed CIMIC reverse BOS analysis (updated daily)
- a completed CIMIC periodic report and civil space (BOS) analysis, (updated daily)
- a completed CIMIC estimate (updated daily)
- a draft liaison architecture
- a draft CIMIC concept (use the IO concept development planner or prepare a CIMIC concept of support).

The S9 or S95 submits the CIMIC recommended EFST and draft TSM rows to the NKE WG or direct to the JFECC TWG as part of the targeting decision cycle in accordance with HQ procedures.

**Appendices:**

1. Example mission analysis worksheet/civil–military cooperation running estimate
2. Liaison architecture
3. Example information operations concept development guide
# Appendix 1 to Annex C to Chapter 5

## Example mission analysis worksheet/civil–military cooperation running estimate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Facts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Displaced person held as human shield at racecourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Link between the IPM and TIB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Two IDP camps loc IVO Ingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>IDP camps run by Danish Refugee Council, who have a good history with ADF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>HC meeting cluster being held in Tvl and accessible by JTF HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Civil HA agencies operating in Ingham and Innisfail are still manned/operating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>TIB B Coy still contributing to security in Ingham</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Relief agencies will respond rapidly after area is secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Distribution point a rail sliding has not been raided by TIB/IPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>TIB OC B Coy is going to uphold their agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>KMF will immediately focus on transition to UN forces in Ingham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>IPM active and supported by local CIVPOP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Essential tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Task (TV, Target, Loc, Purpose, Pri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Implied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Implied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Implied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Implied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Constraints (must do)**

**Restrictions**

**Employment considerations**

(what the commander needs to know about your BOS)

Effective and responsive in inputting effects to targeting to synchronise with manoeuvre.

Too much variation in message reduces effectiveness.
IO, psyops and CIMIC are relationship based effects and, while persistent, take time to develop. Time in this case is limited so effort must be made to demonstrate consistency in force actions, PPP and interactions to reinforce messaging.

CDets have limited capacity to operate widely as they have no organic tpt and rely on the FE to which they are force assigned for mobility.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact of weather/terrain on BOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nil.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time considerations (BOS specific)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Available assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Cap/limits/dates</th>
<th>Total available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>1 S9, 1 KLE Coord, 3 CDet staff, working in a fusion cell psyops, PA</td>
<td>6 pers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 RAR</td>
<td>CDet (-) 2 pers/psyops team</td>
<td>4 pers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 RAR</td>
<td>CDet (-) 2 pers/psyops team</td>
<td>4 pers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CAV</td>
<td>CDet (-) 2 pers/psyops team</td>
<td>4 pers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG Cn</td>
<td>CDet (-) 2 pers</td>
<td>2 pers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Potential opportunities

Police in TP can return to work quickly
### APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO CHAPTER 5

### LIAISON ARCHITECTURE

#### Table 5–5: Liaison architecture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military chain of command/ liaison lead</th>
<th>Host nation government</th>
<th>Government of Australia representative</th>
<th>United Nations</th>
<th>Rule of law</th>
<th>Emergency services</th>
<th>Essential services</th>
<th>Commercial</th>
<th>ICRC, information operations, non-governmental organisation cluster leads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>National or provincial leaders</td>
<td>Head of mission SRSG (DSRSG)</td>
<td>State head of police Senior judiciary</td>
<td>DCOMD/COS Subordinate leaders</td>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ICRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J9</td>
<td>Senior executive government department heads Lead bureaucrats</td>
<td>Senior GOAS department representative Mission security adviser</td>
<td>Operations staff at national or regional centre Chief justice Law society chair</td>
<td>J9 JTF LO PSOs Legal officer Senior Medical Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cluster lead Cluster meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG commander</td>
<td>Provincial or municipal leaders</td>
<td>Regional national project sponsor Local mission reps, UNMLO</td>
<td>Police regional commander</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Program heads and project financiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG executive officer</td>
<td>Municipal officers as relevant</td>
<td>Regional project officers and managers UNDP programs and funds operating in AO</td>
<td>Police regional operations staff Police intelligence Local/regional courts</td>
<td>S9 BG LO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Project coordinator and implementation partners Regional coordination meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT commander</td>
<td>Local government municipal (ward) representative Project community representative Visiting representatives from mission or lead of programs and funds</td>
<td>Local commander</td>
<td>Local commander</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HN project coordinator and local project site manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDet</td>
<td>Local executive government officers Project site manager UNDP/programs and funds teams active in AO</td>
<td>Local command structure Local command structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All relevant to mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military chain of command/ liaison lead</td>
<td>Host nation government</td>
<td>Government of Australia representative</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>Emergency services</td>
<td>Essential services</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>ICRC, information operations, non-governmental organisation cluster leads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT FE</td>
<td>Employees, reception personnel, community members, police patrols in AO</td>
<td>Police patrols in AO</td>
<td>Police patrols in AO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LWD 3-8-6, Civil–Military Cooperation, 2018
Appendix 3 to Annex C to Chapter 5

Example information operations concept development guide

Narrative. The enduring narrative (issued at the operational level) is inserted here to nest themes and objectives.

Theme 1 (Blue). FPDA actions are legitimate and military forces are supported by Public in TAOR and AS.

- **Objective A.** General populace supports FPDA operations:
  - target audience – CIVPOP
  - messages:
    - FPDA is no threat to LX and BA locals, and will only operate as long as necessary
    - FPDA is here to provide assistance to the people of LX and BA.
  - MOI:
    - type and number of demonstrations/messages pro/anti-FPDA
    - observer combat team, civil KSE and patrols
    - NAI within TAOR civil areas.

- **Objective B.** CF/JF actions reinforce narrative at all levels of Comd in order to support FPDA legitimacy:
  - target audience – international community and HN
  - messages:
    - message 1 – FPDA ops in the region are legitimate and under UN mandate
    - message 2.
  - MOI:
    - number of internet and local press reports indicating FPDA legitimacy
    - number of press reports refuting GoKA and KMF legitimacy
    - observer PAO
    - NAI international, AUS and HN media.

Repeat for each IO theme.

Identify specific TA by location and develop EFST to achieve each objective and deliver key messages.
### Non-kinetic targeting task development matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decide</th>
<th>Detect, fix and deliver</th>
<th>Assess</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt of KA</td>
<td>KA</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key civil actors</td>
<td>LX and BA</td>
<td>A/B/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local populace</td>
<td>LX and BA</td>
<td>A/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-compliant groups</td>
<td>LX and BA</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Measure of impact</td>
<td>Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective A: General populace supports FPDA operations</td>
<td>Number of instances involving anti-FPDA graffiti</td>
<td>D+10 D+20 D+30 D+40 D+50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of anti-FPDA media articles</td>
<td>D+10 D+20 D+30 D+40 D+50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of anti-FPDA demonstrations</td>
<td>D+10 D+20 D+30 D+40 D+50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective B: Narrative at all levels of FPDA operations</td>
<td>Number of key civil actors actively supporting FPDA initiatives/operations</td>
<td>D+10 D+20 D+30 D+40 D+50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of anti-FPDA articles</td>
<td>D+10 D+20 D+30 D+40 D+50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of pro-FPDA articles</td>
<td>D+10 D+20 D+30 D+40 D+50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective C: Non-compliant elements neutralised or compliant</td>
<td>Number of non-compliant groups cooperating</td>
<td>D+10 D+20 D+30 D+40 D+50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of non-compliant groups that have not changed their status</td>
<td>D+10 D+20 D+30 D+40 D+50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of compliant groups that are reducing cooperation/compliance</td>
<td>D+10 D+20 D+30 D+40 D+50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex D to Chapter 5

Civil–military cooperation input to courses of action development

The CIMIC staff input to COA development provides:

- a CIMIC concept of support for each COA, nested within the IO narrative and themes in support of the S5/S3
- situational understanding in support of the S2
- avenues for interagency input to planning by agencies represented on the staff
- SME input into other staff branches and the CAG.

Procedures

The staff procedure for input to COA DEV planning is as follows:

- Review and update the CIMIC concept, priority of effects and tasks, liaison architecture and proposed control measures with information from:
  - commander’s guidance after MA brief
  - approved DE
  - feedback on priorities, effects and civil space conditions defining DE or objectives
  - planners broad COA concepts being developed.

- Review and update the civil space events sequence/matrix from IPB based on the broad COA concepts, answers to RFI and updated situation.

- Sequence the key civil space effects to best support each of the broad manoeuvre COAs. The sequence of civil events can be prioritised by geographic location, by sequence of manoeuvre events and objectives, by phase of the operation or by a combination of these.

- Assess what new risks or opportunities are presented by each of the manoeuvre COAs, including:
  - identify what potential impact each COA has on the civil space, where and when
  - identify what potential impact the civil space has on each COA, where and when
  - identify civil areas, populations and vulnerable groups and other TAs related to the impacts
  - review stakeholders and update the TA analysis if required
Contents

• assess the effects and tasks effectiveness at reducing risk and achieving the objectives
• identify inform and influence effects, population control tasks and coordination measures able to reduce and mitigate risks or impacts. Consider protection, collection, IIA.
• Identify the CIMIC support to the main effort (ME) and SEs by phase stating the effect, TA and location.
• Develop the sequence of key civil effects and associated tasks to best support each COA.
• Test the CIMIC concept of support by checking that considerations, effects and DE conditions for each COA have been addressed, are achieved and update the effects and tasks appropriately.
• Test FASSD:
  • feasible – can be achieved with forces assigned in time allocated
  • acceptable – achieves mission, DE and intent including end state conditions
  • suitable – conforms to IHL, Australian WOG direction, Australian public expectations, the operational narrative
  • sustainable – resources can meet peak demand and logistic train can support efforts
  • distinguishable – able to be differentiated from other COA.
• Fully develop the CIMIC concept of support for each COA. An example CIMIC supporting concept is included in the following material on the CIMIC concept of support.
• Prepare the civil space synchronisation matrix combining the civil space events, population movement and displacement as well as the civil actor/TA reactions to combat, manoeuvre and IIA:
  • Only major effects are going to be transferred to the manoeuvre synch and briefed however the underlying detail must support achievement of the effects and later analysis of the COA.
  • Use the same time increments as the manoeuvre synch matrix.
• Develop a statement on the relative suitability of each COA to support achievement of the CIMIC end state conditions and DE conditions.
• Identify any restrictions for any COA.
• Prepare risk assessment briefs for residual risks at or above the commander’s threshold for specific COAs. The briefs should contain the risk source and impact, risk treatment and mitigation as well as residual risk. Options to reduce the risk may be briefed as targeting proposals.
Civil–military cooperation concept of support

The key points for the CIMIC concept of support are as follows:

- input to S2 situation brief, civil areas, populations, critical infrastructure represented on the overlay
- civil areas and boundaries relating to specific TA or population protection issues
- rule of law and civil security conditions
- humanitarian conditions at locations that could impact operations
- displaced person movement corridors, nodes, collection points and destinations
- humanitarian operations coordination and distribution locations, medical treatment facilities, major power generation infrastructure
- population control graphics such as boundaries, collection points, routes, control measures and tasks
- cooperating and contributing civil agencies.

Input to S3 task organisation brief is as follows:

- force assignment of CIMIC enabling capability
- forces able to be tasked or task organised to contribute CIMIC effects
- coordination instruction supporting concepts, CIMIC intent:
  - CIMIC purpose:
    - IO Objective 1 – CIMIC effects
    - IO Objective 2 – CIMIC effects
    - DE conditions
  - CIMIC method – major objectives to be achieved stating TA, effect, location means and allocation:
    - support to the ME by phase; effect, TA, location, time/event
    - highest priority SE effects by phase (population control measures, IIA task); effect, TA, location, time/event
    - IIA to be exploited, countered or risk managed
  - CIMIC end state – civil space conditions and CIMIC relationship effects defining conditions for success
  - liaison architecture:
    - CIMIC IIA sustainment concept for S4 and financial officer
    - resources available
• C2 – identification of interagency cooperation and coordination measures.
Annex E to Chapter 5

Civil–military cooperation inputs to course of action analysis

Background analysis
Finalise preparation of the civil space situation template synchronisation matrix for each the updated COA.

Civil–military cooperation inputs to the wargame
Provide civil space inputs to the war game including the following:

- Critical elements of the civil space start state and the civil situation as it is anticipated to be at each specified time period, as well as threat MLCOA and MDCOA with regard to civil space influence and actions.
- Friendly force/blue force CIMIC effects scheduled in the synchronisation matrix for each time period relevant to specific locations, the mission. These effects include:
  - population protection effect
  - civil space collection and monitoring action
  - CIMIC IIA that shape the civil space or that target threat influence on the civil space in support of the ME.
- An event time line and likely actions and reactions for known civil actors and agencies including HN, UN or other international organisations and NGOs (where the impacts potentially impact or influence the mission or the manoeuvre plan).
- Stakeholder reactions, such as the following:
  - the threat force/red force ‘CIMIC’ or civil space influence actions resulting from friendly manoeuvre and IO action
  - the civil actor reactions relevant to and resulting from the planned friendly force manoeuvre actions and IIAs.
- Friendly force/blue force CIMIC counteractions that could pre-empt or be made ready to defeat the threat force/red force civil influences and that would treat or mitigate civil space risks identified through the war game.

Civil–military cooperation outputs from courses of action analysis
The following outputs are a result of CIMIC involvement in COA analysis:

- updated concept of CIMIC support
- update to synchronisation matrix, proposed groupings and tasks
- message themes and CIMIC collection and influence priorities
Contents

- population control measures, routes for civilian traffic and DC collection points
- liaison architecture identified
- resources and approval processes ensuring administration and logistic arrangements; this will include identification of resources available for population support, ILSA and influence activities
- ensuring C2, including levels of authority for civil influence activities and reporting requirements.
Annex F to Chapter 5

Civil–military cooperation inputs to orders

Civil–military cooperation input to the military appreciation process – decision and execution

The CIMIC input to the orders includes input to operations plans, opords, taskords and fragos and comprises the following:

- **Situation.** In consultation the S2, key civil situation and relevant civil space risks are inserted into the force situation paragraph.

- **Execution.** Execution includes:
  - **Commander’s intent.** Critical events related to the civil space will have been included in the developed and agreed DEs.
  - **Supporting battlespace operating systems concepts.** Key priorities for effects relating to critical TAs and categories of civilians are stated.
  - **Groupings and tasks.** Force assignment of CIMIC FEs, including command status, is clearly articulated in the groupings and tasks or the task organisation matrix of the order. Force assignment should indicate command authority (usually tactical command/operational control below brigade) and should indicate a DTG or event that clearly identifies when the force assignment of detachments will occur and when reassignment is scheduled, if applicable.
  - **Coordination instructions.** Guidance on sequence and priorities for the synchronisation and coordination of CIMIC effects with the manoeuvre scheme and other IRC effects are stated. These are also included in the manoeuvre synchronisation matrix, which is the principal reference tool for synchronisation of BOS effects. Specific TA effects that are not included on the synchronisation matrix can be included on the TSM. Both the manoeuvre synchronisation matrix and the TSM are routinely updated by fragos to make adjustments that maintain synchronisation of effects to the manoeuvre scheme.
  - **Administration and logistics.** Resources relevant to contingencies such as budgets and approval authorities, as well as ILSA capacity, can be identified, or reference can be made to the higher order if control of such resources is to be centralised.
  - **Command and signals.** Authority for direct liaison within the technical chain for passage of civil space information and assessment updates and means and direct liaison authority for civil space liaison should be detailed. Any reporting requirements not already covered by SOPs may also be included.
The civil–military cooperation concept of support

The CIMIC concept of support is outlined in an annex or appendix to orders. The purpose is to inform the force of the concept of support, not as a task directive for CIMIC FEs. The annex or appendix to orders will include the following:

- nest the CIMIC concept with higher IO and CIMIC direction
- ensure that the CIMIC concept is integrated with other support BOS concepts
- clearly state the CIMIC supporting concept and IO messaging priorities for civil TA by phase
- stipulate the coordinating instructions for support options such as funds, claims, QIPs, CWAs, requests for military assistance and military resource requirements.

A sample input to CB OPORD is shown in Appendix 1.
A sample input to BMS orders is shown in Appendix 2.

Appendices:
1. Example civil–military cooperation input to a brigade operation order
2. Example input to a battle management system operation order
Appendix 1 to Annex F to Chapter 5

Example civil–military cooperation input to a brigade operation order

ANNEX Q to
OP Lavarack 13
Dated DD Mmm YY

CIVIL–MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC) ANNEX

1. CIMIC concept of support:
   a. Purpose. The purpose of 3 BDE CIMIC within TAOR is to set conditions for Transition of Responsibility (TOR) to civil authorities.
   b. Method. CIMIC will support the 3 BDE mission by:
      (1) shaping the civilian population IAW IO objectives to set conditions for:
          (a) rapid neutralisation of belligerent armed influence
          (b) restoration of TPE civil security agencies operations supported by the UN Mission
          (c) GoTP to provide essential services and governance, and
          (d) restoration of social, cultural and religious and economic freedoms for TPE civilians and communities
      (2) minimising the impact of JTF 661.2.2 on the civil community of TPE within TAOR, including min collateral damage
      (3) conducting Key Leader Engagement (KLE) and Key Stakeholder Engagement (KSE) with TPE political, cultural and civic leaders emphasising the commitment to a legitimate national authority and TOR/TOA
      (4) conducting rapid civil assessments of HA requirements and priority civil capacities to know the civil situation risks
      (5) BPT facilitate Emergency Relief (ER) support through civil agencies in coordination with AusAID, UN and NGOs
      (6) BPT conduct influence activities in support of DE, targeting objectives or COMD priorities.
2. **Execution General Outline.** CIMIC spt to manoeuvre:

a. **Ph 1 Shaping:**
   1. ME Spt IO and ISTAR to establish means and mechanisms for building relationships with key stakeholders and key leaders IAW liaison architecture.

b. **Ph 2A Isolate/Secure/Clear.** During Phase 2 A JTF 661.2.2 will consider in planning and execution:
   1. ME the rapid provision of a secure environment for restoration of civil governance and international civil agency assistance to TPE.
   2. SE Direct action and Spt to Civ agencies to facilitate population protection and control measures including protected routes/areas for the movement of protection of civilians.
   3. To minimise negative impacts and collateral damage of JTF actions on resources and existing infrastructure.
   4. BPT provide emergency Civ assistance within capacity. Report any Civ emergency requiring response through HQ 3 BDE for response of appropriate assessment and response FE.
   5. Initiate KLE and KSE relationships to support restoration of sovereignty and TOR to the civil assistance mission for humanitarian and recovery assistance.
   6. Receive and register claims for compensation due to battle damage and cultural damage.
   7. Set conditions for early entry of OGA/IO/NGO for management of displaced civilians and to enhance HN population spt.

c. **Ph 2B SASSO/disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration:**
   1. Spt to ME. Initiate and develop CMI assessments to facilitate earliest assistance from supporting civil agencies.
   2. SE Develop key relationships through KLE and KSE specifically preparing for capacity development in representational governance, the TP Police Force, sanitation, water reticulation, health care and displaced civilian management.
   3. Facilitate OGA/I/O/NGO entry and population spt.
   4. Monitor management of refugees/IDP and civil agency restoration of essential services and infrastructure. KLE and KSE are to maintain relationships and civil security conditions conducive to continued civil assistance from civil agencies. Support AusAID, UNHCR and other NGO in their efforts to progress toward economic normalisation.
d. **Ph 3 Transition.** CWA initiatives. Conduct handover of all 3 BDE CMI activities to the legitimate national authority. Conduct detailed introductions and relationship handover through RIP with FOF for KLE and KSE relationship management by military or civil relieving organisation within TAOR.

3. **Coordinating Instructions:**
   
a. **Stabilisation Aid Funds/Commanders’ Emergency Relief Program (SAF/CERP).** The 3 BDE does not have an allocation of funding to implement CWA and QIPs. All proposals are to be forwarded to HQ 3 BDE for further approval processing should funding be made available. Detailed CWA/QIP guidance will be issued separately when issued by CTF.

b. **Compensation Claims.** All civilian claims for compensation are to be investigated at the COMD level prior to submission to JTF 661.2. Requests for compensation by civilians are to be forwarded to HQ 3 BDE for processing with a reliable means of contacting and identifying the claimant.

c. **Locally Employed Civilians.** Opportunities will exist for contracting locally employed civilians (LECs) to fulfil certain functions in support of JTF 661.2.2 efforts and base support plans. In the employment of LEC it is crucial to consider the effects upon the integrity of local community structures and delivery of essential services. The opportunities for corrupt practices within the local community are to be assessed and mitigated through ADF standard contracting practices. All proposals are to be forwarded to HQ 3 BDE for approval processing.

d. **Influence Activities including QIP, CWA.** All influence activities and CMO projects are to be linked to DE, IO messages, themes or effects and presented for targeting decisions on that basis.

e. **Request for Assistance.** All requests for assistance are to be considered at the command level prior to submission to HQ 3 BDE. COMD must consider the following:
   - (1) civilian agencies are maximising the use of their resources (either Integral or contracted)
   - (2) requests for assistance will not prejudice the JTF 661.2 mission
   - (3) can be executed within capabilities.

f. **Provision of emergency relief.** Local commanders may provide immediate life-saving assistance (ILSA) within capacity in cases of risk to life that does not detract from mission achievement. Local commanders should notify HQ 3 BDE immediately if the risk cannot be reduced within their scope of resources and current mission.
4. **Admin and Log:**

   a. *Military Resource Requirements.* Defence ER stocks will be allocated to JTF 661.2 for emergency distribution to IDP/Refugees as required. Provision of ER should be in response to immediate and life threatening requirement and should not displace any current arrangements in place by NGOs. Additional humanitarian stores will be sourced from AusAID at first instance, who will liaise with wider local and international NGO community.
Appendix 2 to Annex F to Chapter 5

Example input to a battle management system operation order

1. **Situation.** Information provided to the S2 to be inserted to the situation paragraph covering:
   a. Civil displacement, stability and humanitarian needs priority areas of risk
   b. The status of key leaders and influencers WRT the force and the mission including political, government executive agencies, cultural or religious, international organisations and NGOs operating and their mandates
   c. The security situation and status of security sector agencies who may be armed
   d. The PMG/IMG identified
   e. The location of protected and restricted targets of particular relevance to manoeuvre forces
   f. To Ops – Force assigned CIMIC FEs to be included in the task organisation or forces assigned paragraph of the situation.

2. **Mission.** There is only the force/commander’s mission – no input after mission analysis.

3. **Execution.** The information required includes the following:
   a. **Supporting BOS concepts.** Key priorities for effects relating to critical target audience and categories of civilians are stated.
   b. **Groupings and tasks.** CIMIC team or operator force assignment and command authority to be identified in grouping here or in the task organisation matrix. Tasking is to the subordinate FE, not to the CIMIC operator or team.
   c. **Coordination instructions.** Concept of operations – CIMIC will support by shaping the civ population in accordance with IO objectives in order to set the conditions for TOR to civil authorities. Support will be achieved by:
      (1) IO and IA objectives
(2) priority of effort
   (a) KLE and engagement
   (b) liaison networks
   (c) assist and empower civilian authorities/security forces to achieve rule of law and civil security objectives
   (d) method and extent of support and cooperation with international organisations/NGOs efforts to provide for IDP
   (e) protection of the population (PCO, DCO).

(3) liaison architecture.

4. Administration and logistics:
   a. ICB IAW opord Annex QIP/CWA budget approval by (position).
   b. Population spt to be ILSA only.

5. Command and signals:
   a. BDE S9 techcon to CDet authorised
   b. BDES9 techcon authorised to CJTF 661.
Bibliography


*Hague Convention IV: Respecting the laws and customs of war on land 1907*


*The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response*


Endmatter

Associated publications

This publication should be read in conjunction with other publications and documents, in particular:

- Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.3, Multinational Operations
- Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 00.9, Multiagency Coordination – Defence’s Contribution to Australian Government Responses
- Australian Defence Force Publication 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process
- Australian Defence Force Service Police Manual
- Defence Instruction (General) Operations 01-1, Defence Force Aid to the Civil Authority
- Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics
- Land Warfare Doctrine 5-1-4, The Military Appreciation Process
- Land Warfare Procedures - Combat Arms (Offensive Support) 5-3-3, Joint Fires and Effects – Planning, Execution and Targeting (Land)
- Land Warfare Procedures - General 0-3-3, Battlespace Information Management
- Standard Infantry Battalion Field Handbook.

Doctrine Online

This and other doctrine publications are available via the Doctrine Online website located at: http://dmet.defence.gov.au/ARMY/Doctrine-Online/Pages/Home.aspx. Paper copies may be out of date. Doctrine Online is the authoritative source for current doctrine. Users are to ensure currency of all doctrine publications against the Doctrine Online library.
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Gender

This publication has been prepared with gender-neutral language.
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Glossary

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civil actor
A non-military person, including one from the national population or local authorities, as well as an international, national or non-government organisation or agency.

civil–military cooperation
1. The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the joint commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.
   (Australian Defence Glossary)
2. The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies, necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. United Nations civil–military cooperation accords the United Nations Mission Civil Primacy for Civil-Military coordination to achieve the best humanitarian outcome for the most people.
   (United Nations)

civil–military operation
An operation conducted in support of military operations or in times of emergency aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of a military force or civil operation and reducing the negative aspects of military operations on civilians.

civil space
combination of civil areas, civil agencies, civil organisations, cultural factors and civil actors as well as civil information systems and influence relationships relevant to an area of interest, area of operations or tactical area of responsibility.
collection
The exploitation of a source by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to an appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence.

commander’s critical information requirement
The critical information a commander needs to make decisions.
Note: The commander’s critical information requirements comprise priority intelligence requirements, friendly force information requirements and essential elements of friendly information.

culture
The ideas, customs, and social behaviour of a particular people or society.

disaster
A serious disruption to the functioning of society which poses a significant, widespread threat to human life, health, property or the environment, whether arising from accident, nature or human activity, whether developing suddenly or as the result of long-term processes, but excluding armed conflict.

disaster relief
Goods and services provided to meet the immediate needs of disaster-affected communities.

elicitation
To draw or bring out or forth; educe; evoke.
Note: To elicit a response with a question in order to gather information.

essential elements of friendly information
Critical exploitable information concerning friendly dispositions, intentions, capabilities, morale, knowledge and potential vulnerabilities that, if compromised, could threaten the success of friendly force.

friendly forces information requirements
Information regarding the activities or capabilities of own or adjacent units.

humanitarian action
Assistance, protection and advocacy actions undertaken on an impartial basis in response to human needs resulting from complex political emergencies and natural hazards.
influence
To cause a change in the character, thought, or action of a particular entity.

inform
To impart information or knowledge.

inform and influence actions
Coordinated and synchronised actions to shape the will, understanding and capability of target audiences by affecting their perceptions, cohesion, information, and decision-making while protecting our own.

information activities
The integration, synchronisation and coordination of two or more information-related capabilities that generate and sustain a targeted information advantage.

information effect
An effect created through performance of information actions

information management
The processes by which information is obtained, manipulated, directed, and controlled.

Note: Information management includes the processes in the creation, collection and control, dissemination, storage and retrieval, protection, and destruction of information.

information operations
The operational level planning and execution of information activities to influence the decision making and actions of a target audience and to protect and enhance our decision making and actions in support of national interests.

information-related capability
Tools, capabilities or processes, which can have effects of a physical, functional, temporal or psychological nature upon targets and target audiences.

information requirement
Information regarding the operational environment and threats which needs to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander.
intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance

The coordinated acquisition of timely, accurate, relevant and assured information that supports the planning and conduct of operations, as well as the targeting and integration of effects.

international organisation

An intergovernmental, regional or global organisation governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international jurisdictional personality given by international agreement, however characterised, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims.

Note: Exceptionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross, although a non-governmental organisation formed under the Swiss Civil Code, is mandated by the international community of states and is founded on international law, specifically the Geneva Conventions, has an international legal personality or status on its own, and enjoys some immunities and privileges for the fulfillment of its humanitarian mandate.

key leader engagement

Personal interactions between unit leadership and key power figures and influencers within a local civilian community.

Note: Most deployments and operations require commanders and other leaders to engage key local and regional leaders to impact attitudes and gain support for their missions.

measure of effectiveness

A criterion used to assess changes in system behaviour, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

measure of impact

A criterion used to assess internal changes in systems, behaviours, capability, or operational environment through the combat assessment of tactical actions.

Note: The criterion is incorporated into the collection plan.

measure of performance

Criteria used to assess friendly actions on systems that are tied to measures of task accomplishment, product distribution or performance.
military public affairs
The targeted, planned and synchronised release of public information on Defence activities in order to shape and influence specific audiences at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

narrative
A story that a force is aiming to establish as valid in the minds of one or more target audiences.

non-government organisation
A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organisation, dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.

noncombatant
An individual, in an area of combat operations, who is not armed and is not participating in any activity in support of any of the factions or forces involved in combat.

Note: Could include military medical personnel, chaplains and those out of combat, including prisoners of war and the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.

no-strike list
A list of objects or entities characterised as protected from the effects of military operations under international law and/or rules of engagement.

Note: Attacking these may violate the law of armed conflict or interfere with friendly relations with indigenous personnel or governments.

operations security
The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces.

perception
A thought or mental image, believed by the holder to be accurate and valid, which influences their emotions, motives, reasoning and behaviour.

presence, posture and profile
The demonstration by a force of its intent and commitment in order to influence the perceptions, will, attitudes and behaviour of target audiences.
priority intelligence requirement
An intelligence requirement for which a commander has stated a priority.

protected target
Specific person, infrastructure, object, location, symbol, cultural property or system identified as being protected against actions that would cause degradation, damage or destruction.

Note: May be prohibited targets protected by international law and other agreements; or they may be sensitive targets, whose impairment, damage or destruction by military actions presents an unacceptable risk to non-combatants, civilians or civil capacity. By definition of its status, such a 'target' would be listed on the no strike list.

restricted target
A valid target that has specific restrictions placed on the actions authorised against it due to operational considerations.

rule of law
A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities; public and private, including the State itself are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, which are consistent with international human rights and standards, and are delivered in timely manner with representation afforded.

target
An object of a particular action, for example a geographic area, a complex, an installation, a force, equipment, an individual, a group or a system, planned for capture, exploitation, neutralisation or destruction by military forces.

target audience
An individual or group selected for influence.

targeting
The process of selecting and prioritising targets and matching the appropriate responses to them, taking account of operations requirements and capabilities to achieve desired effects.

Notes:
1. The process must take into account Australia’s domestic and international legal obligations, as well as national, strategic, and operational objectives and available capabilities.
2. Targeting can occur at all levels of command but must remain consistent with national strategy.

**whole-of-government**

Denotes government departments and agencies working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues.
## Abbreviations

The principal source for Australian Defence Force abbreviations is the Australian Defence Glossary located at [http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms](http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms). Abbreviations contained within this publication are in accordance with the business rules, guidelines and conventions for the Australian Defence Glossary at the time of its release. The following abbreviations are used throughout this publication; however, commonly used terms have been presented in their abbreviated format throughout the publication and have not been included in this list.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Australian Federal Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>area of interest</td>
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<td>ALARP</td>
<td>as low as reasonably practicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>areas, structures, capacities, organisations, people, events</td>
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<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDA</td>
<td>battle damage assessment</td>
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<td>BG</td>
<td>battlegroup</td>
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<td>BMS</td>
<td>battle management system</td>
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<td>BOS</td>
<td>battlespace operating system</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
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<td>CAG</td>
<td>commander’s advisory group</td>
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<td>CB</td>
<td>combat brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>critical capability</td>
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<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
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<td>CDet</td>
<td>civil–military cooperation detachment</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil–military cooperation</td>
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<td>CMI</td>
<td>civil–military interactions</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil–military operations</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil–military operations centre</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>centre of gravity</td>
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<tr>
<td>comm</td>
<td>communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>conops</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
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<td>CR</td>
<td>critical requirement</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>combat team</td>
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<td>CV</td>
<td>critical vulnerability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWA</td>
<td>consent winning action</td>
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<tr>
<td>D3A</td>
<td>decide, detect, deliver, and assess</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>displaced civilian</td>
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<td>DCO</td>
<td>displaced civilian operations</td>
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<td>DE</td>
<td>decisive event</td>
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<td>DR</td>
<td>disaster relief</td>
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<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEFI</td>
<td>essential elements of friendly information</td>
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Contents

OHCHR    Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights
PAO      public affairs officer
PCO      population control operation
PIR      priority intelligence requirement
PMESII   political, military, economic social, information, and infrastructure
PPP      presence, posture and profile
PSO      principal staff officer
psyops   psychological operations
QIP      quick impact project
R2P      responsibility to protect
RFI      request for information
SE       supporting effort
SMAP     staff military appreciation process
SME      subject matter expert
SRSG     Special Representative of the Secretary-General
STRAT    strategic
TA       target audience
TAC      tactical
TAOR     tactical area of responsibility
taskord  tasking order
TDB      targeting decision board
TIS      target information sheet
TSM      targeting synchronisation matrix
TST      tactical support team
TWG      targeting working group
UNDP     United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR    United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF   United Nations Children’s Fund
UNSCR    United Nations Security Council resolution
WFP      World Food Programme
WG       working group
WOG      whole-of-government

The following abbreviations appear in tables and figures within the publication.

COS      chief of staff
DCOMD    deputy commander
OP       operational
OPS      operations
org      organisational
UNMLO    United Nations military liaison officer
Amendment certificate

Land Doctrine, Army Knowledge Centre is responsible for the management of this publication. The sponsor of this publication is Commander Headquarters 2 Division. The doctrine contained herein was approved on 6 November 2018.

Proposals for amendments or additions to the text of this publication should be made through normal channels to the sponsor. To facilitate this go to the Doctrine Online intranet website and select the 'Feedback' icon. Alternatively, there are amendment proposal forms at the back of hard copy versions of this publication.

It is certified that the amendments promulgated in the undermentioned amendment lists have been made in this publication.

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All superseded Amendment Certificates should be retained at the rear of the publication for audit purposes.