



1 September 2016

Dear Colleagues,

A little over a year into my appointment as Chief, at our Army Senior Leadership Group meeting on 17 August 2016, I reflected on Army and our work together. This letter updates my general guidance to you in our continuing efforts to further develop Army as a component of the ADF. While this correspondence is perhaps longer than you would prefer, please appreciate that I am writing to you as your Chief and only intend doing so once. I ask you to reflect upon its content, lead and take action.

Firstly, thank you for your commitment to Army and the support you demonstrate to me on a daily basis. I very much appreciate the teamwork and collegiate approach evident within my Senior Advisory Committee and more broadly across Army's Senior Leadership Group.

As an institution, we should be enormously proud of the achievements and innovation of our people across a wide range of endeavours. For example, the success of Exercise Hamel 16 has confirmed this exercise as both an exemplar operational certification event and a pivotal activity in the broader ADF training cycle. Progression of the ADF's amphibious capability continues to be informed by work from across Army, and effectively trialled as a joint capability supported by both 2 RAR and our Ship's Army Detachments. As demonstrated on Exercise Vital Prospects 16, we are modernising our Divisional Headquarters and reinforcing its role as a deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters. Most notably though, we are achieving all of this, and much more besides, while continuing to meet a diversity of real-time commitments; including current operations, contingency forces, the defence cooperation program, Army's assistance to aboriginal communities and defence aid to the civil community.

As you know, I have set four framework priorities to focus our thinking, planning and action for the further development of Army: **support to operations**, this is why we exist; **assist our wounded, injured and ill**, to respect our people's sacrifice and rebuild capability; **modernise the force**, to give our people the best opportunity to achieve their missions and come home safely; and ongoing **cultural reform and renewal**, to ensure our Army reflects the expectations of the nation we serve. These priorities are intentionally broad, hence the term framework priorities. They enable a conversation about the development of our Army, from Private to Lieutenant General, from combat to logistics, at home and deployed, and from war to peace. Effort that is not linked to these areas of priority should be minimised. Later, I will address ten specific lines of effort to support these priorities.

Across all these priorities, I ask you to keep in mind that Army is a component of, and serves the higher needs of, joint ADF capability directed to achieving Australian strategic policy objectives. This is obvious, but worth restating given the modern norm of joint operations and the need to think, plan and structure to enable joint effects. Moreover, these effects need to be driven by joint command and control,

rehearsed through joint collective training, and informed by joint doctrine and joint professional military education. The function, size, structure and interests of Army and the other services are necessarily secondary to this reality. I do not doubt or diminish the unique professional expertise and relevance of land forces. Nor do I ignore the commitment of land forces, by successive Australian governments over our 115 year history, to pursue our national interests. Rather, I wish to emphasis the context of our work. Army contributes to and serves the joint force.

More important than what priorities we focus on is how we choose to act in addressing them. Here I am speaking of our **leadership and tone**, as individuals and as Army's Senior Leadership Group. I am convinced that leaders at any level should strive to excel in *both* the subject and the people of their command. It should never be one or the other. This is the principal consideration in all of my deliberations on key appointments, performance and professional development. Ethically informed, values based leadership that inspires, resources and enables subordinates to achieve their best work is always expected of Army's leaders, at every level. Let our values of courage, initiative, respect and teamwork be our guide. The purpose of focusing on our values is that, for our unique organisational setting, these are the values that build integrity in leaders and enable us as individuals and organisations to create relationships of trust. It is never appropriate to regard military competence as mitigation for ethical failure. Such failure destroys trust, legitimacy and teamwork. As in all human endeavours, trust is, and always has been, the 'coin of the realm' in successful military organisations.

Attention to leadership and tone extends well beyond Army. We need to build support for Army's future with the many external and internal dependencies upon which Army relies to improve capability. Consultative, constructive, calm and considered should be our hallmarks. Perceptions of Army officers, no matter how few, as bureaucratically authoritarian, assertive and angry are deeply unhelpful. I greatly value your attention to leadership and tone. They are force multipliers in generating trust and the greatest measure of drive and good will for Army's initiatives.

As an aside, to reinforce some excellent work of recent years, I will shortly 'brand' Army's current values based cultural reform initiatives under a single *Pathway to Change* program, akin to Navy's *New Generation Navy* and Air Force's *New Horizon* brands. This is very much a matter of old, but very good quality wine, in a new bottle. Being routinely invited to explain as I am, 'Army's cultural stuff', suggests to me our wider audience innocently, but grossly, misapprehends our considerable efforts in cultural reform; an Army strategic communications fail that it is time we put right.

You have by now heard me say many times that it is often our own **rules**, that we have established and that we police, that constrain or prevent innovation within Army. It is said that rule making is an aspect of the human condition; to seek to impose order upon chaos. My sense is that we in the military have mastered this art and, as a default, prefer more rules than less. Having rules is essential; having too many rules crushes initiative and innovation. Substantive and enduring improvements to our framework priorities will invariably require abolishing, changing or simplifying rules. I encourage this! Abide by our nations laws, be guided by and exemplify our Army's values, but actively change the rules that no longer fit our needs.

I am also very alert to the '**bandwidth**' challenge. Every leader in Army, from the Section Commander to the Chief, would prefer every problem they face fixed yesterday. And every leader in Army has multiple accountabilities, demands and timelines to meet with barely sufficient resources. It was, of course, ever thus. We can only sustainably implement so much in any particular week, month or year. Narrowing down from the framework priorities to implementing specific lines of effort is therefore essential. Such discussion inevitably leads to the reprise from some that since we are busy doing important work we do not have the bandwidth to do new or different important work. This has always been the challenge of managing change. Wherever resources, time, people or capital, are insufficient to meet all tasks, implementing sustained improvement to the lines of effort outlined below takes priority. This may mean that some regular or recurrent activities are not done, less well done or delayed until implementation of specific actions is achieved.

I welcome your advice as these bandwidth challenges are confronted. But I want you to know that I am biased toward implementing specific improvements rather than maintaining the routine, regular or status quo, because that's the only way we will change. What I am suggesting is a low risk approach given the innate competence, quality and capacity of our people. We are a much better trained, educated, equipped and resourced force than the one I joined. So we can bear some risk to gain the rewards of change. The *One Defence* initiative will also help in this regard. With our support and engagement, Department-level direction from the strong strategic centre will build an environment in which Army and the other groups and services can rightly focus their attention on implementation and action rather than the development of their own bespoke policy frameworks.

At one of the Defence Senior Leadership Group meetings last year we were reminded that change is best realised when it is someone's fulltime job. Army is now 500 persons below Average Funded Strength (AFS), has an Establishment 2000 positions above AFS, and aspires for even more (some driven by the 2016 Defence White Paper and some by enthusiastic professional judgement throughout the Service). So while we are in a poor position to heed this advice, it remains very good, evidence based advice. *So heed it we must.*

As you know, I have directed HMSP-A to return to CASAC with a plan to rebalance the establishment in line with AFS, while recruiting to approximately 400 less than AFS, so as to preserve employment flexibility within the total (full and part time) force. This will present difficult but necessary choices. The fact that the establishment and AFS are so far out of alignment is both good and bad. Good in that it reflects the fact that Army has been changing in response to strategic policy settings, the development of the joint force, advanced technological opportunities and modern operational environments. Bad in that we have not shown the self discipline to align to our AFS, nor presented a sufficiently compelling case to increase the force structure. I do not see the need at present for the latter and believe we should all commit to the self discipline of aligning our organisational establishment, AFS and recruited personnel. Until we do so, we will continue to spin Army's training system to deliver against an establishment approximately 2500 positions above the human beings within the force; surely an unsustainable and unreasonable expectation on our great NCOs and young officers.

Over the last fifteen years Army has pursued a number of important initiatives; Hardened and Networked Army, Enhanced Land Force, Adaptive Army, Total Force and Plan Beersheba, to name some. In combination, these initiatives have sought to enhance the Army's capacity for joint land manoeuvre, close combat, campaign design, joint and coalition interoperability, digitised battlefield management, sustainability of the force, amphibious capability and much besides; all important elements of a modern, effective Army. I am very conscious that aspects of each initiative remain unfinished and therefore the true potential of this work is as yet unrealised. Army field command and control is not yet sufficiently digitised, our land manoeuvre still needs the promise of Land 400, our planning and campaign design skills are not uniformly excellent, our part time personnel are delivering in training and on operations but with more to give if enabled, basing issues for Beersheba's infantry brigades still need to be finalised. None of this is surprising. There is always more to do and major initiatives unfold over many years; but only if attention and effort is applied to delivery.

It is for this reason that I have declined the temptation to launch out on a next, new path. For now, it's time Army focussed on the continuing, hard and often unheralded but essential work to deliver. To that end, the ten lines of effort detailed below do more than give specificity of action to my framework priorities. These lines of effort are designed and intended to: deliver on past initiatives; best support the framework priorities of today (an operationally effective Army that cares for its people, is modernised to win in combat and culturally aligned to the expectations of our nation); and postures Army to best anticipate the strategic challenges that may confront Australia into the future.

Work on each Line of Effort has been initiated progressively over the last twelve months and none should surprise. I shall be managing and monitoring the implementation and delivery of these lines of effort throughout the remainder of my tenure. My question to you is: how can you help Army achieve delivery?

### **Army's Lines of Effort**

#### **Recruiting remediation (Lead: Deputy Chief of Army)**

For over a decade, Army has not achieved its recruiting targets, particularly against specialist trades and diversity goals. The resultant personnel and skill shortfalls directly and adversely affect capability. Achieving Army's recruiting targets in a consistent, repeatable and routine manner is of utmost importance. People are the basis of all that Army aspires to be.

More effective recruiting across a broader cross-section of the community will also, in time, deliver an Army more representative of the society we serve. Army's current priorities, within a full recruiting setting, are the recruitment of more women and indigenous Australians. My goals are 25% women and 5% declared Indigenous representation. Key areas for improvement are streamlining and shortening the recruiting process and enhancing Army's support to Defence Force Recruiting to connect to potential recruits. At least 80% of applicants should be able to commence training within three months of their initial inquiry. We will also be advertising the varied opportunities in today's high-tech, diverse, agile and innovative Army, in lieu

of the 1970s light infantry force too many Australians still believe Army to be. ***More choice from more people will provide the best base from which to build our Army.***

On an indirectly related issue, I note and commend the excellent work being done by Commander Australian Army Cadets and his team, to revitalise the Army Cadet experience and make it the equal of if not the best youth development program in Australia. We do not and should not seek to recruit cadets. But a very positive cadet experience will surely better inform a much wider audience of young Australians and their families about the opportunities inherent in military service. Recruiting agencies suggest that every personal story, good or bad, is typically shared with ten friends and family. In cadets, as much as in all other facets of the Army experience, we need a bow wave of positive impressions rippling through Australia.

**Implementation of the 2016 Ryan Review into Training, Education and Doctrine**  
(Lead: Commander Forces Command, supported by Deputy Chief of Army)

Army no longer leads in some aspects of our approach to training, education and doctrine (TED) development. Our high operational tempo over recent years has understandably captured our attention. Army remains a well trained and professional force, as often demonstrated by the manner in which coalition partners regard our units and embedded personnel on operations. But a periodic review of our system of building professional mastery is essential and, implemented, will ensure we remain at the forefront of developing our people. The Ryan Review , available via the Army webpage, provides the basis to return Army to leadership in TED. In all aspects of TED, Army will strive to be regarded for the quality of our people, the way they are developed, and as a team of teams, the best way in which we achieve our mission. ***We should unashamedly aspire to be the best Army in the world (albeit not the biggest).***

**Reserve transformation** (Lead: Head Land Capability, supported by Commander 2nd Division)

Army is an integrated force of full time and part time personnel. We currently have 500 Active Reserve and 600 Standby Reserve personnel on different forms of continuous service, 100 of whom, in both specialist and generalist appointments, are deployed on operations, including in the Middle East. Since 2004, 2,500 reservists have deployed on operations, and many participate annually in Defence Cooperation Program and regional engagement activities in our near region. Our generalist and specialist reserve personnel will continue to serve on all operations.

An effective reserve component is essential, not optional, to sustaining an Australian brigade group deployed on operations over successive rotations. We need a viable, effective, operationally active reserve component now. We will need it even more so into the future. While we have achieved increasing levels of reserve participation on both operations and major exercises over recent years, attracting, training and retaining part time officers and soldiers remains a critical challenge we must resolve. There are no panaceas to a healthy Reserve component, but it is very clear one size does not fit all needs. I will support an approach that is evidence based, open to multiple pathways, and utilises trials to test and confirm: let's deliver progressive incrementalism rather than leaps of faith.

Commander 2nd Division is developing initiatives that, among other issues, focus on opening a range of recruiting pathways, aligning depots and demography, and making structural adjustments to better support training and development of our people. Initially, I seek to stabilise and consolidate the Active Reserve and create conditions for some workforce renewal. Like all who commit to military service, our part time personnel need to be inspired to serve; inspired by their heritage, their training and development, their operational service, but most of all by their leaders. ***Army is an integrated and operationally-focused force of about 45,000.***

### **Special Operations renewal** (Lead: Special Operations Commander Australia)

Special Operations Command is a world class formation with trained personnel and specialist equipment tailored to meet a diversity of strategic tasks. Moreover, Special Operations Command is often called upon to carry out these tasks on very short notice, and in cooperation with many different partners and allies. In order to remain at the leading edge of military capability, as a trusted team of teams given national mission responsibilities, a range of renewal efforts are underway in the Command.

Like other elements of Army, Special Operations Command works collaboratively, helping to realise a more integrated approach to ADF joint and interagency operations. In light of rapidly evolving threats in terrorism and violent extremism, existing capability concepts are under constant review for relevance to the strategic challenges Australia is most likely to face. Special Operations Command international engagement is also progressively shifting from the Middle East to South East Asia. And in recognition of the lessons learned over the last 15 years of operations, the Command is committed to ensuring all personnel have the training and cultural understanding necessary to complete the full suite of missions to which they may be assigned. Professional competence and lethality are assumed; trust, humility and compassion are the true hallmarks of the special operator. ***Special Operations Command is a trusted, team of teams delivering national mission forces.***

### **Retention** (Lead: Deputy Chief of Army)

There is little benefit in Army meeting its recruiting targets, delivering world-class training and providing flexible employment opportunities, if we are unable to retain our people in service. The untimely loss of our people undermines the development of capability, increases stress on the recruiting and training system, and is a very tangible waste of money. Navy and Air Force have consistently lower rates of separation than Army. I want deeper analysis undertaken to better understand and target our efforts. Given the physical rigours of land combat, there is a sweet spot for Army separation that values service offered while allowing ongoing renewal of the force. We need to understand and target this point. What our work force planners are very clear on is that external factors, such as economic cycles and operational commitments, are not the driving factors of retention or separation, we are.

Acknowledging that retention is a very broad issue, I want you to focus on just three elements: resilience, rehabilitation and inspiration.

Led by Commander Forces Command and Commander Special Operation Command, we are working to build resilience within the force. Trials in the development of well-being programs are underway, seeking to deliver a framework to help maintain the

physical, mental and moral health of our people. Where we can, with what we now know, we all need to consciously be designing military training environments that minimise injury, build awareness, remove stigma and encourage early assistance. The physical conditioning program established at the 1st Recruit Training Battalion is an excellent example of such a training environment. Organisationally, we also need to ensure Army remains open to individuals changing their employment stream or specialisation as they move through their time in Army. *A one career, many jobs* approach will support retention through flexibility, opportunity and new challenges.

When rehabilitation is required, valuing and assisting the individual is essential to recovery. A best practise recovery system, standardised throughout Army, and working in lock step with Joint Health Command, is essential. My goal is to assist with dignity our wounded, injured and ill to return to their original duties, or otherwise to alternate productive military service, or else transition to civilian life with opportunity. This must be an approach focussed on assistance to independence, not support into dependence. The engaged and active individual is essential to healing.

I have every confidence in our values, our training, and the unique opportunities we have to offer our people. When speaking of his workforce, Sir Richard Branson has been quoted as saying, *'train them to leave, inspire them to stay'*. This view succinctly represents my aspirations for retention in Army. It speaks directly to the quality of our leadership, at every level, and the impact of our leaders on our people. More than any other reason, the experience of being led is the most influential factor in decisions to leave or stay.

Learning to lead is a life long journey of practice and reflection. We all need to keep working at it. As I have said, our people rightly expect both technical military competence and excellent people skills. The many abuses of power documented in the Defence Abuse Response Task Report reflect a systemic failure over many years of leadership within Army and the ADF. The report is a salutary reminder of the need for cultural renewal, aligned to Defence's *Pathway to Change*. Army supports its people through your leadership. Our cultural reform is drawn from initiatives such as our lived values, Army's Contract with Australia, increasing diversity and inclusion within the force, acknowledging the personal and capability impacts of family and domestic violence. ***Army is an organisation in which people have purpose and are inspired to serve.***

### **Joint Warfighting Readiness (Lead: Functional Commanders)**

The Defence White Paper 2016 requires Army to provide forces that are ready for employment in a range of joint warfighting and other operational settings. In preparing Army force elements, the brigade is the land manoeuvre unit of action; a divisional-scale Joint Task Force Headquarters is the force employer; and Special Operations Command provides national mission forces.

The force generation cycle provides the foundation for progress on this line of effort, led by our Functional Commanders. The Army has adopted a readiness campaign approach to the annual conduct of Exercise Hamel, the joint land certification activity, and will progressively develop our contribution to equivalent air, sea and joint activities. The objective is consistently high force generation outcomes tested by

realistically challenging scenarios incorporating Joint Task Force orchestration, brigade-level land manoeuvre, inclusive of significant reserve capability, and supported by joint and special operations components shaping the exercise battlespace. Importantly, the purpose of force generation must be foremost in mind; to be prepared to support the customer of Army readiness – a standing or standby Joint Task Force, such as JTF 633, HQ 1 Div or a JSOTF.

Of course, readiness is much more than force generation. As a ready force is a force that invests in its allies and friends. As such, readiness activities encompass international engagement, building security partnerships, and developing habits of cooperation with allies and partners that can be drawn upon in times of crises or conflict. In this regard, it is instructive to note that Australia has never fought alone.

With these joint warfighting readiness themes in mind, Army's mission statement is being reviewed and refined to nest better within the ADF mission, and more accurately reflect Army's *Raise-Train-Sustain* role. ***In all aspects, readiness is the essential first step to success in operations.***

#### **Amphibious force development (Lead: Head Land Capability)**

Army is well advanced with trials to inform the land force contribution to Defence's amphibious capability. Amphibious forces are an important strategic capability for Australia in endeavours ranging from peacetime regional engagement, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, through to joint warfighting scenarios. An incremental approach to building and confirming capability milestones will characterise the development of an ADF amphibious capability.

Informed by the trial program undertaken by 2RAR, Army will shortly make a series of key decisions on amphibious capability issues such as permanent amphibious support force structure, force generation of amphibious force elements, and preparations for a future riverine capability. Following a period of transition, Army will have a standing specialist element, an 'amphibious support unit' with a ground combat element that will be rotated within Army's battle groups. Exercise Talisman Sabre 17 will provide the next significant hit out for this emerging capability. Coordination with the other services is at the heart of successful amphibious capability development and application. ***Army is amphibious capable.***

#### **Implementation of the Houston Review into Army Aviation (Lead: Head Land Capability)**

Army aviation is vital to joint land warfighting and our Army operates some of the most capable and technologically advanced combat helicopters in the world. But I am mindful that Army aviation is a costly and challenging force element to sustain, with significant risk to our people and capability if not managed carefully. The recently completed Houston Review into Army aviation notes we are doing well in many areas, particularly our management of operational airworthiness. However, it also provides a series of connected, whole of capability, recommendations on how Army might best take our aviation capability forward. The Houston Review has been endorsed by my Senior Advisory Committee and will be progressively implemented, subject to certain aspects being endorsed by government. ***Army aviation is in all aspects a safe, sustainable and effective contributor to ADF capability.***

## **Force posture** (Lead: Head Land Capability)

Army's force posture requires constant review and adjustment. The Defence White Paper 2016 introduces significant new capabilities to Army over the coming decade. These include a cyber capability, enhanced air defence, long range rocket artillery, and land-based anti-ship missiles. Posturing for these new capabilities, within resource provisions, is a vitally important task. To that end, a more contemporary force posture will assist with sustainment, associated budgetary pressures, and the realisation of a sustainable force as envisaged under Plan Beersheba. Importantly, many force posture related issues are long standing. As such, success on this line of effort will be defined largely by progressing enduring force posture solutions, rather than continuing to manage difficult problems through short term fixes.

As discussed earlier, work on this line of effort will be aimed at aligning Army's establishment with available personnel asset and our AFS in the first instance. The location and facilities of some bases are also subject to review, in order to ensure alignment with Defence's future estate planning and Army's Plan Beersheba dispositions. Similarly, the acceptance into service of new vehicles and capabilities will require some facilities modifications across Army's bases. ***Army is postured for Plan Beersheba and capability delivery under the Integrated Investment Plan.***

## **Modernisation** (Lead: Head Land Capability)

Army has consistently invested time and resources into looking to the future. However, we are at times, too quick to the answer and too inattentive to the subtleties of the question. In an effort to address this point, I will be seeking more attention be focused on asking the right questions as work progresses on this line of effort. Of note, I do not necessarily expect the 'answers' during my time as Chief. Rather, I am seeking to generate extended and iterative discussion, in partnership with others, on issues that will inform decisions on Army's future. My supposition is that, if you're sure you have the answer, you're probably asking the wrong question.

Accordingly, Army research will be reinvigorated, networked and connected with other thought centres. The outcomes of such initiatives will be drawn upon to inform joint force design. We should aspire to establishing Army as a consistent and constructive thought-leader on national security challenges, defence capability and leadership; all with an applied focus on the implications for joint land operations.

More broadly, modernisation will bring into service the 'iconic' land projects of the Integrated Investment Plan. First and foremost, Land 200 will network the Army to fully exploit the potential of all other land and joint force capabilities. For the fight itself, Land 400 will deliver Army's protected ground combat capability. This will include Infantry Fighting Vehicles that, together with the Main Battle Tank, will form the cornerstone of the ADF's close combat capability – the armoured punch if you like – to win when no other option is available or effective. Similarly, I am committed to providing state-of-the-art capabilities to the individual soldier through the Soldier Combat System project. Our soldiers deserve to be equipped to survive, fight and win. And in so equipping our combat personnel, Army will prioritise technology that enables them to keep their *heads up, eyes on target, and hands on weapons*. Army's priority is to preserve these three projects essential to success in the close fight: the

network, protected manoeuvre, and the empowered soldier. *Army thinks critically to deliver the capabilities required to meet Australia's future strategic challenges.*

These ten lines of effort are deliberately ordered. As you may have noticed, the first five lines of effort address the major issues currently affecting our people as people remain the core of Army capability. In combination, the first nine lines of effort deliver on the potential of past initiatives such as the Hardened and Networked Army, Enhanced Land Force, Adaptive Army, and Plan Beersheba. Lastly, while these efforts settle, change and consolidate Army, the tenth line of effort will ensure Army continues to look to, and be prepared, for the future.

I am of the strong view that attention to these lines of effort will operationalise my four framework priorities. They are not an answer or a destination. Rather, through delivering on past initiatives, these lines of effort are a practical pathway for Army to be the joint land force Australia requires now and into the future. Moreover, much of what I have outlined in this letter is aimed at ensuring Army meets government or command direction promulgated through means such as the Defence White Paper 16, the *One Defence* and *Pathway to Change* programs, specified diversity targets for women and Indigenous representation across Defence and the CDF's Preparedness Directive. Such directions constitute orders rather than options or suggestions. As a military that prides itself on achievement of the mission, our responses to them should therefore be focussed, energetic and aimed at complete success. Do not hesitate to redirect time, people and capital to do so.

Yours sincerely,

**Lieutenant General Angus J. Campbell, DSC, AM**  
Chief of the Australian Army