The Prospects for Australian and Japanese Security Cooperation in a More Uncertain Asia-Pacific

by

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September 2003
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<td>ANU</td>
<td>Australian National University</td>
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<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia – New Zealand – United States (Security Treaty)</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia–Europe Meeting</td>
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<td>CBM</td>
<td>confidence-building measures</td>
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<td>CBW</td>
<td>chemical and biological weapons</td>
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<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Pacific</td>
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<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>Five Power Defence Arrangements</td>
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<td>Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force East Timor</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
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<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japanese Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>non-combatant evacuation operations</td>
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<td>NDPO</td>
<td>National Defense Program Outline</td>
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<td>NIDS</td>
<td>National Institute for Defense Studies</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<td>RSL</td>
<td>Returned and Services League</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South-East Asia Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN Mission in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>UN Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS __________________________ iv
ABSTRACT __________________________________________ vii
SUMMARY ____________________________________________ viii

The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific at the Dawn of the Third Millennium ____________________________ 1
Security Mechanisms for the Asia-Pacific vs Europe _________ 4
What Form for an Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Arrangement? _______ 6
  A Broadly Inclusive Multilateral Security Arrangement _______ 6
  A Multilateral Security Arrangement Based on US Alliances ______ 8
  What Else? __________________________________________ 11

  Bridge building ______________________________________ 12
  The 1995 Joint Declaration on the Australia–Japan Partnership __ 13
  A Note of Caution ____________________________________ 15
  US Links ____________________________________________ 16

The Differing Australian and Japanese Approaches to Peacekeeping ______________________________________ 17
  Peacekeeping Histories ________________________________ 17
  Article 9 and Self-defence: What are Land, Sea and Air Forces? _ 18
  The Gulf Crisis ______________________________________ 22
  Cambodia and East Timor: A Comparison of Responses _______ 24
  Legislative Changes on the Horizon? ____________________ 31

Prospects for Japanese and Australian Security Cooperation ___ 32
  The Foundation ______________________________________ 32
  Some Constraints ____________________________________ 34

Practical Steps Forward __________________________________ 35
ABSTRACT

This paper reviews the prospect for the establishment of a robust multilateral security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific. It considers two types of security mechanisms: one broadly inclusive and one based on existing bilateral alliances with the United States. The paper makes the assessment that neither form of multilateral security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific is likely at this time. In the absence of a multilateral institution, the paper examines security interests that are shared by Australia and Japan, and the contribution that they, working together, can make to regional peace and stability. It finds that closer security cooperation between Australia and Japan, particularly in the area of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, has the potential to contribute more to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region than either nation might achieve in isolation. Finally, the paper reviews practical ways that Japan and Australia can work together to achieve this aim.
The decade of the 1990s dawned with great hopes of a new world order of peace, stability and increasing prosperity. In East Asia, in particular, the horizon was rosy. Economic assessments indicated that the region could overtake established Western economies within a few decades. The end of the Cold War had offered a cooperative environment for the international community to deal with seemingly intractable disputes such as that in Cambodia. In 1994, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) had provided the auspices for a new regional forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to discuss a mutual security agenda.

At the beginning of the new millennium things seem far less certain. Economic growth in the new Asian economies has slackened or even reversed, leading to assessments that the region has gone from being a miracle to needing one. Regional security concerns have surfaced. Unresolved territorial issues and domestic concerns have irritated relations between nations in East Asia. Australia, Japan, and the ASEAN nations fear the risk of Balkanisation in the Republic of Indonesia.

Hopes for a swift and peaceful resolution of the 50-year-old confrontation on the Korean Peninsula may have also been misplaced. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea still maintains massive conventional forces and can menace its neighbours with ballistic missiles and the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

The People’s Republic of China is concerned that its policy of ‘one China, two systems’ may not entice Taiwan into political union with the mainland. The security relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China is fraught with uncertainty, as seen by the aftermath of the April 2001 collision between a United States (US) surveillance aircraft and a Chinese fighter.

Although the Asia-Pacific has entered a period of greater uncertainty, the region is rich in human resources and its physical infrastructure remains largely intact. It has the potential to rebound into renewed growth and prosperity. In order to achieve this potential, it needs security to assure a stable economic environment with access to international trade in natural resources, and manufactured goods and services.
In Europe, in contrast with the Asia-Pacific, two monolithic blocs of nations characterised the Cold War security environment. Comprehensive security mechanisms and confidence-building measures (CBMs) between the two blocs were developed to prevent conflict and, in particular, to check strategic and tactical miscalculations that might lead to a nuclear exchange. Although various disputes continue, these European security mechanisms have survived the Cold War and now provide cooperative approaches to a range of security issues such as those in the Balkans.

In the Asia-Pacific, however, key actors have had far more tenuous security relationships. The geostrategic situation is different from that in Europe. Geographical barriers have made nations more insular, with fewer shared land borders. During the Cold War, there was less likelihood in Asia of the recurrence of a major modern continental conventional war, or a major nuclear exchange. Security alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the former Warsaw Pact (with perhaps the exceptions of the ill-fated South-East Asian Treaty Organisation experiment and the continuing Five Power Defence Arrangements) were not developed.

As its name suggests, ASEAN is an association of nations. It does not parallel the economic, political and social integration of the European Union, and its charter makes it clear that it is not a security organisation. The ARF has been a very useful forum for different levels of contact, dialogue and CBMs, but it lacks the mandate to go further. ASEAN is still struggling with the impact of the Asian financial crisis, integration of its new members and how to deal with internal security issues such as were faced during the 1999 East Timor crisis. A different grouping (ASEAN + 3) has potentially more ‘teeth’. Its prospects are, however, in doubt since it does not include the United States, and China has been unwilling to use it to deal with security issues.

The United States has provided a constant stabilising influence in the Asia-Pacific. Australia and Japan both support the US presence in Asia, and encourage continuing US engagement with states in the area. Each has welcomed clear indications that the new Bush Administration will remain committed to the region. Bilateral alliances between the United States and its regional partners remain sound.
It has been suggested that a formal multilateral security approach in the Asia-Pacific, built on existing US alliances, could promote continued US engagement and broader confidence-building in the Asia-Pacific. Such an alliance could provide significant deterrence. There are, however, a variety of reasons why there is little prospect of a NATO-like alliance web in the region. Foremost of these reasons are the reactions of the People’s Republic of China, and constitutional interpretations that prevent the exercise of Japan’s right of collective self-defence.

A truly multilateral security framework for the Asia-Pacific is unlikely in the current strategic environment, but the need to progress beyond the ARF remains. A way forward is to develop more robust bilateral security relationships. These relationships can make an immediate and significant contribution to regional peace and stability, and if the security environment changes, they could be used as the building blocks for a multilateral security system.

Australia and Japan have a convergence of shared interests. They occupy strategic positions—geographically, economically and politically—in the Asia-Pacific. As democracies and maritime trading nations, they continue to share a reliance on regional and international peace and stability to provide an appropriate environment for international trade.

Japan is Australia’s largest trading partner. Australia has been a major source of natural resources for Japan’s postwar economic ‘miracle’, and Japanese and Australian postwar growth and prosperity have been assisted by mutual economic complementarity. They share democratic values and support for the ideals of the United Nations (UN). They have cooperated together closely in a range of security, economic and diplomatic issues (such as Australia’s continuing support for Japan’s quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and Japan’s support for Australian membership of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM)). As significant regional powers, both have an interest and obligation to contribute to maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.

Japan and Australia have no direct formal defence ties, although each is allied to the United States through respective bilateral security treaties. Through this common link there are some similarities in Japanese and
Australian military equipment, doctrine and capabilities, particularly in the maritime and air environments. Although strengthened by educational exchanges and visits during the 1990s, direct defence and security contacts are still developing. There is potential for further cooperation to maintain and enhance regional peace and security.

From the outset, any closer security cooperation between Australia and Japan should be transparent and not misunderstood. Both nations wish to see China integrated as a constructive regional partner. It is particularly important that the People’s Republic of China recognises that closer cooperation by Australia and Japan in the fields of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations is neither a security alliance nor a precursor to any form of regional containment. Furthermore, security cooperation should not be mistaken as the action of a regional police force. Regional nations should feel encouraged by cooperation that is solely aimed to maintain regional prosperity and stability.

Australia and Japan have different legislative and political foundations for their involvement in peacekeeping. Even within the framework of existing legislation, there is room for enhanced Australian and Japanese cooperation in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Closer cooperation is not a form of collective self-defence. Any such cooperation accords with the Charter of the UN and can agree with existing Japanese government interpretations of Article 9 of the Constitution and relevant laws. Collaboration would not be at the expense of bilateral ties with the United States. On the contrary, the United States has made it clear that it expects its allies to increase their contribution to ‘burden sharing’ by taking more active roles in the region.

Australia and Japan worked closely together to achieve a peaceful diplomatic settlement to the Cambodian question and provided key components—communications and engineers—to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia. At first glance, the reaction of each nation to growing turmoil following the East Timorese Referendum in 1999 seemed different; however, the circumstances in East Timor were not the same as those in Cambodia. Understanding this difference is critical in determining how Australia and Japan can best cooperate in the area of international security. Under its domestic legislation, Japan could not make a military contribution to support the International Force East
Timor (INTERFET). Japan’s $100m contribution to INTERFET was vital to funding regional participation, was delivered quickly and was followed up by a significant aid program.

The governments of Australia and Japan have expressed their commitment to developing a sense of trust with countries in the region so that they can all share responsibility for the region’s future based on their common interests. There are a number of steps that Japan and Australia can take towards enhancing their already sound security relationship. Working together, both nations could potentially achieve more than they could as individual nations in maintaining and strengthening a peaceful, stable and prosperous environment in the Asia-Pacific, while protecting their national interests. A steady and resolute approach can send clear signals to other nations, and encourage others to work towards a more effective and inclusive regional security system.

A closer security relationship between Australia and Japan will take time, effort and investment to develop. A wide range of uniformed, civilian and academic contacts and exchanges would be necessary for the development of this relationship, which would contribute significantly to peace in the Asia-Pacific. In these uncertain times, Japan and Australia are ideally placed to make a positive and lasting contribution to the region’s security.
The Prospects for Australian and Japanese Security Cooperation in a More Uncertain Asia-Pacific

The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific at the Dawn of the Third Millennium

By the early 1990s, exponential growth in East Asia had brought new prosperity to the region, and the ‘Tiger Economies’ were heralded as new models of economic development. As late as 1997, most assessments indicated that double-digit growth would continue in the emerging economies in East Asia for at least the next decade.¹ At these rates of growth, the combined output of the region would have overtaken that of leading Western economies by 2020.

The United Nations (UN) and the international community have demonstrated a revitalised willingness to engage in peacekeeping operations and to assist in providing opportunities for acts of self-determination. Problem areas such as Cambodia, which had seemed intractable during the Cold War, were addressed. The Cold War had finished, and globalisation led to hopes for a new order of international and regional peace, cooperation and prosperity. A new cooperative approach to regional security issues saw the formation of the ASEAN² Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 as a venue to discuss mutual security issues.

At the beginning of the new millennium the security situation in the Asia-Pacific seems far less certain. Economic growth in the

² Association of South-East Asian Nations.
new Asian economies has slowed or even reversed, leading to assessments that the region has gone ‘from being a miracle to needing one’. Regional security concerns have resurfaced. Unresolved territorial and domestic issues have raised the level of irritation between states in East Asia. ASEAN, as well as Australia and Japan, fear the risk of possible Balkanisation in Indonesia. Regional frictions have the potential to lead to significant economic disruption with dire humanitarian consequences.

Hopes for a swift and peaceful resolution of the 50-year-old confrontation on the Korean Peninsula now also seem to have been premature. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea still maintains massive conventional forces and can menace its neighbours with ballistic missiles and the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

The People’s Republic of China is concerned that its policy of ‘one China, two systems’ may not entice Taiwan into political union with the mainland.

Although the Asia-Pacific has entered a period of greater uncertainty, the region is rich in human resources and its physical infrastructure remains largely intact. It has the potential to rebound into renewed growth and prosperity. To achieve this potential, it needs security in order to assure a stable economic environment with access to natural resources and markets for goods and services. There is still healthy regional cooperation in a wide range of issues.

The ARF, expanded to include the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, continues to provide welcome dialogue on security matters for the region, even if it has little prospect of developing the mandate to turn dialogue into action. Even Europe, with its

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long-established security mechanisms, has had enormous challenges mounting and maintaining a coordinated response to troubles in, for example, the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Asia-Pacific is left with little but ad-hoc means to respond to a regional crisis.

The United States continues to be an active participant in the region, as it has since the Pacific War. Bilateral alliances between it and its traditional partners have endured. Australia and Japan both support continued United States (US) engagement and the stabilising influence that US presence provides in the Asia-Pacific. Each has welcomed clear indications that the new Bush Administration will remain committed to the region. The security relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China is ambiguous, however, as seen by the consequences of the April 2001 collision between the US surveillance aircraft and a Chinese fighter. This relationship provides a key challenge for at least the next decade.

There is no formal multilateral security regimen in the Asia-Pacific region that can deal with pressing regional issues in an increasingly uncertain setting. There have nevertheless been rapid and constructive responses to crises such as natural disasters in South Asia, the famine in Irian Jaya, tidal waves in Papua New Guinea and the humanitarian crisis in East Timor. Some ARF members have taken encouraging steps towards cooperation in responding to piracy and addressing some transnational issues. There is considerable potential for the countries in the Asia-Pacific to reassert the optimism that was prevalent in the region in the mid-1990s.

If Asia-Pacific nations do not address security and economic issues, there is the possibility that bilateral and multilateral relationships may stagnate, or even sink into acrimonious dispute as leaders fan nationalism to focus their constituencies away from
domestic problems. There is a distinct possibility of regional Balkanisation. Conflict on the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Straits is again imaginable, as is the use of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Much of the progress achieved in the past few decades could be wasted.

**Security Mechanisms for the Asia-Pacific vs Europe**

Tensions and differences within nations in the Asia-Pacific region have outlived the hopefulness apparent at the end of the Cold War. Unlike Europe, where even during the Cold War systematic international confidence-building measures (CBMs) were practised, nations in the Asia-Pacific region have not developed a similar multilateral security framework and similar armament verification mechanisms. A brief examination is needed to see why the region still lacks a comprehensive system to deal with security issues.

Europe has suffered from two conventional ‘world’ wars of attrition in the past century. In the Cold War period, the Warsaw Pact and NATO divided most of Europe and North America into two regions that were tied by mutual security pacts. Comprehensive security mechanisms and CBMs between the blocs were developed to prevent conflict and, in particular, to prevent strategic and tactical miscalculations that might lead to a nuclear exchange. By 1975, this process was institutionalised by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Although various European disputes continue, these security mechanisms have survived the Cold War\(^4\) and continue to provide cooperative opportunities to deal with a range of security issues.

\(^4\) Although the Warsaw Pact was dissolved following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has continued to expand its membership and has shown the willingness and capability to use military force where necessary to intervene in humanitarian and security situations.
In the Asia-Pacific, however, key actors such as the United States, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics / Russia, Australia, Taiwan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and ASEAN nations\(^5\) have had far more tenuous security relationships. Perhaps this is because during the Cold War there was less likelihood in Asia of the recurrence of a modern conventional war on a continental scale, or of a major nuclear exchange.\(^6\) The geostrategic situation is different from that in Europe in that more nations are insular, there is a higher number of geographical barriers, and fewer nations share as many land borders. Regional economic transformation has occurred rapidly, and political and democratic reform is relatively recent.

These factors may explain why security alliances such as NATO and the former Warsaw Pact (with perhaps the exceptions of the ill-fated South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) experiment and the continuing Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)\(^7\)) did not develop in the Asia-Pacific. As its name suggests, ASEAN is an association of nations. It does not parallel the economic, political and social integration of the European Union (EU), and its charter makes it clear that it is not a security organisation. ASEAN is still struggling with the impact of the Asian financial crisis, integration of its new members and how to deal with internal security issues such as the 1999 East Timor crisis. An ‘Asian Union’ is hardly imaginable at this time.

Australia and Japan recognise the potential advantages of a more robust multilateral security mechanism for the Asia-Pacific and have continually encouraged the development of inclusive

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\(^5\) Now including Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar.

\(^6\) The Korean and Vietnam wars were constrained both geographically and in the forces used.

\(^7\) Five Power Defence Arrangements between Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
multilateral security arrangements. The issue is the form that an enhanced security arrangement could take.

**What Form for an Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Arrangement?**

This paper briefly considers two broad types of multilateral arrangements that could deal with regional security issues. The first is a broad-based organisation with comprehensive membership, along the lines of the ARF but with the mandate and power to act to defuse tensions between its members. The second is a security treaty organisation based on the series of extant bilateral security treaties between the United States and various regional nations.

*A Broadly Inclusive Multilateral Security Arrangement*

The ARF has provided a welcome venue for security dialogue and the establishment of CBMs. However, the diverse nature of the ARF and its insistence on consensus have sometimes made it difficult to produce much of substance. There are significant obstacles to the development of a substantive regional security mechanism using the ARF as its foundation. The consensus approach that is fundamental to the ASEAN way is a strength for the ARF because states can cooperatively meet at a table. It can, however, be an impediment to progress since it can allow a single ARF member to veto a view or position held by the majority. Certain subjects are also taboo: for instance, the People’s Republic of China refuses to entertain any discussion of Taiwan since it considers the subject a purely domestic issue.8

These constraints on the ARF are recognised by its members, and

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8 Now that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a member, presumably it could also attempt to block discussion or veto any majority agreement on issues concerning the Korean Peninsula.
may be behind suggestions that it might be useful to promote the ASEAN + 3 as a forum to deal with security issues. The thrust behind the establishment of ASEAN + 3 was to promote economic and social, and not security, fields of cooperation. Another significant weakness of ASEAN + 3 as a security mechanism is that the grouping does not include the United States. Washington is impossible to ignore given the status of the United States as the only superpower; its economic size and influence; its security treaties with Japan, Korea and other regional nations; and its interests in the Asia-Pacific.

An Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in Auckland coordinated a regional response to the deteriorating situation in East Timor following the August 1999 autonomy referendum. The timing was coincidental since APEC is an economic rather than a security organisation. Perhaps a regional forum based on other than ASEAN structures might be more effective, but it would be seen as a competitor to the ARF and would be unlikely to receive ASEAN endorsement.

Despite the advantages of a multilateral regional security organisation, and continuing calls and high hopes for its establishment, the odds for a broadly inclusive arrangement in the Asia-Pacific appear slim at the moment.

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9 The Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation, 28 November 1999, at <http://www.aseansec.org/summit/inf3rd/js_eac.htm>, formalised the ASEAN + 3 grouping. The statement mainly covered economic and social fields. The section on ‘Political and Other Fields’ covers only one security bullet: ‘in the political-security area, they agreed to continuing dialogue, coordination, and cooperation to increase mutual understanding and trust towards forging lasting peace and stability in East Asia’.

10 See the APEC homepage at <http://www.apecsec.org.sg/>.
A Multilateral Security Arrangement Based on US Alliances

A second form of security arrangement might be based on existing bilateral alliances with the United States. Unlike its approach to NATO, since the beginning of the Cold War the United States has generally managed its alliances in Asia (with the exception of SEATO) on a bilateral basis. It has been the predominant partner in a series of security treaties with regional nations such as Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. This predominance has allowed the United States to take a natural lead in each relationship and has avoided the need to develop a unified command structure, or interoperability for combined operations, along NATO lines.

A formal multilateral security approach in the Asia-Pacific led by the United States could promote continued engagement and confidence building, and present a significant deterrent to potential aggressors in the region. It could also result in a series of strategic guarantees for its members and for regional dialogue partners. Benefits for its members could include improved interoperability of procedures, equipment and logistics across the spectrum of possible coalition operations; more opportunities for realistic training and exercises; and the prospect of more efficient research and development and sharing of technology.

Despite these possible advantages, a broadened US-based regional alliance framework is unlikely to eventuate for a number of reasons.

There is a particular danger that a broadened alliance (despite its potential contribution to the status quo of regional stability, and ability to contribute to humanitarian and peacekeeping operations) might be interpreted by Beijing as a move to contain the People’s Republic of China. A broadened US-based regional alliance framework could spark a more acrimonious relationship between China on the one hand and the United States and its
allies on the other. Such a framework could also lead to a more confrontational approach to existing territorial disputes. US allies wish to engage, and not antagonise, the People’s Republic of China.

Foremost among other significant impediments to a broadened US-based alliance are the Japanese Government’s interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution as prohibiting collective self-defence, and historical and political factors that make regional nations wary of formal security and defence ties. The different domestic political environments in the region (with sometimes-mixed support for the role of the United States) make it difficult to consider the creation of an alliance by broadening bilateral security arrangements with the United States.

Each of the existing bilateral alliances is tailored to the different relationships that the United States has with its individual allies, and the one mould may not satisfy all existing needs in the same way. There could also be some costs in establishing and maintaining a NATO-type Secretariat and headquarters organisation and administration. A particularly difficult issue might be that of sharing technology and intelligence. Continuing to meet the existing and tailored relationships with a number of its regional partners might become a divisive issue in a NATO-like alliance.

From the US perspective, the seniority of Washington in each bilateral relationship would be diluted in a multilateral arrangement. Such a multilateral alliance would place the United States more in the role of a partner, albeit still predominant; the alliance may have to reach a broad consensus among its members.

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11 The Japanese Government considers that the exercise of the right of collective self-defence is constitutionally not permissible. It does, however, recognise that all states under international law have the right of self-defence, including collective self-defence. This point is covered in greater detail later in this paper.
before acting. It is probably more effective from the US perspective to manage a series of bilateral relationships rather than a multilateral treaty organisation.

For these reasons, the United States might perceive little advantage to its national interests in fostering a NATO-like alliance or institution in the Asia-Pacific. On the contrary, such an alliance might even be significantly disadvantageous to its current position. Similarly, individual US allies such as Japan, Australia and the Republic of Korea may find that their special relationships with the United States are eroded in an Asia-Pacific multilateral treaty organisation.

Another ‘softer’ US-based option is that of using a combination of mutually supportive bilateral and multilateral strategies in ‘expansive bilateralism’. There are, however, limitations in such an approach. The US Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), Admiral Blair, has encouraged the continued development of opportunities for engagement and confidence building among nations in the Asia-Pacific. These highly useful links are in parallel to the ARF, and engage a number of nations that have even traditionally been quite hostile to the United States. They are not a step towards the establishment of a formal US-based multilateral security organisation but certainly assist regional engagement and confidence building.

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What Else?

From the foregoing analysis, it is unlikely that agreement can be reached in the current strategic environment for either a more robust regional or for a US-based multilateral security framework or arrangement. Overlapping—and sometimes competing—bilateral and multilateral ties of varying strength and effectiveness appear to be the norm, at least for now.

In the absence of a multinational security framework, closer bilateral and multilateral security ties become all the more important because they can contribute to regional stability and can provide the capacity to respond to humanitarian crises and peacekeeping operations under UN mandate. There is considerable potential for Australia and Japan, with their already strong bilateral relationship and shared interests, to work together even more closely in order to contribute to peace and stability, and gain the outcomes that they need for their national security.


As stable democracies and maritime trading nations, Australia and Japan continue to share a reliance on regional and international peace to provide a stable environment for international trade in these uncertain times. Japan is Australia’s largest trading partner. Australia has been a major source of natural resources for Japan’s postwar economic ‘miracle’, and Japanese and Australian postwar growth and prosperity have been assisted by mutual economic complementarity. The two countries share democratic values and support for the ideals of the UN and occupy strategic positions—geographically, economically and in their diplomatic influence—in the Asia-Pacific. They are not strategic competitors, but rather have overlapping interests in ensuring regional stability and helping to prevent a military confrontation or conflict in the Asia-Pacific.
Bridge building

For different reasons both nations have been constrained in their engagement in the region. Japan’s historical legacy from World War II continues to be an irritant in relations with its neighbours; the formal diplomatic request from the Republic of Korea for amendments to history textbooks is an example.\(^{14}\) With its European and American ties, and its legacy of the ‘White Australia’ immigration policy, Australia has found it difficult to be accepted as a member of the region. In particular, Malaysia has objected to Australian membership of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) and has hindered Australia’s hopes for closer economic integration with ASEAN.

The feeling of difference shared by Australia and Japan may provide a spur for closer cooperation. As the journalist, Yoichi Funabashi, points out:

> There is a sense that both Australia and Japan have never really been accepted by Asia as part of the region. We should use our shared sense of alienation and uncertainty as impetus to achieve pro-active regional cooperation. It was this dynamic that worked for the two nations once before when they cooperated to bring APEC into being.\(^{15}\)

Working together, Australia and Japan would be able to contribute more than they can individually by helping one another to build economic and security bridges into the region.

Australia recognises the importance and potential of its relationship with Japan. The Australian Prime Minister has described it as ‘the most broadly based relationship that Australia


enjoys in our region—because of shared strategic interests, political cooperation, and the interaction between our societies.\textsuperscript{16} Given this strong foundation, and in the absence of a comprehensive regional multilateral security framework, there appear to be good prospects for enhancing the Australian–Japanese security relationship. Closer ties between these two nations that occupy key geostrategic positions in the north and to the south of East Asia can promote common national interests and benefit peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.

As significant regional powers, both have an interest and international obligation to contribute to maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. To do this, they can improve their mutual understanding of each other, jointly promote CBMs in the region, and coordinate their responses to humanitarian crises and any emerging requirements for UN peacekeeping operations in the region. Both nations have major regional security capabilities.

\textit{The 1995 Joint Declaration on the Australia–Japan Partnership}

There is nothing new in this proposal; the 1995 Joint Declaration on the Australia–Japan Partnership provided a range of goals, not all of which have yet been fully realised, for the Japanese–

\textsuperscript{16} Transcript of the Prime Minister, the Hon. John Howard, MP, \textit{Address at the Australia–Japan Conference}, 29 April 2001, at <http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/2001/speech1004.htm>. Mr Howard described the relationship between Australia and Japan as having ‘a very special quality. It is a magnificent model to the rest of the world of how two countries with vastly different cultures and very different histories can come together and achieve, through the recognition of their common objectives and their common goals, a great friendship. In the past fifty years, we have built a relationship that has developed far beyond our obvious economic complementarity. It is now the most broadly based relationship that Australia enjoys in our region—because of shared strategic interests, political cooperation, and the interaction between our societies’.
Australian security relationship. In June 1996 the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, addressed Japan’s National Press Club on the topic of ‘Australia and Japan: Cooperation in the Region’. A large part of the address dealt with security issues. Mr Downer commented that Australia and Japan have ‘made some progress on regional security, but there is still a long way to go’, and noted that Australia valued ‘particularly’ its ‘emerging partnership with Japan in this area’. The two nations soon settled into a productive routine of security exchanges and talks.

Almost five years after his address to the Japanese National Press Club, Mr Downer reaffirmed his sentiments in a statement following the Australia–Japan Conference for the 21st Century: ‘We share important strategic, political and economic interests … with a shared interest in regional stability and prosperity’. The Australian and Japanese Co-chairs’ statement following the Conference noted that ‘Australia and Japan have a shared sense of concern, responsibility and opportunity about our neighbourhood’, and suggested some ideas for future action by enhanced dialogue and expanded bilateral cooperation.

Japanese and Australian officials, military personnel and academics have maintained and enhanced regional stability by cooperating in 1, 1 ½ and 2-track contacts in venues such as the ARF and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

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Working Paper No. 123

The two nations have a healthy history of defence: Australian Defence Force (ADF) – Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) and single-service (RAN to MSDF, Army to GSDF and RAAF to ASDF)22) dialogue and cooperation at various levels. Uniformed and civilian defence contacts between Australia and Japan, although strengthened by some educational exchanges and visits during the past decade, still lag well behind diplomatic cooperation in a range of issues. There is the potential to do more.

A Note of Caution

From the first, closer security cooperation should be transparent and steps should be taken to ensure that it is not misunderstood. Both Canberra and Tokyo wish to see Beijing integrated as a constructive regional partner.23 It is particularly important that the People’s Republic of China recognises that closer cooperation by Australia and Japan in the fields of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations does not represent a security alliance, nor is it a precursor to any form of regional containment. Although not the official Beijing view, a 1996 article in the People’s Daily that described Australia and Japan as the two claws of a US ‘crab’ grasping Asia provides a clear example of Chinese sensitivities in this regard.24

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23 Ibid.
24 Li Xuejiang, ‘The “Two Anchors” of the United States’, People’s Daily, 6 April 1996. Another more recent example confirming Chinese sensitivity to any possibility of containment was the official protest to RAN vessels exercising their right of navigation under international law on 17 April 2001 by transiting the Taiwan Strait. A PLA-N ship intercepted and challenged the three RAN vessels on the grounds that the transit was ‘via Chinese waters’. RAN vessels have routinely transited the Strait, and have previously been challenged, but this was the first time that China had officially protested. See Ian Henderson, ‘Navy row threatens China ties’, <news.com.au> report, 30 April 2001, at
Security cooperation should not be mistaken for willingness on the part of Australia and Japan to act as US proxies or as the foundation of a ‘regional police force’. In particular, the concerns of some members of ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China must be addressed in order to ensure that regional nations are encouraged by cooperation that is solely aimed at promoting regional prosperity and stability.

**US Links**

Although Australia and Japan have no direct formal defence ties, and their defence forces have little experience of working together directly, each is allied to the United States through its respective bilateral security treaties. A closer bilateral security relationship would not have to be at the expense of ties with the United States (ANZUS and the Japan–US Security Arrangements). On the contrary, the United States has made it clear that it expects its allies to contribute to ‘burden sharing’ by taking more active roles in the region. Not only is closer bilateral security cooperation between Australia and Japan in accord with existing Japanese–US and Australian–US security relationships, but it meets the national interests of both partners.

<http://news.com.au/newspulse/pulseframe/0,4711,1946276^2^^nbv,00.html>. Coming a few weeks after the collision of a US EP3 surveillance aircraft and a Chinese fighter, the protest was a signal of Chinese concern over Australian support to the United States.

An article in the *Bulletin* (later refuted by the Australian Government) quoted Prime Minister Howard as describing Australia ‘acting in a sort of “deputy” peacekeeping capacity in our region to the global policeman role of the US’. Fred Brenchley, ‘The Howard Doctrine’, *Bulletin*, 28 September 1999.


The common link that Japan and Australia have due to their respective alliances with the United States has given rise to some similarities in Japanese and Australian military equipment, doctrine and capabilities, particularly in the maritime and air environments. Such similarities can benefit ADF–JSDF contacts, as well as interoperability on future peace operations, humanitarian assistance and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).

The Differing Australian and Japanese Approaches to Peacekeeping

Humanitarian assistance operations and NEO do not have the same degree of sensitivity as peace operations. There is considerable potential for Australia and Japan to cooperate more closely in peacekeeping, but more substantive bilateral cooperation in this area will take time to develop. Before further progress can be made to enhance the Australian and Japanese cooperation in peace operations, it is necessary to understand each other’s approach.

Peacekeeping Histories

Although Japan and Australia have underwritten their national security since World War II by maintaining bilateral alliances with the United States, their approaches to peacekeeping and coalition operations during the period have been markedly different. Australian and Japanese national defence policies are dissimilar, as are their political and legislative approaches to peacekeeping. With the exception of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), where national policies coincided, this difference has made it rather difficult to coordinate national responses as possible contributors to peacekeeping operations.

Australia has a tradition of providing expeditionary forces to fulfil its alliance obligations. Civilian volunteer forces have traditionally ‘answered the bugle’, and through two world wars to the Korean War, only volunteers were sent to fight on operations
overseas.\textsuperscript{28} From the early years of the UN, Australian diplomatic and national security policy has also committed Australia to contribute as a ‘good international citizen’ by providing military observers and forces in support of UN peace operations. Most Australian and Japanese students of security studies would be quite familiar with Australian Lieutenant General John Sanderson’s leadership of UNTAC. Very few have heard of Lieutenant General R. H. Nimmo, CBE, who was the first Chief Military Observer of the UN Military Observer Group India–Pakistan, and held that position from 1950 until his death in 1966.\textsuperscript{29} Australia has an impressive peacekeeping record that stretches back to the early years of the UN, and there is widespread domestic support for ADF peacekeeping contributions.\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{Article 9 and Self-defence: What are Land, Sea and Air Forces?}\textsuperscript{31} Japan does not have a similar tradition of participation in international peacekeeping, or of responding to an alliance obligation to deploy forces overseas to a distant conflict. Article 9

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item This achievement is quite remarkable, particularly as Australian casualties in World War I were greater on a per capita basis than those of the United Kingdom, which had to resort to universal conscription.
\item I acknowledge with appreciation comments by Dr Yoshio Katayama, my supervisor at NIDS, and Euan Graham (ANU), particularly in this area of constitutional interpretation of the right to collective self-defence, and general comments by Brice Pacey (ANU) and Dr Alan Ryan (Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
of the Constitution renounces ‘the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes’ and states that Japan will ‘never maintain land, sea and air forces’. This raises two conundrums. How does Japan maintain a self-defence force when (at first glance) the existence of SDF appears to contradict its constitution, and why can Japan not use the self-defence forces (since it has them) in support of UN-mandated peace operations?

Article 9 is interpreted in such a way that Japan may maintain forces purely for self-defence, and may enter into a collective arrangement, but only to protect its own territory (for instance the Japan–US Security Treaty). Tokyo cannot accept broader alliance responsibilities. The United States may be obliged to protect Japan’s territorial integrity and to provide a nuclear umbrella, but Japan does not have a reciprocal obligation to protect the United States.

To clarify this point, the 2000 Defense of Japan White Paper describes Japanese government policy on self-defence and collective defence:

> It is recognized under international law that a state has the right of collective self-defense, which is the right to use actual force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations, even when the state itself is not under direct attack. It is therefore self-evident that, since it is a sovereign state, Japan has the right of self-defense under international law. The Japanese Government nevertheless takes the view that the exercise of the right of self-defense as authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country. The Government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds that limit and is not, therefore, permissible under the Constitution.32

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32 2000 Defense of Japan, p. 64. Emphasis added.
Tokyo has claimed reciprocity in the alliance by providing basing rights for US forces in Japan. Even if, based on constitutional constraints, Tokyo were not obliged to send combat forces outside Japan, the creation of the JSDF ensured that Japan’s sovereignty was well-defended. US forces operating from the strategic position of the Japanese Archipelago certainly made an important contribution to US containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, highly restrictive conditions on Japanese participation in its alliance with the United States endure, even after endorsement of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation and the agreement to amend acquisition and cross-servicing arrangements between Japan and the United States (the ACSA). This lack of participation has led to criticism that Japan is not contributing enough to the alliance, despite significant financial support for US bases.\(^3\) It has also led to increased US pressure to amend Article 9.

Most recently, the October 2000 INSS Special Report, *The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership* (the

Armitage Report, uses the US–UK relationship as a model to propose ways to reinvigorate the Japan–US relationship (including the security alliance). One recommendation of the Report reconfirms US hopes that Japan may become ‘a more equal alliance partner’ by lifting the ban on collective self-defence. Interestingly, the report echoes Japanese (and Australian) concerns at the 2001 Australia–Japan Conference that the Australian–Japanese relationship as a whole may have gone stale ‘like long-term partners in a marriage’ and that ‘there is a possibility that the relationship will become one where both are satisfied with maintaining the status quo while having no real strong interest in each other’.

Richard L. Armitage is now the US Deputy Secretary of State in the George W. Bush Administration, and he has said to Japanese lawmakers ‘that Japan should decide by itself whether to lift its constitutional ban against collective self-defense’. Although the INSS Report does not have officially endorsed status, it clearly shows the direction that Mr Armitage would like the US–Japan relationship to take.

Prior to the end of the Cold War, any amendment of Article 9 was almost unthinkable, despite vocal calls from a small minority on the extreme right. Japanese defence policy indicated that Japan had no inclination to participate in any way in international peace operations and there was little incentive to re-examine constitutional interpretations that prohibited collective security.


A mid-1980s analysis of policy trends since 1976 gives a clear view of Japan’s purely self-defence policies.\textsuperscript{37} 1976 is identified as a watershed year since it was then that Tokyo first adopted the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). Annual Japanese Defense White Papers through the 1980s and even that of 1990, published after the Gulf Crisis, do not consider any JSDF contribution to international peacekeeping. However, even as the 1990 Defense White Paper was being published, the impetus to change Japan’s approach towards peace operations had come from the international response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

The Government’s interpretation of Article 9 has allowed Japan to maintain a credible means of self-defence in the JSDF. The JSDF has similar capabilities to the defence forces of other nations, even if it is not called an army, a navy and an air force. If Tokyo wished, and if the requirements of domestic legislation were satisfied, these capabilities could be a highly useful instrument in support of international peacekeeping. However, until the Gulf Crisis there was no reason for the Japanese Government to upset domestic opinion, or to waken regional sensitivities, by deploying JSDF units overseas in any military capacity. Japan’s very generous overseas aid budget was its contribution to international humanitarian assistance, and Japan provided welcome funds to the UN for peacekeeping.

\textit{The Gulf Crisis}

Rather than make a military contribution to the UN-sanctioned forces during the Gulf War, Japan provided substantial funds to the coalition. It then sent a minesweeping flotilla to the Gulf after hostilities had ceased. However, the lack of a military contribution during the conflict drew attention to Japan’s inability to provide any of its self-defence forces, even in a non-combat

capacity, to the coalition. Tokyo was campaigning for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council at the time. Given Japan’s inability to fully assume the burdens of maintaining international peace and stability by contributing men and money to UN peacekeeping, its candidacy was open to question. Japan was stung by this international criticism, as this quote from a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) paper graphically illustrates:

The Gulf Crisis . . . awakened the Japanese people out of a psychological cocoon that had protected them from the world at large throughout the postwar years. They had to face harsh criticism from around the world that Japan had been too slow in offering too little assistance to the multinational struggle against Iraq’s aggression against its neighbor. Despite Japan’s substantial financial contribution amounting to $13 billion, raised through new taxes, the international community’s lack of appreciation bewildered the Japanese people. This stinging criticism brought home to their minds the importance of sharing the burden with blood, sweat and tears, and not just with money, as a responsible member of the international community striving for the common cause of maintaining peace with justice.38

Initial attempts to bulldoze legislation on a proposed ‘Peace Cooperation with the United Nations’ bill through the Diet failed, and the Japanese Government tabled the International Peace Cooperation Law.39 The rocky road to the passage of this legislation in 1992 caused considerable debate in the Japanese community and Diet, and marked a major change in the direction of the nation’s defence policy.

Because of the lack of political consensus, this pending change to defence policy was not immediately reflected in annual White

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Papers. Even in 1991 the White Paper had a relatively short reference that ‘Japan must assume greater responsibility and play an increasing role in all areas of international relations so that it can further contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world’.  

The 1992 White Paper was published before the International Peace Cooperation Law was passed, but contains a brief section on the ‘International Community and National Security Today’. It was not until 1993 that a whole chapter was devoted to ‘International Contribution and the SDF’. Still, this was a rapid and remarkable change from the inward-looking defence policy that had marked the Cold War years.

Cambodia and East Timor: A Comparison of Responses

Introduction of the International Peace Cooperation Law and subsequent revision of the laws regarding the use of the JSDF enabled Japan to make its first military contribution to a peacekeeping force, when a non-combatant engineer unit was deployed to Cambodia with UNTAC for twelve months from September 1992. Japan has now deployed several thousand SDF personnel on UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (see Table 1). The success in Cambodia was a good start.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1990–91</th>
<th>The Gulf Crisis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1990</td>
<td>Draft Legislation on Peace Cooperation with the UN was withdrawn from the Diet.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 1991</td>
<td>SDF Personnel joined a UN mission to survey Iraqi chemical weapons.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 1992</td>
<td>International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep.–Oct. 1992</td>
<td>UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1993 – Jan. 1995</td>
<td>UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar.–Apr. 1994</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep.–Dec. 1994</td>
<td>SDF dispatched to Zaire to conduct humanitarian assistance activities for the Rwandan refugees.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 1996–present</td>
<td>UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.–Dec. 1998</td>
<td>Dispatch of SDF to Honduras with Japan Disaster Relief Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1999</td>
<td>Dispatch of MSDF to Turkey with earthquake relief supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1999 – Jan. 2000</td>
<td>Dispatch of ASDF to West Timor to assist with refugee relief</td>
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**Table 1: A Chronology to January 2000 of Japan’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations and International Humanitarian Assistance Activities**

Close cooperation between Australia and Japan led to a peaceful diplomatic settlement to the Cambodian question. The two countries provided key components—communications and engineers—to UNTAC. The force commander, Australian Lieutenant General Sanderson, worked carefully with the JSDF and the Japanese contingent to ensure that Japan’s first contribution to UN peacekeeping would be successful; this assistance was much appreciated by the JSDF.43

43 In a conversation following his lecture to NIDS, former GSDF Chief of Staff at the time of UNTAC, General Nishimoto, commented to the author on how appreciative the JSDF was of the strong personal
In contrast to the Cambodian experience with its long lead-time, East Timor seemed to catch Japan somewhat off-balance. Australia reacted quickly to the breakdown in law and order in East Timor following the August 1999 Referendum, and assumed a leadership role to create the international force coalition that intervened in East Timor. Although Australia and Japan consulted with each other prior to the humanitarian intervention, their responses to peace operations were quite different. Canberra was appreciative of the prompt and substantial financial contribution that Tokyo made to support participation by developing nations in the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) coalition, but some Australian planners initially misunderstood Tokyo’s preconditions for deployment of JSDF units and were therefore disappointed that Japan did not make a direct contribution to INTERFET. These misunderstandings were echoed on the Japanese side, where it was noted that perhaps both sides felt that they had not lived up to their expectations of each other.

interest and assistance showed by Lieutenant General Sanderson to the first major Japanese peacekeeping deployment, and how the success of UNTAC set the scene for subsequent deployments.

The author gave a presentation on INTERFET operations to NIDS. From related conversations with JSDF, JDA and civilian colleagues, it was clear that Australia’s motives for taking leadership of the UN-mandated intervention in East Timor were not well understood at the time of INTERFET’s deployment.


Discussions between the author and ex-staff of INTERFET Branch, Australian Defence Headquarters.

Yoichi Funabashi, Uncertainty and Irritation Taint Australia–Japan Relationship, op. cit.
The misunderstanding among some on the Australian side was twofold. In the lead-up to the August 1999 referendum on autonomy for East Timor, Tokyo’s policy priorities regarding Indonesia were quite different from those of Canberra. Japan’s overriding interests were the political stability of Indonesia, security of the essential sea-lanes through the region, and protection of considerable investment in the Archipelago. Initially East Timor was a relatively minor issue for the Japanese. In contrast, for Australia the future of East Timor became an issue of major domestic and international concern. Nevertheless, when the crisis in East Timor was raised at the September 1999 APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Auckland, Japan was supportive of Australia. Furthermore, Japan was generous in its funding of the operation in East Timor.

More importantly, domestic legal reasons (and not the desire to avoid any possible diplomatic sensitivity between Japan and Indonesia) made it impossible for the JSDF to participate directly in the INTERFET coalition, with its mandate for peace enforcement under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.48 The International Peace Cooperation Law specifies that Japan may contribute to UN—and not multinational—peacekeeping operations.49 Japanese defence policy clearly outlines the five principles that provide basic guidelines for Japan’s participation in peacekeeping forces. These principles are outlined in Table 2.

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48 As well as Japan’s significant contribution of funds to support ASEAN members of the INTERFET coalition, Japanese ASDF operated C130s from West Timor to assist in the transportation of refugees and aid.

1 Agreement on a cease-fire must be in place.

2 The parties to the conflict must have given their consent to the operation and Japan’s participation.

3 The activities must be conducted in a strictly impartial manner.

4 Japanese participation may be suspended or terminated if any of the above conditions ceases to be satisfied.

5 Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect [Japanese] personnel’s lives.

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<td>5</td>
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Table 2: The Five Principles

The 1999 Defense of Japan White Paper also states that, ‘pursuant to law, the SDF’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations will therefore never entail the possibility of such uses of force or dispatches of armed forces to foreign countries for the purpose of using force’. As an international force with its Chapter 7 mandate, INTERFET did not fit the criteria for JSDF involvement. For these reasons, JSDF participation would have conflicted with Japanese law, as was made clear by the MOFA Press Secretary at a news conference immediately following the Auckland APEC Leaders’ Meeting. The mandate of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)

50 Paraphrased by the author using MOFA, Japan, Current Issues as a base.
51 Defense of Japan 1999, p. 98.
52 The MOFA Press Secretary, Sadaaki Numata, in answer to a question about the possibility of sending Japanese personnel to East Timor stated in part that ‘this is a multinational force, for which, in terms of participation of our Self Defense Personnel, we have not legal basis’. Mr Numata was then asked a follow-up question: ‘So if Japan is to participate in East Timor, that would require a whole new piece of legislation?’ He answered affirmatively. MOFA Press Conference by the Press Secretary, 17 September 1999, at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1999/9/917.html>.
peacekeeping forces is also drawn under the terms of Chapter 7, and this was used to preclude JSDF participation, although a Japanese citizen has served as the UNTAET Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation.

On the Japanese side, some misunderstood the depth of public sentiment in Australia. This misunderstanding was in part due to the ‘CNN factor’ of press coverage of Australian involvement in the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). UNAMET had been established to supervise the ‘popular consultation’ that would determine whether East Timor should be granted further autonomy as a province of Indonesia, or whether it should leave the Republic. A visit by a bipartisan Australian Parliamentary Delegation occurred just as the militia went on their rampage, press members and Church officials were attacked and some murdered, and UNAMET personnel were held virtual hostage while members of the Indonesian security forces appeared to do nothing but look on. Very few of these incidents were shown on NHK television in Japan. Australia had significant historical links to East Timor, which had been a Portuguese colony rather than part of the Dutch East Indies, and there were strong Australian community misgivings regarding the original annexation of East Timor by Indonesia. There was a remarkable public consensus within Australia that favoured multinational

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53 There is an argument that Japan could have contributed non-combatant SDF personnel to UNAMET, even under Article 9 interpretations and the Peacekeeping Law. Such a contribution, however, would have been opposed by segments of the Diet, including one of the partners in the government coalition. It would have also set a precedent of contributing to Chapter 7 peace operations.

54 During the period of the UNAMET mission, the author watched NHK Television news almost daily, and daily in the period following the popular consultation. Reporting on the situation in East Timor was scant, in contrast to the extensive coverage on Australian television stations.
intervention and which brought quite heavy pressure on the Australian Government to take action.

Australia’s support for East Timorese self-determination was certainly not driven by national or economic interests. On the contrary, the intervention ‘more or less demolished in three months a security and diplomatic relationship (with Indonesia) that Canberra policy-makers had been working on for more than fifty years’. This was a difficult decision for Australia, and followed concerns that proper civilian control from Jakarta had broken down, the turmoil was symptomatic of wider problems, and that if the problem in East Timor was not ‘cauterised’, it might spread to other areas of the archipelago. As seen by the wide international support for INTERFET and UNTAET, particularly from within ASEAN, Australia was not alone in this view. Canberra has continued its backing for the unitary Republic of Indonesia.

Support for INTERFET, continuing contributions to UNTAET, the scrapping of the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia, continuing development assistance to a fledgling nation and ongoing commitment to East Timorese independence have come at a significant financial cost to Australia. A purely rational assessment of this cost, added to the damage to Australian–Indonesian relations, makes it difficult to see how Australia’s national interests might have benefited. That is not to say that intervention was the wrong course of action. In addition to the pragmatic strategic reasons in the paragraph above, from the Australian perspective the answer probably lies in Dr Coral Bell’s assessment of the normative changes that are making a ‘world of

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changing international rules’, and a fundamental Australian philosophy that everyone deserves a ‘fair go’.

Legislative Changes on the Horizon?

Australians tend to question general rules and authority. It may seem that the Japanese have a more traditional approach to authority and tend to adhere to rules. However, when the rules are changed, they can swiftly and smoothly adapt themselves to the new circumstances. For instance, following the Gulf Crisis, the passage of UN peace operations legislation was difficult because it took some time to reach a consensus, but once a consensus was reached and new rules were in place, the JSDF was soon deployed in support of UNTAC.

On the surface, the political system seems to have served Japan well, in that per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is among the highest in the world. In politics, business and the bureaucracy, however, factional and core interests have dominated, pork-barrelling has been prevalent, and there has been little real incentive for the Diet to address a range of structural problems. The economy has been driven by huge budget deficits, but this situation cannot continue indefinitely.

The current Prime Minister, Mr Junichiro Koizumi, was selected because of support from Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) branch

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57 Because Japanese support to UN peace operations was limited to no use of force, and support to the UN defined as not being collective self-defence, no change to the existing wording and interpretation of Article 9 was necessary.
members. Such support reflected mounting community pressure for real structural reform. This is a break from the usual LDP factional consensus deals that have selected the party president who then becomes prime minister. In his initial policy speech, ‘Aiming for Restoration in a New Century’ to the Diet, Mr Koizumi noted that:

the top priority that I must address is to rebuild our economy and reconstruct our society into ones full of pride and confidence. Moreover, Japan must fulfil a constructive role as a member of the global community.\(^{58}\)

In a radical departure from the normal system based on seniority and factional deals, Mr Koizumi has selected some of the members of his cabinet from outside the Diet and has drawn on some younger talent from within the coalition parties. If Mr Koizumi can exercise leadership over the traditional factions, given his public approval of more than 80 per cent as of mid-May 2001, observers should not be surprised if national consensus can be reached for significant changes in Japan. With its strong democratic institutions, Japan may well be on the cusp of a far more proactive role in the international community.

**Prospects for Japanese and Australian Security Cooperation**

*The Foundation*

As has been outlined, there is a firm foundation and clear official commitment on both sides to enhance security cooperation between Japan and Australia. The *1995 Joint Declaration on the Australia–Japan Partnership* states that ‘the Governments of Australia and Japan are committed to building with countries in

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the region a sense of trust, of shared interest, and of shared responsibility for the region’s future’. 59 Their cooperation has benefited not only Japan and Australia, but the whole of the Asia-Pacific in terms of peace and stability.

Since the first visit by a Defence Minister (Director-General Mr Ishikawa of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA)) to Australia in 1990, the security relationship has made remarkable progress. 60 Political and uniformed contacts have been institutionalised in regular consultation, visits and exchanges. Both nations have coordinated their responses to a range of security issues, and have contributed to the development of regional dialogue through their support of the ARF and CSCAP. This security cooperation has paralleled mutual diplomatic efforts in the formation of APEC, and international cooperation in other economic and political venues.

The question now is: ‘Has the relationship gone stale?’ 61 Australia–Japan relations cannot be taken for granted. 62 The challenge is how to put words and intentions into effective action, and to determine what steps to take in order to move forward in the relations between the two countries. Progress requires investment, effort and commitment.

60 A review of the Hansard of 7 December 1992 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade on Japan’s Defence Policy and current defence development and debates in Japan and the region, and Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade June 1993 Report on Japan’s Defence and Security in the 1990s shows how remarkably far the relationship has progressed.
61 See, for instance, Paul Kelly, ‘Friendship in need of renovation: The zing is missing in relations with Japan’, Australian, 2 May 2001, p. 11.
Some Constraints

Again, before stepping forward, it is necessary to reiterate what security cooperation is not: it is not an alliance. Closer security cooperation must be transparent so that it is not misunderstood. Both Australia and Japan have expressed their wish to see all regional nations integrated as constructive partners in an Asia-Pacific security framework, and bilateral collaboration is a step in that direction. Regional nations should feel encouraged by cooperation that is solely aimed at maintaining and enhancing regional prosperity and stability. Quite apart from Japanese constitutional and legal constraints, there are limitations to the type of cooperation that can be expected.

Japan is focused on its partnership with the United States, although it appreciates its other bilateral contacts in the region and holds Australia in a special regard. With a population 6.7 times and GDP eleven times that of Australia, Japan is Australia’s largest trading partner, but Australia ranks as Japan’s third-largest source of imports and eleventh largest export destination. Nevertheless, Australia’s GDP (at almost US$450 billion in 1999) is significant in regional terms. It is a middle-ranking power with a highly important defence capability and geostrategic position in the region. Because of Australia’s small population, however, it may sometimes have to try a little harder to engage Japan to develop the security relationship.

A visit by the President of the Australian Returned Services League (RSL) to Japan in 2000 drew strong criticism from some

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63 This focus has been evident to the author from his experience as a student on the NIDS 48th General Course.
sections of the Australian community. Wartime memories—such as the treatment and deaths in captivity of Australian prisoners of war, and the handling of comfort women—still linger, and are revived by the ongoing debate between Japan and its neighbours on the coverage of the Pacific War in history textbooks. There is a sense that Japan, unlike Germany, has still not brought such wartime issues to a close. These issues must be handled sensitively, and can be placed in the context of the passage of time, Japan’s robust democracy and domestic sensitivity to any hint of militarism, and Japan’s extraordinary record in overseas development aid and generous humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{66}

A final but important limitation is the cost in time, energy, effort and funds to develop the relationship. Japan and Australia have competing calls on defence funding. The benefits of cooperation must be justified on both sides.

**Practical Steps Forward**

Progress in the relationship must be measured, comfortable to domestic audiences, and accepted internationally as a positive contribution to regional peace and stability. Within these constraints, there are some practical ways to build the relationship on its already firm foundations. The following section provides some suggestions and ideas on practical steps that both sides might take.

The first step is to take stock of the already sound relationship, and to continue to maintain the cooperation that has already proved so productive. Working together, Japan and Australia can

\textsuperscript{66} Again, these issues do not carry the same sensitivity that they had even a decade ago. The decision to allow the Japanese Defence Minister to visit in 1990 caused some debate, and the Senate Standing Committee 1993 Report on *Japan’s Defence and Security in the 1990s* (for example, p. 197) devotes significant discussion to this issue.
achieve greater coordination of their approaches to regional security dialogue. They can use opportunities, including the ARF, to strengthen bilateral and multilateral CBMs and to work towards a stronger regional multilateral security framework. The two nations should also continue to support the control of weapons of mass destruction, mines and small arms, and promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament through international forums such as the UN. Australian–Japanese cooperation in these areas has already been productive. Small arms are a topical issue in the present security climate in the South Pacific. Perhaps both Japan and Australia could cooperate in a weapons ‘buy-back’ program.

The next step might be to review existing military and civilian defence contacts and exchanges (along the lines of the 1995 Joint Declaration). Politico-military and military–military talks have been quite productive, and the military/defence side might be expanded or their level raised to include annual exchanges at ministerial and Defence Chief – Joint Chairman level. It would be useful to raise the public relations image of the ADF in Japan.67

Good communication is essential in any relationship. Investment in language training takes time. The current Australian approach to Japanese language training should be reviewed because it has some significant weaknesses.68 The JDA has also recognised a

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67 It may be useful to send a public signal of a closer relationship and receive useful PR coverage in Japan. Although Australian participation may perhaps seem superficial and innocuous, the ADF might consider sending a band to participate in the annual SDF ‘Marching Bands’ festival. This event is attended by the Prime Minister and is very popular with the Japanese public (a video is even released after the event). Bands from the United States and the Republic of Korea participated in the 2000 festival. The first participation of a Republic of Korea band received coverage as the sign of an improving security relationship.

68 Apart from the scarcity of linguists in the ADF (linguists currently qualified in the Regular ADF can be counted on one hand), it is the
need to raise the English language proficiency of JSDF members, and Australia can offer welcome assistance.

Few Japanese officers have attended peacekeeping courses in Australia, and there is the potential for far more exchange in this area. As discussed in more detail earlier in this paper, a combined approach to issues regarding peace operations and humanitarian operations may have significant benefits for regional stability and security. With its experience in a wider range of peace operations, the ADF might assist the JSDF to train and prepare for further and future roles.

Australia and Japan might cooperate in the suggestion of ‘guardian forces’ for longer-term peace operations. The security environment is generally safer once a ‘hot’ situation has been stabilised, and rules of engagement (ROE) can be changed. ‘Guardian forces’ with a constabulary rather than peace-enforcement role can then be deployed and follow on with different capabilities and ROE. Japan might consider contributing to such ‘second wave’ or ‘guardian forces’ with tasks such as civil reconstruction and maintaining civil order rather than the more dangerous and sensitive roles of the forces that must initially enforce peace. Such a course of action may allow Japan to broaden its participation in peacekeeping even under the existing interpretation of Article 9 and defence legislation.

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author’s opinion and personal experience that there are some significant deficiencies in the method of Japanese language training. In part this is reflected in the very low rate of linguists who have maintained the currency of their Japanese language qualifications. Perhaps a joint approach between Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the ADF, and further in-country language training, might address this deficiency.

69 Coral Bell, A Mixed Bag of Dilemmas.
Japan has done more than Australia in the way of educational exchanges. Three Japanese GSDF officers have attended Army or ADF Command and Staff College in Australia, compared with one Australian officer who has attended an equivalent institution in Japan. No RAN or RAAF officers have yet attended the MSDF or ASDF Staff College, although Australia currently plans to send one major-equivalent officer from each Service to Japanese staff college every nine years, and the first has started to attend the MSDF Staff College since mid-2002. There is a similar imbalance in the attendance figures at higher-level staff colleges. No officers have attended each other’s entry-level officer courses, although there have been short-term exchanges between the Australian Defence Force Academy and the National Defense Academy. There is also the potential to consider instructor exchanges at single-service schools and defence colleges, and scope for civilian exchanges between the JDA and Australian Department of Defence, perhaps following attendance at the JDA’s National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) and the Australian Defence College (ADC).

NIDS has a key role in Japan’s regional engagement program, and in the formulation of defence policy. NIDS has often lacked a suitable Australian partner for 1½-track and 2-track – academic dialogue. The proposed Australian Strategic Studies Centre could meet or coordinate this need. NIDS has also sponsored military officers (at colonel-equivalent level) from ARF member nations to attend its annual ‘Asia-Pacific Security Seminar’. An ADF officer has participated each year. Australia does not have a reciprocal system.

There have been productive moves towards exchanging information. Australia’s capabilities, particularly along the essential sea-lanes of communication for Japanese trade, might complement Japanese moves towards acquiring a domestic satellite surveillance capability. Australia is also a world leader in some military applications of information technology.
The RAN and MSDF might also look at learning from their relative strengths and experience in areas such as minesweeping and Antarctic operations. An MSDF icebreaker has regularly assisted Australia’s Antarctic research effort. Perhaps RAN personnel might deploy with the icebreaker to gain first-hand experience in Antarctic icebreaking operations. The MSDF is currently developing an anti-terrorist capability, which was recently used in an international ocean peacekeeping operation with the interception of an illegal fishing vessel near South Africa. The MSDF might benefit from long Australian Army experience in this area. The GSDF and the Australian Army might gain from examining their respective capabilities in the area of countering chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Japan developed such capabilities after the Tokyo subway sarin gas incident, and Australia did so in order to meet any CBW terrorist threat that might have arisen during the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games. The RAAF and ASDF share an interest in NEO and humanitarian relief operations.

NIDS has taken an international lead in proposing ocean peacekeeping as a new role for maritime forces. The proposal is in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This activity can be conducted under existing Japanese legislation. Australia may be able to cooperate further with Japan in exploring the concept of ocean governance and security. 70 Ocean peacekeeping operations may provide the scope for further opportunities to cooperate on transnational issues such the protection of marine resources and the maritime environment, piracy and commercial traffic in illegal immigrants. Such operations would engage the Japanese Coastguard and other Japanese government agencies and their Australian equivalents as well as the MSDF and RAN.

The SDF is grappling with the same issues of restructuring, joint operations and organisations, and gaining efficiencies that the ADF has faced during the last decade. There have already been some productive exchanges in this area, and these should be encouraged. Similarly, there is a potential for increased sharing of knowledge in the areas of doctrinal and capability development.

More might be done to exchange military personnel and observers at national defence exercises. The MSDF could participate in the Kakadu exercises sponsored by the RAN. There is the potential to hold combined and bilateral exercises in peace operations, NEO and humanitarian relief scenarios. Singapore has paved the way to agreements to use facilities in Australia for its national training and exercises, and Japan might wish to use some Australian facilities for exercise and testing opportunities that are lacking in Japan.

Japan and Australia have not adequately explored opportunities for closer cooperation in research and development (although they both already cooperate closely with the United States in this area). Both nations share challenges of block obsolescence of a number of items of major equipment, such as maritime surveillance aircraft, and there may be the scope to cooperate in order to achieve mutual economies of scale in capability development. There may be niche areas where members of the Australian defence industry can supply the Japanese defence market, as they now do to the United States, the United Kingdom and some other nations. Similarly, exports of non-combatant equipment to Australia might be expanded without contravening Japanese restrictions on the transfer of material to other nations.

As the Asia-Pacific enters a more uncertain 21st century, there is much that Japan and Australia can do together to lead the way in ensuring a stable, peaceful and prosperous security environment in the region. The two nations can take these steps in a steady and considered manner.
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