PROJECTING FORCE
THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY
AND MARITIME STRATEGY

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The Australian Army established the LWSC in July 1997 through the amalgamation of several existing staffs and research elements.

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Abstract

With the release of *Force 2030*, the 2009 Defence White Paper, the Australian Government has clearly set the ADF onto the path of a maritime strategy. With this development, Australia has joined many great states—from the Athenians to the Americans—who have pursued maritime strategies to their benefit.

While the ADF does have a history of pursuing maritime strategy that arguably dates back to the landings at Gallipoli, most of its recent strategic thought has dealt with the requirements of Continental Defence. For most serving officers, maritime strategy represents an intellectual shift of direction. The essays contained in this monograph aim to facilitate that shift. They hope to draw back the curtain of poor understanding which at present obscures maritime strategy and thereby ease the three services’ transition to this new guiding concept.

The authors of this study paper examine the concepts that underpin maritime strategy and the operational, force structure, and doctrinal requirements of its successful implementation. Taken together they represent an intellectual starting point on the Army’s—and the RAN and RAAF’s—journey towards the implementation of a revisited yet updated strategic idea. In these essays the authors demonstrate the benefits maritime strategy offers to the organisation, outline some of the challenges officers will need to overcome, and illuminate the pathways forward.
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Foreword

Maritime strategy is almost as old as the history of war—indeed, the Athenians and Spartans demonstrated during the Peloponnesian War over twenty-four centuries ago many of the elements of a maritime strategy that the ADF aspires to today and in the future. The ADF itself also has a long history of projecting power in the maritime environment. Australia’s first joint operation was the dispatch of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force to seize Rabaul in German-held New Guinea in the opening days of the First World War. A maritime objective also lay behind the origins of the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915. Australian and New Zealand soldiers came ashore at ANZAC Cove not to occupy the land but to open the Dardanelles so that the waiting fleet could strike at Istanbul. During the Second World War, sustaining the Rats of Tobruk during their nine month siege by the Afrika Korps was the fleet, and this operation cost the RAN HMAS WATERHEN and HMAS PARRAMATTA. In the Pacific Theatre many of the Army’s operations against the Japanese took place in a maritime context.

Although maritime strategy has a rich history in the ADF, the strategic directions of the RAN and the Army split during the 1980s along a Naval versus Continental Strategy divide. This was an unfortunate path that led to a reduction—rather than an enhancement—of the ADF’s ability to provide the government with useful military options. The promulgation of the 2009 Defence White Paper Force 2030 ends this divide by setting out a maritime strategy in which each of the services has a role in this joint concept.

Over the coming years the ADF will receive the platforms and systems that will enable its forces to adopt a maritime strategy. Acquiring this equipment, however, is but a small part of the challenges that lie ahead. To turn the new hardware into capability the ADF will need new concepts, new doctrine, new procedures and most importantly new and innovative ideas. Projecting Power: The Australian Army and Maritime Strategy is the foundation on which officers can begin their own thinking on maritime strategy. I commend this study to you and urge you to think upon the issues it raises, the lessons it offers and the directions for future investigation it suggests.
Introduction

In the Defence White Paper 2009, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, the government has provided the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with two critical directives—namely implementing the nation’s future strategic direction and managing the allocated force structure, equipment and personnel with which to implement this strategy. The new Defence White Paper articulates a clear strategic direction for the ADF. While the founding principle of Australian defence policy remains ‘self reliance in the direct defence of Australia’ it does so within the context of what is unambiguously a maritime strategy. Although this does not represent a shift from previous policy, maritime strategy—as the basis of national security—is now more strongly and clearly articulated than ever before.

For members of the Australian Army the notion of a defence policy based on a maritime strategy may cause some unease. Such a reaction is unnecessary. Maritime does not mean naval. Rather a maritime strategy is a form of joint operations in which the medium of manoeuvre is the sea, but the objectives to be influenced are on the land. A maritime strategy is a natural one for a nation with Australia’s geographic position and interests.

Much of the Defence White Paper is devoted to the allocation of resources and the identification of capabilities needed to achieve the government’s mandated objectives. The essays in this publication from the Australian Army’s Land Warfare Studies Centre do not address these matters as they have already received—and will continue to receive—considerable attention from other sources. Instead, the aim of this work is to shape the thinking environment in order that Australian Army personnel—and others within the ADF—have a sound understanding of the potential of maritime strategy, the opportunities it offers to the entire defence organisation, and the intellectual requirements for its effective conduct. The goal of these papers is to help the Army’s commanders and planners to implement the government’s strategic direction successfully.
The study paper is divided into four sections. In ‘Maritime Strategy and the Operations of the Australian Army’, Dr Albert Palazzo provides a detailed definition of what is meant by maritime strategy and, in particular, explores how it differs from naval strategy. He outlines the ADF’s previous experience with the conduct of a maritime strategy, and demonstrates why it has worked in some cases while in others it has failed. The lessons contained therein offer useful guidance in this latest articulation of maritime strategy—and outline the pitfalls that must be avoided. Mr Antony Trentini’s paper—‘Manoeuvring in the Littoral: Prospects for the Australian Army’s Future Role’—highlights the distinct operational advantages that flow from a maritime strategic approach and demonstrates that maritime strategy and Adaptive Campaigning fit together comfortably. In ‘Amphibious Warfare: A Discussion Paper’, Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Hawkins examines the next steps the Australian Army must take if it is to be able to play its mandated role in the nation’s security. While the commissioning of the RAN’s new LHDs is still some years away, Hawkins makes an astute and compelling case that the Army cannot delay in making critical decisions on organisation, force structure and doctrine if it is to make worthy use of the ADF’s improved amphibious capability. This publication’s final section is a reading list that has been compiled by Captain Malcolm Brailey. The works he lists offer a starting point for a more detailed investigation of the nuances of maritime strategy, serving as a useful adjunct to the Chief of Army’s Reading List.

Taken as a whole, these essays offer the leaders of the Australian Army a starting point from which to interpret and understand the organisation’s future strategic direction, and to develop the requisite force structure and doctrine. While challenges certainly lie ahead, this is an interesting time for the Army’s thinkers and planners. The Land Warfare Study Centre looks forward to ongoing and vigorous debate on the Army’s adoption and implementation of maritime strategy. We invite further discussion on this issue.

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Maritime Strategy and the Operations of the Australian Army

by Albert Palazzo

Introduction

The 2009 Defence White Paper 2009, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 places the Australian Government’s future security philosophy firmly on the foundation of what can be termed a ‘maritime strategy’, a point highlighted by the trio of submarines featured on its cover.1 While commentators and the media has focused on the government’s recommendations for equipment acquisition, it is the document’s underlying philosophy that is of greater interest and importance to the military professionals of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). The government’s requirement that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) implement a maritime strategy will be an intellectual challenge for each of the services and will require accommodation and adjustment by the force’s leaders and members, but it will also lead to a more joint, capable and combat effective organisation whose posture better meets national requirements.

The 2009 Defence White Paper is not the first occasion in which the Australian Government has embraced a maritime strategy as the basis of its national security policy. For example, the 1997 strategic review, titled Australia’s Strategic Policy, possessed a similar focus.2 Historically, Australia does have considerable experience in the successful waging of maritime war, albeit dating to the Pacific Campaigns of the Second World War. Despite this precedent, however, it remains the case that Australia does not have a tradition of adhering to a maritime strategy, though the nation occupies

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1 See Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009.
2 For the 1997 White Paper see Australia’s Strategic Policy, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1997.
an island continent whose nearest neighbours are archipelagic countries. What must also be remembered is that the 1997 effort to implement a maritime strategy did not succeed. In that instance the Army and the RAN, in association with the RAAF, pursued different strategic interpretations that played to each service’s traditional strengths rather than creating a joint approach to the nation’s defence.

Australia’s experience of maritime strategy is both limited and mixed. There have been notable successes, but also significant failures. Mostly, however, there has been a lack of understanding resulting from the Army and Navy’s preferences for other strategic postures that dates to Federation. This essay will not detail the path of Australia’s strategic evolution as this has been done elsewhere ably, although it will touch on certain points. Rather, it will first define clearly what is meant by ‘maritime strategy’ and highlight how it differs from another type of sea warfare terminology with which it is often mistaken, namely ‘naval strategy’. The essay will then highlight the successes and failures of the past experiences of the ADF and the Army with maritime strategy so that the task ahead may be illuminated by the lessons of the past.

The Nature of Maritime Strategy

Because the Australian Army has had only a limited and sometimes flawed experience with the idea of a maritime strategy, it is critical that those responsible for acting upon the recommendations found in the 2009 Defence White Paper understand precisely what is meant by the concept. Perhaps oddly, ‘Maritime Strategy’ is not truly concerned with the actions taken by a fleet upon the water, but rather with the ability of a nation to project power from the sea in order to influence events upon the land. Maritime strategy should not be confused with naval strategy, although it must be admitted that this is often the case, and in doing so with great loss of clarity. As John Reeve has noted, maritime ‘is an environmental, not a service-related definition’, and Colin Gray has called it a more ‘inclusive concept than either sea power or naval


strategy. In the contemporary age a maritime strategy characteristically also involves the application of air power within its mandate. In 1911 the great maritime theorist, Sir Julian Corbett, perceived the distinction between naval and maritime strategies when he observed that:

By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is but that part of it which determines the movements of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces; for it scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone.6

He went on to observe that the paramount concern of maritime strategy was ‘to determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war’.7 This was essential, he believed, because it was a prerequisite for determining what the navy would do with its ships.

Numerous scholars have interpreted and built upon Corbett’s foundational ideas. British historian John Gooch highlighted the distinction between naval and maritime strategy by explaining that naval strategy was subordinate to maritime strategy; that is, the fleet moved in accordance with the requirements of the maritime objective.8 For the Australian soldier and scholar David Horner, writing in the context of European military affairs, ‘maritime strategy was an extension of continental strategy’, and that maritime activities ‘were ancillary to operations on the continent of Europe’.9 Of the

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7 Ibid., p. 16.
two strategies—maritime or naval—the latter is the more limited as its purpose is the winning or denying of the command of the sea.\textsuperscript{10}

In his examination of US Army General Douglas MacArthur, Clark G Reynolds calls this land commander a maritime strategist. In doing so he takes Corbett’s ideas further by explicitly establishing the joint nature of maritime warfare. He writes

> Maritime strategy is not naval strategy. Naval strategy may be defined as the employment of Navy forces to a specific end. Maritime strategy has a much broader scope: the combined use of all arms—Army, Navy and Air Forces—in seaborne operations.\textsuperscript{11}

Maritime strategy is by its nature a strategy that depends on joint operations. Crudely stated, to use the words of Admiral Jackie Fisher, ‘The British Army should be a projectile to be fired by the British Navy.’\textsuperscript{12} Fisher wrote at the emergence of air power, but his words hold true in the present age.

Corbett and his adherents accept that it is the decision upon the land that in most cases determines the outcome of a conflict. In defining his theory of war, Corbett explains:

> Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided — except in the rarest cases — either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.\textsuperscript{13}

Gooch points out that Corbett in his later years came to the conclusion that the outcome of the 1805 Battle of Austerlitz overshadowed Britain’s great naval victory of the same year over Napoleon at Trafalgar. According to Gooch the reason was that ‘without a supporting army … a navy was not a decisively effective weapon’, or, as

\textsuperscript{10} Breemer, ‘Naval Strategy is Dead,’ p. 50.


\textsuperscript{13} Corbett, \textit{Some Principles of Maritime Strategy}, p. 16.
Geoffrey Till has noted, ‘navies are usually dealing with the symptoms of the problem, not its causes’.\(^{14}\) Moreover, as numerous contemporary theorists have asserted, the Mahanian conception of fleet-versus-fleet battles between surface combatants has passed and is now ‘the least likely form of combat … for the foreseeable future’.\(^{15}\)

To make the point more directly it must be remembered that maritime strategy is equally subject to the enduring values of war as promulgated by Carl von Clausewitz as are strategies that define conflict in continental terms. As Clausewitz wrote, nations employ force to ‘compel our enemy to do our will’.\(^{16}\) This key principle of *On War* remains valid today, even if the conflicts of the twenty-first century differ greatly from those in which he participated two centuries ago. As Gray explains, maritime strategy creates the environment within which to achieve Clausewitz’s objective by its ability to place the enemy at a systemic disadvantage.\(^{17}\)

Writing on the Falklands War, during which Britain applied with great skill a maritime strategy that enabled it to win back those islands from Argentina, J A Robertson concluded that ‘all wars are decided finally by a soldier on the ground with a gun in his hand, exercising control over the land in dispute’.\(^{18}\) This point should be obvious, but it still needs to be made, for as Till observes, ‘it is the land that is the source of most maritime disorder’.\(^{19}\)

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**Maritime Strategy in the Australian Context**

It is Australia’s geographic location and its trade-dependent economy that makes maritime strategy a natural choice upon which to base its national security. Australia occupies an entire continent, is protected by a wide ‘moat’, has never experienced the

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depredations of land-borne invasion, and its wealth is built upon unfettered access to the world’s seaborne trade routes. The end of the Cold War has only served to make an Australian maritime strategy even more viable as the possibility of involvement in a great war has lessened.

Yet throughout its history Australia has never been a maritime nation. Instead, it usually based its strategic policies on either continental or naval paradigms. At first analysis this appears odd since the nation’s military ethos originated at ANZAC Cove at Gallipoli—a maritime operation. However, as Horner explains, Australia relied on coalition partners to provide the maritime forces which allowed the Army to take on the mantle of a continental power. The result has been that although most of the Australian population lives on or near the coast it remains an ‘island-nation with an inward focus’. Perhaps Michael O’Connor has best summed up the situation by noting that ‘Australia is a maritime power with a continental mindset’.

Over the last two decades there has been a decisive shift in the strategic outlook of many Western nations from a continental to a maritime pattern. The United States Navy (USN) and United States Marine Corps (USMC) began their transition in 1992 with the release of *From the Sea*, their concept of the future character of war. This document, and its follow-up paper *Forward . . . From the Sea*, represented a change in mission for the USN from securing the North Atlantic sea-lanes in face of a war with the Soviet Union to one more concerned with intervention in the littoral environment. The new objective called for the United States to be able to ‘project power from the sea in


the critical littoral regions of the world’. The result was that the USN has become the largest coastal navy in the world, ‘only it operates on other people’s coasts’.

The Royal Navy also made an early start on a strategic shift from Cold War requirements, perhaps as a result of the Falklands War. Its 1995 keystone doctrine publication—*Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine*—made clear that:

- Maritime power and naval power are significantly different
- Maritime power is inherently joint
- Maritime power is drawn from all three services and exercises its influence over the land, sea and air environments.

Australia’s first attempt to instil a maritime strategy followed the US and UK efforts by a few years. Unlike those nations, the Australian effort would fail. In 1997 the Australian Government issued a new strategic review called *Australia’s Strategic Policy*. Naturally, it identified the priority for national security preparedness as the defence of Australian territory, as well as the axiomatic support of the defence relationship with the United States; yet it also initiated a move in strategic policy terms away from a narrowly construed defence of the continent philosophy to one calling for greater regional engagement. To achieve this shift in strategic direction the ADF would need to transition to a maritime posture.

In policy terms *Australia’s Strategic Policy* was a significant departure from the defence principles that had dominated Australian strategic thinking for the previous twenty-five years, dating from the nation’s withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972. Throughout this period the government’s strategic ideas concentrated on the concept of ‘self reliance’, which itself was a response to the promulgation of the Guam Doctrine in 1969 by the US President, Richard Nixon, in which the United States called upon its


28 See *Australia’s Strategic Policy*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1997.

29 Ibid., pp. 29–34.
friends to do more for their own defence. Self-reliance would not receive an intellectual underpinning until the 1986 Dibb Report and the publication of the Defence White Paper, *The Defence of Australia*, the following year.\(^{30}\) In brief, *The Defence of Australia* called for the RAN and RAAF to have the ability to prevent an adversary from operating in the maritime environment to the nation’s north. However, the tasks allocated to the Army were much more limited than those of the other services. The Army would only require a force able to protect the bases from which the RAN and RAAF operated and defeat any minor enemy elements that managed to reach Australia’s shore.\(^{31}\)

If *Australia’s Strategic Policy* represented a major shift in governmental defence thinking, its reception by the strategic community saw it come under heavy criticism as an intellectually flawed document.\(^{32}\) While it called for greater regional engagement it also failed to provide the Army with a clear role in this task. Instead, the Army’s priority was to continue to focus on the defence of Australian territory, even to the point of rounding up covert infiltrators.\(^{33}\) The consequence of this guidance was that it encouraged the RAN, along with the RAAF, to pursue a narrowly defined naval strategy of sea denial, whereas the Army followed a reactive policy centred on continental defence.\(^{34}\) One observer described the Army’s assigned role as an ‘isolationist defence-of-the-mainland’ reaction which, in the past, had been ‘quickly invalidated by events on many occasions’.\(^{35}\) In effect, the government wanted the three services to move in two strategic directions, neither of which was a maritime one.

The result was not the creation of a joint maritime strategy but the reinforcement of the existing intellectual divisions between the three services which saw the RAN and the RAAF continue to focus on the defence of the air-sea gap while the Army sought to defend the continent from invasion.\(^{36}\) It also represented a failure on the part of

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31 Department of Defence, *The Defence of Australia*, p. 31.


33 *Australia’s Strategic Policy*, p. 64.


36 Evans, *The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy*, p. 25.
the Department of Defence that interpreted maritime strategy in terms of events taking place upon the water, not the nearby land from which all threats to Australia would originate. In short, Corbett’s conception of maritime strategy had not taken root amongst Australian defence thinkers in the way it had in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Shortly after the release of Australia’s Strategic Policy, the Department of Defence issued a restructuring plan for the Army that served to legitimise the diverging strategic intent between the services. Even more significantly, this separation of roles served to obscure the fact that Australia was protected not just by its seaward moat, but also by the chain of islands that sat on the far side of the air-sea gap. The implication of this geographic fact was that Australia had a need for land forces that were able to operate in a region that has been termed our ‘strategic shield’, but because of internal service preferences was unable to acquire such a capability. Restructuring the Australian Army would cause what Michael O’Connor called a schizophrenia that was ‘replicated in the current government-endorsed restructure . . . which would produce a very modest force incapable of deploying and operating overseas even though the Australian army throughout its distinguished history has never fought anywhere but overseas’.

Evans was also damning. He concluded that Australia’s Strategic Policy and Restructuring the Australian Army advanced strategic ideas that were in opposition. The former favoured a naval interpretation of maritime strategy while the latter pursued a continental defence rationale. This was not a new problem for the ADF, he knew. Rather, conflicting interpretations of strategic guidance were the norm within the Australian Defence Organisation throughout this period. In effect, the services sought to confine their interpretations of the government’s direction to their own environments, instead of working towards a joint maritime strategy which

37 See Restructuring the Australian Army, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1997.
encompassed the sea, land and air. The services also failed to realise that maritime strategy requires more than just the ability to patrol the home waters. To be successful, a maritime strategy also requires the ability to ‘seize vital points beyond the home shores’.42

It is not clear why, when the Department of Defence issued Australia’s Strategic Policy in 1997, it did not strongly signal the necessity for the ADF to have the ability to project power ashore. One conclusion is that those charged with the document’s preparation failed to take into account the nation’s martial history. Had they done so they would have observed that during the Pacific Campaigns of the Second World War Australia turned back the Japanese conquest of the South West Pacific by implementing a maritime strategy alongside the forces of its US ally. By devising a true maritime strategy—one in which all three services combined to exploit the manoeuvre potential of the sea—the allies countered the Japanese in the islands to the country’s north and commenced the march towards their enemy’s homeland. The success of the Australian campaigns against the Japanese represents a compelling argument for the advantages of a maritime strategy, not only because of the allied success but also because the land for which they fought is the same region that received consideration in the 2009 Defence White Paper.

General Douglas MacArthur understood the manoeuvre potential of the seas that connected Australia with the archipelago land occupied by the Japanese. Once allied troops had denied Japan Port Moresby in September 1942, and cleared the Buna, Gona and Sanananda Beachheads the following January, they commenced the long advance to reclaim the Philippines and then onwards to Tokyo. On every step of that journey MacArthur followed a maritime strategy.

As was the pattern in the USN advance across the Central Pacific towards the Japanese Homeland, the way forward in the South-West Pacific followed a three-step progression, with a different service dominating each step. To move forward the allies required airbases from which planes could fly to control the sea, thereby allowing the fleet to advance and put ashore ground forces which would secure a new base. At this point the cycle would repeat, bringing the allies closer to ‘Final Victory’.

42 Horner, ‘Continental School of Strategic Thought’, p. 43.
Conclusion

Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 sets out a template for Australia’s future strategic direction. It is the most recent national strategic guidance issued by the Australian Government, the latest in a series that date back to the nation’s founding. It is different in that it strongly articulates the essential nature of a maritime strategy as the basis for the nation’s security. Its implementation will not be easy, as Australia has traditionally shunned the possibilities of a maritime nation in preference for continental or naval strategic paradigms. The most difficult task facing the three services will be the need to overcome their own history.

The ADF’s implementation of a maritime strategy will be facilitated by remembering the lessons of the past. Modern warfare is a joint enterprise and nowhere more so than when conducted by countries that follow a maritime strategy. Any maritime strategy that does not involve the close interaction of military force in the sea, land and air environments is doomed to fail, as did Australia’s efforts in light of the 1997 Strategic Review.
Manoeuvring in the Littoral: Prospects for the Australian Army’s Future Role

by Antony Trentini

Introduction

With the release of *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, the Rudd Government announced what the media have billed as the single biggest build-up of Australian naval forces since the Second World War. While the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Russ Crane, and all of his officers and sailors must be pleased that the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) will expand rapidly over the coming decades, their Army counterparts may not share the same excitement. However, while it may seem counterintuitive, the Army is well placed to gain immensely from the Navy’s acquisition of well over a dozen new warships. This is because, as this brief essay will show, such greatly expanded naval combat power equals a commensurately improved capacity for the Army to conduct operations. Not only does the maritime strategy and naval build-up stated in the Defence White Paper improve Army’s ability to defeat enemy land forces decisively through Joint Land Combat (JLC), it also enables it to excel at the other four lines of operation contained within Army’s Future Land Operating Concept (FLOC), *Adaptive Campaigning 09* (AC09).

While each of the lines of operation in AC09 will be addressed separately in the context of the new maritime strategy later, the main focus of this essay will be how enhanced naval forces will enable operational decision that is, arguably, not possible today. While the Army is necessarily focused on lower-intensity, counterinsurgency operations at the current time, this essay examines combat against state-based opponents in the future period of 2020 and beyond. Both the conventional focus and the future focus of this paper are eminently defensible. First, the focus on state-
based opponents stems directly from *Force 2030*, which states that conventional wars remain the primary force structuring basis for the Army and the ADF.\(^{43}\) Moreover, the Chief of Army’s direction that ‘Conventional war fighting skills provide the essential foundation for all other types of operations we may undertake’\(^ {44}\) demonstrates the conviction with which Army leadership believes that conventional warfighting remains the critical enabler for success in all types of warfighting tasks.

Following on from the maxim that ‘the enemy always has a vote’, it is essential in estimating the Army’s capability for operational success that one also estimates the threat’s capacity for resistance. Predicting the threat forces against which the ADF may have to operate in the future is fraught with difficulty. As the distinguished strategist Colin S Gray points out ‘The future cannot be predicted in any useful detail; uncertainty does rule.’\(^ {45}\) Accordingly, there will be no detailed analysis within this essay of how the organisations or specific capabilities of individual states are negated by Australia’s maritime strategy, or are otherwise somehow rendered vulnerable. Rather, this essay will make only broad assumptions about generic potential threat forces in order to demonstrate the extent to which the Army will benefit from Australia’s increased focus on a maritime strategy.

**Superior Operational Mobility: The Critical Requirement**

It is unlikely that the Australian Army will have to fight against a state-based opponent with smaller land forces than itself. Within the South-East Asian and Pacific regions, the average strength of military forces (not including Australia’s) is approximately 210,000 compared to the ADF’s planned 58,000.\(^ {46}\) The average strength of land forces in this same region (not including Australia’s) is approximately 170,000 compared

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\(^{43}\) Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, p. 58.


\(^{46}\) *Force 2030*, p. 113.
to the Army’s planned ~30,000. Clearly, the Army is likely to face numerically superior forces if engaged in combat in the Asia-Pacific. While the ability to confront such large, state-based forces was until recently thought an increasingly abstract consideration for Australian defence planners, it is now firmly back in focus as government policy. Force 2030 states as an assumption underpinning its formulation that Australia ‘might have to contend with major power adversaries operating in our approaches—in the most drastic circumstance, as a consequence of a wider conflict in the Asia-Pacific region’ and that, while ‘it is not a current defence planning assumption that Australia would be involved in such a conflict on its own’, Australia must nevertheless be prepared ‘to provide for its own local defence needs without relying on the combat forces of other countries’. Consequently, the government has directed that the ADF have

The weight and reach … [to give Australia] an acceptable margin of confidence that hostile military operations in our primary operational environment can be contested effectively … [including] circumstances where we have to attend to our local defence needs against a major power adversary.

If, as the White Paper stipulates, the Army is to be capable of defeating a major power operating in our approaches alone, then creative, ‘manoeuvrist’ operations become essential—especially when one considers that the Army is highly likely to be outnumbered. Fortunately, this is just the type of operation the Army is trained to conduct.

Manoeuvre warfare is concerned with

defeating the enemy’s will to fight by ‘destroying’ the enemy’s plan rather than destroying tactical forces. Manoeuvre theory seeks to shatter the enemy’s moral and physical cohesion … creating a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation

47 Ibid., p. 65.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
with which the enemy cannot cope … It relies on changing physical and non-
physical circumstances more rapidly than the enemy’s ability to adapt.51

This effort must be aimed entirely at dislocating or disrupting the enemy’s centre
of gravity (COG) if it is to achieve results other than simple attrition.52

_LWD 3-0 Operations_ states that the enemy COG is dislocated/disrupted during
the decisive phase of an operation.53 The decisive phase occurs in two sub-phases,
the first of which, seizing of the initiative, is ‘achieved through rapid response and
a quick build-up of capability’.54 The second sub-phase, domination, is achieved by
‘overmatching joint force capability at the critical time and place, directed at the
operational COG’.55

According to _LWD 3-0_, influence is achieved on COGs primarily through dislocating
and/or disrupting them.56 Of the types of dislocation called for, the one with the
most predictable effect, and the one that can most reliably be achieved, is physical
dislocation. Physical dislocation of the enemy has the _most_ predictable effect because
it does not rely upon an enemy decision for its effect, whereas intellectual and moral
dislocation does. For example, achieving moral dislocation is dependent upon the
enemy choosing to believe they no longer have (or never had) a cause worth pursuing
by organised violence. Achieving intellectual dislocation requires the enemy to choose
to believe what one wants them to believe—that one’s feint is one’s main effort, for
example. Calculating what an intelligent opponent is thinking is extremely difficult—
human history is replete with examples of commanders misjudging their opponent’s
thoughts. Physical dislocation of the enemy, however, is brought about by manoeuvring
one’s forces into positions from which they can effectively engage the enemy but from
which the enemy cannot effectively engage them. The concept of ‘defeat-in-detail’57

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51 _LWD-I The Fundamentals of Land Warfare 2008_, Department of Defence, Canberra,
pp. 45–46.
52 Ibid., p. 48.
53 _LWD-3-0 Operations_, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2008, p. 2-9.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., p. 2-7.
is an excellent example of this. The enemy has no choice in this matter initially—at the opening of the battle, one’s forces have been deployed to advantage while the enemy’s have not. Of course, the enemy may react, by counterattack for example, but their initial physical dislocation is a fact on which their choices have no bearing.

Physical dislocation can be achieved in two main ways. First, it can be achieved through superior operational mobility. Simply moving against a small portion of the enemy’s forces with a larger portion of one’s own—faster than the enemy can manoeuvre counterattacking forces to negate that deployment—will achieve physical dislocation. Second, it can be achieved through some enabling element, such as intellectual dislocation. For example, deceiving the enemy with a feint will possibly result in a corresponding physical dislocation of the enemy’s reserve. However, relying upon some enabling effect, such as intellectual dislocation, would of course result in physical dislocation becoming equally problematic, as its achievement is then dependent upon something that is itself inherently unreliable.

This is not to say that achieving physical dislocation is easy—executing such manoeuvres at the required tempo is a difficult task for command, control and logistics systems. Nor is it to say that physical dislocation is an entirely predictable thing on which commanders can ‘bet the bank’—what is supposed to be a company defending an objective could very well be an excellently concealed battalion. In this instance the battalion you have just sent to take the objective is suddenly at far greater risk. However, at the very least, superior mobility would facilitate a timely withdrawal and the avoidance of envelopment and disaster.

Regardless of its inherent predictability or reliability, physically dislocating the enemy is the most reliable way to achieve superiority in mass and firepower at the critical point as it is the only way to achieve relative overmatch that is not dependent upon the enemy’s cooperation. Accordingly, Australian commanders should always aim to achieve physical dislocation of the enemy through superior operational mobility. With superior mobility, land operations would then be a matter of achieving the defeat-in-detail of those enemy forces defending (or constituting) enemy COGs. These initial victories can then be exploited through superior operational agility, ensuring the enemy’s actions continue to become increasingly irrelevant until, eventually, the enemy succeeds in physically dislocating their own forces and thus presenting further opportunities for exploitation.
As usual, the idea is simple but its execution is difficult. In the 2020+ period, it will become increasingly difficult for the Australian Army to achieve a relative superiority in operational mobility over many of the land forces in the region. The Australian Army, in 2020, will be a force that will be almost entirely mechanised, motorised or airmobile. In addition, the Special Forces will retain a capability for airborne operations. This force, if deployed completely in an emergency, would constitute ten battalions of highly mobile manoeuvre forces. The average strength of armoured, mechanised, motorised, airborne and/or airmobile forces in the Asia-Pacific region, not including Australia’s, is currently seventeen battalions.\textsuperscript{58} This is likely to be somewhat greater by 2020, while the Australian force size is likely to remain the same. Even if one allows for the poorer state of equipment maintenance and availability prevalent in most Asia-Pacific armies when compared with Australia’s, it remains highly likely that Australia will face at least numerical parity in forces with high operational mobility. Accordingly, Australian forces will not be able to reliably achieve physical dislocation of the enemy and subsequent overmatch at critical points because the enemy will be able to respond to Australian manoeuvres with at least equal speed. Any physical dislocation achieved will be temporary at best and is likely to be met with an adequate defensive response before the advantage can be exploited.

In these circumstances, physical dislocation can only be achieved by operating quicker than the enemy can react intellectually (‘getting inside their OODA loop’). However, as already mentioned, depending upon intellectual dislocation to achieve physical dislocation is inherently unreliable, and so a way of achieving superior operational mobility and thus restoring a reliable superiority to the Australian Army must be sought. Indeed, with the potential for disaster inherent to an army with as little depth for casualties as the Australian Army, only the most reliable means for defeating numerically superior enemies can responsibly be pursued—and this means superior operational mobility.

Many officers would argue that this (admittedly) low-fidelity judgment ignores many important factors, such as the comparative quality of the opposing forces’ training, leadership and morale. While this is true, in the absence of any remotely reliable method for projecting the quality of regional land forces almost two decades

hence, it is wise to assume that threat forces will be at least equal in areas measured qualitatively. History is full of examples of disaster resulting from one combatant underestimating the other—an obvious and painful example of this from Australia’s perspective being the initial estimates of Japanese fighting capability at the beginning of the Second World War. In any case, Force 2030 clearly states that it is the Commonwealth’s belief that some military forces within the Asia-Pacific will develop qualitatively to the point where they will be capable of successfully conducting such complex operations.

**Maritime Manoeuvre: The Solution**

As has so often been the case in military history, the answer to an operational problem lies in a joint approach, and in the particular dilemma outlined for the Australian Army—a rough equality in operational mobility but an unfavourable balance in numbers—the solution is the recently announced maritime strategy. Maritime strategy is, despite the title, not dominated by the Navy. It is, in fact, not dominated by any service. Maritime strategy is essentially a strategy to achieve decision—through close combat on land—by an enabling air and sea campaign. Vitally, the sea and air campaigns are conducted to enable the use of the ocean as a *manoeuvre space for land forces*. This is the central point that Army officers must grasp: maritime strategy is *not* naval strategy. Rather, as Dr Albert Palazzo’s essay points out in this study paper, it is a strategy for the decisive application of land force via the use of the sea as a medium for land force manoeuvre.

A brief look at some key numbers again illustrates the validity of the point at hand. Naval forces can move large quantities of personnel and heavy equipment rapidly because they can move constantly with little difficulty. For example, an amphibious task force consisting of LHDs and other surface and sub-surface vessels could, at a relatively modest cruising speed of 15 knots, easily cover approximately 660 kilometres in 24 hours. By way of comparison, the highest rate of advance achieved in 24 hours

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60 Force 2030, p. 38.
by the US XXII Airborne Corps during their famous left hook manoeuvre in Iraq in 1991 was 273 kilometres. Clearly, even against a first rate, highly-mobile land force with unthreatened supply lines and major logistical backing, Australian land forces manoeuvring by sea will almost always have a comfortable margin of superiority in operational mobility.

Moreover, maritime manoeuvre, while enabling reliable physical dislocation, also helps support the achievement of intellectual dislocation because it allows land forces great capacity for stealthy manoeuvre. Even in the relatively constrained waters of South-East Asia, a fast-moving, self-contained amphibious task force will be more difficult to find than slower-moving, more obvious land forces, because unlike mechanised or airborne land forces, ships are not tied to obvious infrastructure like roads, bridges and airfields. Furthermore, most maritime broad area surveillance equipment is sensitive to meteorological effects, enabling a shrewd maritime component commander to maximise further the degree of stealth that the ocean environment confers on their force. By keeping the enemy guessing as to the location of the amphibious task force, they are presented with a dilemma—concentrate and risk leaving some vulnerabilities undefended against the amphibious force, or disperse to cover all vulnerabilities and risk being defeated-in-detail.

In summary, a joint maritime task force can reliably achieve physical dislocation of the enemy’s ground forces by conferring superior operational mobility and a considerable degree of stealth on its component land force. This ensures that larger enemy land forces can be engaged at will and defeated-in-detail, granting joint force commanders a fairly reliable degree of access to enemy COGs—and thus decision—in a campaign.

The RAN’s Future Maritime Operating Concept – 2025 (FMOC) maintains that this mode of maritime manoeuvre in the 2020+ timeframe will depend upon three critical enablers: suitable shipping, assured access and sea basing. In each of these three areas, the RAN’s new warships directly contribute to a vastly increased capability, and with it, a commensurately increased ability for the Australian Army to achieve manoeuvre superiority.

Suitable Shipping

For land forces to manoeuvre on the sea, there must of course be suitable shipping. Australia’s new Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment Capability (ADAS) will fit this requirement neatly. Consisting of the two new CANBERRA class landing helicopter dock (LHD) and the new Strategic Lift Ship, it will be able to deploy a single medium battlegroup with all of its equipment, including the M1A1 Abrams, by sea and by air to its objectives ashore and sustain it there in combat for periods of up to ten days. These ships will also be able to embark all of the necessary combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS) and C4ISTAR capabilities necessary for the battlegroup to operate independently and, when desired, to fully integrate the battlegroup into a joint, inter-agency and/or coalition operation. Much like an aircraft carrier maintains the full suite of capabilities necessary to conduct air operations with an embarked air wing, the LHDs will support all capabilities necessary for embarked land forces to conduct combat operations ashore. In addition to these three major units, six additional ocean-going landing craft have been promised by the government to both supplement the CANBERRA class and operate independently of them in lower-order contingencies where the higher-end capabilities of the LHDs are not required.

Without these ships, the Army cannot simultaneously deploy a medium battlegroup, as the two KANIMBLA class LPAs and the TOBRUK class LSH cannot hold enough troops or equipment between them for such a force. Nor are these ships capable of supporting the simultaneous deployment of a combat team directly to its objective via embarked rotary wing assets due to insufficient helicopter hangar space and landing spots. Moreover, operating together, they can only deploy a maximum of six medium landing craft at once, compared with the eight to ten that the new ADAS will be capable of deploying.

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Assured Access

It is unlikely that the Army’s ability to conduct such manoeuvre is likely to go unchallenged by an opponent, and defending the ADAS against enemy attacks while it is manoeuvring into position will be critical. Assured access to those areas from which landing operations can be conducted is therefore vital to successful maritime manoeuvre. The FMOC states that assuring access requires ‘capabilities to fight for access [and] defeat … denial systems in order to be able to exert local sea control’, as well as ‘the ability to deny the adversary access to the area of operations’.66

The FMOC declares that the most threatening technologies that an Australian amphibious task force is likely to face in the 2020+ period are ‘submarines, mine technologies, fighter aircraft and missile technologies’.67 Countering these threats is therefore critical to assuring amphibious forces’ access to critical points. Once again, the new naval capabilities announced in the 2009 White Paper directly contribute to these goals.

The projected future frigate will be designed specifically to counter submarines in conjunction with the new naval combat helicopters. Both of these platforms will possess advanced ASW capabilities, with the new naval combat helicopter equipped with dipping sonar and air launched torpedos.68 Moreover, the twelve promised submarines will also make a significant contribution to the anti-submarine mission.

The newly announced offshore combatant vessels (OCVs) will also significantly boost Navy’s ability to assure access, in particular against mine threats. By virtue of this

66 FMOC, p. 19.
67 Ibid., p. 9.
68 Force 2030, p. 72.
class’ modular design, it seems that most, if not all of these vessels will have the ability to embark modules enabling them to conduct mine countermeasures (MCM) duties. This represents a dramatic increase in this important access-assurance capability for the RAN, given that it possesses only six smaller MCM vessels at present.

While the future frigates and the OCVs will provide significant enhancements to the RAN’s current access-assurance capability, it is the twin-centrepieces of the RAN’s expansion plan—the twelve new submarines and the HOBART class destroyers—that will contribute the most to this vital attribute of maritime manoeuvre.

Anti-ship missile defence is, by far, the biggest weakness in the Navy’s current ability to defend amphibious shipping in a hostile environment. Even assuming the unsustainable deployment of all four of its Standard Missile-armed ADELAIDE class guided missile frigates as escorts, and further assuming these are equipped with the SM-2 Block III SAM, the Navy could only prosecute eight separate targets at ranges of up to 167 kilometres at any one time. At a range of 18 kilometres, the picture improves slightly: assuming all eight ANZAC class frigates are deployed as escorts (again, highly improbable), then the RAN’s capacity for simultaneous engagement rises to a total of sixteen aerial targets. With the ability to prosecute so few targets at any given moment,
an Australian amphibious task force would currently be very vulnerable to even a modest missile attack. Moreover, sea-skimming aircraft and missiles operating beneath the radar horizon of these ships cannot be detected or engaged until they ‘pop-up’, giving the surface fleet only seconds to react. While the RAN’s short-range air defence capability will rise noticeably with the completion of the ANZAC anti-ship missile defence upgrade, the RAN’s long-range defensive capability is still seriously deficient.

The HOBART class air warfare destroyers (AWD) will go beyond simply alleviating this shortfall in defensive capability: it will revolutionise Navy’s ability to conduct anti-air warfare. Each new HOBART class destroyer will be able to prosecute literally dozens of aircraft and missiles operating at medium to high altitudes out to a range of approximately 370 kilometres, provided that SM-6 is deployed abroad.72

To engage aircraft and missiles operating at altitudes beneath the radar horizon of the AWDs, the RAAF’s fighters and Wedgetail AWACS can be relied upon. Where the LHDs must operate beyond the range of land-based fighters, air defence could be achieved through cooperative engagements between the Wedgetail AWACS (providing over-the-horizon surveillance for the surface fleet and missile-cueing via datalink) and the HOBART class’ SM-6 Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs).73

Prevention is better than cure, and screening the amphibious task force from missile-launching platforms is better than shooting down missiles—it is, as Admiral F N Watkins of the US Navy once said, much better ‘to hit the archer before he shot the arrow’.74 To this end, the RAN’s new submarines—armed with anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles—will prove a potent screen, capable of ranging well ahead of amphibious forces and destroying enemy ships and shore-based missile batteries with almost total impunity. However, screening against aircraft firing missiles at stand-off ranges remains a difficult problem for the ADF, and one which becomes insoluble when naval forces are forced to operate outside the range of land-based air cover.

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72 Jane’s Information Group, ‘Standard Missile’.
Despite this vulnerability, without the formidable defensive capabilities that the HOBART class and new submarines will provide, Australian amphibious task forces would simply be incapable of conducting any useful maritime manoeuvres—any attempt to exploit an enemy vulnerability through maritime manoeuvre would easily be defeated through a relatively minor investment of anti-ship missiles launched from fighters and/or surface combatants operating at stand-off ranges.

**Sea Basing**

Again, it is the Navy’s LHDs that are the primary enabler of the government’s maritime concept. With the capacity to embark, sustain and operate Army command and control, aviation and combat service support capabilities, the LHDs really are floating bases.

However, land forces engaged in operations ashore would quickly exhaust the supplies carried aboard even these large vessels, especially in operations where persistence is critical. Accordingly, providing sustainment to these forces (and the amphibious assault ships they deployed from) will require additional ships configured to store and transport large quantities of supplies. *Force 2030* provides for this requirement by mandating the acquisition of ‘a large strategic sea lift ship to move stores, equipment and personnel’ so that the RAN is suitably equipped to ‘provide ongoing sustainment support for deployed forces, allowing the LHD ships to remain in areas of operations in direct support of the land force ashore’.75

The centrepiece of the RAN’s expansion—the twelve new submarines—also contribute directly to the sea basing concept by providing stealthy and persistent heavy fire-support platforms. Equipped with long-range land attack cruise missiles, these vessels will be capable of prosecuting the deep battle ashore by striking critical enablers like command, control and communications targets, even if they are hardened and heavily-defended.76 Striking these targets will allow Army forces to operate to the greatest effect by reducing the enemy’s ability to detect and react against any ADF maritime manoeuvre.

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75 *Force 2030*, p. 73.
76 Ibid., p. 81.
**Battleship Admirals or Brothers in Arms?**

It is obvious that all of the major purchases of naval equipment flagged in *Force 2030* do not detract from the Army. In fact, they directly contribute to its ability to achieve operational manoeuvre superiority—and thus victory—over larger enemy land forces. In reality, the RAN gains very little from the largest of its new warships in any parochial, single-service sense except a large crewing and maintenance burden. These ships possess no organic weapons systems of note and consequently add little to the RAN's ability to independently prosecute military operations. They are useful solely for the manoeuvre and support capability they offer to Army—their acquisition hardly represents a victory for sea power chauvinists.

Without the HOBART class, the new submarines, the future frigates or the OCVs, the RAN would simply not be capable of maritime manoeuvre against even a moderately competent foe—its present missile defence, anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures capabilities are simply not up to the task of securing a landing zone with an acceptable degree of risk. Put simply, without the RAN’s expansion, the Army cannot hope to win in the future. However, now that it has been given the firepower and the mass it requires to prevail, the RAN will once more be capable of delivering the Army’s cold steel right up to the enemy’s throat.

**Adaptive Campaigning and the Maritime Strategy**

Fighting the enemy in close combat, whether they be insurgents or state-based foes, is only one part of the land force contribution to the joint campaign. AC09 identifies four other lines of operation (LOOs) that are of equal importance to successful campaigns. These are population protection, information actions, population support and indigenous capacity building.77 Just as the RAN’s expansion exponentially increases the Army’s ability to prosecute Joint Land Combat, Australia’s maritime strategy and the Navy’s build-up offer Army many new options for pursuing each of these lines of operation as well.

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Population Protection:

Restoring order and the rule of law is critical to a successful exit from a situation that necessitates Australian intervention. Indeed, in many instances, this would have been the purpose of Australian intervention in the first place. The population protection LOO is a critical contributor to this important objective.

Population protection is defined as ‘actions to provide protection and security to threatened populations in order to set the conditions for the reestablishment of law and order’.

Protecting a population from direct threats to their security is largely a factor of the Army’s close-combat capability, but the RAN’s expansion—in particular the twenty new OCVs—will assist Army in providing comprehensive protection for an entire population’s livelihood in the littoral regions of an area of operations. Indeed, many economically vital elements of the Asia-Pacific region are located in the littorals, such as ports, pipelines, fisheries, commercial shipping, and offshore drilling platforms. While the Army can protect these things when located close to shore, an equally capable naval partner is required to ensure that the Army’s efforts on land are not undone by terrorists, insurgents or other ‘spoilers’ at sea. The new, expanded and more capable RAN is just such a partner.

Less obviously, but no less importantly, is the RAN’s contribution of sea basing. While Coalition experience has shown that population protection is only achievable by living and operating among the people one is seeking to protect, sea basing allows troops to maintain a prolonged presence without placing undue stress on sparse or delicate infrastructure. In the initial phases of a campaign, without the ability to store and move forward the bulk of the Army’s supplies from ships, forces deployed ashore to protect the people could end up alienating locals by disproportionately occupying scarce and vital infrastructure, possibly retarding local economic (re)growth.

Information Actions:

Defined as ‘actions that inform and shape the perceptions, attitudes, behaviour and understanding of target population groups [including] enemy command’, effective information actions (IA) can be just as important to campaign success as the outcome of an actual battle. The RAN’s expansion and the ADF’s focus on maritime

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79 Ibid.
strategy and maritime manoeuvre means that the Army can now conduct far more potent IA than it ever could before.

While a warship can steam just off an enemy’s coast, signalling intent without provocation, it cannot achieve decision by itself. A land force carries the promise of decision, but its deployment on or within the enemy’s borders is slow and can be highly provocative.

Australia’s new amphibious forces will allow the ADF to enjoy ‘the best of both worlds’ in force posturing for IA purposes—it can mix the speed, persistence and relatively inoffensive presence of a warship in international waters with the directness and decisiveness of land forces. This amounts to a potent signal to potential enemies contemplating actions inimical to Australia’s interests, and will allow the ADF to shape events with such effect that battle may ultimately be unnecessary.

**Population Support:**

The 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami is exemplary of the kind of major natural disaster which can drastically change the course of world events within minutes. The enormous quantity of aid, and the impressive speed with which it was rendered was only possible because of the international fleet that assembled in the troubled waters of South-East Asia. By far the largest contributor to this international effort was the US Navy. Its immense effort was only possible because of its large amphibious ships. By deploying these ships, US Marines and US Navy ‘Seabees’ could establish themselves rapidly in devastated areas and commence recovery, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance operations immediately, without having to first restore any of the damaged infrastructure ashore.80

**Indigenous Capacity Building:**

The respected counterinsurgency (COIN) theorist, Dr Daniel Marston, said that ‘proper training and build-up of local indigenous forces is key to clearing and holding any contested region in a successful counterinsurgency campaign’.81

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It must be stated clearly that Adaptive Campaigning is not just COIN, and accordingly, indigenous capacity building may not be a LOO pursued in some campaigns—such as wars against state-based opponents, for example. However, when indigenous capacity building is pursued, it can become critical to success, such as in the fight against insurgents in Afghanistan today.

While operations in Afghanistan place little demand upon naval and maritime assets for indigenous capacity building, this will not always be the case. Insurgents in maritime countries such as Sri Lanka and the Philippines have often resorted to maritime operations, as have terrorists. For example, the Sri Lankan insurgent group Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) established a naval arm, the ‘Sea Tigers’ to prosecute complex attacks against Sri Lankan government forces. It engaged in a number of maritime attacks against Sri Lankan forces, including one spectacular amphibious operation that saw artillery forces deposited ashore close to Trincomalee. The artillery was immediately put into action suppressing Sri Lankan positions, allowing suicide boats to penetrate the harbour defences and destroy a fast passenger ship being used as a troop transport by the government.\textsuperscript{82} Needless to say, the Army’s efforts to train indigenous forces to counter such complex threats will be materially aided by a larger, more capable Navy.

Conclusion

The Navy’s expansion over the coming decades will not only dramatically improve its ability to operate against hostile forces at sea, it will also increase the Army’s ability to operate against increasingly large and lethal forces on land. Maritime manoeuvre, enabled by the new amphibious ships, and protected by the RAN’s powerful new fleet, will allow the Army to outmanoeuvre the enemy. With this ability to reliably overmatch enemy forces at critical points, the Army will be capable of achieving successes out of all proportion to its size. With such operational potency now well within its grasp, the Army’s future looks very bright indeed.

The Amphibious Amphitheatre

by Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Hawkins

A small but highly trained [amphibious] force striking ‘out of the blue’ at a vital spot can produce a strategic effect out of all proportion to its slight numbers.

— Basil Liddell Hart

Introduction

The ADF is on the verge of significant transformation. JP2048 and a range of supporting projects will soon provide a world-class Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment (ADAS) capability with increased networking, more capable helicopters and a complete range of protected and unprotected vehicles. This large scale platform improvement must be accompanied by an equally large cultural and doctrinal change if the nation is to best benefit from this significant expenditure. This essay seeks to set the conditions to have the necessary broad based debate about what change is required to maximise the ADF’s emerging amphibious capability. The recent Defence White Paper reinforces the notion of amphibious manoeuvre for Australia’s land force, facilitated by the amphibious and sea lift ships. Indeed, the ability to project military power throughout our region and beyond, by deployment and sustainment from the sea, places land force maritime manoeuvre in the littoral environment as a key component of future ADF capability.

The essay seeks to define leading edge amphibious concept and examine the amphibious exemplars of Allies to determine their utility within an ADF construct. It aspires to introduce emerging ADF amphibious concepts to a broader audience

84 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009.
in order to evolve it into robust and relevant doctrine. This essay does not propose solutions or rigid conceptual frameworks; these are yet to be developed. When reading this essay it is requested that you consider the issues and alternative approaches raised and seek to provide your input on a way ahead for the ADF amphibious capability. In beginning the discussion, it is useful to gain some historical perspective of Australian amphibious operations.

**An Amphibious Tradition**

Basil Liddell Hart’s observation of amphibious operations to ‘…*produce a strategic effect out of all proportion*…’ offers an insight to the opportunities for Australia’s small army. The ADF achieved this level of capability in previous periods of conflict, especially the First and Second World Wars, and will replicate it again with the introduction of the Amphibious Assault Ships (LHD) and their supporting platforms. A brief examination of history demonstrates that amphibious culture was present in earlier Australian military eras, mainly the two World Wars.

Surprisingly for many students of history, Australia’s initial engagement in the First World War was a successful campaign by the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (AN&MEF) to capture German-held territory in New Guinea. Six companies of 500 men from the Royal Australian Naval Brigade and 1023 men from an infantry battalion, with signals, medical and other enablers, made up the Landing Force. The Commander of the 1st Australian Brigade was the ground force component commander. The Naval element consisted of three cruisers, a transport and three destroyers under the command of a rear admiral. These maritime and land commanders worked together in a supporting and supported role to conduct an expeditionary campaign in the early days of the First World War.

From August to December 1914 the AN&MEF gained control of all German territories from New Guinea through to the Solomon Islands. Unfortunately for amphibious warfare advocates of the era, the huge success of this operation was overshadowed by the Gallipoli campaign. Furthermore, the renowned Dardanelles’ campaign strengthened the notion of single service operations, which was further
reinforced with the Navy conducting sea lift, or transporting troops, for the remainder of the war. In the inter-war period this single service approach continued.85

In the Second World War, Australia developed very capable amphibious forces, demonstrated by the 1st Australian Corps during the Balikpapan, Labuan and Brunei assaults. These were the culmination of three years of joint and combined operations with United States forces. HMAS KANIMBLA, HMAS MANOORA and HMAS WESTRALIA all played crucial roles in the various landings in New Guinea, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. MacArthur conducted a series of ‘leapfrog’ amphibious operations in order to secure airfields, which were later used to provide cover for subsequent phases of the campaign.86 This campaign design, in conjunction with an experienced and specialist amphibious landing force and joint cooperation allowed amphibious warfare to reach a peak in the Australian military milieu. Since the later stages of the Pacific Campaign, Australia has not achieved an advanced level of amphibious capability.

The decision by government to introduce the Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment system, with the main platforms being the two LHD, will enable Australia to not only reproduce past amphibious capability, but exceed it. The transition of current to future capabilities, Annex A, quickly demonstrates the anticipated revolution in amphibious warfare. Table 1 provides an abridged outline, highlighting the comparison in major platforms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Tonnes</th>
<th>Range (nm)</th>
<th>Crew</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Vehicles (linear metres)</th>
<th>Helicopters</th>
<th>Landing Craft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LPA</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>4 (2 spots)</td>
<td>2 LCM8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHD</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>12 (6 spots)</td>
<td>4 LCM1E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 – Current and Future Amphibious Platforms’ Capability87

86 Ibid., pp. 101–02.
87 Source: Operational Capability Document JP2048 Phase 4A/B
In platform terms, the LHDs will allow the ADF to achieve world’s best amphibious practice in line with our allies, and project military force beyond Australian shores without the requirement for coalition key force projection enablers. Additionally, the government’s recent White Paper reflects a greater emphasis on Joint capabilities and the notion of enhanced force projection, which will also assist humanitarian

Figure 1 – Comparison of LHD to other RAN Ships

Figure 2 – The ADF’s Helicopter Assault Ship

and disaster relief. The operational capability aspirations are expressed in Australia’s emerging amphibious doctrine, which echoes Allies’ and NATO policy.  

**Australian Contemporary Amphibious Doctrine**

Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment (MOLE) was released as developing doctrine in 2004 (IWD 3.0.0) to address the lack of a coherent Joint warfighting concept. It has been overshadowed by *Adaptive Campaigning 2006*, but it is still current (draft) in the existing IWD series. It draws on effects-based operations and provides a means for the ADF to achieve an overmatch in effects through employing customised force options and the use of reach-back. MOLE continues to remain relevant to the ADF and still holds its position as Army’s higher operational doctrine; however, it needs to be reviewed especially when analysed against emerging Coalition doctrine.

The Australian Amphibious Concept (AAC) articulates the ADF’s contemporary and future approach to expeditionary and amphibious operations. Specifically, it defines the employment of the capability being introduced by the ADAS system. The AAC reflects Australia’s strategic environment and guidance, and developing ADF capabilities. It is intended to complement, and be consistent with, future Joint, Maritime, Land, Air and Special Forces Operational Concepts. The AAC introduces the future amphibious age, which includes foundation concepts, such as Ship to Objective Manoeuvre (STOM), distributed operations and sea basing. These operations are scalable, threat relative and are captured under a littoral manoeuvre construct.

Littoral manoeuvre capability delivers a Joint expeditionary capability that allows rapid intervention and manoeuvre from the sea into the littoral. The core of this concept is the delivery of a high-tempo precision effect ashore through the capability to land simultaneously Joint forces by maritime air and surface manoeuvre, and to conduct tactical manoeuvre against objectives in the littoral.

The Land Headquarters’ Amphibious Landing Force Concept of Employment proposes an amphibious capability drawn from emerging and practised international

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Future ADF amphibious operational concepts, such as STOM, are currently conducted by Allies, particularly the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and to a slightly lesser degree the United Kingdom’s Royal Marines (UK RM). They can be defined as follows:

- **Ship to Objective Manoeuvre (STOM).** This concentrates focus on the objective by the projection of combined arms, by both surface and air means, directly from the sea, dislocating the adversary both in time and space. STOM permits the Joint Task Force Commander to remain agile and capable of sustaining a range of concurrent tasks. Furthermore, under certain circumstances STOM avoids a traditional operational pause with consequent loss of tempo and initiative inherent when establishing a beachhead. Synchronising air and sea manoeuvre with effects delivery is the key to successful STOM operations.

- **Distributed Operations.** This involves the use of air and sea manoeuvre, but distinct from STOM, it is for isolated tactical activities in separate locations, potentially dispersed throughout the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). Distributed operations involve increased risks to command and control, fire support, tactical mobility and sustainment; however, it also offers commanders an ability to increase tempo and achieve superior tactical advantage based on short notice opportunities.

- **Sea Basing.** This facilitates STOM and distributed operations and provides protected, flexible and responsive support. Sea basing mitigates land threats by preserving the majority of command and control and logistic resources at sea, and it is intended to reduce or negate the operational pause associated with the build-up of combat power ashore prior to the break out to secure objectives. Again this capability is threat and capacity dependent.

STOM, distributed operations and sea basing are currently defined in the Australian operational lexicon but are not well understood. These concepts are beyond single service wherewithal, and require the application of Joint, and often integrated and combined, capabilities to achieve mission success.

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Joint and Inter-agency Environment

In the present environment, amphibious operations are more often not only Joint, but integrated and combined. Navy, Army and Air Force are all required to work with other government agencies, such as AusAID, government departments and coalition allies. In the AOA it is feasible that, while Navy maintains maritime security and Army conducts land operations, Air Command will be commencing air bridge operations and the Australian Federal Police and AusAID will be coordinating activities to enhance stabilisation. Consequently, all services must embrace the joint nature of amphibious warfare intrinsic in Australia’s future. The complexity of Joint requirements in amphibious warfare runs parallel with command and control (C2) requirements and as can be seen in the following passages there will be a good deal of thinking to be done.

The command relationships for amphibious operations are unique, and there are many different approaches taken by different nations. Often they originate from two or more services that each makes different contributions in support of a common mission. Unambiguous C2 is a fundamental requirement of amphibious warfare and a supporting and supported concept is mainly appropriate.92 The Welsh Guards incident at Bluff Cove, during the Falklands War, demonstrated the effects of not following amphibious warfare C2 conventions.93 Australia’s Navy and Army are sufficiently small in size to avoid similar incidents and the existence of the operational level


headquarters, Headquarters Joint Operations Command, should alleviate this and provide clear guidance for C2.

CJOPS will normally nominate a Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) in command of the overall operation. The principal amphibious command appointments for an amphibious operation are:

- **Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF).** CATF has overall responsibility for all elements of the amphibious force and the success of the amphibious operation until termination. CATF is normally a senior naval officer and in some circumstances may also be the appointed CJTF. Navy has a permanently established Commander Australian Amphibious Task Group (COMAUSATG), who would normally be appointed as CATF.

- **Commander Landing Force (CLF).** During transit to the AOA, CLF remains responsive to CATF for the conduct of the Landing Force aboard CATF’s ships. The amphibious operation’s landing plan is based on CLF’s concept of operations and scheme of manoeuvre ashore.

The Australian Army has no standing CLF, while Australia’s coalition partners have standing CLF and CATF organisations that are generally co-located and plan together for exercises and operations. The key question for the debate is whether and how the ADF would undertake and sustain a dedicated standing C2 construct. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the United States Navy (USN), and the UK’s Royal Marines (RM) and Royal Navy (RN), maintain these standing arrangements and respectively share the specialist amphibious capability role in their nations’ inventories—they provide forces permanently structured to achieve effects on land, operating from the sea. A more detailed understanding of some international approaches is useful.

### Amphibious Exemplars

Attributes of amphibious forces, such as flexibility, agility, optimisation and responsiveness are well demonstrated by examining tier one models, the US and UK exemplars, where dedicated and specialist force elements offer world’s best practice. Examination of the French model also provides an awareness of tiers of amphibious competency. These models offer the ADF supplementary insights for positioning any future Australian amphibious capability. In short, the US and UK maintain aggregated
and specialist amphibious forces with the appropriate C2 and joint enablers. The French, on the other hand, had until very recently disaggregated their amphibious forces throughout the Army. The US and UK specialist models offer Australia’s small Army an opportunity to achieve a position out of all proportion to its numbers, which reflects Liddell Hart’s observation of amphibious operations. Is this viable with our size and operational tempo?

When considering the structural investments to be made, it is appropriate to raise certification requirements that may well define our interoperability. It is foreseeable that certification of Australia’s amphibious capability by the US and UK will be necessary for training and operational risk management. The USMC and the UK RM anticipate any future Australian Amphibious Force will be interoperable with their assets and capabilities. France is currently undergoing certification prior to combined exercises with the US and UK. Despite France’s increasing capabilities, world’s best practice can be observed in the USMC.

**United States Marine Corps**

The USMC is the largest and most capable amphibious force in the world. It has three division-sized organisations, Marine Expeditionary Forces, each with approximately three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), producing three Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU). Throughout USMC organisations, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force provides four elements: C2, ground combat and combat support (CS) forces, logistics, and air support. The MEU, which is approximately 2500 personnel, is based on a medium-sized battle group strengthened with enablers such as reconnaissance, armour, engineers, aviation, fires and logistics. Characteristically, a MEU, which is commanded at the O6 level, consists of a battalion landing team, a composite helicopter squadron and a combat logistics battalion. The personnel for these units are all USMC, including the aviation crews, and USN only provides the personnel for the naval platforms. A MEU is a standing joint amphibious organisation that is trained, certified and then online for thirteen months. Thirteen months is not a typical figure for Australian units to be held online, nevertheless, the build-up training regime allows a baseline for readiness and certification. When overlayed against RAN’s platform availability it demonstrates, and reinforces, three to four months as the typical preparedness evolution for an amphibious force. The following line diagrams
highlight the structure of the MEU units, which are commanded by the MEU, NATO staff structured headquarters afloat.\(^\text{94}\)

The MEU HQ is composed of the following:

The Battalion Landing Team comprises the following structure:

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94 Source for Figures 4-6: Expeditionary Warfare Conference October 2008.
The Composite Helicopter Squadron consists of the following elements:

![Composite Helicopter Squadron Diagram](image)

The Combat Logistics Battalion structure is:

![Combat Logistic Battalion Diagram](image)

The Marine Special Operations Company has special reconnaissance and direct action capabilities, plus a small security element.

The US model reflects the C2 structure highlighted previously, where CJTF is allocated a CATF and CLF. Essentially, the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) Commander (O7/O8 level) is allocated a MEU (O6 level) and a naval component known as an Amphibious Ready Group (O6 level). The Amphibious component includes an amphibious assault ship (LHD), an amphibious transport (LPD) and a landing ship dock (LSD), while the ESG has additional maritime resources, such as submarines and frigates. The MEU provides the ESG a versatile sea-based operational force that can be tailored to a variety of missions, including quick reaction, crisis-response.
options in maritime, littoral, and inland environments within a limited non-permissive environment. Indeed, the ESG provides the US national command authority with the ability to react to crisis around the world without land based infrastructure and replicates the operational spectrum mentioned in the AAC.

The USMC training regime is long, resource intensive and complex, and for a MEU involves twenty-two weeks of training and certification. This includes eight weeks of individual and sub-unit collective training, followed by ten weeks of unit collective training, concentrating on integrating the elements of the ESG/MEU. Finally, the training culminates with the evaluation phase of a two week certification exercise. Table 2 demonstrates the activities required under the US system to achieve certification at twenty-two weeks.95

The final phase is the certification exercise, which ensures that all ESG/MEU elements are ready to enter the thirteen-month online period. Certification procedures includes exposure to amphibious raid from boat/helicopter, non-combatant evacuation operations, security operations, direct action (precision raid), humanitarian assistance, Rapid Response Planning Process, long range raid (with Forward Air Refuel Point Operations), mass casualty drill, and airfield seizure.

MEUs are forward deployed and sea based. MEUs normally will be the first on the scene and probably will be the Combatant Commanders’ first choice for immediate employment into a crisis situation. MEUs act as an enabling force for the introduction of more specialised or heavier forces. This notion has parallels for Australia’s Army where currently 3 Brigade is deemed the major Entry by Air and Sea force and would

95 Source: Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Atlantic, Brief to JACIT October 2008.
enable a heavier follow-on force to be delivered by sea lift. In reality, a MEU is similar in size and composition to the UK’s 3 Commando Brigade (RM) lead assault element, a battle group, which provides the spearhead for heavier British Army formations.

**United Kingdom’s 3 Commando Brigade (Royal Marines)**

The UK model’s initial assault elements reflect the USMC MEU concept, and it provides the ADF with background from which to shape any future Army amphibious force. The UK model is based around 3 Cdo Bde (RM), which allows for a lead assault battalion to be held online. The structure of 3 Cdo Bde (RM) is:

![Figure 7 – 3 Cdo Bde (RM) Structure](image)

The lead assault elements, which are drawn from across the Bde and held at short notice to move, are configured to conduct identical tasking as mentioned in the AAC. In essence, four combat teams must be capable of being delivered onto objectives within a period of darkness: two combat teams via helo assault and two combat teams via surface assault. The 3 Cdo Bde (RM) lead elements reflect the proposed model in the LHQ Concept of Employment, indeed, the UK model is slightly smaller than that

### Table 3 – 3 Cdo Bde (RM) Lead Assault Elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>HQCSG</th>
<th>40 CDO</th>
<th>42 CDO</th>
<th>45 CDO</th>
<th>29 CDO</th>
<th>59 CDO</th>
<th>539 ASRM</th>
<th>CDO LOG</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>TAC GP</td>
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<td>Bry Tac Gp</td>
<td>Engr Field Tp</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1516</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: lims are lane metres

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*PROJECTING FORCE: THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND MARITIME STRATEGY — 47*
proposed by LHQ but it must be noted that the UK figures neglect aviation and logistic elements. The configuration of the UK lead assault elements is shown below:

The aviation and logistic elements of the battle group are significant and are drawn from UK fleet assets, where aviation crews and logistic personnel can be a mixture of RM and RN. The aviation package is task organised for each deployment, and by way of illustration the task force package for OP TELIC was five heavy lift, ten medium lift, six anti-tank and six reconnaissance helicopters. This package had a personnel liability in excess of 500 and closely resembles the MEU Composite Aviation Squadron. Typically, the lead logistic elements, with a personnel liability of approximately 100, will be on the first available amphibious ship, or alternatively in the lead elements of the strategic sea lift, which follows the amphibious shipping immediately after the assault.96

The training regime required to attain this level of capability is significant and for a RM Cdo Battle Group it involves sixteen weeks of training and certification. This includes eight weeks of individual and sub-unit collective training, followed by six weeks of unit collective training, concentrating on integrating the elements of the Strike Group. Finally, the training culminates with the evaluation phase of a two week certification exercise. 1st Rifles, a recently created British Army unit, was trained to this level and now provides 3 Cdo Bde (RM) with an additional manoeuvre unit, although it is acknowledged that 1st Rifles would be used as the lead follow-on element in any amphibious operation.97 The UK amphibious model offers Army a very suitable exemplar from a scale, platform and Army formation perspective. Another model that offers benchmarking opportunities is the French approach.

France’s Amphibious Capability

The French model offers insights on developing an amphibious capability, where until very recently the French Army component, including the CLF staff, was rotated annually. Lieutenant Colonel de Revel, of the French Army, points out that staff turn-over had an effect on a specialist approach to amphibious planning and, as a consequence of this, France did not enjoy a C2 relationship commensurate with the forces supplied.98

98 Lieutenant Colonel de Revel, ‘An amphibious force staff (EMF) needs to be appointed’, *Freedom of Speech Objectif Doctrine*, Vol. 36/7, p. 45. This is an article written by a French

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At the national defence layer, as an outcome of the French Army’s legacy approach of disaggregating personnel throughout various headquarters, the French Navy takes on a leadership role in amphibious warfare planning. This influences the supporting and supported C2 relationship that CATF and CLF require. However, in early 2009, as a result of C2 and Landing Force issues, the French have placed a brigade on an enduring footing as the amphibious capability for the French Army. This formation, the 9th Light Armoured Marine Brigade (La 9e Brigade Légère Blindée de Marine), emulates US and UK amphibious landing force structures and C2 relationships, and foreshadows an increased French amphibious commitment with the USMC and the UK RM. These are factors to be observed in evolving Australia’s amphibious capability.

**The Australian Army Requirement**

**A Training Alignment Opportunity**

The Operational Concept Document for the ADAS System (JP2048) defines Army’s Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) as a battle group based organisation with enablers such as armour, medium artillery, aviation, engineers and logistics. The ARG will have 2200 personnel and reflects the USMC and the UK’s RM models and is articulated in detail by the LHQ Landing Force Concept of Employment. Amphibious related individual and collective training requirements exceed baseline infantry skills, as the landing force requires exposure to the maritime environment of surface and helicopter assault. Additionally, contemporary amphibious warfare is about being able to operate congested flight decks, hazardous well docks, drive a range of vehicles on and off moving platforms and over beaches through surf, tailor logistic support

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requirements, manage the joint battlespace, support joint fires, and command from a Joint Operations Room afloat without recourse to operating ashore.

The training necessary to operate safely in the maritime environment has been well articulated by Australia’s allies and the ADF needs to produce an amphibious force with similar training regimes. Survivability at sea will be mandatory training for all the Landing Force, and not just specialist Army personnel attached to the ships.

**A Specialist Formation?**

The Army will have ten battle groups and a commando regiment available (with CS and CSS enablers this yields five deployable battle groups) when Army Objective Force matures; however, there is insufficient capacity in RAN platforms to generate five amphibiously trained battle groups. The UK model yields three Battle Groups, with one online, and this is facilitated through a slightly greater Royal Navy ship/platform availability. Army needs to focus in a similar fashion and position one brigade, to supply one online battle group, for the conduct of amphibious operations at the same certification level as tier one coalition partners. Also important is the requirement for exposure to sea lift and follow-on operations for the remainder of the Army. Potentially, various options exist, but as a guide for consideration three are highlighted which cover the spectrum of capability levels achievable:

- **Option One:** Placing one battle group as the amphibious specialist battalion, similar to an airborne battle group, and group enablers, such as fires, comms and logistics assets in support. This option will allow a high level of capability to be achieved, certifiably to US and UK standards, but introduces significant rotation issues for Army, especially under the current operational constraints.

- **Option Two:** Similar to the USMC MEUs and the UK’s 3 Cdo Bde (RM), an Australian brigade, grouped as a combined arms task force, may be best placed to be the Army’s amphibious specialist, providing entry and allowing heavier, or follow-on, forces to penetrate subsequent to the amphibious operation. This would allow capability comparable to the US and UK certifications levels.

- **Option Three:** Similar to the French model where, until recently, annual changeovers occurred between battle groups as this would permit Army’s ten

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102 Expeditionary Warfare Working Group, hosted by USMC & USN, Briefing to JACIT, October 2008.
battle groups exposure to amphibious capability. This would allow capability development to be broad, but would likely not achieve US and UK certification standards.

Linked to all the options mentioned, consideration must be give to the role of 2nd Commando Regiment and its requirement to also be incorporated into the online Landing Force. Similar to the MEU(SOC) approach of the USMC, or the Bde Recce Force of the UK RM, it may be necessary to rotate a Cdo Coy with the Landing Force. The C2 element for this Landing Force must be aligned to Navy and potentially SOC assets, and operate in a Joint and combined environment.

**The Potential for a Dedicated Command and Control Element**

Command and control of the landing force requires Army to reflect on past experiences. A CLF organisation embedded in the formation that will conduct the amphibious operation, and co-located with the CATF, is a natural assumption. In Army’s case, if a brigade was selected as the most appropriate option, this would suggest that the amphibious brigade takes on the role of CLF in addition to the routine of running day-to-day activities of the battalions and regiments. This would require additional staff on brigade headquarters for planning, such as the land elements of the STOM cell and an amphibious planner. While the physical platforms are being delivered and capability is being enhanced, there is a period where CLF and CATF staff could increase incrementally so as to avoid underutilised personnel in the two headquarters. The RAN would base the LHD in Fleet Base East, Sydney, which is also the current location for COMAUSATG. Potential locations of any CLF/CATF HQ would suggest either positioning with the platforms or with the Landing Force: Sydney or Townsville?

Despite this requirement for a dedicated Landing Force and CLF staff to be formed and co-located with CATF, there also exists a requirement for cultural and training regimes to be modified. The notion that Army only uses Navy for sea lift must be changed. The introduction of cruise missiles and enhanced C2 architecture, as highlighted in the White Paper 2009, will allow Army units on a land objective to call upon Navy for supplementary support. Furthermore, the introduction of emerging amphibious doctrine, such as STOM, distributed operations and sea basing highlights that this capability is beyond just delivering Army to the AOA.
Cultural and Joint Requirements

The LHDs include latent capabilities that must be exploited. ADAS possesses an impressive and enormously capable C2 facility designed to enable battle group level activities. It boasts a comprehensive and superbly equipped Primary Care Reception Facility capability and offers considerable planning and briefing facilities. It has multi-spot capable flight decks, large landing craft docks, four landing craft per LHD, can stow large numbers and varieties of fighting and support vehicles while providing accommodation and hotel facilities for up to 1000 soldiers per LHD. Army needs to learn how to live, deploy, operate in, and operate from the LHDs to maximise the government’s investment in this capability.

Navy and Army will certify the discrete sea and land elements of the amphibious capability prior to melding the force for Joint certification, however, no agency exists in the ADF to certify the entire Joint amphibious capability. This could be achieved in conjunction with US and UK certification through activities such as Exercises TAILSMAN SABRE and COMMANDO RAJAH, but it may be prudent for the ADF to conduct internal Joint Amphibious Certification prior to exposure with allies. The ADF requires a Joint Capability Certification Coordinator, potentially as part of the Joint Capability Coordinator’s responsibility in VCDF’s Division. This certifying office would ensure that areas requiring attention were addressed from a Joint perspective.

One area requiring focused attention in Army is the LHD’s Amphibious Assault Squadrons (AAS), or that component of 10 FSB that provides intimate watercraft support for amphibious operations. In essence, an Amphibious Support Regiment (ASR), similar to 1st Assault Group in the United Kingdom, is required. The ASR would reside inside the amphibious brigade structure and provide the LHDs with their watercraft and associated enablers.

Amphibious Support Regiment

An ASR, formed through aggregating 35 Water Transport Squadron with other elements of Army’s amphibious capabilities, is likely to provide the two LHDs with their AAS. Four AAS, of approximately sixty personnel each, would be required to sustain the capability and would each consist of an Amphibious Assault Troop, a Cargo Troop, an Amphibious Beach Team and a Squadron Command Element. The AAS would be part of the LHD complement but retained for technical control against the ASR.
During LHD scheduled maintenance periods the AAS could operate independently in Townsville where the ASR parenting concept could be reinforced, similar to the 1st Assault Group framework for the RM assault squadrons.\textsuperscript{103}

**Preparedness and Ship Maintenance Requirements**

The UK’s 3 Cdo Bde (RM) is similar in size and composition to Army’s 3rd and 7th Brigades, allowing an exemplar for a Landing Force and associated enablers. However, this similarity also extends to the Navy’s amphibious platforms that are available to project the lead assault elements from 3 Bde Cdo (RM). The Royal Navy’s amphibious platforms closely mirror those available to the RAN when JP2048 delivers the three major components of the ADAS system. Three major platforms enables a battle group plus, or a brigade minus, to be projected onto an objective. The maintenance procedures necessary to keep these platforms available is significant and the Defence Material Organisation, in conjunction with the Joint Amphibious Capability Implementation Team, have \textit{proposed} a maintenance schedule that will maintain the maximum number of training opportunities for Army to exploit the two LHD as a system.

It is expected that each LHD will be ‘at sea’ for up to 180 days per year. The annual External Maintenance Availability (EMA) periods will be scheduled outside of Army’s major exercise season, typically Northern Australia’s dry season, and the Navy’s Fleet Concentration period, which is historically in February. Additionally, the annual leave period is problematic for EMA as it has an effect on resource availability—particularly personnel. Scheduling the EMA outside Army’s exercise period ensures that both LHDs will be online to enable ADF collective training requirements. Preferably LHD 1 will go offline in March, returning on-line late April, and LHD 2 will go offline in October, returning online late November. This ensures that the two EMA events are phased six months apart, which will be the routine for the forty-year Life of Type of the LHDs. This is necessary for suppliers, crew availability, and more importantly FORCOMD and FLEETCOMD planning. This availability is highlighted in the light grey areas in Table 4.

\textsuperscript{103} Littoral Manoeuvre Working Group, Post Visit Report, October 2008.
Navy will be maintaining the LHD in Class with Lloyds’ Register and, as a consequence, the Classification Society will require hull inspections of underwater fittings every five years. This involves no more than two weeks in dry-dock and will be scheduled outside April and November, as high-voltage pod propelled cruise ships conduct their major maintenance during these periods.

During the LHD availability window, there will be an expectation that Army elements and supporting agencies will embark for collective joint training. It will take the duration of each four month deployment window to work-up the Landing Force, as suggested by the USMC and the UK’s RM training regimes. Furthermore, it will prove inefficient to introduce a ‘fresh’ Landing Force main effort component (infantry based battle group), when enablers with more regular exposure to the LHDs, such as aviation and armour, are likely to develop expertise beyond that of the Landing Force main effort. The US and UK exemplars suggest that one Army brigade formation, of three battle groups, cycled through amphibious training regimes annually, or bi-annually, will develop corporate knowledge and culture at a level similar to US and UK capability and certification levels. Alternatively, the Army’s ten battle groups can be exposed to amphibious training, which was the approach adopted by the French Army until recently. However, this will not achieve the same level of capability as key allies. Does Australia wish to emulate the US and UK models, or a less capable model?

Platform availability issues constrain broader training and familiarity with non-specialist battle groups. Whether a specialist Landing Force with additional skills is required, or a more generalist approach is needed to safely conduct an amphibious operation must be determined. Despite the training regimes and platform availability, the maritime surrounds are unforgiving and nowhere is this more evident than in equipment husbandry and logistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Platform Availability</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LHD1: HMAS CANBERRA</td>
<td>Leave</td>
<td>Fleet</td>
<td>EMA</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Port</td>
<td>Leave</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHD2: HMAS ADELAIDE</td>
<td>Leave</td>
<td>Fleet</td>
<td>Port</td>
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<td></td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>EMA</td>
<td>Leave</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 – Proposed LHD Maintenance Schedule
Logistics

Operating and maintaining equipment in the embarked environment will place additional challenges and demands on Army’s people and equipment. This will attract an additional training bill, but it can be reduced if the Landing Force and enablers are specialists who have advanced knowledge of the amphibious environment. As an example, vehicle preparation prior to embarking will extend the life of any vehicles and lessen recovery requirements while on the beach. Furthermore, knowledge of the watercraft freight procedures will expedite loading and avoid delays, which will affect the two sub-units being inserted by surface assault in one period of darkness. Aviation platforms also require additional servicing and maintenance when in a maritime environment, but the clean hangar will provide a dust free and environmentally controlled working space for maintenance crews. There are many facets to the logistic component and the US and the UK have dedicated units to complement the respective Landing Forces.

The option of an Amphibious Support Regiment will go some ways towards alleviating the equipment husbandry requirements for ADAS. Army must of course not leave itself short of key requirements and enablers. It must carefully consider what is necessary and what is not, mindful that on occasions it may not be appropriate to deploy, disperse and defend large volumes of CSS ashore when purpose built facilities and means of re-supply are available within the ADAS system. In the current operational climate Army cannot afford to commit to a standing amphibious logistic equipment holding. Army therefore has to employ underlying Adaptive Army principles by remaining flexible in how we support developing maritime and littoral manoeuvre concepts. Army cannot submit to fill amphibious shipping with equipment that is surplus to requirements; there is neither the capacity nor the need to do so. Central pools of equipment, optimised for amphibious style activities, are perhaps one solution. These equipments may not necessarily be permanently embarked but must be made readily available in order to meet wider readiness requirements. The most important aspect is ensuring that the Landing Force equipment is available when required: on the objective.
Conclusion

The LHDs, while Navy owned, are the centre of a new Joint force designed primarily to support Army, as a leading part of the amphibious capability. In order to maximise the inherent capabilities of a future ADAS system, Army needs to prepare itself in readiness for the arrival of the first LHD in March 2014. These requirements generate several issues for Army, which includes: selecting a brigade level formation with attached enablers as the amphibious specialists; introducing an appropriate C2 structure for amphibious operations; and implementing a robust logistic capability to deal in the amphibious arena. The UK model, reflecting a scale and structure Australia can realise, offers the most appropriate design and mirroring a brigade with 3 Cdo Bde (RM) appears astute.

Ultimately for Army it is about effectiveness, through the careful assessment and decision necessary to select a Landing Force model in order to manage identified risks, and then efficiencies: firstly, in time by reducing individual and collective training; secondly, in space through optimising training areas and opportunities; thirdly, in equipment holdings through fleet management procedures; and lastly, capability certification with allies. Army does not necessarily want to be called Marines but it needs to train, look and fight like Marines (a force that is trained, configured and optimised to conduct operations over the land but launched from the sea).

Finally, is it important to be conscious of CA’s view that ‘We are, and seek to remain, the best small Army in the world’. The introduction into service of the LHDs will provide an additional means of reinforcing this position. Army must prepare for an era that will see battle groups operating in the wider Joint operating arena, spending frequent and sometimes extended periods at sea. Army must be prepared to exploit the inherent capabilities offered by a future ADAS system. In summary, if Army is to remain the best small Army in the world then it needs to be able to demonstrate its ability to adapt, prepare, sustain and excel as a component of a future ADF and regionally dominant amphibious capability.

104 Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie, Chief of Army’s comments to Army News, 14 May 2009.
Transition of Current and Future Amphibious Platforms
Land Forces in Maritime Strategy –
A Reader

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

Julian S Corbett

Sir Julian Stafford Corbett was a prominent British naval historian of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whose works helped shape the Royal Navy’s reforms of that era. One of his most famous works is Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, and it remains to this day the seminal study of the subject. Corbett’s principles of ‘sea control’, ‘focus on the enemy’, and ‘manoeuvre for tactical advantage’ form the foundation for many contemporary maritime strategic concepts. Corbett shared a belief with Clausewitz in the primacy of politics in war and in devising an appropriate strategy to protect national interests. Corbett most resembles Clausewitz, however, in his repeated emphasis on the importance of understanding both the value and inherent limitations of a ‘theory’ of war. In Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Corbett outlines the benefits of limited war of a particular type in a particular place, and his preference for the strategic level are all part of his search for ‘comparative advantage’ (in his case of Britain). Under the favourable conditions of Corbett’s ‘ideal’ limited war, a naval power can assume an offensive posture almost immediately without exposing itself to unacceptable risks. This type of transition would take much longer to accomplish in continental warfare.
Expeditionary Operations

US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDP) Number 3

This is an accessible and publically available version of the US Marine Corps (USMC) Doctrinal Publication 3 (MCDP 3) Expeditionary Operations. It describes the USMC as an ‘expeditionary force’ that is able to respond quickly to a broad variety of crisis and conflicts anywhere in the world. In doing so it emphasises the enduring ‘naval’ character of the USMC and its links to maritime strategy. This naval expeditionary character provides capabilities both to forward deploy forces (in advance of conflict) as well as to deploy sustainable, combined arms teams rapidly by sea and air into desired theatres of operations. Two critical expeditionary considerations are examined in the publication: ‘closure rate’ and ‘global reach’ (i.e. ‘how quick’ and ‘how far’). Shipping cannot generally match the sheer speed of airlift as a deployment option but it remains the only adequate means of deploying large ground forces and tonnage of supplies and equipment. Shipping, therefore, provides not only strategic mobility (between theatres) but also operational mobility (between engagements within a campaign) and even greater tactical mobility (along coastlines rather than by road on land).

Brown, Green and Blue Water Fleets: The Influence of Geography on Naval Warfare, 1861 to the Present

Michael Lindberg and Daniel Todd

Lindberg and Todd are professors of geography and this book is a detailed exploration within that rubric of the conduct of naval warfare in three very different domains: blue waters (high seas), green waters (littorals), and brown waters (inland waterways). The central theme of the book is that historical concepts of ‘distance’ remain central to modern naval operations, leading to the idea of the importance of ‘reach’ and power projection. The first section of the book is a technical discussion of the principles of geo-strategy as it pertains to naval warfare. Following this is a very useful outline of the works of three key naval geo-strategists: Alfred Mahan, Julian Corbett and Harold Mackinder. For the occasional student of naval strategy this section of the book alone is
a worthwhile journey. The most important parts of the book, however, are the sections on each of the three domains of naval warfare. Of direct relevance to considerations of the employment of land forces in a maritime strategy are the chapters on green and brown water geography and operations. Green water—or littoral—warfare is that most concerned with amphibious operations; the authors use the 1915 Gallipoli campaign and the Tarawa and Okinawa actions in the Second World War as historical examples. Their analysis of brown water—or riverine—warfare is equally interesting and relevant, particularly the chosen example of the 1914–17 fighting in Mesopotamia (in what is now Iraq), during which the British relied on the River Tigris for operational and tactical mobility. Perhaps the most important lesson of this book is that navies do not exist just to impact one another, but rather are a component part of the larger ‘spatial dimension’ of warfare. Amphibious operations constitute the great hybrid in that regard—the interface between war on land and sea.

Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy

edited by Colin Gray and Geoffrey Sloan

In this lengthy monograph of some thirteen chapters contributed by individual authors (including renowned authors Colin Gray and Williamson Murray), the reader has at hand a single book that canvasses most aspects of the traditional concerns of geopolitics. In that regard, the book is a useful revisiting of well-known historical literature, but it is also an important discussion of some innovative contemporary themes. Three important points on geopolitics emerge from this book overall. First, it suggests a view of international politics and strategic history which is shaped by the geographical configuration of sea and land. Second, geopolitics can function as a policy science in its own right—for military goals to be secured certain geopolitical perspectives have to be taken into consideration. Geopolitics can help, therefore, to explain the nature of security problems. Third, geopolitics can be an instrument of political warfare; furthermore it can also be a convenient vehicle for justification of political decisions taken on other grounds. Above all, as underlined by Sir Harold Mackinder over 100 years ago, geopolitics, geography and strategy serve together.
A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945
Edited by Stephan Frühling

This official Defence publication, edited by ANU lecturer Dr Stephan Frühling, reproduces the text of fifteen recently declassified strategic guidance documents of the Defence organisation in Australia between 1946 and 1976. Presented as easy to access individual chapters, each with an introduction by the author, these papers present a unique insight into the key tenets underlying Australian defence policy and are a useful guide to the circumstances under which Australia envisaged military force might be used. The papers are a particularly illuminating journey into the debates that shaped Australia’s extensive operational involvement in its close region over the period from the end of the Second World War up to withdrawal from Vietnam, and which marked a shift in our geopolitical orientation to South-East Asia and the Pacific. The centrality and magnitude of the loss of the British security umbrella and the conclusion of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty is striking in these papers, as is the inherent maritime nature of our immediate strategic environment and concomitant US strategic interests in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Also of topical interest for Army readers is the enduring focus on South-East Asia and the geopolitical fault lines within that region (such as Papua). In many respects these papers are the most accessible avenue available into the official archival record that lays out the debates and issues which continue to characterise Australia’s contemporary strategic culture to this day.

Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare, 1945–91
Joseph H Alexander and Merrill Bartlett

This book surveys the American experience of amphibious warfare in the Cold War period. It provides an authoritative insight into amphibious warfare along two central themes: the enduring strategic utility of ‘forced amphibious landing’ in both conventional and limited wars in the nuclear age, and the US Marine Corps’ sharp break with past tactics embodied in the adoption of the ‘helicopter borne beach envelopment’ model. As highlighted by the authors, the Korean War quickly
transformed the US Marine Corps. The experience of the Inchon landings moved Marine leaders to accelerate the shift from the Second World War era frontal assault tactics to ‘beach envelopment’. As early as 1956, proposals surfaced stating helicopters should provide air mobility to assaulting battalions and argued for ‘manoeuvre at sea’ against in-shore tactical objectives. This shift, while evidently well acknowledged inside the Corps, took another three decades to mature owing to the slow technological development of large helicopters and newer landing craft—not to mention the Vietnam War. Significantly, the authors posit that the impact of the Vietnam War, where marines in essence fought as conventional infantry, was a major diversion for the development of amphibious doctrine. The authors also applaud the post-Cold War transition to a ‘Marine Expeditionary Force’ as a key component of the more recent *From the Sea* strategy of the US Navy. Despite the fact that enemy mine warfare and beach defences precluded landing operations in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the prediction of the authors that the US Marine Corps would have a busy future as expeditionary forces has most certainly played out in recent times.

**One Hundred Days: Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander**

Sandy Woodward (with Patrick Robinson)

Admiral Sir John Forster ‘Sandy’ Woodward is a British Admiral who joined the Royal Navy in 1946 at age 13, going on to become a highly experienced submariner. In 1982, as a rear admiral, he commanded the South Atlantic Task Groups in the Falklands War. In this book (co-authored with Patrick Robinson) Woodward candidly describes his Falklands experiences and the pressures of high command in wartime. This is a fine naval autobiography that takes the reader behind the scenes to provide a very readable view of a task force commander at war and provides insights into his myriad of concerns: logistics, weather, technology (much of it untested in combat) and the interference of politics and the modern media. While primarily an account of the sea and air campaigns, the most striking lesson Woodward describes, however, is that control of the sea was meaningless unless it also ensured the retaking of the Falkland Islands themselves—a mission only possible through the careful conduct of a parallel
land campaign. Woodward’s elimination of the surface threat at sea with the sinking of the Belgrano permitted the amphibious phase of the operation to proceed.

**Marine Corps’ Search for a Mission, 1880–1898**  
Jack Shulimson

This historical account of the Marine Corp in the ‘Gilded Age’ by Jack Shulimson (a widely published official historian of the Marine Corps) offers the contemporary reader an insight into the processes of officer professionalisation and the search by the Corps in its formative years for a clearly defined institutional mission. Of particular interest is Shulimson’s account of the Marine’s role in the Spanish-American War. This was a defining period; during the war a Marine contingent (from the cruiser Baltimore) occupied the Spanish Naval base at Cavite. And following the establishment of a Marine battalion with its own transport (a new initiative) this force seized Guantanamo, Cuba, and thereby provided the Navy with a safe and protected harbour and a base to conduct wider blockading operations. These actions—as well as disagreements with Army commanders—brought home to Naval leaders the need for a dedicated landing force under its own control. Following this campaign, the acquisition of new US territories in the Caribbean and Pacific underscored the need for an expanded marine component to defend advanced Naval bases. These developments eventually led in 1900 to the creation of a 1000-man force, which in the event of war, would be used to defend an advanced base in support of a Naval campaign in Asiatic waters—if more permanent defences were needed Army units could then be sent to relieve the Marines. The Marine Corps now had a definite mission—a land force within a maritime strategy.

**Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment**  
Robert Moyse

This short essay, winner of the 2003 Peter Mitchell Essay and published in 2005, is a well argued critique of Australia’s maritime strategy and concomitant capability requirements. Moyse, an RAN officer, highlights the importance of maritime Joint
manoeuvre in the context of Australia’s geostrategic circumstances. However, he also posits that Australia’s maritime strategy, as set out in the *Defence 2000* White Paper, actually describes a ‘sea denial’ strategy; whereas for him the missing ingredient is rather ‘sea control’ (comprised of sea assertion and power projection). A key point of the essay is that the advent of air power fundamentally changed the nature of sea control as seen in the South-West Pacific during the Second World War. Moyse quite rightly points out that a nation which cannot project sustained air power into a non-permissive environment cannot lay claim to a maritime strategy. Importantly, without carrier based aviation, the only alternative is expeditionary land-based air power. He makes a cogent argument for a dedicated Australian amphibious capability, with unambiguous ownership of assets and a permanent staff. While some of his points are now somewhat dated (such as his call for a rationalisation of ADF operational command and control), for Moyse history provides many enduring lessons; Australia ‘cannot afford a Dieppe’ and hence must ‘get its amphibious operations right first time, every time’.

**The Army’s Role in the Maritime Defence of Australia**

David Horner

This chapter by well known Australian military historian David Horner is published in the compelling SDSS monograph *In Search of a Maritime Strategy* (edited by David Stevens). In this brief but comprehensive chapter, Horner provides the reader with an excellent summary of the role played by the Army in the maritime defence of Australia up to the 1990s, and in doing so demonstrates the extent to which the Army has been shaped to meet the requirements of a maritime strategy. Horner looks back at the various impacts on Australia’s colonial defences pre-federation, and goes on to note the not so well-known fact that even at the height of the First World War the Army still had a role in the maritime defence of Australia (for example, the expedition to occupy German New Guinea). Even the formation of the Army’s first permanent infantry force in the 1930s, the Darwin Mobile Force, was justified in terms of maritime defence (the Singapore Strategy required Darwin be created as an alternate naval base and it therefore needed to be protected). While Horner writes here in 1997 (hence before
some of the changes presaged by *Defence 2000* ) his key point remains pertinent: the Army can play (and always has played) a role in Australia’s maritime strategy, and mobile, well-balanced combat groups that can deploy over long distances at short notice will serve that strategy best.

**Australian Army Amphibious Operations in the South-West Pacific: 1942–45**

Edited by Glenn Wahlert

This monograph is an edited collection of papers from the Australian Army History Conference of 1994. It is an excellent and very readable history in that regard, containing diverse presentations covering the political stratégic, operational and tactical levels. The book is also valuable for its joint approach, including chapters on the role of the RAAF and the RAN in the series of amphibious operations across the South-West Pacific made famous by Australian Army campaigns in New Guinea and Borneo. A European theatre perspective is provided by Jo Gullett, who took part in the Normandy landings and famously laid claim to have been one of the few Australians to have been shot at and wounded by Italians, Japanese and Germans alike! Perhaps not surprisingly, the message from veterans is contained in a chapter titled ‘Don’t Do It’; but the important historical point to note is that by the time of the Borneo OBOE campaign, the Australian Army had come a long way in understanding and executing complex amphibious operations since the earlier Lae and Finschhafen landings. Indeed, as the editor Glenn Wahlert notes, the main challenges for the Australians in all these campaigns were not so much the Japanese, but rather the perennial problems in warfare of terrain, weather, disease and long lines of communication. In no small part these were overcome by painstaking planning, preparation and planning, and also by the high level of cooperation and exacting coordination between all three services.
Strength through Diversity: The Combined Naval Role in Operation Stabilise\(^{105}\)

David Stevens

In this short monograph from the Sea Power Centre – Australia David Stevens offers a compelling narrative of the utility of naval power in the pursuit of a maritime objective. Examining the 1999 intervention in Timor-Leste, *Strength through Diversity* highlights the integral role the coalition fleet played in providing the operation with manoeuvrability and flexibility at the joint level—attributes that are essential requirements for a successful maritime operation. Stevens also examines the ease with which ships brought to bear their logistic capability throughout the island's littoral environment. By accessing support from the sea, coalition ground troops were able to minimise the effect of Timor-Leste’s rough terrain and underdeveloped infrastructure on the operation’s sustainment. Although a relatively brief account, in just forty-one pages Stevens ably places Operation STABILISE in a maritime context and uses it as a case study on its value and utility as a strategic option for Australia.

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\(^{105}\) This note was prepared by Albert Palazzo.
Many of the key terms referred to in this study paper are widely debated concepts within the discipline of strategic studies and the realm of military affairs. As such, it is intended that this glossary—which has sourced Australian, allied and academic definitions—will assist in providing a framework within which to consider the relevance of maritime strategy for Australia.

**Amphibious Operation**

(a) A military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force, embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the assigned mission.  

(b) A military operation launched from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked in ships or craft, with the principal purpose of projecting the landing force ashore tactically into an environment ranging from permissive to hostile.

**Expedition**

(a) A military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.

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106 Compiled by Campbell Micallef, Research Officer, Land Warfare Studies Centre
109 DOD, ‘Dictionary of Military Terms’.
(b) The projection of military power over extended lines of communications into a distant operational area to accomplish a specific objective.\textsuperscript{110}

**Expeditionary**

Expeditionary operations are typically conducted in austere environments, from sea, land or forward bases. They will likely require Marines [or land] and other naval forces to be brought to bear without reliance on host nation or outside support.\textsuperscript{111}

**Expeditionary Operation**

The projection of military power over extended lines of communications into a distant operational area to accomplish a specific objective.\textsuperscript{112}

**Expeditionary Force**

(a) An armed force organised to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.\textsuperscript{113}

(b) Forces projected from the home base capable of sustained operations at distance from that home base.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{110} NATO, AAP-6 [2009]


\textsuperscript{113} DOD, ‘Dictionary of Military Terms’.

Littoral Region

(a) Coastal sea areas and that portion of the land which is susceptible to influence or support from the sea.\textsuperscript{115}

(b) Those regions relating to the shore of a lake, sea, or ocean within direct control of, and vulnerable to, the striking power of naval expeditionary forces.\textsuperscript{116}

(c) The areas to seaward of the coast which are susceptible to influence or support from the land and the areas inland from the coast which are susceptible to influence or support from the sea.\textsuperscript{117}

Maritime Environment

The complex union and interaction between oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, and other major water bodies, with the atmosphere and land seaward of the mean high water mark.\textsuperscript{118}

Maritime Power

Power from the Sea — ‘The maritime emphasis has shifted from power at sea to power from the sea. Naval thinking around the world has come to conceive of the sea not just as a strategic medium of transportation, but as the world’s greatest manoeuvre space, the means by which military power might quickly and effectively be brought to bear on the world’s trouble spots.’\textsuperscript{119}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{115} Ministry of Defence, JWP 0-01.1
\textsuperscript{116} ADG
\textsuperscript{118} DOD, ‘Dictionary of Military Terms’.
\end{flushleft}
Maritime Power Projection

Power projection in and from the maritime environment, including a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces or logistic support or to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons’ range of friendly forces. Maritime power projection may be accomplished by amphibious assault operations, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control operations.120

Maritime Strategy

‘By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is but that part of it which determines the movements of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces; for it scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone.’ 121

Sea Basing

(a) In amphibious operations, a technique of basing certain land force support elements aboard ship which decreases shore based presence.122

(b) Sea basing enables forces to move directly from ship to objectives deep inland… Sea basing [networks and] platforms promote[s] interoperability among the amphibious taskforce, carrier battle group, maritime pre-position force, combat logistics force, and high-speed sealift and lighterage technologies. [Sea basing is focused on] supporting expeditionary air and land operations ashore.123

(c) The rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing

120 ADG.
122 ADG.
123 USMC (EMW), pp. 7–8.
continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the JOA. These capabilities expand operational manoeuvre options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.\footnote{124}

**Sea Lift**

(a) Sea lift is the ‘… administrative movement of personnel and/or equipment to and within the Joint Force Area of Operations (JFAO).’\footnote{125}

(b) ‘We will maintain a robust strategic sealift capability to rapidly concentrate and sustain forces, and to enable joint and/or combined campaigns. This capability relies on the maintenance of a strong U.S. commercial maritime transportation industry and its critical intermodal assets.’\footnote{126}

(c) The movement of resources between points by shipping.\footnote{127}


\footnote{127} ADG.
Land Warfare Studies Centre

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122 Evans, Michael and Alan Ryan (eds), *From Breitenfeld to Baghdad: Perspectives on Combined Arms Warfare*, January 2003.


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